WO2022097089A1 - Zenithal reactive jammer - Google Patents
Zenithal reactive jammer Download PDFInfo
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- WO2022097089A1 WO2022097089A1 PCT/IB2021/060275 IB2021060275W WO2022097089A1 WO 2022097089 A1 WO2022097089 A1 WO 2022097089A1 IB 2021060275 W IB2021060275 W IB 2021060275W WO 2022097089 A1 WO2022097089 A1 WO 2022097089A1
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- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- threat
- radiofrequency
- jamming
- predefined
- interest
- Prior art date
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Classifications
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S7/00—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00
- G01S7/02—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00 of systems according to group G01S13/00
- G01S7/021—Auxiliary means for detecting or identifying radar signals or the like, e.g. radar jamming signals
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S13/00—Systems using the reflection or reradiation of radio waves, e.g. radar systems; Analogous systems using reflection or reradiation of waves whose nature or wavelength is irrelevant or unspecified
- G01S13/66—Radar-tracking systems; Analogous systems
- G01S13/68—Radar-tracking systems; Analogous systems for angle tracking only
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S7/00—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00
- G01S7/02—Details of systems according to groups G01S13/00, G01S15/00, G01S17/00 of systems according to group G01S13/00
- G01S7/38—Jamming means, e.g. producing false echoes
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S13/00—Systems using the reflection or reradiation of radio waves, e.g. radar systems; Analogous systems using reflection or reradiation of waves whose nature or wavelength is irrelevant or unspecified
- G01S13/88—Radar or analogous systems specially adapted for specific applications
- G01S13/89—Radar or analogous systems specially adapted for specific applications for mapping or imaging
- G01S13/90—Radar or analogous systems specially adapted for specific applications for mapping or imaging using synthetic aperture techniques, e.g. synthetic aperture radar [SAR] techniques
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S3/00—Direction-finders for determining the direction from which infrasonic, sonic, ultrasonic, or electromagnetic waves, or particle emission, not having a directional significance, are being received
- G01S3/02—Direction-finders for determining the direction from which infrasonic, sonic, ultrasonic, or electromagnetic waves, or particle emission, not having a directional significance, are being received using radio waves
Definitions
- the present invention relates, in general, to the field of Electronic Countermeasures (ECM) .
- ECM Electronic Countermeasures
- the present invention relates to a zenithal reactive jammer, i.e., a reactive-type jamming device for the protection against radiofrequency (RE) remote sensing sensors or systems operating at high elevation angles (such as, for example, radar-type sensors/systems (e.g., imaging radars) , Synthetic Aperture Radars (SARs) or the like, installed on space or air platforms - e.g., satellites, aircrafts, drones, etc.) .
- RE radiofrequency
- the aim of a jamming system for the protection against radar or SAR sensors/ systems is to protect an area, a site (e.g. either of the civil or military type) or a set of assets of interest by inhibiting the capability of an enemy sensor to recognise and/or extract relevant information .
- the aim is to degrade the quality of the images as much as possible, so as to de-focus or otherwise cover the area of interest and thus offer an appropriate protection in either maritime or terrestrial contexts.
- US 10,852,391 B2 relates to a method and a relative device for jamming synthetic aperture radars.
- US 10,852,391 B2 describes a method for jamming airborne SAR-type radars implemented by means of a radar j amming device including a group of at least two cooperating units surrounding an area on the ground to be protected, wherein :
- each unit providing the radar detection function comprises a receiving and processing module configured to analyse the received signals ;
- each unit providing the radar j amming function is configured to generate and transmit j amming signals ;
- each unit is interlinked by at least one two-way data link and is synchronised by a common clock .
- the method according to US 10 , 852 , 391 B2 comprises :
- the jamming systems of the known type do not have the architectural flexibility and the reactivity that are necessary to ensure a simultaneous coverage of all the multiple aspects that need to be taken into account when countering the aforesaid types of threats.
- this requires, from the point of view of the threat detection capability, a high sensitivity of the receiver used.
- Another highly challenging aspect is the high power required from the jamming system in order to make the countermeasure effective.
- the latest generation high-resolution imaging radars have a high process gain in the coherent integration of the signals reflected from the soil/target during the illumination time of the observed area. Therefore, a jamming system, in order to be effective, must be able to compensate for this gain.
- object of the present invention is to provide an innovative jamming device for the protection against remote sensing sensors or systems operating at radiofrequency (RF) and at high elevation angles (e.g., satellite/airborne radars or SARs) , which is capable of overcoming or alleviating, at least in part, the drawbacks and limitations of the currently known jamming technologies.
- RF radiofrequency
- SAR satellite/airborne radars
- the present invention relates to a jamming device for the protection of targets on the earth's surface against radiofrequency (RF) threats of the space, satellite or air type; said j amming device comprising :
- RF threat detection means include :
- the receiving antennas are configured to receive RF signals having elevation angles of arrival that are equal to , or greater than, a minimum elevation angle , thereby providing an elevation angle coverage of interest ; wherein the RF threat detection unit is configured to :
- said predefined RF-threat-related library ( ies ) contain ( s ) information related to one or more RF threats of interest so as to enable the RF threat detection unit to detect the presence of said RF threat ( s ) of interest and to determine the respective type thereof based on the RF signals received by the receiving antennas ;
- the control system includes :
- control unit is configured, in case of detection of an RF threat by the RF threat detection unit , to :
- said predefined RF-j amming-actions-related library ( ies ) contain ( s ) , for each RF threat of interest inserted in the predefined RF-threat-related library ( ies ) , respective information related to one or more respective RF j amming actions to be performed against said RF threat of interest ; and wherein the RF j amming means are operable by the control unit in case of detection of an RF threat by the RF threat detection unit and include :
- an RF j amming signal generation unit configured to generate the RF j amming signals to be transmitted by the transceiver antennas against the detected RF threat so as to perform said RF j amming action .
- Figure 1 schematically shows a j amming device according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention
- Figure 2 schematically shows RF threat detection means of the j amming device of Figure 1 ;
- Figure 3 schematically shows an example of pointing of receiving antennas of the RF threat detection means of Figure 2 for detecting satellite SAR signals ;
- Figure 4 schematically shows an embodiment example of said receiving antennas for detecting satellite SAR signals ;
- Figure 5 schematically shows a control system of the j amming device of Figure 1 ;
- Figure 6 schematically shows RF j amming means of the j amming device of Figure 1 ;
- Figure 7 shows an embodiment example of the j amming device of Figure 1 for use on naval platforms to detect , and to counter, satellite SAR signals ;
- Figures 8 and 9 show, respectively, an example of a satellite SAR image and an example of a corresponding SAR image obtained in the presence of j amming provided by the j amming device according to the present invention in a satellite anti-SAR configuration .
- the present invention relates to a jamming device for the protection of targets on the earth's surface, whether mobile or fixed, such as land or naval platforms (e.g., land vehicles, naval units, etc.) , areas or sites of interest or the like, against radiofrequency (RF) threats such as radar or SAR sensors or systems, RF remote sensing sensors or systems or the like, of the space, satellite or aerial type.
- RF radiofrequency
- Figure 1 shows a block diagram schematically representing a high-level functional architecture of a jamming device (denoted overall by 1) according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention.
- the jamming device 1 (which, for the sake of brevity, will hereafter be referred to simply as the jammer) comprises:
- the jammer 1 is preferably constituted by a single apparatus/device which said RF threat detection means 11, said RF jamming means 12 and said control system 13 are integrated into.
- the jammer 1 is preferably connected, in a wired or wireless mode, to user interface means 2 that are external to said jammer 1 (e.g. a computer, a laptop, a station specifically dedicated to the control of the jammer 1 by a user, i.e. an operator, etc . ) .
- user interface means 2 e.g. a computer, a laptop, a station specifically dedicated to the control of the jammer 1 by a user, i.e. an operator, etc .
- the RF threat detection means 11 represent the passive part of the jammer 1 dedicated to monitoring a predefined angular sector (in azimuth and elevation) to detect the presence of RF threats (e.g., satellite/airborne SAR sensors/ systems , satellite/airborne radar sensors/systems , satellite/airborne RF remote sensing sensors/systems, or the like) that transmit microwave signals or, more generally, RF signals that illuminate a target to be protected (e.g., an area or site of interest, a land or naval platform, or the like) at which the jammer 1 is installed.
- RF threats e.g., satellite/airborne SAR sensors/ systems , satellite/airborne radar sensors/systems , satellite/airborne RF remote sensing sensors/systems, or the like
- microwave signals or, more generally, RF signals that illuminate a target to be protected (e.g., an area or site of interest, a land or naval platform, or the like) at which the jammer 1 is installed.
- the RF jamming means 12 represent, instead, the active part of the jammer 1 dedicated to the delivery of RF countermeasures such as to compromise/impede the extraction of relevant information (e.g., position, distance, shape, etc.) related to the target to be protected.
- relevant information e.g., position, distance, shape, etc.
- control system 13 provides:
- FIG. 2 shows a block diagram schematically representing a high-level functional architecture of the RF threat detection means 11, which include:
- predefined RF-threat-related libraries 113 wherein said predefined RF-threat-related library (ies) 113 may be conveniently stored in an internal memory of the RF 112 threat detection unit or in a memory external thereto.
- the receiving antennas 111 are configured to receive RF signals having elevation angles of arrival which are:
- a given minimum elevation angle (conveniently equal to, or greater than, 20° preferably comprised between 20° and 65°) ;
- the receiving antennas 111 (and, therefore, the RF threat detection means 11) provide an elevation angle coverage with respect to RF signals having high elevation angles of arrival with respect to the jammer 1 (more precisely, with respect to a given horizontal reference plane of said jammer 1) , wherein said elevation coverage may conveniently also be zenithal or quasi-zenithal.
- said receiving antennas 111 are configured to receive RF signals having said elevation angles of arrival and azimuth angles of arrival in the range 0°-180° or 0°- 360°, thereby providing, in addition to said elevation angle coverage, also an azimuth angle coverage of 180° or 360° around a zenith direction of the jammer 1 (wherein said zenith direction is orthogonal to the aforesaid horizontal reference plane) .
- the receiving antennas 111 can be conveniently realized by means of a predefined number of antennas that:
- predefined pointing directions are pointed according to predefined pointing directions ; wherein said predefined number, said predefined operating characteristics, said predefined positions and said predefined pointing directions are such that to guarantee the aforesaid elevation and azimuth angle coverages (or, more generally, elevation and azimuth angle coverages of interest) .
- the receiving antennas 111 are directional antennas, preferably with high gain.
- said receiving antennas 111 preferably also have suitable characteristics in terms of weight and bulk so as to allow or, in any case , facilitate the integration/ installation of said receiving antennas 111 in/on the j ammer 1 .
- Figure 3 schematically shows an example of pointing of the receiving antennas 111 for detecting satellite SAR signals .
- Figure 3 shows a three-dimensional ( 3D) Cartesian reference system defined by :
- Figure 3 also schematically shows respective pointing directions of four groups of receiving antennas 111 together with the respective radiation patterns .
- Figure 3 shows the orientation o f the four groups of receiving antennas 111 in the four quadrants in azimuth ( so as to guarantee an azimuthal coverage of 360 ° around the zenith direction) and at an elevation such that to cover the typical directions of illumination of the SAR satellites .
- the pointing of the receiving antennae 111 can be conveniently redefined in an appropriate way, so as to focus on speci fic sectors ( and, therefore , threats ) , or so as to cover sectors that are common to several types of threats .
- the pointing can be conveniently squinted further, so as to provide coverage even against diving avionics threats , and/or with kinematics that are quasi-orthogonal with respect to the j ammer 1 .
- Figure 4 also schematically shows an embodiment example of each individual group of receiving antennas 111, wherein each group of receiving antennas 111 is conveniently realized by means of three horn antennas (denoted by 111A, 111B and 111C, respectively) that guarantee full-band coverage with respect to the typical frequencies of satellite SAR sensors/ systems .
- the use of four groups of receiving antennas 111 like in the case of the example just described, in addition to guaranteeing the elevation and azimuth angle coverages of interest, also makes it possible to obtain a rough estimate of the direction of arrival of the RF signals which, in the absence of intelligence data on the orbit of the satellite or on the trajectory of the aircraft (e.g., drone, plane, etc.) , makes it possible to appropriately point the RF jamming means 12 towards the detected threats.
- the RF threat detection unit 112 (conveniently implemented by means of a digital receiver) , the latter is configured to:
- said predefined RF-threat-related library(ies) 113 contain(s) (i.e., store (s) ) information related to one or more RF threats of interest (e.g., SAR sensors/ systems , radar sensors/systems or, more generally, RF remote sensing sensors/systems ) so as to enable the RF threat detection unit 112 to detect the presence of said RF threat (s) of interest and to determine the respective type thereof based on the RF signals received by the receiving antennas 111.
- RF threats of interest e.g., SAR sensors/ systems , radar sensors/systems or, more generally, RF remote sensing sensors/systems
- said predefined RF-threat-related library (ies) 113 contain(s) (i.e. store (s) ) information and/or data that is/are:
- FIG. 5 shows a block diagram schematically representing a high-level functional architecture of the control system 13, which includes:
- predefined RF- j amming-actions-related libraries 132 wherein said predefined RF-j amming-actions- related library (ies) 132 may be conveniently stored in an internal memory of said control system 13.
- control unit 131 is configured, in case of detection of an RF threat by the RF threat detection unit 112, to:
- said predefined RF-j amming-actions-related library (ies) 132 contain(s) (i.e., store(s) ) , for each RF threat of interest inserted/indicated/def ined in the predefined RF threat library (ies) 113, respective information related to one or more respective RF jamming actions to be performed against said RF threat of interest.
- said predefined RF- amming-actions-related library(ies) 132 contain(s) (i.e., store(s) ) , for each RF threat of interest inserted/indicated/def ined in the predefined RF threat-related library (ies) 113, respective information and/or respective data that are:
- FIG. 6 shows a block diagram schematically representing a high-level functional architecture of the RF jamming means 12, which are operable by the control system 13 (in particular by the control unit 131) in case of detection of an RF threat by the RF threat detection means 11 (in particular by the RF threat detection unit 112) and include :
- an RF j amming signal generation unit 122 preferably of the Digital Radio Frequency Memory (DRFM) type , configured to generate ( conveniently, after storing and processing of the RF signals coming from the detected RF threat received by the transceiver antennas 121 ) the RF j amming signals to be transmitted by said transceiver antennas 121 against the detected RF threat so as to perform said corresponding RF j amming action .
- DRFM Digital Radio Frequency Memory
- the transceiver antennas 121 are such as to provide :
- said transceiver antennas 121 are made by means of Active Electronically Steered/Steerable Antennas (AESAs ) - sometimes also referred to as Active Electronically Scanned Arrays (AESAs ) .
- AESAs Active Electronically Scanned Arrays
- the j ammer 1 comprises , or is coupled to , a mechanical pointing system that is configured and operable to vary the elevation pointing o f said receiving antennas 111 and of said transceiver antennas 121 so as to modi fy the elevation angle coverage of the j ammer 1 .
- said mechanical pointing system is configured and operable to vary the inclination of the entire j ammer 1 so as to vary the elevation pointing of the receiving antennas 111 and of the transceiver antennas 121 and, thereby, to modi fy the elevation angle coverage of said j ammer 1 .
- the user interface means 2 are conveniently configured to allow a user/operator to : • monitor and control the operation of the jammer 1;
- a jamming system that comprises the jammer 1 and the user interface means 2 (and, in the case of a mechanical pointing system external to said jammer 1, also said mechanical pointing system) .
- FIG. 7 shows an embodiment example of the jammer 1 for use on naval platforms to detect, and to counter, satellite SAR signals.
- the transceiver antennas 121 dedicated to the delivery of the jamming are realized by means of two pairs of AESA 121A, 121B, wherein:
- each pair of AESA 121A, 121B operates in a respective frequency band
- the two respective AESAs 121A or 121B of said pair provide, each, an azimuth angle coverage of 90°, whereby each pair provides a total azimuth angle coverage of 180°.
- the receiving antennas 111 dedicated to the detection of satellite SAR threats comprise a plurality of groups of antennas which also provide, as a whole, an azimuth angle coverage of 180°, wherein each group of antennas can be conveniently realized by means of three horn antennas of the type shown in Figure 4 and previously described (i.e., horn antennas 111A, 111B, 111C) .
- a 45° polariser can also be used advantageously . Therefore, by using a jamming system comprising two jammers realized according to the example shown in Figure 7 and just described, and suitably installed/mounted one with respect to the other on one and the same naval platform, it is possible to obtain a total azimuth angle coverage of 360° around a zenith axis of said jamming system, for both the detection of satellite SAR threats and the delivery of the jamming against such threats.
- the jammer 1 can be conveniently customised and scaled up, also to meet the different requirements (of installation and not only) typical of the different application scenarios.
- the SAR integrates the signal during the observation time so that the jamming, in order to be maximally effective, must act from the beginning to the end of the illumination window.
- the RF threat detection means 11 have, therefore, the task of intercepting the pulses from the electromagnetic environment, recognising pulses belonging to a possible RF threat of interest (in the case of a SAR threat, for example) , of roughly estimating the direction of arrival and then of alerting the control system 13 by providing the latter with the estimated direction of arrival , so as to activate the delivery of the countermeasure via the RF j amming means 12 .
- a possible RF threat of interest in the case of a SAR threat, for example
- a fine tuning of the measurement/estimate of the direction of arrival can be conveniently performed to maximise both the pointing accuracy of the RF j amming means 12 ( in particular of the respective transceiver antennas 121 ) and the power level of the delivered j amming .
- This ef fect can be more or less felt also in the case of contrast to avionic platforms .
- the illumination times are sometimes signi ficantly longer, so the visibility time interval is greater than in the satellite case .
- the useful times for the ef fective delivery of the j amming are reduced, so that the situation is similar to the satellite case .
- the problem of the process gain of the imaging sensors remains , typically higher than that of the "classic" sensors .
- the SAR waveform is usually made up of pulses modulated with a linear ( chirp ) frequency modulation ( FM) with a rather wide bandwidth in order to have a resolution in a range comparable to that in azimuth; this also adds , besides the large distance , also further constraints on the detection technique .
- FM frequency modulation
- FIGS. 8 and 9 show, respectively, an example of a satellite SAR image and an example of a corresponding SAR image obtained in the presence of j amming delivered by the j ammer 1 in the satellite anti-SAR configuration described above .
- the j amming device is based on the coordination of two subsystems , namely :
- a j amming subsystem which inhibits the extraction of sensitive information operated by the enemy sensor (such as , for example , imaging information or the angle and distance coordinates of one or more targets ) .
- the appropriate mechanical structure and the appropriate orientation of the antennas optimise the ability of the j amming device to detect radar transmissions coming from these classes of sensors and to maximise contrast ef fectiveness .
- the characteristics of the threat , as well as the most suitable countermeasure strategy, are appropriately determined, modulated and managed on a library basis , conveniently as a function of the mission in progress .
- the architecture of the j amming device allows to best meet particularly stringent miss ion requirements and, for this reason, this device can be advantageously exploited not only for anti-SAR applications , but also for the defence against diving threats or in any case with quasi- zenithal flight profiles and high kinematic evolution .
- the architecture of the j amming device provides for a deep integration between the aforesaid two subsystems and allows the use of state-of-the-art transmission and processing technologies , which make this architecture particularly reactive and flexible , in addition to guaranteeing the maximum ef fectiveness of the contrast delivered .
- the j amming device arises from the Applicant ' s extens ive experience in j amming radar systems which requires the use of panoramic receivers with a high probability of interception, a fast reaction and the delivery of a coherent j amming .
- the present invention is capable of meeting stringent electronic defence requirements , either against satellite SAR sensors or, more generally, against a wide range of avionic-type RF threats from high elevation angles (up to profiles close to the zenith) .
- the use of state-of-the-art DRFM devices enables the j amming device to be able to deliver a wide range of possible coherent countermeasures and to synthesise ef fective countermeasures extremely quickly .
- the j amming device according to the present invention is characterised by an extremely flexible control architecture .
- the traditional naval and land electronic defence systems currently known are not designed to ensure an elevation angle coverage suitable for the defence against satellite or avionic SAR threats of the zenithal or quasi- zenithal type .
- the traditional configuration of such systems typically ensures an elevation coverage of [ - 5 ° , +55 ° ] .
- the j amming device according to the present invention is capable of ensuring a coverage for high elevation angles , even azimuthal or quasi-azimuthal .
- the j amming device may advantageously include , or may advantageously be coupled to , a mechanical pointing/ tilting system capable of orienting the antennas or the entire j amming device , even in real time , towards the desired pointing direction, held fixed throughout the mission duration .
- This directional ity is also success ful in case of detecting, and countering, SAR threats installed on avionic platforms that also operate close to these angles of view .
- a further configuration may conveniently include positioning the antennas so that , once the j amming device has been suitably tilted, the final pointing is quasi- orthogonal so as to ensure the coverage of the sector at the zenith .
- the use of the j amming device according to the invention is advantageous because this device has a high reactivity; this characteristic, together with the possibility of programming, modi fying and, therefore , using various countermeasure techniques , guarantees high operating ef ficiency and ef fectiveness of the device which is always able to counter satellite SAR threats , cancelling the high processing gain of the SAR receivers ;
- the use of the j amming device according to the invention is advantageous because such a device has a flexible architecture that allows programming, modi fying and, therefore , using highly ef fective contrast techniques ; thi s guarantees an ef ficient electronic defence to be delivered, since the possibility of detecting SAR-type threats is always guaranteed;
- the use of the j amming device according to the invention is advantageous because such device has the capacity to configure the angle of view by means of the mechanical pointing system, so that it is always possible to obtain a suitable configuration such as to guarantee the coverage of zenithal angle elevation sectors or those close to 90 ° ; this guarantees the delivery of an electronic defence that is either ef ficient or ef fective , since
- the present invention makes it possible to equip naval or land platforms with an electronic defence system that is extremely ef fective against satellite or avionic SAR threats and, more generally, against various types of avionic RF threats at high angles of view .
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Priority Applications (5)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
JP2023527092A JP2023548193A (en) | 2020-11-05 | 2021-11-05 | zenith reactive jammer |
EP21831101.7A EP4241108A1 (en) | 2020-11-05 | 2021-11-05 | Zenithal reactive jammer |
KR1020237019005A KR20230145033A (en) | 2020-11-05 | 2021-11-05 | Ceiling reactive jammer |
CA3197560A CA3197560A1 (en) | 2020-11-05 | 2021-11-05 | Zenithal reactive jammer |
IL302611A IL302611A (en) | 2020-11-05 | 2021-11-05 | Zenithal reactive jammer |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
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EP20425047 | 2020-11-05 | ||
EP20425047.6 | 2020-11-05 |
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WO2022097089A1 true WO2022097089A1 (en) | 2022-05-12 |
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PCT/IB2021/060275 WO2022097089A1 (en) | 2020-11-05 | 2021-11-05 | Zenithal reactive jammer |
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EP (1) | EP4241108A1 (en) |
JP (1) | JP2023548193A (en) |
KR (1) | KR20230145033A (en) |
CA (1) | CA3197560A1 (en) |
IL (1) | IL302611A (en) |
WO (1) | WO2022097089A1 (en) |
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CN115048817A (en) * | 2022-08-15 | 2022-09-13 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队航天工程大学 | Decision-making auxiliary method and system for ground deterrence analysis based on Starlink global deployment |
CN115048817B (en) * | 2022-08-15 | 2022-11-25 | 中国人民解放军战略支援部队航天工程大学 | Decision-making auxiliary method and system for analyzing ground deterrence |
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JP2023548193A (en) | 2023-11-15 |
CA3197560A1 (en) | 2022-05-12 |
IL302611A (en) | 2023-07-01 |
KR20230145033A (en) | 2023-10-17 |
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