Classifications

• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
  • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
  • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
  • H04L9/321—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority
  • H04L9/3213—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving a third party or a trusted authority using tickets or tokens, e.g. Kerberos
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/06—Authentication
  • H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
  • H04W12/08—Access security
  • H04W12/084—Access security using delegated authorisation, e.g. open authorisation [OAuth] protocol
• • H—ELECTRICITY
  • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
  • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
  • H04W84/00—Network topologies
  • H04W84/02—Hierarchically pre-organised networks, e.g. paging networks, cellular networks, WLAN [Wireless Local Area Network] or WLL [Wireless Local Loop]
  • H04W84/04—Large scale networks; Deep hierarchical networks
  • H04W84/06—Airborne or Satellite Networks
• • B—PERFORMING OPERATIONS; TRANSPORTING
  • B64—AIRCRAFT; AVIATION; COSMONAUTICS
  • B64U—UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES [UAV]; EQUIPMENT THEREFOR
  • B64U2101/00—UAVs specially adapted for particular uses or applications

Definitions

• 5G communications technology may include: enhanced mobile broadband addressing human-centric use cases for access to multimedia content, services and data; ultra-reliable-low latency communications (URLLC) with certain specifications for latency and reliability; and massive machine type communications, which may allow a very large number of connected devices and transmission of a relatively low volume of non-delay-sensitive information.
• URLLC ultra-reliable-low latency communications
• massive machine type communications which may allow a very large number of connected devices and transmission of a relatively low volume of non-delay-sensitive information.
• Further aspects include a base station having a processing system configured to perform one or more operations of any of the methods summarized above. Further aspects include processing devices for use in a base station configured with processor- executable instructions to perform operations of any of the methods summarized above. Further aspects include a non-transitory processor-readable storage medium having stored thereon processor-executable instructions configured to cause a processor of a base station to perform operations of any of the methods summarized above. Further aspects include a base station having means for performing functions of any of the methods summarized above.
• FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an example of a base station.
• FIG. 6E is a sequence diagram of an example of a process of broadcasting certificates by a base station.
• Software shall be construed broadly to mean instructions, instruction sets, code, code segments, program code, programs, subprograms, software components, applications, software applications, software packages, routines, subroutines, objects, executables, threads of execution, procedures, functions, etc., whether referred to as software, firmware, middleware, microcode, hardware description language, or otherwise.
• rotorcraft examples include tricopters (three rotors), quadcopters (four rotors), hexacopters (six rotors), and octocopters (eight rotors).
• a rotorcraft may include any number of rotors.
• a vehicle may include a variety of components and/or payloads that may perform a variety of functions.
• the term “components” when used with respect to a vehicle includes vehicle components and/or vehicle payloads.
• Such communications may include, for example, intended maneuvers and other flight operations, observations of other traffic and of the environment, and so forth. Requiring such communications to be digitally signed enables the authentication of the source of such information.
• a typical UAV digital certificate is static, and may include identifiers of the UAV and its operator, which may enable tracking of the UAV and/or correlation with a known operator or organization.
• UAV operators by nature of their identity, role, or mission may desire the ability to operate UAVs anonymously, while still signing and transmitting authenticatable messages for safety and other operational purposes.
• the network computing device may determine whether the digital signature is verified using the digital certificate. In some embodiments, the network computing device may use the digital certificate to perform a verification of the digital signature. In some embodiments, the network computing device may use the digital certificate to cryptographically verify the digital signature. In some embodiments, cryptographic verification of the digital signature using the digital certificate may indicate that UAV message is authentic and/or that the sending UAV may be considered a trusted source. In some embodiments, the network computing device may send an indication that the message is authenticated responsive to the request in response to determining that the digital signature is verified using the digital certificate.
• the association between each anonymity token and digital certificate may be maintained by the network computing device.
• the network computing device may generate a plurality of anonymity tokens using a hash of the digital certificate.
• the network computing device may generate a plurality of anonymity tokens using a keyed hash of the digital certificate.
• the network computing device may generate a plurality of anonymity tokens using a keyed hash tree of the digital certificate.
• the network computing device may maintain a secret key used by the network computing device in a keyed hashing process to produce the plurality of anonymity tokens.
• the UAV may rotate through its plurality of anonymity tokens for inclusion in one or more transmissions.
• a base station, access point, or other device that provides a wireless communication link and supports access to a communication network may be configured to perform methods for managing a UAV) identity.
• the base station may be configured to receive from a UAV an assertion that the UAV is entitled to perform operations anonymously.
• the assertion may include an anonymity token or digital certificate, and the anonymity token or digital certificate may include an indication (such as information including the assertion) that the UAV is entitled to perform operations anonymously.
• the assertion may include a message and an anonymity token.
• the digital signature is performed over the message and the anonymity token.
• the assertion may include an attribute or a data structure pointer to information indicating that the UAV is entitled to perform operations anonymously.
• a data structure pointer may be a record locator or other suitable information pointing to a location of information in a data structure, such as a database.
• a database may be managed by or accessible by the network computing device.
• the anonymity token included in the assertion may be the product of a cryptographic process, such as a hash of a digital certificate. The cryptographic process may enable the anonymity token to be unambiguously associated with a digital signature that is associated with the UAV.
• the anonymity token may include a cryptographically verifiable indication that the anonymity token is associated with a digital certificate of the UAV.
• a structure of the digital signature may include the UAV message data.
• the digital signature may be generated over the UAV message using a private key of the UAV.
• Various embodiments may be implemented in a variety of scenarios. For example, a UAV of a law enforcement agency may perform reconnaissance operations in an area where other UA Vs are simultaneously operating, necessitating an exchange of Detect-and-A void (DAA) messages to avoid near-misses or collisions with the other UAV s.
• DAA Detect-and-A void
• the law enforcement UAV drone may either transmit its digital certificate along with a signed DAA message, or may make its digital certificate available to message recipients via UTM infrastructure (e.g., upon request via a base station) such that message receivers may cryptographically verify and trust messages received from the UAV.
• UTM infrastructure e.g., upon request via a base station
• message receivers may cryptographically verify and trust messages received from the UAV.
• the law enforcement UAV may digitally sign transmissions messages with an anonymity token that may be associated with a public key certificate.
• FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating an example of a wireless communications system and an access network 100.
• the wireless communications system (also referred to as a wireless wide area network (WWAN)) includes at least one BS 105, UEs 110, an Evolved Packet Core (EPC) 160, and a 5G Core (5GC) 190.
• the BS 105 may include macro cells (high power cellular base station) and/or small cells (low power cellular base station).
• the macro cells include base stations.
• the small cells include femtocells, picocells, and microcells.
• the user equipment (UE) 110 may include a communication component 222.
• the small cell 105' may operate in a licensed and/or an unlicensed frequency spectrum. When operating in an unlicensed frequency spectrum, the small cell 105' may employ NR and use the same 5 GHz unlicensed frequency spectrum as used by the Wi-Fi AP 150. The small cell 105', employing NR in an unlicensed frequency spectrum, may boost coverage to and/or increase capacity of the access network.
• an example of an environment 400 for managing UAVs may include a mobile device 402.
• the mobile device 402 may include, be part of, or the same as the UE 110.
• the mobile device 402 may be an UAV, an unmanned aerial system (UAS), a drone, or other apparatuses controllable by a remote operator.
• the mobile device 402 may be operated by an operator 404 (e.g., a human operator, a machine operator or an artificial intelligence operator).
• the environment 400 may include a first receiver 410a, a second receiver 410b, and a third receiver 410c.
• the first receiver 410a may be a third-party authorized entity (TPAE, such as a police detector, civil/govemmental detectors, regulatory agencies, etc.).
• the second receiver 410b and the third receiver 410c may be mobile devices such as UAVs. Other types of receivers are possible.
• the mobile device 402 may communicate with the first receiver 410a via wireless communication links 412 such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular device-to-device link or other wireless communication links.
• the mobile device 402 may communicate with the second receiver 410b via the D2D communication link 158 such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular device-to-device link or other wireless communication links.
• the mobile device 402 may communicate with the third receiver 410c via the communication links 154 such as Bluetooth, WiFi, cellular device-to-device link or other wireless communication links. Other communication links may be used for communication.
• the first BS 105a may receive the certificate from the mobile device 402, the core network 430, the UFMS 422, and/or the USS 420.
• the first BS 105a may receive a flight/travel plan of the mobile device 402 from the core network 430, the UFMS 422, and/or the USS 420. Based on the flight plan, the first BS 105a may determine a geographical area that the mobile device 402 will enter.
• the USS 420 and/or the UFMS 422 may transmit the certificate associated with the UAV 602 (including the UAV ID) to the core network 430.
• the core network 430 may determine the geographical location of the UAV 602 based on the location information (e.g., latitude, longitude, altitude, etc.) in the location report.
• the core network 430 may determine the one or more coverage areas and corresponding base stations associated with the geographical location, such as the first BS 105a and the first coverage area 130a.
• the core network 430 may provide the certificate to the first BS 105a and/or the second BS 105b after determining that the UAV 602 is within the first coverage area 130a.
• the first receiver 604 may use the certificate to authenticate the BRID from the UAV 602.
• the UAV 602 may broadcast a UAV message in communication 764 that includes the assertion and a digital signature associated with the UAV, which is received by the first receiver 604.
• the first receiver 604 may send a request in communication 766 to authenticate the UAV 602 to the first BS 105a.
• the processor may determine whether the UAV is entitled to perform operations anonymously based on the response received from the network computing device.
• Means for performing the operations of block 1008 may include the processor 312 (FIG. 3).
• FIG. 13 is a component block diagram of a network computing device 1300 suitable for use with various embodiments.
• Such network computing devices may include at least the components illustrated in FIG. 13.
• the network computing device 1300 may typically include a processor 1301 coupled to volatile memory 1302 and a large capacity nonvolatile memory, such as a disk drive 1308.
• the network computing device 1300 also may include a peripheral memory access device 1306 such as a floppy disc drive, compact disc (CD) or digital video disc (DVD) drive coupled to the processor 1301.
• a peripheral memory access device 1306 such as a floppy disc drive, compact disc (CD) or digital video disc (DVD) drive coupled to the processor 1301.
• Example 3 The method of either of examples 1 or 2, in which the anonymity token includes an indication that the UAV is entitled to perform operations anonymously.
• Example 6 The method of any of examples 1-5, in which the anonymity token is associated with a nsability geographic limitation.
• these components may execute from various non-transitory computer readable media having various instructions or data structures stored thereon.
• Components may communicate by way of local or remote processes, function or procedure calls, electronic signals, data packets, memory read/writes, and other known network, computer, processor, or process related communication methodologies.
• a number of different cellular and mobile communication services and standards are available or contemplated in the future, all of which may implement and benefit from the various embodiments.
• Such services and standards include, e.g., third generation partnership project (3 GPP), long term evolution (LTE) systems, third generation wireless mobile communication technology (3G), fourth generation wireless mobile communication technology (4G), fifth generation wireless mobile communication technology (5G) as well as later generation 3 GPP technology, global system for mobile communications (GSM), universal mobile telecommunications system (UMTS), 3GSM, general packet radio service (GPRS), code division multiple access (CDMA) systems (e.g., cdmaOne, CDMA1020TM), enhanced data rates for GSM evolution (EDGE), advanced mobile phone system (AMPS), digital AMPS (IS- 136/TDMA), evolution-data optimized (EV-DO), digital enhanced cordless telecommunications (DECT), Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX), wireless local area network (WLAN), Wi-Fi Protected Access I & II (WPA
• DSP digital signal processor
• ASIC application specific integrated circuit
• FPGA field programmable gate array
• a general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor, but, in the alternative, the processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine.

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• Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
• Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
• Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
• Signal Processing (AREA)
• Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• Astronomy & Astrophysics (AREA)
• General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
• Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
• Traffic Control Systems (AREA)

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• 2022
  • 2022-02-24 EP EP22712119.1A patent/EP4331250A1/en active Pending
  • 2022-02-24 WO PCT/US2022/017611 patent/WO2022231685A1/en not_active Ceased
  • 2022-02-24 JP JP2023563881A patent/JP7812385B2/ja active Active
  • 2022-02-24 KR KR1020237035854A patent/KR20230173109A/ko active Pending
  • 2022-02-24 BR BR112023021596A patent/BR112023021596A2/pt unknown
  • 2022-02-24 TW TW111106766A patent/TW202243440A/zh unknown

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