WO2022031556A1 - Activation de service informatique pour des réseaux cellulaires de prochaine génération - Google Patents

Activation de service informatique pour des réseaux cellulaires de prochaine génération Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2022031556A1
WO2022031556A1 PCT/US2021/044048 US2021044048W WO2022031556A1 WO 2022031556 A1 WO2022031556 A1 WO 2022031556A1 US 2021044048 W US2021044048 W US 2021044048W WO 2022031556 A1 WO2022031556 A1 WO 2022031556A1
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Prior art keywords
computation
network
ran
service
comp
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PCT/US2021/044048
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English (en)
Inventor
Ching-Yu Liao
Puneet Jain
Abhijeet Kolekar
Thomas Luetzenkirchen
Zongrui DING
Qian Li
Sangeetha L. BANGOLAE
Sudeep Palat
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Intel Corporation
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Priority to CN202180047142.1A priority Critical patent/CN115769615A/zh
Publication of WO2022031556A1 publication Critical patent/WO2022031556A1/fr

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/08—Access point devices
    • H04W88/085—Access point devices with remote components
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W48/00—Access restriction; Network selection; Access point selection
    • H04W48/18—Selecting a network or a communication service
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W60/00—Affiliation to network, e.g. registration; Terminating affiliation with the network, e.g. de-registration
    • H04W60/04—Affiliation to network, e.g. registration; Terminating affiliation with the network, e.g. de-registration using triggered events
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/18—Processing of user or subscriber data, e.g. subscribed services, user preferences or user profiles; Transfer of user or subscriber data
    • H04W8/20—Transfer of user or subscriber data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W88/00—Devices specially adapted for wireless communication networks, e.g. terminals, base stations or access point devices
    • H04W88/18—Service support devices; Network management devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W92/00—Interfaces specially adapted for wireless communication networks
    • H04W92/04—Interfaces between hierarchically different network devices

Definitions

  • Various embodiments generally may relate to the field of wireless communications. For example, some embodiments may relate to providing solutions to enable support of computing services in scenarios where network operators provide both computation and connectivity services in 5G network to end-users, as well as in scenarios where computation services are provided by ASPs (application service providers), CSPs (cloud service providers), or ECSP (edge computing service providers). Other embodiments may be described and/or claimed.
  • ASPs application service providers
  • CSPs cloud service providers
  • ECSP edge computing service providers
  • the cloud/edge rendering based applications in the cloud/edge network use computation services provided by ASPs (application service providers).
  • ASPs application service providers
  • the ASP is the computation service provider, while using connectivity services via 5G network provided by network operators.
  • the connectivity services of a public land mobile network (PLMN) or NPN (non-public network) are provided by network operators, and the computation services can be provided by ASP, CSP (cloud service provider), or ECSP (Edge Computing service provider).
  • the ASP uses the computation services provided by CSP or ECSP.
  • Figure 1 illustrates an example of the overall architecture for separation of gNB-CU-CP and gNB-CU-UP in accordance with various embodiments.
  • Figure 2 illustrates an example of a reference RAN architecture supporting RAN compute functions in accordance with various embodiments.
  • Figure 3 illustrates an example of a proposed reference architecture and control/data plane signaling paths in accordance with various embodiments.
  • Figure 4 illustrates an example of a key hierarchy of KgNB-cf generated by Kamf in accordance with various embodiments.
  • Figure 5 illustrates an example of Comp SF security protection activation for multiple connectivity with a compute service in accordance with various embodiments.
  • Figure 6 illustrates an example of a first option (Option 1) for providing message flows for RAN Comp CF security in accordance with various embodiments.
  • Figure 7 illustrates an example of a second option (Option 2) for providing message flows for RAN Comp CF security in accordance with various embodiments.
  • Figure 8 illustrates an example of a relationship between primary authentication and slicespecific authentication and authorization in accordance with various embodiments.
  • Figure 9 illustrates an example of a network slice-specific authentication and authorization procedure in accordance with various embodiments.
  • Figure 10 schematically illustrates a wireless network in accordance with various embodiments.
  • Figure 11 schematically illustrates components of a wireless network in accordance with various embodiments.
  • Figure 12 is a block diagram illustrating components, according to some example embodiments, able to read instructions from a machine-readable or computer-readable medium (e.g., a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium) and perform any one or more of the methodologies discussed herein.
  • a machine-readable or computer-readable medium e.g., a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium
  • Figure 13 depicts an example of a procedure for practicing the various embodiments discussed herein.
  • Figure 14 depicts another example of a procedure for practicing the various embodiments.
  • Figure 15 depicts another example of a procedure for practicing the various embodiments.
  • Various embodiments herein provide techniques to enable computing services at a RAN node with security protection in a next generation network. Additionally, embodiments provide techniques to support network slicing-based computing services in a next generation cellular network.
  • embodiments of the present disclosure may consider at least the following two scenarios for computation services:
  • Scenario 1 network operators provide both computation and connectivity services in 5G network to end-users, e.g., network operators also play the role of ASP in its 5G network.
  • the application can be rendered to the computation functions in a 5G network close to the users, e.g. the computation functions are enabled at RAN node, aka RAN compute functions.
  • Scenario 2 network operators and ASPs have a service level agreement (SLA) for the ASPs/CSPs/ECSPs to provide computation services at the RAN compute functions that is close to its end users in the network operator’s 5G network.
  • SLA service level agreement
  • Embodiments of the present disclosure help provide solutions to enable support of computing services in the abovementioned scenario 1 and scenario 2, as described in more detail below.
  • Embodiment 1 multiple connectivities for computation service
  • Embodiment 2 security keys generation principles
  • Embodiment 3 message flows for RAN Comp SF security
  • Embodiment 4 message flows for RAN Comp CF security
  • a gNB may include a gNB-CU-CP, multiple gNB-CU-UPs and multiple gNB-DUs;
  • the gNB-CU-CP is connected to the gNB-DU through the Fl-C interface;
  • the gNB-CU-UP is connected to the gNB-DU through the Fl-U interface;
  • the gNB-CU-UP is connected to the gNB-CU-CP through the El interface;
  • One gNB-DU is connected to only one gNB-CU-CP;
  • One gNB-CU-UP is connected to only one gNB-CU-CP;
  • a gNB-DU and/or a gNB-CU-UP may be connected to multiple gNB-CU-CPs by appropriate implementation.
  • One gNB-DU can be connected to multiple gNB-CU-UPs under the control of the same gNB-CU-CP;
  • One gNB-CU-UP can be connected to multiple DUs under the control of the same gNB-CU-CP;
  • the gNB-CU-CP selects the appropriate gNB-CU-UP(s) for the requested services for the UE. In case of multiple CU-UPs they belong to same security domain as defined in TS 33.210.
  • Embodiment 1 multiple connectivity for computation service
  • Embodiment 3 message flows for RAN Comp SF security
  • Embodiment 4 message flows for RAN Comp CF security
  • embodiments of the present disclosure helps provide solutions to provision a new 5G services, e.g., computation services, at RAN nodes with security activation for computation services.
  • the 5G network enables computation services support for the following two use cases: o Scenario 1: network operators provide both computation and connectivity services in 5G network to end-users, e.g., network operators also play the role of ASP in its 5G network.
  • the application can be rendered to the computation functions in 5G network close to the users, e.g. the computation functions are enabled at RAN node, aka RAN compute functions.
  • o Scenario 2 network operators and ASPs have service level agreement (SLA) for the ASPs/CSPs/ECSPs to provide computation services at the RAN compute functions that is close to its end users in the network operator’s 5G network.
  • SLA service level agreement
  • the 5G networks enables computation services support at the RAN node close to the UE.
  • gNB refers to the RAN node and can be xNB referring to future generations.
  • 5G is used for reference and can be any xG referring to future generations.
  • the 5G network enables computation services support at the RAN node close to the UE by RAN Computation Functions, including one or more RAN Comp CFs and RAN Comp SFs with the following functionalities:
  • gNB-CMP-CF computation service control function: o selection of compute SF for a specific application based on worklet o management of compute context across multiple Compute SFs o support of computation tasks scheduling, control, orchestration, etc. o support of Cl interface to interact with gNB-CU-CP o support of C2 interface to interact with gNB-Comp-SF
  • computation service function o perform computation tasks of applications based on worklets information, which may be a new function dedicated for support of computation services, or an instance of CU-UP dedicated for support of computation services.
  • Embodiment 1 multiple connectivities for computation service
  • DRB data radio bearer
  • CRB compute radio bearer
  • Support multiple connectivity including one connectivity with master RAN node for communication-related data traffic and one or more connectivity with comp SFs as secondary RAN nodes for compute related data traffic.
  • the DU connects to the CU-CP may be the same or different from the DU that connects to Comp-SF.
  • Embodiment 1.1 For control plane signaling
  • control plane signaling for the compute service is between CU-CP and Comp-CF over Cl interface by piggyback the message in an RRC message, as shown in Figure 3 - portion (c).
  • Cl interface supports L3/L4 protocol, e.g. GTP, HTTP, SCTP, etc.
  • CU-CP generates an RRC security key for RAN comp CF for RRC protection of integrity and encryption. Between UE and CU-CP, there supports a new SRB or CRB-C specific for RAN Compute related signaling message.
  • Embodiment 1.2 For user plane data
  • C3 interface and protocol are similar to Fl-U interface between the CU-UP and DU.
  • CU-CP generates an RRC security key for RAN comp SF for RRC protection of integrity and encryption.
  • Embodiment 1.2.1
  • comp SF or Comp CF supports RRC stack and provide a second RRC connection with the UE which already has a first RRC connection at the registered RAN node.
  • Embodiment 2 security keys generation principles
  • the RAN compute functions support security keys, and security context for RAN Comp CF and RAN Comp SF with the following principles:
  • the security key is based on KgNB or KgNB-cf.
  • o KgNB is the security key generated by AMF for a RAN node for communication services.
  • o KgNB-cf is the security key generated by AMF for computation service, the key hierarchy is as shown in Figure 4.
  • OR o kgNB-cf is the security key generated by gNB based on KgNB for computation service.
  • RAN Comp CF security o
  • the CU-CP generates Kef for the RAN Compute CF and sends it to the RAN Comp CF. o Integrity and Encryption Keys are derived further.
  • this embodiment provides message flows for the activation of security protection for RAN compute session at RAN Comp SF.
  • the communication established between the UE and the RAN Compute SF is protected at the PDCP layer using the information stored in RAN Compute Security Context (e.g. key counter and algorithm).
  • CU-CP notifies/selects a Comp CF for computation offloading.
  • Comp-CF selects a Comp-SF based on the application worklet requested by the UE for Computation offloading.
  • Step 2-4 [CU-CP->SF]: The CU-CP and RAN Comp SF negotiate encryption algorithm.
  • Step2 the CU-CP or Comp CF sends Comp SF Addition/Modification Request message including Ksf, UE security capabilities, and Compute security policy.
  • Step3 Comp SF selects a security algorithm and generates the security context
  • Step4 Comp SF sends acknowledge message including the selected algorithm and indications of the use of integrity and encryption protection for Compute service.
  • Step 5 [CU-CP->UE]: The CU-CP sends RRC connection ReConfig message to the UE, including the information related to RAN compute session, e.g., Compute Key Counter, selected algorithm, and indications of the use of integrity and encryption protection for Compute service.
  • RAN compute session e.g., Compute Key Counter, selected algorithm, and indications of the use of integrity and encryption protection for Compute service.
  • the Compute Key counter can be the same or different for both Comp CF and Comp SF.
  • the security keys of Kef and Ksf can be updated based on corresponding compute security policies, respectively.
  • the UE When receiving the RRC connection ReConfig message, the UE derives the encryption key from Ksf (based on the key counter and selected algorithm).
  • Step 6 [UE- CU-CP or Comp CF]: the UE replies RRC Connection ReConfig complete message to CU-CP or Comp CF.
  • Step7 CU-CP or Comp CF sends a Comp SF Reconfiguration Completion message to Comp SF to confirm the multiple connectivities established in the UE.
  • the Comp SF When receiving the RRC connection ReConfig complete message, the Comp SF derives the encryption key from Ksf (based on the key counter and selected algorithm). Both the UE and Comp SF activates the security protection of ciphering and integrity for Computation related data message.
  • Embodiment 4 message flows for RAN Comp CF security
  • Figure 6 illustrates an example of Comp SF security protection activation for multiple connectivity with Compute service in accordance with various embodiments.
  • embodiment 3 for the activation of security protection of control plane signaling between the UE and RAN Comp CF, there are the following options depending on the deployment of Comp CF:
  • Optionl Comp CF is collocated with RAN CU-CP o
  • the following modification can be applied to Figure 5 as shown in Figure 6 illustrating Option 1.
  • the CU-CP generates Kef for the RAN Comp CF and sends it to the RAN Comp CF.
  • Option2 Comp CF is collocated with one or more Comp SFs that are managed by the Comp CF o Following embodiment 3, the following additions are needed in Figure 5 as shown in Figure 7 illustrating Option 2.
  • Step2 The CU-CP sends Kef to Comp CF and the Compute security policy includes compute signaling policy.
  • the CU-CP provides a container including Ksf, UE security capability, and compute data policy.
  • the Comp CF forwards the container to Comp SF.
  • Step3 The Comp CF selects algorithm for compute signaling security; the Comp SF selects an algorithm for compute data security.
  • Step4 The Comp CF replies CU-CP with information of selected algorithms and an indication of integrity and encryptions from both of Comp CF and Comp SF.
  • Step5 The CU-CP sends RRC connection ReConfig request message to the UE with information of selected algorithms and indications of integrity and encryption for compute signaling and compute data security.
  • the UE When receiving the RRC connection ReConfig message, the UE derives the encryption key from Kef and Ksf (based on the respective key counters and selected algorithms).
  • Step6 [UE->CU-CP or Comp CF/Comp SF]: the UE replies RRC Connection ReConfig message to CU-CP.
  • Step7 CU-CP sends Comp CF Reconfiguration Completion message to Comp CF to confirm the multiple connectivity established in the UE. The Comp CF forwards the result to Comp SF.
  • the Comp CF and Comp SF When receiving the RRC connection ReConfig request message, the Comp CF and Comp SF derives the encryption key from Kef and Ksf (based on the respective key counter and selected algorithm).
  • the UE, Comp CF, and Comp SF activate the security protection of ciphering and integrity for Computation signaling and Computation data messages.
  • Embodiments of the present disclosure help provide the following solutions to enable support of computation services in the abovementioned scenario 1 and scenario 2.
  • Solution 1 enable computation service support at RAN node
  • Solution 5 Computation Service Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization via RAN Compute Function (alternative to solution 4)
  • An S-NSSAI identifies a Network Slice.
  • An S-NSSAI is comprised of:
  • SST Slice/Service type
  • a Slice Differentiator which is optional information that complements the Slice/Service type(s) to differentiate amongst multiple Network Slices of the same Slice/Service type.
  • An S-NSSAI can have standard values (e.g., such S-NSSAI is only comprised of an SST with a standardised SST value, see clause 5.15.2.2, and no SD) or non-standard values (e.g. such S- NSSAI is comprised of either both an SST and an SD or only an SST without a standardized SST value and no SD).
  • An S-NSSAI with a non-standard value identifies a single Network Slice within the PLMN with which it is associated.
  • An S-NSSAI with a non-standard value shall not be used by the UE in access stratum procedures in any PLMN other than the one to which the S-NSSAI is associated.
  • the S-NSSAIs in the NSSP of the URSP rules (see TS 23.503 clause 6.6.2) and in the Subscribed S-NSSAIs (see clause 5.15.3) contain only HPLMN S-NSSAI values.
  • the S-NSSAIs in the Configured NSSAI, the Allowed NSSAI (see clause 5. 15.4. 1), the Requested NSSAI (see clause 5.15.5.2.1), the Rejected S-NSSAIs contain only values from the Serving PLMN.
  • the Serving PLMN can be the HPLMN or a VPLMN.
  • the S-NSSAI(s) in the PDU Session Establishment contain one Serving PLMN S-NSSAI value and in addition may contain a corresponding HPLMN S-NSSAI value to which this first value is mapped (see clause 5.15.5.3).
  • the optional mapping of Serving PLMN S-NSSAIs to HPLMN S-NSSAIs contains Serving PLMN S-NSSAI values and corresponding mapped HPLMN S-NSSAI values.
  • the NSSAI is a collection of S-NSSAIs.
  • An NSSAI may be a Configured NSSAI, a Requested NSSAI or an Allowed NSSAI.
  • the Requested NSSAI signalled by the UE to the network allows the network to select the Serving AMF, Network Slice(s) and Network Slice instance(s) for this UE, as specified in clause 5.15.5.
  • Standardized SST values provide a way for establishing global interoperability for slicing so that PLMNs can support the roaming use case more efficiently for the most commonly used Slice/Service Types.
  • the SSTs which are standardised are in the following Table 5.15.2.2-1.
  • a serving PLMN shall perform Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization for the S-NSSAIs of the HPLMN which are subject to it based on subscription information.
  • the UE shall indicate in the Registration Request message in the UE 5GMM Core Network Capability whether it supports this feature. If the UE does not support this feature, the AMF shall not trigger this procedure for the UE and if the UE requests these S-NSSAIs that are subject to Network Slice- Specific Authentication and Authorization they are rejected for the PLMN.
  • a UE If a UE is configured with S-NSSAIs, which are subject to Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization, the UE stores an association between the S-NSSAI and corresponding credentials for the Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization.
  • the credentials for Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization and how to provision them in the UE are not specified.
  • the AMF invokes an EAP- based Network Slice-Specific authorization procedure documented in TS 23.502 clause 4.2.9 (see also TS 33.501) for the S-NSSAI.
  • This procedure can be invoked for a supporting UE by an AMF at any time, e.g. when: a.
  • the UE registers with the AMF and one of the S-NSSAIs of the HPLMN which maps to an S-NSSAI in the Requested NSSAI is requiring Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization (see clause 5.15.5.2.1 for details), and can be added to the Allowed NSSAI by the AMF once the Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization for the S-NSSAI succeeds; or b.
  • the Network Slice-Specific AAA Server triggers a UE re-authentication and reauthorization for an S-NSSAI; or c.
  • the AMF based on operator policy or a subscription change, decides to initiate the Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization procedure for a certain S-NSSAI which was previously authorized.
  • AMF selects an Access Type to be used to perform the Network Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization procedure based on network policies.
  • the AMF shall update the Allowed NSSAI for each Access Type to the UE via UE Configuration Update procedure.
  • the AMF shall execute the Network-initiated Deregistration procedure described in TS 23.502, clause 4.2.2.3.3, and shall include in the explicit De-Registration Request message the list of Rejected S-NSSAIs, each of them with the appropriate rejection cause value.
  • the UE context in the AMF shall retain the authentication and authorization status for the UE for the related specific S-NSSAI of the HPLMN while the UE remains RM-REGISTERED in the PLMN, so that the AMF is not required to execute a Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization for a UE at every Periodic Registration Update or Mobility Registration procedure with the PLMN.
  • a Network Slice-Specific AAA server may revoke the authorization or challenge the authentication and authorization of a UE at any time.
  • authorization is revoked for an S- NSSAI that is in the current Allowed NSSAI for an Access Type
  • the AMF shall provide a new Allowed NSSAI to the UE and trigger the release of all PDU sessions associated with the S-NSSAI, for this Access Type.
  • the AMF provides the GPSI of the UE related to the S-NSSAI to the AAA Server to allow the AAA server to initiate the Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization, or the Authorization revocation procedure, where the UE current AMF needs to be identified by the system, so the UE authorization status can be challenged or revoked.
  • the Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization requires that the UE Primary Authentication and Authorization of the SUPI has successfully completed. If the SUPI authorization is revoked, then also the Network Slice-Specific authorization is revoked.
  • the 5G System architecture introduces the following security entities in the 5G Core network: AUSF: Authentication Server Function;
  • ARPF Authentication credential Repository and Processing Function
  • SIDF Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function
  • SEAF SEcurity Anchor Function
  • the security anchor function provides the authentication functionality via the AMF in the serving network.
  • the SEAF shall fulfil the following requirements:
  • the SEAF shall support primary authentication using SUCI.
  • the Network slice specific authentication and authorization function shall handle the Network Slice Specific Authentication requests from the serving AMF.
  • the NSSAAF is responsible to send the NSSAA requests to the appropriate AAA-S (AAA Server).
  • AAA-S AAA-S triggered Network Slice-Specific Re-authentication and Reauthorization and Slice-Specific Authorization Revocation and translate any AAA protocol into a Service Based format.
  • NSSAAF shall translate the Service based messages from the serving AMF to AAA protocols towards AAA-P (AAA Proxy )/AAA-S(AAA Server).
  • This clause specifies the relationship between primary authentication (as described in Clause 6.1) and authorization for network slice access (as described in TS 23.502) for a UE.
  • Authorization from a home/serving PLMN is required for a UE to gain access to a network slice, identified by an S-NSSAI.
  • An authorized S-NSSAI e.g. allowed S-NSSAI shall be granted to a UE only after the UE has completed successfully primary authentication.
  • the AMF and UE may receive a list of allowed S- NSSAI, which the UE is authorized to access.
  • NSSAI Network Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization
  • the existing solution and use case may not be able to support the applications that require low latency for the responsive interaction between the application servers and the application client.
  • Solution 1 enable computation service support at RAN node
  • Solution 5 Computation Service Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization via RAN Compute Function (alternative to solution 4)
  • embodiments of the present disclosure help fulfill the required packet delay budget of QoS for applications. Additionally, embodiments of the disclosure help provide solutions to provision anew 5G services, e.g., computation service.
  • the 5G networks enables computation services support for the following two use cases: o Scenario 1: network operators provide both of computation and connectivity services in 5G network to end user, e.g. network operators also play the role of ASP in its 5G network.
  • the application can be rendered to the computation functions in 5G network close to the users, e.g. the computation functions are enabled at RAN node, aka RAN compute functions.
  • o Scenario 2 network operators and ASPs have service level agreement (SLA) for the ASPs/CSPs/ECSPs to provide computation services at the RAN compute functions that is close to its end users in the network operator’s 5G network.
  • SLA service level agreement
  • the 5G networks enables computation services support at the RAN node close to the UE.
  • gNB refers to the RAN node and can be xNB referring to future generations.
  • 5G is used for reference and can be any xG referring to future generations.
  • the 5G networks enables computation services support at the RAN node close to the UE by RAN Computation Functions, including one or more RAN Comp CFs and RAN Comp SFs with the following functionalities:
  • the gNB-CU-CP including RRC stack: o selection of comp CF for a specific computation session shared by applications o support of Cl interface to interact with gNB-Comp-CF
  • gNB-Comp-CF computation service control function: o selection of comp SF for a specific application based on worklet o management of compute context across multiple Comp SFs o support of computation tasks scheduling, control, orchestration, etc. o support of Cl interface to interact with gNB-CU-CP o support of C2 interface to interact with gNB-Comp-SF
  • computation service function o perform computation tasks of applications based on worklets information, which may be a new function dedicated for support of computation services, or an instance of CU-UP dedicated for support of computation services.
  • the reference architecture of the RAN node is as shown in Figure 1, introduced above.
  • Solution 2 support of computation service using network slicing
  • an S-NSSAI is comprised of: - A Slice/Service type (SST), which refers to the expected Network Slice behaviour in terms of features and services and can be a standardized value (eMBB, URLLC, MIoT, V2X) or non-standardized value.
  • SST A Slice/Service type
  • SD Slice Differentiator
  • the computation service slice can be designed in the following options:
  • a new standardized value of SST is defined for compute service in S-NSSAI
  • the SD can be further defined with the following information for scenarios 1 and scenario 2 as follows:
  • Option2 a new optional IE, e.g. computation service type, for RAN compute, is defined in S-NSSAI
  • the S-NSSAI is defined with three IES including SST, SD, and service type of computation service (STCMP), in which SST and SD are used for connectivity services provided by 5G network operators.
  • SST service type of computation service
  • STCMP service type of computation service
  • the STCMP can be configured with the indication of compute service provider including network operator (scenario 1), or application provider (scenario2).
  • anew computation service slice is defined as C-NSSAI
  • the C-NSSAI is for compute service, which is different from S-NSSAI for connectivity service.
  • the C-NSSAI is defined as C-SST (service and slice type of compute service) and C-SD (service differentiation of compute service for a specific C-SST).
  • the C-SST can be defined based on the type of service provider for the compute service, e.g. network operator (scenariol), or application provider (scenario2).
  • type of service provider for the compute service e.g. network operator (scenariol), or application provider (scenario2).
  • C-SD is the optional IE providing additional information for the UE for the compute service slice.
  • C-SD can include the application IDs to be supported in the specific C- SST.
  • Solution 2.1 Following solution 2, for computation service slice, the S-NSSAI (option 1/option 2) or C-NSSAI (option3) includes an optional IE for indicating protocol type of compute offload capabilities, e.g PCI-E, Vulkan, RoCE, etc.
  • Solution 3 subscription information related to computation service
  • the Subscription Information of a UE contains one or more subscribed computation service slices, e.g. S-NSSAI (optionl/option2 in solution 2) or C-NSSAI (options in solution 2).
  • subscribed computation service slices e.g. S-NSSAI (optionl/option2 in solution 2) or C-NSSAI (options in solution 2).
  • the Subscription Information may additionally contain:
  • RAN-DNN value can be used to represent RAN compute services provided by ASP/CSP/ECSP
  • the S-NSSAI for RAN compute can be a default subscribed S- NSSAI or C-NSSAI.
  • the CIoT device does not need to indicate S-NSSAI or C-NSSAI in Registration Request message
  • the Subscription Information may additionally contain protocol type of compute offload capabilities, e.g PCI-E, Vulkan, RoCE, etc., for the associated S-NSSAI or C- NSSAI.
  • protocol type of compute offload capabilities e.g PCI-E, Vulkan, RoCE, etc.
  • AMF triggers Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization with a AAA Server (AAA-S) which may be hosted by the H-PLMN operator or by an application service provider (ASP, third party) with the following principles as indicated in TS33.501 clause 16 for network slices of connectivity services.
  • AAA-S Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization with a AAA Server
  • ASP application service provider
  • the AMF performs the role of the EAP Authenticator and communicates with the AAA-S via the AUSF.
  • the AUSF undertakes any AAA protocol interworking with the AAA protocol supported by the AAA-S.
  • the NSSAA Function contacts the AAA-S via a AAA-P.
  • the NSSAA Function and the AAA-P may be co-located.
  • AAA-S can be provided by ASPs for its computation service slices.
  • the ASP provides the addresses information of AAA-S(s), e.g. AAA-S ID, IP address and port number, etc., in SLA with network operators for the computation service.
  • AAA-S(s) e.g. AAA-S ID, IP address and port number, etc.
  • the NSSAA Function contacts the AAA-S via a AAA-P, where the NSSAA Function and the AAA-P may be co-located, and AAA-S replies the result of the authentication to NSSAA via AAA-P.
  • the computation slice-specific authentication and authorization between a UE and an AAA server uses a User ID, e.g. represented as NAI, and credentials, which is different from the 3GPP subscription credentials (e.g. SUPI and credentials used for PLMN access) and takes place after the primary authentication.
  • a User ID e.g. represented as NAI
  • credentials which is different from the 3GPP subscription credentials (e.g. SUPI and credentials used for PLMN access) and takes place after the primary authentication.
  • Figure 9 illustrates an example of a network slice-specific authentication and authorization procedure in accordance with various embodiments.
  • the message flows for computation slice specific authentication and authorization is based on network slice specific authentication and authorization procedure as indicated in TS33.501 clause 16.3 with the following additions/ differences :
  • the slice information can be S- NSSAI or (solution 2, optionl, option2) C-NSSAI (solution 2, option3) based on options included in solution2.
  • the computation Service Slice- Specific Authentication and Authorization is initiated by the RAN Comp-CF sending authentication request to AAA-S provided by ASP/CSP/ECSP.
  • Step2 when an application requiring computation service is launched, the UE receiving the application request initiates RAN compute session establishment procedure by indicating the following information: o compute service slice information, e.g. allowed S-NSSAI or C-NSSAI. o the user ID, e.g. represented as Network Access Identifier (NAI), which subscribes to compute service provided by the ASP/CSP/ECSP.
  • compute service slice information e.g. allowed S-NSSAI or C-NSSAI.
  • the user ID e.g. represented as Network Access Identifier (NAI), which subscribes to compute service provided by the ASP/CSP/ECSP.
  • NAI Network Access Identifier
  • Step3 the registered RAN node selects a RAN Comp-CF based on the following information: o Requested S-NSSAI(s) or C-NSSAI(s) o Stored RAN network configuration information.
  • Step4 the RAN Comp-CF initiates computation service slice specific authentication and authorization procedure by sending an authentication request to AAA-S provided by ASP/CSP/ECSP.
  • Step5 based on the result of the authentication response, o If successful, the RAN Comp-CF selects a RAN Comp-SF and responds successful results to RAN node, e.g. CU-CP. o If failed, the RAN Comp-CF returns the authentication result and rejection cause to the RAN node, e.g. CU-CP.
  • Solution 5.1 the computation session establishment procedure
  • step 2 the computation session establishment procedure can be supported in the following options:
  • Option 1 using a new or existing RRC message.
  • Option2 using a PDU session establishment procedure toward SMF including computation service indication and PDU session ID.
  • the SMF based on the computation service indication, initiates a RAN compute session request message to the registered RAN node, e.g. CU-CP.
  • the RAN node receives result of RAN Comp session from RAN Comp-CF, the RAN responds to SMF and forwards the PDU session establishment response message sent by the SMF to the UE.
  • Option3 using a new NAS procedure towards AMF.
  • the AMF based on the computation service indication, initiates a RAN compute session request message to the registered RAN node, e.g. CU-CP.
  • the RAN node receives result of RAN Comp session from RAN Comp-CF, the RAN responds to AMF and forwards the new NAS response message indicating the results sent by the AMF to the UE.
  • optionl the UE indicates one S-NSSAI for computation service in RAN Compute Session establishment request message, in which one or more S-NSSAIs may be also provided with an indication for the association of the S-NSSAI for computation service.
  • option2 the UE indicates an S-NSSAI with optional IE for the computation service in RAN Compute Session establishment request message, in which one or more S- NSSAIs of the connectivity services may be also provided with an indication for the association of S-NSSAI for the computation service.
  • option3 the UE indicates a C-NSSAI for the computation service in RAN Compute Session establishment request message, in which one or more S-NSSAIs may be also provided with an indication for the association of C-NSSAI.
  • Connectivity service and Computation service are orthogonal services, which can be supported via one to one mapping, one to many mappings, or many to many mappings between the connectivity service slices and computation service slices.
  • the RAN node e.g. CU-CP, selects one RAN Comp-CFs for each of S-NSSAI of the connectivity services, e.g. each network slice for connectivity service has corresponding compute service slice.
  • the RAN node e.g. CU-CP, selects one RAN Comp-CF for the indicated S-NSSAI for all S-NSSAI of the connectivity services, and the RAN Comp-CF allocates RAN Comp-SFs for each network slices of connectivity service.
  • stepl initial Registration Procedure performs primary Authentication with SUPI with the following additional steps to enable support of computation services at the 5G network:
  • the UE indicates Configured/ Allowed S-NSSAI or C-NSSAI for the computation service in the registration request message.
  • the AMF provides Allowed S-NSSAI (solution 2, optionl/2) or C-NSSAI (solution 2, option3) to the RAN node and the UE.
  • UE context is created with subscribed compute service information, e.g. allowed S-NSSAI list or C-NSSAI list based on solution 2 optionl/option2, or solution 2 option 3, respectively.
  • subscribed compute service information e.g. allowed S-NSSAI list or C-NSSAI list based on solution 2 optionl/option2, or solution 2 option 3, respectively.
  • UE also provides generic compute offload capabilities to AMF in the registration request NAS message.
  • the AMF validates requested compute offload capabilities based on subscription data. If the subscription is valid, the AMF further checks the subscription of requested S-NSSAI or C-NSSAI for the computation services.
  • FIGS 10-11 illustrate various systems, devices, and components that may implement aspects of disclosed embodiments.
  • FIG. 10 illustrates a network 1000 in accordance with various embodiments.
  • the network 1000 may operate in a manner consistent with 3GPP technical specifications for LTE or 5G/NR systems.
  • 3GPP technical specifications for LTE or 5G/NR systems 3GPP technical specifications for LTE or 5G/NR systems.
  • the example embodiments are not limited in this regard and the described embodiments may apply to other networks that benefit from the principles described herein, such as future 3GPP systems, or the like.
  • the network 1000 may include a UE 1002, which may include any mobile or non-mobile computing device designed to communicate with a RAN 1004 via an over-the-air connection.
  • the UE 1002 may be communicatively coupled with the RAN 1004 by a Uu interface.
  • the UE 1002 may be, but is not limited to, a smartphone, tablet computer, wearable computer device, desktop computer, laptop computer, in-vehicle infotainment, in-car entertainment device, instrument cluster, head-up display device, onboard diagnostic device, dashtop mobile equipment, mobile data terminal, electronic engine management system, electron! c/engine control unit, electronic/engine control module, embedded system, sensor, microcontroller, control module, engine management system, networked appliance, machine-type communication device, M2M or D2D device, loT device, etc.
  • the network 1000 may include a plurality of UEs coupled directly with one another via a sidelink interface.
  • the UEs may be M2M/D2D devices that communicate using physical sidelink channels such as, but not limited to, PSBCH, PSDCH, PSSCH, PSCCH, PSFCH, etc.
  • the UE 1002 may additionally communicate with an AP 1006 via an over-the-air connection.
  • the AP 1006 may manage a WLAN connection, which may serve to offload some/all network traffic from the RAN 1004.
  • the connection between the UE 1002 and the AP 1006 may be consistent with any IEEE 802.11 protocol, wherein the AP 1006 could be a wireless fidelity (Wi-Fi®) router.
  • the UE 1002, RAN 1004, and AP 1006 may utilize cellular- WLAN aggregation (for example, LWA/LWIP).
  • Cellular- WLAN aggregation may involve the UE 1002 being configured by the RAN 1004 to utilize both cellular radio resources and WLAN resources.
  • the RAN 1004 may include one or more access nodes, for example, AN 1008.
  • AN 1008 may terminate air-interface protocols for the UE 1002 by providing access stratum protocols including RRC, PDCP, RLC, MAC, and LI protocols. In this manner, the AN 1008 may enable data/voice connectivity between CN 1020 and the UE 1002.
  • the AN 1008 may be implemented in a discrete device or as one or more software entities running on server computers as part of, for example, a virtual network, which may be referred to as a CRAN or virtual baseband unit pool.
  • the AN 1008 be referred to as a BS, gNB, RAN node, eNB, ng-eNB, NodeB, RSU, TRxP, TRP, etc.
  • the AN 1008 may be a macrocell base station or a low power base station for providing femtocells, picocells or other like cells having smaller coverage areas, smaller user capacity, or higher bandwidth compared to macrocells.
  • the RAN 1004 may be coupled with one another via an X2 interface (if the RAN 1004 is an LTE RAN) or an Xn interface (if the RAN 1004 is a 5G RAN).
  • the X2/Xn interfaces which may be separated into control/user plane interfaces in some embodiments, may allow the ANs to communicate information related to handovers, data/context transfers, mobility, load management, interference coordination, etc.
  • the ANs of the RAN 1004 may each manage one or more cells, cell groups, component carriers, etc. to provide the UE 1002 with an air interface for network access.
  • the UE 1002 may be simultaneously connected with a plurality of cells provided by the same or different ANs of the RAN 1004.
  • the UE 1002 and RAN 1004 may use carrier aggregation to allow the UE 1002 to connect with a plurality of component carriers, each corresponding to a Pcell or Scell.
  • a first AN may be a master node that provides an MCG and a second AN may be secondary node that provides an SCG.
  • the first/second ANs may be any combination of eNB, gNB, ng-eNB, etc.
  • the RAN 1004 may provide the air interface over a licensed spectrum or an unlicensed spectrum.
  • the nodes may use LAA, eLAA, and/or feLAA mechanisms based on CA technology with PCells/Scells.
  • the nodes Prior to accessing the unlicensed spectrum, the nodes may perform medium/carrier-sensing operations based on, for example, a listen-before-talk (LBT) protocol.
  • LBT listen-before-talk
  • the UE 1002 or AN 1008 may be or act as a RSU, which may refer to any transportation infrastructure entity used for V2X communications.
  • An RSU may be implemented in or by a suitable AN or a stationary (or relatively stationary) UE.
  • An RSU implemented in or by: a UE may be referred to as a “UE-type RSU”; an eNB may be referred to as an “eNB-type RSU”; a gNB may be referred to as a “gNB-type RSU”; and the like.
  • an RSU is a computing device coupled with radio frequency circuitry located on a roadside that provides connectivity support to passing vehicle UEs.
  • the RSU may also include internal data storage circuitry to store intersection map geometry, traffic statistics, media, as well as applications/software to sense and control ongoing vehicular and pedestrian traffic.
  • the RSU may provide very low latency communications required for high speed events, such as crash avoidance, traffic warnings, and the like. Additionally or alternatively, the RSU may provide other cellular/WLAN communications services.
  • the components of the RSU may be packaged in a weatherproof enclosure suitable for outdoor installation, and may include a network interface controller to provide a wired connection (e.g., Ethernet) to a traffic signal controller or a backhaul network.
  • the RAN 1004 may be an LTE RAN 1010 with eNBs, for example, eNB 1012.
  • the LTE RAN 1010 may provide an LTE air interface with the following characteristics : SCS of 15 kHz; CP-OFDM waveform for DL and SC-FDMA waveform for UL; turbo codes for data and TBCC for control; etc.
  • the LTE air interface may rely on CSI-RS for CSI acquisition and beam management; PDSCH/PDCCH DMRS for PDSCH/PDCCH demodulation; and CRS for cell search and initial acquisition, channel quality measurements, and channel estimation for coherent demodulation/ detection at the UE.
  • the LTE air interface may operating on sub-6 GHz bands.
  • the RAN 1004 may be an NG-RAN 1014 with gNBs, for example, gNB 1016, or ng-eNBs, for example, ng-eNB 1018.
  • the gNB 1016 may connect with 5G-enabled UEs using a 5G NR interface.
  • the gNB 1016 may connect with a 5G core through an NG interface, which may include an N2 interface or anN3 interface.
  • the ng-eNB 1018 may also connect with the 5G core through an NG interface, but may connect with a UE via an LTE air interface.
  • the gNB 1016 and the ng-eNB 1018 may connect with each other over an Xn interface.
  • the NG interface may be split into two parts, an NG user plane (NG- U) interface, which carries traffic data between the nodes of the NG-RAN 1014 and a UPF 1048 (e.g., N3 interface), and an NG control plane (NG-C) interface, which is a signaling interface between the nodes of the NG-RAN1014 and an AMF 1044 (e.g., N2 interface).
  • NG- U NG user plane
  • N3 interface e.g., N3 interface
  • N-C NG control plane
  • the NG-RAN 1014 may provide a 5G-NR air interface with the following characteristics: variable SCS; CP-OFDM for DL, CP-OFDM and DFT-s-OFDM for UL; polar, repetition, simplex, and Reed-Muller codes for control and LDPC for data.
  • the 5G-NR air interface may rely on CSI- RS, PDSCH/PDCCH DMRS similar to the LTE air interface.
  • the 5G-NR air interface may not use a CRS, but may use PBCH DMRS for PBCH demodulation; PTRS for phase tracking for PDSCH; and tracking reference signal for time tracking.
  • the 5G-NR air interface may operating on FR1 bands that include sub-6 GHz bands or FR2 bands that include bands from 24.25 GHz to 52.6 GHz.
  • the 5G-NR air interface may include an SSB that is an area of a downlink resource grid that includes PSS/SSS/PBCH.
  • the 5G-NR air interface may utilize BWPs for various purposes.
  • BWP can be used for dynamic adaptation of the SCS.
  • the UE 1002 can be configured with multiple BWPs where each BWP configuration has a different SCS. When a BWP change is indicated to the UE 1002, the SCS of the transmission is changed as well.
  • Another use case example of BWP is related to power saving.
  • multiple BWPs can be configured for the UE 1002 with different amount of frequency resources (for example, PRBs) to support data transmission under different traffic loading scenarios.
  • a BWP containing a smaller number of PRBs can be used for data transmission with small traffic load while allowing power saving at the UE 1002 and in some cases at the gNB 1016.
  • a BWP containing a larger number of PRBs can be used for scenarios with higher traffic load.
  • the RAN 1004 is communicatively coupled to CN 1020 that includes network elements to provide various functions to support data and telecommunications services to customers/subscribers (for example, users of UE 1002).
  • the components of the CN 1020 may be implemented in one physical node or separate physical nodes.
  • NFV may be utilized to virtualize any or all of the functions provided by the network elements of the CN 1020 onto physical compute/storage resources in servers, switches, etc.
  • a logical instantiation of the CN 1020 may be referred to as a network slice, and a logical instantiation of a portion of the CN 1020 may be referred to as a network sub-slice.
  • the CN 1020 may be an LTE CN 1022, which may also be referred to as an EPC.
  • the LTE CN 1022 may include MME 1024, SGW 1026, SGSN 1028, HSS 1030, PGW 1032, and PCRF 1034 coupled with one another over interfaces (or “reference points”) as shown. Functions of the elements of the LTE CN 1022 may be briefly introduced as follows.
  • the MME 1024 may implement mobility management functions to track a current location of the UE 1002 to facilitate paging, bearer activation/deactivation, handovers, gateway selection, authentication, etc.
  • the SGW 1026 may terminate an SI interface toward the RAN and route data packets between the RAN and the LTE CN 1022.
  • the SGW 1026 may be a local mobility anchor point for inter-RAN node handovers and also may provide an anchor for inter-3GPP mobility. Other responsibilities may include lawful intercept, charging, and some policy enforcement.
  • the SGSN 1028 may track a location of the UE 1002 and perform security functions and access control. In addition, the SGSN 1028 may perform inter-EPC node signaling for mobility between different RAT networks; PDN and S-GW selection as specified by MME 1024; MME selection for handovers; etc.
  • the S3 reference point between the MME 1024 and the SGSN 1028 may enable user and bearer information exchange for inter-3GPP access network mobility in idle/active states.
  • the HSS 1030 may include a database for network users, including subscription-related information to support the network entities’ handling of communication sessions.
  • the HSS 1030 can provide support for routing/roaming, authentication, authorization, naming/addressing resolution, location dependencies, etc.
  • An S6a reference point between the HSS 1030 and the MME 1024 may enable transfer of subscription and authentication data for authenticating/ authorizing user access to the LTE CN 1020.
  • the PGW 1032 may terminate an SGi interface toward a data network (DN) 1036 that may include an application/content server 1038.
  • the PGW 1032 may route data packets between the LTE CN 1022 and the data network 1036.
  • the PGW 1032 may be coupled with the SGW 1026 by an S5 reference point to facilitate user plane tunneling and tunnel management.
  • the PGW 1032 may further include a node for policy enforcement and charging data collection (for example, PCEF).
  • the SGi reference point between the PGW 1032 and the data network 10 36 may be an operator external public, a private PDN, or an intra-operator packet data network, for example, for provision of IMS services.
  • the PGW 1032 may be coupled with a PCRF 1034 via a Gx reference point.
  • the PCRF 1034 is the policy and charging control element of the LTE CN 1022.
  • the PCRF 1034 may be communicatively coupled to the app/content server 1038 to determine appropriate QoS and charging parameters for service flows.
  • the PCRF 1032 may provision associated rules into a PCEF (via Gx reference point) with appropriate TFT and QCI.
  • the CN 1020 may be a 5GC 1040.
  • the 5GC 1040 may include an AUSF 1042, AMF 1044, SMF 1046, UPF 1048, NSSF 1050, NEF 1052, NRF 1054, PCF 1056, UDM 1058, and AF 1060 coupled with one another over interfaces (or “reference points”) as shown.
  • Functions of the elements of the 5GC 1040 may be briefly introduced as follows.
  • the AUSF 1042 may store data for authentication of UE 1002 and handle authentication- related functionality.
  • the AUSF 1042 may facilitate a common authentication framework for various access types.
  • the AUSF 1042 may exhibit an Nausf service-based interface.
  • the AMF 1044 may allow other functions of the 5GC 1040 to communicate with the UE 1002 and the RAN 1004 and to subscribe to notifications about mobility events with respect to the UE 1002.
  • the AMF 1044 may be responsible for registration management (for example, for registering UE 1002), connection management, reachability management, mobility management, lawful interception of AMF-related events, and access authentication and authorization.
  • the AMF 1044 may provide transport for SM messages between the UE 1002 and the SMF 1046, and act as a transparent proxy for routing SM messages.
  • AMF 1044 may also provide transport for SMS messages between UE 1002 and an SMSF.
  • AMF 1044 may interact with the AUSF 1042 and the UE 1002 to perform various security anchor and context management functions.
  • AMF 1044 may be a termination point of a RAN CP interface, which may include or be an N2 reference point between the RAN 1004 and the AMF 1044; and the AMF 1044 may be a termination point of NAS (Nl) signaling, and perform NAS ciphering and integrity protection.
  • AMF 1044 may also support NAS signaling with the UE 1002 over an N3 IWF interface.
  • the SMF 1046 may be responsible for SM (for example, session establishment, tunnel management between UPF 1048 and AN 1008); UE IP address allocation and management (including optional authorization); selection and control of UP function; configuring traffic steering at UPF 1048 to route traffic to proper destination; termination of interfaces toward policy control functions; controlling part of policy enforcement, charging, and QoS; lawful intercept (for SM events and interface to LI system); termination of SM parts of NAS messages; downlink data notification; initiating AN specific SM information, sent via AMF 1044 over N2 to AN 1008; and determining SSC mode of a session.
  • SM may refer to management of a PDU session, and a PDU session or “session” may refer to a PDU connectivity service that provides or enables the exchange of PDUs between the UE 1002 and the data network 1036.
  • the UPF 1048 may act as an anchor point for intra-RAT and inter-RAT mobility, an external PDU session point of interconnect to data network 1036, and a branching point to support multihomed PDU session.
  • the UPF 1048 may also perform packet routing and forwarding, perform packet inspection, enforce the user plane part of policy rules, lawfully intercept packets (UP collection), perform traffic usage reporting, perform QoS handling for a user plane (e.g., packet filtering, gating, UL/DL rate enforcement), perform uplink traffic verification (e.g., SDF-to-QoS flow mapping), transport level packet marking in the uplink and downlink, and perform downlink packet buffering and downlink data notification triggering.
  • UPF 1048 may include an uplink classifier to support routing traffic flows to a data network.
  • the NSSF 1050 may select a set of network slice instances serving the UE 1002.
  • the NSSF 1050 may also determine allowed NSSAI and the mapping to the subscribed S-NSSAIs, if needed.
  • the NSSF 1050 may also determine the AMF set to be used to serve the UE 1002, or a list of candidate AMFs based on a suitable configuration and possibly by querying the NRF 1054.
  • the selection of a set of network slice instances for the UE 1002 may be triggered by the AMF 1044 with which the UE 1002 is registered by interacting with the NSSF 1050, which may lead to a change of AMF.
  • the NSSF 1050 may interact with the AMF 1044 via an N22 reference point; and may communicate with another NSSF in a visited network via an N31 reference point (not shown). Additionally, the NSSF 1050 may exhibit an Nnssf service-based interface.
  • the NEF 1052 may securely expose services and capabilities provided by 3GPP network functions for third party, internal exposure/re-exposure, AFs (e.g., AF 1060), edge computing or fog computing systems, etc.
  • the NEF 1052 may authenticate, authorize, or throttle the AFs.
  • NEF 1052 may also translate information exchanged with the AF 1060 and information exchanged with internal network functions. For example, the NEF 1052 may translate between an AF-Service-Identifier and an internal 5GC information.
  • NEF 1052 may also receive information from other NFs based on exposed capabilities of other NFs. This information may be stored at the NEF 1052 as structured data, or at a data storage NF using standardized interfaces. The stored information can then be re-exposed by the NEF 1052 to other NFs and AFs, or used for other purposes such as analytics. Additionally, the NEF 1052 may exhibit an Nnef service-based interface.
  • the NRF 1054 may support service discovery functions, receive NF discovery requests from NF instances, and provide the information of the discovered NF instances to the NF instances. NRF 1054 also maintains information of available NF instances and their supported services. As used herein, the terms “instantiate,” “instantiation,” and the like may refer to the creation of an instance, and an “instance” may refer to a concrete occurrence of an object, which may occur, for example, during execution of program code. Additionally, the NRF 1054 may exhibit the Nnrf service-based interface.
  • the PCF 1056 may provide policy rules to control plane functions to enforce them, and may also support unified policy framework to govern network behavior.
  • the PCF 1056 may also implement a front end to access subscription information relevant for policy decisions in a UDR of the UDM 1058.
  • the PCF 1056 exhibit an Npcf service-based interface.
  • the UDM 1058 may handle subscription-related information to support the network entities’ handling of communication sessions, and may store subscription data of UE 1002. For example, subscription data may be communicated via an N8 reference point between the UDM 1058 and the AMF 1044.
  • the UDM 1058 may include two parts, an application front end and a UDR.
  • the UDR may store subscription data and policy data for the UDM 1058 and the PCF 1056, and/or structured data for exposure and application data (including PFDs for application detection, application request information for multiple UEs 1002) for the NEF 1052.
  • the Nudr service-based interface may be exhibited by the UDR 221 to allow the UDM 1058, PCF 1056, and NEF 1052 to access a particular set of the stored data, as well as to read, update (e.g., add, modify), delete, and subscribe to notification of relevant data changes in the UDR.
  • the UDM may include a UDM-FE, which is in charge of processing credentials, location management, subscription management and so on. Several different front ends may serve the same user in different transactions.
  • the UDM-FE accesses subscription information stored in the UDR and performs authentication credential processing, user identification handling, access authorization, registration/mobility management, and subscription management.
  • the UDM 1058 may exhibit the Nudm service-based interface.
  • the AF 1060 may provide application influence on traffic routing, provide access to NEF, and interact with the policy framework for policy control.
  • the 5GC 1040 may enable edge computing by selecting operator/3 rd party services to be geographically close to a point that the UE 1002 is attached to the network. This may reduce latency and load on the network.
  • the 5GC 1040 may select a UPF 1048 close to the UE 1002 and execute traffic steering from the UPF 1048 to data network 1036 via the N6 interface. This may be based on the UE subscription data, UE location, and information provided by the AF 1060. In this way, the AF 1060 may influence UPF (re)selection and traffic routing.
  • the network operator may permit AF 1060 to interact directly with relevant NFs. Additionally, the AF 1060 may exhibit an Naf service-based interface.
  • the data network 1036 may represent various network operator services, Internet access, or third party services that may be provided by one or more servers including, for example, application/content server 1038.
  • FIG 11 schematically illustrates a wireless network 1100 in accordance with various embodiments.
  • the wireless network 1100 may include a UE 1102 in wireless communication with an AN 1104.
  • the UE 1102 and AN 1104 may be similar to, and substantially interchangeable with, like-named components described elsewhere herein.
  • the UE 1102 may be communicatively coupled with the AN 1104 via connection 1106.
  • the connection 1106 is illustrated as an air interface to enable communicative coupling, and can be consistent with cellular communications protocols such as an LTE protocol or a 5GNR protocol operating at mmWave or sub-6GHz frequencies.
  • the UE 1102 may include a host platform 1108 coupled with a modem platform 1110.
  • the host platform 1108 may include application processing circuitry 1112, which may be coupled with protocol processing circuitry 1114 of the modem platform 1110.
  • the application processing circuitry 1112 may run various applications for the UE 1102 that source/sink application data.
  • the application processing circuitry 1112 may further implement one or more layer operations to transmit/receive application data to/from a data network. These layer operations may include transport (for example UDP) and Internet (for example, IP) operations
  • the protocol processing circuitry 1114 may implement one or more of layer operations to facilitate transmission or reception of data over the connection 1106.
  • the layer operations implemented by the protocol processing circuitry 1114 may include, for example, MAC, RLC, PDCP, RRC and NAS operations.
  • the modem platform 1110 may further include digital baseband circuitry 1116 that may implement one or more layer operations that are “below” layer operations performed by the protocol processing circuitry 1114 in a network protocol stack. These operations may include, for example, PHY operations including one or more of HARQ-ACK functions, scrambling/descrambling, encoding/decoding, layer mapping/de-mapping, modulation symbol mapping, received symbol/bit metric determination, multi-antenna port precoding/decoding, which may include one or more of space-time, space-frequency or spatial coding, reference signal generation/detection, preamble sequence generation and/or decoding, synchronization sequence generation/detection, control channel signal blind decoding, and other related functions.
  • PHY operations including one or more of HARQ-ACK functions, scrambling/descrambling, encoding/decoding, layer mapping/de-mapping, modulation symbol mapping, received symbol/bit metric determination, multi-antenna port precoding/decoding, which may
  • the modem platform 1110 may further include transmit circuitry 1118, receive circuitry 1120, RF circuitry 1122, and RF front end (RFFE) 1124, which may include or connect to one or more antenna panels 1126.
  • the transmit circuitry 1118 may include a digital-to-analog converter, mixer, intermediate frequency (IF) components, etc.
  • the receive circuitry 1120 may include an analog-to-digital converter, mixer, IF components, etc.
  • the RF circuitry 1122 may include a low-noise amplifier, a power amplifier, power tracking components, etc.
  • RFFE 1124 may include filters (for example, surface/bulk acoustic wave filters), switches, antenna tuners, beamforming components (for example, phase-array antenna components), etc.
  • transmit/receive components may be specific to details of a specific implementation such as, for example, whether communication is TDM or FDM, in mmWave or sub-6 gHz frequencies, etc.
  • the transmit/receive components may be arranged in multiple parallel transmit/receive chains, may be disposed in the same or different chips/modules, etc.
  • the protocol processing circuitry 1114 may include one or more instances of control circuitry (not shown) to provide control functions for the transmit/receive components.
  • a UE reception may be established by and via the antenna panels 1126, RFFE 1124, RF circuitry 1122, receive circuitry 1120, digital baseband circuitry 1116, and protocol processing circuitry 1114.
  • the antenna panels 1126 may receive a transmission from the AN 1104 by receive-beamforming signals received by a plurality of antennas/antenna elements of the one or more antenna panels 1126.
  • a UE transmission may be established by and via the protocol processing circuitry 1114, digital baseband circuitry 1116, transmit circuitry 1118, RF circuitry 1122, RFFE 1124, and antenna panels 1126.
  • the transmit components of the UE 1104 may apply a spatial filter to the data to be transmitted to form a transmit beam emitted by the antenna elements of the antenna panels 1126.
  • the AN 1104 may include a host platform 1128 coupled with a modem platform 1130.
  • the host platform 1128 may include application processing circuitry 1132 coupled with protocol processing circuitry 1134 of the modem platform 1130.
  • the modem platform may further include digital baseband circuitry 1136, transmit circuitry 1138, receive circuitry 1140, RF circuitry 1142, RFFE circuitry 1144, and antenna panels 1146.
  • the components of the AN 1104 may be similar to and substantially interchangeable with like-named components of the UE 1102.
  • the components of the AN 1108 may perform various logical functions that include, for example, RNC functions such as radio bearer management, uplink and downlink dynamic radio resource management, and data packet scheduling.
  • Figure 12 is a block diagram illustrating components, according to some example embodiments, able to read instructions from a machine-readable or computer-readable medium (e.g., a non-transitory machine-readable storage medium) and perform any one or more of the methodologies discussed herein.
  • Figure 12 shows a diagrammatic representation of hardware resources 1200 including one or more processors (or processor cores) 1210, one or more memory /storage devices 1220, and one or more communication resources 1230, each of which may be communicatively coupled via a bus 1240 or other interface circuitry.
  • a hypervisor 1202 may be executed to provide an execution environment for one or more network slices/sub-slices to utilize the hardware resources 1200.
  • the processors 1210 may include, for example, a processor 1212 and a processor 1214.
  • the processors 1210 may be, for example, a central processing unit (CPU), a reduced instruction set computing (RISC) processor, a complex instruction set computing (CISC) processor, a graphics processing unit (GPU), a DSP such as a baseband processor, an ASIC, an FPGA, a radio-frequency integrated circuit (RFIC), another processor (including those discussed herein), or any suitable combination thereof.
  • CPU central processing unit
  • RISC reduced instruction set computing
  • CISC complex instruction set computing
  • GPU graphics processing unit
  • DSP such as a baseband processor, an ASIC, an FPGA, a radio-frequency integrated circuit (RFIC), another processor (including those discussed herein), or any suitable combination thereof.
  • the memory /storage devices 1220 may include main memory, disk storage, or any suitable combination thereof.
  • the memory /storage devices 1220 may include, but are not limited to, any type of volatile, non-volatile, or semi-volatile memory such as dynamic random access memory (DRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), Flash memory, solid-state storage, etc.
  • DRAM dynamic random access memory
  • SRAM static random access memory
  • EPROM erasable programmable read-only memory
  • EEPROM electrically erasable programmable read-only memory
  • Flash memory solid-state storage, etc.
  • the communication resources 1230 may include interconnection or network interface controllers, components, or other suitable devices to communicate with one or more peripheral devices 1204 or one or more databases 1206 or other network elements via a network 1208.
  • the communication resources 1230 may include wired communication components (e.g., for coupling via USB, Ethernet, etc.), cellular communication components, NFC components, Bluetooth® (or Bluetooth® Low Energy) components, Wi-Fi® components, and other communication components.
  • Instructions 1250 may comprise software, a program, an application, an applet, an app, or other executable code for causing at least any of the processors 1210 to perform any one or more of the methodologies discussed herein.
  • the instructions 1250 may reside, completely or partially, within at least one of the processors 1210 (e.g., within the processor’s cache memory), the memory /storage devices 1220, or any suitable combination thereof.
  • any portion of the instructions 1250 may be transferred to the hardware resources 1200 from any combination of the peripheral devices 1204 or the databases 1206. Accordingly, the memory of processors 1210, the memory /storage devices 1220, the peripheral devices 1204, and the databases 1206 are examples of computer-readable and machine-readable media.
  • the electronic device(s), network(s), system(s), chip(s) or component(s), or portions or implementations thereof, of Figures 10-12, or some other figure herein may be configured to perform one or more processes, techniques, or methods as described herein, or portions thereof.
  • One such process is depicted in Figure 13.
  • process 1300 may include, at 1305, providing a first interface with a distributed unit (DU), wherein the first interface has a common protocol with an interface between a centralized unit control plane (CU- CP) and the DU.
  • CU- CP centralized unit control plane
  • the process further includes, at 1310, providing a second interface with a computation control function (Comp-CF).
  • Comp-CF computation control function
  • the process further includes, at 1315, supporting a packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) stack at the Comp-SF and the CU-UP.
  • the process further includes, at 1320, negotiating an encryption algorithm with the CU-CP via the second interface based on the RRC security key.
  • PDCP packet data convergence protocol
  • the process 1400 includes, at 1405, establishing a radio resource control (RRC) connection with a centralized unit control plane (CU-CP) or computation control function (Comp-CF).
  • the process further includes, at 1410, receiving, from the CU-CP or Comp-CF, an RRC message that includes integrity and encryption information.
  • the process further includes, at 1415, activating integrity and ciphering protection based on the integrity and encryption information.
  • the process 1500 includes, at 1505, encoding a registration request for transmission to an access and mobility management function (AMF) to access single-network slice selection assistance information (S- NSSAI).
  • the process further includes, at 1510, receiving an indication of a subscribed S-NSSAI, wherein the subscribed S-NSSAI includes an indication of: a slice/service type (SST), a slice differentiator (SD), and a radio access network (RAN) computation service type.
  • SST slice/service type
  • SD slice differentiator
  • RAN radio access network
  • At least one of the components set forth in one or more of the preceding figures may be configured to perform one or more operations, techniques, processes, and/or methods as set forth in the example section below.
  • the baseband circuitry as described above in connection with one or more of the preceding figures may be configured to operate in accordance with one or more of the examples set forth below.
  • circuitry associated with a UE, base station, network element, etc. as described above in connection with one or more of the preceding figures may be configured to operate in accordance with one or more of the examples set forth below in the example section.
  • Example 1 may include a method for enabling the support of PDCP stack at Comp SF which supports a first interface, denoted as C3, e.g. similar to Fl-U, with DU, and a second interface, denoted as C4, e.g. similar to El, with CU-CP.
  • Example 2 may include the method of example 1 or some other example herein, whereby the Comp SF handles computing services requested from the UE which is registered to a RAN CU-CP and supports multiple connectivity, including one connectivity with a first RAN node for communication-related data traffic and one or more connectivity with Comp SFs as other RAN nodes for compute related data traffic.
  • Example 3 may include the method of example 2 or some other example herein, whereby the UE can receive compute control signaling message from a Comp CF which is interfaced with RAN CU-CP over a third interface, denoted as Cl, by piggyback the message in an RRC message.
  • Example 4 may include the method of example 3 or some other example herein, whereby the UE receives DRB (data radio bearer) from the first RAN node for communication related data traffic and CRB-U (compute radio bearer at user plane) from Comp SF for compute related data traffic.
  • DRB data radio bearer
  • CRB-U compute radio bearer at user plane
  • Example 5 may include the method of example 3 or example 4 or some other example herein, whereby the UE receives CRB-C (compute radio bearer at control plane) from Comp CF for compute control signaling message.
  • CRB-C compute radio bearer at control plane
  • Example 6 may include the method of example 3 or some other example herein, whereby the security keys of the RAN compute CF and RAN Comp SF are based on KgNB or KgNB-cf
  • Example 7 may include the method of example 6 or some other example herein, whereby KgNB is the security key generated by AMF for a RAN node for communication services.
  • Example 8 may include the method of example 6 or some other example herein, whereby KgNB-cf is the security key generated by AMF for computation service, or kgNB-cf is the security key generated by gNB based on KgNB for computation service.
  • Example 9 may include the method of examples 7 or 8 or some other example herein, whereby the RAN CU-CP generates Kef for the RAN Comp CF and sends it to the RAN Comp CF.
  • Example 10 may include the method of example 9 or some other example herein, whereby the Comp CF generates Integrity and Encryption Keys for security protection of compute control signaling message.
  • Example 11 may include the method of examples 7 or 8 or some other example herein, whereby the RAN CU-CP generates Ksf for the RAN Comp SF and sends it to the RAN Compute SF directly or via RAN Compte CF.
  • Example 12 may include the method of example 11 or some other example herein, whereby the Comp SF generates Integrity and Encryption Keys for security protection of containing compute related data traffic.
  • Example 13 may include the method of example 2 or some other example herein, whereby the communication established between the UE and the RAN Comp SF is protected at the PDCP layer using the information stored in RAN Compute Security Context (e.g. key counter and algorithm).
  • RAN Compute Security Context e.g. key counter and algorithm
  • Example 14 may include the method of example 13 or some other example herein, whereby the RAN CU-CP and RAN Comp SF negotiate encryption algorithm directly or via Comp CF by sending Comp SF Addition/Modification Request message including Ksf, UE security capabilities, and Compute security policy.
  • Example 15 may include the method of example 14 or some other example herein, whereby the Comp SF selects a security algorithm and generates the security context and sends acknowledge message to RAN CU-CP including the selected algorithm and indications of the use of integrity and encryption protection for Compute service.
  • Example 16 may include the method of example 15 or some other example herein, whereby the CU-CP sends RRC connection ReConfig request message to the UE, including the information related to RAN compute session, e.g., Compute Key Counter, selected algorithm, and indications of the use of integrity and encryption protection for Compute service.
  • the CU-CP sends RRC connection ReConfig request message to the UE, including the information related to RAN compute session, e.g., Compute Key Counter, selected algorithm, and indications of the use of integrity and encryption protection for Compute service.
  • Example 17 may include the method of example 16 or some other example herein, whereby the Compute Key counter can be the same or different for both Comp CF and Comp SF.
  • Example 18 may include the method of example 17 or some other example herein, whereby for the same compute Key counter, the security keys of Kef and Ksf are updated at the same time.
  • Example 19 may include the method of example 17 or some other example herein, whereby for different compute Key counter, the security keys of Kef and Ksf can be updated based on corresponding compute security policies, respectively.
  • Example 20 may include the method of example 16 or some other example herein, whereby the UE derives the encryption key from Ksf (based on the key counter and selected algorithm) when receiving the RRC connection ReConfig request message.
  • Example 21 may include the method of example 20 or some other example herein, whereby the UE replies RRC Connection ReConfig response message to CU-CP or Comp CF.
  • Example 22 may include the method of example 21 or some other example herein, whereby CU-CP or Comp CF sends a Comp SF Reconfiguration Completion message to Comp SF to confirm the multiple connectivities established in the UE.
  • Example 23 may include the method of example 22 or some other example herein, whereby the Comp SF derives the encryption key from Ksf (based on the key counter and selected algorithm) when receiving the RRC connection ReConfig request message.
  • Example 24 may include the method of example 23 or some other example herein, whereby both the UE and Comp SF activates the security protection of ciphering and integrity for Computation related data message.
  • Example 25 may include the method of example 13 or some other example herein, whereby the compute control connection established between the UE and the RAN Comp CF is protected by using the information stored in RAN Compute Security Context (e.g. key counter and algorithm).
  • RAN Compute Security Context e.g. key counter and algorithm
  • Example 26 may include the method of examples 25 and 14 or some other example herein, whereby the RAN CU-CP and RAN Comp CF negotiate encryption algorithm by sending Comp CF Addition/Modification Request message including Kef, UE security capabilities, and Compute security policy.
  • Example 27 may include the method of example 15 or some other example herein, whereby the Comp CF selects a security algorithm and generates the security context and sends acknowledge message to RAN CU CP including the selected algorithm and indications of the use of integrity and encryption protection for Compute service.
  • Example 28 may include the method of example 27 and 16 or some other example herein, whereby the CU-CP sends RRC connection ReConfig request message to the UE, including the information related to RAN compute session, e.g., Compute Key Counter for Comp CF and/or Comp SF, selected algorithms for compute control signaling and compute data traffic, and indications of the use of integrity and encryption protection for Compute service for compute control signaling and compute data traffic.
  • the CU-CP sends RRC connection ReConfig request message to the UE, including the information related to RAN compute session, e.g., Compute Key Counter for Comp CF and/or Comp SF, selected algorithms for compute control signaling and compute data traffic, and indications of the use of integrity and encryption protection for Compute service for compute control signaling and compute data traffic.
  • Example 29 includes a method comprising: providing, by a computation service function (Comp-SF), a first interface with a distributed unit (DU); providing, by the Comp-SF, a second interface with a computation control function (Comp-CF); and supporting, by the Comp-SF, a packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) stack using the first interface and the second interface.
  • Comp-SF computation service function
  • DU distributed unit
  • Comp-CF computation control function
  • PDCP packet data convergence protocol
  • Example 30 includes the method of example 29 or some other example herein, wherein the first interface is to provide a user data plane path between the DU and Comp-SF.
  • Example 31 includes the method of example 29 or some other example herein, wherein the first interface has a common protocol with an interface between a centralized unit control plane (CU-CP) and the DU.
  • CU-CP centralized unit control plane
  • Example 32 includes the method of example 29 or some other example herein, wherein the method further includes receiving, by the Comp-SF, a radio resource control (RRC) security key via the second interface.
  • RRC radio resource control
  • Example 33 includes the method of example 32 or some other example herein, further comprising negotiating, by the Comp-SF, an encryption algorithm with the CU-CP via the second interface.
  • Example 34 includes the method of example 33 or some other example herein, further comprising selecting a security algorithm and generating a security context, by the Comp-SF, based on the RRC security key.
  • Example 35 includes the method of example 34 or some other example herein, further comprising sending, by the Comp-SF, an acknowledge message that includes an indication of the selected security algorithm to the CU-CP via the second interface.
  • Example 36 includes the method of example 29 or some other example herein, further comprising providing an RRC stack and RRC connection with a user equipment (UE) by the Comp-SF.
  • UE user equipment
  • Example 37 includes the method of example 29 or some other example herein, further comprising: receiving, by the Comp-SF, a reconfiguration complete message from the CU-CP over the second interface; and in response to receiving the reconfiguration complete message, activating integrity and ciphering protection by the Comp-SF.
  • Example 38 includes a method comprising: establishing a radio resource control (RRC) connection with a centralized unit control plane (CU-CP) or computation control function (Comp-CF); receiving, from the CU-CP or Comp-CF, an RRC message that includes integrity and encryption information; and activating integrity and ciphering protection based on the integrity and encryption information.
  • RRC radio resource control
  • CU-CP centralized unit control plane
  • Comp-CF computation control function
  • Example 39 includes the method of example 38 or some other example herein, wherein the RRC message includes one or more of: an indication of a compute key counter, and an indication of a selected security algorithm.
  • Example 40 includes the method of example 39 or some other example herein, wherein the method further includes deriving an encryption key based on the compute key counter and the selected security algorithm.
  • Example 41 includes the method of example 39 or some other example herein, further comprising sending an RRC connection reconfiguration response message to the CU-CP or the Comp-CF.
  • Example 42 includes the method of any of examples 38-41 or some other example herein, wherein the method is performed by a user equipment (UE) or portion thereof.
  • UE user equipment
  • Example Al may include a method for enabling computation services support at the RAN node close to the UE by RAN Computation Functions, including one or more RAN Comp CFs and RAN Comp SFs, in which the network operators provide both of computation and connectivity services in 5G network to end user, e.g. network operators also play the role of ASP in its 5G network or network operators and ASPs have service level agreement (SLA) for the ASPs/CSPs/ECSPs to provide computation services at the RAN compute functions that is close to its end users in the network operator’s 5G network.
  • SLA service level agreement
  • Example A2 may include [solution 2 option 1] the method of example Al or some other example herein, whereby for computation services provided by network operators, an S-NSSAI is comprised of a Slice/Service type (SST) with a new value defined for computation services, and a Slice Differentiator (SD), which differentiates amongst multiple Network Slices of the same Slice/Service type.
  • SST Slice/Service type
  • SD Slice Differentiator
  • Example A3 may include [solution 2 option 1] the method of example A2 or some other example herein, whereby the SD can include the following information: identification of network operator or ASP which provides computation service, and one or more Application IDs.
  • Example A4 may include [solution 2 option2] the method of example Al or some other example herein, whereby for computation services provided by network operators, a new optional IE, service type of computation service (STCMP) for RAN compute, is defined in S-NSSAI in addition to SST and SD which are used for connectivity services provided by 5G network operators.
  • Example A5 may include [solution 2 option3] the method of example Al or some other example herein, whereby for computation services provided by network operators, a new computation service slice is defined as C-NSSAI, which is different from S-NSSAI for connectivity service and defined as C-SST (service and slice type of compute service) and C-SD (service differentiation of compute service for a specific C-SST).
  • Example A6 may include [solution 2 option3] the method of example A5 or some other example herein, whereby the C-SST can be defined based on the type of service provider for the compute service, e.g. network operator (scenariol), or application provider (scenario2) and C-SD is the optional IE providing additional information, including application IDs, for the UE for the compute service slice.
  • the C-SST can be defined based on the type of service provider for the compute service, e.g. network operator (scenariol), or application provider (scenario2)
  • C-SD is the optional IE providing additional information, including application IDs, for the UE for the compute service slice.
  • Example A7 may include the method of examples A3 or A4 or A6 or some other example herein, whereby the Subscription Information of a UE contains one or more subscribed computation service slices, e.g. S-NSSAI (optionl/option2 in solution 2) or C-NSSAI (option3 in solution 2).
  • subscribed computation service slices e.g. S-NSSAI (optionl/option2 in solution 2) or C-NSSAI (option3 in solution 2).
  • Example A8 may include the method of example A7 or some other example herein, whereby for each subscribed computation service slices, the Subscription Information additionally contain: a Subscribed RAN-DNN list and one default RAN-DNN for RAN Compute.
  • Example A9 may include the method of example A8 or some other example herein, whereby a default RAN-DNN value is defined for RAN compute.
  • Example A10 may include the method of example A8 or some other example herein, whereby a RAN-DNN value can be used to represent RAN compute services provided by ASP/CSP/ECSP
  • Example Al 1 may include the method of example A7 or some other example herein, whereby Subscription Information additionally contain the indication whether the S-NSSAI is marked as default Subscribed computation service slices.
  • Example Al 2 may include the method of example Al 1 or some other example herein, whereby Subscription Information additionally contain the indication whether the computation service slice is subject to Computation Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization and associated AAA Server Address, similar to Network Slice-Specific Authentication.
  • Example Al 3 may include the method of example Al 1 or some other example herein, whereby based on the subscription information of a computation service slice, e.g. S-NSSAI or C- NSSAI, as part of initial registration procedure, a AMF triggers Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization with a AAA Server (AAA-S) which may be hosted by the H- PLMN operator or by an application service provider (ASP, third party) with the following principles as indicated in TS33.501 clause 16 for network slices of connectivity services.
  • a computation service slice e.g. S-NSSAI or C- NSSAI
  • Example Al 4 may include the method of example Al 2 or some other example herein, whereby the AMF performs the role of the EAP Authenticator and communicates with the AAA- S via the AUSF which undertakes any AAA protocol interworking with the AAA protocol supported by the AAA-S.
  • Example Al 5 may include the method of example Al 4 or some other example herein, whereby if the AAA-S belongs to an ASP (third party), the NSSAA Function contacts the AAA-S via a AAA-P.
  • the NSSAA Function and the AAA-P may be co-located.
  • Example Al 6 may include the method of example Al 5 or some other example herein, whereby when ASP provides computation services at 5G network, the AAA-S can be provided by ASPs for its computation service slices and the ASP provides the addresses information of AAA- S(s), e.g. AAA-S ID, IP address and port number, etc., in SLA with network operators for the computation service.
  • AAA-S can be provided by ASPs for its computation service slices and the ASP provides the addresses information of AAA- S(s), e.g. AAA-S ID, IP address and port number, etc., in SLA with network operators for the computation service.
  • Example Al 7 may include the method of example Al 6 or some other example herein, whereby based on SLA, the NSSAA Function contacts the AAA-S via a AAA-P, where the NSSAA Function and the AAA-P may be co-located, and AAA-S replies the result of the authentication to NSSAA via AAA-P.
  • Example Al 8 may include the method of example Al 7 or some other example herein, whereby for the computation service slice, the computation slice-specific authentication and authorization between a UE and an AAA server (AAA-S) uses a User ID, e.g. represented as NAI, and credentials, which is different from the 3 GPP subscription credentials (e.g. SUPI and credentials used for PLMN access) and takes place after the primary authentication.
  • AAA-S AAA server
  • Example Al 9 may include the method of example Al 8 or some other example herein, whereby for the computation slice authentication and authorization, the slice information can be S-NSSAI or (solution 2, optionl, option2) C-NSSAI (solution 2, option3) and the EAP framework is used for computation slice-specific authentication and authorization between the UE and the AAA server.
  • the slice information can be S-NSSAI or (solution 2, optionl, option2) C-NSSAI (solution 2, option3) and the EAP framework is used for computation slice-specific authentication and authorization between the UE and the AAA server.
  • Example A20 may include the method of example Al 1 or some other example herein, whereby for ASP providing compute services, based on stored UE context at the RAN node for the information of allowed S-NSSAI or C-NSSAI, as part of Computation Session establishment procedure, the computation Service Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization is initiated by the RAN Comp-CF sending authentication request to AAA-S provided by ASP/CSP/ECSP.
  • Example A21 may include the method of example A20 or some other example herein, whereby when an application requiring computation service is launched, the UE receiving the application request initiates RAN compute session establishment procedure by indicating the following information: compute service slice information, e.g. allowed S-NSSAI or C-NSSAI and the user ID, e.g. represented as Network Access Identifier (NAI), which subscribes to compute service provided by the ASP/CSP/ECSP.
  • compute service slice information e.g. allowed S-NSSAI or C-NSSAI
  • the user ID e.g. represented as Network Access Identifier (NAI)
  • NAI Network Access Identifier
  • Example A22 may include the method of example A21 or some other example herein, whereby the registered RAN node selects a RAN Comp-CF based on the following information: Requested S-NSSAI(s) or C-NSSAI(s) and stored RAN network configuration information.
  • Example A23 may include the method of example A22 or some other example herein, whereby the RAN Comp-CF initiates computation service slice specific authentication and authorization procedure by sending an authentication request to AAA-S provided by ASP/CSP/ECSP.
  • Example A24 may include the method of example A23 or some other example herein, whereby based on the result of the authentication response, the RAN Comp-CF selects a RAN Comp-SF and responds successful results to RAN node, e.g. CU-CP if authentication is successful, otherwise the RAN Comp-CF returns the authentication result and rejection cause to the RAN node, e.g. CU-CP.
  • RAN node e.g. CU-CP
  • Example XI includes an apparatus of a computation service function (Comp-SF) comprising: memory to store a radio resource control (RRC) security key; and processing circuitry, coupled with the memory, to: provide a first interface with a distributed unit (DU), wherein the first interface has a common protocol with an interface between a centralized unit control plane (CU-CP) and the DU; provide a second interface with a computation control function (Comp-CF); support a packet data convergence protocol (PDCP) stack at the Comp-SF and the CU-UP; and negotiate an encryption algorithm with the CU-CP via the second interface based on the RRC security key.
  • DU distributed unit
  • CU-CP centralized unit control plane
  • Comp-CF computation control function
  • PDCP packet data convergence protocol
  • Example X2 includes the apparatus of example XI or some other example herein, wherein the processing circuitry is further to receive the RRC security key via the second interface.
  • Example X3 includes the apparatus of example XI or some other example herein, wherein the processing circuitry is further to select a security algorithm and generate a security context based on the RRC security key.
  • Example X4 includes the apparatus of example X3 or some other example herein, wherein the processing circuitry is further to send an acknowledge message that includes an indication of the selected security algorithm to the CU-CP via the second interface.
  • Example X5 includes the apparatus of example XI or some other example herein, wherein the processing circuitry is further to: receive a reconfiguration complete message from the CU-CP over the second interface; and in response to receiving the reconfiguration complete message, activate integrity and ciphering protection.
  • Example X6 includes the apparatus of any of examples XI -X5 or some other example herein, wherein the processing circuitry is further to provide an RRC stack and RRC connection with a user equipment (UE).
  • UE user equipment
  • Example X7 includes one or more computer-readable media storing instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause a user equipment (UE) to: establish a radio resource control (RRC) connection with a centralized unit control plane (CU-CP) or computation control function (Comp-CF); receive, from the CU-CP or Comp-CF, an RRC message that includes integrity and encryption information; and activate integrity and ciphering protection based on the integrity and encryption information.
  • RRC radio resource control
  • CU-CP centralized unit control plane
  • Comp-CF computation control function
  • Example X8 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example X7 or some other example herein, wherein the RRC message includes one or more of: an indication of a compute key counter, and an indication of a selected security algorithm.
  • Example X9 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example X8 or some other example herein, wherein memory further stores instructions to cause the UE to derive an encryption key based on the compute key counter and the selected security algorithm.
  • Example XI 0 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example X8 or some other example herein, wherein memory further stores instructions to cause the UE to send an RRC connection reconfiguration response message to the CU-CP or the Comp-CF.
  • Example XI 1 includes one or more computer-readable media storing instructions that, when executed by one or more processors, cause user equipment (UE) to: encode a registration request for transmission to an access and mobility management function (AMF) to access single-network slice selection assistance information (S-NSSAI); and receive an indication of a subscribed S-NSSAI, wherein the subscribed S-NSSAI includes an indication of: a slice/service type (SST), a slice differentiator (SD), and a radio access network (RAN) computation service type.
  • SST slice/service type
  • SD slice differentiator
  • RAN radio access network
  • Example X12 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example XI 1 or some other example herein, wherein the SD includes an indication of a network operator or application service provider (ASP) that provides a computation service, or an indication of one or more application identifiers.
  • ASP application service provider
  • Example XI 3 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example XI 1 or some other example herein, wherein the subscribed S-NSSAI further includes an indication of a service type of computation service (STCMP).
  • STCMP service type of computation service
  • Example X14 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example XI 1 or some other example herein, wherein the UE further receives an indication of computation-network slice selection assistance information (C-NSSAI) associated with computation services provided by a network operator.
  • C-NSSAI computation-network slice selection assistance information
  • Example X15 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example X14 or some other example herein, wherein the C-NSSAI includes an indication of a computation-service and slice type (C-SST) and an indication of a computation-service differentiation (C-SD) for a particular C-SST.
  • C-SST computation-service and slice type
  • C-SD computation-service differentiation
  • Example XI 6 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example XI 5 or some other example herein, wherein the C-SST is associated with a type of service provider for the computation service.
  • Example XI 7 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example XI 5 or some other example herein, wherein the C-SD includes an indication of an application identifier.
  • Example XI 8 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example XI 1 or some other example herein, wherein subscription information stored by the UE includes an indication of one or more subscribed computation service slices.
  • Example XI 9 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example XI 8 or some other example herein, wherein the subscription information further includes an indication of a subscribed radio access network-data network name (RAN-DNN) list.
  • RAN-DNN radio access network-data network name
  • Example X20 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example XI 9 or some other example herein, wherein the RAN-DNN list includes an indication of a default RAN-DNN for RAN computation.
  • Example X21 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example X19 or some other example herein, wherein the RAN-DNN list includes an indication of a RAN-DNN value that is to represent computation services provided by an ASP, cloud service provider (CSP), or edge computing service provider (ECSP).
  • CSP cloud service provider
  • ECSP edge computing service provider
  • Example X22 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example XI 8 or some other example herein, wherein the subscription information further includes an indication of whether the subscribed N-SSAI is marked as a default subscribed computation service slice.
  • Example X23 includes the one or more computer-readable media of example XI 8 or some other example herein, wherein the subscription information further includes an indication of whether a subscribed computation service slice is subject to computation slice-specific authentication and authorization.
  • Example Z01 may include an apparatus comprising means to perform one or more elements of a method described in or related to any of examples 1-X23, or any other method or process described herein.
  • Example Z02 may include one or more non-transitory computer-readable media comprising instructions to cause an electronic device, upon execution of the instructions by one or more processors of the electronic device, to perform one or more elements of a method described in or related to any of examples 1- X23, or any other method or process described herein.
  • Example Z03 may include an apparatus comprising logic, modules, or circuitry to perform one or more elements of a method described in or related to any of examples 1- X23, or any other method or process described herein.
  • Example Z04 may include a method, technique, or process as described in or related to any of examples 1- X23, or portions or parts thereof.
  • Example Z05 may include an apparatus comprising: one or more processors and one or more computer-readable media comprising instructions that, when executed by the one or more processors, cause the one or more processors to perform the method, techniques, or process as described in or related to any of examples 1- X23, or portions thereof.
  • Example Z06 may include a signal as described in or related to any of examples 1- X23, or portions or parts thereof.
  • Example Z07 may include a datagram, packet, frame, segment, protocol data unit (PDU), or message as described in or related to any of examples 1- X23, or portions or parts thereof, or otherwise described in the present disclosure.
  • PDU protocol data unit
  • Example Z08 may include a signal encoded with data as described in or related to any of examples 1- X23, or portions or parts thereof, or otherwise described in the present disclosure.
  • Example Z09 may include a signal encoded with a datagram, packet, frame, segment, protocol data unit (PDU), or message as described in or related to any of examples 1- X23, or portions or parts thereof, or otherwise described in the present disclosure.
  • PDU protocol data unit
  • Example Z10 may include an electromagnetic signal carrying computer-readable instructions, wherein execution of the computer-readable instructions by one or more processors is to cause the one or more processors to perform the method, techniques, or process as described in or related to any of examples 1- X23, or portions thereof.
  • Example Zll may include a computer program comprising instructions, wherein execution of the program by a processing element is to cause the processing element to carry out the method, techniques, or process as described in or related to any of examples 1- X23, or portions thereof.
  • Example Z12 may include a signal in a wireless network as shown and described herein.
  • Example Z13 may include a method of communicating in a wireless network as shown and described herein.
  • Example Z14 may include a system for providing wireless communication as shown and described herein.
  • Example Z15 may include a device for providing wireless communication as shown and described herein.
  • AMBRAggregate 45 BPSK Binary Phase Shift 80 CDMA Code-
  • ANR Automatic BSR Buffer Status CID Cell-ID (e g.,
  • CPU CSI processing to-noise and interference Language Digital unit, Central Processing ratio Subscriber Line Unit 55 CSMA Carrier Sense 90 DSLAM DSL Access
  • EPDCCH enhanced FACCH/F Fast 95 FN Frame Number
  • PDCCH enhanced Associated Control FPGA Field-
  • GGSN Gateway GPRS (related to WUS) Secure (https is Support Node 40 GUMMEI Globally http/1.1 over SSL, GLONASS Unique MME Identifier 75 i.e. port 443)
  • GSM Global System for Number Element Identifier Mobile HSPA High Speed Packet IEIDL Information
  • WUS Connectivity 80 Function NACKNegative NM Network Manager NRS Narrowband Acknowl edgement NMS Network Reference Signal NAI Network Access Management System NS Network Service Identifier 50 N-PoP Network Point of NSA Non-Standalone
  • Non-Access Presence 85 operation mode Stratum, Non- Access NMIB, N-MIB NSD Network Service Stratum layer Narrowband MIB Descriptor NCT Network NPBCH Narrowband NSR Network Service Connectivity Topology 55 Physical Broadcast Record NC-JT NonCHannel 90 NSSAINetwork Slice coherent Joint NPDCCH Narrowband Selection Assistance Transmission Physical Downlink Information
  • NF Network Function NPUSCH Narrowband 100 wus NFP Network Physical Uplink NZP Non-Zero Power Forwarding Path Shared CHannel O&M Operation and Maintenance ODU2 Optical channel PCF Policy Control 70 PM Performance Data Unit - type 2 Function Measurement OFDM Orthogonal PCRF Policy Control and PMI Precoding Matrix Frequency Division Charging Rules Indicator Multiplexing Function PNF Physical Network
  • PC Power Control PEI Permanent Proximity-Based Personal Computer Equipment Identifiers Service
  • PCC Primary PFD Packet Flow PRS Positioning Component Carrier
  • 60 Description 95 Reference Signal Primary CC
  • P-GW PDN Gateway PRR Packet Reception
  • PCell Primary Cell PHICH Physical Radio PCI Physical Cell ID, hybrid-ARQ indicator PS Packet Services Physical Cell Identity channel PSBCH Physical PCEF Policy and 65 PHY Physical layer 100 Sidelink Broadcast Charging PLMN Public Land Mobile Channel
  • Point Descriptor 70 SeNB secondary eNB 105 SMSF SMS Function SMTC SSB-based 35 Signal Received TCP Transmission
  • SoC System on Chip 40 Noise and Interference TDM Time Division SON Self-Organizing Ratio Multiplexing Network SSS Secondary 75 TDMATime Division
  • Synchronization Configuration Indicator 100 Signal based Reference Technical Standard TTI Transmission Time UPF User Plane VM Virtual Machine
  • circuitry refers to, is part of, or includes hardware components such as an electronic circuit, a logic circuit, a processor (shared, dedicated, or group) and/or memory (shared, dedicated, or group), an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), a field- programmable device (FPD) (e.g., a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), a programmable logic device (PLD), a complex PLD (CPLD), a high-capacity PLD (HCPLD), a structured ASIC, or a programmable SoC), digital signal processors (DSPs), etc., that are configured to provide the described functionality.
  • FPD field- programmable device
  • FPGA field-programmable gate array
  • PLD programmable logic device
  • CPLD complex PLD
  • HPLD high-capacity PLD
  • DSPs digital signal processors
  • the circuitry may execute one or more software or firmware programs to provide at least some of the described functionality.
  • the term “circuitry” may also refer to a combination of one or more hardware elements (or a combination of circuits used in an electrical or electronic system) with the program code used to carry out the functionality of that program code. In these embodiments, the combination of hardware elements and program code may be referred to as a particular type of circuitry.
  • processor circuitry refers to, is part of, or includes circuitry capable of sequentially and automatically carrying out a sequence of arithmetic or logical operations, or recording, storing, and/or transferring digital data.
  • Processing circuitry may include one or more processing cores to execute instructions and one or more memory structures to store program and data information.
  • processor circuitry may refer to one or more application processors, one or more baseband processors, a physical central processing unit (CPU), a single-core processor, a dual-core processor, a triple-core processor, a quad-core processor, and/or any other device capable of executing or otherwise operating computer-executable instructions, such as program code, software modules, and/or functional processes.
  • Processing circuitry may include more hardware accelerators, which may be microprocessors, programmable processing devices, or the like.
  • the one or more hardware accelerators may include, for example, computer vision (CV) and/or deep learning (DL) accelerators.
  • CV computer vision
  • DL deep learning
  • application circuitry and/or “baseband circuitry” may be considered synonymous to, and may be referred to as, “processor circuitry.”
  • interface circuitry refers to, is part of, or includes circuitry that enables the exchange of information between two or more components or devices.
  • interface circuitry may refer to one or more hardware interfaces, for example, buses, I/O interfaces, peripheral component interfaces, network interface cards, and/or the like.
  • user equipment refers to a device with radio communication capabilities and may describe a remote user of network resources in a communications network.
  • the term “user equipment” or “UE” may be considered synonymous to, and may be referred to as, client, mobile, mobile device, mobile terminal, user terminal, mobile unit, mobile station, mobile user, subscriber, user, remote station, access agent, user agent, receiver, radio equipment, reconfigurable radio equipment, reconfigurable mobile device, etc.
  • the term “user equipment” or “UE” may include any type of wireless/wired device or any computing device including a wireless communications interface.
  • network element refers to physical or virtualized equipment and/or infrastructure used to provide wired or wireless communication network services.
  • network element may be considered synonymous to and/or referred to as a networked computer, networking hardware, network equipment, network node, router, switch, hub, bridge, radio network controller, RAN device, RAN node, gateway, server, virtualized VNF, NFVI, and/or the like.
  • computer system refers to any type interconnected electronic devices, computer devices, or components thereof. Additionally, the term “computer system” and/or “system” may refer to various components of a computer that are communicatively coupled with one another. Furthermore, the term “computer system” and/or “system” may refer to multiple computer devices and/or multiple computing systems that are communicatively coupled with one another and configured to share computing and/or networking resources.
  • appliance refers to a computer device or computer system with program code (e.g., software or firmware) that is specifically designed to provide a specific computing resource.
  • program code e.g., software or firmware
  • a “virtual appliance” is a virtual machine image to be implemented by a hypervisor-equipped device that virtualizes or emulates a computer appliance or otherwise is dedicated to provide a specific computing resource.
  • resource refers to a physical or virtual device, a physical or virtual component within a computing environment, and/or a physical or virtual component within a particular device, such as computer devices, mechanical devices, memory space, processor/CPU time, processor/CPU usage, processor and accelerator loads, hardware time or usage, electrical power, input/output operations, ports or network sockets, channel/link allocation, throughput, memory usage, storage, network, database and applications, workload units, and/or the like.
  • a “hardware resource” may refer to compute, storage, and/or network resources provided by physical hardware element(s).
  • a “virtualized resource” may refer to compute, storage, and/or network resources provided by virtualization infrastructure to an application, device, system, etc.
  • network resource or “communication resource” may refer to resources that are accessible by computer devices/systems via a communications network.
  • system resources may refer to any kind of shared entities to provide services, and may include computing and/or network resources. System resources may be considered as a set of coherent functions, network data objects or services, accessible through a server where such system resources reside on a single host or multiple hosts and are clearly identifiable.
  • channel refers to any transmission medium, either tangible or intangible, which is used to communicate data or a data stream.
  • channel may be synonymous with and/or equivalent to “communications channel,” “data communications channel,” “transmission channel,” “data transmission channel,” “access channel,” “data access channel,” “link,” “data link,” “carrier,” “radiofrequency carrier,” and/or any other like term denoting a pathway or medium through which data is communicated.
  • link refers to a connection between two devices through a RAT for the purpose of transmitting and receiving information.
  • instantiate refers to the creation of an instance.
  • An “instance” also refers to a concrete occurrence of an object, which may occur, for example, during execution of program code.
  • Coupled may mean two or more elements are in direct physical or electrical contact with one another, may mean that two or more elements indirectly contact each other but still cooperate or interact with each other, and/or may mean that one or more other elements are coupled or connected between the elements that are said to be coupled with each other.
  • directly coupled may mean that two or more elements are in direct contact with one another.
  • communicatively coupled may mean that two or more elements may be in contact with one another by a means of communication including through a wire or other interconnect connection, through a wireless communication channel or link, and/or the like.
  • information element refers to a structural element containing one or more fields.
  • field refers to individual contents of an information element, or a data element that contains content.
  • SMTC refers to an S SB-based measurement timing configuration configured by SSB- MeasurementTimingConflguration.
  • SSB refers to an SS/PBCH block.
  • a “Primary Cell” refers to the MCG cell, operating on the primary frequency, in which the UE either performs the initial connection establishment procedure or initiates the connection re-establishment procedure.
  • Primary SCG Cell refers to the SCG cell in which the UE performs random access when performing the Reconfiguration with Sync procedure for DC operation.
  • Secondary Cell refers to a cell providing additional radio resources on top of a Special Cell for a UE configured with CA.
  • Secondary Cell Group refers to the subset of serving cells comprising the PSCell and zero or more secondary cells for a UE configured with DC.
  • the term “Serving Cell” refers to the primary cell for a UE in RRC CONNECTED not configured with CA/DC there is only one serving cell comprising of the primary cell.
  • the term “serving cell” or “serving cells” refers to the set of cells comprising the Special Cell(s) and all secondary cells for a UE in RRC_CONNECTED configured with CA/.
  • Special Cell refers to the PCell of the MCG or the PSCell of the SCG for DC operation; otherwise, the term “Special Cell” refers to the Pcell.

Abstract

Divers modes de réalisation de la présente invention peuvent se rapporter d'une manière générale au domaine des communications sans fil. Par exemple, certains modes de réalisation peuvent concerner la fourniture de solutions pour activer la prise en charge de services informatiques dans des scénarios où des opérateurs de réseau fournissent à la fois des services informatiques et de connectivité dans un réseau 5G à des utilisateurs finaux, ainsi que dans des scénarios dans lesquels des services informatiques sont fournis par des ASP (fournisseurs de services d'application), des CSP (fournisseurs de services en nuage) ou des ECSP (fournisseurs de services d'informatique périphérique). D'autres modes de réalisation peuvent être décrits et/ou revendiqués.
PCT/US2021/044048 2020-08-03 2021-07-30 Activation de service informatique pour des réseaux cellulaires de prochaine génération WO2022031556A1 (fr)

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