WO2022147846A1 - 一种生成设备间通信的密钥的方法、系统和装置 - Google Patents
一种生成设备间通信的密钥的方法、系统和装置 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2022147846A1 WO2022147846A1 PCT/CN2021/071149 CN2021071149W WO2022147846A1 WO 2022147846 A1 WO2022147846 A1 WO 2022147846A1 CN 2021071149 W CN2021071149 W CN 2021071149W WO 2022147846 A1 WO2022147846 A1 WO 2022147846A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- key
- user equipment
- network element
- identifier
- network
- Prior art date
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 397
- 238000004891 communication Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 250
- 230000008569 process Effects 0.000 claims description 101
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 claims description 88
- 230000004044 response Effects 0.000 claims description 36
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 claims description 28
- 238000013475 authorization Methods 0.000 claims description 27
- 238000007726 management method Methods 0.000 claims description 26
- 238000013523 data management Methods 0.000 claims description 7
- 238000012545 processing Methods 0.000 description 20
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 12
- 230000003993 interaction Effects 0.000 description 9
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 8
- 230000011664 signaling Effects 0.000 description 6
- 238000010295 mobile communication Methods 0.000 description 5
- 230000001360 synchronised effect Effects 0.000 description 5
- 230000009286 beneficial effect Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 description 3
- 230000008878 coupling Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000010168 coupling process Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000005859 coupling reaction Methods 0.000 description 3
- 238000005516 engineering process Methods 0.000 description 3
- 230000007774 longterm Effects 0.000 description 3
- 238000013500 data storage Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000009795 derivation Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000011161 development Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000003287 optical effect Effects 0.000 description 2
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 2
- 238000003491 array Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000006399 behavior Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000001413 cellular effect Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000013144 data compression Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000001914 filtration Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004927 fusion Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000010354 integration Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000013307 optical fiber Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000003908 quality control method Methods 0.000 description 1
- 239000004065 semiconductor Substances 0.000 description 1
- 239000007787 solid Substances 0.000 description 1
- 230000003068 static effect Effects 0.000 description 1
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
- H04W12/069—Authentication using certificates or pre-shared keys
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/06—Authentication
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
- H04W88/02—Terminal devices
- H04W88/04—Terminal devices adapted for relaying to or from another terminal or user
Definitions
- the present application relates to the field of communications, and more particularly, to a method, system and apparatus for generating a key for communication between a remote device and a relay device.
- ProSe device-to-device proximity-based service
- UE user equipment
- a communication connection is established directly between devices.
- One of the communication models is that one UE accesses the operator's network through the assistance of another UE, so as to perform service interaction with the data network.
- the remote user equipment obtains services through the relay user equipment (UE-to-Network Relay)
- UE-to-Network Relay in order to ensure communication security, a secure connection needs to be established between the Remote UE and the UE-to-Network Relay.
- the establishment of communication connections through UE-to-Network Relay is dynamically established on demand, and shared security information cannot be pre-configured between Remote UE and UE-to-Network Relay, and Remote UE and UE- Secure connections between to-Network Relays. Therefore, there is an urgent need for a method to dynamically establish a secure connection between the Remote UE and the UE-to-Network Relay.
- the present application provides a method, system and apparatus for generating a key for inter-device communication, so that a secure communication connection is dynamically established between user equipment and user equipment.
- a first aspect provides a method for generating a key for inter-device communication, the method comprising: a first user equipment generates a first temporary identifier based on the first key; the first user equipment sends a message to the second user equipment a first request, where the first request is used to establish a communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment; wherein the first request includes the first temporary identifier and a relay service code ; the first user equipment generates a shared key based on the second key and the relay service code; wherein the shared key is used to protect the connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment
- the second key and the first key are the keys generated in the authentication process or the keys derived based on the intermediate key generated in the authentication process.
- the shared key is used to protect the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment.
- a possible implementation includes that the first user equipment and the second user equipment deduce an intermediate key or session key based on the generated shared key, respectively, and further, deduce the first user equipment based on the intermediate key or the session key.
- encryption key and/or integrity protection key for messages or data between the device and the second user equipment.
- the encryption key and/or the integrity protection key are used to protect the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment.
- Another possible implementation includes that the first user equipment and the second user equipment deduce the encryption key and/or complete protection of the message or data between the first user equipment and the second user equipment based on the generated shared key, respectively key.
- the encryption key and/or the integrity protection key are used to protect the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment.
- the first user equipment Based on the above solution, the first user equipment generates a shared key that can be used to protect the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment, so that a secure secure connection is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment communication connection.
- the second key is the same as the first key, and the second key and the first key are the authentication The key Kausf generated in the process or the key derived based on the Kausf.
- the second key is different from the first key, and the first key is the key Kausf generated in the authentication process ;
- the second key is a key derived based on the Kausf.
- the second key is different from the first key, and the second key is the key Kausf generated in the authentication process ;
- the first key is a key derived based on the Kausf.
- the generating, by the first user equipment, the first temporary identifier based on the first key includes: the first user equipment is based on the first key, The network identifier and routing information of the first user equipment to generate the first temporary identifier; wherein, the network identifier of the first user equipment is used for the network side to identify the information of the first user equipment, and the routing information is used for for determining the information of the core network element related to the first user equipment.
- the core network elements related to the first user equipment may specifically be core network elements involved in the authentication process of the first user equipment, such as data management network elements and short-range service security function network elements.
- the first user equipment generates a first temporary identifier based on the first key, the network identifier of the first user equipment, and routing information, and sends the first temporary identifier to the second user equipment.
- the second user equipment sends the first temporary identifier to the network side, so that the core network element related to the user of the first user equipment can obtain the second key according to the first temporary identifier, and further the core network element can obtain the second key according to the first temporary identifier.
- the second key determines the shared key and sends it to the second user equipment, so that the first user equipment and the second user equipment obtain the same shared key. Based on the shared key, the first user equipment and the second user equipment can dynamically establish a secure communication connection.
- the first user equipment generates the first temporary identifier based on the first key, the network identifier of the first user equipment, and routing information , comprising: obtaining, by the first user equipment, a second temporary identifier based on the first key and the network identifier of the first user equipment as input parameters of the first preset algorithm; combining the second temporary identifier and the The routing information is spliced to obtain the first temporary identifier.
- the network identifier of the first user equipment is the user permanent identifier SUPI or the International Mobile Subscriber Identity IMSI or the Universal Public Subscription Identifier GPSI; the routing information is routing instructions.
- the method further includes: the first user equipment sends a non-access stratum NAS message to a mobility management network element, where the NAS message includes capability information, the The capability information is used to indicate that the first user equipment supports as a remote user equipment.
- the first user equipment sends a NAS message including capability information to the network side, so as to serve as a basis for the network side to determine whether the first user equipment has the capability to support the remote user equipment, thereby helping the first user equipment
- the device generates a shared key to dynamically establish a secure communication connection between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- the first user equipment Based on the above technical solution, the first user equipment generates the shared key based on the second key, the relay service code, and the first freshness parameter, to ensure that the second key is the same and the relay service is the same.
- the codes are the same, but the first user equipment generates different shared keys when establishing direct communication with different user equipments, so that the secure communication connection established between the user equipment and the user equipment is more reliable.
- the method further includes: the first user equipment receiving a security mode command from the second user equipment, the security mode command including a second freshness parameters; the first user equipment generates the shared key based on the second key and the relay service code, including: the first user equipment generates the shared key based on the second key, the relay A service code and the second freshness parameter to generate the shared key.
- the first user equipment Based on the above technical solution, the first user equipment generates the shared key based on the second key, the relay service code, and the second freshness parameter, to ensure that the second key is the same and the relay service
- the codes are the same, but the first user equipment generates different shared keys when establishing direct communication with different user equipments, so that the secure communication connection established between the user equipment and the user equipment is more reliable.
- the first request further includes a first freshness parameter; the method further includes: the first user equipment receives a security message from the second user equipment mode command, the security mode command includes a second freshness parameter; the first user equipment generates the shared key based on the second key and the relay service code, including: the first user The device generates the shared key based on the second key, the relay service code, the first freshness parameter, and the second freshness parameter.
- the first user equipment Based on the above technical solution, the first user equipment generates the shared key based on the second key, the relay service code, the first freshness parameter, and the second freshness parameter, to ensure that the The second key is the same and the relay service code is the same, but the first user equipment generates different shared keys when establishing direct communication with different user equipments, so that the secure communication connection established between the user equipment and the user equipment is more reliable.
- the security mode command further includes a security algorithm; the method further includes: the first user equipment, based on the shared key and the security algorithm, obtains a communication key; the communication key is used to protect the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment. Specifically, the first user equipment obtains the communication key based on the shared key and the security algorithm, and further includes: the first user equipment generates an intermediate key/session key based on the shared key, Based on the intermediate key/session key and the communication key of the security algorithm.
- the first user equipment obtains the communication key based on the shared key and the security algorithm, so that the secure communication connection established between the user equipment and the user equipment is protected and thus more reliable.
- a method for generating a key for inter-device communication includes: a first network element generates a first temporary identifier based on the first key; the first network element receives data from a second network element
- the key acquisition message includes the identification of the first user equipment and the relay service code, wherein the identification of the first user equipment includes the first temporary identification or the identification of the first user equipment.
- Network identifier, the network identifier of the first user equipment is used for the network side to identify the information of the first user equipment; the first network element is based on the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code and the second password.
- the shared key is used to protect the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment, and the second key and the first key are the The key generated in the authentication process of the first user equipment or the key derived from the intermediate key generated in the authentication process of the first user equipment; the first network element reports to the second network element sends the shared key. Further, the second network element sends the shared key to the second user equipment.
- the first network element generates a shared key that can be used to protect the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment, and sends it to the second user equipment, so that the second user equipment A secure communication connection may be dynamically established with the first user equipment based on the shared key.
- the first network element generates a shared key according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code and the second key, including : the first network element obtains the second key according to the identifier of the first user equipment, and the first network element generates the shared secret according to the second key and the relay service code key.
- the first network element obtains the second key according to the identifier of the first user equipment, so that the first network element can generate a
- the shared key for protecting the communication connection between the devices enables a secure communication connection between the user equipment and the user equipment to be dynamically established.
- the second key is the same as the first key, and the second key and the first key are the authentication The key Kausf generated in the process or the key derived based on the Kausf.
- the second key is different from the first key, and the first key is the key Kausf generated in the authentication process ;
- the second key is a key derived based on the Kausf.
- the second key is different from the first key, and the second key is the key Kausf generated in the authentication process ;
- the first key is a key derived based on the Kausf.
- the first network element generates the first temporary identifier based on the first key, including: the first network element is based on the first key, The network identifier and routing information of the first user equipment to generate the first temporary identifier; wherein, the network identifier of the first user equipment is used for the network side to identify the information of the first user equipment, and the routing information is the information used to determine the core network element related to the first user equipment.
- the first network element generates the first temporary identifier based on the first key, the network identifier of the first user equipment, and routing information, including: The first network element obtains a second temporary identifier based on the first key and the network identifier of the first user equipment as input parameters of the first preset algorithm; the second temporary identifier and the routing information Splicing is performed to obtain the first temporary identification.
- the network identifier of the first user equipment is the user permanent identifier SUPI or the International Mobile Subscriber Identity IMSI or the Universal Public Subscription Identifier GPSI; the routing information is routing instructions.
- the method further includes: in the process of authenticating the first user equipment, the first network element receives indication information from a third network element ; in response to the indication information, the first network element generates the first temporary identifier based on the first key.
- the first network element Based on the above technical solution, the first network element generates the first temporary identifier in response to the indication information sent by the third network element. Then the first network element stores the generated first temporary identifier in association with the second key. Subsequently, when the first network element receives a key acquisition message carrying the first temporary identifier from the second network element, the first network element can acquire the above-mentioned second key according to the first temporary identifier, which is beneficial to the first The network element determines the shared key according to the second key and sends it to the second user equipment via one or more intermediate network elements, so that a secure communication connection is dynamically established between the first user equipment and the second user equipment based on the shared key . .
- the first network element in the process of authenticating the first user equipment, receives indication information from a third network element; in response to the indicating information, the first network element generating the first temporary identifier based on the first key includes: in the process of authenticating the first user equipment, the first network element receives a message from the first user equipment. Capability information of four network elements, where the capability information is used to indicate that the first user equipment supports the capability of a remote UE; in response to the indication information and the capability information, the first network element is based on the first key to generate the first temporary identifier.
- the first network element Based on the above technical solution, the first network element generates the first temporary identifier in response to the indication information sent by the third network element and the capability information sent by the fourth network element. Then the first network element stores the generated first temporary identifier in association with the second key. Subsequently, when the first network element receives a key acquisition message carrying the first temporary identifier from the second network element, the first network element can acquire the above-mentioned second key according to the first temporary identifier, which is beneficial to the first The network element determines the shared key according to the second key and sends it to the second user equipment via one or more intermediate network elements, so that a secure communication is dynamically established between the first user equipment and the second user equipment based on the shared key connect.
- the method further includes: the first network element sending the first temporary identifier to a third network element.
- the first network element sends the first temporary identifier to a third network element, and the third network element stores the first temporary identifier and the identifier of the first network element in the first user in the context information of the device.
- the subsequent second network element may acquire the identifier of the first network element and the network identifier of the first user equipment from the third network element according to the first temporary identifier.
- the second network element can obtain the above-mentioned shared key from the first network element based on the network identifier of the first user equipment and send it to the second user equipment, so that the relationship between the first user equipment and the second user equipment can be based on the
- the shared key dynamically establishes a secure communication connection.
- the key acquisition message further includes a first freshness parameter; the first network element according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay Service code and second key, and generating a shared key, including: the first network element according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code, the second key and the first freshness parameter , to generate a shared key.
- the first network element generates a shared key according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code, the second key, and the first freshness parameter, to ensure that the second key is The same and the same relay service code, but the first user equipment generates different shared keys when establishing direct communication with different user equipments, thereby making the secure communication connection established between the user equipment and the user equipment more reliable.
- the method further includes: generating, by the first network element, a second freshness parameter; Generating the shared key by the relay service code and the second key includes: the first network element according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code, the second key and the shared key.
- the second freshness parameter is used to generate a shared key.
- the first network element generates a shared key according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code, the second key, and the second freshness parameter, to ensure that the second key is The same and the same relay service code, but the first user equipment generates different shared keys when establishing direct communication with different user equipments, thereby making the secure communication connection established between the user equipment and the user equipment more reliable.
- the key acquisition message further includes a first freshness parameter; the method further includes: the first network element generates a second freshness parameter; the The first network element generates a shared key according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code and the second key, including: the first network element is based on the identifier of the first user equipment , the relay service code, the second key, the first freshness parameter and the second freshness parameter to generate a shared key.
- the first network element generates a shared secret according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code, the second key, the first freshness parameter and the second freshness parameter ensure that the second key is the same and the relay service code is the same, but the first user equipment generates different shared keys when establishing direct communication with different user equipment, so that the security established between the user equipment and the user equipment The communication connection is more reliable.
- the first network element is an authentication function network element.
- the second network element is a mobility management network element, an authentication function network element, or a short-range service security function network element.
- the third network element is a data management network element.
- the fourth network element is a mobility management network element.
- a method for generating a key for inter-device communication includes: a fifth network element obtains a first temporary identifier and a third key, where the third key is generated based on an authentication process The key obtained by deriving the intermediate key from the second network element; the fifth network element receives a key acquisition message from the sixth network element, and the key acquisition message includes the first temporary identifier and the relay service code; Five network elements generate a shared key according to the first temporary identifier, the relay service code and the third key; wherein the shared key is used to protect the communication between the first user equipment and the second user equipment The fifth network element sends the shared key to the sixth network element.
- the fifth network element generates a shared key that can be used to protect the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment, so that the security is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment communication connection.
- the fifth network element generates a shared key according to the first temporary identifier, the relay service code and the third key, including: The fifth network element generates a shared key according to the first temporary identifier, the relay service code and the third key; including: the fifth network element obtains the third temporary identifier according to the first temporary identifier key, the fifth network element generates a shared key according to the third key and the relay service code.
- the fifth network element obtains the third key according to the first temporary identifier, so that the fifth network element can generate a device for protecting the device according to the third key and the relay service code the shared key of the communication connection between the two, the fifth network element sends the shared key to the second user equipment via one or more intermediate network elements, ensuring that the shared key is dynamically established between the first user equipment and the second user equipment , based on the shared key, a secure communication connection is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- acquiring the first temporary identifier by the fifth network element includes: the fifth network element receiving the first temporary identifier from the first network element, and the The first temporary identifier is generated based on a first intermediate key, and the first intermediate key is an intermediate key generated in the process of authenticating the first user equipment or based on the intermediate key generated in the process of authentication.
- the key obtained by key derivation; or, the fifth network generates the first temporary identifier based on the third intermediate key.
- the fifth network element obtains the first temporary identifier, so that the fifth network element can obtain the third key according to the first temporary identifier, so that the fifth network element can obtain the third key according to the third
- the key and the relay service code are used to generate a shared key for protecting the communication connection between devices, and the fifth network element sends the shared key to the second user equipment via one or more intermediate network elements, ensuring that the first A shared key is dynamically established between the user equipment and the second user equipment, and based on the shared key, a secure communication connection is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- the third key is a key deduced based on the key Kausf generated in the authentication process.
- the first temporary identifier is generated based on the first key, including: the first temporary identifier is based on the first key, The network identification and routing information of the first user equipment are generated; wherein, the network identification of the first user equipment is used for the network side to identify the information of the first user equipment, and the routing information is used to determine the information about the core network element related to the first user equipment.
- the first temporary identifier is generated based on the first key, the network identifier of the first user equipment, and routing information, including: the The second temporary identifier is obtained based on the first key and the network identifier of the first user equipment as input parameters of the first preset algorithm; the first temporary identifier is obtained by combining the second temporary identifier and the obtained by splicing the routing information.
- the network identifier of the first user equipment is the user permanent identifier SUPI or the International Mobile Subscriber Identity IMSI or the Universal Public Subscription Identifier GPSI; the routing information is routing instructions.
- the key acquisition message further includes a first freshness parameter; the fifth network element according to the first temporary identifier, the relay service code and a third key, generating a shared key, comprising: the fifth network element generating a shared key according to the first temporary identifier, the relay service code, the third key and the first freshness parameter key.
- the fifth network element generates a shared key according to the first temporary identifier, the relay service code, the second key and the first freshness parameter, to ensure that the second key is the same,
- the relay service codes are the same, but the first user equipment generates different shared keys when establishing direct communication with different user equipments, thereby making the secure communication connection established between the user equipment and the user equipment more reliable.
- the method further includes: the fifth network element generates a second freshness parameter; the fifth network element generates a second freshness parameter according to the first temporary identifier, the Relay service code and third key to generate a shared key, including: the fifth network element according to the first temporary identifier, the relay service code, the third key and the third key Two freshness parameters to generate a shared key.
- the fifth network element generates a shared key according to the first temporary identifier, the relay service code, the second key, and the second freshness parameter, to ensure that the second key is the same,
- the relay service codes are the same, but the first user equipment generates different shared keys when establishing direct communication with different user equipments, thereby making the secure communication connection established between the user equipment and the user equipment more reliable.
- the key acquisition message further includes a first freshness parameter; the method further includes: the fifth network element generating the shared key according to the relay service code and the third key, comprising: the fifth network element according to the first temporary identifier, the relay service code, the third key, the The first freshness parameter and the second freshness parameter generate a shared key.
- the fifth network element generates a shared key according to the first temporary identifier, the relay service code, the second key, the first temporary identifier and the second freshness parameter, to ensure that the The second key is the same and the relay service code is the same, but the first user equipment generates different shared keys when establishing direct communication with different user equipments, thereby making the secure communication connection established between the user equipment and the user equipment more reliable.
- the fifth network element is the first short-range service security function network element.
- the fifth network element is the first short-range service security function network element.
- the sixth network element is a second short-range service security function network element.
- a system for generating a key for inter-device communication comprising: a first network element for generating a first temporary identifier based on the first key; The network element sends a key acquisition message, where the key acquisition message includes the identification of the first user equipment and the relay service code, wherein the identification of the first user equipment includes the first temporary identification or the first user
- the network identifier of the device where the network identifier of the first user equipment is used for the network side to identify the information of the first user equipment; the first network element is also used to code and a second key to generate a shared key; wherein the shared key is used to protect the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment, and the second key and the first user equipment
- the key is a key generated in the authentication process of the first user equipment or a key derived based on an intermediate key generated in the authentication process of the first user equipment; the first network element sends The second network element sends the shared key.
- the first network element generates a shared key that can be used to protect the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment, so that the security is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment communication connection.
- the first network element is further configured to generate a shared secret according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code and the second key key, including: the first network element is further configured to obtain the second key according to the identifier of the first user equipment, and the first network element is further configured to obtain the second key according to the second key and the middle Following the service code, the shared key is generated.
- the first network element obtains the second key according to the identifier of the first user equipment, so that the first network element can generate a
- the shared key for protecting the communication connection between the devices enables a secure communication connection between the user equipment and the user equipment to be dynamically established.
- the second key is the same as the first key, and the second key and the first key are the authentication The key Kausf generated in the process or the key derived based on the Kausf.
- the second key is different from the first key, and the first key is the key Kausf generated in the authentication process ;
- the second key is a key derived based on the Kausf.
- the second key is different from the first key, and the second key is the key Kausf generated in the authentication process ;
- the first key is a key derived based on the Kausf.
- the first network element configured to generate the first temporary identifier based on the first key, includes: the first network element is further configured to, based on the first key, the network identifier and routing information of the first user equipment, to generate the first temporary identifier; wherein the network identifier of the first user equipment is used for the network side to identify the first user equipment information, where the routing information is information used to determine the core network element related to the first user equipment.
- the first network element Based on the above technical solution, the first network element generates the first temporary identifier based on the first key, the network identifier of the first user equipment, and routing information, so that the core network element related to the first user equipment can obtain the first temporary identifier according to the first temporary identifier.
- the above-mentioned second key is further determined according to the second key and sent to the second user equipment to ensure that the first user equipment and the second user equipment obtain the same shared key. Based on the shared key, a secure communication connection is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- the first network element is further configured to, based on the first key, the network identifier of the first user equipment, and routing information, generate the The first temporary identification includes: the first network element is further configured to obtain a second temporary identification based on the first key and the network identification of the first user equipment as input parameters of the first preset algorithm; The second temporary identifier and the routing information are spliced to obtain the first temporary identifier.
- the first network element Based on the above technical solution, the first network element generates the first temporary identifier based on the first key, the network identifier of the first user equipment, and routing information, so that the core network element related to the first user equipment can obtain the first temporary identifier according to the first temporary identifier.
- the above-mentioned second key is helpful for the first network element to determine the shared key according to the second key and send it to the second user equipment via one or more intermediate network elements, so that a dynamic relationship between the user equipment and the user equipment is established. Secure communication connection.
- the network identifier of the first user equipment is the user permanent identifier SUPI or the international mobile subscriber identity IMSI or the general public subscription identifier GPSI; the routing information is routing instructions.
- the system further includes: a third network element, and in the process of authenticating the first user equipment, the third network element is configured to send a request to the third network element.
- the first network element sends first indication information; in response to the first indication information, the first network element is configured to, based on the first key, generate the first temporary identifier.
- the first network element Based on the above technical solution, the first network element generates a first temporary identifier in response to the indication information sent by the third network element, so that the first network element can obtain the above-mentioned second key according to the first temporary identifier, which is beneficial to the first
- the network element determines the shared key according to the second key and sends it to the second user equipment via one or more intermediate network elements, so that a secure communication connection is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- the system further includes: a fourth network element, and in the process of authenticating the first user equipment, the fourth network element is used to send the The first network element sends capability information, where the capability information is used to indicate the capability of the first user equipment to support the remote UE; in response to the first indication information and the capability information, the first network element uses and generating the first temporary identifier based on the first key.
- the first network element Based on the above technical solution, the first network element generates a first temporary identifier in response to the indication information sent by the third network element and the capability information sent by the fourth network element, so that the first network element can obtain the above-mentioned first temporary identifier according to the first temporary identifier.
- the second key is helpful for the first network element to determine the shared key according to the second key and send it to the second user equipment via one or more intermediate network elements, so that the user equipment and the user equipment are dynamically established. communication connection.
- the first network element is further configured to send the first temporary identifier to the third network element.
- the first network element sends the first temporary identifier to the third network element, and the third network element stores the first temporary identifier in the context information of the first user equipment, so as to facilitate all
- the third network element determines the identifier of the first network element from the context of the first user equipment according to the first temporary identifier, and then enables the first network element to obtain the second key according to the first temporary identifier , so that the first network element determines the shared key according to the second key and sends it to the second user equipment via one or more intermediate network elements, so that a secure communication connection is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- the second network element is further configured to send the first temporary identifier to the third network element; the third network element is further configured to , sending the identifier of the first network element to the second network element.
- the second network element sends the first temporary identifier (the first temporary identifier sent by the first user equipment to the second network element via one or more intermediate network elements) to the third network element for use in
- the third network element determines the identifier of the first network element from the context of the first device according to the first temporary identifier, and then enables the first network element to obtain the above-mentioned second key according to the first temporary identifier, thereby
- the first network element determines the shared key according to the second key and sends it to the second user equipment via one or more intermediate network elements, so that a secure communication connection is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- the third network element is further configured to send the identifier of the first network element and the network identifier of the first user equipment to the second network element .
- the third network element sends the identifier of the first network element and the network identifier of the first user equipment to the second network element, so that the second network element finds the first network element according to the identifier of the first network element, so that the The first network element can obtain the above-mentioned second key according to the first temporary identification or the network identification of the first user equipment, so that the first network element determines the shared key according to the second key and sends it via one or more intermediate network elements
- a secure communication connection is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- the key acquisition message further includes a first freshness parameter; the first network element is used to: generating the shared key by using the relay service code and the second key, including: the first network element being used for, according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code, the second key and the The first freshness parameter is described, and a shared key is generated.
- the first network element generates a shared key according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code, the second key, and the first freshness parameter, to ensure that the second key is The same and the same relay service code, but the first user equipment generates different shared keys when establishing direct communication with different user equipments, thereby making the secure communication connection established between the user equipment and the user equipment more reliable.
- the first network element is further configured to generate a second freshness parameter; the first network element is configured to, according to the first user equipment's The identification, the relay service code, and the second key, and generating a shared key, including: the first network element being used for, according to the identification of the first user equipment, the relay service code, the first The second key and the second freshness parameter generate a shared key.
- the first network element generates a shared key according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code, the second key, and the second freshness parameter, to ensure that the second key is The same and the same relay service code, but the first user equipment generates different shared keys when establishing direct communication with different user equipments, thereby making the secure communication connection established between the user equipment and the user equipment more reliable.
- the key acquisition message further includes a first freshness parameter; the first network element is further configured to generate a second freshness parameter; the first A network element is used for generating a shared key according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code and the second key, including: the first network element is used for, according to the first network element The identifier of a user equipment, the relay service code, the second key, the first freshness parameter and the second freshness parameter are used to generate a shared key.
- the first network element generates a shared secret according to the identifier of the first user equipment, the relay service code, the second key, the first freshness parameter and the second freshness parameter ensure that the second key is the same and the relay service code is the same, but the first user equipment generates different shared keys when establishing direct communication with different user equipment, so that the security established between the user equipment and the user equipment The communication connection is more reliable.
- the system further includes: a first user equipment and a second user equipment.
- the first network element is an authentication function network element.
- the second network element is a mobility management network element, an authentication function network element, or a short-range service security function network element.
- the third network element is a data management network element.
- the fourth network element is a mobility management network element.
- an apparatus for generating a key for communication between devices comprising: a memory for storing computer instructions; a processor for executing the computer instructions stored in the memory, so that the apparatus executes The method described in the first aspect or any one of the possible implementations of the first aspect.
- the apparatus for generating a key for inter-device communication executes the method described in the first aspect or any possible implementation manner of the first aspect, so that the apparatus generates a key that can be used to protect the A shared key for the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment, so that a secure communication connection is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- an apparatus for generating a key for inter-device communication comprising: a memory for storing computer instructions; a processor for executing the computer instructions stored in the memory, so that the apparatus executes The method described in the second aspect or any one possible implementation manner of the second aspect.
- the apparatus for generating a key for inter-device communication executes the method described in the second aspect or any possible implementation manner of the second aspect, so that the apparatus generates a key that can be used to protect the A shared key for the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment, so that a secure communication connection is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- an apparatus for generating a key for communication between devices comprising: a memory for storing computer instructions; a processor for executing the computer instructions stored in the memory, so that the apparatus executes The method described in the third aspect or any one possible implementation manner of the third aspect.
- the apparatus for generating a key for inter-device communication executes the method described in the third aspect or any possible implementation manner of the third aspect, so that the apparatus generates a key that can be used to protect the A shared key for the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment, so that a secure communication connection is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- a readable computer storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a communication device, the communication device can execute the first aspect or any one of the possible first aspects. Implement the method described in the method.
- a computer program is stored on the readable computer storage medium, and when the computer program is executed by an apparatus for generating a key for inter-device communication, the computer program is executed by executing the first aspect or any one of the possible options in the first aspect.
- the method described in the implementation manner enables the apparatus to generate a shared key that can be used to protect the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment, thereby enabling dynamic communication between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- a secure communication connection is established.
- a readable computer storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a communication device, the communication device can execute the second aspect or any one of the possible possibilities of the second aspect. Implement the method described in the method.
- a computer program is stored on the readable computer storage medium, and when the computer program is executed by an apparatus for generating a key for inter-device communication, by executing the second aspect or any one of the possible possibilities of the second aspect
- the method described in the implementation manner enables the apparatus to generate a shared key that can be used to protect the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment, thereby enabling dynamic communication between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- a secure communication connection is established.
- a readable computer storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a communication device, causes the communication device to execute the third aspect or any one of the possible possibilities of the third aspect. Implement the method described in the method.
- a computer program is stored on the readable computer storage medium, and when the computer program is executed by the apparatus for generating a key for inter-device communication, by executing the third aspect or any one of the possible possibilities of the third aspect
- the method described in the implementation manner enables the apparatus to generate a shared key that can be used to protect the communication connection between the first user equipment and the second user equipment, thereby enabling dynamic communication between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- a secure communication connection is established.
- a chip system in an eleventh aspect, includes a processor for calling and running a computer program from a memory, so that a device installed with the chip system executes the first aspect or any one of the first aspects A communication method described in a possible implementation.
- system-on-a-chip may further include a memory in which instructions are stored, and the processor is configured to execute the instructions stored in the memory or other instructions.
- the processor is configured to implement the method of the first aspect or any possible implementations thereof.
- system-on-a-chip can be integrated on user equipment.
- a twelfth aspect provides a chip system, the chip system includes a processor for calling and running a computer program from a memory, so that a device installed with the chip system executes the second aspect or any of the second aspects A communication method described in a possible implementation.
- system-on-a-chip may further include a memory in which instructions are stored, and the processor is configured to execute the instructions stored in the memory or other instructions.
- the processor is adapted to implement the method of the second aspect above or any possible implementation thereof.
- system-on-a-chip can be integrated on a network device.
- a thirteenth aspect provides a chip system, the chip system includes a processor for calling and running a computer program from a memory, so that a device installed with the chip system executes the third aspect or any of the third aspects A communication method described in a possible implementation.
- system-on-a-chip may further include a memory in which instructions are stored, and the processor is configured to execute the instructions stored in the memory or other instructions.
- the processor is configured to implement the method of the above third aspect or any possible implementations thereof.
- system-on-a-chip can be integrated on a network device.
- a secure communication connection is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a scenario applied to an embodiment of the present application
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a network architecture applied to an embodiment of the present application
- FIG. 3 is a schematic interaction flowchart of an example of a method for deriving a temporary identity of a remote user equipment on the network side provided by an embodiment of the present application
- FIG. 4 is a schematic interaction flowchart of an example of a method for a remote user equipment to access a network through a relay user equipment provided by an embodiment of the present application
- FIG. 5 is a schematic interaction flowchart of another example of a method for deriving a temporary identity of a remote user equipment on the network side provided by an embodiment of the present application
- FIG. 6 is a schematic interaction flowchart of another example of a method for a remote user equipment to access a network through a relay user equipment provided by an embodiment of the present application
- FIG. 7 is a schematic interaction flowchart of another example of a method for deriving a temporary identity of a remote user equipment on the network side provided by an embodiment of the present application
- FIG. 8 is a schematic interaction flowchart of another example of a method for a remote user equipment to access a network through a relay user equipment provided by an embodiment of the present application
- FIG. 9 is a schematic block diagram of an example of a communication device provided by an embodiment of the present application.
- FIG. 10 is a schematic block diagram of another example of a communication device provided by an embodiment of the present application.
- the wireless communication systems mentioned in the embodiments of the present application include but are not limited to: a global system of mobile communication (GSM) system, a long term evolution (long term evolution, LTE) frequency division duplex (frequency division duplex, FDD) system , LTE time division duplex (time division duplex, TDD), wideband code division multiple access (wideband code division multiple access, WCDMA) system, code division multiple access (code division multiple access, CDMA) system, time division synchronous code division multiple access ( time division-synchronous code division multiple access, TD-SCDMA), general packet radio service (GPRS), LTE system, advanced long-term evolution (LTE-Advanced, LTE-A) system, general mobile communication system (universal mobile telecommunication system, UMTS), worldwide interoperability for microwave access (WiMAX) communication system, next-generation communication system (for example, 5G communication system), fusion system of multiple access systems, or evolution system , Three major application scenarios of the next-generation 5G mobile communication system: enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB), ultra
- V2V Vehicle to Vehicle
- V2I Vehicle to Infrastructure
- V2P Vehicle to Pedestrian
- V2N Vehicle to Network
- the terminal devices involved in the embodiments of this application may include various access terminals, mobile devices, user terminals, or user equipments with wireless communication functions.
- user equipment UE
- handheld terminal notebook computer
- subscriber unit cellular phone
- smart phone wireless data card
- personal digital assistant, PDA personal digital assistant
- tablet computer tablet computer
- wireless modem modem
- handheld device handheld
- laptop computer laptop computer
- cordless phone cordless phone
- wireless local loop wireless local loop
- WLL wireless local loop
- MTC machine A machine type communication
- a certain air interface technology is used to communicate with each other between the terminal equipment and the access network equipment.
- the embodiments of the present application do not limit application scenarios.
- FIG. 1 shows a schematic diagram of a scenario applied to an embodiment of the present application.
- the Remote UE accesses the operator network through the UE-to-Network Relay to perform service interaction with the data network.
- FIG. 1 is only for ease of understanding, and is an example of a schematic diagram of an application scenario of the embodiment of the present application, which is not limited by the embodiment of the present application, and the network elements involved in the schematic diagram are described below.
- Remote UE A UE with short-range communication that can communicate with a data network (DN) through a relay device.
- DN data network
- UE may be a UE capable of accessing and accessing the network through another UE.
- UE-to-Network Relay It can be a UE capable of providing access to another UE and providing the UE with the function of accessing the network.
- RAN equipment is mainly 3GPP network wireless network equipment
- AN can be a non-3GPP-defined access network equipment, which is mainly responsible for radio resource management, quality of service (QoS) management, data compression and encryption on the air interface side.
- the access network equipment may include various forms of base stations, such as: a macro base station, a micro base station (also referred to as a small cell), a relay station, an access point, and the like.
- the names of devices with base station functions may be different, for example, in the 5th generation (5G) system, it is called RAN or gNB (5G NodeB); In an LTE system, it is called an evolved NodeB (evolved NodeB, eNB or eNodeB); in a 3rd generation (3rd generation, 3G) system, it is called a Node B (Node B) and so on.
- 5G 5th generation
- RAN 5th generation
- gNB 5G NodeB
- eNB evolved NodeB
- 3rd generation (3rd generation, 3G) system it is called a Node B (Node B) and so on.
- Gateway mainly responsible for external connection to the data network and data packet routing and forwarding on the user plane, packet filtering, and performing service quality control related functions.
- User data can be received from the data network and transmitted to the terminal device through the access network device, and user data can also be received from the terminal device through the access network device and forwarded to the data network.
- the user plane network element may be a user plane function (UPF) network element.
- the user plane network element may still be the UPF network element, or may have other names, which are not limited in this application.
- FIG. 2 shows a schematic diagram of a 5G network architecture applied to an embodiment of the present application.
- the embodiments of the present application may be applied to a network architecture of a 5G communication system, and each network element that may be involved in the network architecture will be described below.
- Authentication server function (AUSF) network element supports the authentication function during access.
- the AUSF network element is used to implement authentication when the UE accesses the network, to generate a key, and can also be used to determine the authorization of the Remote UE.
- Unified data management (UDM) network element used to generate authentication credentials, user identification processing (such as storing and managing user permanent identities, etc.), access authorization control and contract data management, etc.
- UDM Unified data management
- the UDM is used to perform authorization determination on the Remote UE, and store user information.
- PCF Policy control function
- Network exposure function (NEF) network element used to securely open services and capabilities provided by 3GPP network functions to the outside.
- Application function network element used to provide services, or perform data routing affected by applications, access network open function network elements, or exchange service data with PCF network elements for policy control, etc.
- the network repository function (NRF) network element is used for a network function (NF) network element in the network to discover the network elements of another NF, such as network function entities such as AMF, SMF, PCF, and UDM. Both are called NF network elements.
- the NRF is used to find the routing information of the AUSF according to the instance ID (Instance ID) of the AUSF, and send it to the PSF.
- Unified data storage network element that is, used to store user subscription data, service policy data, unstructured data, etc.
- Mobility management function network element access and mobility management function, AMF
- AMF access and mobility management function
- MME mobility management entity
- Other functions other than that, such as terminal mobility management, terminal authentication and de-authentication, terminal session access, terminal allowed slice access selection, legal interception or access authorization (or authentication) and other functions.
- Session management function session management function, SMF
- SMF Session management function
- IP Internet Protocol
- User plane function network element can be used for packet routing and forwarding, or quality of service (quality of service, QoS) parameter processing of user plane data, etc.
- User data can be transmitted to the data network (DN) through this network element.
- DN data network
- PC5 The reference point between UEs with NFC capability, used for ProSe Direct Discovery, ProSe Direct Communication and UE-to-Network Relay control plane connection and User plane connection.
- UE A can directly access the network through the Uu interface, or can first establish a connection with UE C through the PC5 interface, and then access the network through UE C.
- UE B first establishes a connection with UE A through the PC5 interface, and then accesses the network through UE A;
- UE C can access the network through the Uu interface, or first establish a connection with UE A through the PC5 interface, and then access the network through UE A.
- both UE A and UE C can directly access the network through the Uu interface.
- UE A can also establish a connection with UE C through the PC5 interface first, and then access the network through UE C (at this time, UE A is called Remote UE, and UE C is called UE-to-Network Relay); UE C can also pass The PC5 interface establishes a connection with UE A, and then accesses the network through UE A (at this time, UE C is called Remote UE, and UE A is called UE-to-Network Relay).
- UE B first establishes a connection with UE A through the PC5 interface, and then accesses the network through UE A (at this time, UE B is called Remote UE, and UE A is called UE-to-Network Relay).
- UE A and UE C can be regarded as either a UE-to-Network Relay that provides a network connection function for another Remote UE, or a UE-to-Network Relay capable of accessing and accessing the network through another UE-to-Network Relay.
- Remote UE UE-to-Network Relay that provides a network connection function for another Remote UE
- UE-to-Network Relay capable of accessing and accessing the network through another UE-to-Network Relay.
- UE B can be considered as a Remote UE with the ability to access and access the network through another UE-to-Network Relay, and access the network through UE-to-Network Relay A.
- FIG. 3 shows a schematic flowchart of the network side deriving the temporary identity of Remote UE#1 during or after the authentication process of UE#1 (that is, an example of the first user equipment) according to the embodiment of the present application, including the following steps:
- UDM generates indication information and sends it to AUSF#1.
- AUSF#1 the following implementations can be listed:
- UE#1 reports capability information to AMF#1, where the capability information is used to indicate whether the UE#1 supports the capability of being a Remote UE.
- the capability information reported by the UE side to the network side may be carried in a non-access stratum NAS message (eg, a registration request message) sent by UE#1 to AMF#1 (ie, an example of the fourth network element).
- NAS message eg, a registration request message
- AMF#1 sends capability information of UE#1 to AUSF#1.
- the capability information of UE#1 sent by AMF#1 to AUSF#1 may be carried in the authentication request message (eg, Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request) sent by AMF#1 to AUSF#1.
- the authentication request message eg, Nausf_UEAuthentication_Authenticate Request
- AUSF#1 receives the capability information sent by S410, and sends the capability information to the UDM (ie, an example of the third network element).
- AUSF#1 may send an authentication request message (eg, Nudm_UEAuthentication Request message) containing capability information of UE#1 to UDM.
- an authentication request message eg, Nudm_UEAuthentication Request message
- the UDM generates indication information #1 according to the capability information and the subscription data of UE#1, where the indication information #1 is used to indicate whether to generate information for short-range communication of UE#1, for example, the information is used to identify UE#1;
- the UDM may acquire the subscription information of UE#1 according to the authentication request message carrying the capability information, and determine the indication information #1 according to the subscription data of UE#1 and the capability information of UE#1.
- the UDM determines the indication information #1 according to the capability information of UE#1 and the subscription data of UE#1, including:
- the UDM indicates AUSF# 1 Generate indication information #1. If any one of the conditions is not satisfied, the UDM does not send the indication information #1 to the AUSF or the indication information #1 indicates that the AUSF #1 does not generate the temporary identifier #1.
- S440a The UDM sends indication information #1 to AUSF #1.
- the indication information #1 may be carried in the authentication response message sent by the UDM to the AUSF #1 during the authentication process (for example, Nudm_UEAuthentication response), or may be sent after the authentication request process.
- S400b to S410b are the same as the above-mentioned S400a to S410a, and are not repeated here for brevity.
- AUSF#1 sends an authentication request message to the UDM, wherein the authentication request message is the same as or similar to the prior art;
- UDM obtains UE#1 subscription data according to the authentication request message, and generates indication information #2, which is used to indicate whether UE#1 is authorized as a Remote UE;
- the UDM sends indication information #2 to AUSF #1.
- the indication information #2 may be carried in the authentication response message sent by the UDM to the AUSF #1 during the authentication process (for example, Nudm_UEAuthentication response), or may be sent after the authentication process.
- UE#1 sends a registration request message to AMF#1, wherein the registration request message is the same as or similar to the prior art;
- AMF#1 sends an authentication request message to AUSF#1, wherein the authentication request message is the same as or similar to the prior art;
- S420c-S440c are the same as the above-mentioned S420b-S440b, and are not repeated here.
- AUSF#1 determines to generate a temporary identifier #1 according to any one of the following three situations:
- Case 1 Corresponding to the above-mentioned mode 1, AUSF#1 receives indication information #1, and the indication information #1 instructs the generation of temporary identifier #1.
- Case 2 Corresponding to the above method 2, AUSF#1 receives the capability information and indication information #2, and both the capability information and indication information #2 indicate that UE#1 can act as a Remote UE.
- Case 3 Corresponding to the above-mentioned mode 3, AUSF#1 receives indication information #2, and indication information #2 indicates that UE#1 is authorized as a Remote UE.
- the process of generating the temporary identification #1 can generate the temporary identification #1 according to the key #1 (that is, an example of the first key) and the network identification of the Remote UE #1, for example, the following implementations can be listed:
- AUSF#1 generates temporary identifier #1 according to the network identifier of Remote UE#1 sent by AMF#1 in the authentication process and the key #1 generated by AUSF#1 in the authentication process,
- the algorithm used in the generation process may be the same as or similar to the prior art, and is not described in detail in order to avoid redundant description.
- the AUSF#1 obtains the temporary identifier #1' (that is, another example of the first temporary identifier) according to the temporary identifier #1 (that is, an example of the second temporary identifier) and the routing information of the UDM.
- the network identifier of the Remote UE can be listed as follows: user permanent identifier (subscription permanent identifier, SUPI) or international mobile subscriber identity (international mobile subscriber identity, IMSI) or (generic public subscription identifier, GPSI)
- SUPI subscription permanent identifier
- IMSI international mobile subscriber identity
- GPSI generator public subscription identifier
- Routing indicator The routing information can be listed as follows: Routing indicator.
- AUSF#1 may store temporary identifier #1 and its corresponding relationship with key #1; it may also not store temporary identifier #1, but store the network identifier and key of Remote UE#1 Correspondence of #1.
- the key #1 may be a key generated in the authentication process for UE #1 or a key derived based on an intermediate key generated in the authentication process.
- the key #1 may be based on the key Kausf#1 generated during the authentication process, or may be the key Kpru#1 deduced based on Kausf#1.
- AUSF#1 obtains temporary identifier #1' according to the splicing of temporary identifier #1 and the routing information of UDM, including the following implementations:
- the temporary identifier #1 can be represented by X bits, where the upper Y bits are used to represent the routing information; the remaining low (X-Y) bits are used to represent the temporary identifier #1', where X and Y are positive integers;
- the temporary identifier #1 can be represented by X bits, where the lower Y bits are used to represent the routing information; the remaining high (X-Y) bits are used to represent the temporary identifier #1', where X and Y are positive integers.
- AUSF#1 may also generate a key derived from the intermediate key generated in the authentication process, such as Kpru#1, after generating the temporary identifier #1. This embodiment of the present application does not make any limitation on this.
- the AUSF sends the temporary identifier #1 to the UDM.
- the AUSF#1 sends the temporary identifier #1 and the network identifier of the Remote UE#1 to the UDM, and the UDM stores the temporary identifier #1 in the context information of the Remote UE#1 according to the network identifier of the Remote UE#1.
- the context of the UE further includes the identifier of the AUSF.
- FIG. 4 shows a schematic flowchart of the stage of Remote UE#1 accessing the network through UE-to-Network Relay#1 (that is, an example of the second user equipment) according to the embodiment of the present application, including the following steps:
- Remote UE#1 discovers one or more UE-to-Network Relays, and selects one UE-to-Network Relay (counted as UE-to-Network Relay#1, that is, an example of the second user equipment) to communicate with , the manner in which the Remote UE#1 selects the UE-to-Network Relay#1 is the same as or similar to the prior art, which is not limited in this embodiment of the present application.
- Remote UE#1 generates a temporary identifier #1' (that is, an example of the first temporary identifier).
- the way that the Remote UE#1 generates the temporary identifier #1' is the same as the way that the AUSF generates the temporary identifier #1' in S450, that is, the Remote UE#1 obtains the temporary identifier #1' by splicing the temporary identifier #1 and the routing information of the UDM, which is To avoid repetition, detailed description is omitted here.
- Remote UE#1 sends a request message #1 (ie, an example of the first request) to UE-to-Network Relay#1, where request message #1 is used to request the establishment of the Remote UE#1 and UE-to-Network Relay#1 A communication connection between Network Relay#1, such as a direct communication request (DCR) message.
- the request message #1 includes the temporary identification #1' and the Relay service code.
- the Relay service code may be pre-configured by the UE side, or may be sent to the UE by the network side, such as the UE Configuration Update process defined in TS23.502.
- the Relay service code is used to identify the connection service provided by the UE-to-Network Relay that supports the ProSe service, and the authorized user of the UE-to-Network Relay that supports the ProSe service to provide the service, and can select the relevant security policy or information .
- the request message #1 may further include a freshness parameter #1 (ie, an example of the first freshness parameter).
- the request message #1 may further include an integrity message authentication code (message authentication code for integrity, MAC-I) (counted as MAC-I#1).
- integrity message authentication code messages authentication code for integrity, MAC-I
- Remote UE#1 takes the Relay service code as an input parameter, and generates key #A according to a specific algorithm based on key #1.
- Remote UE#1 uses key #A to encrypt temporary identifier #1' and Relay service code after , and generate MAC-I#1, which is used to verify the integrity protection of the request message #1 and prevent the request message #1 from being tampered with by an attacker.
- the network element #2 (ie, the second network element) may be PSF#1, AMF#2, or AUSF#2.
- AMF#2 may be the same AMF as AMF#1, or may be an AMF different from AMF#1.
- AMF#1 may be the AMF serving remote UE#
- AMF#2 may be the AMF serving UE-to-Network Relay#1.
- AUSF#2 may be the same AUSF as AUSF#1, or may be a different AUSF from AUSF#1.
- AUSF#1 may be the AUSF serving remote UE#
- AUSF#2 may be the AUSF serving UE-to-Network Relay#1.
- AMF#2 may be the same AMF as AMF#1, or may be an AMF different from AMF#1.
- AMF#1 may be the AMF serving remote UE#
- AMF#2 may be the AMF serving UE-to-Network Relay#1.
- UE-to-Network Relay#1 sends temporary identifier 1' and Relay service code to network element #2.
- the information acquired by the network element #2 may further include the freshness parameter #1.
- the information acquired by network element #2 may further include MAC-I #1.
- the network element #2 determines the corresponding UDM according to the routing information in the temporary identifier #1'.
- the network element #2 sends the temporary identifier #1' to the UDM.
- the UDM determines the temporary identifier #1 according to the temporary identifier #1', obtains the network identifier of the Remote UE#1 from the corresponding relationship between the temporary identifier #1 and the network identifier of the Remote UE#1 saved by the UDM in the above S460, and then according to the Remote UE#1
- the network identity of #1 obtains the identity of AUSF#1 from the context information of Remote UE#1, and sends the identity of AUSF#1 to network element #2.
- the information sent to the network element #2 may further include the network identifier of the Remote UE#1.
- UDM obtains the identity of AUSF#1 from the context information of Remote UE#1, including:
- UDM searches the Instance ID of AUSF#1 from the context information of Remote UE#1, and network element #2 finds AUSF#1 accordingly.
- the PSF performs an authorization check on the Remote UE#1.
- the PSF stores authorization information corresponding to each UE to perform authorization checking.
- the PSF checks whether Remote UE#1 is authorized as a Remote UE according to the network identifier of Remote UE#1, so as to obtain the connection service corresponding to the Relay service code through UE-to-Network Relay#1. If the authorization check passes, continue to perform the following steps; if the authorization check fails, the PSF sends a failure response message to AUSF#2, the response message includes the reason value of the authorization failure (for example, the authorization check fails, lack of necessary parameters, etc.).
- network element #2 sends a key acquisition message to AUSF #1.
- the key acquisition message includes the temporary identifier #1' (that is, an example of the identifier of the first user equipment) and the Relay service code.
- the network element #2 acquires the network identifier of the Remote UE#1 sent by the UDM (that is, an example of the identifier of the first user equipment), the key acquisition message includes the Remote UE#1 Network ID and Relay service code for #1.
- the key acquisition message may further include a freshness parameter #1.
- the key acquisition message may further include MAC-I#1.
- AUSF#1 determines the shared key between Remote UE#1 and UE-to-Network Relay#1 according to key#2 (ie, an example of the second key), Relay service code, and at least one freshness parameter (eg Kr).
- key#2 ie, an example of the second key
- Relay service code ie, an example of the second key
- freshness parameter eg Kr
- AUSF#1 obtains the temporary identifier #1' sent by the network element #2 in S4150, and AUSF#1 stores the correspondence between the temporary identifier #1 and the key #1 in S450, then AUSF#1 The temporary identifier #1 is determined according to the temporary identifier #1', and the key #1 is found according to the correspondence between the temporary identifier #1 and the key.
- AUSF#1 obtains the network identifier of Remote UE#1 sent by network element #2 in S4150, and in S450, AUSF#1 stores the network identifier of Remote UE#1 and the network identifier of key #1. corresponding relationship, then AUSF#1 finds key #1 according to the network identifier of Remote UE#1 and the corresponding relationship.
- the key #2 is the key generated in the authentication process or the key derived from the intermediate key generated in the authentication process.
- the following three situations can be listed:
- Case 1 The key #2 is the same as the key #1, and the key #2 and the key #1 are the key Kausf generated in the authentication process or the key derived based on the Kausf.
- Case 2 The key #2 is different from the key #1, and the key #1 is the key Kausf generated in the authentication process; the key #1 is the key derived based on the Kausf .
- Case 3 The key #2 is different from the key #1, and the key #2 is the key Kausf generated in the authentication process; the key #1 is the key derived based on the Kausf .
- Kpru#1 is generated and used in S450
- key #2 is Kpru#1 in this step
- Kpru#1 is not generated or used in S450
- key #2 can be Kausf in this step #1, or Kpru#1 that was generated and used in this step.
- At least one freshness parameter can be listed in the following embodiments:
- the at least one freshness parameter may be the freshness parameter #1 sent by S4150 (that is, the freshness parameter #1 generated by the Remote UE);
- the at least one freshness parameter may be the freshness parameter #2 (that is, an example of the second freshness parameter) generated by the AUSF#1;
- the at least one freshness parameter may be the freshness parameter #1 generated by the Remote UE#1 and the freshness parameter #2 generated by the AUSF#1 itself.
- the embodiment of the present application does not limit the quantity of the freshness parameter.
- AUSF#1 verifies the integrity of the message according to MAC-I#1, Relay service code and temporary identifier #1, which is the same as Remote UE# in S480. 1
- the method of generating MAC-I#1 is the same.
- AUSF#1 takes the Relay service code as an input parameter, and generates key#A according to a specific algorithm based on key#1.
- Remote UE#1 uses key#A to encrypt temporary After identifying #1 and Relay service code, MAC-I#1' is generated. If MAC-I#1 is inconsistent with MAC-I#1', it means that the information content is lost or attacked during transmission. If MAC-I#1 Consistent with MAC-I#1', the shared key is deduced.
- the input parameter of the above-mentioned generation key #A may further include a freshness parameter #1.
- AUSF#1 sends the shared key to network element #2, and network element #2 sends the shared key to UE-to-Network Relay#1.
- the network element #2 sends the shared key to the UE-to-Network Relay#1 in the following ways:
- the network element #2 sends the UE-to-Network Relay#1 through the user;
- network element #2 sends to UE-to-Network Relay#1 through signaling.
- the shared key may be forwarded to UE-to-Network Relay#1 through one or more other network elements.
- AUSF#1 sends freshness parameter #2 to UE-to-Network Relay#1.
- UE-to-Network Relay#1 sends a security mode command to Remote UE#1.
- the security mode command includes a security algorithm
- the security algorithm may include an encryption algorithm and/or an integrity protection algorithm.
- the safe mode command may further include a freshness parameter #2.
- the Remote UE#1 generates the shared key in this step by using the same method as the AUSF#1 in S4160 to generate the shared key based on the key, the Relay service code, and at least one freshness parameter.
- Remote UE#1 and UE-to-network Relay#1 obtain the communication key based on the shared key and the security algorithm.
- obtaining the communication key may include the following implementations:
- Remote UE#1 and UE-to-network Relay#1 deduce an intermediate key or session key based on the generated shared key, and further, derive Remote based on the intermediate key or session key Encryption key (for example, NR PC5Encryption Key, NRPEK) and/or integrity protection key (for example, NR PC5Integrity Key, NRPIK) of the signaling plane and user plane between UE#1 and UE-to-network Relay#1.
- Encryption key for example, NR PC5Encryption Key, NRPEK
- integrity protection key for example, NR PC5Integrity Key, NRPIK
- Remote UE#1 and UE-to-network Relay#1 deduce the message or data between Remote UE#1 and UE-to-network Relay#1 based on the generated shared key, respectively. Encryption key and/or full protection key.
- the specific generation method of the communication key is the same as or similar to the prior art, for example, the key generation method in TS23.303 and TS33.536.
- UE-to-Network Relay#1 sends a response message #1 to Remote UE#1 to respond to the security mode command in S4180, and the response message #1 indicates that communication security has been established.
- UE-to-Network Relay#1 sends a response message #2 to Remote UE#1, which is used to respond to the request message #1 in S490, and the response message #2 indicates that the direct connection communication has been established.
- FIG. 5 shows a schematic flowchart of the stage of authorizing UE#1 as Remote UE#1 (that is, an example of the first user equipment) by the network side in the authentication process of UE#1 according to the embodiment of the present application, including the following steps:
- S500a-S540a in Mode 1 are similar to the above-mentioned methods in S400a-S440a
- S500b-S540b in Mode 2 are similar to the above-mentioned methods in S400b-S440b
- S500c-S540c in Mode 3 are similar to the above-mentioned methods in S400c-S440c The method is similar and will not be repeated here.
- the PSF obtains the key #3 (that is, an example of the third key) and the temporary identifier #1, and the following implementations can be listed:
- AUSF#1 generates a temporary identifier #1 and a key #3.
- the AUSF#1 sends the temporary identifier #1 and the key #3 to the PSF, and the PSF stores the temporary identifier #1 and the corresponding relationship between the temporary identifier #1 and the key #3.
- the key #3 may be a key derived based on the intermediate key generated in the authentication process.
- the key #3 may be the key Kpru#1 derived from the key Kausf#1 generated in the authentication process.
- the key #1 is a key derived based on the intermediate key generated in the authentication process (for example, Kpru#1)
- the key #1 and the key #3 are the same.
- the AUSF#1 determines to generate the key #3 according to the three situations described in the above S450, and at the same time determines that the temporary identifier #1 is generated by the PSF.
- the AUSF#1 sends the network identifier of the Remote UE#1 and the sending key #3 to the PSF, which can be used to indicate that the temporary identifier #1 is generated by the PSF.
- the PSF generates the temporary identifier #1 according to the network identifier of the Remote UE#1 and the key #3, which can be implemented in the following ways:
- the PSF generates a temporary identification #1 (ie, an example of the first temporary identification) according to the network identification of Remote UE #1 and the key #3.
- the PSF obtains the temporary identifier #1' (that is, an example of the second temporary identifier) according to the splicing of the temporary identifier #1 and the routing information of the UDM.
- the PSF stores the temporary identifier #1 and its corresponding relationship with the key #3.
- FIG. 6 shows a schematic flowchart of the stage of Remote UE#1 accessing the network through UE-to-Network Relay in the embodiment of the present application, including the following steps:
- S570 is the same as or similar to the method of S470 above.
- Remote UE#1 discovers one or more UE-to-Network Relays, and selects one UE-to-Network Relay (counted as UE-to-Network Relay#1, that is, the first UE-to-Network Relay). An example of two user equipments) to communicate.
- S580 is the same as or similar to the method of S480 above, and the Remote UE#1 generates a temporary identifier #1'.
- the manner in which the Remote UE#1 generates the temporary identifier #1' is the same as the manner in which the AUSF#1 generates the temporary identifier #1' in S540.
- AUSF#1 obtains temporary identifier #1' according to the splicing of temporary identifier #1 and the routing information of PSF, including the following implementations:
- the temporary identifier #1 can be represented by X bits, where the upper Y bits are used to represent the routing information; the remaining low (X-Y) bits are used to represent the temporary identifier #1', where X and Y are positive integers;
- the temporary identifier #1 can be represented by X bits, where the lower Y bits are used to represent the routing information; the remaining high (X-Y) bits are used to represent the temporary identifier #1', where X and Y are positive integers.
- the specific algorithm is the same as or similar to the prior art, such as the basic key derivation method specified in the standard.
- the Remote UE#1 sends a request message #1 (that is, an example of the first request) to the UE-to-Network Relay#1, and the request message #1 is used to request the UE-to-Network Relay#1 to-Network Relay#1 accesses the network, such as a direct communication request (DCR) message.
- Request message #1 carries information #2, and request message #1 includes temporary identifier #1' and Relay service code.
- the Relay service code may be pre-configured by the UE side, or may be sent to the UE by the network side, such as the UE Configuration Update process defined in TS23.502.
- the Relay service code is used to identify the connection service provided by the UE-to-Network Relay that supports the ProSe service, and the authorized user of the UE-to-Network Relay that supports the ProSe service to provide the service, and can select the relevant security policy or information .
- the request message #1 may further include a freshness parameter #1.
- the request message #1 may further include the MAC-I #2.
- Remote UE#1 takes the Relay service code as an input parameter, and generates key #A according to a specific algorithm based on key #3.
- Remote UE#1 uses key #A to encrypt temporary identifier #1' and Relay service code after , and generate an integrity message authentication code (message authentication code for integrity, MAC-I) (counted as MAC-I#2), which is used to verify the integrity protection of the request message #1 and prevent the request message #1 from being tampered with by an attacker.
- MAC-I message authentication code for integrity
- UE-to-Network Relay#1 sends temporary identifier #1' and Relay service code to the PSF on the network side.
- the information obtained by the PSF from the UE-to-Network Relay#1 may further include the freshness parameter #1.
- the information obtained by the PSF from UE-to-Network Relay#1 may further include MAC-I#2.
- the UE-to-Network Relay#1 can send the temporary identifier 1' and the Relay service code to the PSF through one or more other network elements.
- the method is the same as or similar to that of S4140, and the PSF performs authorization check on Remote UE#1.
- the PSF stores authorization information corresponding to each UE to perform authorization checking.
- the PSF checks whether Remote UE#1 is authorized as a Remote UE according to the temporary identifier #1', so as to obtain the connection service corresponding to the Relay service code through UE-to-Network Relay#1. If the authorization check passes, continue to perform the following steps; if the authorization check fails, the PSF sends a failure response message to AUSF#2, the response message includes the reason value of the authorization failure (for example, the authorization check fails, lack of necessary parameters, etc.).
- the PSF determines the shared key (eg Kr) between Remote UE#1 and UE-to-Network Relay#1 according to key#3, Relay service code, and at least one fresh parameter .
- Kr shared key
- the PSF determines the temporary identifier #1 according to the temporary identifier #1', the corresponding relationship between the temporary identifier #1 and the key #3 stored in S560a in the above-mentioned method A, or
- the key #3 is searched from the corresponding relationship between the temporary identifier #1 and the key #3 stored in S565b in the above method B.
- the key #3 may be a key derived based on the intermediate key generated in the authentication process.
- the key #3 may be the key Kpru#1 derived from the key Kausf#1 generated in the authentication process.
- the generation method of at least one freshness parameter can be listed as follows:
- At least one freshness parameter may be the freshness parameter #1 sent by S590 (that is, the freshness parameter #1 generated by the Remote UE);
- the at least one freshness parameter may be the freshness parameter #2 generated by the PSF;
- the at least one freshness parameter may be the freshness parameter #1 generated by the Remote UE and the freshness parameter #2 generated by the PSF itself.
- the embodiment of the present application does not limit the quantity of the freshness parameter.
- the information obtained by the PSF can also include MAC-I#2, then AUSF#1 verifies the integrity of the message according to MAC-I#2, Relay service code and temporary identifier #1, and the verification method is the same as that in S580.
- the method is the same or similar, AUSF#1 takes the Relay service code as an input parameter, generates key #A according to a specific algorithm based on key #3, and Remote UE#1 uses key #A to encrypt temporary ID #1 and Relay service code After that, MAC-I#2' is generated. If MAC-I#2 and MAC-I#2' are inconsistent, it means that the information content is lost or attacked during the transmission process. If MAC-I#2 and MAC-I#2' If they are consistent, the shared key is deduced.
- the input parameter of the above-mentioned generation key #A may further include a freshness parameter #1.
- the PSF sends the shared key to UE-to-Network Relay#1.
- the PSF is sent through the user-oriented UE-to-Network Relay#1;
- PSF is sent to UE-to-Network Relay#1 through signaling.
- the shared key may be forwarded to UE-to-Network Relay#1 through one or more other network elements.
- AUSF-2 sends freshness parameter #2 to UE-to-Network Relay #1.
- UE-to-Network Relay#1 sends a security mode command to Remote UE#1.
- the security mode command includes a security algorithm
- the security algorithm may include an encryption algorithm and/or an integrity protection algorithm.
- the safe mode command may further include a freshness parameter #2.
- the Remote UE#1 uses the same method as S5120 to generate a shared key based on the key #3, the Relay service code, and at least one fresh parameter.
- the Remote UE#1 obtains the communication key based on the shared key and the security algorithm.
- obtaining the communication key may include the following implementations:
- Remote UE#1 and UE-to-network Relay#1 deduce an intermediate key or session key based on the generated shared key, and further, derive Remote based on the intermediate key or session key Encryption key (for example, NR PC5Encryption Key, NRPEK) and/or integrity protection key (for example, NR PC5Integrity Key, NRPIK) of the signaling plane and user plane between UE#1 and UE-to-network Relay#1.
- Encryption key for example, NR PC5Encryption Key, NRPEK
- integrity protection key for example, NR PC5Integrity Key, NRPIK
- Remote UE#1 and UE-to-network Relay#1 deduce the message or data between Remote UE#1 and UE-to-network Relay#1 based on the generated shared key, respectively. Encryption key and/or full protection key.
- the specific generation method of the communication key is the same as or similar to the prior art, for example, the key generation method in TS23.303 and TS33.536. .
- UE-to-Network Relay#1 sends a response message #1 to Remote UE#1 for responding to the security mode command in S5160, and the response message #1 indicates that communication security has been established Finish.
- UE-to-Network Relay#1 sends a response message #2 to Remote UE#1, which is used to respond to the request message #1 in S590, and the response message #2 indicates direct connection communication Completed.
- FIG. 7 shows a schematic flowchart of the stage of authentication and authorization of UE#1 as Remote UE#1 (that is, an example of the second user equipment) according to the embodiment of the present application, including the following steps:
- S600a-S640a in Mode 1 are similar to the above-mentioned methods in S500a-S540a
- S600b-S640b in Mode 2 are similar to the above-mentioned methods in S500b-S540b
- S600c-S640c in Mode 3 are similar to the above-mentioned methods in S500c-S540c
- S650a-S660a in mode A are similar to the methods in the above S550a-S560a
- S650b-S665b in the mode B are similar to the methods in the above-mentioned S550b-S565b
- S670-S690 are similar to the methods in the above-mentioned S570-S590, It will not be repeated here.
- PSF#1 (that is, an example of the fifth network element) may be a Remote PSF
- PSF#2 (that is, an example of the sixth network element) may be a serving UE-to-Network Relay# 1 PSF.
- UE-to-Network Relay#1 sends temporary identifier #1' and Relay Service Code to PSF#2.
- the UE-to-Network Relay#1 can send the temporary identifier 1' and the Relay service code to the PSF through one or more other network elements.
- the information obtained by PSF#2 from UE-to-Network Relay#1 may further include freshness parameter #1.
- the information obtained by PSF#2 from UE-to-Network Relay#1 may further include MAC-I#1.
- PSF#2 determines the corresponding PSF#1 according to the routing information in the temporary identifier #1' (that is, an example of the first temporary identifier).
- PSF#1 obtains temporary identifier #1' and Relay service code.
- the information acquired by PSF#1 may further include freshness parameter #1.
- the information acquired by PSF#1 may further include MAC-I#1.
- the method is the same as or similar to the method of S5110 above, and PSF#1 performs authorization check on Remote UE#1.
- PSF#1 checks whether Remote UE#1 is authorized as a Remote UE according to temporary identifier #1', so as to obtain the connection service corresponding to the Relay service code through UE-to-Network Relay#1. If the authorization check passes, continue to perform the following steps; if the authorization check fails, PSF#1 sends a failure response message to AUSF#2, the response message includes the reason value of the authorization failure (for example, authorization check fails, lack of necessary parameters, etc.) .
- the PSF#1 determines the shared key (for example, Kr ). In order to avoid redundant description, detailed description is omitted here.
- the information obtained by PSF#1 also includes MAC-I#1
- AUSF#1 is based on MAC-I#1, Relay service code and temporary identifier #1 (that is, an example of the first temporary identifier ) to verify the integrity of the message, and the verification method is the same as or similar to the method of S5120, and will not be repeated here.
- PSF#1 sends the shared key to PSF#2.
- PSF#1 is sent through the user-oriented UE-to-Network Relay#1;
- PSF#1 is sent to UE-to-Network Relay#1 through signaling.
- the shared key may be forwarded to UE-to-Network Relay#1 through one or more other network elements.
- the PSF#2 sends the shared key to the UE-to-Network Relay#1.
- the PSF#2 receives the freshness parameter #2, the PSF#2 sends the freshness parameter #2 to the UE-to-Network Relay#1.
- UE-to-Network Relay#1 sends a security mode command to Remote UE#1.
- the security mode command includes a security algorithm
- the security algorithm may include an encryption algorithm and/or an integrity protection algorithm.
- the safe mode command may further include a freshness parameter #2.
- the Remote UE#1 uses the same method as S6150 to generate a shared key based on key #3, Relay service code, and at least one fresh parameter.
- the Remote UE#1 obtains the communication key based on the shared key and the security algorithm.
- obtaining the communication key may include the following implementations:
- Remote UE#1 and UE-to-network Relay#1 deduce an intermediate key or session key based on the generated shared key, and further, derive Remote based on the intermediate key or session key Encryption key (for example, NR PC5Encryption Key, NRPEK) and/or integrity protection key (for example, NR PC5Integrity Key, NRPIK) of the signaling plane and user plane between UE#1 and UE-to-network Relay#1.
- Encryption key for example, NR PC5Encryption Key, NRPEK
- integrity protection key for example, NR PC5Integrity Key, NRPIK
- Remote UE#1 and UE-to-network Relay#1 deduce the message or data between Remote UE#1 and UE-to-network Relay#1 based on the generated shared key, respectively. Encryption key and/or full protection key.
- the specific generation method of the communication key is the same as or similar to the prior art, for example, the key generation method in TS23.303 and TS33.536.
- UE-to-Network Relay#1 sends a response message #1 to Remote UE#1 for responding to the security mode command in S6190, and the response message #1 indicates that communication security has been established Finish.
- UE-to-Network Relay#1 sends response message #2 to Remote UE#1, which is used to respond to request message #1 in S690 (that is, an example of the first request), This response message #2 indicates that the direct communication has been established.
- the identifier of the first user equipment (that is, including the network identifier of the Remote UE and the network identifier of the first user equipment) is used to identify the information of the first user equipment.
- the identifier of a user equipment is not limited in any way, and those skilled in the art can flexibly define the identifier according to the specific situation in order to achieve the purpose of identifying the first user equipment.
- the size of the sequence numbers of each process does not mean the order of execution, and the execution order of each process should be determined by its function and internal logic, and should not constitute any limitation to the implementation process of the embodiments of the present application. .
- Remote UE and UE-to-Network Relay access the network respectively, and obtain authorization and configuration information from the network. Among them, the authorization and configuration information are used to establish a ProSe communication connection.
- Remote UE discovers one or more UE-to-Network Relays, selects one UE-to-Network Relay among them, and accepts the connection service information provided by it.
- the Remote UE establishes a one-to-one direct communication connection with the selected UE-to-Network Relay.
- the UE-to-Network Relay reports the Remote UE Report (Remote UE Report) of the relay-related protocol data unit (PDU) session to the session management network element, for example (Remote User ID ), remote user information (Remote UE info)).
- PDU relay-related protocol data unit
- the Remote UE obtains services through the UE-to-Network Relay
- a secure connection needs to be established between the Remote UE and the UE-to-Network Relay.
- the communication connection established by the Remote UE through the UE-to-Network Relay is established dynamically on demand, for example, during the discovery process of the Remote UE, the discovered UE-to-Network Relay is not fixed.
- the first discovered may be UE-to-Network Relay#1
- the second discovered may be UE-to-Network Relay#1.
- the UE-to-Network Relay discovered by the Remote UE may be different and unpredictable at different times and places. Therefore, it is not possible to pre-configure shared security parameters (eg, shared keys) between the Remote UE and the UE-to-Network Relay for secure communication between the Remote UE and the UE-to-Network Relay.
- the embodiments of the present application generate a key for inter-device communication, so that a secure communication connection is dynamically established between the user equipment and the user equipment, which is substantially different from the above-mentioned prior art , which solves the problems existing in the above-mentioned prior art.
- each network element includes corresponding hardware structures and/or software modules for performing each function.
- each network element includes corresponding hardware structures and/or software modules for performing each function.
- the present application can be implemented in hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software with the units and algorithm steps of each example described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein. Whether a function is performed by hardware or computer software driving hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Skilled artisans may implement the described functionality using different methods for each particular application, but such implementations should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
- the transmitting-end device or the receiving-end device may be divided into functional modules according to the foregoing method examples.
- each functional module may be divided corresponding to each function, or two or more functions may be integrated into one processing module. middle.
- the above-mentioned integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware, and can also be implemented in the form of software function modules. It should be noted that, the division of modules in the embodiments of the present application is schematic, and is only a logical function division, and there may be other division manners in actual implementation. The following description will be given by taking as an example that each function module is divided corresponding to each function.
- FIG. 9 is a schematic block diagram of a communication apparatus 100 provided by an embodiment of the present application.
- the communication apparatus 100 may include: a transceiver unit 110 and a processing unit 120 .
- the communication apparatus 100 may be the remote user equipment in the above method embodiments, or may be a chip for implementing the functions of the remote user equipment in the above method embodiments.
- the communication apparatus 100 may correspond to the remote user equipment in the method 400, the method 500, the method 600, the method 700, the method 800, and the method 900 according to the embodiments of the present application, and the communication apparatus 100 may include a method for executing the Method 400 in Figure 3, Method 500 in Figure 4, Method 600 in Figure 5, Method 700 in Figure 6, Method 800 in Figure 7, Method 900 in Figure 8, Method 700 in Figure 6, Figure 7 Elements of the method performed by the remote user equipment in the method 800 in FIG. 8 and the method 900 in FIG. 8 .
- each unit in the communication device 100 and the above-mentioned other operations and/or functions are for implementing the method 400 in FIG. 3 , the method 500 in FIG. 4 , the method 600 in FIG.
- the communication apparatus 100 may be the authentication function network element in the above method embodiment, or may be a chip for implementing the authentication function network element in the above method embodiment.
- the communication device 100 may correspond to the authentication function network element in the method 400 and the method 500 according to the embodiment of the present application, and the communication device 100 may include a method for executing the method 400 in FIG. 3 and the method 500 in FIG. 4 .
- each unit in the communication device 100 and the above-mentioned other operations and/or functions are respectively to implement the corresponding processes of the method 400 in FIG. 3 and the method 500 in FIG. 4 .
- the specific process of each unit performing the above-mentioned corresponding steps has been described in detail in the above-mentioned method embodiments, and for the sake of brevity, it will not be repeated here.
- the communication apparatus 100 may be the short-range service security function network element in the above method embodiment, or may be a network element for implementing the short-range service security function in the above method embodiment functional chip.
- the communication device 100 may correspond to the short-range service security function network element in the method 600, the method 700, the method 800 and the method 900 according to the embodiments of the present application, and the communication device 100 may include a method for executing the method in FIG. 5 . 600 , the method 700 in FIG. 6 , the method 800 in FIG. 7 , and the method unit 900 of the method 900 in FIG. 8 performed by the short-range service security function network element.
- each unit in the communication device 100 and the above-mentioned other operations and/or functions are respectively to implement the corresponding methods of the method 600 in FIG. 5 , the method 700 in FIG. 6 , the method 800 in FIG. 7 and the method 900 in FIG. 8 . process. It should be understood that the specific process of each unit performing the above-mentioned corresponding steps has been described in detail in the above-mentioned method embodiments, and for the sake of brevity, it will not be repeated here.
- transceiver unit in the communication apparatus 100 may correspond to the transceiver 210 in the communication apparatus 200 shown in FIG. 10
- processing unit 120 in the communication apparatus 100 may correspond to the communication apparatus shown in FIG. 10
- Transceiver 220 in 200 may correspond to the transceiver 210 in the communication apparatus 200 shown in FIG. 10 .
- the chip when the communication device 100 is a chip, the chip includes a transceiver unit and a processing unit.
- the transceiver unit may be an input/output circuit or a communication interface;
- the processing unit may be a processor, a microprocessor or an integrated circuit integrated on the chip.
- the transceiving unit 110 is configured to implement a signal transceiving operation of the communication device 100
- the processing unit 120 is configured to implement a signal processing operation of the communication device 100 .
- the communication apparatus 100 further includes a storage unit 130, and the storage unit 130 is used for storing instructions.
- FIG. 10 is a schematic block diagram of a communication device 200 provided by an embodiment of the present application.
- the communication device 200 includes: at least one processor 210 and a transceiver 220 .
- the processor 210 is coupled to the memory for executing instructions stored in the memory to control the transceiver 220 to transmit and/or receive signals.
- the communication device 200 further includes a memory 230 for storing instructions.
- processor 210 and the memory 230 may be combined into a processing device, and the processor 210 is configured to execute the program codes stored in the memory 230 to realize the above-mentioned functions.
- the memory 230 may also be integrated in the processor 210 or independent of the processor 210 .
- transceiver 220 may include a receiver (or, receiver) and a transmitter (or, transmitter).
- the transceiver may further include antennas, and the number of the antennas may be one or more.
- the transceiver 220 may be a communication interface or an interface circuit.
- the communication device 200 may be the remote user equipment in the above method embodiments, or may be a chip for implementing the functions of the remote user equipment in the above method embodiments.
- the communication device 200 may correspond to the remote user equipment in the method 400, the method 500, the method 600, the method 700, the method 800, and the method 900 according to the embodiments of the present application, and the communication device 200 may include a method for executing the diagram The method 400 in FIG. 3, the method 500 in FIG. 4, the method 600 in FIG. 5, the method 700 in FIG. 6, the method 800 in FIG. 7, and the method 900 in FIG. unit.
- each unit in the communication device 200 and the above-mentioned other operations and/or functions are for implementing the method 400 in FIG. 3 , the method 500 in FIG. 4 , the method 600 in FIG. 5 , the method 700 in FIG.
- the corresponding flow of the method 800 in FIG. 7 and the method 900 in FIG. 8 It should be understood that the specific process of each unit performing the above-mentioned corresponding steps has been described in detail in the above-mentioned method embodiments, and for the sake of brevity, it will not be repeated here.
- the communication device 200 may be the short-range service security function network element in the above method embodiment, or may be used to implement the function of the short-range service security function network element in the above method embodiment chip.
- the communication device 200 may correspond to the short-range service security function network element in the method 400 and the method 500 according to the embodiments of the present application, and the communication device 200 may include a method for executing the method 400 in FIG. Elements of the method performed by the short-range service security function network element in the method 500 .
- each unit in the communication device 200 and the above-mentioned other operations and/or functions are respectively to implement the corresponding processes of the method 400 in FIG. 3 and the method 500 in FIG. 4 . It should be understood that the specific process of each unit performing the above-mentioned corresponding steps has been described in detail in the above-mentioned method embodiments, and for the sake of brevity, it will not be repeated here.
- the communication device 200 may be the authentication function network element in the above method embodiment, or may be a chip for implementing the function of the authentication function network element in the above method embodiment.
- the communication device 200 may correspond to the authentication function network element in the method 600 , the method 700 , the method 800 and the method 900 according to the embodiments of the present application, and the communication device 200 may include a method for executing the method 600 in FIG. 5 . , the unit of the method performed by the authentication function network element in the method 700 in FIG. 6 , the method 800 in FIG. 7 and the method 900 in FIG. 8 .
- each unit in the communication device 200 and the above-mentioned other operations and/or functions are respectively to implement the corresponding methods of the method 600 in FIG. 5 , the method 700 in FIG. 6 , the method 800 in FIG. 7 and the method 900 in FIG. 8 process. It should be understood that the specific process of each unit performing the above-mentioned corresponding steps has been described in detail in the above-mentioned method embodiments, and for the sake of brevity, it will not be repeated here.
- the chip When the communication device 200 is a chip, the chip includes a transceiver unit and a processing unit.
- the transceiver unit may be an input/output circuit or a communication interface;
- the processing unit may be a processor, a microprocessor or an integrated circuit integrated on the chip.
- the embodiment of the present application also provides a processing apparatus, including a processor and an interface.
- the processor may be used to execute the methods in the foregoing method embodiments. It should be understood that the foregoing processing device may be a chip.
- the processing device may be a field programmable gate array (FPGA), an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a system on chip (SoC), or a It is a central processing unit (CPU), a network processor (NP), a digital signal processing circuit (DSP), or a microcontroller (microcontroller unit). , MCU), it can also be a programmable logic device (PLD) or other integrated chips.
- FPGA field programmable gate array
- ASIC application specific integrated circuit
- SoC system on chip
- MCU microcontroller unit
- MCU programmable logic device
- PLD programmable logic device
- each step of the above-mentioned method can be completed by a hardware integrated logic circuit in a processor or an instruction in the form of software.
- the steps of the methods disclosed in conjunction with the embodiments of the present application may be directly embodied as executed by a hardware processor, or executed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the processor.
- the software modules may be located in random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory or electrically erasable programmable memory, registers and other storage media mature in the art.
- the storage medium is located in the memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory, and completes the steps of the above method in combination with its hardware. To avoid repetition, detailed description is omitted here.
- the processor in this embodiment of the present application may be an integrated circuit chip, which has a signal processing capability.
- each step of the above method embodiments may be completed by a hardware integrated logic circuit in a processor or an instruction in the form of software.
- the aforementioned processors may be general purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components .
- DSPs digital signal processors
- ASICs application specific integrated circuits
- FPGAs field programmable gate arrays
- the methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of this application can be implemented or executed.
- a general purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may be any conventional processor or the like.
- the steps of the method disclosed in conjunction with the embodiments of the present application may be directly embodied as executed by a hardware decoding processor, or executed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the decoding processor.
- the software modules may be located in random access memory, flash memory, read-only memory, programmable read-only memory or electrically erasable programmable memory, registers and other storage media mature in the art.
- the storage medium is located in the memory, and the processor reads the information in the memory, and completes the steps of the above method in combination with its hardware.
- the memory in this embodiment of the present application may be a volatile memory or a non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memory.
- the non-volatile memory may be read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically programmable Erase programmable read-only memory (electrically EPROM, EEPROM) or flash memory.
- Volatile memory may be random access memory (RAM), which acts as an external cache.
- RAM random access memory
- DRAM dynamic random access memory
- SDRAM synchronous DRAM
- SDRAM double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory
- ESDRAM enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory
- SLDRAM synchronous link dynamic random access memory
- direct ram-bus RAM direct ram-bus RAM
- the present application also provides a computer program product, the computer program product includes: computer program code, when the computer program code is run on a computer, the computer is made to execute FIG. 3 or FIG. 4 or The method of any one of the embodiments shown in FIG. 5 .
- the present application further provides a computer-readable medium, where program codes are stored in the computer-readable medium, and when the program codes are executed on a computer, the computer is made to execute FIG. 3 or FIG. 4 or The method of any one of the embodiments shown in FIG. 5 .
- the present application further provides a system, which includes the foregoing apparatus or equipment.
- the above-mentioned embodiments it may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware or any combination thereof.
- software it can be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product.
- the computer program product includes one or more computer instructions. When the computer instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, all or part of the processes or functions described in the embodiments of the present application are generated.
- the computer may be a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, computer network, or other programmable device.
- the computer instructions may be stored in or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions may be downloaded from a website site, computer, server, or data center Transmission to another website site, computer, server, or data center by wire (eg, coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line, DSL) or wireless (eg, infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.).
- the computer-readable storage medium can be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server, a data center, or the like that includes an integration of one or more available media.
- the available media may be magnetic media (eg, floppy disks, hard disks, magnetic tapes), optical media (eg, high-density digital video discs (DVDs)), or semiconductor media (eg, solid state discs, SSD)) etc.
- the network-side equipment in each of the above apparatus embodiments corresponds to the terminal equipment and the network-side equipment or terminal equipment in the method embodiments, and corresponding steps are performed by corresponding modules or units. Or the step of sending, other steps except sending and receiving may be performed by a processing unit (processor). For functions of specific units, reference may be made to corresponding method embodiments.
- the number of processors may be one or more.
- a component may be, but is not limited to, a process running on a processor, a processor, an object, an executable, a thread of execution, a program, and/or a computer.
- an application running on a computing device and the computing device may be components.
- One or more components may reside within a process and/or thread of execution, and a component may be localized on one computer and/or distributed between 2 or more computers.
- these components can execute from various computer readable media having various data structures stored thereon.
- a component may, for example, be based on a signal having one or more data packets (eg, data from two components interacting with another component between a local system, a distributed system, and/or a network, such as the Internet interacting with other systems via signals) Communicate through local and/or remote processes.
- data packets eg, data from two components interacting with another component between a local system, a distributed system, and/or a network, such as the Internet interacting with other systems via signals
- the disclosed system, apparatus and method may be implemented in other manners.
- the apparatus embodiments described above are only illustrative.
- the division of the units is only a logical function division. In actual implementation, there may be other division methods.
- multiple units or components may be combined or Can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored, or not implemented.
- the shown or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be through some interfaces, indirect coupling or communication connection of devices or units, and may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.
- the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution in this embodiment.
- each functional unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically alone, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
- the functions, if implemented in the form of software functional units and sold or used as independent products, may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.
- the technical solution of the present application can be embodied in the form of a software product in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art or the part of the technical solution.
- the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including Several instructions are used to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application.
- the aforementioned storage medium includes: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disk or optical disk and other media that can store program codes .
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
- Data Exchanges In Wide-Area Networks (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims (69)
- 一种生成设备间通信的密钥的方法,其特征在于,包括:第一用户设备基于第一密钥,生成第一临时标识;所述第一用户设备向第二用户设备发送第一请求,所述第一请求用于建立所述第一用户设备和所述第二用户设备之间的通信连接;其中,所述第一请求包括所述第一临时标识和中继服务码;所述第一用户设备基于第二密钥和所述中继服务码,生成共享密钥;其中,所述共享密钥用于保护所述第一用户设备和所述第二用户设备之间的通信连接,所述第二密钥与所述第一密钥为鉴权流程中生成的密钥或者是基于鉴权流程中生成的中间密钥推演得到的密钥。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二密钥与所述第一密钥相同,且所述第二密钥和所述第一密钥为所述鉴权流程中生成的密钥Kausf或者基于所述Kausf推演得到的密钥。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二密钥与所述第一密钥不同,且所述第一密钥为所述鉴权流程中生成的密钥Kausf;所述第二密钥为基于所述Kausf推演得到的密钥。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二密钥与所述第一密钥不同,且所述第二密钥为所述鉴权流程中生成的密钥Kausf;所述第一密钥为基于所述Kausf推演得到的密钥。
- 根据权利要求1-4中任一所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一用户设备基于第一密钥,生成第一临时标识,包括:所述第一用户设备基于所述第一密钥、所述第一用户设备的网络标识和路由信息,生成所述第一临时标识;其中,所述第一用户设备的网络标识用于网络侧识别第一用户设备的信息,所述路由信息为用于确定与所述第一用户设备相关的核心网网元的信息。
- 根据权利要求5所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一用户设备基于所述第一密钥、所述第一用户设备的网络标识和路由信息,生成所述第一临时标识,包括:所述第一用户设备基于所述第一密钥和所述第一用户设备的网络标识作为第一预设算法的输入参数,得到第二临时标识;将所述第二临时标识和所述路由信息进行拼接,得到所述第一临时标识。
- 根据权利要求5或6所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一用户设备的网络标识为用户永久标识SUPI或者国际移动用户识别码IMSI或者通用公共订阅标识符GPSI;所述路由信息为路由指示。
- 根据权利要求1-7中任一所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:所述第一用户设备向移动管理网元发送非接入层NAS消息,所述NAS消息包括能力信息,所述能力信息用于指示所述第一用户设备支持作为远端用户设备。
- 根据权利要求1-8中任一所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一请求还包括第一新鲜性参数;所述第一用户设备基于所述第二密钥和所述中继服务码,生成所述共享密钥,包括:所述第一用户设备基于所述第二密钥、所述中继服务码和所述第一新鲜性参数,生成所述共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求1-8中任一所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:所述第一用户设备接收来自所述第二用户设备的安全模式命令,所述安全模式命令包括第二新鲜性参数;所述第一用户设备基于所述第二密钥和所述中继服务码,生成所述共享密钥,包括:所述第一用户设备基于所述第二密钥、所述中继服务码和所述第二新鲜性参数,生成所述共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求1-8中任一所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一请求还包括第一新鲜性参数;所述方法还包括:所述第一用户设备接收来自所述第二用户设备的安全模式命令,所述安全模式命令包括第二新鲜性参数;所述第一用户设备基于所述第二密钥和所述中继服务码,生成所述共享密钥,包括:所述第一用户设备基于所述第二密钥、所述中继服务码、所述第一新鲜性参数和所述第二新鲜性参数,生成所述共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求11所述的方法,其特征在于,所述安全模式命令还包括安全算法;所述方法还包括:所述第一用户设备基于所述共享密钥和所述安全算法,得到通信密钥;所述通信密钥用于保护所述第一用户设备和所述第二用户设备之间的通信连接。
- 一种生成设备间通信的密钥的方法,其特征在于,包括:第一网元基于第一密钥,生成第一临时标识;所述第一网元接收来自第二网元的密钥获取消息,所述密钥获取消息包括第一用户设备的标识和中继服务码,其中,所述第一用户设备的标识包括所述第一临时标识或者所述第一用户设备的网络标识,所述第一用户设备的网络标识用于网络侧识别第一用户设备的信息;所述第一网元根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码以及第二密钥,生成共享密钥;其中,所述共享密钥用于保护所述第一用户设备和第二用户设备之间的通信连接,所述第二密钥与所述第一密钥为所述第一用户设备的鉴权流程中生成的密钥或者是基于所述第一用户设备的鉴权流程中生成的中间密钥推演得到的密钥;所述第一网元向所述第二网元发送所述共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求13所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一网元根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码以及第二密钥,生成共享密钥,包括:所述第一网元根据所述第一用户设备的标识获取所述第二密钥,所述第一网元根据所述第二密钥和所述中继服务码,生成所述共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求13或14所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二密钥与所述第一密钥相同,且所述第二密钥和所述第一密钥为所述鉴权流程中生成的密钥Kausf或者基于所述Kausf推演得到的密钥。
- 根据权利要求13或14所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二密钥与所述第一密钥不同,且所述第一密钥为所述鉴权流程中生成的密钥Kausf;所述第二密钥为基于所述Kausf推演得到的密钥。
- 根据权利要求13或14所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二密钥与所述第一密钥不同,且所述第二密钥为所述鉴权流程中生成的密钥Kausf;所述第一密钥为基于所述Kausf推演得到的密钥。
- 根据权利要求13-17中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一网元基于第一密钥,生成第一临时标识,包括:所述第一网元基于所述第一密钥、所述第一用户设备的网络标识和路由信息,生成所述第一临时标识;其中,所述第一用户设备的网络标识用于网络侧识别所述第一用户设备的信息,所述路由信息为用于确定与所述第一用户设备相关的核心网网元的信息。
- 根据权利要求18所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一网元基于第一密钥、所述第一用户设备的网络标识和路由信息,生成第一临时标识,包括:所述第一网元基于所述第一密钥和所述第一用户设备的网络标识作为第一预设算法的输入参数,得到第二临时标识;将所述第二临时标识和所述路由信息进行拼接,得到所述第一临时标识。
- 根据权利要求13-19中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一用户设备的网络标识为用户永久标识SUPI或者国际移动用户识别码IMSI或者通用公共订阅标识符GPSI;所述路由信息为路由指示。
- 根据权利要求13-20中任一所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:在对所述第一用户设备进行鉴权流程中,所述第一网元接收来自第三网元的指示信息;响应于所述指示信息,所述第一网元基于所述第一密钥,生成所述第一临时标识。
- 根据权利要求21所述的方法,其特征在于,在对所述第一用户设备进行鉴权流程中,所述第一网元接收来自第三网元的指示信息;响应于所述指示信息,所述第一网元基于所述第一密钥,生成所述第一临时标识,包括:在对所述第一用户设备进行鉴权流程中,所述第一网元接收来自第四网元的能力信息,所述能力信息用于指示所述第一用户设备支持远端UE的能力;响应于所述指示信息和所述能力信息,所述第一网元基于所述第一密钥,生成所述第一临时标识。
- 根据权利要求13-22中任一所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:所述第一网元将所述第一临时标识发送给第三网元。
- 根据权利要求13-23中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述密钥获取消息还包括第一新鲜性参数;所述第一网元根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码以及第二密钥,生成共享密钥,包括:所述第一网元根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码、第二密钥和所述第一新鲜性参数,生成共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求13-23中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:所述第一网元生成第二新鲜性参数;所述第一网元根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码以及第二密钥,生成共享密钥,包括:所述所述第一网元根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码、第二密钥和所述第二新鲜性参数,生成共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求13-23中任一项所的方法,其特征在于,所述密钥获取消息还包括第一新鲜性参数;所述方法还包括:所述第一网元生成第二新鲜性参数;所述第一网元根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码以及第二密钥,生成共享密钥,包括:所述所述第一网元根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码、所述第二密钥、所述第一新鲜性参数和所述第二新鲜性参数,生成共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求13-26中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一网元为鉴权功能网元。
- 根据权利要求13-27中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第二网元为移动管理网元、鉴权功能网元或近距离业务安全功能网元。
- 根据权利要求13-28中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第三网元为数据管理网元。
- 根据权利要求13-29中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第四网元为移动管理网元。
- 一种生成设备间通信的密钥的方法,其特征在于,包括:第五网元获取第一临时标识和第三密钥,所述第三密钥为基于鉴权流程中生成的中间密钥推演得到的密钥;所述第五网元接收来自第六网元的密钥获取消息,所述密钥获取消息包括所述第一临时标识和中继服务码;所述第五网元根据所述第一临时标识、所述中继服务码以及第三密钥,生成共享密钥;其中,所述共享密钥用于保护所述第一用户设备和第二用户设备之间的通信连接;所述第五网元向所述第六网元发送所述共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求31所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第五网元根据所述第一临时标识、所述中继服务码以及第三密钥,生成共享密钥,包括:所述第五网元根据所述第一临时标识、所述中继服务码以及第三密钥,生成共享密钥;包含:所述第五网元根据所述第一临时标识获取所述第三密钥,所述第五网元根据所述第三密钥和中继服务码生成共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求31所述的方法,其特征在于,第五网元获取第一临时标识,包括:第五网元从所述第一网元接收到所述第一临时标识,所述第一临时标识是基于第一中间密钥生成的,所述第一中间密钥为对所述第一用户设备进行鉴权流程中生成的中间密钥或者是基于鉴权流程中生成的中间密钥推演得到的密钥;或者,第五网元基于第三中间密钥生成所述第一临时标识。
- 根据权利要求31-33中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第三密钥为基于所述鉴权流程中生成的密钥Kausf推演得到的密钥。
- 根据权利要求33所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一临时标识是基于所述第一密钥生成的,包括:所述第一临时标识是基于所述第一密钥、所述第一用户设备的网络标识和路由信息生成的;其中,所述第一用户设备的网络标识用于网络侧识别所述第一用户设备的信息,所述路由信息为用于确定与所述第一用户设备相关的核心网网元的信息。
- 根据权利要求35所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一临时标识是基于所述第一密钥、所述第一用户设备的网络标识和路由信息生成的,包括:所述第二临时标识是基于所述第一密钥和所述第一用户设备的网络标识作为第一预设算法的输入参数得到的;所述第一临时标识是将所述第二临时标识和所述路由信息进行拼接得到的。
- 根据权利要求31-36中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一用户设备的网络标识为用户永久标识SUPI或者国际移动用户识别码IMSI或者通用公共订阅标识符GPSI;所述路由信息为路由指示。
- 根据权利要求31-37中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述密钥获取消息还包括第一新鲜性参数;所述第五网元根据所述第一临时标识、所述中继服务码以及第三密钥,生成共享密钥,包括:所述第五网元根据所述第一临时标识、所述中继服务码、第三密钥和所述第一新鲜性参数,生成共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求31-37中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:所述第五网元生成第二新鲜性参数;所述第五网元根据所述第一临时标识、所述中继服务码以及第三密钥,生成共享密钥,包括:所述所述所述第五网元根据所述第一临时标识、所述中继服务码、第三密钥和所述第二新鲜性参数,生成共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求31-37中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述密钥获取消息还包括第一新鲜性参数;所述方法还包括:所述第五网元根据所述第一临时标识、所述中继服务码以及第三密钥,生成共享密钥,包括:所述所述所述第五网元根据所述第一临时标识、所述中继服务码、第三密钥、所述第一新鲜性参数和所述第二新鲜性参数,生成共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求31-40中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第五网元为第一近距离业务安全功能网元。
- 根据权利要求31-41中任一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第六网元为第二近距离业务安全功能网元。
- 一种生成设备间通信的密钥的系统,其特征在于,包括:第一网元,用于基于第一密钥生成第一临时标识;第二网元,用于向第一网元发送密钥获取消息,所述密钥获取消息包括第一用户设备的标识和中继服务码,其中,所述第一用户设备的标识包括所述第一临时标识或者所述第 一用户设备的网络标识,所述第一用户设备的网络标识用于网络侧识别第一用户设备的信息;所述第一网元还用于根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码以及第二密钥,生成共享密钥;其中,所述共享密钥用于保护所述第一用户设备和第二用户设备之间的通信连接,所述第二密钥与所述第一密钥为所述第一用户设备的鉴权流程中生成的密钥或者是基于所述第一用户设备的鉴权流程中生成的中间密钥推演得到的密钥;所述第一网元向所述第二网元发送所述共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求43所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第一网元还用于根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码以及第二密钥,生成共享密钥,包括:所述第一网元还用于根据所述第一用户设备的标识获取所述第二密钥,所述第一网元还用于根据所述第二密钥和所述中继服务码,生成所述共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求43或44所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第二密钥与所述第一密钥相同,且所述第二密钥和所述第一密钥为所述鉴权流程中生成的密钥Kausf或者基于所述Kausf推演得到的密钥。
- 根据权利要求43或44所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第二密钥与所述第一密钥不同,且所述第一密钥为所述鉴权流程中生成的密钥Kausf;所述第二密钥为基于所述Kausf推演得到的密钥。
- 根据权利要求43或44所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第二密钥与所述第一密钥不同,且所述第二密钥为所述鉴权流程中生成的密钥Kausf;所述第一密钥为基于所述Kausf推演得到的密钥。
- 根据权利要求43-47中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第一网元,用于基于第一密钥,生成第一临时标识,包括:所述第一网元还用于,基于所述第一密钥、所述第一用户设备的网络标识和路由信息,生成所述第一临时标识;其中,所述第一用户设备的网络标识用于网络侧识别所述第一用户设备的信息,所述路由信息为用于确定与所述第一用户设备相关的核心网网元的信息。
- 根据权利要求48所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第一网元还用于,基于所述第一密钥、所述第一用户设备的网络标识和路由信息,生成所述第一临时标识,包括:所述第一网元还用于,基于所述第一密钥和所述第一用户设备的网络标识作为第一预设算法的输入参数,得到第二临时标识;将所述第二临时标识和所述路由信息进行拼接,得到所述第一临时标识。
- 根据权利要求43-49中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第一用户设备的网络标识为用户永久标识SUPI或者国际移动用户识别码IMSI或者通用公共订阅标识符GPSI;所述路由信息为路由指示。
- 根据权利要求43-50中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述系统还包括:第三网元,在对所述第一用户设备进行鉴权流程中,所述第三网元用于向所述第一网元发送第一指示信息;响应于所述第一指示信息,所述第一网元用于,基于所述第一密钥,生成所述第一临时标识。
- 根据权利要求51中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述系统还包括:第四网元,在对所述第一用户设备进行鉴权流程中,所述第四网元用于向所述第一网元发送能力信息,所述能力信息用于指示所述第一用户设备支持远端UE的能力;响应于所述第一指示信息和所述能力信息,所述第一网元用于,基于所述第一密钥,生成所述第一临时标识。
- 根据权利要求43-52中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第一网元还用于将所述第一临时标识发送给所述第三网元。
- 根据权利要求43-53中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第二网元还用于,向所述第三网元发送所述第一临时标识;所述第三网元还用于,向所述第二网元发送所述第一网元的标识。
- 根据权利要求43-54中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第三网元还用于,向所述第二网元发送所述第一网元的标识和第一用户设备的网络标识。
- 根据权利要求43-55中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述密钥获取消息还包括第一新鲜性参数;所述第一网元用于,根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码以及第二密钥,生成共享密钥,包括:所述第一网元用于,根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码、第二密钥和所述第一新鲜性参数,生成共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求43-55中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第一网元还用于,生成第二新鲜性参数;所述第一网元用于,根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码以及第二密钥,生成共享密钥,包括:所述所述第一网元用于,根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码、第二密钥和所述第二新鲜性参数,生成共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求43-55中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述密钥获取消息还包括第一新鲜性参数;所述第一网元还用于,生成第二新鲜性参数;所述第一网元用于,根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码以及第二密钥,生成共享密钥,包括:所述所述第一网元用于,根据所述第一用户设备的标识、所述中继服务码、第二密钥、所述第一新鲜性参数和所述第二新鲜性参数,生成共享密钥。
- 根据权利要求43-58中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述系统还包括:第一用户设备和第二用户设备。
- 根据权利要求43-59中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第一网元为鉴权功能网元。
- 根据权利要求43-60中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第二网元为移动管理网元、鉴权功能网元或近距离业务安全功能网元。
- 根据权利要求43-61中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第三网元为数据管理网元。
- 根据权利要求43-62中任一项所述的系统,其特征在于,所述第四网元为移动管理网元。
- 一种生成设备间通信的密钥的装置,其特征在于,包括:存储器,用于存储计算机指令;处理器,用于执行所述存储器中存储的计算机指令,使得所述通信装置执行如权利要求1至12中任一项所述的方法。
- 一种生成设备间通信的密钥的装置,其特征在于,包括:存储器,用于存储计算机指令;处理器,用于执行所述存储器中存储的计算机指令,使得所述装置执行如权利要求13至30中任一项所述的方法。
- 一种生成设备间通信的密钥的装置,其特征在于,包括:存储器,用于存储计算机指令;处理器,用于执行所述存储器中存储的计算机指令,使得所述通信装置执行如权利要求31至42中任一项所述的方法。
- 一种计算机可读存储介质,其特征在于,其上存储有计算机程序,所述计算机程序被通信装置执行时,使得所述通信装置执行如权利要求1至12中任一项所述的方法。
- 一种计算机可读存储介质,其特征在于,其上存储有计算机程序,所述计算机程序被通信装置执行时,使得所述通信装置执行如权利要求13至30中任一项所述的方法。
- 一种计算机可读存储介质,其特征在于,其上存储有计算机程序,所述计算机程序被通信装置执行时,使得所述通信装置执行如权利要求31至42中任一项所述的方法。
Priority Applications (6)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
EP21916899.4A EP4271012A4 (en) | 2021-01-11 | 2021-01-11 | METHOD, SYSTEM AND DEVICE FOR GENERATING A KEY FOR COMMUNICATION BETWEEN DEVICES |
CA3204772A CA3204772A1 (en) | 2021-01-11 | 2021-01-11 | Method, system, and apparatus for generating key for inter-device communication |
CN202180089811.1A CN116762470A (zh) | 2021-01-11 | 2021-01-11 | 一种生成设备间通信的密钥的方法、系统和装置 |
PCT/CN2021/071149 WO2022147846A1 (zh) | 2021-01-11 | 2021-01-11 | 一种生成设备间通信的密钥的方法、系统和装置 |
AU2021416579A AU2021416579B2 (en) | 2021-01-11 | Method, system, and apparatus for generating key for inter-device communication | |
US18/349,587 US20230354028A1 (en) | 2021-01-11 | 2023-07-10 | Method, system, and apparatus for generating key for inter-device communication |
Applications Claiming Priority (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/CN2021/071149 WO2022147846A1 (zh) | 2021-01-11 | 2021-01-11 | 一种生成设备间通信的密钥的方法、系统和装置 |
Related Child Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US18/349,587 Continuation US20230354028A1 (en) | 2021-01-11 | 2023-07-10 | Method, system, and apparatus for generating key for inter-device communication |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2022147846A1 true WO2022147846A1 (zh) | 2022-07-14 |
Family
ID=82357615
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/CN2021/071149 WO2022147846A1 (zh) | 2021-01-11 | 2021-01-11 | 一种生成设备间通信的密钥的方法、系统和装置 |
Country Status (5)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20230354028A1 (zh) |
EP (1) | EP4271012A4 (zh) |
CN (1) | CN116762470A (zh) |
CA (1) | CA3204772A1 (zh) |
WO (1) | WO2022147846A1 (zh) |
Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20170055149A1 (en) * | 2015-08-17 | 2017-02-23 | Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) | Method and Apparatus for Direct Communication Key Establishment |
WO2018126452A1 (zh) * | 2017-01-06 | 2018-07-12 | 华为技术有限公司 | 授权验证方法和装置 |
CN111417092A (zh) * | 2019-01-04 | 2020-07-14 | 华硕电脑股份有限公司 | 支持单个一对一侧链路通信链路车联网服务的方法和设备 |
Family Cites Families (1)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US10897707B2 (en) * | 2015-01-19 | 2021-01-19 | Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) | Methods and apparatus for direct communication key establishment |
-
2021
- 2021-01-11 CA CA3204772A patent/CA3204772A1/en active Pending
- 2021-01-11 WO PCT/CN2021/071149 patent/WO2022147846A1/zh active Application Filing
- 2021-01-11 CN CN202180089811.1A patent/CN116762470A/zh active Pending
- 2021-01-11 EP EP21916899.4A patent/EP4271012A4/en active Pending
-
2023
- 2023-07-10 US US18/349,587 patent/US20230354028A1/en active Pending
Patent Citations (3)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US20170055149A1 (en) * | 2015-08-17 | 2017-02-23 | Telefonaktiebolaget L M Ericsson (Publ) | Method and Apparatus for Direct Communication Key Establishment |
WO2018126452A1 (zh) * | 2017-01-06 | 2018-07-12 | 华为技术有限公司 | 授权验证方法和装置 |
CN111417092A (zh) * | 2019-01-04 | 2020-07-14 | 华硕电脑股份有限公司 | 支持单个一对一侧链路通信链路车联网服务的方法和设备 |
Non-Patent Citations (4)
Title |
---|
HUAWEI, HISILICON: "Solution on key management in UE-to-network relay based on primary authentication", 3GPP DRAFT; S3-203432, vol. SA WG3, 16 November 2020 (2020-11-16), pages 1 - 3, XP051955237 * |
SAMSUNG: "Updates to solution#1 in TR 33.847", 3GPP DRAFT; S3-202611, vol. SA WG3, 2 October 2020 (2020-10-02), pages 1 - 4, XP051937912 * |
See also references of EP4271012A4 * |
ZTE COPORATION: "Security of Relay Service Code", 3GPP DRAFT; S3-151897-SECURITY OF RELAY SERVICE CODE, vol. SA WG3, 17 August 2015 (2015-08-17), Tallinn Estonia, pages 1 - 3, XP050995296 * |
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
CA3204772A1 (en) | 2022-07-14 |
CN116762470A (zh) | 2023-09-15 |
AU2021416579A1 (en) | 2023-08-10 |
US20230354028A1 (en) | 2023-11-02 |
EP4271012A4 (en) | 2024-01-24 |
EP4271012A1 (en) | 2023-11-01 |
Similar Documents
Publication | Publication Date | Title |
---|---|---|
US11778459B2 (en) | Secure session method and apparatus | |
US9184977B2 (en) | System for controlling access to device-to-device communication services in wireless network | |
US11310843B2 (en) | PDU session establishment method and apparatus | |
US20190253403A1 (en) | Network Authentication Triggering Method and Related Device | |
EP2936876B1 (en) | Methods and apparatus for differencitating security configurations in a radio local area network | |
CN108605225B (zh) | 一种安全处理方法及相关设备 | |
US20230087407A1 (en) | Authentication and authorization method and apparatus | |
AU2021417645A1 (en) | Secure communication method and device | |
WO2023011630A1 (zh) | 授权验证的方法及装置 | |
CN112492590A (zh) | 一种通信方法及装置 | |
CA3204536A1 (en) | Key identifier generation method and related apparatus | |
CN114600487B (zh) | 身份认证方法及通信装置 | |
WO2022134089A1 (zh) | 一种安全上下文生成方法、装置及计算机可读存储介质 | |
WO2024067619A1 (zh) | 通信方法和通信装置 | |
WO2023016160A1 (zh) | 一种会话建立方法和相关装置 | |
WO2022147846A1 (zh) | 一种生成设备间通信的密钥的方法、系统和装置 | |
CN117296401A (zh) | 建立到移动网络的附加注册 | |
AU2021416579B2 (en) | Method, system, and apparatus for generating key for inter-device communication | |
WO2023213191A1 (zh) | 安全保护方法及通信装置 | |
WO2022174729A1 (zh) | 保护身份标识隐私的方法与通信装置 | |
WO2023011263A1 (zh) | 消息传输方法及通信装置 | |
WO2021057456A1 (zh) | 用于注册的方法和装置 | |
US20240163670A1 (en) | Wireless communication method and apparatus | |
WO2022067827A1 (zh) | 一种密钥推衍方法及其装置、系统 | |
WO2023160390A1 (zh) | 通信方法与装置 |
Legal Events
Date | Code | Title | Description |
---|---|---|---|
121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application |
Ref document number: 21916899 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 202180089811.1 Country of ref document: CN |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 3204772 Country of ref document: CA |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2021916899 Country of ref document: EP Effective date: 20230724 |
|
ENP | Entry into the national phase |
Ref document number: 2021416579 Country of ref document: AU Date of ref document: 20210111 Kind code of ref document: A |
|
NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
WWE | Wipo information: entry into national phase |
Ref document number: 11202305275S Country of ref document: SG |