WO2021243629A1

WO2021243629A1 - Secure positioning method and apparatus for wireless sensor network, device, and storage medium

Info

Publication number: WO2021243629A1
Application number: PCT/CN2020/094284
Authority: WO
Inventors: 谢宁; 陈逸枞; 李卓远
Original assignee: 深圳大学
Priority date: 2020-06-04
Filing date: 2020-06-04
Publication date: 2021-12-09
Also published as: CN112205021A; CN112205021B

Abstract

Disclosed are a secure positioning method and apparatus for a wireless sensor network, a device, and a storage medium. The method comprises: acquiring a first receiver noise extracted when a target node receives a challenge signal, a second receiver noise extracted when an anchor point receives a response signal, and an analytic result of the response signal obtained from the anchor point; determining a target distance between the anchor point and the target node; determining an attack detection result according to the analytic result of the response signal obtained from the anchor point, the second receiver noise, the first receiver noise, and a preset detection threshold value; and if the attack detection result indicates that there is no ranging attack, positioning the target node according to the target distance, otherwise, discarding the target distance.

Description

Safe positioning method, device, equipment and storage medium of wireless sensor network

Technical field

The embodiments of the present application relate to the technical field of wireless network communication, for example, to a secure positioning method, device, device, and storage medium of a wireless sensor network.

Background technique

Wireless sensor networks have a wide range of applications in military and civilian fields. The location information of sensor nodes is very important for environmental monitoring and tracking of target nodes. Although the location information of sensor nodes can be provided through the Global Positioning System (GPS), the performance of GPS is very sensitive to the environment, and the cost is too high for low-cost sensor nodes. Therefore, in some applications, the system locates target nodes through wireless transmission between anchor target nodes, for example, based on Received Signal Strength (RSS), Time Of Arrival (ToA), and Time Of Arrival (Based on the target radiation source) and Angle of Arrival (AoA), etc.

The security of wireless sensor networks is an important issue, and the openness of wireless sensor networks causes security vulnerabilities, the distributed nature of sensor positioning schemes, and the possibility of multiple attackers (especially coordinated attackers), which make the wireless sensor network It is challenging to ensure the security of the positioning scheme in the medium. Attack defense schemes for positioning schemes often introduce higher communication overhead, and their security depends on the ability of the attacker. The high communication overhead of the traditional scheme has led to the following limitations. First, the battery life of all sensor nodes needs to be high enough; second, the storage space of each sensor node must be large enough; third, in the case of mobile sensor nodes, the timeliness is relatively high. Difference. In addition, if the attacker has enough energy to launch more attacks, even if a higher communication overhead is introduced, the traditional scheme will fail. To sum up, the wireless sensor network in the related technology cannot meet the requirements for ensuring positioning safety.

Summary of the invention

The embodiments of the present application provide a secure positioning method, device, equipment, and storage medium for a wireless sensor network to optimize the secure positioning scheme of the wireless sensor, and reduce communication overhead on the basis of ensuring secure positioning.

The embodiment of the present application provides a secure positioning method for a wireless sensor network, including:

Obtain the first receiver noise extracted when the target node receives the challenge signal, the second receiver noise extracted when the anchor point receives the response signal, and the analysis result of the anchor point on the response signal; and determine the anchor point and the response signal. The target distance between the target nodes;

Determine an attack detection result according to the analysis result of the response signal by the anchor point, the second receiver noise, the first receiver noise, and a preset detection threshold;

If the attack detection result is that there is no ranging attack, the target node is located according to the target distance; otherwise, the target distance is discarded.

An embodiment of the present application also provides a secure positioning device for a wireless sensor network, including:

The information acquisition module is configured to acquire the first receiver noise extracted when the target node receives the challenge signal, the second receiver noise extracted when the anchor point receives the response signal, and the analysis result of the anchor point on the response signal; and determine The target distance between the anchor point and the target node;

An attack detection module, configured to determine an attack detection result according to the analysis result of the response signal by the anchor point, the second receiver noise, the first receiver noise, and a preset detection threshold;

The positioning module is configured to locate the target node according to the target distance if the attack detection result is that there is no ranging attack; otherwise, discard the target distance.

An embodiment of the present application also provides a device, which includes:

One or more processors;

Storage device for storing one or more programs;

When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors realize the secure positioning method of the wireless sensor network as described above.

The embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the program is executed by a processor, the secure positioning method of the wireless sensor network as described above is realized.

The secure positioning solution for wireless sensors provided by the embodiments of the present application obtains the first receiver noise extracted when the target node receives the challenge signal, the second receiver noise extracted when the anchor point receives the response signal, and the analysis result of the anchor point on the response signal ; And determine the target distance between the anchor point and the target node; determine the attack detection result according to the anchor point’s analysis result of the response signal, the second receiver noise, the first receiver noise and the preset detection threshold; if the attack is detected The result is that there is no ranging attack, the target node is located according to the target distance; otherwise, the target distance is discarded. Using the above technical solution, by extracting the receiver noise in the wireless transmission process, and measuring the distance based on the receiver noise through one measurement, the detection of the ranging attack can be realized. Based on the detection result of the attack, the wireless sensor node is located, which is the basis for ensuring safe positioning. This saves communication overhead.

Description of the drawings

FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a secure positioning method for a wireless sensor network provided by an embodiment of this application;

2 is a schematic diagram of a secure positioning method for a wireless sensor network provided by an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a related technology positioning method provided by an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a range-finding reduction attack provided by an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a range increase attack provided by an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of the location of a range-finding reduction attack provided by an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of the location of a range-finding augmentation attack provided by an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a two-way positioning provided by an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 9 is a flowchart of another method for secure positioning of a wireless sensor network according to an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of a wireless sensor network system provided by an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 11 is a schematic diagram of a comparison between experiment and theory provided by the embodiments of this application;

FIG. 12 is a schematic diagram of a relationship between detection performance and measurement times provided by an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 13 is a schematic diagram of a relationship between communication overhead and the number of anchor points according to an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 14 is a schematic diagram of the relationship between communication overhead and the number of measurements provided by an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 15 is a schematic diagram of the relationship between the performance overhead ratio and the number of measurements provided by an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 16 is a schematic structural diagram of a secure positioning device for a wireless sensor network provided by an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 17 is a schematic structural diagram of a device provided by an embodiment of this application.

detailed description

The application will be described below with reference to the drawings and embodiments. The specific embodiments described here are only used to explain the application, but not to limit the application. For ease of description, the drawings only show a part of the structure related to the present application, but not all of the structure.

It should be mentioned before discussing the exemplary embodiments that some exemplary embodiments are described as processes or methods depicted as flowcharts. Although the flowchart describes the steps as sequential processing, many of the steps can be implemented in parallel, concurrently, or simultaneously. In addition, the order of the steps can be rearranged. The processing may be terminated when its operation is completed, but may also have additional steps not included in the drawings. The processing may correspond to methods, functions, procedures, subroutines, subroutines, and so on.

Figure 1 is a flowchart of a secure positioning method for a wireless sensor network provided by an embodiment of this application. This embodiment may be suitable for realizing the secure positioning of wireless sensors. The method can be executed by a secure positioning device of a wireless sensor network. The device can be implemented in software and/or hardware, and the device can be configured in an electronic device, such as a server or a terminal device. As shown in Figure 1, the method can include:

S110. Obtain the first receiver noise extracted when the target node receives the challenge signal, the second receiver noise extracted when the anchor point receives the response signal, and the analysis result of the anchor point on the response signal; and determine the distance between the anchor point and the target node Target distance.

Among them, the target node and the anchor point refer to the sensor node in the wireless sensor network. The anchor point is used to determine the location of the target node. Sure. The challenge signal is a signal sent by the anchor to the target node, and the response signal is a signal returned to the anchor after the target node receives the challenge signal. The first receiver noise is the receiver noise extracted when the target node receives the challenge signal, and the second receiver noise is the receiver noise extracted when the anchor point receives the response signal.

In this embodiment, the response signal is obtained by the target node through message connection of the challenge signal, the first receiver noise variance corresponding to the first receiver noise, and the encrypted information. The encrypted information is obtained by using a hash function to compare the challenge signal and the first receiver. The message concatenation result of the machine noise variance is encrypted. The challenge signal can be composed of random numbers based on the set capacity, and the set capacity can be set according to actual conditions.

In this embodiment, the anchor can send a challenge signal to the target node. After receiving the challenge signal, the target node extracts the first receiver noise at this time; the target node determines the first receiver noise variance based on the first receiver noise calculation Use a hash function to encrypt the message connection result of the challenge signal and the noise variance of the first receiver to obtain the encrypted information, and then connect the challenge signal, the noise variance of the first receiver and the encryption result to the message to obtain the response signal and send the response The signal is sent to the anchor point; after the anchor point receives the response signal, it can extract the message connection result of the challenge signal and the receiver noise variance from the response signal, as well as the encrypted information, and use the same hash function as the target node to determine the decryption of the message connection result Information, the above-mentioned encrypted information and decrypted information are the analysis results obtained by the anchor point analysis.

After the anchor point receives the response signal, it can record the time interval, and determine the target distance between the anchor point and the target node according to the actual interval. Alternatively, the secure positioning device of the wireless sensor network can also obtain the time interval recorded by the anchor point to determine the target distance between the anchor point and the target node.

Exemplarily, refer to FIG. 2, which is a schematic diagram of a secure positioning method for a wireless sensor network according to an embodiment of the application. The anchor point A in Figure 2 sends a challenge signal D composed of random numbers based on the set capacity to the target node S. The target node S _{receives the challenge signal D at time t 1} and estimates the noise of the first receiver

The target node S generates a response signal

Where || represents the message concatenation operator,

Yes

The variance of

Expressed as a binary sequence of set capacity,

To encrypt information, the message integrity code (Messages Integrity Check, MIC) can be used for encryption in this embodiment, expressed as g _K (M), g (·) represents the hash function and K is the key, and the response signal Return to anchor point A; anchor point A _{receives the response signal at t 2} and the recording time interval is τ _AS =t ₂ -t ₁ for subsequent positioning, and anchor point A is extracted from the response signal

Calculate decrypted information by hash function

After anchor A receives the response signal, it also estimates the second receiver noise

In the traditional scheme, the distance between the anchor point and the target node is estimated by continuously measuring multiple arrival times and storing the median value, and a safe positioning scheme is proposed, as shown in Figure 3. Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a positioning method of a related technology provided by an embodiment of the application. It is assumed that the key K is shared between all anchor nodes and target nodes, and message integrity code technology is used to ensure security. MIC pairs information M is encrypted with g _K (M), g(·) represents the hash function, K is the key, and the external attacker may know the details of g(·), but does not know the key K. The function has two aspects: one is To determine the source of M, the second is to ensure the integrity of M to defend against tampering attacks.

The traditional scheme requires L times of measurement, and each measurement consists of three wireless transmissions, that is, L≥3, as shown in Figure 3. In each measurement, the anchor point A first sends a challenge signal composed of a 1-bit random number D to the target node S; the target node S _{receives the challenge signal at time t 1} , and then extracts the random number D, and the target node S sends 2l -bit D || B of the response signal to the anchor a, at time t ₂ anchor a response signal is received, a message indicating || concatenation operator, B is a l-bit random number; and the anchor point a The elapsed time is recorded as τ _AS =t ₂ -t ₁ _{and t AS of} the two-way ToA is calculated. At the same time, the anchor point A extracts D||B from the received response signal, and calculates the value of v=g _K (D||B); the target node S sends the MIC signal g _K (D||B) to Anchor point A.

The traditional scheme detects the range reduction attack and the range increase attack through two consecutive steps. In the first step, if the received MIC is the same value as v, the detection of the range reduction attack has been passed; in the second step In, after continuously measuring multiple ToAs, the a priori scheme uses the median of the number of measurements as the final measurement value to resist the range increase attack. The resistance of traditional schemes to increasing range attacks depends on the number of attacks M. If M≤(L-1)/2, the range increasing attack can be successfully detected; otherwise, its security cannot be guaranteed. Although both types of attacks have passed the detection, anchor point A can accept t _AS as a legal ToA and store it as useful positioning information to obtain the actual location of the target node. For a _{wireless sensor network including N A} anchor points, the communication overhead of the traditional scheme is 3LN _A , the number 3 means that each measurement contains three wireless transmissions, and L means the number of measurements. Therefore, when N _A or L increases, the traditional scheme Increased communication overhead. Based on the above technical problems, this embodiment takes into account that when an external attacker forwards a challenge signal, additional receiver noise will inevitably be introduced. The receiver noise is used to perform attack detection before safe positioning, and target based on the attack detection result. The safe positioning of nodes to reduce communication overhead.

S120: Determine an attack detection result according to the analysis result of the anchor point on the response signal, the second receiver noise, the first receiver noise, and a preset detection threshold.

The positioning method adopted in this embodiment is the two-way Time Of Arrival (ToA) algorithm. In the two-way ToA technology, there are two vulnerabilities in the range reduction attack and the range increase attack, and two malicious nodes initiate an attack cooperatively. , As shown in Figures 4 and 5, Figure 4 is a schematic diagram of a ranging attack provided by an embodiment of this application, and Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of a ranging increase attack provided by an embodiment of this application. Figures 6 and 7 respectively show the effects of the two attacks. Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of the location of a range reduction attack provided by an embodiment of this application, and Figure 7 is a range measurement increase attack provided by an embodiment of this application. Schematic diagram of positioning. In Figure 4, Figure 5, Figure 6 and Figure 7, S ₁ is the actual position of the target node,

Is the estimated position of the target node, A ₁ represents the anchor point, E ₁ and E ₂ represent malicious nodes, and the purpose of malicious nodes is to destroy the positioning process or reduce the positioning accuracy.

In the range reduction attack, as shown in Figure 4, E ₂ always sends an interference signal to S ₁ to prevent receiving the challenge signal _{from A 1.} When A ₁ sends a challenge signal

E ₁ received

Due to the broadcasting characteristics of wireless media. The received signal is expressed _{in E 1 as}

and

These are the channel response, the receiver noise _{from A 1} to E ₁ and E _{1 respectively.} Then, E ₁ imitates S _{1 to} send a response message

The signals received for A ₁ and A _{1 are expressed as}

Is the channel response from E ₁ to A _1. If _{the distance from E 1} to S ₁ is shorter than the distance from A ₁ to S ₁ , A ₁ will get a shorter two-way ToA value than when there is no attack, so A ₁ gets the estimated value of distance reduction, as shown in Figure 6. Shown. Finally, the error position _{of S 1 is estimated.}

In the range increase attack, as shown in Figure 5, E ₂ has different functions in the two stages. In the first stage, when A ₁ sends a challenge signal

E ₂ transmits the interference signal S ₁ , and then E ₁ receives

Expressed as

In the second stage, E ₂ remains silent and E ₁ sends directly

Given S ₁ , with a gain G _E , the received signal is expressed _{in S 1 as}

Is the channel response from E ₁ to S _1. Then S ₁ sends a response signal

Give A ₁ . Therefore, it _{takes a longer time for A 1 to} receive the response signal, and A ₁ will obtain a longer two-way ToA value than when there is no attack. Therefore, A ₁ gets the estimated value of the increase in distance, as shown in Figure 7. Finally, the error position _{of S 1 is estimated.}

Determining the attack detection result according to the analysis result of the anchor point on the response signal may include: determining the detection result of the ranging attack based on the comparison result of the decrypted information and the encrypted information in the analysis result, and the decrypted information is the anchor point using hash The function decrypts the message connection result of the challenge signal extracted from the response signal and the noise variance of the first receiver.

In one embodiment, according to the comparison result of the decrypted information and the encrypted information in the analysis result, the detection result of the range reduction attack is determined, including: if the encrypted information and the decrypted information are the same, the detection result of the range reduction attack is non-existent Range reduction attack; otherwise, the detection result of range reduction attack is that there is a range reduction attack.

Optionally, determining the attack detection result according to the second receiver noise, the first receiver noise, and a preset detection threshold may include: determining the first receiver noise variance corresponding to the first receiver noise and the second receiver The second receiver noise variance corresponding to the noise; determine the variance value of the second receiver noise variance and the first receiver noise variance; according to the comparison result of the variance value and the detection threshold, determine the detection result of the range increase attack .

In an embodiment, determining the detection result of the range increase attack based on the comparison result of the variance value and the detection threshold may include: if the variance value is less than or equal to the detection threshold, the detection result of the range increase attack is There is no range increase attack; otherwise, the detection result of the range increase attack is that there is a range increase attack.

In this embodiment, it is assumed

Indicates that there is no case of increasing the range finding attack,

Indicates that there is a situation where the distance measurement increases the attack. The challenge signal received by the target node S is

and

Respectively expressed as

and

exist

When the target node S uses the channel estimation algorithm and recovers the message

Get estimated channel response

Because the recovered error can be corrected by modulation and channel coding, it is assumed in this embodiment that the message can be completely recovered, namely

The target node S extracts the receiver noise as

The target node S calculates its variance

exist

When the target node S gets the channel response as

The extracted receiver noise is

The target node S calculates its variance

After that, since it is assumed in this embodiment that there is an attack when the anchor point A sends a challenge signal to the target node S, and there is no attack when the target node S returns a response signal, the anchor point A gets the channel response as

The extracted receiver noise is

Anchor point A calculates its variance

In an embodiment, the variance value can be

|·| represents the absolute value operator, when δ<θ, it can be determined that the detection result of the range increase attack is that there is no range increase attack, otherwise, the detection result of the range increase attack is that there is a range increase attack attack. Where θ represents the detection threshold, which can be preset based on experience and actual conditions.

In this embodiment, the target node and the anchor point can respectively determine the noise variance of the first receiver and the noise variance of the second receiver, and then send them to the secure positioning device of the wireless sensor network for subsequent attack detection and positioning, or directly send the first receiver The machine noise and the second receiver noise are sent to the safe positioning device of the wireless sensor network, and the safe positioning device of the wireless sensor network determines the first receiver noise variance and the second receiver noise variance respectively.

In this embodiment, each measurement includes two wireless transmissions. By appropriately increasing the value of the duration of the first bit of the response signal from the antenna of the target node after the last bit of the challenge signal reaches the antenna of the target node, A relatively large constant is obtained, which is large enough to complete all operations; and the attack detection method in this embodiment only requires one measurement. For a wireless sensor network, the communication overhead is 2N _A , where N _A is the number of anchor points in the wireless sensor network. Therefore, compared with traditional solutions, this solution saves communication overhead, especially in the case of large-scale wireless sensor networks or powerful external attackers.

S130: If the attack detection result is that there is no ranging attack, locate the target node according to the target distance; otherwise, discard the target distance.

If the attack detection result is that there is no range increase attack and range reduction attack, the two-way arrival time algorithm is used to locate the target node according to the target distance. If the attack detection result is that there is a range reduction attack or a range increase attack, the target distance is discarded. Optionally, after discarding the target distance, the wireless sensor network can be checked against malicious nodes to eliminate the attack, until the attack detection result is that there is no range reduction attack and range increase attack, then the target node can be located.

Among them, the two-way arrival time algorithm is an algorithm for locating sensor nodes in wireless sensor networks. Three types of sensor nodes can be included in wireless sensor networks: anchors, target nodes, and malicious nodes. The role of the anchor point is to determine the location of the target node, and the purpose of the malicious node is to destroy the positioning process or reduce the positioning accuracy. In order to determine the two-dimensional position of the target node, the number of anchor points should be greater than 3. The more anchor points, the higher the corresponding positioning accuracy, but at the same time increased communication overhead, so the number of anchor points can be set according to the actual situation.

In a wireless sensor network, all sensor nodes are randomly deployed on a plane, and the positioning process of the target node is usually completed in the network initialization phase. Suppose there are N _A anchor points, expressed as

N _S target nodes, expressed as

And malicious nodes N _E, as represented by

Where N _A ≥3. Suppose _{_{N A = 3, N S =}} 1 and N _E = 2, A ₁ at times t ₁ first transmits a challenge signal

Give S ₁ . The signal received by S _{1 is expressed as}

in

and

They are the channel response _{from A 1} to S ₁ _{and the receiver noise extracted by S 1} , assuming that all channel responses are modeled as zero-mean complex Gaussian random variables (RVs), namely

in

d is the distance between the transmitter and the receiver, λ=c/f _c is the wavelength of the transmitted signal, c is the speed of light, and f _c is the carrier frequency of the transmitted signal. G _t and G _r are the transmit antenna gain and the receive antenna gain, respectively. Suppose that the receiver noise is also modeled as a zero-mean complex Gaussian random variable, such as

It is based on hardware. The received signal-to-noise ratio (Signal Noise Ratio, SNR) is expressed as

Where P _t represents the transmission power.

S ₁ sends a response signal

Given to A ₁ , the received signal in A _{1 is} expressed as

in

and

Respectively, to channel S ₁ A ₁ A ₁ response and noise, the last bi-A ₁ calculating the ToA,

Indicates the time from the last bit of the challenge signal to the complete decoding of the _{A 1 response signal;}

Indicates the duration after the last bit of the response signal reaches the A ₁ antenna until the response signal is _{completely decoded by A 1;}

It represents the duration from the last bit of the challenge signal to the S ₁ antenna until the response signal of the first bit is _{emitted from the S 1} antenna; t _tran represents the transmission time.

and

It is equipment-based and constant during the positioning process. It can be pre-determined and pre-loaded to A1 for calibration time measurement to a certain accuracy. t _tran = 2l/b, where l is the length of the transmitted signal and b is the bandwidth of the wireless sensor network.

FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of a two-way positioning provided by an embodiment of the application. Estimate the distance between _{A 1} and S _{1 as}

Similarly, other anchor points can also estimate the distance S ₁ . Indicates that the two-dimensional positions of _{A j} and S _{j are}

and

Without loss of generality, assume that the first anchor point A ₁ acts as the leader to collect all positioning information from other anchor points. Based on the positioning information of the three anchor points, A ₁ establishes the following equation,

Through this equation, the position is the intersection formed by the three circles, as shown in Figure 8.

The secure positioning method of the wireless sensor network provided by this embodiment has the following advantages: MIC technology is used to defend against spoofing attacks and tampering attacks; it can resist range reduction attacks and range increase attacks; it has strong adaptability, because this solution guarantees sensors The security of the node under harsh conditions, such as the limited battery life of the sensor node, the limited storage space of the sensor node, and the high mobility of the sensor node; no matter how many attacks launched by an external attacker, it will not affect the security of the proposed solution .

Fig. 9 is a flowchart of another secure positioning method for a wireless sensor network provided by an embodiment of the application. On the basis of the above-mentioned embodiment, this embodiment optimizes the above-mentioned safe positioning method of the wireless sensor network. Correspondingly, the method of this embodiment includes:

S210. Obtain the first receiver noise extracted when the target node receives the challenge signal, the second receiver noise extracted when the anchor point receives the response signal, and the analysis result of the anchor point on the response signal; and determine the distance between the anchor point and the target node Target distance.

After S210, S221 and S222-S224 can be executed. The execution sequence is not limited in this embodiment, and can be set according to actual conditions.

S221: Determine the detection result of the distance measurement and reduction attack according to the comparison result of the decrypted information and the encrypted information in the analysis result.

Wherein, the decryption information is obtained by decrypting the message connection result of the challenge signal extracted from the response signal and the noise variance of the first receiver by the anchor point using a hash function.

If the encrypted information and the decrypted information are the same, the detection result of the range reduction attack is that there is no range reduction attack; otherwise, the detection result of the range reduction attack is that there is a range reduction attack.

S222: Determine the first receiver noise variance corresponding to the first receiver noise and the second receiver noise variance corresponding to the second receiver noise.

S223. Determine a variance value of the noise variance of the second receiver and the noise variance of the first receiver.

S224: Determine the detection result of the range increase attack according to the comparison result of the variance value and the detection threshold.

If the variance value is less than or equal to the detection threshold, the detection result of the range increase attack is that there is no range increase attack; otherwise, the detection result of the range increase attack is that there is a range increase attack.

S230. Whether the attack monitoring result is that there is no range increase attack and range reduction attack, if yes, execute S240; otherwise, execute S250.

S240: Use a two-way time-of-arrival algorithm to locate the target node according to the target distance.

The positioning method is as described above, and will not be repeated here.

S250: Discard the target distance.

Next, the secure positioning method of the wireless sensor network provided in this embodiment is verified through experimental simulation and analysis. This embodiment studies the experimental results of detecting distance attack performance. These conclusions are also applicable to the performance evaluation of the secure positioning scheme. There are two reasons for this. First, if all distance measurements are legal, then the final positioning result is also legal. ; Secondly, if the communication overhead in each distance measurement is very low, the overall overhead of the safe positioning scheme will also be very low. For the setting of the number of sensor nodes, the experimental results in a simple case of four nodes are provided, that is, the number of anchor points N _A =1, the number of target nodes N _S =1, and the number of malicious nodes _NE =2. When setting the position of each sensor node, assuming that all anchor points and malicious nodes are distributed on the same plane, first set the positions of four nodes, as shown in FIG. 10, which is a kind of example provided by this application. Schematic diagram of wireless sensor network system. Then let E _{1 move} on a 30m×30m plane, and set the transmission power P _t =1W and the transmitting antenna gain and the receiving antenna gain G _t =G _r =8.

In this embodiment, since channel fading and receiver noise both introduce randomness, in this embodiment, the final results of a set number of independent experimental schemes can be used for averaging, for example, the set number can be 60,000. In this embodiment, four performance indicators are taken as examples for description. The first indicator is detection probability/false alarm probability (PD/PFA). The second indicator is Area Under Curve (AUC). According to the Neyman Pearson (NP) theorem, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve is obtained, and then the ROC curve is calculated. AUC. The third indicator is communication overhead, which is defined as the total number of bits transmitted in a distance measurement. Due to the conflict between detection performance and overhead, the fourth indicator, Performance Overhead Ratio (POR), is used to compare various solutions, which is defined as the ratio of AUC to communication overhead.

An example is given through the comparison of the first indicator. Referring to Figure 11, Figure 11 is a schematic diagram of an experiment and a theoretical comparison provided by an embodiment of the application. The detection performance of this solution increases with the increase of the received noise G _E value of the malicious node. As shown in Figure 11, the setting signal The noise ratio γ=10dB, the false alarm probability threshold ε=0.01, the performance of the adopted channel estimation algorithm α=5% and the hardware performance of the malicious node β=100%. As shown in Figure 11, the closed-form expressions of PD and PFA are in full agreement with the expected simulation results. And, if the estimation error cannot be ignored, then as the G _E value increases, the detection performance of the scheme will improve. G _E value of an external attacker can not be set too small, otherwise the target node receives the signal will be very low, and even challenge the target node can not decode the signal, so that the distance becomes meaningless attack.

The detection performance of this scheme decreases as the value of α increases, α represents the performance of the adopted channel estimation algorithm, set G _E =150, and other conditions are the same as those in Fig. 11 for analysis. As the value of β increases, the detection performance improves. β represents the hardware performance of the malicious node. Set G _E =150. The other conditions are the same as those in Figure 11 for analysis. When α and β increase in this scheme, the closed-form expressions of PD and PFA are completely consistent with the expected simulation results

As the distance between the target node and the malicious node decreases, the detection performance improves. Except for the _{positions of GE} = 150 and E ₁ , the other conditions are the same as those in Figure 11 for analysis. However, if the estimation error cannot be ignored, as the distance between the target node and the malicious node decreases, the detection performance of the scheme improves.

Next, this solution will be described by comparing the solution provided in this embodiment with the traditional solution. The detection performance of this solution has nothing to do with the number of measurements, as shown in FIG. 12, which is a schematic diagram of the relationship between the detection performance and the number of measurements provided by an embodiment of this application. In addition to the same G _E = 150 and M = 3 to rest outside the conditions of FIG 11, L represents the number of measurements in the conventional scheme. It can be seen from Figure 12 that the detection performance of this scheme is independent, while the detection performance of the traditional scheme increases as the value of L increases. When L≥2M+1, the detection performance of the traditional scheme is better, that is, AUC=1; otherwise, the detection performance of the traditional scheme is poor, that is, the AUC is equal to 0.5, which is equivalent to random guessing. In the case of estimation errors, the performance of the scheme drops slightly, that is, AUC=0.992.

For different numbers of anchor points, this solution can save 72.8% of communication overhead compared with the traditional solution, and it has nothing to do with L. First, referring to FIG. 13, FIG. 13 is a schematic diagram of the relationship between communication overhead and the number of anchor points according to an embodiment of the application, and other conditions are the same as those in FIG. 11 except that L=3. As it can be seen from Figure 13, the present embodiment and the conventional scheme communication overhead increases as the number average value of N _A anchor point increases. But compared with the traditional scheme, this scheme has lower communication overhead. For example, if the IEEE 802.15.4 standard is adopted, for the case of 4 anchor points, the communication overhead of this solution is 1.067Kbytes lower than that of the traditional solution; for the case of 10 anchor points, the communication overhead of this solution is 2.666Kbytes lower than that of the traditional solution. For different numbers of anchor points, compared with the traditional solution, the communication overhead of this solution is saved by 72.8%.

Secondly, referring to Fig. 14, Fig. 14 is a schematic diagram of the relationship between communication overhead and the number of measurements provided by an embodiment of the application, and other conditions are the same as Fig. 11 _{except that N A =1.} It can be seen from Figure 14 that as the number of measurements L increases, the communication overhead of the traditional solution increases significantly, while the communication overhead of this solution is independent of L. Compared with the traditional solution, this solution has lower communication overhead, especially It is in the case of a larger L. For example, when L=3, the communication overhead of this solution is 0.267Kbytes lower than the original solution; for L=10, the communication overhead of this solution is 1.121Kbytes lower than the original solution.

The POR value of this scheme is much better than that of the traditional scheme, and the POR value has nothing to do with L. As shown in FIG. 15, FIG. 15 is a schematic diagram of the relationship between the performance overhead ratio and the number of measurements provided by an embodiment of the application, and all the conditions are the same as those in FIG. 12. POR is defined as the ratio of AUC to communication overhead. It can be seen from Figure 15 that the POR value of this scheme is much better than that of the traditional scheme. The POR value of this scheme has nothing to do with L, while the POR value of the traditional scheme decreases as the value of L increases, even if L≥2M+1. Figure 15 highlights the superiority of this program in terms of POR.

In summary, in view of the security problem of node positioning when two malicious nodes in wireless sensor networks initiate an attack cooperatively, this scheme uses the noise characteristics of external distance attacks to propose a lightweight safe positioning scheme. Compared with the traditional scheme, this scheme provides lower communication overhead and higher security. The experimental results show the superiority of this scheme.

The secure positioning solution for wireless sensors provided by the embodiments of the present application obtains the first receiver noise extracted when the target node receives the challenge signal, the second receiver noise extracted when the anchor point receives the response signal, and the analysis result of the anchor point on the response signal , And determine the target distance between the anchor point and the target node; determine the detection result of the range-finding attack according to the comparison result of the decrypted information and the encrypted information in the analysis result; determine the first receiver corresponding to the noise of the first receiver The noise variance and the second receiver noise variance corresponding to the second receiver noise, determine the variance value of the second receiver noise variance and the first receiver noise variance, and determine the measurement based on the comparison result of the variance value and the detection threshold. The detection result of the distance increase attack; if the attack detection result is that there is no range increase attack and range reduction attack, the target node is located according to the target distance; otherwise, the target distance is discarded. Using the above technical solution, by extracting the receiver noise in the wireless transmission process, and measuring the distance based on the receiver noise through one measurement, the detection of the ranging attack can be realized. Based on the detection result of the attack, the wireless sensor node is located, which is the basis for ensuring safe positioning. This saves communication overhead.

FIG. 16 is a schematic structural diagram of a secure positioning device for a wireless sensor network provided by an embodiment of this application. This embodiment may be suitable for realizing secure positioning of wireless sensors. The secure positioning device for the wireless sensor network provided by the embodiment of the present application can execute the secure positioning method for the wireless sensor network provided by any embodiment of the present application, and has functional modules and effects corresponding to the execution method. The device includes:

The information acquisition module 310 is configured to acquire the first receiver noise extracted when the target node receives the challenge signal, the second receiver noise extracted when the anchor point receives the response signal, and the analysis result of the anchor point on the response signal; and Determine the target distance between the anchor point and the target node; the attack detection module 320 is configured to analyze the response signal based on the anchor point, the second receiver noise, and the first receiver Machine noise and a preset detection threshold to determine the attack detection result; the positioning module 330 is configured to locate the target node according to the target distance if the attack detection result is that there is no ranging attack; otherwise, the The target distance is discarded.

Optionally, the response signal is obtained by the target node through message connection of the challenge signal, the first receiver noise variance corresponding to the first receiver noise, and encrypted information, and the encrypted information is obtained by The Greek function encrypts the message connection result of the challenge signal and the noise variance of the first receiver to obtain it.

Optionally, the attack detection module 320 includes: a first detection unit, and the first detection unit is configured to:

According to the comparison result of the decrypted information in the analysis result and the encrypted information, the detection result of the ranging and reduction attack is determined, and the decrypted information is that the anchor point uses the hash function to extract from the response signal The message connection result of the challenge signal and the noise variance of the first receiver is obtained by decrypting.

Optionally, the first detection unit is specifically configured to:

Optionally, the attack detection module 320 includes a second detection unit, and the second detection unit is configured to:

Determine the first receiver noise variance corresponding to the first receiver noise and the second receiver noise variance corresponding to the second receiver noise; determine the variance of the second receiver noise variance and the first receiver noise variance Variance difference value; according to the comparison result of the variance difference value and the detection threshold value, the detection result of the ranging increase attack is determined.

Optionally, the second detection unit is specifically configured to:

If the variance value is less than or equal to the detection threshold, the detection result of the range increase attack is that there is no range increase attack; otherwise, the detection result of the range increase attack is that there is range measurement Increase the attack.

Optionally, the positioning module 330 is specifically configured to:

If the attack detection result is that there is no range increase attack and range reduction attack, then a two-way arrival time algorithm is used to locate the target node according to the target distance.

The secure positioning device for the wireless sensor network provided by the embodiment of the present application can execute the secure positioning method for the wireless sensor network provided by any embodiment of the present application, and has functional modules and beneficial effects corresponding to the execution method.

FIG. 17 is a schematic structural diagram of a device provided by an embodiment of this application. Figure 17 shows a block diagram of an exemplary device 412 suitable for implementing embodiments of the present application. The device 412 shown in FIG. 17 is only an example, and should not bring any limitation to the function and scope of use of the embodiments of the present application.

As shown in FIG. 17, the device 412 is represented in the form of a general-purpose device. The components of the device 412 may include, but are not limited to: one or more processors 416, a storage device 428, and a bus 418 connecting different system components (including the storage device 428 and the processor 416).

The bus 418 represents one or more of several types of bus structures, including a storage device bus or a storage device controller, a peripheral bus, a graphics acceleration port, a processor, or a local bus using any bus structure among multiple bus structures. For example, these architectures include, but are not limited to, Industry Standard Architecture (Industry Subversive Alliance, ISA) bus, Micro Channel Architecture (MAC) bus, enhanced ISA bus, Video Electronics Standards Association (Video Electronics Standards) Association, VESA) local bus and Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) bus.

The device 412 typically includes a variety of computer system readable media. These media can be any available media that can be accessed by the device 412, including volatile and non-volatile media, removable and non-removable media.

The storage device 428 may include a computer system readable medium in the form of a volatile memory, such as a random access memory (RAM) 430 and/or a cache memory 432. The device 412 may include other removable/non-removable, volatile/non-volatile computer system storage media. For example only, the storage system 434 can be used to read and write non-removable, non-volatile magnetic media (not shown in FIG. 17, and generally referred to as a "hard drive"). Although not shown in FIG. 17, a disk drive for reading and writing to a removable non-volatile disk (such as a "floppy disk") and a removable non-volatile optical disk such as a compact disc (Compact Disc Read) can be provided. -Only Memory, CD-ROM), Digital Video Disc-Read Only Memory (DVD-ROM) or other optical media) read and write optical disc drives. In these cases, each drive can be connected to the bus 418 through one or more data media interfaces. The storage device 428 may include at least one program product, and the program product has a set of (for example, at least one) program modules, and these program modules are configured to perform the functions of the embodiments of the present application.

A program/utility tool 440 having a set of (at least one) program module 442 may be stored in, for example, the storage device 428. Such program module 442 includes but is not limited to an operating system, one or more application programs, other program modules, and programs Data, each of these examples or some combination may include the realization of the network environment. The program module 442 generally executes the functions and/or methods in the embodiments described in this application.

The device 412 can also communicate with one or more external devices 414 (such as a keyboard, a pointing terminal, a display 424, etc.), and can also communicate with one or more terminals that enable a user to interact with the device 412, and/or communicate with The device 412 can communicate with any terminal (such as a network card, modem, etc.) that communicates with one or more other computing terminals. This communication can be performed through an input/output (I/O) interface 422. In addition, the device 412 may also communicate with one or more networks (for example, a local area network (LAN), a wide area network (WAN), and/or a public network, such as the Internet) through the network adapter 420. As shown in FIG. 17, the network adapter 420 communicates with other modules of the device 412 through the bus 418. It should be understood that although not shown in the figure, other hardware and/or software modules can be used in conjunction with the device 412, including but not limited to: microcode, terminal drives, redundant processors, external disk drive arrays, and disk arrays (Redundant Arrays of Independent Disks, RAID) systems, tape drives, and data backup storage systems.

The processor 416 executes various functional applications and data processing by running programs stored in the storage device 428, for example, to implement the secure positioning method of the wireless sensor network provided in the embodiment of the present application, the method includes:

Obtain the first receiver noise extracted when the target node receives the challenge signal, the second receiver noise extracted when the anchor point receives the response signal, and the analysis result of the anchor point on the response signal; and determine the anchor point and the response signal. The target distance between the target nodes; determine the attack detection result according to the analysis result of the response signal by the anchor point, the second receiver noise, the first receiver noise, and a preset detection threshold; If the attack detection result is that there is no ranging attack, the target node is located according to the target distance; otherwise, the target distance is discarded.

The embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the program is executed by a processor, the method for secure positioning of a wireless sensor network as provided in the embodiment of the present application is implemented, and the method includes:

The computer storage medium of the embodiment of the present application may adopt any combination of one or more computer-readable media. The computer-readable medium may be a computer-readable signal medium or a computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable storage medium may be, for example, but not limited to, an electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, device, or device, or a combination of any of the above. Examples of computer-readable storage media (non-exhaustive list) include: electrical connections with one or more wires, portable computer disks, hard disks, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable Programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), optical fiber, portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), optical storage device, magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination of the above. In this document, the computer-readable storage medium can be any tangible medium that contains or stores a program, and the program can be used by or in combination with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

The computer-readable signal medium may include a data signal propagated in baseband or as a part of a carrier wave, and computer-readable program code is carried therein. This propagated data signal can take many forms, including but not limited to electromagnetic signals, optical signals, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. The computer-readable signal medium may also be any computer-readable medium other than the computer-readable storage medium. The computer-readable medium may send, propagate or transmit the program for use by or in combination with the instruction execution system, apparatus, or device .

The program code contained on the computer-readable medium can be transmitted by any suitable medium, including but not limited to wireless, wire, optical cable, RF, etc., or any suitable combination of the above.

The computer program code used to perform the operations of this application can be written in one or more programming languages or a combination thereof. The programming languages include object-oriented programming languages-such as Java, Smalltalk, C++, and also conventional Procedural programming language-such as "C" language or similar programming language. The program code can be executed entirely on the user's computer, partly on the user's computer, executed as an independent software package, partly on the user's computer and partly executed on a remote computer, or entirely executed on the remote computer or terminal. In the case of a remote computer, the remote computer can be connected to the user's computer through any kind of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN), or it can be connected to an external computer (for example, using an Internet service provider to pass Internet connection).

Claims

A safe positioning method for wireless sensor network, including:

Obtain the first receiver noise extracted when the target node receives the challenge signal, the second receiver noise extracted when the anchor point receives the response signal, and the analysis result of the anchor point on the response signal; and determine the anchor point and the response signal. The target distance between the target nodes;

Determine an attack detection result according to the analysis result of the response signal by the anchor point, the second receiver noise, the first receiver noise, and a preset detection threshold;

If the attack detection result is that there is no ranging attack, the target node is located according to the target distance; otherwise, the target distance is discarded.
The method according to claim 1, wherein the response signal is obtained by the target node through message connection of the challenge signal, the first receiver noise variance corresponding to the first receiver noise, and encryption information, The encryption information is obtained by encrypting the message connection result of the challenge signal and the noise variance of the first receiver by using a hash function.
The method according to claim 2, wherein determining the attack detection result according to the analysis result of the response signal by the anchor point comprises:

According to the comparison result of the decrypted information in the analysis result and the encrypted information, the detection result of the ranging and reduction attack is determined, and the decrypted information is that the anchor point uses the hash function to extract from the response signal The message connection result of the challenge signal and the noise variance of the first receiver is obtained by decrypting.
The method according to claim 3, wherein determining the detection result of the range-finding attack based on the comparison result of the decrypted information in the analysis result and the encrypted information comprises:

If the encrypted information and the decrypted information are the same, the detection result of the range reduction attack is that there is no range reduction attack; otherwise, the detection result of the range reduction attack is that there is a range reduction attack.
The method according to claim 1, wherein determining an attack detection result according to the second receiver noise, the first receiver noise, and a preset detection threshold comprises:

Determine a first receiver noise variance corresponding to the first receiver noise and a second receiver noise variance corresponding to the second receiver noise;

Determine the variance value of the variance of the noise of the second receiver and the variance of the noise of the first receiver;

According to the comparison result of the variance difference value and the detection threshold value, the detection result of the ranging increase attack is determined.
The method according to claim 5, wherein determining the detection result of the range increase attack according to the comparison result of the variance value and the detection threshold value comprises:

If the variance value is less than or equal to the detection threshold, the detection result of the range increase attack is that there is no range increase attack; otherwise, the detection result of the range increase attack is that there is range measurement Increase the attack.
The method according to claim 1, wherein if the attack detection result is that there is no ranging attack, locating the target node according to the target distance includes:

If the attack detection result is that there is no range increase attack and range reduction attack, then a two-way arrival time algorithm is used to locate the target node according to the target distance.
A secure positioning device for a wireless sensor network, including:

The information acquisition module is configured to acquire the first receiver noise extracted when the target node receives the challenge signal, the second receiver noise extracted when the anchor point receives the response signal, and the analysis result of the anchor point on the response signal; and determine The target distance between the anchor point and the target node;

An attack detection module, configured to determine an attack detection result according to the analysis result of the response signal by the anchor point, the second receiver noise, the first receiver noise, and a preset detection threshold;

The positioning module is configured to locate the target node according to the target distance if the attack detection result is that there is no ranging attack; otherwise, discard the target distance.
A device that includes:

One or more processors;

Storage device, set to store one or more programs;

When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors realize the secure positioning method of the wireless sensor network according to any one of claims 1-7.
A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, wherein when the program is executed by a processor, the secure positioning method for a wireless sensor network according to any one of claims 1-7 is realized.