WO2022059172A1

WO2022059172A1 - Chatting switching program, chatting processing program, information processing device, and chatting switching method

Info

Publication number: WO2022059172A1
Application number: PCT/JP2020/035493
Authority: WO
Inventors: 賢二郎西田
Original assignee: 富士通株式会社
Priority date: 2020-09-18
Filing date: 2020-09-18
Publication date: 2022-03-24
Also published as: JPWO2022059172A1

Abstract

This information processing device comprises a reception unit, an analysis unit, and a switching unit. The reception unit receives an instruction to start a conversation pertaining to a procedure between a first avatar and a corresponding chatbot. The analysis unit analyzes the possibility of the illegality of the procedure on the basis of details received as the conversation with the chatbot or a reception timing. When it has been determined that there is the possibility of illegality of the procedure, the switching unit switches the conversation between the first avatar and the corresponding chatbot into a conversation between a second avatar, which is different from the first avatar, and a corresponding chatbot, or a conversation in manned chat. As a result, a person involved in the procedure can be alerted about the possibility of the illegality of the procedure.

Description

Chat switching program, chat processing program, information processing device and chat switching method

The present invention relates to a chat switching program, a chat processing program, an information processing device, and a chat switching method.

In the past, transfer procedures were performed from bank counters and ATMs (Automatic Teller Machines), but even if the transfer procedure person does not go to the bank or ATM, the transfer procedure can be performed from the transfer procedure person's smartphone terminal or personal computer. The transfer system is known. 13A and 13B are explanatory views showing an example of a Web transfer image. In FIG. 13A, when the smartphone terminal of the transfer procedure person inputs the customer number in the customer number input field of the login screen on the Web screen, detects the PW input in the password input field, and then detects the login button operation (step S201). Notify the banking system of the login request. Further, the bank system presents a transfer destination input screen for inputting transfer destination information, for example, a bank name, a store number, an account number, a transfer amount, and the like (step S202). After detecting the input of the bank name, store number, account number and transfer amount on the transfer destination input screen, the smartphone terminal notifies the bank system of the transfer destination information according to the button operation of the confirmation button (step S202A).

In the banking system, when the transfer destination information from the smartphone terminal is detected, it is determined whether or not the content of the transfer destination information is normal (step S203). When the contents of the transfer destination information are normal, the bank system notifies the smartphone terminal of the transfer destination confirmation screen. In addition, the banking system notifies the smartphone terminal of an error message screen when the content of the transfer destination information is abnormal. In FIG. 13B, when the smartphone terminal confirms the contents of the transfer destination confirmation screen and then detects the button operation of the execute button on the transfer destination confirmation screen (step S204), the smartphone terminal notifies the bank system of the transfer request.

When the bank system receives the transfer request, it notifies the smartphone terminal of the customer authentication screen of the smartphone terminal. In FIG. 13B, when the smartphone terminal detects the input operation of the transfer PW in the transfer password input field on the authentication screen (step S205), the smartphone terminal notifies the bank system of the transfer PW.

When the bank system receives the transfer PW from the smartphone terminal, the bank system executes customer authentication of the smartphone terminal by the transfer PW. Then, when the customer authentication of the smartphone terminal is completed, the bank system executes the transfer procedure based on the transfer destination information. Then, after the transfer procedure is completed, the banking system presents a transfer confirmation screen indicating the completion of the transfer to the smartphone terminal (step S206).

As a result, the transfer procedure person of the smartphone terminal can perform the transfer procedure by remote control without going to the bank store, etc., so that the work load of the window required for the transfer and the burden of the transfer procedure person can be reduced.

Japanese Patent Publication No. 2008-544339 Special Table 2010-515175 Publication No.

However, in recent years, for example, while fraudulent procedures such as transfer fraud and unauthorized use of ID / PW are rampant, the possibility of fraud is also raised in the transfer procedure by remote control from the smartphone terminal of the transfer procedure person. It is necessary to have a mechanism to make people aware of this.

One aspect is to provide a chat switching program, etc. that can alert the procedure person to the possibility of fraudulent procedures.

The chat switching program on one side causes the computer to execute a process of accepting an instruction to start a conversation regarding the procedure between the first avatar and the associated chatbot. Further, the computer is made to execute a process of analyzing the possibility of fraud against the procedure based on the content received as a conversation with the chatbot or the timing of the reception. Further, when it is determined that there is a possibility of fraudulent activity against the procedure, the conversation with the chatbot associated with the first avatar is associated with the second avatar different from the first avatar. Have the computer perform a process to switch to a conversation with a chatbot or a conversation in a manned chat.

According to one aspect, the possibility of fraud in the procedure can be aroused to the procedure person.

FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a transfer chat system of this embodiment. FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an example of a server device. FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a fraudulent possibility DB. FIG. 4 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the message DB. FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing an example of the processing operation of the server device related to the transfer chat processing. FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a chat transfer image in a normal state. FIG. 7A is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (transfer fraud). FIG. 7B is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (transfer fraud). FIG. 8A is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (transfer fraud). FIG. 8B is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (transfer fraud). FIG. 9A is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (transfer fraud). FIG. 9B is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (transfer fraud). FIG. 10A is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (transfer fraud). FIG. 10B is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (transfer fraud). FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (tool abuse). FIG. 12 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of an information processing device that executes a chat switching program. FIG. 13A is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a Web transfer image. FIG. 13B is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a Web transfer image.

Hereinafter, examples of the transfer chat system and the like disclosed in the present application will be described in detail based on the drawings. The disclosed technology is not limited by each embodiment. In addition, the examples shown below may be appropriately combined as long as they do not cause a contradiction.

FIG. 1 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the transfer chat system 1 of this embodiment. The transfer chat system 1 shown in FIG. 1 includes a terminal device 2 of a transfer procedure person who is a customer, a server device 3, a bank system 4, and a network 5. The terminal device 2 is a terminal device for a transfer procedure person such as a smartphone terminal, a tablet terminal, or a personal computer, which controls wired communication or wireless communication with the network 5. The server device 3 is, for example, an information processing device that controls the entire bank transfer chat system 1. The bank system 4 is a system on the bank side provided with a DB or the like that manages customer information of the bank. It is a communication network such as the Internet that connects the terminal device 2 and the server device 3 by communication.

In the DB of the bank system 4, the customer name that identifies the transfer procedure person who is the customer, the customer's account number, the customer's customer number, the customer's login PW, the MAC number of the operation terminal used by the customer at the time of transfer, the account balance, etc. Manage customer information by associating the answers to additional questions. The answer to the additional question is information for verifying the identity of the pet, such as the name of the pet that the customer has for the first time.

FIG. 2 is a block diagram showing an example of the server device 3. The server device 3 shown in FIG. 2 has a communication device 11, a storage device 12, and a processor 13. The communication device 11 is a device that controls communication with the network 5. The storage device 12 is a device that stores various types of information. The processor 13 controls the entire server device 3. The storage device 12 has a rogue possibility DB 21 and a message DB 22. The fraudulent possibility DB 21 is a DB that manages information for determining the fraudulent possibility of the transfer procedure according to the content used for the anomaly analysis. The message DB 22 is a DB that manages the content of the message that calls attention or restraint to the transfer procedure person according to the result of the anomaly analysis.

The processor 13 reads a program stored in the storage device 12, and executes a process as a function based on the read program. The processor 13 has a chatbot 31, a reception unit 32, an analysis unit 33, a switching unit 34, a display control unit 35, and a recording unit 36 as functions.

The chatbot 31 is an AI (Artificial Intelligence) chatbot that supports a customer's transfer procedure in a conversational manner with the terminal device 2. The chatbot 31 has a first avatar 31A (see FIG. 8A) that appears at a normal timing and a second avatar 31B (see FIG. 8B) that appears at the timing of alerting.

The reception unit 32 receives an instruction to start a conversation regarding the transfer procedure between the first avatar 31A and the chatbot associated with the first avatar 31A. The analysis unit 33 analyzes the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure based on the content received as a conversation with the chatbot or the timing of reception. The analysis unit 33 accesses the DB in the banking system 4 and collects customer information. The analysis unit 33 refers to the customer information and the fraudulent possibility DB 21 and analyzes the fraudulent possibility of the transfer procedure.

When the switching unit 34 determines that the transfer procedure may be fraudulent, the switching unit 34 switches from the first avatar 31A to the second avatar 31B and continues the conversation with the chatbot in association with the second avatar 31B. .. Further, when the switching unit 34 determines that the transfer procedure may be fraudulent, the switching unit 34 switches from the first avatar 31A to a conversation in a manned chat.

The display control unit 35 can distinguish between a conversation with a chatbot associated with the second avatar 31B or a conversation in a manned chat and a conversation with the chatbot associated with the first avatar 31A. It is controlled to be displayed on the display unit of the device 2 (see FIG. 9A). When the recording unit 36 receives a reply that the meta information may be generated in response to the inquiry information, the recording unit 36 generates the meta information and records the generated meta information. For example, as shown in FIG. 9B, when the recording unit 36 receives an answer of "yes" to the message "Is it okay to leave the information in the financial institution / police agency?", The transfer procedure is performed. Record the log as meta information in the DB of the financial institution or the National Police Agency. The recording unit 36 may store the transfer procedure log in the storage device 12 as meta information.

FIG. 3 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the possibility of fraud DB21. The fraudulent possibility DB 21 shown in FIG. 3 is a DB that manages fraudulent possibility information for detecting the fraudulent possibility of the transfer procedure from the input contents of the other party by the chatbot 31. The fraud possibility information is information that manages the classification, the content, and the detailed content in association with each other. The fraudulent possibility information includes fraudulent possibility information focusing on the state of the transfer procedure person, fraud possibility information focusing on the operation of the transfer procedure, and fraud possibility information focusing on the operation of the chatbot 31. ..

The information on the possibility of fraud focusing on the state of the transfer procedure person is the personal information of the transfer procedure person himself / herself. The personal information of the transfer procedure person has the age and the account balance. The analysis unit 33 pays attention to the age of the personal information, and calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure, for example, when the age group of the transfer procedure person is over 70s. In addition, the analysis unit 33 pays attention to the account balance of the personal information and calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure when the account balance of the transfer procedure person himself / herself is high.

The fraudulent possibility information focusing on the operation of the transfer procedure includes the personal information of the transfer procedure person, the other party information of the transfer destination, the quality information, and the quantity information. The self-information includes an IP address, a terminal information, and a location information. The analysis unit 33 pays attention to the IP address of the transfer procedure person and calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure when the transfer operation is detected from a PC different from the usual one. The analysis unit 33 pays attention to the terminal information of the transfer procedure person himself and calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure when the transfer operation is detected from the terminal device 2 different from the usual one. The analysis unit 33 pays attention to the location information of the transfer procedure person himself and calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure when the transfer operation is detected from a place different from the normal living area.

The transfer destination information includes the transfer destination, the nationality of the account, the suspicious account, and the new transfer destination. When the analysis unit 33 pays attention to the transfer destination and detects the transfer request to the account in the caution list, the analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure. The analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures when it detects a transfer request to an overseas account by focusing on the nationality of the account. When the analysis unit 33 pays attention to the suspicious account and detects the transfer request to the dormant account, the analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure. When the analysis unit 33 pays attention to the new transfer destination and detects the transfer request to the new transfer destination, the analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure.

Quality information includes suddenness, regulations / rules, and elderly people. The analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures when it detects a sudden transfer request to the first transfer destination, paying attention to the suddenness. The analysis unit 33 pays attention to the regulation / rule and calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure when the transfer amount is limited and the transfer request is detected. The analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures when the elderly person pays attention to the transfer request and detects the transfer request.

The quantity information includes frequency, amount, and number of times. The analysis unit 33 pays attention to the frequency and calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures when it detects multiple transfer requests to the same account within the same month. The analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures when a transfer request for a large transfer amount is detected by paying attention to the amount. The analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures when it detects a transfer request to a plurality of accounts in one day by paying attention to the number of times.

Abnormal information focusing on the operation of the chatbot 31 includes time information, input information, and question information. There are short time information, slow time information, and constant time information. When the analysis unit 33 pays attention to the shortness and detects various inputs of the transfer whose operation time is too short as compared with the normal operation, the analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure. When the analysis unit 33 pays attention to the slowness and detects various inputs of the transfer whose operation time is too late as compared with the normal operation, the analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure. The analysis unit 33 pays attention to a certain amount and calls attention to the possibility of fraud in the transfer procedure when the operation time of each of the various input of the transfer is fixed and the transfer input is detected.

The input information includes the number of erroneous inputs and the number of corrections. When the analysis unit 33 pays attention to the number of erroneous inputs and detects a transfer request with many erroneous inputs, the analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure. When the analysis unit 33 pays attention to the number of corrections and detects a transfer request having a large number of corrections, the analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures.

The question information includes the number and the content of the question. When the analysis unit 33 pays attention to the number and detects the transfer request containing the inquiry of personal information, the analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure. The analysis unit 33 calls attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures when it detects a transfer request with a Japanese error by paying attention to the content of the question.

The analysis unit 33 refers to the fraudulent possibility DB 21 shown in FIG. 3 and identifies, for example, a transfer fraud targeting the elderly, an ID / PW misuse act, a cyber attack, etc. as the fraudulent possibility of the transfer procedure.

FIG. 4 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the message DB 22. The message DB 22 shown in FIG. 4 is a DB that manages a message addressed to a transfer procedure person indicating the content of the message after determining the possibility of fraud. The content of the message includes a message for an additional question to the transfer procedure person, a message for notifying the transfer procedure person, a message for preventing the execution by the tool, and a message for restraining the malicious transfer procedure person.

Additional question messages include, for example, "Please select the transfer purpose", "Who told me to transfer?", "Enter your child's name", "Transfer destination". Do you want to check your account information? "," What is the name of your pet for the first time? ", Etc.

Messages that give notice to the transfer procedure person are, for example, "This transaction is suspected of being a transfer fraud.", "The transfer destination account is an account that has not been used for more than ○ years.", "The transfer destination account. The account is a message that calls attention such as "The account is an account on the caution list in financial transactions." And "The transfer destination account is an overseas account."

As messages to prevent execution by the tool, for example, "Please select an image of a person.", "Please select an image of a memory (user).", "Enter your date of birth in the input field." This is a message to suppress cyber attacks such as "Please enter."

Messages that restrain malicious transfer procedures include, for example, "I will contact my family", "I'm sorry from the side", "I will cooperate with manned chat", "Financial institution / National Police Agency" It is a message such as "I will leave the information in." Or "I will shoot a video when the transfer is executed."

Based on the analysis result of the anomaly of the analysis unit 33, the chatbot 31 extracts a message corresponding to the transfer fraud from the message DB 22 and extracts the extracted message as a possibility of fraud in the transfer procedure, for example, in the case of a transfer fraud targeting the elderly. Presented to the terminal device 2.

Based on the analysis result of the anomaly of the analysis unit 33, the chatbot 31 extracts from the message DB 22 a message corresponding to the misuse of the ID / PW, for example, in the case of the misuse of the ID / PW, as the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure. The extracted message is presented to the terminal device 2.

Based on the analysis result of the anomaly of the analysis unit 33, the chatbot 31 extracts a message corresponding to the cyber attack from the message DB 22 as a possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure, for example, in the case of a cyber attack, and transfers the extracted message to the terminal device 2. Present.

Next, the operation of the transfer chat system 1 of this embodiment will be described. FIG. 5 is a flowchart showing an example of the processing operation of the server device 3 related to the transfer chat processing. In FIG. 5, the server device 3 determines whether or not a conversation start instruction with the first avatar 31A has been received from the terminal device 2 of the transfer procedure person (step S11). The first avatar 31A is a character that supports the transfer procedure for the transfer procedure person. When the server device 3 receives the conversation start instruction with the first avatar 31A from the terminal device 2 (step S11: Yes), whether or not the server device 3 has detected the input content of the transfer procedure person for the conversation content of the first avatar 31A. (Step S12).

When the server device 3 detects the input content from the terminal device 2 (step S12: Yes), the server device 3 specifies the input content (step S13). When the server device 3 specifies the input content, the server device 3 refers to the fraudulent possibility DB 21 and anomaly analyzes the input content (step S14). The server device 3 determines whether or not the possibility of fraud in the transfer procedure has been detected based on the result of the anomaly analysis of the input contents (step S15). When the server device 3 detects the possibility of fraud (step S15: Yes), the server device 3 identifies the content of the possibility of fraud (step S16). The contents of the possibility of fraud include, for example, transfer fraud targeting the elderly, fraudulent use of ID / PW, cyber attacks, and the like.

The server device 3 extracts a message according to the content of the identified fraudulent possibility from the message DB 22 (step S17), and chat-outputs the extracted message to the terminal device 2 of the transfer procedure person (step S18). As a result, the transfer procedure person of the terminal device 2 can recognize the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure by looking at the message. If the transfer procedure person is a well-meaning transfer procedure person, the transfer procedure person can be alerted. In addition, if the transfer procedure person is a malicious transfer procedure person, it is possible to check the transfer procedure person for fraudulent transfer procedures.

After chatting out a message to the terminal device 2, the server device 3 determines whether or not the response content corresponding to the message is detected from the terminal device 2 (step S19). When the server device 3 detects the response content from the terminal device 2 (step S19: Yes), the server device 3 specifies the response content (step S20).

When the answer content is specified, the server device 3 refers to the fraudulent possibility DB 21 and anomaly analyzes the answer content (step S21). The server device 3 determines whether or not the possibility of fraud has been detected based on the anomaly analysis result of the answer content (step S22).

When the server device 3 detects the possibility of fraud (step S22: Yes), the server device 3 checks against the transfer procedure person of the terminal device 2 from the chat of the first avatar 31A to the manned chat or the second avatar 31B. Switch to chat (step S23). As a result, the transfer procedure person of the terminal device 2 can recognize the possibility of further fraudulent transfer procedure by switching to the manned chat or the second avatar 31B. If the transfer procedure person is a well-meaning transfer procedure person, further attention can be drawn. In addition, if the transfer procedure person is a malicious transfer procedure person, it is possible to further restrain the transfer procedure person.

The server device 3 executes a conversation with the transfer procedure person after switching to a manned chat or a chat of the second avatar 31B. By switching from the first avatar 31A to the manned chat or the second avatar 31B, the transfer procedure person can call attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure. Then, the server device 3 executes a conversation with the transfer procedure person, and when it is determined that the transfer procedure of the transfer procedure person is normal, the server device 3 starts personal authentication from the terminal device 2 (step S24), and the process shown in FIG. End the operation.

Further, when the server device 3 does not detect the possibility of fraud (step S22: No), it is determined that the transfer procedure of the transfer procedure person is normal, and the personal authentication from the terminal device 2 is started in step S24. Transition.

Further, when the server device 3 does not detect the possibility of fraud (step S15: No), it determines whether or not all the designated inputs have been completed (step S25). All designated inputs are, for example, inputs related to the transfer procedure such as the customer number, PW, the store number of the transfer destination, the account number of the transfer destination, and the transfer amount. When all the designated inputs are completed (step S25: Yes), the server device 3 determines that the transfer procedure of the transfer procedure person is normal, and proceeds to step S24 in order to start personal authentication from the terminal device 2.

When all the designated inputs are not completed (step S25: No), the server device 3 proceeds to step S12 in order to determine whether or not the input contents for the conversation contents of the first avatar 31A have been detected. Further, when the server device 3 does not detect the input content for the conversation content of the first avatar 31A (step S12: No), it determines whether or not the input content for the conversation content of the first avatar 31A is detected. Therefore, the process proceeds to step S12.

Further, when the server device 3 does not receive the conversation start instruction from the terminal device 2 to the first avatar 31A (step S11: Yes), the server device 3 ends the processing operation shown in FIG. When the server device 3 does not detect the response content from the terminal device 2 (step S19: No), the server device 3 proceeds to step S19 in order to determine whether or not the response content has been detected from the terminal device 2.

When the server device 3 detects the input content for the conversation content of the first avatar 31A from the terminal device 2, it analyzes the anomaly from the input content and determines whether or not the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure is detected based on the anomaly analysis result. To judge. When the server device 3 detects the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure, the server device 3 presents a message according to the content of the fraudulent possibility to the terminal device 2. As a result, the customer can call attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure with the additional message of the first avatar 31A.

Further, when the server device 3 detects the answer content corresponding to the message, it analyzes the anomaly from the answer content and determines whether or not the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure is detected based on the anomaly analysis result. When the server device 3 detects the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure, the server device 3 switches from the first avatar 31A to the second avatar 31B or a manned chat. As a result, the customer can further call attention to the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures by switching from the first avatar 31A to the second avatar 31B or manned chat.

FIG. 6 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a chat transfer image in a normal state. The chat transfer image shown in FIG. 6 is a chat transfer image between the terminal device 2 and the server device 3. For convenience of explanation, the procedure of the procedure is the transfer procedure, the operation time of the procedure is usually the same as the transfer destination of the procedure, the transfer amount of the procedure is the same as usual, and the operation terminal of the procedure is also the same as usual. Same.

The server device 3 presents "Please select a target transaction" from the first avatar 31A to the terminal device 2 (step S41). Further, the server device 3 presents a selection button such as "transfer" or "remittance" to the terminal device 2 as a target transaction. When the server device 3 detects the button operation of the "transfer" selection button, it displays "transfer. Log in." And "enter your customer number." From the first avatar 31A. Presented in 2 (step S42).

When the server device 3 detects the input of the customer number from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 presents "Enter PW" from the first avatar 31A to the terminal device 2 (step S43). When the server device 3 detects the input of the PW from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes the anomaly analysis of the PW (step S44). When the PW is normal, the server device 3 presents "Enter the store number of the transfer destination" from the first avatar 31A to the terminal device 2 (step S45).

When the server device 3 detects the input of the store number of the transfer destination from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 presents "Enter the account number of the transfer destination" from the first avatar 31A to the terminal device 2 (step S46). ). Further, when the server device 3 detects the input of the transfer destination account number from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes anomaly analysis of the transfer destination account number (step S47). When the transfer destination account number is normal, the server device 3 presents "Enter the transfer amount" from the first avatar 31A to the terminal device 2 (step S48).

When the server device 3 detects the input of the transfer amount from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes the anomaly analysis of the transfer amount (step S49). When the transfer amount is normal, the server device 3 presents the transfer content confirmation screen and confirmation button to the terminal device 2 from the first avatar 31A (step S50). When the server device 3 detects the button operation of the "Yes" confirmation button of the transfer contents from the terminal device 2, the first avatar 31A "authenticates the person. Please enter the name of your dog." The authentication screen is presented to the terminal device 2 (step S51). At this time, the authentication screen is a simple authentication method because the analysis result of the anomaly analysis of the transfer destination account number and the transfer amount is normal.

When the server device 3 detects the input of the dog's name from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 starts the transfer, and after the transfer is completed, presents "the transfer is completed" to the terminal device 2 (step S52). As a result, the server device 3 can complete the transfer procedure when the answer contents are normal while confirming the answer contents by the chat between the first avatar 31A and the terminal device 2 by the anomaly analysis.

7A and 7B are explanatory diagrams showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (transfer fraud). The chat transfer image shown in FIGS. 7A and 7B is a chat transfer image between the terminal device 2 and the server device 3. For convenience of explanation, the procedure of the procedure is a transfer procedure, the operation time of the procedure is usually an account that has not been tired for 5 years or more, the transfer amount of the procedure is 500,000 yen, the operation of the procedure The terminal is the same as usual.

In FIG. 7A, the server device 3 presents "Please select a target transaction" from the first avatar 31A to the terminal device 2 (step S41). Further, the server device 3 presents a selection button such as "transfer" or "remittance" to the terminal device 2 as a target transaction. When the server device 3 detects the button operation of the "transfer" selection button, it presents "transfer. Log in." And "enter the customer number." To the terminal device 2 (step). S42).

When the server device 3 detects the input of the customer number from the terminal device 2, it presents "Enter PW." To the terminal device 2 (step S43). When the server device 3 detects the input of the PW from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes the anomaly analysis of the PW (step S44). When the PW is normal, the server device 3 presents "Enter the store number of the transfer destination" to the terminal device 2 (step S45).

When the server device 3 detects the input of the store number of the transfer destination from the terminal device 2, it presents "Enter the account number of the transfer destination" to the terminal device 2 (step S46). Further, when the server device 3 detects the input of the transfer destination account number from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes an anomaly analysis for determining whether or not the transfer destination account number is a dormant account (step S47A). Based on the anomaly analysis result, if there is a possibility that the transfer destination account number is incorrect, the server device 3 will ask "The transfer destination account has not been used for 5 years or more. Do you want to proceed with the procedure?" The message and the confirmation button are presented to the terminal device 2 (step S47B). As a result, the server device 3 arouses the possibility of fraudulent transfer account to the transfer procedure person in good faith. Further, the server device 3 restrains the fraudulent transfer procedure against the malicious transfer procedure person.

In FIG. 7B, when the server device 3 detects the button operation of the confirmation button of "Yes" from the terminal device 2, it presents "Please enter the transfer amount" to the terminal device 2 (step S48). When the server device 3 detects the input of the transfer amount from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes the anomaly analysis of the transfer amount (step S49A). Based on the anomaly analysis result, the server device 3 presents "Please select the transfer purpose this time" and the transfer purpose selection button to the terminal device 2 when there is a possibility that the transfer amount is fraudulent (step S49B). As a result, the server device 3 arouses the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure to the well-meaning transfer procedure person. The server device 3 restrains the fraudulent transfer procedure against the malicious transfer procedure person.

When the server device 3 detects a button operation of a transfer purpose selection button such as "remittance / remittance to a child" from the terminal device 2, it presents "there is a possibility of transfer fraud" to the terminal device 2 ( Step S62). The server device 3 presents "I will contact the family, is that okay?" And a confirmation button to the terminal device 2 (step S63). As a result, the server device 3 arouses the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure to the well-meaning transfer procedure person. The server device 3 restrains the fraudulent transfer procedure against the malicious transfer procedure person.

Furthermore, when the server device 3 detects the button operation of the "Yes" confirmation button from the terminal device 2, it "authenticates the person. Since the SMS was sent to the registered phone number, the transfer is executed from the SMS. Please do. ”To the terminal device 2 (step S64). Then, the customer of the terminal device 2 executes the transfer according to the button operation of the transfer button on the received SMS (step S65).

8A and 8B are explanatory diagrams showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (transfer fraud). The chat transfer image shown in FIGS. 8A and 8B is a chat transfer image between the terminal device 2 and the server device 3. For convenience of explanation, the procedure of the procedure is a transfer, the operation time of the procedure is usually, the transfer destination of the procedure is a normal account, the transfer amount of the procedure is 500,000 yen, and the operation terminal of the procedure is also different from usual. It is referred to as a terminal device 2.

In FIG. 8A, the server device 3 presents "Please select a target transaction" to the terminal device 2 (step S41). Further, the server device 3 presents a selection button such as "transfer" or "remittance" to the terminal device 2 as a target transaction. When the server device 3 detects the button operation of the "transfer" selection button, it presents "transfer. Log in." And "enter the customer number." To the terminal device 2 (step). S42).

When the server device 3 detects the input of the customer number from the terminal device 2, it presents "Enter PW." To the terminal device 2 (step S43). When the server device 3 detects the input of the PW from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes the anomaly analysis of the PW (step S71). Further, the server device 3 determines whether or not the terminal device 2 is different from the usual one by using, for example, the MAC number of the terminal device 2 and the MAC number of the usual terminal based on the anomaly analysis result.

The server device 3 determines that the transfer procedure may be fraudulent if the current terminal device 2 is a terminal device 2 different from the normal one. Then, the server device 3 presents "Please answer the following questions to confirm the identity of the operator" and "What is the name of the pet you have for the first time?" To the terminal device 2 ( Step S72). As a result, the server device 3 arouses the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure by the terminal device 2 which is different from the usual one to the well-meaning transfer procedure person. The server device 3 restrains the fraudulent transfer procedure against the malicious transfer procedure person. Then, when the server device 3 detects the content of the reply from the terminal device 2, it presents "Please enter the store number of the transfer destination" to the terminal device 2 (step S45).

When the server device 3 detects the input of the store number of the transfer destination from the terminal device 2, it presents "Enter the account number of the transfer destination" to the terminal device 2 (step S46). Further, in FIG. 8B, when the server device 3 detects the input of the transfer destination account number from the terminal device 2, it presents "Please input the transfer amount" to the terminal device 2 (step S48). When the server device 3 detects the input of the transfer amount from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes the anomaly analysis of the transfer amount (step S73). Based on the anomaly analysis result, if the transfer amount exceeds the upper limit and there is a possibility that the transfer amount is fraudulent, the server device 3 presses the "Please select the transfer purpose this time" and the transfer purpose selection button to the terminal device 2. (Step S74). As a result, the server device 3 arouses the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure with a high transfer amount to the well-meaning transfer procedure person. The server device 3 restrains the fraudulent transfer procedure against the malicious transfer procedure person.

When the server device 3 detects the button operation of the transfer purpose selection button such as "remittance / remittance to the child" from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes the anomaly analysis of "remittance / remittance to the child" (step S75). The server device 3 presents "there is a possibility of transfer fraud", "I will contact the family, is that okay?" And a confirmation button to the terminal device 2 (step S76). As a result, the server device 3 arouses the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure to the well-meaning transfer procedure person. The server device 3 restrains the fraudulent transfer procedure against the malicious transfer procedure person.

Furthermore, when the server device 3 detects the button operation of the "Yes" confirmation button from the terminal device 2, it "authenticates the person. Since the SMS was sent to the registered phone number, the transfer is executed from the SMS. Please present to the terminal device 2 (step S77. As a result, the customer of the terminal device 2 executes the transfer in response to the button operation of the transfer button on the received SMS (step S78).

FIGS. 9A and 9B are explanatory diagrams showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (transfer fraud). The chat transfer image shown in FIGS. 9A and 9B is a chat transfer image between the terminal device 2 and the server device 3. For convenience of explanation, the procedure of the procedure is the transfer procedure, the operation time of the procedure is usually the account on the financial transaction caution list, the transfer amount of the procedure is 500,000 yen, the operation of the procedure The terminal is the same as usual.

In FIG. 9A, the server device 3 presents "Please select a target transaction" from the first avatar 31A to the terminal device 2 (step S41). Further, the server device 3 presents a selection button such as "transfer" or "remittance" to the terminal device 2 as a target transaction. When the server device 3 detects the button operation of the "transfer" selection button, it presents "transfer. Log in." And "enter the customer number." To the terminal device 2 (step). S42).

When the server device 3 detects the input of the customer number from the terminal device 2, it presents "Enter PW." To the terminal device 2 (step S43). When the server device 3 detects the input of the PW from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes the anomaly analysis of the PW (step S44). Further, when the PW is normal, the server device 3 presents "Enter the store number of the transfer destination" to the terminal device 2 (step S45).

When the server device 3 detects the input of the store number of the transfer destination from the terminal device 2, it presents "Enter the account number of the transfer destination" to the terminal device 2 (step S46). When the server device 3 detects the input of the transfer destination account number from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes anomaly analysis of the transfer destination account number (step S81). As a result, the server device 3 determines that the transfer procedure may be fraudulent if the transfer destination account number is a new transfer destination and the account is on the financial attention list, based on the result of the anomaly analysis of the transfer destination account number. Judgment is made, and the first avatar 31A is switched to the second avatar 31B.

Then, the server device 3 presents "Excuse me from the side" to the terminal device 2 from the second avatar 31B (step S82). The server device 3 presents "The transfer account is an account on the financial attention list" and "Are you sure you want to proceed?" And the answer button from the second avatar 31B to the terminal device 2 (step S83). .. As a result, with the advent of the second Avata 31B, the server device 3 further arouses the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures to the financial attention list account to the well-meaning transfer procedure person. The server device 3 further restrains the fraudulent transfer procedure against the malicious transfer procedure person. When the server device 3 detects the button operation of the answer button of "Yes" in FIG. 9B, the server device 3 presents "Enter the transfer amount" to the terminal device 2 from the second avatar 31B (step S48). .. When the server device 3 detects the input of the transfer amount from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes the anomaly analysis of the transfer amount (step S84). Based on the anomaly analysis result, the server device 3 presents "Please select the transfer purpose this time" and the transfer purpose selection button to the terminal device 2 when there is a possibility that the transfer amount is fraudulent (step S85). As a result, the server device 3 arouses the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures to the high-value financial attention list account to the well-meaning transfer procedure person. The server device 3 restrains the fraudulent transfer procedure against the malicious transfer procedure person.

When the server device 3 detects the button operation of the transfer purpose selection button such as "remittance / remittance to the child" from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes the anomaly analysis of "remittance / remittance to the child" (step S86). The server device 3 presents "there is a possibility of transfer fraud" to the terminal device 2 (step S87). The server device 3 presents "I will leave the information to the financial institution / National Police Agency, is that okay?" And the answer button to the terminal device 2 (step S88).

Furthermore, when the server device 3 detects the button operation of the answer button of "Yes" from the terminal device 2, it "authenticates the person. The SMS is sent to the registered telephone number, so the transfer is executed from the SMS. Please do. ”To the terminal device 2 (step S89). As a result, the customer of the terminal device 2 executes the transfer according to the button operation of the transfer button on the received SMS (step S79).

FIGS. 10A and 10B are explanatory diagrams showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (transfer fraud). The chat transfer image shown in FIGS. 10A and 10B is a chat transfer image between the terminal device 2 and the server device 3. For convenience of explanation, the procedure of the procedure is the transfer procedure, the operation time of the procedure is usually the overseas account, the transfer amount of the procedure is 500,000 yen, and the operation terminal of the procedure is also usual. Same.

In FIG. 10A, the server device 3 presents "Please select a target transaction" from the first avatar 31A to the terminal device 2. Further, the server device 3 presents a selection button such as "transfer" or "remittance" to the terminal device 2 as a target transaction. When the server device 3 detects the button operation of the "transfer" selection button, it presents "transfer. Log in." And "enter the customer number." To the terminal device 2 (step). S42).

When the server device 3 detects the input of the store number of the transfer destination from the terminal device 2, it presents "Enter the account number of the transfer destination" to the terminal device 2 (step S46). When the server device 3 detects the input of the transfer destination account number from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes anomaly analysis of the transfer destination account number (step S91). As a result, the server device 3 determines that if the transfer destination account number is a new transfer destination, the transfer procedure may be fraudulent, based on the result of the anomaly analysis of the transfer destination account number, and the first avatar 31A To the second avatar 31B. As a result, with the advent of the second avatar 31B, the server device 3 further arouses the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures to the transfer account to the well-meaning transfer procedure person. The server device 3 further restrains the fraudulent transfer procedure against the malicious transfer procedure person.

Then, the server device 3 presents "Excuse me from the side" to the terminal device 2 from the second avatar 31B (step S92). The server device 3 presents "the transfer account is an overseas account" to the terminal device 2 from the second avatar 31B (step S93). The server device 3 presents the answer button and "Are you sure you want to proceed with the procedure?" From the second avatar 31B to the terminal device 2 (step S94). When the server device 3 detects the button operation of the answer button of "Yes" in FIG. 10B, the server device 3 presents "Enter the transfer amount" to the terminal device 2 from the second avatar 31B (step S48). .. When the server device 3 detects the input of the transfer amount from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes the anomaly analysis of the transfer amount (step S95). Based on the anomaly analysis result, the server device 3 presents "Who told me to make the transfer?" And a selection button to the terminal device 2 when there is a possibility that the transfer amount is fraudulent (step S96). The selection button is, for example, a button such as "your own intention", "police / bank clerk", or "other".

When the server device 3 detects the button operation of the "other" selection button, the server device 3 presents a free input field to the terminal device 2 (step S97). When the server device 3 detects the input to the free input field from the terminal device 2, it presents "Connect to the manned chat" to the terminal device 2, and then changes from the chat of the second avatar 31B to the manned chat. Switching (step S98). As a result, manned chat arouses the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures to well-meaning transfer procedures. Manned chat restrains fraudulent transfer procedures against malicious transfer procedures.

The manned chat terminal presents "Please tell me the purpose of the transfer" and the free input field to the terminal device 2 from the manned chat terminal (step S98A). When the operator of the manned chat terminal detects the purpose of the transfer to the free input field, the operator determines whether or not the procedure is normal from the transfer purpose. If the procedure is determined to be normal, the manned chat terminal presents "Authenticate the person" to the terminal device 2.

The server device 3 activates the face authentication function (step S99), and if the face authentication is OK, the second avatar 31B sends "personal authentication was successful" and "thank you" to the terminal device 2. Present (step S100). Then, when the server device 3 detects the button operation of the answer button of "Yes" from the terminal device 2, it "authenticates the person. The SMS is sent to the registered telephone number, so the transfer is executed from the SMS. Please do. "Is presented to the terminal device 2. As a result, the customer of the terminal device 2 executes the transfer according to the button operation of the transfer button on the received SMS.

FIG. 11 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of a chat transfer image at the time of abnormality (tool abuse). The chat transfer image shown in FIG. 11 is a chat transfer image between the terminal device 2 and the server device 3. For convenience of explanation, the procedure of the procedure is a transfer, the operation time of the procedure is short or constant, the transfer destination of the procedure is usually 10,000 yen, and the operation terminal of the procedure is the same as usual. And.

In FIG. 11, the server device 3 presents "Please select a target transaction" from the first avatar 31A to the terminal device 2 (step S41). Further, the server device 3 presents a selection button such as "transfer" or "remittance" to the terminal device 2 as a target transaction. When the server device 3 detects the button operation of the "transfer" selection button, it presents "transfer. Log in." And "enter the customer number." To the terminal device 2 (step). S42).

When the server device 3 detects the input of the customer number from the terminal device 2, it measures the time from the presentation of "Please enter the customer number" to the detection of the customer number input, for example, 2 seconds.

When the server device 3 detects the input of the customer number from the terminal device 2, it presents "Enter PW." To the terminal device 2 (step S43). When the server device 3 detects the input of the PW from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 executes the anomaly analysis of the PW (step S44). Further, when the server device 3 detects the input of the PW from the terminal device 2, the server device 3 measures the time from the presentation of "Please input the PW." To the detection of the PW input, for example, 2 seconds.

Further, when the PW is normal, the server device 3 presents "Enter the store number of the transfer destination" to the terminal device 2 (step S45). When the server device 3 detects the input of the store number of the transfer destination from the terminal device 2, the time from the presentation of "Please enter the store number of the transfer destination" to the detection of the store number input, for example, 2 seconds. To measure.

Further, when the server device 3 detects the input of the store number of the transfer destination from the terminal device 2, it presents "Enter the account number of the transfer destination" to the terminal device 2 (step S46). When the server device 3 detects the input of the transfer destination account number from the terminal device 2, the time from the presentation of "Please enter the transfer destination account number" to the detection of the account number input, for example, 2 seconds. To measure. Further, the server device 3 executes anomaly analysis of the transfer destination account number (step S47), and determines that the transfer procedure is normal.

Further, when the server device 3 detects the input of the store number of the transfer destination from the terminal device 2, it presents "Please input the transfer amount" to the terminal device 2 (step S48). When the server device 3 detects the input of the transfer amount from the terminal device 2, it measures the time from the presentation of "Enter the transfer amount" to the detection of the transfer amount input, for example, 2 seconds. Further, the server device 3 executes an anomaly analysis of the transfer amount and determines that the transfer procedure is normal.

Further, if the measurement time for each message from the message presentation to the detection of the input of the message reply is 2 seconds for a certain period, the server device 3 determines that the operation is not a manual input operation but an unauthorized operation by a computer (step S101). The server device 3 presents "Please select a human image from the following to confirm the operation by a human" and a plurality of selected images to the terminal device 2 (step S102).

When the server device 3 does not detect the input of the selected image from the terminal device 2 within the predetermined time (step S103), the server device 3 presents to the terminal device 2 "The processing is canceled because the time has been exceeded." Cancel the transfer procedure (step S104).

Further, even when the server device 3 detects an erroneous selection of the selected image from the terminal device 2, it presents "The processing is canceled because the selected image is incorrect" to the terminal device 2 and performs the transfer procedure. To cancel.

In the example shown in FIG. 11, the case where it is determined that the transfer procedure may be fraudulent when the operation time is a certain period is illustrated, but it is also possible to detect a state where a certain amount is transferred to another account every day. It may be judged that the transfer procedure may be fraudulent, and it can be changed as appropriate.

Further, when the operation time is short, it may be determined that the operation is not a manual input operation but an illegal operation by a computer, and it may be determined that the transfer procedure may be illegal. In addition, if the operation time is too late, it may be determined that the transfer procedure may be fraudulent.

The server device 3 of this embodiment analyzes the possibility that the procedure is fraudulent based on the content received as a conversation with the chatbot of the first avatar 31A or the reception timing. When the procedure is determined to be fraudulent, the server device 3 has a conversation with the chatbot associated with the first avatar 31A, a conversation with the chatbot associated with the second avatar 31B, or a manned person. Switch to a chat conversation. As a result, by switching from the conversation of the first avatar 31A to the conversation of the second avatar 31B or the manned chat, the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedure can be aroused to the transfer procedure person.

The server device 3 identifiablely displays a conversation with a chatbot associated with the second avatar 31B or a conversation in a manned chat with a conversation with the chatbot associated with the first avatar 31A. Presented to the terminal device. As a result, the transfer procedure person of the terminal device 2 can visually recognize the conversation of the first avatar 31A and the conversation of the second avatar 31B or the conversation of the manned chat.

When the transfer procedure is determined to be fraudulent, the server device 3 executes an additional inquiry by conversation with the chatbot associated with the second avatar 31B. As a result, the server device 3 makes an additional inquiry to the transfer procedure person to alert the well-meaning transfer procedure person to the fraudulent transfer procedure, and at the same time, perform the fraudulent transfer procedure to the malicious transfer procedure person. Can be restrained.

When the server device 3 receives a reply that the meta information may be generated for the additional inquiry, the server device 3 generates the meta information for the additional inquiry and sends the generated meta information to, for example, a financial institution or the National Police Agency. Record. As a result, the server device 3 can check the fraudulent transfer procedure by recording the meta information such as the content of the conversation with the procedure person, for example.

The server device 3 has a content that may suppress fraud in a conversation with a chatbot associated with the second avatar 31B or a conversation in a manned chat. As a result, the server device 3 makes the content of the conversation with the transfer procedure person a content that may suppress the improperness, so that the transfer procedure person in good faith is alerted to the fraudulent transfer procedure and is malicious. It is possible to check fraudulent transfer procedures for transfer procedures.

The server device 3 analyzes the possibility that the procedure is fraudulent based on the content received as a conversation with the chatbot of the first avatar 31A or the reception timing. When the procedure is determined to be fraudulent, the server device 3 executes an additional inquiry by conversation between the first avatar 31A and the chatbot associated with the first avatar 31A. As a result, the server device 3 makes an additional inquiry to the procedure person of the terminal device 2, so that the well-meaning transfer procedure person is alerted to the fraudulent transfer procedure, and the server device 3 is fraudulent to the malicious transfer procedure person. You can check the transfer procedure.

Since the operation log remains in the server device 3 using the chatbot, it is possible to reliably detect the operation suspected of being a criminal act by log analysis. Further, the server device 3 presents a message to the transfer procedure person to stop / stay the operation with the chatbot for the possibility of fraud, for example, the operation suspected of being a criminal act. As a result, the possibility of fraudulent transfer procedures can be raised to the transfer procedure person. Then, it is possible to protect a well-meaning transfer procedure person from criminal acts such as transfer fraud, unauthorized use of ID / PW, and cyber attacks.

The server device 3 detects operations suspected of being a criminal act from the log of interactive exchanges performed by the chatbot, and additionally asks irregular questions to restrain the criminal act, thereby transferring in good faith. The outflow of the procedureer's assets can be prevented.

With the server device 3, it is possible to give notice to the customer by interactively asking the transaction suspected of being a transfer fraud.

In the server device 3, if the transfer procedure person in good faith is not the person (ID / PW is stolen), it is possible to restrain the crime by asking a plurality of questions. As a result, the damage caused by transfer fraud is reduced. By interactively alerting, it is possible to narrow the scope of responsibility of the bank.

Because of chat, it is possible to detect discomfort during communication. Furthermore, because it is a chat, it is possible to check each action, so it is possible to detect a crisis in real time. Moreover, from the analysis results of the chatbot log, it is possible to additionally ask the user "irregular questions". Moreover, cyber attacks can be suppressed by checking the intervals between operations.

Although the transfer procedure is illustrated as a procedure in this embodiment, it is not limited to the transfer procedure and can be applied to various procedures using a chatbot.

In this embodiment, a case where the transfer procedure is executed by a conversational chat between the chatbot in the server device 3 and the terminal device 2 of the transfer procedure person is illustrated. However, the chatbot is not limited to the one executed by the server device 3, and may be executed in the cloud, and can be changed as appropriate.

Further, each component of each part shown in the figure does not necessarily have to be physically configured as shown in the figure. That is, the specific form of distribution / integration of each part is not limited to the one shown in the figure, and all or part of them may be functionally or physically distributed / integrated in any unit according to various loads and usage conditions. Can be configured.

Furthermore, the various processing functions performed by each device are such that all or any part of them is executed on the CPU (Central Processing Unit), DSP (Digital Signal Processor), FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array), etc. Is also good. Further, the various processing functions may be executed in whole or in an arbitrary part on a program to be analyzed and executed by a CPU or the like, or on hardware by wired logic.

The area for storing various information is, for example, ROM (Read Only Memory), DRAM (Synchronous Dynamic Random Access Memory), MRAM (Magnetoresistive Random Access Memory), NVRAM (Non-Volatile Random Access Memory), or other RAM (Random Access). Memory) may be used.

By the way, various processes described in this embodiment can be realized by executing a program prepared in advance by a processor such as a CPU in the computer. Therefore, in the following, an example of the information processing apparatus 100 that executes a program having the same function as that of the above embodiment will be described. FIG. 12 is an explanatory diagram showing an example of the information processing apparatus 100 that executes the chat switching program.

The information processing device 100 that executes the chat switching program shown in FIG. 19 includes a communication device 110, an input device 120, a display device 130, a ROM 140, a RAM 150, a processor 160, and a bus 170. The communication device 110, the input device 120, the display device 130, the ROM 140, the RAM 150, and the processor 160 are connected via the bus 170. The communication device 110 controls communication between the terminal device operated by the customer and the network connected to the terminal device.

Then, in the ROM 140, a chat switching display program that exhibits the same function as that of the above embodiment is stored in advance. The ROM 140 stores the reception program 140A, the analysis program 140B, and the switching program 140C as chat switching programs. The chat switching program may be recorded on a computer-readable recording medium with a drive (not shown) instead of the ROM 140. The recording medium may be, for example, a portable recording medium such as a CD-ROM, a DVD disk, or a USB memory, or a semiconductor memory such as a flash memory.

Then, the processor 160 reads the reception program 140A from the ROM 140 and makes it function as the reception process 160A on the RAM 150. Further, the processor 160 reads the analysis program 140B from the ROM 140 and makes it function as the analysis process 160B on the RAM 150. Further, the processor 160 reads the switching program 140C from the ROM 140 and makes it function as the switching process 160C on the RAM 150.

The processor 160 receives an instruction to start a conversation regarding the procedure between the first avatar and the associated chatbot. The processor 160 analyzes the possibility that the procedure is fraudulent based on the content received as a conversation with the chatbot or the timing of the reception. When the procedure is determined to be fraudulent, the processor 160 changes the conversation of the chatbot associated with the first avatar to the conversation with the chatbot associated with the second avatar different from the first avatar. Or switch to a manned chat conversation. As a result, by switching from the conversation of the first avatar to the conversation of the second avatar or manned chat, the possibility of fraudulent procedure can be aroused to the procedure person.

1 Transfer chat system 2 Terminal device 3 Server device 31 Chatbot 31A 1st avatar 31B 2nd avatar 32 Reception section 33 Analysis section 34 Switching section

Claims

Accepting instructions to start a conversation about the procedure between the first avatar and the associated chatbot,
Based on the content accepted as a conversation with the chatbot or the timing of acceptance, the possibility of fraud against the procedure is analyzed.
When it was determined that there was a possibility of fraudulent activity against the procedure, the conversation with the chatbot associated with the first avatar was associated with a second avatar different from the first avatar. Switch to a chatbot conversation or a manned chat conversation,
A chat switching program characterized by having a computer execute processing.
A terminal device for identifiablely displaying a conversation with a chatbot associated with the second avatar or a conversation with the chatbot associated with the first avatar and a conversation with the chatbot associated with the first avatar. The chat switching program according to claim 1, wherein the computer executes the process presented in 1.
When it is determined that there is a possibility of fraudulent activity against the procedure, the computer is made to execute a process of executing an additional inquiry in a conversation between the second avatar and the chatbot associated with the second avatar. The chat switching program according to claim 1.
When it is determined that there is a possibility of fraudulent activity against the procedure, the computer is made to execute a process of executing an additional inquiry in a conversation between the second avatar and the chatbot associated with the second avatar. The chat switching program according to claim 2.
When a reply that meta information may be generated for the additional query is received, the computer executes a process of generating the meta information for the additional query and recording the generated meta information. The chat switching program according to claim 4, wherein the chat is switched.
Any of claims 1 to 5, wherein the conversation with the chatbot associated with the second avatar or the conversation in the manned chat has a content that may suppress fraud against the procedure. The chat switching program described in one.
Accepting instructions to start a conversation about the procedure between the first avatar and the associated chatbot,
Based on the content accepted as a conversation with the chatbot or the timing of acceptance, the possibility of fraud against the procedure is analyzed.
When it is determined that there is a possibility of fraudulent activity against the procedure, the computer is made to execute a process of executing an additional inquiry in a conversation between the first avatar and the chatbot associated with the first avatar. Chat processing program.
A reception unit that accepts instructions to start a conversation regarding the procedure between the first avatar and the associated chatbot,
An analysis unit that analyzes the possibility of fraud against the procedure based on the content or timing of the conversation with the chatbot.
When it was determined that there was a possibility of fraudulent activity against the procedure, the conversation with the chatbot associated with the first avatar was associated with a second avatar different from the first avatar. A switching unit that switches to a conversation with a chatbot or a conversation with a manned chat,
An information processing device characterized by having.
The computer
Accepting instructions to start a conversation about the procedure between the first avatar and the associated chatbot,
Based on the content accepted as a conversation with the chatbot or the timing of acceptance, the possibility of fraud against the procedure is analyzed.
When it was determined that there was a possibility of fraudulent activity against the procedure, the conversation with the chatbot associated with the first avatar was associated with a second avatar different from the first avatar. Switch to a chatbot conversation or a manned chat conversation,
A chat switching method characterized by executing processing.