WO2022063714A2 - Verfahren zur bestimmung von navigationsdaten - Google Patents
Verfahren zur bestimmung von navigationsdaten Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2022063714A2 WO2022063714A2 PCT/EP2021/075751 EP2021075751W WO2022063714A2 WO 2022063714 A2 WO2022063714 A2 WO 2022063714A2 EP 2021075751 W EP2021075751 W EP 2021075751W WO 2022063714 A2 WO2022063714 A2 WO 2022063714A2
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- correction data
- gnss
- data
- validated
- localization device
- Prior art date
Links
- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 title claims abstract description 26
- 238000012937 correction Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 165
- 230000004807 localization Effects 0.000 claims abstract description 37
- 238000011156 evaluation Methods 0.000 claims description 8
- 230000005540 biological transmission Effects 0.000 claims description 6
- 238000013461 design Methods 0.000 description 2
- 230000036962 time dependent Effects 0.000 description 1
- 238000012546 transfer Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000010200 validation analysis Methods 0.000 description 1
- 238000012795 verification Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
- G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/40—Correcting position, velocity or attitude
- G01S19/41—Differential correction, e.g. DGPS [differential GPS]
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
- G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/40—Correcting position, velocity or attitude
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/38—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system
- G01S19/39—Determining a navigation solution using signals transmitted by a satellite radio beacon positioning system the satellite radio beacon positioning system transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/42—Determining position
- G01S19/45—Determining position by combining measurements of signals from the satellite radio beacon positioning system with a supplementary measurement
- G01S19/47—Determining position by combining measurements of signals from the satellite radio beacon positioning system with a supplementary measurement the supplementary measurement being an inertial measurement, e.g. tightly coupled inertial
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01S—RADIO DIRECTION-FINDING; RADIO NAVIGATION; DETERMINING DISTANCE OR VELOCITY BY USE OF RADIO WAVES; LOCATING OR PRESENCE-DETECTING BY USE OF THE REFLECTION OR RERADIATION OF RADIO WAVES; ANALOGOUS ARRANGEMENTS USING OTHER WAVES
- G01S19/00—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems; Determining position, velocity or attitude using signals transmitted by such systems
- G01S19/01—Satellite radio beacon positioning systems transmitting time-stamped messages, e.g. GPS [Global Positioning System], GLONASS [Global Orbiting Navigation Satellite System] or GALILEO
- G01S19/03—Cooperating elements; Interaction or communication between different cooperating elements or between cooperating elements and receivers
- G01S19/07—Cooperating elements; Interaction or communication between different cooperating elements or between cooperating elements and receivers providing data for correcting measured positioning data, e.g. DGPS [differential GPS] or ionosphere corrections
Definitions
- GNSS correction data to obtain precise navigation data (mainly to determine navigation information, for example GNSS-based position determinations) is a common practice. Such data is used, for example, to correct uncertainties in position determination as a result of atmospheric disturbances in the GNSS signals and so on.
- correction data are usually made available by special service providers. Such service providers may transmit the correction data to a GNSS localization device at regularly recurring times or upon request.
- a method for determining navigation data with a GNSS localization device comprising the following steps: a) obtaining GNSS satellite signals from GNSS satellites; b) receiving at least two mutually alternative GNSS correction data from at least two different correction data sources; c) Analyzing the mutually alternative GNSS correction data and determining validated correction data; and d) determining navigation data from received GNSS satellite signals and validated correction data.
- the GNSS localization device described here is preferably part of a sensor for determining navigation data, which, in addition to GNSS satellite signals, may also use other data to determine navigation data - for example data from an environment sensor system, map data stored, data from an inertial sensor system or similar data.
- the GNSS satellite signals obtained in step a) are preferably received by GNSS satellites using an antenna provided for this purpose and a GNSS localization device.
- GNSS signals contain the carrier phase and pseudo-orange observations as well as the modulated navigation data.
- Correction data sources that provide correction data are normally so-called correction data providers that make correction data available.
- the service for providing correction data is booked by the manufacturer/supplier of the respective GNSS localization device on a permanent basis (usually for the intended lifetime of the GNSS localization device).
- a special feature of the method described here is that in step b) alternative correction data from two different correction data sources are received.
- the different correction data sources are preferably two different correction data providers, each providing correction data independently of one another. The method described can therefore be used preferably if the provider/manufacturer of the respective GNSS
- Localization device (with which the described method is carried out) has appropriate contracts/agreements with various correction data providers so that these correction data are available.
- step c various methods can be used in order to determine validated correction data from the correction data that are available as alternatives to one another.
- Determining the navigation data is the aim of the method described. This determination is made in step d).
- the validated correction data when determining the navigation data higher quality can be achieved, whereby the higher quality here includes various aspects, such as high accuracy, integrity and/or security (both functional security and data security).
- the mutually alternative GNSS correction data received in step b) each contain quality parameters which are used in step c) to analyze the mutually alternative GNSS correction data and to determine validated correction data.
- a correction data source can signal directly if there could be problems with the respective correction data.
- the correction data source can therefore transmit the information to the GNSS localization device via quality parameters that it might be better to use other correction data from another correction data source in order to achieve a high quality of the determination of navigation data in step d).
- high quality means high accuracy of the navigation data.
- Time stamp information contained in the correction data can also be processed in connection with quality parameters. Timestamp information can form the quality parameter itself or be part of the quality parameters. Time stamp information can also be included in the correction data in addition to the quality parameters. Time stamp information can contain information about how up-to-date the correction data is, for example. In step c), the more recent correction data can be determined/provided as validated correction data
- the navigation data determined in step d) contain at least one of the following output parameters:
- step b) a correction data request comprising at least one request parameter is sent to the various correction data sources and the mutually alternative GNSS correction data are sent and received by the correction data sources as a function of the correction data request.
- the correction data request contains the necessary information that the correction data source needs in order to provide the necessary correction data in a targeted manner. This can be time and/or location information, for example.
- the correction data source can then supply the required correction data for determining navigation data with a high quality as correction data for this time and this location.
- step b) the correction data are received at least in encrypted form and are decrypted using a key stored in the GNSS localization device.
- the correction data source can ensure that the correction data is only processed by GNSS localization devices that are authorized to use the correction data.
- End-to-end encryption is particularly preferably used, in which the correction data is encrypted at the correction data source using a public key that is provided by the GNSS localization device.
- the associated private key for decrypting the correction data is preferably stored in the GNSS localization device.
- the public key is preferably transmitted by the GNSS localization device to the correction data source with a correction data request.
- symmetrical encryption methods are also possible, in which the same key is stored in the correction data source and in the GNSS localization device. It is also advantageous if the correction data is received with an electronic signature in step b) and the electronic signature is checked during the analysis of the correction data in step c).
- a public key is preferably stored in the GNSS localization device, with which the authenticity of the electronic signature of the correction data can be checked.
- the verification of an electronic signature makes it possible in particular to establish that no counterfeit correction data, which may have been manipulated, for example, are being received here.
- a correction data request preferably also contains an electronic signature, namely an electronic signature with a certificate from the GNSS localization device.
- the correction data source can use such an electronic signature to recognize the authenticity of the correction data request.
- the correction data request is also very particularly preferably encrypted.
- the correction data request may contain sensitive information, such as the position of the GNSS localization device.
- the encryption can ensure that this sensitive information is only used by the correction data source to determine the correct correction data to be transmitted and not by a third party for other purposes.
- a symmetrical encryption can also be used for the encryption of the correction data request in embodiment variants, in which the same key is stored in the GNSS localization device and in the correction data source, which is then used in the GNSS localization device to encrypt the correction data request and in the correction data source to decrypt the Correction data request is used.
- the correction data are compared with one another during the plausibility check.
- a plausibility check is possible in particular if more than two mutually alternative correction data (e.g. three mutually alternative correction data from three mutually alternative correction data sources) are evaluated. Then, for example, it can be checked which of the three mutually alternative correction data deviates the most from the other correction data. This correction data can then be discarded.
- the various correction data can also be compared with an expected standard data set, which may also be location- and time-dependent. In this way it can be determined whether correction data are plausible.
- An evaluation algorithm can use a wide variety of criteria.
- correction data from a specific correction data source are preferred and made available as validated correction data, depending on the location and/or time.
- Various evaluation criteria can be used as part of the evaluation in the evaluation algorithm, for example the determination of a deviation from expected comparison values.
- a rating can be used to decide to use a specific correction data source.
- weighting correction data it is possible to combine correction data from different correction data sources.
- a weighting factor can be determined according to criteria similar to those described above in connection with the evaluation algorithm (in particular time and/or location as criteria).
- an existing encryption and/or signature of correction data is also used in the plausibility check, evaluation and weighting of correction data.
- step c) at least one of the following additional parameters is used to determine validated correction data: output parameters calculated on the GNSS localization device;
- Transmission latency parameters indicate when problems have occurred or are occurring in the data transmission of the correction data that could cause the respective correction data to be corrupted or indicate that there could be difficulties in transmitting the correction data from the correction data source to the GNSS without errors -Transfer localization device.
- a GNSS localization device set up to carry out the described method is also to be described here.
- Fig. 1 a described GNSS localization device.
- the GNSS localization device 2 which provides navigation data 1 .
- the GNSS localizer 2 receives GNSS Satellite data 3 from GNSS satellites 4 in order to determine the navigation data 1 therefrom. This is preferably done in a GNSS module 13 of the GNSS localization device 2.
- the GNSS localization device 2 also processes validated correction data 9.
- the validated correction data 9 are determined from correction data 5, 6, which are determined from different correction data sources 7,8.
- a first correction data source 7 for providing first correction data 5 and a second correction data source 8 for providing second correction data 6 are shown here as an example. Other correction data sources may exist.
- the correction data 5, 6 are preferably provided by the correction data sources 7, 8 in response to a correction data request 10, which is provided by the GNSS localization device 2.
- a correction data module 12 is preferably provided in the GNSS localization device 2 for the determination of the validated correction data 9 and their provision to the GNSS module.
- the correction data module 12 can optionally receive output parameters 11 from the GNSS module 13 which are used to determine the validated correction data 9 .
- Such output parameters 11 can optionally also be forwarded to the correction data sources 7, 8 in the form of the correction data request 10.
- the output parameters 11 transferred to the correction data module 12 can also be part of the navigation data 1 that the GNSS localization device 2 provides.
- the individual method steps a), b) and c) are assigned to the respective components of the GNSS localization device 2 in FIG. 1 .
- Step a) relates to the receipt of the GNSS satellite data 3.
- Step b) corresponds to the receipt of the correction data 5, 6 from the correction data sources 7, 8.
- Step c) is carried out in the correction data module 12.
- Step d) is carried out in the GNSS module 13.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Radar, Positioning & Navigation (AREA)
- Remote Sensing (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Position Fixing By Use Of Radio Waves (AREA)
- Navigation (AREA)
Abstract
Description
Claims
Priority Applications (4)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
CN202180063517.3A CN116249915A (zh) | 2020-09-24 | 2021-09-20 | 用于确定导航数据的方法 |
KR1020237013284A KR20230070485A (ko) | 2020-09-24 | 2021-09-20 | 내비게이션 데이터 결정 방법 |
JP2023518809A JP2023542386A (ja) | 2020-09-24 | 2021-09-20 | ナビゲーションデータを決定するための方法 |
US18/245,667 US20240012160A1 (en) | 2020-09-24 | 2021-09-20 | Method for Determining Navigation Data |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
DE102020212028.5A DE102020212028A1 (de) | 2020-09-24 | 2020-09-24 | Verfahren zur Bestimmung von Navigationsdaten |
DE102020212028.5 | 2020-09-24 |
Related Child Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US18/534,712 Continuation US20240109621A1 (en) | 2021-06-10 | 2023-12-10 | Motor for a bicycle, and bicycle |
Publications (2)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
WO2022063714A2 true WO2022063714A2 (de) | 2022-03-31 |
WO2022063714A3 WO2022063714A3 (de) | 2022-07-21 |
Family
ID=77989786
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
PCT/EP2021/075751 WO2022063714A2 (de) | 2020-09-24 | 2021-09-20 | Verfahren zur bestimmung von navigationsdaten |
Country Status (6)
Country | Link |
---|---|
US (1) | US20240012160A1 (de) |
JP (1) | JP2023542386A (de) |
KR (1) | KR20230070485A (de) |
CN (1) | CN116249915A (de) |
DE (1) | DE102020212028A1 (de) |
WO (1) | WO2022063714A2 (de) |
Family Cites Families (5)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
DE19624719A1 (de) * | 1996-06-21 | 1998-01-02 | Claas Ohg | System zur Positionsbestimmung von mobilen Objekten, insbesondere von Fahrzeugen |
US7471239B1 (en) * | 2007-06-20 | 2008-12-30 | Mediatek Inc. | Methods for processing external correction messages, correcting position measurements of GNSS receiver, and related apparatuses |
US9645241B1 (en) * | 2013-03-14 | 2017-05-09 | Google Inc. | Using data from non-surveyed devices to generate geopositioning corrections for portable devices |
JP7269246B2 (ja) * | 2018-08-24 | 2023-05-08 | ソニーセミコンダクタソリューションズ株式会社 | 受信機、および、受信機の制御方法 |
EP3667234B1 (de) * | 2018-12-14 | 2021-08-04 | Valeo Comfort and Driving Assistance | Verfahren zum betrieb eines navigationssystems eines fahrzeugs in einem zellularen netzwerk |
-
2020
- 2020-09-24 DE DE102020212028.5A patent/DE102020212028A1/de active Pending
-
2021
- 2021-09-20 US US18/245,667 patent/US20240012160A1/en active Pending
- 2021-09-20 KR KR1020237013284A patent/KR20230070485A/ko unknown
- 2021-09-20 WO PCT/EP2021/075751 patent/WO2022063714A2/de active Application Filing
- 2021-09-20 JP JP2023518809A patent/JP2023542386A/ja active Pending
- 2021-09-20 CN CN202180063517.3A patent/CN116249915A/zh active Pending
Also Published As
Publication number | Publication date |
---|---|
KR20230070485A (ko) | 2023-05-23 |
DE102020212028A1 (de) | 2022-03-24 |
WO2022063714A3 (de) | 2022-07-21 |
US20240012160A1 (en) | 2024-01-11 |
CN116249915A (zh) | 2023-06-09 |
JP2023542386A (ja) | 2023-10-06 |
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