WO2021259310A1 - 空中下载更新方法、更新服务器、终端设备和物联网系统 - Google Patents

空中下载更新方法、更新服务器、终端设备和物联网系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2021259310A1
WO2021259310A1 PCT/CN2021/101769 CN2021101769W WO2021259310A1 WO 2021259310 A1 WO2021259310 A1 WO 2021259310A1 CN 2021101769 W CN2021101769 W CN 2021101769W WO 2021259310 A1 WO2021259310 A1 WO 2021259310A1
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Prior art keywords
update
data
terminal device
key
encrypted
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PCT/CN2021/101769
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
关红涛
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京东方科技集团股份有限公司
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Priority to US17/778,193 priority Critical patent/US12050901B2/en
Publication of WO2021259310A1 publication Critical patent/WO2021259310A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W4/00—Services specially adapted for wireless communication networks; Facilities therefor
    • H04W4/70—Services for machine-to-machine communication [M2M] or machine type communication [MTC]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F8/00—Arrangements for software engineering
    • G06F8/60—Software deployment
    • G06F8/65—Updates
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G16—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR SPECIFIC APPLICATION FIELDS
    • G16Y—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS [IoT]
    • G16Y10/00—Economic sectors
    • G16Y10/75—Information technology; Communication
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G16—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR SPECIFIC APPLICATION FIELDS
    • G16Y—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR THE INTERNET OF THINGS [IoT]
    • G16Y40/00—IoT characterised by the purpose of the information processing
    • G16Y40/50—Safety; Security of things, users, data or systems
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
    • H04L67/125—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks involving control of end-device applications over a network
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0822—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
    • H04L9/3073—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves involving pairings, e.g. identity based encryption [IBE], bilinear mappings or bilinear pairings, e.g. Weil or Tate pairing
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/043—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA] using a trusted network node as an anchor
    • H04W12/0433—Key management protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/22—Processing or transfer of terminal data, e.g. status or physical capabilities
    • H04W8/24—Transfer of terminal data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W8/00—Network data management
    • H04W8/22—Processing or transfer of terminal data, e.g. status or physical capabilities
    • H04W8/24—Transfer of terminal data
    • H04W8/245—Transfer of terminal data from a network towards a terminal
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/80—Wireless
    • H04L2209/805—Lightweight hardware, e.g. radio-frequency identification [RFID] or sensor

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to the technical field of the Internet of Things, and in particular to an air download update method, an update server, terminal equipment, and an Internet of Things system.
  • the embodiments of the present disclosure provide an over-the-air download update method, which is applied to an update server in an Internet of Things system, the Internet of Things system includes an update server and a terminal device, and the update server is in communication connection with the terminal device ,
  • the method includes the following steps:
  • the encrypted update data is sent to the terminal device, so that the terminal device uses the decrypted update key to decrypt the update data, and uses the update data to perform data update.
  • the method before sending the encrypted update data to the terminal device, the method further includes:
  • the update method further includes receiving a heartbeat packet periodically sent by the terminal device, and when the update server receives the heartbeat packet of the terminal device, sending the encrypted public key to the terminal device.
  • the update server sends the encrypted update key to the terminal device when receiving the heartbeat packet sent by the terminal device.
  • the embodiments of the present disclosure also provide an over-the-air download update method, which is applied to a terminal device in an Internet of Things system.
  • the Internet of Things system includes an update server and a terminal device.
  • the update server communicates with the terminal device. Connecting, the method includes the following steps:
  • the method further includes:
  • the integrity of the update data is verified according to the first integrity data and the second integrity data, wherein the first integrity verification data is generated by the update server according to the update data and sent to the The terminal equipment.
  • using the update data to update data includes:
  • the update data passes the integrity check, the update data is used to update the data.
  • the update method further includes periodically sending a heartbeat packet to the update server.
  • the embodiments of the present disclosure also provide an update server, which is applied to an Internet of Things system, the Internet of Things further includes a terminal device, the update server is in communication connection with the terminal device, and the update server includes:
  • the first generation module is used to generate matching encrypted public key and encrypted private key
  • the first sending module is configured to send the encrypted public key to the terminal device
  • the first encryption module is configured to generate an update secret key, and encrypt the update secret key by the encryption private key;
  • a second sending module configured to send the encrypted update key to the terminal device, so that the terminal device can use the encrypted public key to decrypt the encrypted update key
  • the second encryption module is used to encrypt the update data by using the update secret key
  • the third sending module is configured to send the encrypted update data to the terminal device, so that the terminal device uses the decrypted update key to decrypt the update data, and use the update data to update data .
  • it also includes:
  • the second generation module is used to generate the first integrity check data corresponding to the update data
  • the fourth sending module is configured to send the first integrity check data to the terminal device.
  • the first sending module is configured to send the encrypted public key to the terminal device when a heartbeat packet of the terminal device is received.
  • the second sending module is configured to send the encrypted update key to the terminal device when receiving the heartbeat packet sent by the terminal device.
  • the embodiments of the present disclosure also provide a terminal device, which is applied to an Internet of Things system, the Internet of Things system further includes an update server, the update server is in communication connection with the terminal device, and the terminal device includes:
  • the first receiving module is configured to receive the encrypted public key sent by the update server
  • the second receiving module is configured to receive an update secret key sent by the update server, where the update secret key is encrypted by the update service area using an encryption private key that matches the encryption public key;
  • the first decryption module is configured to use the encrypted public key to decrypt the encrypted updated secret key
  • the third receiving module is configured to receive update data sent by the update server, where the update data is encrypted by the update server using the update secret key;
  • the second decryption module is configured to decrypt the update data by using the decrypted update secret key
  • the update module is used to update the data by using the update data.
  • it also includes:
  • the verification module is configured to verify the integrity of the update data according to the first integrity data and the second integrity data, wherein the first integrity verification data is the update server according to the update The data is generated and sent to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device further includes a sending module, configured to periodically send a heartbeat packet to the update server.
  • a sending module configured to periodically send a heartbeat packet to the update server.
  • the embodiments of the present disclosure also provide an Internet of Things system, including an update server and a terminal device, the update server is the update server described in any one of the above, and the terminal device is any one of the above Terminal equipment.
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of an OTA update method provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 2 is another flowchart of the OTA update method provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 3 is another flowchart of the OTA update method provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • Figure 4 is a schematic structural diagram of an update server provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • Fig. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal device provided by an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • the present disclosure provides an OTA (Over The Air) update method, which is applied to an Internet of Things system.
  • the Internet of Things system includes an update server and a terminal device. Ways to send update data to the terminal device.
  • the OTA update method includes the following steps. Steps 101 to 106 are executed in the update server.
  • Step 101 Generate a matching encryption public key and encryption private key.
  • an asymmetric encryption algorithm such as RSA is used to generate a matching encryption public key and encryption private key.
  • the encryption public key and encryption private key can be further updated regularly. Specifically, the encryption private key and the encryption public key can be changed periodically. For example, the validity period of each group of encryption public key and encryption private key is set to one week, ten days, etc., and the group of encryption public key and encryption private key It is only valid within the validity period; for another example, each time OTA upgrades, a set of encrypted public keys and encrypted private keys that are different from the previous ones can be randomly generated in the update server to improve the security of the update.
  • Step 102 Send the encrypted public key to the terminal device.
  • the update server After the connection between the terminal device and the update server is established, the update server sends the encrypted public key to the terminal device. Specifically, the update server may send the encrypted public key when receiving the heartbeat packet of the terminal device.
  • the heartbeat packet may be periodically sent by the terminal device to the server, and is usually used to maintain a long connection between the terminal device and the server.
  • the terminal device may send a heartbeat request to the server through the persistent connection channel every predetermined period, and the encrypted public key may be included in the heartbeat request.
  • Step 103 Generate an update secret key, and encrypt the update secret key by the encryption private key.
  • step 103 may be performed after step 102 or before step 102.
  • the update key is generated by symmetric encryption such as AES in the update server, and the update key is encrypted with the encryption private key.
  • Step 104 Send the encrypted update key to the terminal device, so that the terminal device uses the encryption public key to decrypt the encrypted update key.
  • the update key is encrypted and sent to the terminal device, in this process, if an unauthorized user obtains the update key, then the unauthorized user obtains the encrypted update key.
  • the terminal device After receiving the encrypted update key, the terminal device can decrypt the update key through the encrypted public key to obtain the true update key.
  • the update server may send the encrypted update key to the IoT terminal when receiving the heartbeat packet sent by the terminal.
  • Step 105 Use the update secret key to encrypt the update data.
  • the update data When the update data needs to be sent to the terminal device, the update data is encrypted with the unencrypted update key. In this way, if an unauthorized user obtains the update data during the transmission of the update data, what it obtains is also encrypted Update data reduces the possibility of update data leakage.
  • step 105 may be performed at any time before sending the update data to the terminal device after the update key is generated, for example, it may be performed before or after step 104.
  • Step 106 Send the encrypted update data to the terminal device, so that the terminal device uses the decrypted update key to decrypt the update data, and uses the update data to update the data.
  • the encrypted update data is sent to the terminal device.
  • the terminal device first decrypts the update key with the encrypted public key, then uses the decrypted update key to decrypt the more detailed data, and finally , The terminal device uses the obtained update data to update the data.
  • the method further includes:
  • the first integrity data can be obtained by calculating the MD5 value of the updated data through the MD5 algorithm. Since the MD5 value is unique, the MD5 value calculated for the same file is the same. In this way, for the same update data, the MD5 value calculated in the update server and in the terminal device is also the same.
  • the first integrity check data of the update data is updated in the update server, and then sent to the terminal device. Further, the integrity data of the received update data is calculated in the terminal device, which is the same as the above-mentioned first integrity check. The data is compared. If the two are the same, it proves that there is no problem with the update data received by the terminal device; otherwise, it proves that the received update data may be damaged or tampered. In this case, the update server needs to send the correct data to the terminal again. Updated data.
  • the update data is encrypted with the update secret key
  • the update server is further used to encrypt the update secret key of the update data with the encryption private key
  • the terminal device is used to decrypt the update data with the encryption public key.
  • update data loss it can also prevent other illegal users from directly obtaining update data, which helps reduce the possibility of update data leakage.
  • the update secret key is also encrypted by the encryption public key and the encryption private key. Even if an unauthorized user obtains the update secret key, in the case of not obtaining the encryption public key Also, it is impossible to directly decrypt the update data to obtain the update data, which further improves the security.
  • Steps 201 to 206 in this embodiment are executed in the terminal device.
  • Step 201 Receive the encrypted public key sent by the update server.
  • the encrypted public key received in this embodiment is the encrypted public key generated in step 101 of the foregoing embodiment.
  • the update server uses the encrypted private key to encrypt the update secret key.
  • Step 202 Receive an update secret key sent by the update server, where the update secret key is encrypted by the update service area using an encryption private key that matches the encryption public key.
  • the terminal device receives the update key sent by the update server, and the update key is encrypted in the update server through step 103 described above.
  • Step 203 Use the encrypted public key to decrypt the encrypted updated secret key.
  • the encrypted public key After receiving the encrypted public key and the encrypted update key issued by the update server, the encrypted public key is used to decrypt the update key, and the decrypted update key can be obtained.
  • Step 204 Receive update data sent by the update server, where the update data is encrypted by the update server using the update secret key.
  • the update server receives the update data encrypted by using the update secret key in step 105 above. Since the update data is encrypted, even if it is obtained by an unauthorized user during the transmission process, it is an encrypted file and cannot be directly obtained. Original file.
  • Step 205 Use the decrypted update key to decrypt the update data.
  • the updated data is decrypted by using the decrypted update key to obtain update data that can be used for data update.
  • Step 206 Use the update data to update data.
  • the update operation can be completed by erasing the original data and updating the firmware of the update program.
  • step 205 the method further includes:
  • the integrity of the update data is verified according to the first integrity data and the second integrity data, wherein the first integrity verification data is generated by the update server according to the update data and sent to the The terminal equipment.
  • the first integrity data is calculated and generated by the update server according to the sent update data
  • the second integrity data is calculated and generated by the terminal device according to the decrypted update data.
  • the first integrity data and the second integrity data should be the same.
  • step 206 may include:
  • the update data passes the integrity check, the update data is used to update the data.
  • the update data passes the integrity check, that is, when the first integrity data and the second integrity data are consistent, it is proved that there is no abnormality in the update data received by the terminal device, and the update data can be used for data update .
  • the technical solution of this embodiment can be summarized as: generating a matching encryption public key and encryption private key in a finer server 301, and it is also necessary to generate an update secret key X in a finer server 301, using encryption
  • the private key is the update secret key X encryption, a more detailed secret key Y is obtained, and then the encrypted public key and the update secret key Y are sent to the terminal device 302.
  • the terminal device 302 decrypts the update key Y with the received encrypted public key, and obtains the update key X.
  • the required update data is update data A.
  • the update data A is encrypted with the update secret key X to obtain the update data B.
  • the integrity data C of the updated data A needs to be calculated. Further, the update data B and the integrity data C are sent to the terminal device 302.
  • the terminal device 302 After receiving the update data B, the terminal device 302 uses the update key X to decrypt the update data B, and can obtain the update data A. Further, in the terminal device 302, the integrity data D of the update data A is calculated.
  • the updated data A can be used to update the data of the terminal device 302. If the integrity data C and the integrity data D are inconsistent, it is proved that the updated data exists If it is abnormal, it is reported that the update of the finer server 301 has failed, and the update step needs to be performed again.
  • the embodiment of the present disclosure also provides an update server, which is applied to an Internet of Things system, the Internet of Things further includes a terminal device, the update server is in communication connection with the terminal device, and the update server 400 includes:
  • the first generating module 401 is used to generate a matching encrypted public key and encrypted private key
  • the first sending module 402 is configured to send the encrypted public key to the terminal device
  • the first encryption module 403 is configured to generate an update secret key, and encrypt the update secret key by the encryption private key;
  • the second sending module 404 is configured to send the encrypted update key to the terminal device, so that the terminal device can use the encrypted public key to decrypt the encrypted update key;
  • the second encryption module 405 is configured to encrypt the update data by using the update secret key
  • the third sending module 406 is configured to send the encrypted update data to the terminal device, so that the terminal device uses the decrypted update key to decrypt the update data, and use the update data to perform data renew.
  • it also includes:
  • the second generation module is used to generate the first integrity check data corresponding to the update data
  • the fourth sending module is configured to send the first integrity check data to the terminal device.
  • the embodiment of the present disclosure also provides a terminal device, which is applied to an Internet of Things system, the Internet of Things system further includes an update server, the update server is in communication connection with the terminal device, and the terminal device 500 includes:
  • the first receiving module 501 is configured to receive the encrypted public key sent by the update server;
  • the second receiving module 502 is configured to receive an update secret key sent by the update server, where the update secret key is encrypted by the update service area using an encryption private key that matches the encryption public key;
  • the first decryption module 503 is configured to use the encrypted public key to decrypt the encrypted updated secret key
  • the third receiving module 504 is configured to receive update data sent by the update server, where the update data is encrypted by the update server using the update secret key;
  • the second decryption module 505 is configured to decrypt the update data by using the decrypted update key
  • the update module 506 is used to update the data by using the update data.
  • it also includes:
  • the verification module is configured to verify the integrity of the update data according to the first integrity data and the second integrity data, wherein the first integrity verification data is the update server according to the update The data is generated and sent to the terminal device.
  • the update module 506 is specifically configured to use the update data to update data when the update data passes the integrity check.
  • An embodiment of the present disclosure also provides an Internet of Things system, including an update server and a terminal device, the update server is the update server described in any one of the above, and the terminal device is the terminal device described in any of the above.
  • the update server, terminal device, and IoT system of this embodiment can implement each step of the above OTA update method embodiment, it can at least achieve all the above technical effects, which will not be repeated here.

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Abstract

本公开提供一种空中下载更新方法、更新服务器、终端设备和物联网系统。一实施例中的空中下载更新方法应用于物联网系统中的更新服务器，物联网系统还包括终端设备，更新服务器与终端设备通信连接，该方法包括以下步骤：生成相匹配的加密公钥和加密私钥；将加密公钥发送至终端设备；生成更新秘钥，并通过加密私钥对更新秘钥加密；将加密后的更新秘钥发送至终端设备，以供终端设备利用加密公钥对加密后的更新秘钥解密；利用更新秘钥对更新数据进行加密；将加密后的更新数据发送至终端设备，以供终端设备利用解密后的更新秘钥解密更新数据，并利用更新数据进行数据更新。

Description

空中下载更新方法、更新服务器、终端设备和物联网系统
相关申请的交叉引用
本申请主张在2020年6月23日在中国提交的中国专利申请号No.202010582268.6的优先权，其全部内容通过引用包含于此.
技术领域
本公开涉及物联网技术领域，尤其涉及一种空中下载更新方法、更新服务器、终端设备和物联网系统。
背景技术
随着产品的迭代，物联网终端产品固件程序经常有升级的需求，而采用空中下载(OTA，Over The Air)技术由于方便快捷、省时省力而被广泛应用。然而OTA升级方式方便的同时，也带来数据安全隐患，程序固件数据有被通过无线模块监听截获的风险，导致固件程序被非法盗取，所以现有空中下载更新方法的安全性较低。
发明内容
第一方面，本公开实施例提供了一种空中下载更新方法，应用于物联网系统中的更新服务器，所述物联网系统包括更新服务器和终端设备，所述更新服务器与所述终端设备通信连接，所述方法包括以下步骤：
生成相匹配的加密公钥和加密私钥；
将所述加密公钥发送至所述终端设备；
生成更新秘钥，并通过所述加密私钥对所述更新秘钥加密；
将加密后的所述更新秘钥发送至所述终端设备，以供所述终端设备利用所述加密公钥对加密后的所述更新秘钥解密；
利用所述更新秘钥对更新数据进行加密；
将加密后的更新数据发送至所述终端设备，以供所述终端设备利用解密后的所述更新秘钥解密所述更新数据，并利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
可选的，将加密后的更新数据发送至所述终端设备之前，还包括：
生成所述更新数据对应的第一完整性校验数据；
将所述第一完整性校验数据发送至所述终端设备。
可选的，该更新方法还包括接收所述终端设备周期性发送的心跳包，并且在所述更新服务器接收到终端设备的心跳包时，将所述加密公钥发送至所述终端设备。
可选的，在通过所述加密私钥对所述更新秘钥加密之后，所述更新服务器在收到终端设备发送的心跳包时，将经过加密的更新秘钥发送至所述终端设备。
第二方面，本公开实施例还提供了一种空中下载更新方法，应用于物联网系统中的终端设备，所述物联网系统包括更新服务器和终端设备，所述更新服务器与所述终端设备通信连接，所述方法包括以下步骤：
接收所述更新服务器发送的加密公钥；
接收所述更新服务器发送的更新秘钥，所述更新秘钥是所述更新服务区利用与所述加密公钥相匹配的加密私钥进行加密的；
利用所述加密公钥对加密后的所述更新秘钥解密；
接收所述更新服务器发送的更新数据，其中，所述更新数据是所述更新服务器利用所述更新秘钥进行加密的；
利用解密后的所述更新秘钥对更新数据进行解密；
利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
可选的，所述利用解密后的所述更新秘钥解密所述更新数据之后，还包括：
计算解密后的所述更新数据的第二完整性校验数据；
根据第一完整性数据和所述第二完整性数据校验所述更新数据的完整性，其中，所述第一完整性校验数据是所述更新服务器根据所述更新数据生成并发送至所述终端设备的。可选的，利用所述更新数据进行数据更新，包括：
在所述更新数据通过完整性校验的情况下，利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
可选的，该更新方法还包括周期性地向所述更新服务器发送心跳包。
第三方面，本公开实施例还提供了一种更新服务器，应用于物联网系统，所述物联网还包括终端设备，所述更新服务器与所述终端设备通信连接，所述更新服务器包括：
第一生成模块，用于生成相匹配的加密公钥和加密私钥；
第一发送模块，用于将所述加密公钥发送至所述终端设备；
第一加密模块，用于生成更新秘钥，并通过所述加密私钥对所述更新秘钥加密；
第二发送模块，用于将加密后的所述更新秘钥发送至所述终端设备，以供所述终端设备利用所述加密公钥对加密后的所述更新秘钥解密；
第二加密模块，用于利用所述更新秘钥对更新数据进行加密；
第三发送模块，用于将加密后的更新数据发送至所述终端设备，以供所述终端设备利用解密后的所述更新秘钥解密所述更新数据，并利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
可选的，还包括：
第二生成模块，用于生成所述更新数据对应的第一完整性校验数据；
第四发送模块，用于将所述第一完整性校验数据发送至所述终端设备。
可选的，所述第一发送模块用于在接收到终端设备的心跳包时，将所述加密公钥发送至所述终端设备。
可选的，所述第二发送模块用于在收到终端设备发送的心跳包时，将经过加密的更新秘钥发送至所述终端设备。
第四方面，本公开实施例还提供了一种终端设备，应用于物联网系统，所述物联网系统还包括更新服务器，所述更新服务器与所述终端设备通信连接，所述终端设备包括：
第一接收模块，用于接收所述更新服务器发送的加密公钥；
第二接收模块，用于接收所述更新服务器发送的更新秘钥，所述更新秘钥是所述更新服务区利用与所述加密公钥相匹配的加密私钥进行加密的；
第一解密模块，用于利用所述加密公钥对加密后的所述更新秘钥解密；
第三接收模块，用于接收所述更新服务器发送的更新数据，其中，所述更新数据是所述更新服务器利用所述更新秘钥进行加密的；
第二解密模块，用于利用解密后的所述更新秘钥对更新数据进行解密；
更新模块，用于利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
可选的，还包括：
计算模块，用于计算解密后的所述更新数据的第二完整性校验数据；
校验模块，用于根据第一完整性数据和所述第二完整性数据校验所述更新数据的完整性，其中，所述第一完整性校验数据是所述更新服务器根据所述更新数据生成并发送至所述终端设备的。
可选的，所述终端设备还包括发送模块，用于周期性地向所述更新服务器发送心跳包。
第六方面，本公开实施例还提供了一种物联网系统，包括更新服务器和终端设备，所述更新服务器为以上任一项所述的更新服务器，所述终端设备为以上任一项所述的终端设备。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本公开实施例的技术方案，下面将对本公开实施例描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍，显而易见地，下面描述中的附图仅仅是本公开的一些实施例，对于本领域普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动性的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1是本公开实施例提供的OTA更新方法的流程图；
图2是本公开实施例提供的OTA更新方法的又一流程图；
图3是本公开实施例提供的OTA更新方法的又一流程图；
图4是本公开实施例提供的更新服务器的结构示意图；
图5是本公开实施例提供的终端设备的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合本公开实施例中的附图，对本公开实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述，显然，所描述的实施例是本公开一部分实施例，而不是全部的实施例。基于本公开中的实施例，本领域普通技术人员在没有作出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例，都属于本公开保护的范围。
本公开提供了一种OTA(空中下载，Over The Air)更新方法，应用于物联网系统，该物联网系统包括更新服务器和终端设备，更新服务器和终端设备通信连接，以通过更新服务器通过OTA的方式向终端设备发送更新数据。
如图1所示，在一个实施例中，该OTA更新方法包括以下步骤，步骤101至步骤106在更新服务器中执行。
步骤101：生成相匹配的加密公钥和加密私钥。
在更新服务器中，利用RSA等非对称加密算法生成相匹配的加密公钥和加密私钥。
实施时，可以使用固定的加密公钥和加密私钥。为了提高安全性，则可以进一步对加密公钥和加密私钥进行定时更新。具体的，可以周期性更换加密私钥和加密公钥，例如，每一组加密公钥和加密私钥的有效期设定为一周、十天等不同的时长，该组加密公钥和加密私钥仅在该有效期内有效；又如，还可以每一次OTA升级时，在更新服务器中随机生成一组与之前不同，且相匹配的加密公钥和加密私钥，以提高对于更新的安全性。
步骤102：将所述加密公钥发送至所述终端设备。
在建立了终端设备和更新服务器的连接之后，更新服务器将加密公钥发送至终端设备，具体的，可以是更新服务器接收到终端设备的心跳包时，发送加密公钥。
所述心跳包可以是由终端设备定期向服务器发送，通常用于在终端设备和服务器之间维持长连接。在本实施例中，例如可以由终端设备每隔预定周期通过长连接通道发送一个心跳请求到服务器端，并且在该心跳请求中包括所述加密公钥。
步骤103：生成更新秘钥，并通过所述加密私钥对所述更新秘钥加密。
应当理解的是，该步骤103可以在步骤102之后进行，也可以在步骤102之前进行。
实施时，在更新服务器中以AES等对称加密生成更新秘钥，并利用加密私钥对更新秘钥进行加密。
步骤104：将加密后的所述更新秘钥发送至所述终端设备，以供所述终端设备利用所述加密公钥对加密后的所述更新秘钥解密。
由于更新秘钥在加密后发送至终端设备，所以这一过程中，如果非授权用户获得了更新秘钥，那么该非授权用户获得的是经过加密的更新秘钥。
而终端设备在接收到该加密后的更新秘钥后，能够通过加密公钥对更新秘钥进行解密而获得真实的更新秘钥。
这样，通过为更新秘钥进行加密，降低了更新数据被窃取的可能性，有助于提高安全程度。
在本公开实施例中，更新服务器可以在收到终端发送的心跳包时，将经过加密的更新秘钥发送给物联网终端。
步骤105：利用所述更新秘钥对更新数据进行加密。
在需要向终端设备下发更新数据时，利用未经加密的更新秘钥对更新数据进行加密，这样，非授权用户如果在更新数据的传输过程中获得了更新数据，其获得的也是经过加密的更新数据，降低了更新数据泄露的可能性。
应当理解的是，该步骤105可以在生成更新秘钥之后，在将更新数据发送至终端设备之前的任意时刻进行，例如在步骤104之前或步骤104之后进行均可。
步骤106：将加密后的更新数据发送至所述终端设备，以供所述终端设备利用解密后的所述更新秘钥解密所述更新数据，并利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
在完成对更新数据的加密之后，将加密后的更新数据发送至终端设备，终端设备首先利用加密公钥对更新秘钥进行解密，然后利用解密后的更新秘钥对更细数据进行解密，最后，终端设备利用所获得的更新数据进行数据更新。
作为一种可选的具体实施方式，可选的，将加密后的更新数据发送至所述终端设备之前，还包括：
生成所述更新数据对应的第一完整性校验数据；
将所述第一完整性校验数据发送至所述终端设备。
该第一完整性数据可以通过MD5算法计算更新数据的MD5值获得，由于MD5值具有唯一性，所以针对同一文件计算出的MD5值是相同的。这样，针对相同的更新数据，在更新服务器中和在终端设备中计算的MD5值也是相 同的。
这样，在更新服务器中更新数据的第一完整性校验数据，然后发送至终端设备，进一步的，在终端设备中计算所接收到的更新数据的完整性数据，与上述第一完整性校验数据相对比，如果两者一致，则证明终端设备接收到的更新数据没有问题；反之，则证明接收到的更新数据可能存在损坏或篡改，此时，需要重新由更新服务器向终端设下发正确的更新数据。
通过计算并向终端设备发送更新数据的第一完整性校验数据，能够确保终端设备接收到正确的更新数据，降低更新出现错误的可能性。
这样，本公开实施例中，利用更新秘钥对更新数据加密，并进一步在更新服务器端利用加密私钥对更新数据的更新秘钥进行加密，在终端设备端利用加密公钥对更新数据进行解密，在更新数据丢失的情况下，也能够避免其他非法用户直接获取更新数据，有助于降低更新数据泄露的可能性。
由于更新数据通过更新秘钥进行了加密，进一步的，更新秘钥还通过加密公钥和加密私钥相配合进行了加密，即使非授权用户获得了更新秘钥，在未获得加密公钥的情况下，也无法直接对更新数据进行解密获得更新数据，进一步提高了安全性。
本实施例中的步骤201至步骤206在终端设备中执行。
步骤201：接收所述更新服务器发送的加密公钥。
本实施例中所接收到的加密公钥是上述实施例步骤101中生成的加密公钥，实施时，更新服务器利用加密私钥对更新秘钥进行加密。
步骤202：接收所述更新服务器发送的更新秘钥，所述更新秘钥是所述更新服务区利用与所述加密公钥相匹配的加密私钥进行加密的。
进一步的，终端设备接收更新服务器发送的更新秘钥，该更新秘钥在更新服务器中，通过上述步骤103进行了加密。
步骤203：利用所述加密公钥对加密后的所述更新秘钥解密。
在接收到更新服务器下发的加密公钥和加密后的更新秘钥后，利用加密公钥对更新秘钥进行解密，能够获得解密后的更新秘钥。
步骤204：接收所述更新服务器发送的更新数据，其中，所述更新数据是所述更新服务器利用所述更新秘钥进行加密的。
进一步的，接收更新服务器通过上述步骤105中利用更新秘钥进行加密的更新数据，由于该更新数据是经过加密的，所以传输过程中即使被非授权用户获取，也是经过加密的文件，无法直接获取原文件。
步骤205：利用解密后的所述更新秘钥对更新数据进行解密。
最后，利用解密后的更新秘钥对更新数据进行解密，能够获得可以用于进行数据更新的更新数据。
步骤206：利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
实施时，可以通过擦除原有数据，并进行更新程序固件更新，完成本次更新操作。
作为一种可选的具体实施方式，在步骤205之后，还包括：
计算解密后的所述更新数据的第二完整性校验数据；
根据第一完整性数据和所述第二完整性数据校验所述更新数据的完整性，其中，所述第一完整性校验数据是所述更新服务器根据所述更新数据生成并发送至所述终端设备的。
本实施例中，第一完整性数据是更新服务器根据发送的更新数据计算生成的，第二完整性数据是终端设备根据解密后的更新数据计算生成的，在更新数据未发生改变时，第一完整性数据和第二完整性数据应当是相同的，通过对第一完整性数据和第二完整性数据进行对比，能够校验更新数据是否发生变化，以避免利用错误的更新数据进行更新而可能造成的不利影响。
进一步的，上述步骤206可以包括：
在所述更新数据通过完整性校验的情况下，利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
在更新数据通过完整性校验的情况下，也就是第一完整性数据和第二完整性数据一致的情况下，证明终端设备接收到的更新数据不存在异常，可以利用该更新数据进行数据更新。
如图3所示，本实施例的技术方案可以概括为，在更细服务器301中生成相匹配的加密公钥和加密私钥，还需要在更细服务器301中生成更新秘钥X，利用加密私钥为更新秘钥X加密，获得更细秘钥Y，接下来将加密公钥和更新秘钥Y发送到终端设备302。
终端设备302利用接收到的加密公钥对更新秘钥Y解密，获得更新秘钥X。
进一步的，在一次OTA更新过程中，所需的更新数据为更新数据A，在更细服务器301中，利用更新秘钥X为该更新数据A加密，获得更新数据B。
此外，还需要计算更新数据A的完整性数据C。进一步的，将更新数据B和完整性数据C发送至终端设备302。
终端设备302在接收到更新数据B后，利用更新秘钥X为更新数据B解密，能够获得更新数据A，进一步的，在终端设备302中，计算更新数据A的完整性数据D。
如果完整性数据C和完整性数据D一致，则证明更新数据无异常，可以利用该更新数据A对终端设备302进行更新数据，如果完整性数据C和完整性数据D不一致，则证明更新数据存在异常，此时上报更细服务器301更新失败，需要重新进行更新步骤。
本公开实施例还提供了一种更新服务器，应用于物联网系统，所述物联网还包括终端设备，所述更新服务器与所述终端设备通信连接，所述更新服务器400包括：
第一生成模块401，用于生成相匹配的加密公钥和加密私钥；
第一发送模块402，用于将所述加密公钥发送至所述终端设备；
第一加密模块403，用于生成更新秘钥，并通过所述加密私钥对所述更新秘钥加密；
第二发送模块404，用于将加密后的所述更新秘钥发送至所述终端设备，以供所述终端设备利用所述加密公钥对加密后的所述更新秘钥解密；
第二加密模块405，用于利用所述更新秘钥对更新数据进行加密；
第三发送模块406，用于将加密后的更新数据发送至所述终端设备，以供所述终端设备利用解密后的所述更新秘钥解密所述更新数据，并利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
可选的，还包括：
第二生成模块，用于生成所述更新数据对应的第一完整性校验数据；
第四发送模块，用于将所述第一完整性校验数据发送至所述终端设备。
本公开实施例还提供了一种终端设备，应用于物联网系统，所述物联网系统还包括更新服务器，所述更新服务器与所述终端设备通信连接，所述终端设备500包括：
第一接收模块501，用于接收所述更新服务器发送的加密公钥；
第二接收模块502，用于接收所述更新服务器发送的更新秘钥，所述更新秘钥是所述更新服务区利用与所述加密公钥相匹配的加密私钥进行加密的；
第一解密模块503，用于利用所述加密公钥对加密后的所述更新秘钥解密；
第三接收模块504，用于接收所述更新服务器发送的更新数据，其中，所述更新数据是所述更新服务器利用所述更新秘钥进行加密的；
第二解密模块505，用于利用解密后的所述更新秘钥对更新数据进行解密；
更新模块506，用于利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
可选的，还包括：
计算模块，用于计算解密后的所述更新数据的第二完整性校验数据；
校验模块，用于根据第一完整性数据和所述第二完整性数据校验所述更新数据的完整性，其中，所述第一完整性校验数据是所述更新服务器根据所述更新数据生成并发送至所述终端设备的。
可选的，所述更新模块506，具体用于在所述更新数据通过完整性校验的情况下，利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
本公开实施例还提供了一种物联网系统，包括更新服务器和终端设备，所述更新服务器为以上任一项所述的更新服务器，所述终端设备为以上任一项所述的终端设备。
由于本实施例的更新服务器、终端设备和物联网系统能够实现上述OTA更新方法实施例的各个步骤，因此至少能实现上述全部技术效果，此处不再赘述。
以上所述，仅为本公开的具体实施方式，但本公开的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本公开揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到变化或替换，都应涵盖在本公开的保护范围之内。因此，本公开的保护 范围应以权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (16)

  1. 一种空中下载更新方法，应用于物联网系统中的更新服务器，所述物联网系统包括更新服务器和终端设备，所述更新服务器与所述终端设备通信连接，所述方法包括以下步骤：
    生成相匹配的加密公钥和加密私钥；
    将所述加密公钥发送至所述终端设备；
    生成更新秘钥，并通过所述加密私钥对所述更新秘钥加密；
    将加密后的所述更新秘钥发送至所述终端设备，以供所述终端设备利用所述加密公钥对加密后的所述更新秘钥解密；
    利用所述更新秘钥对更新数据进行加密；
    将加密后的更新数据发送至所述终端设备，以供所述终端设备利用解密后的所述更新秘钥解密所述更新数据，并利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
  2. 如权利要求1所述的空中下载更新方法，其中，将加密后的更新数据发送至所述终端设备之前，还包括：
    生成所述更新数据对应的第一完整性校验数据；
    将所述第一完整性校验数据发送至所述终端设备。
  3. 如权利要求1或2所述的空中下载更新方法，还包括接收所述终端设备周期性发送的心跳包，并且在所述更新服务器接收到终端设备的心跳包时，将所述加密公钥发送至所述终端设备。
  4. 如权利要求3所述的空中下载更新方法，其中在通过所述加密私钥对所述更新秘钥加密之后，所述更新服务器在收到终端设备发送的心跳包时，将经过加密的更新秘钥发送至所述终端设备。
  5. 一种空中下载更新方法，应用于物联网系统中的终端设备，所述物联网系统包括更新服务器和终端设备，所述更新服务器与所述终端设备通信连接，所述方法包括以下步骤：
    接收所述更新服务器发送的加密公钥；
    接收所述更新服务器发送的更新秘钥，所述更新秘钥是所述更新服务区利用与所述加密公钥相匹配的加密私钥进行加密的；
    利用所述加密公钥对加密后的所述更新秘钥解密；
    接收所述更新服务器发送的更新数据，其中，所述更新数据是所述更新服务器利用所述更新秘钥进行加密的；
    利用解密后的所述更新秘钥对更新数据进行解密；
    利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
  6. 如权利要求5所述的空中下载更新方法，其中，所述利用解密后的所述更新秘钥解密所述更新数据之后，还包括：
    计算解密后的所述更新数据的第二完整性校验数据；
    根据第一完整性数据和所述第二完整性数据校验所述更新数据的完整性，其中，所述第一完整性校验数据是所述更新服务器根据所述更新数据生成并发送至所述终端设备的。
  7. 如权利要求6所述的空中下载更新方法，其中，利用所述更新数据进行数据更新，包括：
    在所述更新数据通过完整性校验的情况下，利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
  8. 如权利要求5至7中任一项所述的空中下载更新方法，还包括周期性地向所述更新服务器发送心跳包。
  9. 一种更新服务器，应用于物联网系统，所述物联网系统还包括终端设备，所述更新服务器与所述终端设备通信连接，所述更新服务器包括：
    第一生成模块，用于生成相匹配的加密公钥和加密私钥；
    第一发送模块，用于将所述加密公钥发送至所述终端设备；
    第一加密模块，用于生成更新秘钥，并通过所述加密私钥对所述更新秘钥加密；
    第二发送模块，用于将加密后的所述更新秘钥发送至所述终端设备，以供所述终端设备利用所述加密公钥对加密后的所述更新秘钥解密；
    第二加密模块，用于利用所述更新秘钥对更新数据进行加密；
    第三发送模块，用于将加密后的更新数据发送至所述终端设备，以供所述终端设备利用解密后的所述更新秘钥解密所述更新数据，并利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
  10. 如权利要求9所述的更新服务器，还包括：
    第二生成模块，用于生成所述更新数据对应的第一完整性校验数据；
    第四发送模块，用于将所述第一完整性校验数据发送至所述终端设备。
  11. 如权利要求9或10所述的更新服务器，其中所述第一发送模块用于在接收到终端设备的心跳包时，将所述加密公钥发送至所述终端设备。
  12. 如权利要求11所述的更新服务器，其中所述第二发送模块用于在收到终端设备发送的心跳包时，将经过加密的更新秘钥发送至所述终端设备。
  13. 一种终端设备，应用于物联网系统，所述物联网系统还包括更新服务器，所述更新服务器与所述终端设备通信连接，所述终端设备包括：
    第一接收模块，用于接收所述更新服务器发送的加密公钥；
    第二接收模块，用于接收所述更新服务器发送的更新秘钥，所述更新秘钥是所述更新服务区利用与所述加密公钥相匹配的加密私钥进行加密的；
    第一解密模块，用于利用所述加密公钥对加密后的所述更新秘钥解密；
    第三接收模块，用于接收所述更新服务器发送的更新数据，其中，所述更新数据是所述更新服务器利用所述更新秘钥进行加密的；
    第二解密模块，用于利用解密后的所述更新秘钥对更新数据进行解密；
    更新模块，用于利用所述更新数据进行数据更新。
  14. 如权利要求13所述的终端设备，还包括：
    计算模块，用于计算解密后的所述更新数据的第二完整性校验数据；
    校验模块，用于根据第一完整性数据和所述第二完整性数据校验所述更新数据的完整性，其中，所述第一完整性校验数据是所述更新服务器根据所述更新数据生成并发送至所述终端设备的。
  15. 如权利要求14所述的终端设备，还包括发送模块，用于周期性地向所述更新服务器发送心跳包。
  16. 一种物联网系统，包括更新服务器和终端设备，所述更新服务器为权利要求9或10所述的更新服务器，所述终端设备为权利要求13或14所述的终端设备。
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