WO2023021094A1

WO2023021094A1 - Effective target engagement using a military device comprising a first network for non-classified information and a second network for classified information

Info

Publication number: WO2023021094A1
Application number: PCT/EP2022/072971
Authority: WO
Inventors: Rolf Müller
Original assignee: Atlas Elektronik Gmbh; Thyssenkrupp Ag
Priority date: 2021-08-20
Filing date: 2022-08-17
Publication date: 2023-02-23
Also published as: EP4388272A1

Abstract

The invention relates to a military device (10), said military device (10) having a first target locating sensor (20), a target engagement device (30), a first network (40) for non-classified data, and a second network (50) for classified data, wherein the first network (40) and the second network (50) are connected together via at least one first secure data connection device (60), the first target locating sensor (20) and the target engagement device (30) are connected to the first network (40), and the military device (10) has a target identification device (70) which is connected to the second network (50). The invention is characterized in that the military device (10) has a target tracking analysis device (80). The target tracking analysis device (80) is connected to the first network (40) and to the first target locating sensor (20), and the target tracking analysis device (80) is connected the target engagement device (30) via the first network (40) and to the target identification device (70) via the first secure data connection device (60).

Description

Effective target engagement by a military facility having a first unclassified information network and a second classified information network

The invention relates to a military facility with a first network for unclassified information and a second network for classified information. Classified information is information that must be specially protected for security reasons. This means that the connection between the first network and the second network is a security-critical point in order to reliably prevent unauthorized access to security-relevant information. Therefore, the first network and the second network are connected via security data connection devices. Such

Safety data connection devices are known from the prior art and can contain data diodes, for example, which already physically enable data transfer in only one direction. Such security data connection devices ensure the security of the classified data in the second network, but at a significant cost to the data transmission rate and a time delay in data transmission.

In today's standard architecture, all information and decision-making processes come together in a combat management system (CMS). This is where all the data from the sensors accumulates, is evaluated, decisions are made and, if necessary, the effectors are controlled. However, this means that if an attacker is being fought, for example, this is detected by a first target location sensor in order to determine the attacker's position, which varies over time. A large amount of data accumulates here, which has to be made available to an effector in a time-critical, processed form. Any system-internal time offset can lead to the effector not being aligned to the correct position. But precisely the necessary safety data connection device has to be traversed twice in the current architecture, and it can also be two different safety data connection devices. A security data link device is between the first target location sensor and placed on the CMS and the second security data link device (may be identical to the first) between the CMS and the effector.

A method and a device for transmitting a missile threat to a commercial aircraft is known from US 2009/0 189 785 A1.

A communication module for components of tactical air defense systems is known from DE 10 2019 007 779 A1.

DE 10 2017 011 108 A1 discloses a mobile optical long-range reconnaissance and observation system with automatic object recognition and a corresponding method.

A drone defense system is known from US 2017/0 261 613 A1.

The object of the invention is to make it possible to attack targets more reliably.

This object is achieved by a military device with the features specified in claim 1 and by the method with the features specified in claim 8. Advantageous developments result from the dependent claims, the following description and the drawings.

The military facility according to the invention has a first target location sensor, a target engagement device. The military facility also has a first network for unclassified data and a second network for classified data. The first network and the second network are different. This means that these are not directly connected to each other, but that they are two physically separate networks. The first network and the second network are interconnected via at least one first security data connection device. Unclassified information can be exchanged between the first network and the second network via the at least one first security data connection device. A data exchange between the first network and the second network, which does not run via a security data connection device, can not. This ensures the security of the data in the second network even in the event of an attack on the first network. The first target locating sensor is connected to the first network and the target engagement device is connected to the first network. The military facility also has a target identification device, the target identification device being connected to the second network.

According to the invention, the military installation has a target tracking evaluation device. The target tracking evaluation device is connected to the first network. The target tracking evaluation device is connected to the first target location sensor via the first network and also to the target combat device via the first network. The target tracking evaluation device is connected to the target identification device via the first security data connection device.

A target tracking evaluation device is a device that can evaluate the data from the first target location sensor and use it to determine the position of a detected object and then make this location information available to other systems, in particular the target combat device. If the military facility has a second target location sensor, for example a radar and a sonar, in addition to the first target location sensor, the military facility can also have two separate target tracking evaluation devices, one for evaluating the first target location sensor and one for evaluating the second target location sensor. The target tracking evaluation device preferably has a prognosis function in order to predict the most likely future course of an object from the previous course.

The essential new aspect is therefore that the pursuit of a goal does not take place in the classified area, especially not within a CMS. For this purpose, a target tracking evaluation device is inserted in the unclassified first network, with the target being tracked more or less anonymously, ie not identified, but only on the basis of a neutral identifier. Thus, the comparatively large amounts of data for target tracking do not pass through the safety data connection device, what the transmission speed is significantly increased. As a result, no classification of the data is necessary for the time and data rate-critical target tracking. As a result, the information can be made available to the target engagement device more quickly and therefore more up-to-date and more precisely. The data flow between the first network and the second network can thus be minimized by separating the location information from the identification information.

For example, if the military installation tracks an object flying towards the military installation, the target tracking evaluation device would continuously determine the position of the object and only assign this to a neutral identifier. Initially, this does not result in any safety-relevant information, since the position alone does not permit any further statement. The target identification device can then, for example, differentiate between an approaching own supply helicopter and an attacking missile after the object has been identified. In this case, it is sufficient to hand over the information as to whether this object should be fought or not. This reduces the amount of information that needs to be exchanged between the first network and the second network. And above all, after the decision to combat the object, the location and the transfer of the location information for the object are no longer slowed down by a security data connection device.

According to the invention, classified information is information that must be kept secret in order to avert the risk of serious damage to external security.

In a further embodiment of the invention, the first target location sensor is selected from the group consisting of radar, lidar, optical sensor, acoustic sensor and sonar. Optical sensors include cameras, for example, but also include infrared sensors, which can be advantageous in particular for locating missiles through their hot exhaust gases. In addition, acoustic sensors are becoming increasingly interesting, particularly for locating attackers in asymmetric threat situations, particularly when combined with an optical sensor. The data recorded by the first target location sensor can be evaluated separately. With the target tracking evaluation device, the data are evaluated with regard to the position of the attacker. The data can be transferred, even only partially, to the target identification device via the safety data connection device in order to identify the object therefrom. For example, the type of missile, for example, can be distinguished from the strength of a radar signal together with the distance, direction of movement and speed. In particular, however, no constant identification is necessary after a successful identification, so that the data flow from the first network into the second network can be reduced to a minimum.

In a further embodiment of the invention, the military facility has a first target identification sensor, the first target identification sensor being connected to the second network and the first target identification sensor being connected to the target identification device via the second network. A target identification sensor is an example and preferred electronic reconnaissance device. The aim is to collect information that will allow the object to be identified. In this case, the object can also actively transmit an identifier, which is received, as is usual with civil aircraft. In the case of an attacker, however, it is regularly necessary to intercept information that the adversary is trying to avoid emitting.

In a further embodiment of the invention, the anti-target device is selected from the group consisting of barrel weapons, missiles, torpedoes and depth charges. A military installation usually has a number of anti-target devices, on the one hand against different targets and on the other against targets at different distances. The target engagement device can therefore also change during target engagement, for example when the object comes closer and thus leaves the area of engagement with a long-range target engagement device and enters the area of close-range defense. In a preferred development of this embodiment of the invention, the target combat device is arranged on a combat unit that can be separated from the rest of the military installation, for example a helicopter or a drone. For example, it can be an onboard helicopter with a lightweight torpedo.

In a further embodiment of the invention, the military facility is a watercraft, in particular a watercraft selected from the group consisting of corvette, frigate, destroyer, cruiser, battleship, ship for coastal combat operations, carrier, including aircraft carrier, flight deck cruiser, helicopter carrier, auxiliary carrier, landing carrier , Submarine, Speedboat, Patrol Boat, Minelayer, Anti-Mine Vehicle, Dropship, Auxiliary Ship, including Task Force Supply, Tanker, Tender, Tugboat. The watercraft is particularly preferably selected from the group consisting of a corvette, frigate, destroyer, cruiser, ship for coastal combat operations, speedboat, patrol boat, landing ship and task force support vessel.

In a further aspect, the invention relates to a method for effective target engagement using a military installation according to the invention. The method comprises the following steps: a) detecting a first target with the first target location sensor, b) assigning an identifier to the first target for use in the first network, c) identifying the first target using the target identification device, d) making the decision to combat of the first target, e) transmitting the combat decision to the target combat device in connection with the identifier, f) transmitting the target tracking data in connection with the identifier from the first target location sensor exclusively via the first network to the target combat device.

An identifier within the meaning of the invention is any information about an object that can be clearly distinguished from other objects, but which does not contain any information about the object itself. In the simplest case, the identifier is a number, e.g recorded contacts are simply numbered consecutively. Each object is uniquely assigned via this number and can be distinguished from the other objects without this information per se being relevant to security.

The identification in step c) generates classified information, but the link between the identifier and the identification information remains in the second network. In step e), only the unclassified information of the identifier is then returned from the second network with the order to combat the object which is designated by this identifier. In order to then be able to carry out this as successfully as possible, the target tracking in step f) takes place exclusively within the first network. As a result, maximum data transmission is available without unnecessary time delay, since no data has to be exchanged via a safety data connection device.

Within the meaning of the invention, it is to be understood that the data does not run via the second network exclusively within the first network. Of course, a third network for unclassified data could be present in parallel with the first network, for example to increase redundancy or to increase the data transmission rate. In this case, the third network would be understood as a sub-network of the first network within the meaning of the invention.

The order of steps a), b) and c) can vary. This is shown below using two examples.

In the first example, a new contact is detected by means of radar, i.e. it is detected in step a). An identifier, for example a number, is assigned to this contact in step b). This unidentified contact is then identified in step c).

In a second example, the military facility receives the information about an object, for example an approaching missile, which is still outside the detection range of the military facility. This information can come from an AWACS aircraft, for example. By receiving the information, the identification in step c) has thus been carried out first. this An identifier is then assigned to the object in step b). After the missile has entered the detection range of the military facility, detection can also take place in step a).

In a further embodiment of the invention, the identification in step c) takes place with the aid of data from a first target identification sensor. A target identification sensor is an example and preferred electronic reconnaissance device.

In a further embodiment of the invention, the identification in step c) takes place with the aid of externally received data. For example, this data can be exchanged within a group or come from a long-distance reconnaissance aircraft, for example an AWACS aircraft.

In a further embodiment of the invention, the identification in step c) takes place with the aid of the data from the first target location sensor.

In a further embodiment of the invention, the detection in step a) takes place with the first target location sensor and a second target location sensor. For example and preferably, the first target location sensor and the second target location sensor are each a radar. The first target location sensor is, for example, a rotating long-range radar with a phased array antenna. This is initially used for detection and localization. During combat, the second target location sensor, for example a fire control radar, then takes over. However, there are also target location sensors, such as Active Electronically Scanned Array, which can take on both tasks.

In a further embodiment of the invention, the identification takes place first in step c) and, on the basis of the identification, a detection takes place in step a).

In a further embodiment of the invention, the handover in step e) takes place manually in the event of a failure of the first safety data connection device. This allows a further level of redundancy to be achieved. The military facility according to the invention is explained in more detail below with reference to an exemplary embodiment illustrated in the drawings.

Fig. 1 first scenario

Fig. 2 second scenario

1 shows a first military installation 10, for example a frigate. The frigate has a radar as the first target location sensor 20 . The first target location sensor 20 can be an Active Electronically Scanned Array, for example. The target location sensor 20 is connected to a target tracking evaluation device 80 and a target engagement device 30 via a first network 40 . The target combat device 30 is, for example, a launcher for missiles, for example a RIM-116 short-range defense system. For example, the frigate also has a second anti-target device 30 (not shown), for example a vertical launch system for longer-range missiles, for example the RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile. The frigate also has a second network 50 for classified information. In particular, a target identification device 70 is connected to the second network 50, which can be a component of a combat management system, for example. The first network 40 and the second network 50 are connected to each other via a security data connection device 60 . The frigate also has a first target identification sensor 90, which is, for example, a device for electronic reconnaissance. The first target identification sensor 90 is connected to the second network 50 .

The idea according to the invention is explained on the basis of an exemplary scenario.

With the first target location sensor 20, a radar, three contacts 1, 2, 3 are detected. These three contacts 1, 2, 3 are assigned three unique identifiers "1", "2" and "3". This can be done, for example and preferably, by the target tracking evaluation device 80 . The position of the three objects 1, 2, 3 is not considered to be classified, since the position is also known for every third party is readily recognizable. However, without further knowledge, a decision to combat one or more of the contacts cannot be made.

In the example shown, the detected radar data from the first target location sensor 20 is therefore transferred to the target identification device 70 via the safety data connection device 60 . Alternatively or additionally, the target identification device 70 can also receive information from a first target identification sensor 90, which is a device for electronic reconnaissance, for example. Thus, the target identification device 70 can identify the first contact 1 as a civil aircraft, the second contact 2 as an attacking anti-ship missile and the third contact 3 as a returning airborne helicopter. Thus, in step d) the decision is made to fight neither the first contact 1 nor the third contact 3 but to fight the second contact 2. Only the information “Fight contact 2” is thus transferred to the first network, in particular to the target combat device 30 and the target tracking evaluation device 80, without the identification information. As a result, the data from the first target location sensor 20 can now directly and without a time delay through a safety data connection device 60 via a

Target tracking evaluation device 80 are transferred to the target combat device 30. This eliminates the risk of the location information arriving in the target combat device 30 with a delay and thus later. In this way, for example, an intercepting missile, for example a RIM-116 guided missile, can be delivered to the second contact 2 and thus to the attacking anti-ship missile.

2 shows a second scenario in plan. The military facility 10, for example the frigate, operates in the context of combating piracy in waters that also have an occurrence of civilian uninvolved ships, in particular fishing boats. In contrast to the first scenario, this is viewed as an asymmetric threat situation. The risk with such a mission is that an attack, for example with a reactive anti-tank rifle (also Panzerfaust or Rocket Propelled Grenade) from an initially completely harmless appearing boat from the camouflage of the higher number of uninvolved civilian ships.

In order to protect the frigate, it has four optical cameras as first target location sensors 20 in the example shown. These cameras preferably record in the visible and near infrared range, for example from 350 to 1700 nm. Contacts, for example fishing boats, are recognized from the recorded images. In the case shown, six contacts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 are located. Initially, all six contacts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 appear as harmless and uninvolved civilian ships.

In addition to the cameras as the first target location sensors 20 , the frigate has acoustic sensors as the target identification device 70 . Such a military facility 10 is known, for example, from EP 3 227 711 B1. If an attack now occurs, for example with a reactive anti-tank rifle from one of the contacts 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, the position of the firing of the reactive anti-tank rifle can be determined by identification via the acoustic sensors as target identification device 70. The target identification device 70 can thus assign the position of the firing to one of the contacts 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , 5 , 6 from the information from the target identification device 70 . The contact 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 from which the attack originated is classified as hostile. If, for example, the fifth contact 5 was shot down, the target identification device 70 can make the decision to combat the fifth contact 5 in step d) and transfer the information in step e) to the first network 40 to combat the fifth contact 5. The advantage according to the invention becomes clear precisely in this example. Image data is comparatively large, the evaluation is complex. However, this data remains in step f) within the first network 40, so that combat by means of the anti-target device 30, for example an on-board gun, is possible reliably and precisely in this civil environment.

Reference sign

1 first contact

2 second contact

3 third contact 4 fourth contact

5 fifth contact

6 sixth contact

10 military installation 20 first target location sensor

30 target engagement device

40 first network

50 second network

60 security data link device 70 target identification device

80 target tracking evaluation device

90 first target identification sensor

Claims

patent claims

A military facility (10), the military facility (10) having a first target location sensor (20), the military facility (10) having a target engagement device (30), the military facility having a first network (40) for unclassified data and a second network (50) for classified data, the first network (40) and the second network (50) being different, the first network (40) and the second network (50) having at least one first secure data connection device ( 60) are connected to one another, the first target location sensor (20) being connected to the first network (40), the target combat device (30) being connected to the first network (40), the military installation (10) having a target identification device (70 ), wherein the target identification device (70) is connected to the second network (50), characterized in that the military Einri device (10) has a target tracking evaluation device (80), the target tracking evaluation device (80) being connected to the first network (40), the target tracking evaluation device (80) being connected to the first target location sensor (20) via the first network (40), wherein the target tracking evaluator (80) is connected to the target combat device (30) via the first network (40), wherein the target tracking evaluator (80) is connected to the target identification device (70) via the first security data connection device (60).

2. Military facility (10) according to claim 1, characterized in that the first target location sensor (20) is selected from the group comprising radar, lidar, optical sensor, acoustic sensor and sonar.

3. Military installation (10) according to any one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the military installation (10) has a first target identification sensor (90), the first target identification sensor (90) being connected to the second network (50), the first Target identification sensor (90) via the second network (50) is connected to the target identification device (70). The military installation (10) of claim 3, characterized in that the first target identification sensor (90) is an electronic reconnaissance device. Military installation (10) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the anti-target device (30) is selected from the group consisting of barrel weapons, missiles, torpedoes and depth charges. Military facility (10) according to Claim 5, characterized in that the target combat device (30) is arranged on a combat unit which can be separated from the rest of the military facility (10), for example a helicopter or a drone. Military installation (10) according to one of the preceding claims, characterized in that the military installation (10) is a watercraft, in particular a watercraft selected from the group consisting of corvette, frigate, destroyer, cruiser, battleship, ship for near-shore combat operations, carrier , including, aircraft carrier, flight deck cruiser, helicopter carrier, auxiliary carrier, landing carrier, submarine, speedboat, patrol boat, minelayer, anti-mine craft, landing ship, support ship, including task force support, tanker, tender, tugboat. Method for effective target engagement by a military installation (10), the method comprising the following steps: a) detecting a first target with the first target location sensor (20), b) assigning an identifier to the first target for use in the first network (40) , c) identifying the first target by means of the target identification device (70), d) making the decision to combat the first target, e) passing the combat decision to the

Target combat device (30) in connection with the identifier, 15 f) transfer of the target tracking data in connection with the identifier from the first target location sensor (20) exclusively via the first network (40) to the target combat device (30). Method according to Claim 8, characterized in that the identification in step c) takes place with the aid of data from a first target identification sensor (90). Method according to one of Claims 8 to 9, characterized in that the identification in step c) takes place with the aid of externally received data. Method according to one of Claims 8 to 10, characterized in that the identification in step c) takes place with the aid of the data from the first target location sensor (20). Method according to one of Claims 8 to 11, characterized in that first the identification takes place in step c) and on the basis of the identification a detection takes place in step a). Method according to one of Claims 8 to 12, characterized in that the handover in step e) takes place manually if the first safety data connection device (60) fails.