WO2022201234A1 - 秘密検索方法、秘密検索システム、秘密検索装置、暗号化装置、検索者端末、およびプログラム - Google Patents

秘密検索方法、秘密検索システム、秘密検索装置、暗号化装置、検索者端末、およびプログラム Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2022201234A1
WO2022201234A1 PCT/JP2021/011663 JP2021011663W WO2022201234A1 WO 2022201234 A1 WO2022201234 A1 WO 2022201234A1 JP 2021011663 W JP2021011663 W JP 2021011663W WO 2022201234 A1 WO2022201234 A1 WO 2022201234A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
search
data
target
encryption
target data
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/JP2021/011663
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English (en)
French (fr)
Japanese (ja)
Inventor
慧 高橋
浩司 千田
浩気 濱田
敦謙 市川
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
NTT Inc
Original Assignee
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp filed Critical Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corp
Priority to US18/283,005 priority Critical patent/US12547749B2/en
Priority to AU2021436355A priority patent/AU2021436355B2/en
Priority to EP21932848.1A priority patent/EP4296996A4/en
Priority to PCT/JP2021/011663 priority patent/WO2022201234A1/ja
Priority to JP2023508156A priority patent/JPWO2022201234A1/ja
Priority to CN202180096064.4A priority patent/CN117043835A/zh
Publication of WO2022201234A1 publication Critical patent/WO2022201234A1/ja
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/008—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving homomorphic encryption
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6227—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database where protection concerns the structure of data, e.g. records, types, queries
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/46—Secure multiparty computation, e.g. millionaire problem

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to secure computation technology, and more particularly to technology for searching for data similar to search condition data while keeping search target data confidential.
  • Patent Document 1 discloses a technique for verifying the identity of a visitor by anonymizing a characteristic part of a visitor extracted from surveillance camera video or the like by means of secret sharing or the like and performing a search on the anonymized information. is disclosed.
  • Patent Document 1 when applying secure computation technology, directly inputting image data and searching by secure computation requires a huge computational cost and is not realistic.
  • the conventional technique described in Patent Document 1 only outputs the matching result, and cannot safely provide the original image data to the user.
  • the purpose of this invention in view of the above technical issues, is to efficiently perform data searches using secure computation and to safely provide the searched data.
  • a secret search method is a secret search method executed by a secret search system including at least one secret search device, an encryption device, and a searcher terminal, wherein the target feature encryption of the encryption device
  • the encryption unit encrypts the target feature amount extracted from the target data to be searched
  • the target data encryption unit of the encryption device encrypts the target data
  • the conditional feature amount encryption unit of the searcher terminal performs the search
  • the conditional feature quantity extracted from the conditional data as a condition is encrypted
  • the feature quantity search unit of the secret search device uses the ciphertext of the target feature quantity and the ciphertext of the conditional feature quantity to encrypt the target feature quantity and the conditional feature quantity.
  • the search result indicating the ciphertext of the target data corresponding to the target feature value similar to the conditional feature value is acquired, and the encrypted data decryption unit of the searcher terminal decrypts the ciphertext of the target data indicated by the search result to obtain the original target data.
  • FIG. 1 is a diagram illustrating the functional configuration of a secure search system.
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating the functional configuration of the secret search device.
  • FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating the functional configuration of the encryption device.
  • FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating the functional configuration of a searcher terminal.
  • FIG. 5 is a diagram illustrating a processing procedure of a secret search method (data registration).
  • FIG. 6 is a diagram illustrating a processing procedure of a secret search method (data search).
  • FIG. 7 is a diagram illustrating the functional configuration of a computer.
  • This invention applies secure computation technology to realize a secure search system for highly confidential data.
  • An intermediate server installed between the servers) extracts feature amounts from the original data in advance, encrypts the feature amounts and the original data, and registers them in the search system.
  • the retrieval system uses only ciphertexts of features to perform data retrieval by secure computation.
  • the search system Based on the search result, the search system provides the search result indicating the ciphertext of the original data separately stored to the searcher who executed the search.
  • the searcher decrypts the ciphertext of the original data obtained as the search result to obtain the original data.
  • An embodiment of the present invention is a secure search system and method for searching data similar to data input as a search condition from data stored as a search target by secure calculation while keeping each data confidential.
  • image data included in surveillance camera video captured by a surveillance camera is set as a search target
  • image data in which a specific person is photographed is set as a search condition
  • search condition A usage pattern is assumed in which images in which a person appears in image data are output as search results.
  • data to be searched in the present invention is not limited to image data.
  • any type of data such as voice data or text data, from which a feature amount can be extracted can be searched.
  • the secret search system 100 of the embodiment includes N ( ⁇ 1) secret search devices 1 1 , . .
  • a plurality of encryption devices 2 and searcher terminals 3 may be included.
  • C ( ⁇ 1) monitoring cameras 5 1 , . . . , 5 C are connected to the encryption device 2 via wired or wireless interfaces.
  • the storage device 4 can be omitted by implementing the functions to be provided in any one of the secret search devices 1 1 , . . . , 1 N .
  • the communication network 9 is a circuit-switched or packet-switched communication network configured so that connected devices can communicate with each other. etc. can be used.
  • the encryption device 2 for example, as shown in FIG.
  • a decryption key transmission unit 25 is provided. For example, as shown in FIG. Prepare.
  • the secret search devices 1 1 By doing so, the confidential search method of the embodiment is realized.
  • the secure search method of the embodiment includes a data registration process for registering search target data in the secure search system 100, and a data search for searching for data similar to search condition data among the search target data by secure calculation. It consists of two stages of processing.
  • FIG. 5 is a flowchart illustrating the procedure of data registration processing
  • FIG. 6 is a flowchart illustrating the procedure of data search processing.
  • Each device or terminal included in the secret search system 100 has, for example, a central processing unit (CPU: Central Processing Unit), a main storage device (RAM: Random Access Memory), etc.
  • a special program is installed in a publicly known or dedicated computer. It is a special device that is loaded and configured.
  • Each device or terminal executes each process under the control of, for example, a central processing unit. Data input to each device or terminal and data obtained in each process are stored in, for example, a main memory device, and the data stored in the main memory device are read out to the central processing unit as necessary. Used for other processing.
  • At least a part of each processing unit of each device or terminal may be configured by hardware such as an integrated circuit.
  • Each storage unit provided in each device or terminal is, for example, a main storage device such as RAM (Random Access Memory), an auxiliary storage device composed of a semiconductor memory device such as a hard disk, optical disk, or flash memory, or It can be composed of middleware such as a relational database and a key-value store.
  • a main storage device such as RAM (Random Access Memory)
  • auxiliary storage device composed of a semiconductor memory device such as a hard disk, optical disk, or flash memory
  • middleware such as a relational database and a key-value store.
  • the secret search device 1n and the encryption device 2 are information processing devices having a data communication function, such as tower-type or rack-mount type server computers.
  • the searcher terminal 3 is an information processing device having a data communication function, such as a desktop or laptop personal computer or a mobile terminal such as a smart phone or tablet.
  • the storage device 4 is, specifically, a tower-type or rack-mount server computer to which a large-capacity storage device is connected, or a network-connected storage having a built-in large-capacity storage device, which has a data communication function and a data storage function. It is an information processing device.
  • the surveillance camera 5c is, for example, a photographing device having a video camera for photographing a moving image of a person or an object as a subject.
  • a photographing device having a video camera for photographing a moving image of a person or an object as a subject.
  • the functions that the surveillance camera 5 c should have such as the resolution that can be taken, the recording medium of the video, the presence or absence of a microphone, whether it is digital or analog, and generally any shooting device that can shoot moving images. can be used.
  • the target data acquisition unit 21 of the encryption device 2 acquires data to be searched (hereinafter referred to as "target data").
  • the target data is, for example, image data included in a surveillance camera image captured by the surveillance camera 5c .
  • the target data may be tagged with information such as the shooting location and shooting date and time.
  • the target data acquisition unit 21 outputs the acquired target data to the target feature amount extraction unit 22 and the target data encryption unit 24 .
  • the target feature amount extraction unit 22 of the encryption device 2 receives the target data from the target data acquisition unit 21 and extracts a feature amount (hereinafter referred to as "target feature amount") from the target data.
  • the target feature quantity extraction unit 22 outputs the extracted target feature quantity to the target feature quantity encryption unit 23 .
  • a feature amount extraction method can be arbitrarily determined according to the type of target data. For example, assuming that the target data is image data included in a video in which an unspecified number of people are captured, and that the target data is used to search for the face of a specific person, the following two steps are taken to determine the feature quantity. should be extracted.
  • an area to be searched for example, a person's face
  • region extraction for example, a general method such as principal component analysis may be used (see Reference 1).
  • the extracted face image data is converted into feature amounts (step 2).
  • the feature amount conversion of face image data for example, the pixel value of each pixel of the image may be used as the feature amount as it is, or the change amount for each pixel may be used as the feature amount using a general edge extraction method. (See reference 2).
  • the target data is voice data
  • a feature amount such as a known word embedding vector may be extracted.
  • the target feature quantity encryption unit 23 of the encryption device 2 receives the target feature quantity from the target feature quantity extraction unit 22, and encrypts the target feature quantity.
  • the target feature quantity encryption unit 23 encrypts the target feature quantity using an arbitrary cryptographic method or secret sharing method capable of secret calculation.
  • examples of cryptographic schemes capable of secure computation include homomorphic encryption
  • examples of secret sharing schemes capable of secure computation include Shamir secret sharing and replication secret sharing.
  • the generated ciphertext is one ciphertext in the case of the cryptosystem, and is a distributed value composed of a plurality of shares in the case of the secret sharing system.
  • the target feature amount encryption unit 23 transmits the ciphertext of the target feature amount to each secret search device 1 n .
  • to send a ciphertext to each secret search device 1n means to send one ciphertext to one secret search device 11 if the ciphertext is based on the encryption method. If the ciphertext is based on the secret sharing scheme, the distributed value is distributed so that each of the multiple secret search devices 1 1 , . . . , 1 N holds one share without duplication. means to The same applies to the following description.
  • each secure search device 1n receives the ciphertext of the target feature from the encryption device 2 and stores the ciphertext of the target feature in the encrypted feature storage unit 10.
  • the target data encryption unit 24 of the encryption device 2 receives the target data from the target data acquisition unit 21 and encrypts the target data.
  • the encryption method used by the target data encryption unit 24 is different from the encryption method used by the target feature amount encryption unit 23, and the original data cannot be obtained unless a valid decryption key is used. is an encryption method that cannot Such an encryption method may be a common key encryption method or a public key encryption method.
  • the target data encryption unit 24 associates information indicating the ciphertext of the target data with information indicating the decryption key required to decrypt the ciphertext of the target data, and stores them in the decryption key storage unit 20. .
  • the information indicating the decryption key may be the decryption key itself, or may be information capable of identifying the decryption key exchanged in advance between the encryption device 2 and the searcher terminal 3 by a secure method.
  • the target data encryption unit 24 transmits the ciphertext of the target data to the storage device 4 .
  • step S24-2 the storage device 4 receives the ciphertext of the target data from the encryption device 2 and stores the ciphertext of the target data.
  • step S31 the condition data input unit 31 of the retriever terminal 3 receives data (hereinafter referred to as "condition data") as a retrieval condition input to the retriever terminal 3 by the retriever using the retriever terminal 3. get.
  • the condition data is, for example, image data of the face of the person to be searched.
  • the condition data input unit 31 outputs the acquired condition data to the condition feature quantity extraction unit 32 .
  • step S32 the condition feature amount extraction unit 32 of the searcher terminal 3 receives the condition data from the condition data input unit 31 and extracts a feature amount (hereinafter referred to as "condition feature amount") from the condition data.
  • the feature amount extracted by the conditional feature amount extraction unit 32 is the same as the feature amount extracted by the target feature amount extraction unit 22 of the encryption device 2 .
  • the conditional feature amount extraction unit 32 outputs the extracted conditional feature amount to the conditional feature amount encryption unit 33 .
  • step S33 the condition feature amount encryption unit 33 of the retriever terminal 3 receives the condition feature amount from the condition feature amount extraction unit 32 and encrypts the condition feature amount.
  • the encryption method used by the condition feature amount encryption unit 33 is the same as the encryption method used by the target feature amount encryption unit 23 of the encryption device 2 .
  • the conditional feature amount encryption unit 33 transmits the ciphertext of the conditional feature amount to each secret search device 1 n .
  • step S11 the feature quantity search unit 11 of each secret search device 1 n receives the ciphertext of the condition feature quantity from the searcher terminal 3, and the ciphertext of the target feature quantity stored in the encrypted feature quantity storage unit 10. and the ciphertext of the conditional feature quantity received from the retriever terminal 3, a target feature quantity similar to the conditional feature quantity is searched by secure calculation. That is, while keeping the target feature amount and the conditional feature amount confidential, the ciphertext of the target feature amount similar to the conditional feature amount is extracted.
  • the feature retrieval unit 11 outputs information indicating the ciphertext of the target data corresponding to the extracted ciphertext of the target feature (hereinafter referred to as “search result”) to the search result transmission unit 12 .
  • a feature value search by secure calculation can be performed by calculating the Euclidean distance between all target data and condition data on secure calculation and comparing the calculation result with a preset threshold value.
  • Search results can be generated by calculating the Euclidean distance D for all target data and comparing the calculated results with a predetermined threshold.
  • a predetermined threshold For example, the target data whose Euclidean distance D is equal to or less than a predetermined threshold value, or the target data of a predetermined number from the beginning when the Euclidean distance D is sorted in ascending order may be output as the search result.
  • the technique described in reference 4 for example, can be used.
  • step S12-1 the search result transmission unit 12 of each secret search device 1 n receives the search result from the feature amount search unit 11 and transmits the search result to the searcher terminal 3.
  • FIG. The search result transmitting unit 12 also transmits the search result and information indicating the searcher terminal 3 to the encryption device 2 .
  • step S12-2 the retriever terminal 3 receives the retrieval results from each secret retrieval device 1 n and obtains information indicating the ciphertext of the target data from the retrieval results.
  • the feature amount search unit 11 performs a search by a secret calculation method based on secret sharing, information indicating the ciphertext of the target data is obtained by restoring the share of the search result received from each secret search device 1 n . All you have to do is
  • the feature amount search unit 11 performs a search by a secret calculation method based on encryption, information indicating the ciphertext of the target data is obtained by decrypting the search result received from the secret search device 11 according to a predetermined decryption method. You should get it.
  • the retriever terminal 3 inputs information indicating the obtained ciphertext of the target data to the encrypted data acquisition unit 34 .
  • step S12-3 the encryption device 2 receives the search results and information indicating the searcher terminal 3 from each of the secret search devices 1n, and, like the searcher terminal 3, encrypts the ciphertext of the target data from the search results. obtain information indicating The encryption device 2 inputs information indicating the obtained ciphertext of the target data and information indicating the searcher terminal 3 to the decryption key transmission unit 25 .
  • step S34 the encrypted data acquisition unit 34 of the retriever terminal 3 acquires the ciphertext of the target data indicated by the input information from the storage device 4.
  • the encrypted data acquisition unit 34 outputs the acquired ciphertext of the target data to the encrypted data decryption unit 35 .
  • step S25-1 the decryption key transmission unit 25 of the encryption device 2 acquires from the decryption key storage unit 20 information indicating the decryption key for decrypting the ciphertext of the target data indicated by the input information.
  • the decryption key transmission unit 25 transmits information indicating the obtained decryption key to the retriever terminal 3 .
  • step S25-2 the retriever terminal 3 receives information indicating the decryption key from the encryption device 2 and acquires the decryption key.
  • the retriever terminal 3 inputs the acquired decryption key to the encrypted data decryption unit 35 .
  • step S35 the encrypted data decryption unit 35 of the retriever terminal 3 receives the ciphertext of the target data from the encrypted data acquisition unit 34, and decrypts the ciphertext of the target data using the input decryption key. .
  • the encrypted data decryption unit 35 outputs the original target data obtained by decryption. If the target data acquisition unit 21 tags the target data with information such as the shooting location and shooting date and time, the information may be added to the original target data and output.
  • the secure search devices 1 1 , . can.
  • the retriever terminal 3 can obtain original data itself similar to data used as a retrieval condition among data to be retrieved as a retrieval result.
  • the original data is encrypted by a cryptosystem that cannot be decrypted without the decryption key, information about the original data will not leak to the secret search devices 1 1 , . . . , 1N . Therefore, the original data can be safely provided to the searcher terminal as the search result.
  • the encryption device 2 extracts feature amounts from each of the image data captured by the plurality of surveillance cameras 5 1 , . . . , 5 C , and encrypts the feature amounts and the original image data. , . . , 1N and stored so that they can be used by the secure computing devices 1 1 , . . . , 1N.
  • the monitoring cameras 5 1 , . and a decoding key transmission unit 25 that is, in the secret search system of the modified example, each of the monitoring cameras 5 1 , . . .
  • Computer-readable recording media are, for example, non-temporary recording media such as magnetic recording devices and optical discs.
  • this program will be carried out, for example, by selling, transferring, lending, etc. portable recording media such as DVDs and CD-ROMs on which the program is recorded.
  • the program may be distributed by storing the program in the storage device of the server computer and transferring the program from the server computer to other computers via the network.
  • a computer that executes such a program for example, first stores a program recorded on a portable recording medium or a program transferred from a server computer once in the auxiliary recording unit 1050, which is its own non-temporary storage device. Store. When executing the process, this computer reads the program stored in the auxiliary recording unit 1050, which is its own non-temporary storage device, into the storage unit 1020, which is a temporary storage device, and follows the read program. Execute the process. Also, as another execution form of this program, the computer may read the program directly from a portable recording medium and execute processing according to the program, and the program is transferred from the server computer to this computer. Each time, the processing according to the received program may be executed sequentially.
  • ASP Application Service Provider
  • the above-mentioned processing is executed by a so-called ASP (Application Service Provider) type service, which does not transfer the program from the server computer to this computer, and realizes the processing function only by its execution instruction and result acquisition.
  • ASP Application Service Provider
  • the program in this embodiment includes information that is used for processing by a computer and that conforms to the program (data that is not a direct instruction to the computer but has the property of prescribing the processing of the computer, etc.).
  • the device is configured by executing a predetermined program on a computer, but at least part of these processing contents may be implemented by hardware.

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PCT/JP2021/011663 2021-03-22 2021-03-22 秘密検索方法、秘密検索システム、秘密検索装置、暗号化装置、検索者端末、およびプログラム Ceased WO2022201234A1 (ja)

Priority Applications (6)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
US18/283,005 US12547749B2 (en) 2021-03-22 2021-03-22 Secure search method, system thereof, apparatus thereof, encryption apparatus, searcher terminal, and program
AU2021436355A AU2021436355B2 (en) 2021-03-22 2021-03-22 Secure search method, system thereof, apparatus thereof, encryption apparatus, searcher terminal, and program
EP21932848.1A EP4296996A4 (en) 2021-03-22 2021-03-22 SECURE SEARCH METHOD, SECURE SEARCH SYSTEM, SECURE SEARCH DEVICE, ENCRYPTION DEVICE, SEARCH TERMINAL, AND PROGRAM
PCT/JP2021/011663 WO2022201234A1 (ja) 2021-03-22 2021-03-22 秘密検索方法、秘密検索システム、秘密検索装置、暗号化装置、検索者端末、およびプログラム
JP2023508156A JPWO2022201234A1 (https=) 2021-03-22 2021-03-22
CN202180096064.4A CN117043835A (zh) 2021-03-22 2021-03-22 秘密检索方法、秘密检索系统、秘密检索装置、加密装置、检索者终端以及程序

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PCT/JP2021/011663 WO2022201234A1 (ja) 2021-03-22 2021-03-22 秘密検索方法、秘密検索システム、秘密検索装置、暗号化装置、検索者端末、およびプログラム

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CN (1) CN117043835A (https=)
AU (1) AU2021436355B2 (https=)
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JP7649558B2 (ja) * 2022-11-24 2025-03-21 株式会社アクセル 暗号処理装置、暗号処理方法、暗号処理プログラム

Citations (7)

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