WO2022148406A1 - 一种重放攻击处理方法、统一数据管理实体及存储介质 - Google Patents

一种重放攻击处理方法、统一数据管理实体及存储介质 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2022148406A1
WO2022148406A1 PCT/CN2022/070587 CN2022070587W WO2022148406A1 WO 2022148406 A1 WO2022148406 A1 WO 2022148406A1 CN 2022070587 W CN2022070587 W CN 2022070587W WO 2022148406 A1 WO2022148406 A1 WO 2022148406A1
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Prior art keywords
suci
replay attack
udm
count value
replay
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PCT/CN2022/070587
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
刘福文
粟栗
杨波
陈旭
宋月
Original Assignee
中国移动通信有限公司研究院
中国移动通信集团有限公司
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Publication of WO2022148406A1 publication Critical patent/WO2022148406A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
    • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices

Definitions

  • the embodiments of the present application relate to the field of wireless communication technologies, and in particular, to a replay attack processing method, a unified data management entity, and a storage medium.
  • Fig. 1 is a schematic diagram of the SUCI retransmission mechanism timer. As shown in the figure, in the existing solution, the SUCI retransmission mechanism is defined for the UE, and two timers are used: T3519 (60 seconds) and T3510 (15 seconds) to achieve.
  • T3519 60 seconds
  • T3510 15 seconds
  • the UE After the UE generates the SUCI, it starts timers T3519 and T3510, stores the SUCI, and sends the SUCI to the AMF. If the AMF receives the SUCI, it will pass it to the Authentication Server Function (AUSF, Authentication Server Function) without replay check, and then forward it to the Unified Data Management Entity (UDM, Unified Data Management) by the AUSF. If the UE does not receive a response from the AMF within the timer T3510, it will resend the stored SUCI to the network.
  • AUSF Authentication Server Function
  • UDM Unified Data Management Entity
  • the UE may send the same SUCI to the network five times, that is, the UDM may receive the same SUCI five times.
  • the UE After the timer T3519 expires, the UE generates a new SUCI and stores it, and starts a new round of SUCI transmission.
  • the attacker obtains the user's valid SUCI over the air interface, and then replays it to the network over the air interface.
  • UDM will generate an authentication vector just like processing a normal user's SUCI, and send a random number (RAND) to the attacker. , Random) and the authentication request message of the authentication token (AUTN, Authentication Token).
  • RAND random number
  • AUTN Authentication Token
  • the attacker then forwards the authentication request message to the legitimate UE. If the attacker uses the replay attack many times, the UDM and the UE have to spend a lot of resources to process the replay message and the authentication request message, because these messages are legitimate, thus causing a Denial of Service (DOS, Denial of Service) to the UDM and the UE. )attack.
  • DOS Denial of Service
  • a DOS attack on the UE will cause the UE's processing capability to decrease and consume battery power rapidly.
  • a DOS attack on UDM will cause the processing capability of the UDM to decrease and the request response to the legitimate UE to be slowed down.
  • the attacker can use the RAND and AUTN obtained by the SUCI replay attack to launch a correlation attack on the victim to determine whether the victim is in a specific area.
  • the disadvantage of the existing anti-replay attack solution is that the method of anti-replay attack on the UDM cannot distinguish whether the SUCI is retransmitted by a legitimate UE using the SUCI retransmission mechanism, or the SUCI replayed by the attacker, so that the Disable the SUCI retransmission mechanism on the UE side.
  • the embodiments of the present application provide a replay attack processing method, a unified data management entity, and a storage medium, so as to solve the problem of the failure of the SUCI retransmission mechanism on the UE side.
  • a replay attack processing method including:
  • the UDM After the UDM confirms that the received first SUCI is not a replay attack, it identifies the reception time of the first SUCI;
  • the UDM After receiving the second SUCI, the UDM compares the first SUCI with the second SUCI when it is determined according to the reception time of the first SUCI that the second SUCI is within a preset time period.
  • the method further includes:
  • the second SUCI is not discarded, and an authentication vector is generated and returned to the user after obtaining the SUPI according to the second SUCI.
  • the method further includes:
  • the comparison between the first SUCI and the second SUCI is performed according to the first SUCI in the data unit.
  • the implementation further includes:
  • the SUPI is encapsulated in the data unit, and the SUPI is used for the UDM to generate an authentication vector and return it to the user.
  • the preset time period is 60 seconds or the time duration of the timer T3519.
  • the implementation further includes:
  • the first SUCI is different from the second SUCI, it is determined whether it is a replay attack according to the anti-replay parameter in the second SUCI.
  • whether it is a replay attack is confirmed according to the anti-replay parameter in the second SUCI, including:
  • the method further includes:
  • the long-term key of the UE of the SUPI corresponding to the second SUCI is obtained, an authentication vector is generated and returned to the UE.
  • a UDM that includes:
  • the processor for reading the program in memory, performs the following processes:
  • a transceiver for receiving and transmitting data under the control of the processor.
  • the method further includes:
  • the second SUCI is not discarded, and an authentication vector is generated and returned to the user after obtaining the SUPI according to the second SUCI.
  • the method further includes:
  • the comparison between the first SUCI and the second SUCI is performed according to the first SUCI in the data unit.
  • the implementation further includes:
  • the SUPI is encapsulated in the data unit, and the SUPI is used for the UDM to generate an authentication vector and return it to the user.
  • the preset time period is 60 seconds or the time duration of the timer T3519.
  • the implementation further includes:
  • the first SUCI is different from the second SUCI, it is determined whether it is a replay attack according to the anti-replay parameter in the second SUCI.
  • whether it is a replay attack is confirmed according to the anti-replay parameter in the second SUCI, including:
  • the method further includes:
  • the long-term key of the UE of the SUPI corresponding to the second SUCI is obtained, an authentication vector is generated and returned to the UE.
  • a UDM that includes:
  • a time module configured to identify the reception time of the first SUCI after confirming that the received first SUCI is not a replay attack
  • a comparison module configured to compare the first SUCI with the second SUCI when it is determined according to the reception time of the first SUCI that the second SUCI is within a preset time period after the second SUCI is received.
  • the comparison module is further configured to compare the first SUCI with the second SUCI
  • the second SUCI is not discarded, and an authentication vector is generated and returned to the user after obtaining the SUPI according to the second SUCI.
  • the time module is further configured to encapsulate the received first SUCI into a data unit with a timestamp and the first SUCI after confirming that the received first SUCI is not a replay attack;
  • the comparison module is further configured to determine according to the time stamp in the data unit when the second SUCI is within the preset time period according to the reception time of the first SUCI; compare the first SUCI with the second SUCI according to the The first SUCI in the data unit is compared.
  • the time module is further configured to encapsulate the SUPI in the data unit, where the SUPI is used for the UDM to generate an authentication vector and return it to the user.
  • the comparison module is further configured to use 60 seconds or the timing duration of the timer T3519 as the preset time period.
  • the comparison module is further configured to confirm whether it is a replay attack according to the anti-replay parameter in the second SUCI if the first SUCI is different from the second SUCI.
  • the comparison module is further configured to confirm whether it is a replay attack according to the anti-replay parameter in the second SUCI, including:
  • the comparison module is further configured to obtain the UE's long-term key of the SUPI corresponding to the second SUCI after comparing the first SUCI with the second SUCI, when it is confirmed that it is not a replay attack, generate an authentication vector and return it to the UE.
  • a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program for executing the above replay attack processing method.
  • the judgment is made according to this time, and the SUCI within the preset time period, as long as the SUCI is the same, will not be discarded , which can be further processed. That is, within a preset time period, for example, within the timer T3519, the SUCI sent by the UE to the UDM using the retransmission mechanism will not be discarded, so that the retransmission mechanism on the UE side will not fail.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a SUCI retransmission mechanism timer in the background technology
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of an implementation flowchart of a method for processing a replay attack in an embodiment of the present application
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a UDM in an embodiment of the present application.
  • the current SUCI anti-replay attack solution is divided into the following two categories according to whether the anti-replay parameters (random number, count value) in SUCI are encrypted:
  • the UE sends the anti-replay parameters in the SUCI to the UDM without encryption.
  • the UDM determines whether the SUCI is replayed according to the anti-replay parameter.
  • the anti-replay parameter is a random number
  • the UDM searches the database to see if there is a previously received random number that is equal to the random number just received. If it is found to be equal, the UDM determines that the received SUCI is a replay attack. The SUCI is discarded; if no equivalent is found, the UDM determines that the received SUCI is not a replay attack, and proceeds to the next step.
  • Another solution is to use the user's public key in SUCI to prevent SUCI replay attacks.
  • the UDM on the network side determines whether the received SUCI message is a replay message by comparing the user public key in the SUCI received from the UE side with the previous user public key stored in the database.
  • the UDM When the anti-replay parameter is a count value, since the count value is associated with the UE, the UDM needs to decrypt the SUCI to obtain the Subscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI) to find the corresponding UE, and then use the last stored count value of the corresponding UE. Compare. If the received count value is greater than the last count value, the UDM determines that the received SUCI is not a replay attack, and proceeds to the next step. If the received count value is less than or equal to the last count value; the UDM determines that the received SUCI is a replay attack, and the UDM discards the SUCI.
  • SUPI Subscription Permanent Identifier
  • the UE encrypts the anti-replay parameters in the SUCI and sends it to the UDM.
  • the UDM After receiving the SUCI, the UDM first decrypts the SUCI, and then judges whether the SUCI is replayed according to the anti-replay parameters.
  • the method of judging whether the SUCI is playback based on the random number and the count value is the same as the method described above.
  • One scheme proposes a one-time nonce N to prevent replay attacks and mitigate DoS. N is introduced into cryptographic operations as follows:
  • IMSIEnc MCC
  • MCC and MNC are not encrypted because they need to be used for routing in roaming situation
  • is a concatenation operation
  • EncPK(X) means that the plaintext X is encrypted with the key PK.
  • the existing methods for preventing replay attacks on UDM cannot distinguish whether the SUCI is retransmitted by a legitimate UE using the SUCI retransmission mechanism, or the SUCI replayed by the attacker. Once the UDM detects that the SUCI is replayed, it will discard the received SUCI. As a result, the SUCI retransmission mechanism on the UE side is disabled.
  • the technical solutions provided by the embodiments of the present application will solve the problem of failure of the SUCI retransmission mechanism on the UE side on the UDM.
  • the SUCI retransmission mechanism on the UE side may refer to: after the legitimate UE generates the SUCI, it starts the timer T3519 (60 seconds), stores the SUCI, and sends the SUCI to the UDM. If the UE does not receive a response within the timer T3510 (15 seconds), it will resend the stored SUCI to the network, so as to send the same multiple SUCIs to the network within 60 seconds. After the timer T3519 (60 seconds) expires, the UE generates a new SUCI and stores it, and starts a new round of SUCI transmission.
  • An attacker's SUCI replay attack may refer to: first, the attacker obtains the SUCI of a legitimate user through a manual operation on the air interface, and then replays the SUCI to the network through a manual operation on the air interface. Due to the manual operation of the attacker, the attacker cannot both intercept the SUCI of a legitimate user and replay the intercepted SUCI to the network within 60 seconds, and the attacker cannot send the same multiple SUCI to the network within 60 seconds. .
  • the specific include:
  • DU Data Unit
  • the UDM After the UDM receives the SUCI again, it compares the SUCI received subsequently with the SUCI in the DU. If the two are the same and within the count duration of the timer T3519 (60 seconds), the UDM determines that it is a legitimate UE through retransmission. The SUCI sent by the mechanism, in this way, the SUCI received subsequently is not lost, so that the retransmission mechanism on the UE side does not fail, and at the same time, the UDM removes the DUs constructed in the message queue.
  • the UDM determines that it is a SUCI sent by a different device. In this way, the anti-replay parameters are extracted from the subsequently received SUCI, and the anti-replay parameters are used to determine whether the subsequently received SUCI is a replay attack. If the subsequently received SUCI is not a replay attack, the subsequently received SUCI is encapsulated into a DU carrying a timestamp, and the constructed DU is moved into the message queue.
  • the UDM After the UDM receives the SUCI again, it compares the SUCI received subsequently with the SUCI in the DU.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the implementation flow of the replay attack processing method. As shown in the figure, it may include:
  • Step 201 After UDM confirms that the received first SUCI is not a replay attack, it identifies the reception time of the first SUCI;
  • Step 202 After receiving the second SUCI, the UDM compares the first SUCI with the second SUCI when it is determined according to the reception time of the first SUCI that the second SUCI is within a preset time period.
  • the method may further include:
  • the second SUCI is not discarded, and an authentication vector is generated and returned to the user after obtaining the SUPI according to the second SUCI.
  • the anti-playback parameter (random number, count value) in the SUCI is further used to judge whether the SUCI is playback.
  • the second SUCI is not discarded, and the SUPI is acquired according to it, an authentication vector is generated, and returned to the user.
  • the received first SUCI after confirming that the received first SUCI is not a replay attack, it may further include:
  • the comparison between the first SUCI and the second SUCI is performed according to the first SUCI in the data unit.
  • the implementation further includes:
  • the SUPI is encapsulated in the data unit, and the SUPI is used for the UDM to generate an authentication vector and return it to the user.
  • the preset time period is 60 seconds or the time duration of the timer T3519. That is, the duration of T3519.
  • DU Data Unit
  • timestamp timestamp
  • the DU will be used as a comparison label to identify whether the received SUCI is the SUCI retransmitted by a legitimate user, that is, the subsequently received SUCI will be the same as that in the DU.
  • the SUCIs are compared, and if they are the same, the received SUCIs are not discarded for further processing.
  • the anti-replay parameter in SUCI is a random number and a count value.
  • the SUCI sent by the UE to the UDM using the retransmission mechanism within the timer T3519 will not be discarded, so that the retransmission mechanism on the UE side will not fail.
  • it may further include:
  • the first SUCI is different from the second SUCI, it is determined whether it is a replay attack according to the anti-replay parameter in the second SUCI.
  • the method may further include:
  • the long-term key of the UE of the SUPI corresponding to the second SUCI is obtained, an authentication vector is generated and returned to the UE.
  • the SUCI in the scheme includes anti-replay parameters.
  • Random numbers are used as anti-replay parameters.
  • random numbers are not encrypted and random numbers are encrypted.
  • the UDM can analyze the two situations respectively when judging whether the SUCI is playback according to the received SUCI.
  • UDM will use the message queue of the stored data unit (DU), together with the database that stores random numbers, to determine whether the received SUCI is a replay attack, as follows:
  • the UDM After the UDM receives the SUCI, it sets the timestamp as the time point when the SUCI is received, and searches for the SUCI in the message queue that stores the DU. If the SUCI is found and the timestamp in the corresponding DU is within T3519, the UDM obtains the SUPI of the corresponding DU. , find the long-term key of the UE corresponding to SUPI, generate an authentication vector and return it to the UE (User Equipment).
  • the UDM removes DUs in the message queue whose time is before T3519 according to the timestamp.
  • the UDM If the UDM does not find a SUCI in the message queue, it extracts a random number from the received SUCI.
  • UDM will use the message queue that stores data units (DUs), together with the database that stores random numbers, to determine whether the received SUCI is a replay attack, as follows:
  • the UDM After the UDM receives the SUCI, it sets the timestamp as the time point when the SUCI is received, and searches for the SUCI in the message queue that stores the DU. If the SUCI is found and the timestamp in the corresponding DU is within T3519, the UDM obtains the SUPI of the corresponding DU. , find the long-term key of the UE corresponding to SUPI, generate an authentication vector and return it to the UE.
  • the UDM removes DUs in the message queue whose time is before T3519 according to the timestamp.
  • the UDM If the UDM does not find the corresponding SUCI in the message queue, it decrypts the received SUCI to obtain a random number and SUPI.
  • the UDM searches for the random number corresponding to the SUCI in the database storing the random number. If it is found, it confirms that the SUCI is a replay attack, and then the link is terminated; if it is not found, it confirms that the SUCI is not a replay attack. Based on the UE's long-term key corresponding to SUPI, an authentication vector is generated and returned to the UE.
  • the count value is used as an anti-replay parameter.
  • the UDM analyzes the two situations respectively when judging whether the SUCI is playback.
  • the UDM For each UE, the UDM will use the message queue to store the data unit (DU) and the previously stored count value to determine whether the received SUCI is a replay attack, as follows:
  • the UDM After the UDM receives the SUCI, it sets the timestamp as the time point when the SUCI is received, and searches for the SUCI in the message queue that stores the DU. If the SUCI is found and the timestamp in the corresponding DU is within T3519, the UDM obtains the SUPI of the corresponding DU. , find the long-term key of the UE corresponding to SUPI, generate an authentication vector and return it to the UE.
  • the UDM removes DUs in the message queue whose time is before T3519 according to the timestamp.
  • the UDM If the UDM does not find the corresponding SUCI in the message queue, it extracts the count value in the received SUCI.
  • the UDM uses the previously stored count value to compare with the corresponding count value in the SUCI. If the corresponding count value in the SUCI is less than or equal to the previously stored count value, it is confirmed that the SUCI is a replay attack, and the link is terminated.
  • the UDM For each UE, the UDM will use the message queue to store the data unit (DU) and the previously stored count value to determine whether the received SUCI is a replay attack, as follows:
  • the UDM After the UDM receives the SUCI, it sets the timestamp as the time point when the SUCI is received, and searches for the SUCI in the message queue that stores the DU. If the SUCI is found and the timestamp in the corresponding DU is within T3519, the UDM obtains the SUPI of the corresponding DU. , find the long-term key of the UE corresponding to SUPI, generate an authentication vector and return it to the UE.
  • the UDM removes DUs in the message queue whose time is before T3519 according to the timestamp.
  • the UDM If the UDM does not find the corresponding SUCI in the message queue, it decrypts the received SUCI to obtain the SUPI and the count value.
  • the UDM uses the previously stored count value to compare with the corresponding count value in the SUCI. If the corresponding count value in the SUCI is less than or equal to the previously stored count value, it is confirmed that the SUCI is a replay attack, and the link is terminated.
  • a UDM and a computer-readable storage medium are also provided in the embodiments of the present application. Since the principle of solving the problem of these devices is similar to the replay attack processing method, the implementation of these devices can be referred to in the description of the method. Implementation, the repetition will not be repeated.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of the UDM structure, as shown in the figure, the UDM includes:
  • the processor 300 is configured to read the program in the memory 320, and execute the following processes:
  • the transceiver 310 is used for receiving and transmitting data under the control of the processor 300 .
  • the method further includes:
  • the second SUCI is not discarded, and an authentication vector is generated and returned to the user after obtaining the SUPI according to the second SUCI.
  • the method further includes:
  • the comparison between the first SUCI and the second SUCI is performed according to the first SUCI in the data unit.
  • the implementation further includes:
  • the SUPI is encapsulated in the data unit, and the SUPI is used for the UDM to generate an authentication vector to return to the user.
  • the preset time period is 60 seconds or the time duration of the timer T3519.
  • the implementation further includes:
  • the first SUCI is different from the second SUCI, it is determined whether it is a replay attack according to the anti-replay parameter in the second SUCI.
  • whether it is a replay attack is confirmed according to the anti-replay parameter in the second SUCI, including:
  • the method further includes:
  • the long-term key of the UE of the SUPI corresponding to the second SUCI is obtained, an authentication vector is generated and returned to the UE.
  • the bus architecture may include any number of interconnected buses and bridges, specifically one or more processors represented by processor 300 and various circuits of memory represented by memory 320 are linked together.
  • the bus architecture may also link together various other circuits, such as peripherals, voltage regulators, and power management circuits, which are well known in the art and, therefore, will not be described further herein.
  • the bus interface provides the interface.
  • Transceiver 310 may be multiple elements, ie, including a transmitter and a receiver, providing a means for communicating with various other devices over a transmission medium.
  • the processor 300 is responsible for managing the bus architecture and general processing, and the memory 320 may store data used by the processor 300 in performing operations.
  • a kind of UDM is also provided in the embodiment of the embodiment of the present application, including:
  • a time module configured to identify the reception time of the first SUCI after confirming that the received first SUCI is not a replay attack
  • a comparison module configured to compare the first SUCI with the second SUCI when it is determined according to the reception time of the first SUCI that the second SUCI is within a preset time period after the second SUCI is received.
  • the comparison module is further configured to compare the first SUCI with the second SUCI
  • the second SUCI is not discarded, and an authentication vector is generated and returned to the user after obtaining the SUPI according to the second SUCI.
  • the time module is further configured to encapsulate the received first SUCI into a data unit with a timestamp and the first SUCI after confirming that the received first SUCI is not a replay attack;
  • the comparison module is further configured to determine according to the time stamp in the data unit when the second SUCI is within the preset time period according to the reception time of the first SUCI; compare the first SUCI with the second SUCI according to the The first SUCI in the data unit is compared.
  • the time module is further configured to encapsulate the SUPI in the data unit, where the SUPI is used for the UDM to generate an authentication vector and return it to the user.
  • the comparison module is further configured to use 60 seconds or the timing duration of the timer T3519 as the preset time period.
  • the comparison module is further configured to confirm whether it is a replay attack according to the anti-replay parameter in the second SUCI if the first SUCI is different from the second SUCI.
  • the comparison module is further configured to confirm whether it is a replay attack according to the anti-replay parameter in the second SUCI, including:
  • the comparison module is further configured to obtain the UE's long-term key of the SUPI corresponding to the second SUCI after comparing the first SUCI with the second SUCI, when it is confirmed that it is not a replay attack, generate an authentication vector and return it to the UE.
  • each part of the device described above is divided into various modules or units by function and described respectively.
  • the functions of each module or unit may be implemented in one or more software or hardware.
  • the embodiments of the present application further provide a computer-readable storage medium, where the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program for executing the foregoing replay attack processing method.
  • the embodiments of the present application provide a solution for defending against SUCI replay attacks on the UDM, and within the timer T3519, the data unit DU will be used as a comparison label to identify whether the received SUCI is a legitimate user If it is retransmitted, that is, the subsequently received SUCI will be compared with the SUCI in the DU. If it is the same, the received SUCI will not be lost and will be further processed.
  • DU Data Unit
  • the SUCI sent by the UE to the UDM using the retransmission mechanism within the timer T3519 will not be discarded, so that the retransmission mechanism on the UE side will not fail.
  • embodiments of the embodiments of the present application may be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Accordingly, the embodiments of the present application may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, embodiments of the present application may take the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, optical storage, etc.) having computer-usable program code embodied therein.
  • computer-usable storage media including, but not limited to, disk storage, optical storage, etc.
  • These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing apparatus to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory result in an article of manufacture comprising instruction means, the instructions
  • the apparatus implements the functions specified in the flow or flow of the flowcharts and/or the block or blocks of the block diagrams.

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Abstract

本申请实施例公开了一种重放攻击处理方法、统一数据管理实体及存储介质，包括：UDM确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，标识所述第一SUCI的接收时间；UDM在接收到第二SUCI后，根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较。采用本申请实施例，在预设时间段内，UE使用重传机制发给UDM的SUCI不会被丢弃，从而使UE侧的重传机制不会失效。

Description

一种重放攻击处理方法、统一数据管理实体及存储介质
相关申请的交叉引用
本申请基于申请号为202110025012.X、申请日为2021年01月08日的中国专利申请提出，并要求该中国专利申请的优先权，该中国专利申请的全部内容在此以全文引入的方式引入本申请。
技术领域
本申请实施例涉及无线通信技术领域，特别涉及一种重放攻击处理方法、统一数据管理实体及存储介质。
背景技术
对于签约加密标识(SUCI，Subscription Concealed Identifier)的可靠性传输，为了实现SUCI由用户设备(UE，User Equipment)向接入和移动管理功能(AMF，Access and Mobility Management Function)的可靠性传输，图1为SUCI重传机制定时器示意图，如图所示，在现有方案中，对UE定义了SUCI重传机制，使用了两个定时器：T3519(60秒)T3510(15秒)来实现。
UE生成SUCI后启动定时器T3519和T3510，存储SUCI，并把SUCI发给AMF。如果AMF收到SUCI，将不做重放检查把它传给鉴权服务功能(AUSF，Authentication Server Function)，并由AUSF转发给统一数据管理实体(UDM，Unified Data Management)。UE如果在定时器T3510内没有从AMF收到响应，将重新发送存储的SUCI给网络。
在极端情况下，UE可能把相同的SUCI向网络发送五次，也就是有可能UDM会收到5次相同的SUCI。在定时器T3519过期后，UE再生成一个新的SUCI并存储它，开始一轮新的SUCI传输。
对于SUCI重放攻击，攻击者在空口获取用户有效的SUCI后，然后在空口向网络重放，UDM会像处理一个正常用户的SUCI一样，生成认证矢 量，并向攻击者发送含有随机数(RAND，Random)和认证令牌(AUTN，Authentication Token)的认证请求消息。攻击者再向合法的UE转发认证请求消息。如果攻击者多次使用重放攻击，UDM和UE不得不花费大量资源来处理重放消息和认证请求消息，因为这些消息是合法的，从而造成对UDM和UE的拒绝服务(DOS，Denial of Service)攻击。对UE的DOS攻击，会造成UE的处理能力下降和快速消耗电池的电量。对UDM的DOS攻击，会造成UDM的处理能力下降和对合法UE的请求响应变慢。攻击者使用获得SUCI重放攻击获得的RAND和AUTN可以对受害者发起关联性攻击从而确定受害者是否在某一个特定的区域内。
现有的防重放攻击的方案的不足在于，在UDM上防重放攻击的方法无法区分SUCI是合法的UE使用SUCI重传机制重发过来的，还是攻击者重放的SUCI，以至于会使UE侧的SUCI重传机制失效。
发明内容
本申请实施例提供了一种重放攻击处理方法、统一数据管理实体及存储介质，用以解决UE侧的SUCI重传机制失效的问题。
本申请实施例提供以下技术方案：
一种重放攻击处理方法，包括：
UDM确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，标识所述第一SUCI的接收时间；
UDM在接收到第二SUCI后，根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较。
实施中，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，进一步包括：
若第一SUCI与第二SUCI相同，则第二SUCI不丢弃，根据第二SUCI获取SUPI后生成认证矢量返回用户。
实施中，确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，进一步包括：
封装成带时间戳以及第一SUCI的数据单元；
根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，是根据数据单元中的时间戳确定的；
对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较，是根据数据单元中的第一SUCI进行比较的。
实施中，进一步包括：
在数据单元中封装SUPI，所述SUPI用以供UDM生成认证矢量返回用户。
实施中，所述预设时间段为60秒或定时器T3519的定时时长。
实施中，进一步包括：
若第一SUCI与第二SUCI不相同，根据第二SUCI中的防重放参数确认是否为重放攻击。
实施中，根据第二SUCI中的防重放参数确认是否为重放攻击，包括：
在第二SUCI中的随机数未加密时，若第二SUCI中的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击；
在第二SUCI中的随机数加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击；
针对每个UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值未加密时，若第二SUCI中的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击；
针对每个UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击。
实施中，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，进一步包括：
在确认不是重放攻击时，获取第二SUCI对应的SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。
一种UDM，包括：
处理器，用于读取存储器中的程序，执行下列过程：
确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，标识所述第一SUCI的接收时间；
在接收到第二SUCI后，根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较；
收发机，用于在处理器的控制下接收和发送数据。
实施中，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，进一步包括：
若第一SUCI与第二SUCI相同，则第二SUCI不丢弃，根据第二SUCI获取SUPI后生成认证矢量返回用户。
实施中，确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，进一步包括：
封装成带时间戳以及第一SUCI的数据单元；
根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，是根据数据单元中的时间戳确定的；
对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较，是根据数据单元中的第一SUCI进行比较的。
实施中，进一步包括：
在数据单元中封装SUPI，所述SUPI用以供UDM生成认证矢量返回用户。
实施中，所述预设时间段为60秒或定时器T3519的定时时长。
实施中，进一步包括：
若第一SUCI与第二SUCI不相同，根据第二SUCI中的防重放参数确认是否为重放攻击。
实施中，根据第二SUCI中的防重放参数确认是否为重放攻击，包括：
在第二SUCI中的随机数未加密时，若第二SUCI中的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击；
在第二SUCI中的随机数加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击；
针对每个UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值未加密时，若第二SUCI中的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击；
针对每个UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击。
实施中，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，进一步包括：
在确认不是重放攻击时，获取第二SUCI对应的SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。
一种UDM，包括：
时间模块，用于确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，标识所述第一SUCI的接收时间；
比较模块，用于在接收到第二SUCI后，根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较。
实施中，比较模块进一步用于在对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，
若第一SUCI与第二SUCI相同，则第二SUCI不丢弃，根据第二SUCI获取SUPI后生成认证矢量返回用户。
实施中，时间模块进一步用于确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，封装成带时间戳以及第一SUCI的数据单元；
比较模块进一步用于根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，是根据数据单元中的时间戳确定的；对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较，是根据数据单元中的第一SUCI进行比较的。
实施中，时间模块进一步用于在数据单元中封装SUPI，所述SUPI用以供UDM生成认证矢量返回用户。
实施中，比较模块进一步用于采用60秒或定时器T3519的定时时长为所述预设时间段。
实施中，比较模块进一步用于若第一SUCI与第二SUCI不相同，根据第二SUCI中的防重放参数确认是否为重放攻击。
实施中，比较模块进一步用于在根据第二SUCI中的防重放参数确认是否为重放攻击时，包括：
在第二SUCI中的随机数未加密时，若第二SUCI中的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击；
在第二SUCI中的随机数加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击；
针对每个UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值未加密时，若第二SUCI中的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击；
针对每个UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击。
实施中，比较模块进一步用于对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，在确认不是重放攻击时，获取第二SUCI对应的SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。
一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机可读存储介质存储有执行上述重放攻击处理方法的计算机程序。
本申请实施例有益效果如下：
本申请实施例实施例提供的技术方案中，由于在确认接收到的SUCI不是重放攻击后，根据此时间来进行判断，在预设时间段内的SUCI，只要SUCI相同，都不会被丢掉，可以进行进一步的处理。也即，在预设时间段内，例如在计时器T3519时间内，UE使用重传机制发给UDM的SUCI不会被丢弃，从而使UE侧的重传机制不会失效。
附图说明
此处所说明的附图用来提供对本申请实施例的进一步理解，构成本申请实施例的一部分，本申请实施例的示意性实施例及其说明用于解释本申请实施例，并不构成对本申请实施例的不当限定。在附图中：
图1为背景技术中SUCI重传机制定时器示意图；
图2为本申请实施例实施例中重放攻击处理方法实施流程示意图；
图3为本申请实施例实施例中UDM结构示意图。
具体实施方式
发明人在发明过程中注意到：
目前的SUCI防重放攻击的方案，按照SUCI中的防重放参数(随机数，计数值)是否被加密分为以下两类：
(1)SUCI中的防重放参数没有加密。
这类方案是UE把SUCI中的防重放参数不加密并发给UDM。UDM收到SUCI后，根据防重放参数判断SUCI是否是重放。对于防重放参数是随机数时，UDM在数据库中查找是否有以前收到的随机数与刚收到的随机数 相等，如果找到相等的，则UDM判断收到的SUCI为重放攻击，UDM则丢弃此SUCI；如果没有找到相等的，则UDM判断收到的SUCI不是重放攻击，并进行下一步处理。另一种方案是使用SUCI中的用户公钥来防止SUCI重放攻击。网络侧UDM通过把从UE侧收到的SUCI中的用户公钥与存储在数据库中以前的用户公钥比对确定收到的SUCI消息是否是重放消息。
对于防重放参数是计数值时，由于计数值是与UE相关联的，UDM需要先解密SUCI得到签约永久标识(SUPI，Subscription Permanent Identifier)找到对应UE，然后使用对应UE上次存储的计数值进行比较。如果收到的计数值大于上次计数值，UDM判断收到的SUCI不是重放攻击，并进行下一步处理。如果收到的计数值小于等于上次的计数值；则UDM判断收到的SUCI为重放攻击，UDM则丢弃此SUCI。
(2)SUCI中的防重放参数加密。
这类方案是UE把SUCI中的防重放参数加密并发给UDM。UDM收到SUCI后，首先对SUCI进行解密，再根据防重放参数判断SUCI是否是重放。基于随机数，计数值来判断SUCI是否是重放的方法与上面介绍的方法一致。一个方案提出了一种使用一次性随机数(nonce)N防止重放攻击并减轻DoS方案。N被引入加密操作中，如下所示：
IMSIEnc＝MCC||MNC||EncPK(MSIN,N)，
其中，MCC和MNC未加密，因为它们需要用于在漫游情况下路由，||是级联操作，EncPK(X)表示使用密钥PK来加密明文X。网络侧收到IMSIEnc后，解密得到N，首先验证N是否是新的。如果归属公共陆上移动网络(PLMN，Public Land Mobile Network)之前已经看过N，则检测到重放攻击。
现有的在UDM上防重放攻击的方法无法区分SUCI是合法的UE使用 SUCI重传机制重发过来的，还是攻击者重放的SUCI。UDM一旦检测到SUCI是重放的，将丢弃收到的SUCI。结果是使UE侧的SUCI重传机制失效。
基于此，本申请实施例实施例提供的技术方案将在UDM上解决UE侧的SUCI重传机制失效问题。
UE侧的SUCI重传机制，可以是指：合法的UE生成SUCI后，启动定时器T3519(60秒)，存储SUCI，并把SUCI发给UDM。UE如果在定时器T3510(15秒)内没有收到响应，将重新发送存储的SUCI给网络，以实现在60秒内向网络发送相同的多个SUCI。在定时器T3519(60秒)过期后，UE再生成一个新的SUCI并存储它，开始一轮新的SUCI传输。
攻击者的SUCI重放攻击，可以是指：首先，攻击者在空口，通过手动操作获取合法用户的SUCI，然后，在空口，再通过手动操作向网络重放SUCI。由于攻击者是手动操作，导致攻击者在60秒内无法既实现截获合法用户的SUCI又实现向网络重放截获的SUCI，而且，攻击者在60秒内也无法向网络发送相同的多个SUCI。
为了避免相关技术中UDM无法区分SUCI是合法的UE使用SUCI重传机制重发过来的还是攻击者重放的SUCI从而导致UE侧的SUCI重传机制失效问题的发生，本申请实施例中，具体包括：
UDM收到SUCI后，在确认收到的SUCI不是重放攻击的情况下，将该SUCI封装成携带时间戳的数据单元(DU，Data Unit)，其结构可以为：DU＝{SUCI，SUPI，Timestamp}。其中，Timestamp为收到SUCI的时间点。并将构建的DU移入消息队列。
UDM后续再次收到SUCI后，将后续收到的SUCI与DU中的SUCI进行比较，如果二者相同，且在计时器T3519(60秒)的计数时长内，则UDM确定是合法UE通过重传机制发送的SUCI，如此，后续收到的SUCI 不丢掉，以使UE侧的重传机制不失效，同时，UDM移除消息队列中构建的DU。
如果二者不相同，则UDM确定是不同设备发送的SUCI，如此，从后续收到的SUCI中提取防重放参数，利用防重放参数判断后续收到的SUCI是否是重放攻击，在确定后续收到的SUCI不是重放攻击的情况下，将该后续收到的SUCI封装成携带时间戳的DU，并将构建的DU移入消息队列。
以此类推，UDM后续再次收到SUCI后，将后续收到的SUCI与DU中的SUCI进行比较。
下面结合附图对本申请实施例的具体实施方式进行说明。
图2为重放攻击处理方法实施流程示意图，如图所示，可以包括：
步骤201、UDM确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，标识所述第一SUCI的接收时间；
步骤202、UDM在接收到第二SUCI后，根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较。
通过比较，即可判读第二SUCI是否是重放攻击。
实施中，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，还可以进一步包括：
若第一SUCI与第二SUCI相同，则第二SUCI不丢弃，根据第二SUCI获取SUPI后生成认证矢量返回用户。
具体的，若第一SUCI与第二SUCI不相同，则进一步使用SUCI中的防重放参数(随机数，计数值)对SUCI是否是重放进行判断。
若第一SUCI与第二SUCI相同，则第二SUCI不丢弃，根据它获取SUPI并生成认证矢量，并返回给用户。
实施中，确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，还可以进一步包括：
封装成带时间戳以及第一SUCI的数据单元；
根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，是 根据数据单元中的时间戳确定的；
对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较，是根据数据单元中的第一SUCI进行比较的。
实施中，进一步包括：
在数据单元中封装SUPI，所述SUPI用以供UDM生成认证矢量返回用户。
实施中，所述预设时间段为60秒或定时器T3519的定时时长。也即T3519的时长。
具体的，方案中，在确认收到的SUCI不是重放攻击后，把它封装成带时间戳(Timestamp)的DU(数据单元，Data Unit)，其结构可以为：DU＝{SUCI，SUPI，Timestamp}。以预设时间段为T3519的时长为例，在计时器T3519时间内，DU会用作比较标签来鉴别收到的SUCI是否是合法用户重传的SUCI，即后续收到的SUCI会与DU中的SUCI进行比较，如果相同，则收到的SUCI不丢掉，进一步进行处理。如果不同，继续使用SUCI中的防重放参数(例如：随机数、计数值)对SUCI是否是重放进行判断。以下的方案还会就SUCI中的防重放参数是随机数和计数值分别进行说明。方案中，在计时器T3519时间内UE使用重传机制发给UDM的SUCI不会被丢弃，从而使UE侧的重传机制不会失效。
实施中，还可以进一步包括：
若第一SUCI与第二SUCI不相同，根据第二SUCI中的防重放参数确认是否为重放攻击。
实施中，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，还可以进一步包括：
在确认不是重放攻击时，获取第二SUCI对应的SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。
为了实现重放攻击检测，方案中的SUCI中包含有防重放的参数。
1、随机数用作防重放参数。
随机数用作SUCI中的防重放参数有两种情形：随机数没有加密和随机数加密。UDM可以根据收到的SUCI在判断SUCI是否是重放时分别就这两种情形进行分析。
1)随机数没有加密。
在第二SUCI中的随机数未加密时，若第二SUCI中的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击。
UDM会使用存储的数据单元(DU)的消息队列，与存储随机数的数据库一起来判断收到的SUCI是否是重放攻击，具体可以如下：
UDM收到SUCI后，设置timestamp为收到SUCI的时间点，并在存储DU的消息队列中寻找SUCI，如果寻找到SUCI并且对应的DU中的时间戳在T3519时间内，UDM获取对应DU的SUPI，找到对应SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE(用户设备，User Equipment)。
UDM根据时间戳移除消息队列中的时间在T3519以前的DU。
如果UDM在消息队列中没有找到SUCI，则从收到SUCI中提取随机数。
UDM在存储随机数的数据库搜寻与SUCI中对应的随机数，如果找到，确认SUCI不是重放攻击，则中断链接；如果没有找到，确认SUCI不是重放攻击。则对SUCI进行解密获得SUPI。基于对应SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。UDM构建数据单元DU＝{SUCI，SUPI，Timestamp}，并把它移入消息队列。
2)随机数加密。
在第二SUCI中的随机数加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击。
UDM会使用存储数据单元(DU)的消息队列，与存储随机数的数据 库一起来判断收到的SUCI是否是重放攻击，具体可以如下：
UDM收到SUCI后，设置timestamp为收到SUCI的时间点，并在存储DU的消息队列中寻找SUCI，如果寻找到SUCI并且对应的DU中的时间戳在T3519时间内，UDM获取对应DU的SUPI，找到对应SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。
UDM根据时间戳移除消息队列中的时间在T3519以前的DU。
如果UDM在消息队列中没有找到对应的SUCI，则解密收到的SUCI获得随机数和SUPI。
UDM在存储随机数的数据库搜寻与SUCI中对应的随机数，如果找到，确认SUCI是重放攻击，则中断链接；如果没有找到，确认SUCI不是重放攻击。基于对应SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。UDM构建数据单元DU＝{SUCI，SUPI，Timestamp}，并把它移入消息队列。
2、计数值用作防重放参数。
计数值用作SUCI中的防重放参数有两种情形：计数值没有加密和计数值加密。UDM根据收到的SUCI在判断SUCI是否是重放时分别就这两种情形进行分析。
1)计数值没有加密。
针对每个UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值未加密时，若第二SUCI中的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击。
针对每个UE，UDM会使用消息队列存储数据单元(DU)和以前存储的计数值一起来判断收到的SUCI是否是重放攻击，具体可以如下：
UDM收到SUCI后，设置timestamp为收到SUCI的时间点，并在存储DU的消息队列中寻找SUCI，如果寻找到SUCI并且对应的DU中的时间戳在T3519时间内，UDM获取对应DU的SUPI，找到对应SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。
UDM根据时间戳移除消息队列中的时间在T3519以前的DU。
如果UDM在消息队列中没有找到对应的SUCI，则提取收到SUCI中的计数值。
UDM使用以前存储的计数值与SUCI中对应的计数值进行比较，如果SUCI中对应的计数值小于等于以前存储的计数值，确认SUCI是重放攻击，则中断链接。
如果SUCI中对应的计数值大于以前存储的计数值，确认SUCI不是重放攻击，并对SUCI进行解密获得SUPI。基于对应SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。UDM构建数据单元DU＝{SUCI，SUPI，Timestamp}，并把它移入消息队列。
2)计数值加密。
针对每个UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击。
针对每个UE，UDM会使用消息队列存储数据单元(DU)和以前存储的计数值一起来判断收到的SUCI是否是重放攻击，具体可以如下：
UDM收到SUCI后，设置timestamp为收到SUCI的时间点，并在存储DU的消息队列中寻找SUCI，如果寻找到SUCI并且对应的DU中的时间戳在T3519时间内，UDM获取对应DU的SUPI，找到对应SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。
UDM根据时间戳移除消息队列中的时间在T3519以前的DU。
如果UDM在消息队列中没有找到对应的SUCI，则解密收到的SUCI得到SUPI和计数值。
UDM使用以前存储的计数值与SUCI中对应的计数值进行比较，如果SUCI中对应的计数值小于等于以前存储的计数值，确认SUCI是重放攻击，则中断链接。
如果SUCI中对应的计数值大于以前存储的计数值，确认SUCI不是重放攻击。基于对应SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。UDM构建数据单元DU＝{SUCI，SUPI，Timestamp}，并把它移入消息队列。
基于同一发明构思，本申请实施例实施例中还提供了一种UDM、及计算机可读存储介质，由于这些设备解决问题的原理与重放攻击处理方法相似，因此这些设备的实施可以参见方法的实施，重复之处不再赘述。
在实施本申请实施例实施例提供的技术方案时，可以按如下方式实施。
图3为UDM结构示意图，如图所示，UDM中包括：
处理器300，用于读取存储器320中的程序，执行下列过程：
确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，标识所述第一SUCI的接收时间；
在接收到第二SUCI后，根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较；
收发机310，用于在处理器300的控制下接收和发送数据。
实施中，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，进一步包括：
若第一SUCI与第二SUCI相同，则第二SUCI不丢弃，根据第二SUCI获取SUPI后生成认证矢量返回用户。
实施中，确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，进一步包括：
封装成带时间戳以及第一SUCI的数据单元；
根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，是根据数据单元中的时间戳确定的；
对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较，是根据数据单元中的第一SUCI进行比较的。
实施中，进一步包括：
在数据单元中封装SUPI，所述SUPI用以供UDM生成认证矢量返回 用户。
实施中，所述预设时间段为60秒或定时器T3519的定时时长。
实施中，进一步包括：
若第一SUCI与第二SUCI不相同，根据第二SUCI中的防重放参数确认是否为重放攻击。
实施中，根据第二SUCI中的防重放参数确认是否为重放攻击，包括：
在第二SUCI中的随机数未加密时，若第二SUCI中的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击；
在第二SUCI中的随机数加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击；
针对每个UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值未加密时，若第二SUCI中的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击；
针对每个UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击。
实施中，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，进一步包括：
在确认不是重放攻击时，获取第二SUCI对应的SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。
其中，在图3中，总线架构可以包括任意数量的互联的总线和桥，具体由处理器300代表的一个或多个处理器和存储器320代表的存储器的各种电路链接在一起。总线架构还可以将诸如外围设备、稳压器和功率管理电路等之类的各种其他电路链接在一起，这些都是本领域所公知的，因此，本文不再对其进行进一步描述。总线接口提供接口。收发机310可以是多个元件，即包括发送机和接收机，提供用于在传输介质上与各种其他装置通信的单元。处理器300负责管理总线架构和通常的处理，存储器320可以存储处理器300在执行操作时所使用的数据。
本申请实施例实施例中还提供了一种UDM，包括：
时间模块，用于确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，标识所述第一SUCI的接收时间；
比较模块，用于在接收到第二SUCI后，根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较。
实施中，比较模块进一步用于在对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，
若第一SUCI与第二SUCI相同，则第二SUCI不丢弃，根据第二SUCI获取SUPI后生成认证矢量返回用户。
实施中，时间模块进一步用于确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，封装成带时间戳以及第一SUCI的数据单元；
比较模块进一步用于根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，是根据数据单元中的时间戳确定的；对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较，是根据数据单元中的第一SUCI进行比较的。
实施中，时间模块进一步用于在数据单元中封装SUPI，所述SUPI用以供UDM生成认证矢量返回用户。
实施中，比较模块进一步用于采用60秒或定时器T3519的定时时长为所述预设时间段。
实施中，比较模块进一步用于若第一SUCI与第二SUCI不相同，根据第二SUCI中的防重放参数确认是否为重放攻击。
实施中，比较模块进一步用于在根据第二SUCI中的防重放参数确认是否为重放攻击时，包括：
在第二SUCI中的随机数未加密时，若第二SUCI中的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击；
在第二SUCI中的随机数加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击；
针对每个UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值未加密时，若第二SUCI中的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击；
针对每个UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击。
实施中，比较模块进一步用于对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，在确认不是重放攻击时，获取第二SUCI对应的SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。
为了描述的方便，以上所述装置的各部分以功能分为各种模块或单元分别描述。当然，在实施本申请实施例时可以把各模块或单元的功能在同一个或多个软件或硬件中实现。
本申请实施例实施例中还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机可读存储介质存储有执行上述重放攻击处理方法的计算机程序。
具体实施可以参见UDM上的重放攻击处理方法的实施。
综上所述，本申请实施例实施例提供了在UDM上抵御SUCI重放攻击的方案，可以在计时器T3519时间内，数据单元DU会用作比较标签来鉴别收到的SUCI是否是合法用户重传的，即后续收到的SUCI会与DU中的SUCI进行比较，如果相同，则收到的SUCI不丢掉，进一步进行处理。
在确认收到的SUCI不是重放攻击后，把它封装成带时间戳的数据单元(DU:Data Unit)，其结构为DU＝{SUCI，SUPI，Timestamp}。
还提供了随机数用作防重放参数、计数值用作防重放参数时，在UDM侧的防重放流程。
基于此方案，在计时器T3519时间内UE使用重传机制发给UDM的SUCI不会被丢弃，从而使UE侧的重传机制不会失效。
本领域内的技术人员应明白，本申请实施例的实施例可提供为方法、 系统、或计算机程序产品。因此，本申请实施例可采用完全硬件实施例、完全软件实施例、或结合软件和硬件方面的实施例的形式。而且，本申请实施例可采用在一个或多个其中包含有计算机可用程序代码的计算机可用存储介质(包括但不限于磁盘存储器和光学存储器等)上实施的计算机程序产品的形式。
本申请实施例是参照根据本申请实施例实施例的方法、设备(系统)、和计算机程序产品的流程图和/或方框图来描述的。应理解可由计算机程序指令实现流程图和/或方框图中的每一流程和/或方框、以及流程图和/或方框图中的流程和/或方框的结合。可提供这些计算机程序指令到通用计算机、专用计算机、嵌入式处理机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器以产生一个机器，使得通过计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器执行的指令产生用于实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的装置。
这些计算机程序指令也可存储在能引导计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备以特定方式工作的计算机可读存储器中，使得存储在该计算机可读存储器中的指令产生包括指令装置的制造品，该指令装置实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能。
这些计算机程序指令也可装载到计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备上，使得在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行一系列操作步骤以产生计算机实现的处理，从而在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行的指令提供用于实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的步骤。
显然，本领域的技术人员可以对本申请实施例进行各种改动和变型而不脱离本申请实施例的精神和范围。这样，倘若本申请实施例的这些修改和变型属于本申请实施例权利要求及其等同技术的范围之内，则本申请实施例也意图包含这些改动和变型在内。

Claims (11)

  1. 一种重放攻击处理方法，包括：
    统一数据管理实体UDM确认接收到的第一签约加密标识SUCI不是重放攻击后，标识所述第一SUCI的接收时间；
    UDM在接收到第二SUCI后，根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较。
  2. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其中，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，进一步包括：
    若第一SUCI与第二SUCI相同，则第二SUCI不丢弃，根据第二SUCI获取签约永久标识SUPI后生成认证矢量返回用户。
  3. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其中，确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，进一步包括：
    封装成带时间戳以及第一SUCI的数据单元；
    根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，是根据数据单元中的时间戳确定的；
    对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较，是根据数据单元中的第一SUCI进行比较的。
  4. 如权利要求3所述的方法，其中，进一步包括：
    在数据单元中封装SUPI，所述SUPI用以供UDM生成认证矢量返回用户。
  5. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述预设时间段为60秒或定时器T3519的定时时长。
  6. 如权利要求1至5任一所述的方法，其中，进一步包括：
    若第一SUCI与第二SUCI不相同，根据第二SUCI中的防重放参数确认是否为重放攻击。
  7. 如权利要求6所述的方法，其中，根据第二SUCI中的防重放参数确认是否为重放攻击，包括：
    在第二SUCI中的随机数未加密时，若第二SUCI中的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击；
    在第二SUCI中的随机数加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的随机数是未存储过的，则确认不是重放攻击；
    针对每个用户设备UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值未加密时，若第二SUCI中的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击；
    针对每个UE，在第二SUCI中的计数值加密时，若第二SUCI中解密后的计数值比以前存储的计数值大，则确认不是重放攻击。
  8. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其中，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较后，进一步包括：
    在确认不是重放攻击时，获取第二SUCI对应的SUPI的UE的长期密钥，生成认证矢量并返回给UE。
  9. 一种UDM，包括：
    处理器，用于读取存储器中的程序，执行下列过程：
    确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，标识所述第一SUCI的接收时间；
    在接收到第二SUCI后，根据所述第一SUCI的接收时间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较；
    收发机，用于在处理器的控制下接收和发送数据。
  10. 一种UDM，包括：
    时间模块，用于确认接收到的第一SUCI不是重放攻击后，标识所述第一SUCI的接收时间；
    比较模块，用于在接收到第二SUCI后，根据所述第一SUCI的接收时 间确定第二SUCI在预设时间段内时，对第一SUCI与第二SUCI进行比较。
  11. 一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机可读存储介质存储有执行权利要求1至8任一所述方法的计算机程序。
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