WO2021229410A1 - Génération de clés par corruption commandée dans des réseaux informatiques - Google Patents

Génération de clés par corruption commandée dans des réseaux informatiques Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2021229410A1
WO2021229410A1 PCT/IB2021/053964 IB2021053964W WO2021229410A1 WO 2021229410 A1 WO2021229410 A1 WO 2021229410A1 IB 2021053964 W IB2021053964 W IB 2021053964W WO 2021229410 A1 WO2021229410 A1 WO 2021229410A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
data
key
privacy
server
keys
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/IB2021/053964
Other languages
English (en)
Inventor
Devi Selva Kumar VIJAYANARAYANAN
Original Assignee
Autnhive Corporation
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Priority claimed from US16/872,127 external-priority patent/US10903997B2/en
Application filed by Autnhive Corporation filed Critical Autnhive Corporation
Priority to CN202180049502.1A priority Critical patent/CN116018592A/zh
Priority to MX2022014179A priority patent/MX2022014179A/es
Priority to JP2022568446A priority patent/JP2023525774A/ja
Priority to CA3178613A priority patent/CA3178613A1/fr
Priority to KR1020227043195A priority patent/KR20230024279A/ko
Priority to BR112022023105A priority patent/BR112022023105A2/pt
Priority to AU2021272736A priority patent/AU2021272736A1/en
Priority to EP21804512.8A priority patent/EP4150858A4/fr
Publication of WO2021229410A1 publication Critical patent/WO2021229410A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
    • G06F21/31—User authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0643—Hash functions, e.g. MD5, SHA, HMAC or f9 MAC
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/12—Transmitting and receiving encryption devices synchronised or initially set up in a particular manner
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H04L9/3231—Biological data, e.g. fingerprint, voice or retina
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3271—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using challenge-response
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/30—Compression, e.g. Merkle-Damgard construction
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/42—Anonymization, e.g. involving pseudonyms

Definitions

  • This invention relates in general to the field of data security and more particularly to security of targeted communications and authentication of a user of a network or system.
  • U.S. Patent No. 6,962,530 issued to IGT on November 8, 2005 discloses an architecture and method for a gaming-specific platform that features secure storage and verification of game code and other data. The method further provides a user with the ability to securely exchange data with a computerized wagering game system. This invention does not involve spreading out login information amongst multiple devices.
  • U.S. Patent No. 8,989,706 issued to Microsoft Corporation on March 24, 2015 discloses systems, method and/or techniques that relate to automated secure pairing for devices, relating to parallel downloads of content using devices. The tools for pairing the devices may perform authentication protocols based on addresses and on keys. This invention does not involve holding back portions of the encrypted details.
  • the prior art encryption methods and systems are particularly vulnerable to the intervention of third parties into the transfer of data and information between a user and a user and a system or network. If the third party can access data in transit, it can extrapolate login details from such information. If all of the login details are available from data transferred between the user and the system then the third party may be able to login to the system using the user’s login details. This creates a security hazard for present day systems if known authentication methods and systems are utilized. What is needed is an authentication method and system that will protect a user’s login details from being obtained through third party interference with transmitted data.
  • a method of processing keys generated using controlled corruption may comprise registering a first computing device at one or more servers, the one or more servers comprising a security engine and an action engine; receiving, at the one or more servers, a first privacy code and one or more parameters associated with first data from the first computing device, the first privacy code being based on first user input at the first computing device and the first data being based on second user input at the first computing device; generating, at the one or more servers, a chunk count and a public key, wherein the chunk count is based on the one or more parameters associated with first data, and the public key is part of an asymmetric cryptographic key pair; transmitting the chunk count and the public key from the one or more servers to the first computing device; receiving, at the one or more servers, data associated with a quantity of privacy keys and a second privacy code from the first computing device, wherein: the privacy keys are based on the first data, the chunk count, and one or more corruptors, the second privacy code is based on the first privacy code, and
  • a method of processing keys generated using controlled corruption may comprise generating, at the one or more servers, two or more chunk names; and transmitting the two or more chunk names to the first computing device.
  • the privacy keys are further based on the two or more chunk names.
  • concatenating the privacy keys to generate the concatenated key is based on the two or more chunk names.
  • the one or more corruptors comprises three corruptors.
  • At least one of the corruptors is based on the first privacy code.
  • removing the one or more corruptors to generate the second data comprises removing one or more first corruptors from the concatenated key to generate first cleaned data; removing one or more second corruptors from the first cleaned data to generate second cleaned data; removing one or more third corruptors from the second cleaned data to generate a base 64 of compressed data; decoding the base of the compressed second data to generate the compressed data; and decompressing the compressed data to generate the second data, wherein the privacy code is used to remove at least one of the one or more first corruptors, the one or more second corruptors, and the one or more third corruptors.
  • the first privacy code is used to remove at least one of the corruptors.
  • the second privacy code is used to remove at least one of the corruptors.
  • the first data comprises a targeted communication.
  • the second user input comprises at least one of an alphanumeric string of characters, biometric data, a password, an eye scan, a photograph, and a fingerprint.
  • a method of generating keys using controlled corruption may comprise the steps of: generating a first privacy code and one or more parameters associated with first data at a first computing device, the first privacy code based on first user input and the first data based on second user input; transmitting the first privacy code and the one or more parameters associated with the first data from the first computing device to one or more servers; receiving, at the first computing device, a chunk count and a public key from the one or more servers, wherein the chunk count is based on the one or more parameters associated with the first data and the public key is part of an asymmetric cryptographic key pair; compressing, at the first computing device, the first data to generate compressed first data; generating, at the first computing device, a first pre-key based on the compressed first data and one or more first corruptors; generating, at the first computing device, the second pre-key based on the first pre-key and one or more second corruptors; generating, at the first computing device, two or more chunks based on the second pre-key
  • the generating the two or more chunks based on the second pre-key and the chunk count comprises: corrupting the second pre-key using a salt to generate a third pre-key; corrupting the third pre-key using one or more third corruptors; and dividing the corrupted third pre-key into the two or more chunks based on the chunk count.
  • a method of generating keys using controlled corruption may comprise receiving, at the first computing device, two or more chunk names.
  • the two or more privacy keys are additionally based on the two or more chunk names.
  • a method of generating and distributing keys using controlled corruption may comprise registering a first computing device at one or more servers; receiving, at the one or more servers, a first privacy code and one or more parameters associated with first data from the first computing device, the first privacy code being based on first user input at the first computing device and the first data being based on second user input at the first computing device; generating, at the one or more servers, a chunk count and a public key, wherein the chunk count is based on the one or more parameters associated with first data, and the public key is part of an asymmetric cryptographic key pair; transmitting the chunk count and the public key from the one or more servers to the first computing device; receiving, at the one or more servers, data associated with a quantity of first privacy keys and a second privacy code from the first computing device, wherein the first privacy keys are based on the first data, the chunk count, and one or more corruptors; the second privacy code is based on the first privacy code; and the quantity of the first privacy keys is equal to the chunk
  • a method of generating keys using controlled corruption may comprise the steps of receiving, at the one or more servers, two or more privacy keys based on third data from the first computing device; and generating sign-in data, wherein the sign-in data is based on the two or more privacy keys based on the third data.
  • a method of generating keys using controlled corruption may comprise the steps of retrieving, based on at least one of the receiver identifier and the privacy code identifier, the privacy keys stored at the one or more nodes; and generating enrollment data, wherein the enrollment data is based on the privacy keys retrieved from the one or more nodes.
  • a method of generating keys using controlled corruption may comprise the steps of comparing the sign-in data to the enrollment data; and generating a result.
  • a system may comprise a server, the server comprising: a memory comprising server instructions; and a processing device configured for executing the server instructions, wherein the server instructions cause the processing device to perform operations of: registering a first computing device at one or more servers, the one or more servers comprising a security engine, an action engine, a library, and one or more nodes associated with the one or more servers; receiving, at the one or more servers, a first privacy code and one or more parameters associated with first data from the first computing device, the first privacy code being based on first user input at the first computing device and the first data being based on second user input at the first computing device; generating, at the one or more servers, a chunk count and a public key, wherein the chunk count is based on the one or more parameters associated with first data, and the public key is part of an asymmetric cryptographic key pair; transmitting the chunk count and the public key from the one or more servers to the first computing device; receiving, at the one or more servers, a quantity of privacy keys
  • FIG. 1 is a system drawing showing an embodiment of the authentication system of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a system drawing showing a configuration of elements operable to undertake a transfer of data between the client system and the verification system of an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a system drawing showing a configuration of elements operable to undertake a registration process of an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a system drawing showing a configuration of elements operable to undertake an access process of an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a system drawing showing a synchronization element operable to process a hashed OY -packet portion in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a system drawing showing a configuration of elements operable to undertake a decoding process of an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a system drawing showing elements of a user device of an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 8 is a system drawing showing elements of a client system of an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 9 is a system drawing showing elements of a client display unit of an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 10 is a system drawing showing elements of an verification system of an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 11 is a system drawing showing a configuration of elements operable to undertake processing of a user authentication request to access the secure portion(s) of a client system in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 12 is a system drawing showing a configuration of elements operable to undertake the generation and processing of noise and keys for authentication of a user in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 13 is a system drawing showing a configuration of elements operable to undertake the verification of keys for authentication of a user in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 14 is a system drawing showing a configuration of elements operable to undertake the verification of tokens for authentication of a user in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 15 is a system drawing showing a configuration of elements operable to undertake the verification of a challenge via a client display system for authentication of a user in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 16 is a system drawing showing a configuration of elements operable to undertake the verification of a challenge via a user device for authentication of a user in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 17 illustrates a registration method, according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 18 illustrates a method of creating one or more keys, according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 19 illustrates a method of distributing one or more keys, according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 20 illustrates a login method, according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 21 illustrates a method of creating one or more keys, according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 22 illustrates a method of distributing one or more verification keys, according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 23 illustrates a method of verifying a verification key in a local database, according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 24 illustrates a method of validating a verification process, according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 25 illustrates a method of generating one or more bar codes, according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 26 illustrates a method of generating one or more keys, according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 27 illustrates a method of generating one or more keys, according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 28 illustrates a method of generating one or more keys, according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 29 illustrates a method of establishing a web session, according to one embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIGURE 30 illustrates a system for generating keys using controlled corruption, according to some embodiments.
  • FIGURE 31 illustrates a method of generating keys using controlled corruption, according to some embodiments.
  • FIGURE 32 illustrates a method of generating keys using controlled corruption, according to some embodiments.
  • FIGURE 33 illustrates a method of generating keys using controlled corruption, according to some embodiments.
  • FIGURE 34 illustrates a method of generating keys using controlled corruption, according to some embodiments.
  • FIGURE 35 illustrates a method of using keys generated using controlled corruption for authentication, according to some embodiments.
  • the present invention is an authentication method and system operable to authenticate users, data, documents, devices and transactions.
  • Embodiments of the present invention may be operable with any system or network of any organization or individual.
  • the authentication method and system are operable to disburse unique portions of login related information amongst multiple devices.
  • the disbursed portions of login related information are utilized by the system to authenticate users, data, documents, devices and transactions without revealing the login related information to the system.
  • the login related information is encrypted and/or hashed through multi-layer encryption and/or hashing, and some of the encrypted and/or hashed details are held back.
  • the devices wherein login related information is stored will all be utilized in the authentication method and system.
  • Login related information provided to a user is not revealed to and/or stored in the system or any user device.
  • the authentication of data, documents, devices and transactions does not require a key to be revealed to the system.
  • client system means either the network or system of an organization or individual.
  • client device means a device utilized by a user to login to the client system, such as a laptop, a tablet, a cell phone, a smart phone, a desktop computer, smart watch, a computing device, whereby a user can login to the client system or any other device which requires a secure login.
  • transfer of information between a user and the client system can include any creation, transfer or storage of information occurring in relation to the system.
  • any unit or element of the authentication system “accessing” another unit or element may involve any of the following: (i) the unit or element accessing the other unit or element to obtain information therefrom; or (ii) the unit or element sending a request to the other unit or element for information to be retrieved or generated, and once such information is retrieved or generated in response to the request, such information can be sent to the unit or element that sent the request.
  • the creation, transfer, storage or authentication of login related information between the user device and the client system can be vulnerable to atack by a third party.
  • the third party may obtain and/or use such information for nefarious purposes.
  • the third party may login to the client system using the login details they have obtained and thereby achieve unauthorized access to the client system or move laterally to systems connected to the client system by obtaining more login related information from the client system or otherwise.
  • the third party may utilize the data, documents or transaction information obtained due to the attack for a variety of unauthorized purposes (i.e., dissemination of the information to other parties, use of the information to obtain a market advantage, holding the information hostage for a ransom, espionage, subversion etc.).
  • the present invention decreases the vulnerability of a client system to such unauthorized usage of the client system or data, documents or transaction information created, transferred and/or stored between such client system and a user device.
  • the method of the present invention involves a user utilizing a user device to login to the client system of an organization or person.
  • the login related information will be hashed and/or encrypted through a single or multi-layer hashing and/or encryption process(es). In particular at least a portion of the encrypted and/or hashed key may be generated and stored in the user’s device. Other unique portions of the login related information will be stored in other devices in the environment.
  • the disbursement of unique portions of the login related information amongst multiple devices means a third party who accesses information transferring between the client system and the user’s device will not be able to obtain any or all of the information required for a successful login to the client system.
  • the user’s device will need to prove to the client system that it has valid keys and/or that the device has been previously authenticated This will be achieved by the present invention without the user device having to reveal a key or keys to the client system.
  • the authentication of data, documents, devices, transaction and users can occur without the user having to reveal his or her key to the client system.
  • the login related information will be created uniquely and will not be stored and/or transmitted; this along with the user device assisted multipoint authentication prevents unauthorized third party access to the client system.
  • the prior art systems are vulnerable to such information being compromised by third parties. Once such information is obtained by a third party, the information can be used to login at a single authentication point to the system network without authorization, or unauthorized use of the data, documents or transaction information.
  • the present invention offers a benefit over the prior art systems in that it is not vulnerable to such third party access to information that would allow unauthorized access to a client system, or to data, documents or transaction information.
  • the authentication system of the present invention addresses the problem of prior art authentications that can be compromised at creation, storage, transit and authentication point.
  • prior art systems are not generally operable with any type of client system, or with any type of user device.
  • the present invention provides an organization with a secure authentication system that will provide the necessary secure access to a user to access the organizations' data across any platform, solution or environment.
  • the present invention can be implemented by any organization for use with any type of client system, and with any user device on any platform.
  • the present invention is operable to undertake hive authorization of devices within an environment. For example, multiple mobile and/or storage devices across geo temporal zones can be authorized in the course of hive authorization. Prior art systems are not operable to undertake hive authorization across geo-temporal zones.
  • Embodiments of the present invention may incorporate multiple components operable to authenticate a user for the purpose of a user login to a client system having secure portions therein, or for the purpose of the user accessing the secure portions of such system.
  • one embodiment of the present invention may incorporate three main components as follows: (1) Synchronized Multi-Faceted Authentication (SMFA); (2) Interactive Semi-Manual Authentication (ISMA); (3) Transaction Authentication.
  • SMFA Synchronized Multi-Faceted Authentication
  • ISMA Interactive Semi-Manual Authentication
  • Transaction Authentication To provide an example of such an embodiment of the present invention these three components of an embodiment of the present invention all described below.
  • a skilled reader will recognize that other configurations of the present invention are possible, including configurations that only include one or two of the three components described below, or configurations that incorporate other components.
  • the authentication process for a user of the present invention authentication method and system operates so that the encrypted and or hashed portions of random multi-unit login related information are disbursed amongst devices (e.g., user and/or system devices and storage units) and all of such or more of such devices must be utilized to authenticate the user.
  • devices e.g., user and/or system devices and storage units
  • the present invention is operable to require a user to engage in a challenge, such as, a static challenge that may be a pm and/or pattern challenge, an animated and/or non -animated challenge, a graphical and/or non-graphical challenge, a two dimensional and/or three dimensional challenge, a moving and/or static gamified challenge, and/or a non-gamified interface challenge, in order to login to the client system.
  • a challenge such as, a static challenge that may be a pm and/or pattern challenge, an animated and/or non -animated challenge, a graphical and/or non-graphical challenge, a two dimensional and/or three dimensional challenge, a moving and/or static gamified challenge, and/or a non-gamified interface challenge, in order to login to the client system.
  • the system may choose a series of units and may use these to generate a challenge. Each unit is randomly assigned multiple digits, that may change at each login event. A user may select multiple challenges in the same authentication event and in any
  • the series of units chosen during the challenge are divided by the authentication system into multiple unique system portions.
  • the units in each unit portion may be hashed or encrypted individually to generate unit results, and then the units in each system portion are hashed and/or encrypted collectively to generate system portion results.
  • the number of hashes and/or encryptions applied to each unit in a system portion and to each system portion can vary .
  • Portions of the hashed and/or encrypted results are stored in different devices of the distributed architecture of the client or other system and a portion is stored in the user’s device. For example, portions of the hashed and/or encrypted results may he stored in multiple user and system devices.
  • the present authentication system invention is platform agnostic, so it can be used with any client system.
  • ISMA Interactive Semi-Manual Authentication
  • the authentication process for a user of the present invention operates so that the login information is encrypted and/or hashed using multi-layer encryption and/or hashing functions.
  • the portions of random encryption and/or hashing details that are held back and manually transmitted and are not stored in the client system, or in the user device, thereby decreasing the possibility of compromise during transmission, storage or authentication.
  • the system of the present invention provides a key (i.e., key#1) to the mobile device. All keys in the present invention are encrypted and/or hashed using multi-layer encryption and/or hashing functions.
  • the encrypted key is required to be used in the authentication process of the present invention, and therefore the user must first authenticate using the SMFA process described herein, and thereby validate the key and authenticate the user’s device.
  • the system will generate a challenge based on random encrypted keys that will change at each h login event.
  • the authenticated user will use their authenticated device to scan the challenge.
  • part or whole portions of the random encrypted key will be sent to the user device.
  • there may be another set of encrypted random keys that may be generated by the user device that will also change at each login event. Multiple keys that can be combined to form an encrypted shared secret key; portions of or the entire encrypted shared secret key will be sent to the client system of the organization that is requesting authentication of the user.
  • Multiple layers of encryption may be generated by the user device. Such encryption may be applied to elements individually or collectively. For example, random three or more digits (that may change during each login event) along with salt and iv can be generated by the user device, or other types of encryption and/or hashing may be applied. Another layer of encryption may be added collectively to the prior encryption..
  • Multiple random characters will be removed from the package that results from the multiple layers of encryption. For example, six random characters may be removed from the package.
  • the multiple random digits and characters will be provided to the user and the encrypted details are sent to the client system requesting authentication of the user device.
  • the client system requesting authentication of the user device will challenge the user to provide the information given to the user device. Only upon the user providing such information will the client system be able to authenticate the user. This process reduces the possibility of a third party intercepting, guessing or knowing the user’s login information.
  • the session will be authenticated through time and geo- based access code.
  • the geo-based access code may be a token or any other type of geo-based access code.
  • the geo-based access code may be invalidated if the time expires or the geo aspect is invalidated.
  • the geo aspect may be invalidated if the user is not located within the geo-location relating to the geo-based access code.
  • the authentication process for a user of the present invention authentication system operates so that the transactions are authenticated without the user having to reveal his or her key to the client system.
  • the client system does not know the user key or if the user has a key.
  • the user device has to prove to the system that it has valid keys and that the user and device have been authenticated, without revealing the key to the system. In order to achieve this the user device will have to authenticate using the SMFA process described herein and/or the ISMA process described herein.
  • the user device may use a random temporary key it has or that it has received.
  • the system will generate a security challenge.
  • This challenge may be secured using features, such as, multi-layer encryption, digital signature and or hashing.
  • the secured package is sent to the user device requesting authentication.
  • the user device will verify the package and may use the decryption key provided to the display or solve the challenge.
  • one embodiment of the present invention may be operable such that the system will generate multiple random digit alpha numeric codes with one or more digits being blank, the corresponding alphabet or numeral to be filled-in to the blank will be also sent to the user with the challenge in the ISMA process.
  • the system may generate six or more multiple random digit alpha numeric codes, or any other number of random digit alpha numeric codes.
  • the system will generate and encrypt the six or more random digit alphanumeric code as well as other elements. For example, the system may encrypt the six or more random digit alphanumeric code, Additional encryption and security features (which may include but not limited to salt, iv, secure keys etc.) may also be applied by the client system. The system will then add a digital signature to the results of the encryptions. This encrypted & signed package is then sent to the user device requesting to be authenticated.
  • Additional encryption and security features which may include but not limited to salt, iv, secure keys etc.
  • the user device will verify the digital signature and then use the decryption key provided to recreate the six or more digit alpha numeric code along with corresponding alphabets or numerals.
  • the user device then encrypts the recreated information, along with the security features.
  • the user device will then add a digital signature to the results of the encryption.
  • This encrypted and signed package is then sent to the client system engaged in the authentication process.
  • the client system receives the message from the user device, and upon receipt will verify the digital signature, decrypt the message and compares the message with the sent message. If the comparison shows that the received message is the same as the sent message then the client system knows that the user has the required key
  • the session will be authenticated through time and geo-based access codes, these access codes will be invalidated if the time expires or the geo is invalidated, as previously discussed herein.
  • FIGs 1-17 provide some examples of embodiments of the present invention, and these are described herein.
  • the authentication system incorporates many elements including a client system, a user system, a verification system, and multiple storage units.
  • the authentication system is operable to achieve many functions including proving and verifying a user’s login.
  • the user system 102 is used by the user to login to the client system 902.
  • the user system is operable to engage in verifying the user’s identity as well as other activities, as described herein.
  • the user’s identity must be verified by the client system in order for the user to gain access to the secured area of the client system.
  • the verification system 202 is operable to engage in verifying the identity of the user to the client system.
  • the user When the user, through the user device 90, wants to access a secured area of the client system, the user will have to first prove the user’s identity to the client system. Once the client system receives verification of the identity of the user, the system can then permit the user to access the secure contents of the client system.
  • the user uses the user system to prove its identity and to gain access to the secured area of the client system.
  • the verification system 202 is operable to verify the authenticity of the user’s identity.
  • the synchronization system 300 is a collection of one or more synchronization elements 302A...302N, operable to function in a synchronized manner to approve the authenticity of user’s identity.
  • the user system may incorporate multiple elements.
  • the user system may incorporate a proving unit 104, a display unit 106, a processing unit 108, an approval unit 112, a storage unit 110 and a communications unit 114.
  • the proving unit is operable to prove the initial identity of the user system 102 to the verification system.
  • the display unit is operable to display information to a user, for example, such as a challenge or any other information transferred from the client system, the verification system or any other system or element of the present invention to the user system.
  • the display unit is further operable to display information generated by the client system to the user.
  • the display unit may further be connected to an input unit, or have a touch screen or other input operability, whereby a user can input information.
  • the information inputted by the user may be displayed on the display unit, or may otherwise be collected by the user system and stored, transferred to the client system or another system or element of the authentication system, or processed by the user system.
  • the processing unit 108 will be responsible for all the processing capacity within the system.
  • the approval unit 112 will be responsible for accessing the challenge and response and providing a result and the storage unit will be responsible for storing both temporary and permanent data.
  • the communication unit 114 is responsible for all external communications.
  • the verification system 202 may incorporate multiple elements.
  • the verification system may incorporate a masker unit 204, a N-packet generator 206, a report generator 208, a processing unit 210, an approval unit 212, one or more storage units 214A...214N, and communications unit 216.
  • the masker unit is operable to generate one or more unique non-identifying identifiers for the client system and the user system.
  • the processing unit 210 is operable to processing of information and data as required by the authentication system.
  • the approval unit 212 is operable to access the responses received internally in the system and providing a result that can be sent to the processing unit or sent to a receiver that is external to the system via a communication unit.
  • the one or more storage units are operable to store both temporary and permanent data.
  • the N-packet generator 206 is operable to generate packets of authentication information.
  • the communication unit 216 is operable to receive and transfer all communications with all elements of the authentication system that are external to the verification system (i.e., the client system, the user system, etc.).
  • some or all of the units described as elements of the verification system in FIG. 1 may be incorporated within other systems or elements of the authentication system, such as the client system. In some embodiments of the present invention some or all of the units described as elements of the verification system in FIG. 1 may be standalone elements that are not incorporated in any system of the authentication system, but are generally incorporated in the authentication system.
  • the synchronization system 300 may incorporate one or more synchronization elements 302A...302N, and each synchronization element may incorporate multiple units.
  • at least two synchronization elements may incorporate a proving unit 304A...304N, a storage unit 308A...308N, a processing unit 306A...306N, an approval unit 312A...312N, and a communications unit 310A...310N.
  • the proving unit 304A is operable to prove the initial identity of the synchronization system 300 to the verification system 202.
  • Communication between the user system, the verification system and the synchronization elements is received by and transferred from the communication unit of such system and/or elements. All such communication between the systems and/or elements may be secured by the use of one or more masking functions.
  • the one or more masking functions may include, hashing and/or encryption.
  • data may be transferred between the client system 902 and a masker unit 204 of the verification system via the communication unit 216 of the verification system.
  • the client system may communicate with the masker unit of the verification system to request credentials required for the new user to establish a secure connection with the client system.
  • the masker unit generates unique secured credentials the client system can use to establish a link between the client system and the verification system. These unique credentials may include for example a client ID, or other forms of credentials.
  • the masker unit When the trusted connection is established between the client system and the verification system, the masker unit performs a process, such as, a calculation, an algorithm or another type of process that will generate a unique non-identifying identifier that is a secret for the user.
  • the unique non-identifying identifier may be stored in one of the storage units 214A (or any of storage units 214A...214N) incorporated in the verification system.
  • the masker unit may use a masking function such as hashing, encryption, and or some other masking function to render the non-identifying identifier secure.
  • the client system may also provide the verification system with a list of all available synchronization elements.
  • one or more of the synchronization elements may be stored in one or more of the storage units 214A...214N of the verification system.
  • the registration process of the present invention may involve the operation of elements of the authentication system as required during the initial interaction of the user with the authentication system, in order for the user to register with the client system. All communications between the client system, elements of the user system, elements of the verification system and elements of the synchronization system are via the communication units of the user system, the verification system and the synchronization system, as shown in FIG. 3.
  • the user must register with the client system to be authorized to access the secure portions of the client system.
  • the proving unit 104 accesses one or more storage units 110 of the client system to retrieve proving information.
  • the proving information may include a non-identifying identifier generated by the masker unit, a secret that has also been generated by the masker unit, and may also include information that may identify the user device, a unique application number, and or other information relating to the user, for example biometric information (e.g., the user’s fingerprint, the user’s retina scan, or other biometric information of the user), usage information etc.
  • biometric information e.g., the user’s fingerprint, the user’s retina scan, or other biometric information of the user
  • usage information etc.
  • the proving information that has been obtained by the proving unit 104 is securely sent via the communication unit 114 of the user system to the processing unit 210 of the verification system.
  • the processing unit 210 retrieves information for the user, via the communications unit 216 of the verification system, from one or more of the storage units 214A...214N of the verification system.
  • the processing unit 210 combines the information it receives from the client system with the information it retrieves from the one or more storage units of the verification system to create a package of information.
  • the processing unit sends such package of information to the approval unit 212.
  • the approval unit 212 compares the values of the package of information it receives from the processing unit with information stored in the one or more storage units 214A...214N of the verification system, that was previously received from the client system. If the comparison is successful the approval unit will accept the connection with the user system. If the comparison is not successful the approval unit 212 will deny the connection with the user system. The results of the approval system are sent to the N-packet generator 206.
  • connection with the user system is not approved, the operation of the authentication system to attempt to register the user will end.
  • the N- packet generator will generate a random challenge.
  • the random challenge may include multiple packets (N-packets). Each N-packet contains multiple random numeric or alphanumeric/other characters (N-RANC).
  • the N-packets are securely sent to the display unit 106 of the user system.
  • Embodiments of the present invention may apply multi-layer of protection, including, but not limited to encryption, hashing and /or digital signature to provide security to the N-packets in transit between the N-packet generator and the display unit, for example, the multi-layer protection of both the N-RNAC and the N-packets prior to transit.
  • N packets could be generated by an element of the user system or a different system with or without N-RNAC. The user interacts with this element to generate an OY packet.
  • the display unit 106 receives the N-packets and displays the information incorporated in the N-packets to the user. From the N-packets displayed the user enters one or more N-packets, and thereby selects the N-RANC associated with the chosen N-packets. For ease of reference the N-packets chosen by the user are the Y-packets herein. The order in which the Y -packets are chosen by the user is retained to become Ordered Y - packet (OY-Packet) The OY-Packets are sent by the display unit 106 to the processing unit 108 of the user system. The processing unit of the user system splits the OY-Packet into two or more portions. Each portion may contain two or more N- Packets.
  • the processing unit of the user system may mask the OY-Packet information by applying a masking function to each portion of the OY-Packet. For example, the processing unit of the user system may apply masking to one or more of the following: each of N-RNAC incorporated in the OY-Packet and/or to each Y-Packet incorporated in the OY-Packet and/or to each OY-Packet,.
  • the results of one or more masking may be stored in one or more of the storage units 110 of the user system. The results that are not stored are sent to the processing unit of the verification system.
  • the challenge generated by the N-packet generator that is sent to the display unit of the user system may incorporate multiple N-packets and each N-packet may incorporate three or more N-RANC.
  • the user may select multiple Y-packets that form the OY-packet.
  • the OY-packet may be split into 2 portions (i.e., an OYA-portion and an OYB-portion).
  • the processing unit of the verification system may apply hashing and/or encryption and then select two or more random synchronization elements of the synchronization system from a list stored in the one or more storage units of the verification system.
  • the selected random synchronization elements form a sync registry.
  • the processing unit of the verification system may add a secret to the OY-packet portions, individually or collectively, and may perform a multi-layer hashing and/or encryption function on the OY-packet portions, individually and/or collectively.
  • the hashed and/or encrypted unique OY-packet portions may then be distributed among one or more synchronization elements, and be stored in one or more of the storage units in one or more of the synchronization elements to which the OY-packet portion is distributed. The result is that the unique OY-packet portions are stored in different synchronization elements.
  • the distribution information portions may be stored in a sync registry of the synchronization elements.
  • the authentication system may be operable to perform an access process, whereby the registered user tries to authenticate itself through the operation of the verification system, in order for the user to gain access to secure portions of the client system.
  • All communications between elements of the user system, elements of the verification system and elements of the synchronization system are via the communication units of the user system, the verification system and the synchronization elements of the synchronization elements of the synchronization system, as shown in FIG. 4.
  • the proving unit 104 of the user system accesses one or more of the storage units 110 of the user system to retrieve proving information.
  • the proving information may include a non-identifying identifier and a secret.
  • Some or all of the proving information that has been obtained by the proving unit is securely sent via the communication unit 114 of the user system to the processing unit 210 of the verification system, via the communication unit 216 of the verification system.
  • the processing unit 210 retrieves information for the user from one or more of the storage units 214A...214N of the verification system.
  • the processing unit 210 combines information received from the client system with the information retrieved from one or more storage units of the verification system to create a package of information.
  • the processing unit sends this package of information to the approval unit 212 of the verification system.
  • the approval unit 212 compares the values of the package of information it receives from the processing unit 210 with information stored in the verification system that was previously received from the client system. If the comparison is successful (i.e., the comparison results in a match between the compared information) the approval unit will accept the connection with the user system. If the comparison is not successful the approval unit will deny the connection with the user system. The results of the approval system are sent to the N-packet generator 206.
  • the N-packet generator will generate a random challenge.
  • the random challenge may include two or more packets (N-packets). Each N-packet contains two more random numbers or alphanumeric characters (N-RANC).
  • N-RANC random numbers or alphanumeric characters
  • a multi layer hashing and/or encryption may be applied to the challenge sent to the display unit. The hashing and/or encryption is applied by the random number generator
  • the N-packets are securely sent to the display unit 106 of the user system.
  • Embodiments of the present invention may apply multi-layer hashing and/or encryption to provide security to the N-packets in transit between the N-packet generator and the display unit.
  • the multi-layer hashing and/or encryption may incorporate hashing and/or encrypting the N-RNAC and/or the N-packets prior to transit.
  • the display unit 106 receives the N-packets and displays the corresponding information to the user. From corresponding information displayed the user selects two or more corresponding information and there by selecting N-packets, and N- RANC associated with the chosen N-packets.
  • the N-packets chosen by the user are the Y -packets herein these Y packets are ordered and are called OY Packets.
  • the N-packet generator maybe present in the user system and or other systems which may generate Y and/or OY packets by interaction with a user through any element from the user system or other systems, such as, cameras, scanners, etc.
  • the OY-Packets are sent by the display unit 106 to the processing unit 108 of the user system.
  • the processing unit of the user system splits the OY-Packet into multiple portions. Each portion contains multiple N-Packets.
  • the processing unit 108 of the user system retrieves previously stored OY-packet portions from one or more storage units of the user system where such previously stored OY-packet portions are stored.
  • the processing unit sends the previously stored OY-packet portions and more recently created OY-packet portions to the approval unit 110 of the user system.
  • the approval unit of the user system compares the information it receives from the processing unit of the user system with the previously stored OY-packet portion and generates either an approval result or a denial result.
  • the result generated by the approval unit of the user system (that is either an approval result or a denial result) is transferred to the processing unit of the user system. If the result from the approval unit of the user system is a denial result the authentication process is halted.
  • the processing unit of the user system may store one or more of the OY-packet portions recently generated in one or more storage units of the user system, and will send the rest of the OY-packet portions to the processing unit of the verification system.
  • the processing unit of the verification system retrieves the synchronization system information for the user from the sync registry.
  • the processing unit of the verification system may add a secret to the OY-packet portions it receives and perform a multi-layer hashing and/or encryption function on these OY-packet portions.
  • the processing unit of the verification system may send the hashed and/or encrypted unique OY-packet portions to one or more of the processing units 302A...320N of the synchronization elements of the synchronization system.
  • Each synchronization element of the synchronization unit that receives a hashed and/or encrypted OY-packet portion may undertake a process, as shown in FIG. 5.
  • the processing unit 306A...306N of the synchronization element may decode the hash and/or encryption to determine and identify one or more N-Packets and N-RANCs.
  • the processing unit of the synchronization element may send the N-packets and N-RANCs to the approval unit 312A...312N of the same synchronization element.
  • the proving unit 304A...304N of the synchronization unit retrieves the previously stored hashed and/or encrypted OY-packet portions from the storage unit 308A...308N of the synchronization element.
  • the proving unit of the synchronization unit may decode the hash and/or encryption to determine and identify one or more N- packets and N-RANCs and these are sent to the approval unit of the synchronization element.
  • the approval unit of the synchronization element compares the N-packets and N-RANCs it received that were recently generated to those that were previously stored. Based upon this comparison either a pass value or a fail value is generated. The generated pass value or fail value is transferred to the proving unit of the synchronization element.
  • the proving unit of the synchronization unit retrieves proving information from one or more of the storage units of the synchronization unit and both the proving information and the pass value or fail value that the proving unit has received may be hashed and/or encrypted and sent to the processing unit of the verification system.
  • the processing unit of the verification system receives the hashed and/or encrypted results and proving information from each of the proving units of each of the synchronization elements that generated such information. For clarity, multiple synchronization elements may have received unique OY-packet portions and each such synchronization element will have processed the OY-packet portions in accordance with the method discussed herein. All communications between elements of the user system, verification system and the client system are via the communication units of the user system, client system and the verification system, as shown in FIG. 6. Also as shown in FIG. 6, the processing unit 210 of the verification system 202 will decode the proving information it received from each synchronization element 302A...302N and send the decoded information to the approval unit 212 of the verification system.
  • the processing unit 210 of the verification system retrieves proving information from one or more of the storage units 214A...214N of the verification system.
  • the processing unit of the verification system sends the retrieved proving information to the approval unit of the verification system.
  • the approval unit of the verification system utilizes the information it receives to approve the synchronization elements.
  • the processing unit of the verification system decodes each of the pass and/or fail values it receives from the synchronization elements.
  • the decoded values are saved in one or more of the storage units of the verification system as verification results.
  • a verification results report may be generated by the processing unit of the verification system or a report generator 208, and this report may contain a variety of information, for example the total synchronization elements requested, the number of pass values received, the number of fail values received, synchronization system trust scores and other information.
  • the processing unit of the verification system may hash or encrypt the verification results and send the hashed and/or encrypted verification result to the processing unit 108 of the user system 102, via the communication unit 216 of the verification system.
  • the processing unit of the user system sends the hashed or encrypted verification result to the client system 902.
  • the client system submits a request for authentication to the processing unit 210 of the verification system, via the communication unit 216 of the verification system, based upon the verification results the client system receives.
  • the processing unit of the verification system retrieves the verification results saved in one or more of the storage units of the verification system and sends the retrieved results to the approval unit of the verification system.
  • the approval unit of the verification system reviews the retrieved results and may approve these and send the verification results to the client system which will then decide whether or not to authenticate the user based on the verification report results.
  • the user may access information (i.e., data, documents, transaction information, etc.) and/or provide user information (i.e., text, data, etc.) to the client system.
  • information i.e., data, documents, transaction information, etc.
  • user information i.e., text, data, etc.
  • the user may access the client system to send messages, to undertake purchases that involve credit card payments, to attach an e-signature to a document, or for a variety of other purposes.
  • user information will be transmitted between the client system and the user system.
  • the present invention is operable to protect the security of such user and authentication related information during creation, transit, storage and authentication.
  • an embodiment of the present invention may incorporate a user system, a client system, a client display unit and a verification system.
  • the user system may be incorporated wholly or partially in the client device utilized by the user to communicate with and access the client system.
  • a skilled reader will recognize that embodiments of the present invention that achieve security for user and authentication related information in transit between the user device and the client system may incorporate other elements.
  • the user will use the user device to verify the user system and the user’s credentials to the client systems.
  • a user’s credentials and the user system must be verified in order to verify that the user is authorized to access the secure portions of the client system.
  • the user will only be able to perform certain functions or access certain information through the secure portions of the client system if the user is authenticated.
  • the user will only be able to approve certain transactions through the client system if the user and the user system are authenticated.
  • the client system is the system that the user is trying to gain access to and therefore requires the authentication to be performed.
  • the verification system of the present invention will verify the identity of the user and the user system and cause the client system to recognize the user and the user system as authenticated, as is described herein.
  • a user system 101 utilized to transmit user information to and from the client system may incorporate multiple elements.
  • an embodiment of the present invention may include a user system that incorporates an interaction unit 103, a verifier generator 105, a noise generator 107, a processing unit 109, a storage unit 111, and a reader unit 113.
  • the client system 130 of an embodiment of the present invention may incorporate multiple elements.
  • an embodiment of the present invention may include a client system that incorporates a CSAP generator 131, a storage unit 133, a processing unit 135, a challenge generator 137, and an approval unit 139.
  • the client display unit 150 of an embodiment of the present invention may incorporate multiple elements.
  • an embodiment of the present invention may include a client display unit that incorporates an interaction unit 151, a processing unit 153, a temporary storage unit 155 and a key generator 157.
  • the verification system 140 of an embodiment of the present invention may incorporate multiple elements.
  • an embodiment of the present invention may include a verification system that incorporates a random key generator 141, a random text generator 143, a USID generator 145 and a processing unit 147.
  • the user When the user wants to login to a secure portion of the client system, the user will declare his/her intention through interaction with client display unit, and use of the interaction unit of the client display unit to input a request. As shown in FIG. 11, the interaction unit 151 will communicate the request to the processing unit 153 of the client display unit, and the processing unit of the client display unit will then communicates the request to the processing unit 147 of the verification system.
  • the processing unit 109 of the user system will generate a request to generate an Alpha Key ( ⁇ k) combo consisting of a ⁇ k1 and ⁇ k2 Keys that it sends to the key generator 157 of the client display unit via the processing unit 147 of the verification system.
  • the key generator of the client display unit transmits both ⁇ k1 & ⁇ k2 to the processing unit 147 of the verification system.
  • the processing unit 147 of the verification system then requests random text from the random text generator 143 of the verification system, and requests a unique system & event identifier (USID) from the USID generator 145 of the verification system.
  • the random text generator generates the random text and sends the random text to the processing unit 147 of the verification system.
  • the USID generator generates the USID and sends the USID to the processing unit of the verification system.
  • the USID generator is operable to identify to the verification system, the user device and event that is trying to connect to the secure area in the client system.
  • the USID may be unique to each tab in a browser or in multiple browsers to identify and control the number of browsers or tabs that are open for use by a user.
  • the processing unit 147 of the verification system combines the USID and random text that it receives with ⁇ k2 into a data string and converts the data string into a machine readable format, then sends this to the processing unit 153 of the client display unit.
  • the interaction unit 151 of the client display unit makes the information available to the reader unit 113 of the user system.
  • the reader unit 113 may include one or more sensors including any of the following auditory, visual, tactile, print, movement and other kind of sensors that may be incorporated in the client device or external to the client device but connected thereto either via a wired connection or a wireless connection.
  • the sensors may be utilized to obtain information relating to the user.
  • the reader unit 113 then sends the information that it obtained to the processing unit 109 of the user system.
  • the processing unit of the user system may separate the information it receives from the reader unit and may hold that information.
  • the processing unit 109 of the user system will request noise from the noise generator 107 of the user system.
  • the noise generator will generate noise and will send the noise to the processing unit of the user system.
  • the noise is used to mask the identity of the information in transit.
  • the user system may have a random Delta 1 Key ( ⁇ k1).
  • the processing unit of the user system will send ⁇ k2 and ⁇ k1 to the verifier generator 105 of the user system.
  • the processing unit will also send a request to the verifier generator of the user system requesting that a new Beta Key be generated.
  • the verifier generator will generate Beta Keyl ( ⁇ K1) and Beta Key2 ( ⁇ K2) using ⁇ k2 and ⁇ k1.
  • the verifier generator 105 will send ⁇ K1 and ⁇ K2 to the processing unit 109 of the user system.
  • the processing unit of the user system will also access the storage unit 111 of the user system and request Delta 1 Key and/or session code and/or the generation of a session code .
  • the storage unit 111 will provide Delta 1 Key to the processing unit of the user system or will generate a session code and provide this to the processing unit of the user system.
  • the processing unit 109 of the user system may request that the random key generator 141 of the verification system generate a random Delta 1 keys and / or a session code and provide this to the processing unit 109, that may generate a hash value for ⁇ k1 or SC that is provided.
  • the processing unit of the user system may generate a Manual Interaction Code (MIC) using the information obtained from each of the noise generator, the storage unit of the user system, and the verifier generator.
  • the processing unit of the user system may send the MIC to the interaction unit 103 of the user system.
  • the interaction unit 103 of the client display unit will display the MIC to the user.
  • the processing unit of the user system may conduct a symmetric or asymmetric encryption on the post-MIC Data.
  • the processing unit of the user system may send the post-MIC data and the hash value to the processing unit 135 of the client system.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system receives post-MIC data and the hash.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system sends the hash value to be stored temporarily in the storage unit 133 of the client system.
  • the post-MIC data is sent to the processing unit 153 of the client display unit.
  • the processing unit 153 of the client display unit combines ⁇ k1 and post-MIC data as a package and sends this package to the key generator 157 of the client display unit.
  • the processing unit 153 requests that the key generator 157 of the client display unit generates a Gama key ( ⁇ K).
  • the ⁇ K is sent by the key generator of the client display unit to the processing unit 153 of the client display unit.
  • the user is now required to interact with the interaction unit 151 of the client display unit. The user must manually enter the MIC. Once entered, the MIC is then sent by the interaction unit of the client display unit to the processing unit 153 of the client display unit.
  • the processing unit 153 uses ⁇ K, MIC and package, to cause SC or ⁇ k1 to be available.
  • the processing unit of the client display unit calculates the hash value for SC or ⁇ k1 and sends the hash value to the approval unit 139 of the client system for verification.
  • Any of the information received or generated by the processing unit of the client display unit can be temporarily stored in the temporary storage unit 155 of the client display unit at any point during the processing activities of the processing unit 153 of the client display unit.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system retrieves the hash value temporarily stored in the storage unit 133 of the client system.
  • the processing unit of the client system sends either the hash value of SC or ⁇ k1, and the value retrieved from storage to the approval unit 139 of the client system.
  • the approval unit 139 compares the hash values to determine a match.
  • the approval unit 139 confirms the match to the processing unit 135 of the client system.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system requests a Client Session Access Pass (CSAP) from the CSAP generator 131.
  • the CSAP generator 131 generates the CSAP which is sent to the storage unit 133 of the client system to be stored temporarily.
  • the CSAP generator 131 also sends the CSAP to the processing unit 147 of the verification system.
  • the processing unit 147 of the verification system sends the CSAP to the processing unit of the 153 client display unit.
  • the processing unit 153 of the client display unit sends CSAP to the processing unit 135 of the user system.
  • the processing unit 135 of the user system sends CSAP to the approval unit 139 of the client system.
  • the approval unit of the client system confirms the CSAP.
  • the processing unit of the user system receives notice of such confirmation and operates to permit the user to access secured portions of the client system. If the approval unit 139 of the client system determines that the values do not match, then the user, the user system and the client display unit are not authenticated.
  • the CSAP generator 131 of the client system may be utilized to test conditions relating to the authentication of the user; the user system and the client display unit periodically through the generation of CSAP, the processing thereof by the processing unit of the client system and the transfer of such CSAP to other processing units of the verification system, user system, client display unit and storage of such CSAP in the storage unit of the client system, user system and client display unit, in accordance with the method described herein.
  • the approval unit of the client system determines that authentication conditions are not met in relation to the CSAP, for example, such as a determination that the CSAP received by the processing unit of the client system and the stored CSAP do not match, then the authentication (i.e., CSAP authentication) of the user, the user device and the client display unit will be rescinded and access to the secure area terminated for the user, the user device and the client display unit.
  • the authentication i.e., CSAP authentication
  • CSAP conditions for authentication applied in embodiments of the present invention may include conditions relating to any of the following: dimensions, geo-temporal, machine leamt artificial intelligence, behavioral, or any other conditions.
  • FIG. 15 Another embodiment of the present invention whereby the user uses the client display unit to attempt to validate a transaction through access to a secure portion of the client system is shown in FIG. 15.
  • the processing unit 153 of the client display unit sends a request to the processing unit 135 of the client system to validate a transaction.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system sends a request to the challenge generator 137 of the client system to generate a challenge.
  • the challenge generator 137 of the client system will generate a challenge and may further apply a hash value to the result of the challenge, and save the solution and/or the hash value in the storage unit 133 of the client system.
  • the challenge generator of the client system will send the challenge to the processing unit 135 of the client system.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system may apply symmetric and/or asymmetric encryption to the challenge.
  • the processing unit 135 will send the challenge to the processing unit 153 of the client display unit.
  • the processing unit 153 of the client display unit may decrypt the challenge using the key provided to it, and will send the challenge to the interaction unit 151 of the client display unit.
  • the user may be required to interact with the interaction unit 151 of the client display unit to find the solution to the challenge.
  • the processing unit 153 of the client display unit may solve the decrypted challenge.
  • the user solution is sent to the processing unit 153 of the client display unit.
  • the processing unit 153 of the client display unit may generate a hash value based upon the user solution, and the processing unit of the client display unit may further add either symmetric or asymmetric encryption to this hash value and/or to the solution.
  • the results of the processing by the processing unit of the client display unit e.g., a hash value or an encrypted hash value, or a solution or an encrypted solution
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system may send a request to the storage unit 133 of the client system to retrieve the stored solution and/or the stored hash value. Upon such a request the storage unit 133 of the client system will retrieve the stored solution and/or the stored hash value and send the stored solution and/or stored hash value to the processing unit 135 of the client system.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system will decrypt any encrypted hash value or encrypted solution and/or non-encrypted hash values it receives from the processing unit 153 of the client display unit.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system will send the hash value and/or solution it receives from the processing unit 153 of the client display unit (in an unencrypted form), and the stored solution and/or the stored has value, to the approval unit 139 of the client system for approval.
  • the approval unit 139 of the client system will compare the received solution to the stored solution, and/or the received hash value to the stored hash value.
  • the approval unit 139 will send confirmation to the processing unit 135 of the client system of a match. If the match is a positive the processing unit 135 of the client system will transmit the confirmation of the positive match to the client system to confirm that the authentication of the transaction has completed successfully and the client system will thereby authorize the transaction.
  • the approval unit 139 will send notice to the processing unit 135 of the client system that there is no match.
  • the processing unit of the client system will transmit the notice to the client system and advise the client system not to authenticate the transaction.
  • the processing unit of the verification system can perform the functions described for the processing unit of the client system in accordance with FIG. 14.
  • a challenge generator unit and an approval unit may be incorporated in either the client system or the verification system, and such challenge generator unit and approval unit will have the same functions as described in accordance with FIG. 14 of the challenge generator 137 and the approval unit 139.
  • FIG. 16 Another embodiment of the present invention whereby the user uses the user system to attempt to validate a transaction is shown in FIG. 16.
  • the processing unit 109 of the user system sends a request of the processing unit 135 of the client system to validate a transaction.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system sends a request to the challenge generator 137 to generate a challenge.
  • the challenge generator 137 will generate a challenge, and will further apply hash value to the result of the challenge (the solution of the challenge), and save the solution and/or hash value in the storage unit 133 of the client system.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system may apply symmetric and/or asymmetric encryption to the challenge.
  • the processing unit 135 will send the challenge, which may be encrypted, to the processing unit 109 of the user system.
  • the processing unit 109 of the user system may decrypt the challenge, if the challenge is encrypted, and will send the challenge to the interaction unit 103 of the user system.
  • the user may be required to interact with the interaction unit 103 of the user system to find the solution to the challenge.
  • the processing unit 109 of the user system may solve the decrypted challenge. Once the user finds a solution to the challenge, the user solution is sent to the processing unit 109 of the user system.
  • the processing unit 109 of the user system may generate a hash value based upon the user solution, and the processing unit 109 of the user system may further add either symmetric or asymmetric encryption to this hash value and/or to the solution.
  • the results of the processing by the processing unit 109 of the user system (e.g., a hash value or an encrypted hash value, and a solution or an encrypted solution) may be sent to the processing unit 135 of the client system.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system may send a request to the storage unit 133 of the client system to retrieve the stored solution and/or the stored hash value. Upon such a request the storage unit 133 of the client system will retrieve the stored solution and/or the stored hash value and send the stored solution and/or stored hash value to the processing unit 135 of the client system.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system will decrypt any encrypted hash value or encrypted solution it receives from the processing unit 109 of the user system.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system will send the hash value and solution it receives from the processing unit 109 of the user system (in an unencrypted form), and the stored solution and/or the stored has value, to the approval unit 139 of the client system for approval.
  • the approval unit 139 of the client system will compare the received solution to the stored solution, and/or the received hash value to the stored hash value.
  • the approval unit 139 will send confirmation to the processing unit 135 of the client system of a match.
  • the processing unit 135 of the client system will transmit the confirmation of a match to the client system to confirm that the authentication of the transaction is completed and successful.
  • the approval unit 139 will send notice to the processing unit of the client system that there is no match.
  • the processing unit of the client system will transmit the notice to the client system and advise the client system not to authenticate the transaction.
  • the processing unit of the verification system can perform the functions described for the processing unit of the client system in accordance with FIG. 16.
  • a challenge generator unit and an approval unit may be incorporated in either the client system or the verification system, and such challenge generator unit and approval unit will have the same functions as described in accordance with FIG. 16 of the challenge generator 137 and the approval unit 139.
  • a system and network for authentication may comprise one or more first peers, one or more servers, and one or more second peers, each comprising at least a processor and a transmitter/receiver.
  • One or more first peers and one or more second peers may additionally comprise a respective memory.
  • each of one or more first peers and one or second peers may comprise a visual display.
  • One or more servers may additionally comprise a database.
  • a transmitter/receiver of each of a first peer, a second peer, and a server may be configured to transmit and receive information from an exogenous source.
  • a first peer may be configured to transmit and receive information from a server
  • a server may be configured to transmit and receive information from both a first peer and a second peer
  • a second peer may be configured to transmit and receive information from a server.
  • a memory of a first peer and a second peer and a database of a server may be configured to store information and to allow information to be retrieved.
  • a visual display may additionally comprise a means for a user to interact with a display, e.g. enter data, select characters, select objects, etc.
  • a processor of a first peer, a second peer, or a server may comprise a processing migrator, a data manipulator, a data converter, a processing generator, and a processing verifier.
  • a processing migrator may be configured to migrate data from one component within a first peer, a second peer, or a server to another component within a first peer, a second peer, or a server.
  • a processing migrator may be configured to move data from a memory of a first peer to a processor of a first peer, or from a processor of a second peer to a transmitter/receiver of a second peer.
  • a data manipulator may be configured to manipulate data, e.g.
  • a data manipulator of a first peer may be configured to separate a one or more strings of characters into a first portion and a second portion, or a data manipulator of a server may be configured to combine a first portion of data with a second portion of data to produce a single packet of data.
  • a data converter may be configured to convert a first string of characters into a second string of characters, wherein each of a first string of characters and a second string of characters may be different in any one or more of length, composition, or arrangement.
  • a data converter may be configured to apply hash algorithms to a first string of characters.
  • a data converter may be configured to apply encryption protocols to a first string of characters.
  • a data converter may be configured to apply decryption protocols to a first string of characters.
  • a data converter may be configured to apply any combination of hash algorithms, encryption protocols, decryption protocols, or any other known method of data conversion to a first string of characters to produce a second string of characters.
  • a processing generator may be configured to produce data.
  • data may comprise a one or more strings of characters of any length and may comprise bar codes and the like.
  • data may be produced in either a random manner or in a directed manner.
  • a processing verifier may be configured to compare two or more data and determine if those data are identical or different.
  • a processing verifier and a processing generator may be paired to determine if a first string of characters and a second string of characters are identical and generate a response based on the identity of a first and second string of characters.
  • An authentication method may comprise a registration method 1700 and a user log-in method 2000.
  • a registration method 1700 may comprise creating one or more keys, distributing one or more keys, storing one or more keys on a local database, and storing one or more keys on a server database.
  • a registration method 1700 may additionally comprise communication between a first peer 1701, a server 1750, and at least one second peer 1775.
  • a server 1750 may receive a registration request 1702 from a first peer 1701.
  • a server 1750 may send registration data 1751 to a first peer 1701.
  • Registration data 1751 may comprise any data required for a registration method 1700.
  • registration data 1751 may comprise a client registration code 1703.
  • a client registration code 1703 may be made up of one or more characters comprising letters, numbers, symbols, or any combination thereof, and may be generated by a server 1750.
  • registration data comprises user selection objects.
  • registration data may comprise a combination of one or more of client registration codes 1703, user selection objects, and any other data required for registration.
  • a registration method 1700 may further comprise generating a server key 1705 and a client key 1706 from user input 1704.
  • a server key 1705 and a client key 1706 are used to generate a registration key 1707.
  • a server key 1705, a client key 1706, and at least one client registration code 1703 are used to generate a registration key 1707.
  • Other embodiments may comprise different combinations of client keys 1706, server keys 1705, and client registration codes 1703 being used to generate registration keys 1707.
  • Some information, e.g. a client key 1706, a client registration code 1703 may be stored in the memory 1708 of a first peer 1701.
  • a registration method 1700 may comprise transferring information from a first peer 1701 to a server 1750.
  • a registration key 1707 and a server key 1705 are transferred to a server 1750.
  • a registration method 1700 may comprise receiving information from a first peer 1701 at a server 1750.
  • information received at a server 1750 may comprise a registration key 1707 and a server key 1705.
  • a server 1750 may generate a recipient code 1752.
  • a server 1750 may generate a sender code 1754.
  • a server 1750 may generate a distribution code 1756.
  • a server key 1705, recipient code 1752, and sender code 1754 may be used to generate a distribution key 1753.
  • a distribution key 1753 may be generated from any one or more of server keys 1705, recipient codes 1752, or sender codes 1754, or any combination therein.
  • a recipient code 1752, a distribution key 1753 may be stored in the database 1757 of a server 1750.
  • a registration method 1700 may further comprise transferring information from a server 1750 to at least one second peer 1775.
  • a distribution key 1753 and a distribution code 1756 are transferred to at least one second peer 1775.
  • a registration method 1700 may further comprise storing one or more keys on a local database. Illustrated in Figure 17, at least one second peer 1775 may receive information from a server 1750.
  • information may comprise a distribution key 1753 and a distribution code 1756.
  • a second peer may generate a deposit code 1776. Further, a distribution key 1753 and a deposit code 1776 may be used to generate a deposit key 1777.
  • a deposit key 1777 may be generated using only a distribution key 1753, only a deposit code 1776, or any combination of distribution keys 1753 and deposit codes 1776. Some information, e.g. a distribution key 1753, a deposit key 1777, a distribution code 1756 may be stored in the memory 1758 of a second peer device 1775. A registration method 1700 may further comprise transferring information from a second peer 1775 to a server 1750. In some embodiments, a deposit key 1777 and a distribution code 1756 are transferred to a server 1750.
  • a registration method 1700 may comprise receiving information from a second peer 1775 and storing that information in a local database.
  • a server 1750 receives information from a second peer 1775.
  • Information received may comprise a deposit key 1777, a distribution code 1756, and other information needed for storage of information by the server 1750 or for identification of the second peer 1775.
  • a first peer 1801 may be any IoT device, i.e. any device that may connect to a network and have the ability to transmit data, including but not limited to cell phones, personal assistants, buttons, home security systems, appliances, and the like.
  • a first peer 1801 may request registration from a server 1850.
  • a server 1850 may transmit registration data to a first peer 1801.
  • Registration data may be received by a transmitter/receiver 1841 of a first peer 1801 and may comprise any data necessary to generate one or more keys 1800 at a first peer 1801.
  • registration data may comprise a client registration code 1803.
  • registration data may comprise a client registration code 1803 and additional data which may serve as a precursor to user input 1804.
  • a client registration code 1803 may comprise a one or more strings of characters of any length.
  • User input 1804 may comprise any form of user-generated data which comprises discreet units of information.
  • user input 1804 comprises biometric data, e.g. fingerprint, iris, etc.
  • biometric data may be split into discreet units of information comprising identifiers.
  • Identifiers may be converted into unique selection codes 1809.
  • user input 1804 may comprise any number of spatial and/or temporal data. Spatial and/or temporal data may be split into discreet units of information comprising identifiers.
  • Identifiers may be converted into unique selection codes 1809.
  • user input 1804 may comprise a combination of biometric data and spatial and/or temporal data, each of which may be used to generate unique selection codes 1809.
  • user input 1804 may comprise one or more selection objects.
  • One or more selection objects may be images, icons, tokens, buttons, or any other object that allows a user to select one or more selection objects from a group of selection objects.
  • selection objects may be received at a transmitter/receiver 1841 and a processing migrator 1842 may migrate selection objects to a visual display 1843.
  • selection objects may be converted into selection codes 1809 which may comprise any number of characters, e.g. letters, numbers, symbols.
  • selection objects are images that may be received from a server 1850.
  • Each image is assigned a unique selection code 1809, wherein user selection of a combination of selection objects produces a user input 1804 comprising a combination of selection codes 1809 that is unique to the user’s selection of selection objects.
  • any combination of biometric data, spatial and/or temporal data, and selection objects may comprise user input 1804.
  • a user may generate user input 1804 comprising two or more selection codes 1809, wherein the number of selection codes is equal to n.
  • a data manipulator 1844 may be configured to separate selection codes into two or more groups.
  • a data manipulator 1844 may be configured to separate selection codes 1809 into a first group 1810 and a second group 1811, wherein a first group 1810 comprises between one and n-1 selection codes 1809 and a second group 1811 comprises between one and n-1 selection codes 1809.
  • Each selection code 1809 in a first group 1810 and a second group 1811 may be individually converted 1812 into a one or more strings of characters, by a data converter 1845, resulting in a first group of converted selection codes 1813 and a second group of converted selection codes 1815.
  • conversion 1812 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 1812 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 1812 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a first group of converted selection codes 1813 may be used to generate a client pre-key 1814. Individual converted selection codes comprising a first group of converted selection codes 1813 may be combined by a data manipulator 1844 to form one or more strings of characters comprising a client pre-key 1814.
  • individual converted selection codes are combined through concatenation of units. Concatenation may comprise using each of the individual converted selection codes as a unit or may comprise using pieces of each individual converted selection code as a unit.
  • a client pre-key 1814 may be converted 1812 to a client key 1806 by a data converter 1845.
  • conversion 1812 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 1812 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 1812 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a client key 1812 may be stored in a memory 1808 of a first peer 1801 by a processing migrator 1842.
  • a second group of converted selection codes 1815 may be used to generate a server pre-key 1816.
  • Individual converted selection codes comprising a second group of converted selection codes 1815 may be combined by a data manipulator 1844 to form one or more strings of characters comprising a server pre-key 1816.
  • individual converted selection codes may be combined through concatenation of units. Concatenation may comprise using each of the individual converted selection codes as a unit or may comprise using pieces of each individual converted selection code as a unit.
  • a server pre-key 1816 may be converted 1812 to a server key 1805 by a data converter 1845.
  • conversion 1812 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 1812 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 1812 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a registration key 1807 may be generated.
  • Each of a client key 1806 and a server key 1805 may be separated by a data manipulator 1844 into a client key first part 1817, a client key second part 1818, a server key first part 1819, and a server key second part 1820.
  • a client key 1806 may be separated into three or more parts.
  • a server key 1805 may be separated into three or more parts.
  • a client key first part 1817 and a client key second part 1818 may comprise different portions of the characters that comprise a client key 1806.
  • each of a client key first part 1817 and a client key second part 1818 may be one half of a client key 1806.
  • a server key first part 1819 and a server key second part 1820 may comprise different portions of the characters that comprise a server key 1805.
  • each of a server key first part 1819 and a server key second part 1820 may be one half of a server key 1805.
  • a client key first part 1817, a client key second part 1818, a server key first part 1819, and a server key second part 1820 may be combined by a data manipulator 1844 through concatenation of units to form one or more strings of characters comprising a first pre-key 1821.
  • Concatenation by a data manipulator 1844 may comprise using each of a client key first part 1817, a client key second part 1818, a server key first part 1819, and a server key second part 1820 as a unit or may comprise using pieces of a client key first part 1817, a client key second part 1818, a server key first part 1819, and a server key second part 1820 as a unit. Further, concatenation may comprise using any combination of parts generated by separation of a client key 1806 or a server key 1805.
  • a first pre-key 1821 may be converted 1812 by a data converter 1845 into a one or more strings of characters comprising a second pre-key 1822. In some embodiments, conversion 1812 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 1812 may comprise using encryption methods. Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 1812 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a second pre-key 1822 may be used to generate a registration pre-key 1823.
  • a second pre-key 1822 and a client registration code 1803 may be concatenated by a data manipulator 1844 to form one or more strings of characters comprising a registration pre-key 1823. Concatenation may comprise using each of a second pre-key 1822 and a client registration code 1803 as a unit or may comprise using pieces of a second pre-key 1822 and a client registration code 1803 as a unit.
  • a registration pre-key 1823 may be converted 1812 by a data converter 1845 into a one or more strings of characters comprising a registration key 1807.
  • conversion 1812 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 1812 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 1812 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a first peer 1801 may transmit information to a server 1850.
  • a processing migrator 1842 of a first peer 1801 may migrate a registration key 1807 and a server key 1805 to a transmitter/receiver 1841 of a first peer 1801, which may transmit a registration key 1807 and a server key 1805 to a server 1850.
  • a transmitter/receiver 1841 of a first peer 1801 may transmit a registration key 1807, a server key 1805, and other information necessary for a registration method to a server 1850.
  • a registration method may further comprise distributing one or more keys 1900. Illustrated in Figure 19, a transmitter/receiver 1941 of a server 1950 may receive information from a first peer 1901. According to some embodiments, a transmitter/receiver 1941 of a server 1950 may receive a registration key 1907 from a first peer 1901. A transmitter/receiver 1941 of a server 1950 may receive a server key 1905 from a first peer 1901. A transmitter/receiver 1941 of a server 1950 may receive both a registration key 1907 and a server key 1905 from a first peer 1901. A processing migrator 1942 may migrate a registration key 1907 and a server key 1905 to a processor of a server 1950.
  • a registration key 1907 may be stored in a database 1957 of a server 1950 by a processing migrator 1942.
  • a processing generator 1946 of a server 1950 may generate a peer list 1958.
  • a peer list 1958 may comprise a list of peer devices, e.g. a first peer 1901, a second peer 1975, on the network.
  • a peer list may also comprise recipient codes 1952 and distribution codes 1956, which may comprise a one or more strings of characters of any length.
  • a processing generator 1946 of a server 1950 may generate a sender code 1954, which may also comprise a one or more strings of characters of any length.
  • a server 1950 may receive a registration key 1907 from a first peer 1901.
  • a registration key 1907 may be used to generate any number of registration key subparts.
  • a data manipulator may generate registration key subparts from a registration key 1907.
  • a registration key 1907 may comprise any number of characters equal to n.
  • Each registration key subpart may comprise any number or combination of characters equal to n-1.
  • a server 1950 may generate one or more random strings of characters.
  • Each of a registration subpart may be concatenated with one or more random strings of characters by a data manipulator 1944.
  • concatenated strings may be converted 1912.
  • Each generated concatenated string or converted concatenated string may be transmitted to one or more second peers 1975.
  • a server 1950 may receive a server key 1908 from a first peer 1901.
  • a server key 1908 may be used to generate any number of server key subparts.
  • a data manipulator may generate server key subparts from a server key 1908.
  • server key 1908 may comprise any number of characters equal to n.
  • Each server key subpart may comprise any number or combination of characters equal to n-1.
  • a server 1950 may generate one or more random strings of characters.
  • Each of a server key subpart may be concatenated with one or more random strings of characters by a data manipulator 1944.
  • concatenated strings may be converted 1912.
  • Each generated concatenated string or converted concatenated string may be transmitted to one or more second peers 1975.
  • a data manipulator 1944 of a server 1950 may generate a distribution pre-key 1959 by combining any combination of a server key 1905, a recipient code 1952, a sender code 1954, a distribution code 1956, or a registration key 1907.
  • a distribution pre-key is comprised of a server key 1905, a sender code 1954, and a recipient code 1952, which may be combined through concatenation of units to form one or more strings of characters. Concatenation may comprise using each of a server key 1905, a sender code 1954, and a recipient code 1952 as a unit or may comprise using pieces of a server key 1905, a sender code 1954, and a recipient code 1952 as a unit.
  • a distribution pre-key 1959 may be converted 1912 by a data converter 1945 into a one or more strings of characters comprising a distribution key 1953.
  • conversion 1912 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 1912 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 1912 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a distribution key 1953 may be stored in a database 1957 of a server 1950 by a processing migrator 1942.
  • a server 1950 may be configured to transmit information to a second peer 1975.
  • a processing migrator 1942 of a server 1950 may migrate a distribution key 1953 and a distribution code 1956 to a transmitter/receiver 1941 of a server 1950.
  • a transmitter/receiver 1941 of a server 1950 may transmit a distribution key 1953, a distribution code 1956, and other information necessary for a registration method to a second peer 1975.
  • a server 1950 may store any combination of a registration key 1907, a server key 1905, and a distribution key 1953 at a database 1957 of a server 1950.
  • a server 1950 may generate more than one distribution keys 1953 and transmit data to more than one second peer 1975.
  • a peer list 1958 may comprise a list of more than one second peers 1975 on the network.
  • a second peer may comprise any IoT device, server, or any device that is on a network and capable of transmitting and receiving data from a server 1950.
  • a server 1950 may generate a unique distribution code 1956 for each second peer 1975.
  • a server 1950 may generate a unique recipient code 1952 for each second peer 1975.
  • a distribution key 1953 created for each second peer 1975 may be different from distribution keys 1953 created for other second peers 1975, although underlying server keys 1905 received from a first peer 1901 may be identical.
  • a registration key 1907 may be used to generate a distribution pre-key 1959.
  • any combination of a registration key 1907, a sender code 1954, a recipient code 1952, and a server key 1905 may be used to generate a distribution pre-key 1959.
  • a registration method 1700 may comprise storing one or more keys on a local database.
  • a second peer 1775 may be configured to receive and transmit information to a server 1750 through a transmitter/receiver of a second peer 1775.
  • a second peer 1775 may receive a distribution key 1753 from a server 1750 through a transmitter/receiver of a second peer 1775.
  • a second peer 1775 may receive a distribution code 1756 from a server 1750.
  • a second peer 1775 may receive a distribution key 1753 and a distribution code 1756 from a server 1750.
  • a distribution key 1753 and a distribution code 1756 may be stored in a memory 1778 of a second peer 1775.
  • a second peer 1775 may generate a deposit code 1776.
  • a deposit code 1776 may be a one or more strings of characters of any length and may be generated in a random fashion. Alternatively, a deposit code 1776 may be generated by a server 1750 and received by a second peer 1775.
  • a deposit code 1776 and a distribution key 1753 may be combined through concatenation of units to form one or more strings of characters comprising a deposit pre-key 1779. Concatenation may comprise using each of a deposit code 1776 and a distribution key 1753 as a unit or may comprise using pieces of deposit code 1776 and a distribution key 1753 as a unit.
  • a deposit pre-key 1779 may be converted 1712 into a one or more strings of characters comprising a deposit key 1777.
  • conversion 1712 may comprise using hash algorithms. In other embodiments, conversion 1712 may comprise using encryption methods. Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 1712 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a deposit key 1777 may be stored in a memory 1778 of a second peer 1775. In some embodiments, a second peer 1775 may transmit a deposit key 1777 and a distribution code 1756 to a server 1750. In other embodiments, a second peer 1775 may transmit a deposit key 1777, a distribution code 1756, and any other information necessary for a registration method 1700 to a server 1750.
  • a registration method 1700 may further comprise storing one or more keys on a server database.
  • a transmitter/receiver 1941 of a server 1950 may receive information from a second peer 1975.
  • a transmitter/receiver 1941 of a server 1950 may receive a distribution code 1956.
  • a transmitter/receiver 1941 of a server 1950 may receive a deposit key 1977.
  • a transmitter/receiver 1941 of a server 1950 may receive a distribution code 1956 and a deposit key 1977.
  • a transmitter/receiver 1941 of a server 1950 may receive a distribution code 1956, a deposit key 1977, and any other information necessary for a registration method.
  • a distribution code 1956 and a deposit key 1977 may be stored in a database 1957 of a server 1950 by a processing migrator 1942.
  • a registration method 1700 may comprise creating one or more keys, distributing one or more keys, storing one or more keys on a local database, and storing one or more keys on a server database. Illustrated in Figure 17, a registration method 1700 may begin with a request for registration 1702 from a first peer 1701. A request for registration 1702 may be transmitted to and received by one or more servers 1750. One or more servers may transmit registration data 1751 to a first peer 1701. Referring now to Figure 18, a specific embodiment may comprise a first peer 1801 receiving registration data from a server 1850. Registration data may comprise a client registration code 1803 and one or more selection objects. A client registration code 1803 may comprise a single, eight-digit string of characters.
  • Selection objects may comprise a number of images. In a specific embodiment, selection objects may comprise a number of selection objects equal to 60. Each selection object may contain a unique selection code 1809. A selection code 1809 may comprise a one or more strings of characters, and in a specific embodiment, each selection code may comprise a string of five characters. A user may select a number of selection objects from selection objects received by a server 1850. In a specific embodiment, a user may select six selection objects. A user’s selection of selection objects may generate user input 1804 comprising a collection of selection codes 1809 that may be chosen by selecting specific selection object associated with each selection code 1809. In a specific embodiment, user input 1804 comprises six, five- character selection codes 1809.
  • User input 1804 may be separated into a first group 1810 and a second group 1811.
  • each of a first group 1810 and a second group 1811 comprises three different selection codes 1809.
  • Each selection code 1809 comprising a first group 1810 and a second group 1811 may be converted 1812 into one or more strings of characters.
  • each selection code 1809 may be converted using a hash algorithm and may collectively comprise a first group of converted selection codes 1813 and a second group of converted selection codes 1815, respectively.
  • Each of a first group of converted selection codes 1813 and a second group of converted selection codes 1815 may be combined to generate each of a client pre-key 1814 and a server pre-key 1816, respectively.
  • three converted selection codes comprising a first group of converted selection codes 1813 may be concatenated to produce one or more strings of characters comprising a client pre-key 1814.
  • three converted selection codes comprising a second group of converted selection codes 1815 may be concatenated to produce one or more strings of characters comprising a server pre-key 1816.
  • a client pre-key 1814 and a server pre-key 1816 may be converted 1812 to a client key 1806 and a server key 1805, respectively.
  • conversion 1812 comprises using a hash algorithm.
  • a registration key 1807 may be generated using a combination of client key 1806, server key 1805, and client registration code 1803.
  • a client key 1806 and server key 1805 are separated into a first part 1817 and 1819, and a second part 1818 and 1820, respectively.
  • a first pre-key 1821 may be generated by combining any part of a client key 1806 and any part of a server key 1805 by concatenation to form one or more strings of characters.
  • a first pre-key 1821 may be converted 1812 into one or more strings of characters comprising a second pre-key 1822.
  • conversion 1812 comprises using a hash algorithm.
  • a registration pre-key 1823 may be generated by combining a client registration code 1803 and a second pre-key 1822 by concatenation to form one or more strings of characters.
  • a registration pre-key 1823 may be converted 1812 to a registration key 1807, where conversion 1812 comprises using a hash algorithm.
  • a client key 1806 and a client registration code 1803 may be stored in a memory 1808 of a first peer 1801. Further, a server key 1805 and a registration key 1807 may be transmitted to one or more servers 1850.
  • a registration method may comprise distributing one or more keys.
  • a server 1950 may receive a registration key 1907 and a server key 1905 from a first peer 1901.
  • a registration key may be stored in a database 1957 of a server 1950.
  • a server 1950 may generate a peer list 1958, which may comprise a list of second peers 1975 on the network.
  • a server 1950 may generate a recipient code 1952 and a distribution code 1956.
  • a recipient code 1952 and a distribution code 1956 may be unique to both a specific second peer 1975 and a specific transaction.
  • a server 1950 may generate a sender code 1954 that may be unique to a particular server 1950.
  • a recipient code 1952, a sender code 1954, and a server key 1905 may be combined through concatenation to produce one or more strings of characters comprising a distribution pre-key 1959.
  • a distribution pre-key 1959 may be converted 1912 into a distribution key 1953.
  • conversion 1912 may comprise using a hash algorithm.
  • multiple unique distribution keys 1953 may be generated, each comprising a different recipient code 1952 and having a different associated distribution code 1956 from a peer list 1958, wherein each unique distribution key 1953 may be ultimately transmitted to a different second peer 1975.
  • multiple unique distribution keys 1953 are generated from an identical server key 1905 and each of the unique distribution keys 1953 is transmitted to a separate second peer 1975 on a network.
  • a registration method may further comprise storing one or more keys on a local database, illustrated in Figure 17.
  • a second peer 1775 may receive a distribution key 1753 and a distribution code 1756 from a server 1750.
  • a second peer 1775 may be one of several second peers 1775 in a network to receive distribution keys 1753 and distribution codes 1756 arising from a same transaction between a first peer 1701 and a server 1750 discussed above.
  • a second peer 1775 may store a distribution key 1753 and a distribution code 1756 in a memory 1778 of a second peer 1775.
  • a second peer 1775 may generate a deposit code 1776.
  • a deposit code 1776 comprises a single string of eight characters.
  • a deposit code 1776 and a distribution key 1753 may be combined through concatenation to produce one or more strings of characters comprising a deposit pre-key 1779.
  • a deposit pre-key 1779 may be converted 1712 to a deposit key 1777.
  • conversion 1712 comprises using a hash algorithm.
  • a second peer 1775 may transmit information to one or more servers 1750. In a specific embodiment, several second peers 1775 may transmit information to a server 1750.
  • Information may comprise a distribution code 1756, a deposit key 1777, and any other information necessary to perform a registration process 1700.
  • a registration method 1700 may comprise storing one or more keys on a server database.
  • a server 1750 may be configured to receive information from one or more second peers 1775.
  • a server 1750 may receive information from several second peers 1775, information comprising distribution codes 1756 and deposit keys 1777.
  • a server 1750 may store distribution codes 1756 and deposit keys 1777 in a database 1757.
  • distribution codes 1956 and deposit keys 1977 may be stored on a peer list 1958 stored inside a database 1957.
  • distribution codes 1956 and deposit keys 1977 are paired with stored distribution keys 1953 and recipient codes 1952 which may be specific to a transaction conducted between a first peer 1901, a server 1950, and a specific second peer 1975.
  • An authentication method may comprise a login method, illustrated in Figure 20.
  • a login method 2000 may comprise creating one or more login keys, distributing one or more verification keys, verifying a verification key in a local database, and validating a verification process. Additionally, a login method 2000 may comprise communication between one or more first peers 2001, one or more servers 2050, and one or more second peers 2075.
  • a login method 2000 may comprise a first peer 2001, wherein the first peer may be configured to interact with a user.
  • a first peer 2001 may request login 2002 and a login request 2002 may be transmitted to one or more servers 2050.
  • a server 2050 may receive a login request 2002 and generate login data 2051.
  • login data 2051 may comprise a login salt 2024.
  • a login salt may be made up of one or more characters comprising letters, numbers, symbols, or any combination thereof.
  • login data 2051 may comprise user selection objects.
  • login data 2051 may comprise one or more login salts 2024 and user selection objects, and any other data required for a login method 2000.
  • Creating one or more login keys may further comprise generating a server key 2005 and a client key 2006 from user input 2004.
  • a server key 2005 and a client key 2006 may be used to generate a login key 2099.
  • a server key 2005, a client key 2006, and at least login salt 2024 may be used to generate a login key 2099.
  • Other embodiments may comprise different combinations of client keys 2006, server keys 2005, and login salts 2024 being used to generate login keys 2099.
  • Some information, e.g. a client key 2006, a login salt 2024 may be stored in the memory 2008 of a first peer 2001.
  • creating one or more login keys may comprise transferring information from a first peer 2001 to a server 2050.
  • a login key 2099 and a server key 2005 are transferred to a server 2050.
  • distributing one or more verification keys may comprise receiving information from a first peer 2001 at a server 2050.
  • information received at a server 2050 may comprise a login key 2099 and a server key 2005.
  • a server 2050 may generate a recipient code 2052.
  • a server 2050 may generate a sender code 2054.
  • a server 2050 may generate a distribution code 2056.
  • a server key 2005, recipient code 2052, and sender code 2054 may be used to generate a verification key 2062.
  • a verification key 2062 may be generated from one or more server keys 2005, recipient codes 2052, verification salts 2024 or sender codes 2054, or any combination therein.
  • a recipient code 2052, a verification key 2062 may be stored in the database 2057 of a server 2050. In some embodiments, a verification key 2062 may not be stored in the database 2057 of a server 2050. Distributing one or more verification keys may further comprise transferring information from a server 2050 to at least one second peer 2075. In some embodiments, a verification key 2062 and a distribution code 2056 are transferred to at least one second peer 2075.
  • a login method 2000 may further comprise verifying one or more verification keys on a local database. Illustrated in Figure 20, at least one second peer 2075 may receive information from a server 2050. In some embodiments, information may comprise a verification key 2062 and a distribution code 2056. In other embodiments, information may comprise a verification key 2062, a distribution code 2056, and a verification salt 2063. A second peer 2075 may use any combination of a distribution code 2056 and a verification key 2062 to locate and confirm that a corresponding distribution key may be stored in a memory 2078 of a second peer 2075. A stored distribution key may be used to generate confirmation key 2081.
  • a stored distribution key 2053 and a verification salt 2063 received from a server 2050 may be used to generate a confirmation key 2081.
  • a second peer 2075 may transmit information to a server 2050, which may comprise any combination of a confirmation key 2081, a distribution code 2056, and any other information that may be necessary for a login method 2000.
  • Validating a verification process may comprise receiving information from a second peer 2075 and comparing received information against information stored in a database 2057 of a server 2050.
  • a server 2050 receives information from a second peer 2075.
  • Information received may comprise a confirmation key 2081, a result, a distribution code 2056 and other information needed for storage or comparison of information by the server 2050 or for identification of the second peer 2075.
  • a first peer 2101 may be any IoT device, i.e. any device that may connect to a network and have the ability to transmit data, including but not limited to cell phones, personal assistants, buttons, home security systems, appliances, and the like.
  • a first peer 2101 may request login from a server 2150.
  • a transmitter/receiver of a server 2150 may transmit login data to a first peer 2101.
  • Login data may be received by a transmitter/receiver 2141 of a first peer 2101 and may comprise any data necessary to initiate a login method at a first peer 2101.
  • login data may comprise a login salt 2124.
  • login data may comprise a login salt 2124 and additional data which may serve as a precursor to user input 2104.
  • a login salt 2124 may comprise a one or more strings of characters of any length.
  • user input 2104 may comprise any form of user-generated data which comprises discreet units of information.
  • user input 2104 comprises biometric data, e.g. fingerprint, iris, etc.
  • biometric data may be split into discreet units of information comprising identifiers. Identifiers may be converted into unique selection codes 2109.
  • user input 2104 may comprise one or more selection objects.
  • One or more selection objects may be images, icons, tokens, buttons, or any other object that allows a user to select one or more selection objects from a group of selection objects.
  • Selection objects may be displayed on a visual display 2143 of a first peer 2101 and may be converted into selection codes 2109 which may comprise any number of characters, e.g. letters, numbers, symbols.
  • selection objects are images that may be received from a server 2150. Each image is assigned a unique selection code 2109, wherein user selection of a combination of selection objects produces a user input 2104 comprising a combination of selection codes 2109 that is unique to the user’s selection of selection objects.
  • a user may generate user input 2104 comprising two or more selection codes 2109, wherein the number of selection codes is equal to n.
  • Selection codes 2109 may be separated by a data manipulator 2144 into a first group 2110 and a second group 2111, wherein a first group 2110 comprises between one and n-1 selection codes 2109 and a second group 2111 comprises between one and n-1 selection codes 2109.
  • Each selection code 2109 in a first group 2110 and a second group 2111 may be individually converted 2112 by a data converter 2145 into a one or more strings of characters, resulting in a first group of converted selection codes 2113 and a second group of converted selection codes 2115.
  • conversion 2112 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 2112 may comprise using encryption methods. Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 2112 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a first group of converted selection codes 2113 may be used to generate a client pre-key 2114. Individual converted selection codes comprising a first group of converted selection codes 2113 may be combined by a data manipulator 2144 to form one or more strings of characters comprising a client pre-key 2114. In some embodiments, individual converted selection codes may be combined through concatenation of units. Concatenation may comprise using each of the individual converted selection codes as a unit or may comprise using pieces of each individual converted selection code as a unit.
  • a client pre-key 2114 may be converted 2112 by a data converter 2145 to a client key 2106.
  • conversion 2112 may comprise using hash algorithms. In other embodiments, conversion 2112 may comprise using encryption methods. Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 2112 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a client key 2106 may be stored by a processing migrator 2147 in a memory unit 2108 of a first peer 2101.
  • a client key 2106 generated by a login method may be compared by a processing verifier 2147 to a client key 2106 stored in a memory 2108 of a first peer 2101 during a registration process for identity.
  • a second group of converted selection codes 2115 may be used to generate a server pre-key 2116.
  • Individual converted selection codes comprising a second group of converted selection codes 2115 may be combined by a data manipulator 2144 to form one or more strings of characters comprising a server pre-key 2116.
  • individual converted selection codes may be combined through concatenation of units. Concatenation may comprise using each of the individual converted selection codes as a unit or may comprise using pieces of each individual converted selection code as a unit.
  • a server pre-key 2116 may be converted 2112 by a data converter 2145 to a server key 2105.
  • conversion 2112 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 2112 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 2112 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a login key 2199 may be generated.
  • Each of a client key 2106 and a server key 2105 may be separated by a data manipulator 2144 into a client key first part 2117, a client key second part 2118, a server key first part 2119, and a server key second part 2120.
  • a client key first part 2117 and a client key second part 2118 may comprise different portions of the characters that comprise a client key 2106.
  • each of a client key first part 2117 and a client key second part 2118 may be one half of a client key 2106.
  • a server key first part 2119 and a server key second part 2120 may comprise different portions of the characters that comprise a server key 2105.
  • each of a server key first part 2119 and a server key second part 2120 may be one half of a server key 2105.
  • a client key first part 2117, a client key second part 2118, a server key first part 2119, and a server key second part 2120 may be combined by a data manipulator 2144 through concatenation of units to form one or more strings of characters comprising a first pre-key 2121.
  • Concatenation may comprise using each of a client key first part 2117, a client key second part 2118, a server key first part 2119, and a server key second part 2120 as a unit or may comprise using pieces of a client key first part 2117, a client key second part 2118, a server key first part 2119, and a server key second part 2120 as a unit.
  • a first pre-key 2121 may be converted 2112 by a data converter 2145 into a one or more strings of characters comprising a second pre-key 2122.
  • conversion 2112 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 2112 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 2112 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a second pre-key 2122 may be used to generate a registration pre-key 2123.
  • a second pre-key 2122 and a client registration code 2103 may be concatenated by a data manipulator 2144 to form one or more strings of characters comprising a registration pre-key 2123.
  • Concatenation may comprise using each of a second pre-key 2122 and a client registration code 2103 as a unit or may comprise using pieces of a second pre-key 2122 and a client registration code 2103 as a unit.
  • a client registration code 2103 may be stored in a memory 2108 of a first peer 2101 by a processing migrator 2142 during a registration process.
  • a registration pre-key 2123 may be converted 2112 by a data converter 2144 into a one or more strings of characters comprising a registration key 2107.
  • conversion 2112 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 2112 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 2112 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a registration key 2107 may be identical to a registration key 1707 generated by a first peer 1701 during a registration method 1700, shown in Figure 17.
  • a registration key 2107 may be used to generate a login key 2199.
  • a registration key 2107 and a login salt 2124 are used to generate a login key 2199.
  • a registration key 2107 and a login salt 2024 may be concatenated by a data manipulator 2144 to form one or more strings of characters comprising a login pre-key 2198. Concatenation may comprise using each of a registration key 2107 and a login salt 2024 as a unit or may comprise using pieces of a registration key 2107 and a login salt 2024 as a unit.
  • a login pre-key 2198 may be used to generate a login key 2199.
  • a login pre-key 2198 may be converted 2112 by a data converter 2145 to a login key 2199.
  • conversion 2112 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 2112 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 2112 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a first peer 2101 may transmit information to a server 2150.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2141 of a first peer 2101 may transmit a login key 2199 and a server key 2105 to a server 2150.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2141 of a first peer 2101 may transmit a login key 2199, a server key 2105, and other information necessary for a login method to a server 2150.
  • a login method may further comprise distributing one or more verification keys.
  • a server 2250 may receive information from a first peer 2201.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2241 of a server 2250 may receive a login key 2299 from a first peer 2201.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2241 of a server 2250 may receive a server key 2205 from a first peer 2201.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2241 of a server 2250 may receive both a login key 2299 and a server key 2205 from a first peer 2201.
  • a server 2250 may generate a comparison login key 2260.
  • a comparison login key 2260 may be generated using a registration key 2207 that has been stored in a database 2257 of a server 2250 during a registration method.
  • a processing migrator 2242 of a server 2250 may migrate a registration key 2207 and a login salt 2224 from a database 2257.
  • a data manipulator 2244 of a server 2250 may combine a registration key 2207 and a login salt 2224 by concatenation to generate a comparison login pre-key.
  • a comparison login pre-key may be converted 2212 by a data converter 2245 to a comparison login key 2260.
  • conversion 2212 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 2212 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 2212 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a processing verifier 2247 of a server 2250 may compare a comparison login key 2260 to a login key 2299 sent by a first peer 2201 to determine if a first peer 2201 may be communicated with.
  • a login key 2299 may be stored in a database 2257 of a server 2250 by a processing migrator 2242.
  • a server may access a previously stored peer list 2258 using a data migrator 2242.
  • a stored peer list 2258 may comprise a list of peer devices, e.g. a first peer 2201, a second peer 2275, on the network.
  • a peer list may also comprise recipient codes 2252 and distribution codes 2256, which may comprise a one or more strings of characters of any length.
  • a processing generator 2246 of a server 2250 may generate a sender code 2254, which may also comprise a one or more strings of characters of any length.
  • a data manipulator 2244 of a server 2250 may generate a distribution pre-key 2259 by combining any combination of a server key 2205, a recipient code 2252, a sender code 2254, a distribution code 2256, or a login key 2299.
  • a distribution pre-key 2259 is comprised of a server key 2205, a sender code 2254, and a recipient code 2252, which may be combined through concatenation of units to form one or more strings of characters.
  • Concatenation may comprise using each of a server key 2205, a sender code 2254, and a recipient code 2252 as a unit or may comprise using pieces of a server key 2205, a sender code 2254, and a recipient code 2252 as a unit.
  • a distribution pre-key 2259 may be converted 2212 by a data converter 2245 into a one or more strings of characters comprising a distribution key 2253.
  • conversion 2212 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 2212 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 2212 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a distribution key 2253 may be stored in a database 2257 of a server 2250.
  • a verification pre-key 2261 may be generated by a data manipulator 2244 of a server 2250.
  • a distribution key 2253 and a verification salt 2263 generated by a processing generator 2246 of a server 2250 and comprising any number of characters, may be concatenated to generate a verification pre-key 2261.
  • a verification pre-key 2261 may be converted 2212 by a data converter 2245 into a verification key 2262.
  • conversion 2212 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 2212 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 2212 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a server 2250 may be configured to transmit information to a second peer 2275.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2241 of a server 2250 may transmit a verification key 2262 and a distribution code 2256 to a second peer 2275.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2241 of a server 2250 may transmit a verification key 2262, a distribution code 2256, a verification salt 2263, and other information necessary for a login method 2000 to a second peer 2275.
  • a server 2250 may transmit any combination of a distribution key 2253, a verification salt 2263, and a distribution code 2256 to a second peer 2275.
  • a server 2250 may generate more than one verification keys 2262 and transmit data to more than one second peer 2275.
  • a peer list 2258 may comprise a list of more than one second peers 2275 on the network.
  • a second peer may comprise any IoT device, server, or any device that is on a network and capable of transmitting and receiving data from a server 2250.
  • a server 2250 may generate a unique distribution code 2256 for each second peer 2275.
  • a server 2250 may generate a unique recipient code 2252 for each second peer 2275.
  • a verification key 2262 created for each second peer 2275 may be different from verification keys 2262 created for other second peers 2275, although underlying server keys 2205 received from a first peer 2201 may be identical. Verification keys 2262 may or may not be stored at a database 2257 of a server 2250.
  • a login method may comprise verifying one or more login keys on a local database.
  • a second peer 2375 may be configured to receive and transmit information to a server 2350.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2341 of a second peer 2375 may receive a verification key 2362 from a server 2350.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2341 of a second peer 2375 may receive a distribution code 2356 from a server 2350.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2341 of a second peer 2375 may receive a verification key 2362, a distribution code 2356, and verification salt 2363 from a server 2350.
  • a distribution code 2356 may be compared by a processing verifier 2347 across all distribution codes 2356 stored in a memory 2378 of a second peer 2375. If a distribution code 2356 received from a server 2350 is identical to a distribution code 2356 stored in a memory 2378 of a second peer 2375, then a processing generator 2346 of a second peer 2375 may produce a result 2382 that is affirmative. If a distribution code 2356 received by a second peer 2375 is not identical to a distribution code 2356 stored in a memory 2378 of a second peer 2375, then a processing generator 2346 of a second peer 2375 may produce a result 2382 that is negative. In some embodiments, a verification key 2362 is also used to locate identical distribution codes 2356.
  • a processing migrator 2342 of a second peer 2375 may remove a distribution key 2353 that is associated with a matching distribution code 2356 from a memory 2378.
  • a distribution key 2353 removed from a memory 2378 of a second peer 2375 and a verification salt 2363 may be used by a data manipulator 2344 to generate a confirmation pre-key 2380 by concatenation.
  • a confirmation pre key 2380 may be converted 2312 by a data converter 2345 to a confirmation key 2381.
  • conversion 2312 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 2312 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 2312 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a second peer 2375 may receive a distribution key and a verification salt 2363 from a server 2350.
  • a second peer 2375 may generate a verification key 2362 at a second peer 2375 by concatenation of a distribution key and a verification salt 2363 to generate a verification pre-key.
  • a verification pre-key may be converted 2312 to a verification kay 2362.
  • a second peer 2375 may generate a comparison verification key 2383.
  • a second peer 2375 may generate a comparison verification key 2383 by concatenation of a stored distribution key 2353 and a verification salt 2363 received from a server 2350 to generate a comparison verification pre-key.
  • a comparison verification pre-key may be converted 2312 to a comparison verification key.
  • a comparison verification key 2383 may be compared by a processing verifier 2347 to a received verification key 2362 and a result 2382 may be generated.
  • a result 2382 may comprise a result generated from comparing a verification key 2362 to a comparison verification key 2383 and a result generated from comparing a received distribution code 2356 to a stored distribution code 2356.
  • a confirmation key 2381 may be generated from a verification salt 2363 and a deposit key 2377 retrieved from a memory 2378 of a second peer 2375.
  • a deposit key 2377 and a verification salt 2363 may be concatenated by a data manipulator 2344 to generate a confirmation pre-key 2380.
  • a confirmation pre-key 2380 may be converted 2312 to a confirmation key 2381. Any combination of a confirmation key 2381, a distribution code 2356, and a result 2382 may be transmitted from a second peer 2375 to a server 2350.
  • a second peer 2375 may be configured to transmit data to a server 2350.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2341 of a second peer 2375 may transmit any combination of a result 2382, a distribution code 2356, and a confirmation key 2381 to a server 2350.
  • a second peer 2375 may be configured to delete all data associated with a transaction.
  • a second peer 2375 may delete any combination of a distribution code 2356, a deposit key 2377, a distribution key 2353, a verification key 2362, a verification salt 2326, a confirmation pre-key 2380, and a confirmation key 2381 from a memory 2378 of a second peer 2375 or from a processor of a second peer 2375.
  • deletion of data may occur contemporaneously with transmitting data to a server 2350. In other embodiments, deletion of data may occur after transmitting data to a server 2350.
  • a login method may further comprise validating a verification process 2400.
  • a server 2450 may be configured to receive data from a one or more second peers 2475.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2441 of a server 2450 may receive any combination of a confirmation key 2481, a result 2482, and a distribution code 2456.
  • a server 2450 may acknowledge a result 2482 received from a second peer 2475.
  • a processing verifier 2447 of a server 2450 may compare a distribution code 2456 received from a second peer 2475 to all or some distribution codes 2456 stored in a database 2457 of a server 2450.
  • a processing migrator 2442 of a server 2450 may retrieve any combination of a verification salt 2463 and a distribution key 2453 which may be associated with a distribution code 2456 and stored in a database 2457 of a server 2450.
  • a retrieved distribution key 2453 may be a distribution key 2453 which was stored during a registration process.
  • a retrieved verification salt 2463 and a retrieved distribution key 2453 may be used by a data manipulator 2444 to generate a verification pre-key 2461 through concatenation of a verification salt 2463 and a distribution key 2453.
  • a verification pre-key 2461 may be converted 2412 by a data converter 2445 to a verification key 2462.
  • conversion 2412 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 2412 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 2412 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a processing verifier 2447 of a server 2450 may compare a generated verification key 2462 to a confirmation key 2481 received from a second peer 2475 and a processing generator 2246 may produce an authentication result 2464. If a verification key 2462 is identical to a confirmation key 2481 received from a second peer 2475, a result might be affirmative, e.g. authentication success. If a verification key 2462 is not identical to a confirmation key 2481 received from a second peer 2475, then an authentication result 2464 may be negative, e.g. authentication failure or threat.
  • a processing migrator 2442 of a server 2450 may store an authentication result 2464 in a database 2457. In some embodiments, an authentication result 2464 is stored with an associated distribution key 2453 generated during a registration method.
  • a server 2450 may send new distribution keys 2453 to one or more second peers 2475.
  • a server 1950 may generate a new peer list 1958 in a database 1957 of a server 1950.
  • a server 1950 may assign any combination of a new recipient code 1952 and a new distribution code 1956 and use any combination of a new recipient code 1952 and a new distribution code 1956 to generate a new distribution key 1953, in a method which may be identical to distributing one or more distribution keys 1900.
  • a server 1950 may transmit newly generated distribution keys 1953 to second peers 1975 which may be different from second peers 1975 which previously stored distribution keys 1953.
  • a web authentication method may comprise generating a bar code, generating one or more keys, and establishing a web session.
  • a web authentication system may comprise communication between one or more first devices, second devices, first servers, second servers, and internet applications.
  • One or more first devices, second devices, first servers, and second servers may comprise at least a processor and a transmitter/receiver.
  • One or more first devices and one or more second devices may additionally comprise a respective memory.
  • each of one or more first devices and one or second devices may comprise a visual display.
  • Each of one or more first devices and one or second devices may comprise a means to scan a bar code.
  • One or more first servers and second servers may additionally comprise a database.
  • a transmitter of a first device, a second device, a first server, and a second server may be configured to transmit and receive information from an exogenous source.
  • a first device may be configured to transmit and receive information from any combination of a second device, a first server, and a second server.
  • a first server and a second server may be configured to transmit and receive information from both a first device and a second device, and a second device may be configured to transmit and receive information from a first server, a first device, and a second server.
  • a memory of a first device and a second device and a database of a server may be configured to store information and to allow information to be retrieved.
  • a visual display may additionally comprise a means for a user to interact with a display, e.g. enter data, select characters, select objects, etc.
  • An internet application may be configured to transmit or receive information from any combination of a first server, a second server, a first device, and a second device.
  • a processor of a first device, a second device, a first server, and a second server may comprise a processing migrator, a data manipulator, a data converter, a processing generator, and a processing verifier.
  • a processing migrator may be configured to migrate data from one component within a first device, a second device, or first or second server to another component within a first device, a second device, or a first or second server.
  • a processing migrator may be configured to move data from a memory of a first device to a processor of a first device, or from a processor of a second device to a transmitter/receiver of a second device.
  • a data manipulator may be configured to manipulate data, e.g.
  • a data manipulator of a first device may be configured to separate a one or more strings of characters into a first portion and a second portion
  • a data manipulator of a server may be configured to combine a first portion of data with a second portion of data to produce one or more strings of characters.
  • a data converter may be configured to convert a first string of characters into a second string of characters, wherein each of a first string of characters and a second string of characters may be different in any one or more of length, composition, or arrangement.
  • a data converter may be configured to apply hash algorithms to a first string of characters.
  • a data converter may be configured to apply encryption protocols to a first string of characters.
  • a data converter may be configured to apply decryption protocols to a first string of characters.
  • a data converter may be configured to apply any combination of hash algorithms, encryption protocols, decryption protocols, or any other known method of data conversion to a first string of characters to produce a second string of characters.
  • a processing generator may be configured to produce data.
  • data may comprise a one or more strings of characters of any length and may comprise bar codes and the like.
  • data may be produced in a random manner or a directed manner.
  • a processing verifier may be configured to compare two or more data and determine if those data are identical or different.
  • a processing verifier and a processing generator may be paired to determine if a first string of characters and a second string of characters are identical and generate a response based on the identity of a first and second string of characters.
  • a web authentication method may comprise generating a bar code, illustrated in Figure 25. Generating a bar code 2500 may be initiated at an internet application 2590. In some embodiments, a user may initiate generating a bar code 2500 at an internet application 2590 with a login request.
  • a first agreement protocol pair 2646 may be generated by a processing generator 2646. In some embodiments, a first agreement protocol pair 2646 may be generated by a processing generator 2646 at an internet application 2590.
  • a first key agreement protocol pair 2526 may comprise any key agreement protocol pair that is readily known to a person having ordinary skill in the art. In some embodiments, a first key agreement protocol pair 2526 may comprise an Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) pair.
  • ECDH Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman
  • an internet application 2590 may be configured to transmit information to a first server 2525.
  • a processing migrator 2642 may transfer information to a transmitter/receiver 2541 of an internet application 2590.
  • An internet application 2590 may transmit any combination of a first public key 2503, a first private key 2504, and any other information necessary to generate a bar code 2505.
  • a first server 2525 may be configured to receive information from an internet application 2590.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2541 of a first server 2525 may receive any combination of a first public key 2503, a first private key 2504, and any other necessary information for generating a bar code 2500 from an internet application 2590.
  • a first server 2525 may generate a random key 2527 and a random key 2527 may be generated by a processing generator 2646 of a first server 2525.
  • a random key 2527 may comprise one or more strings of characters of any length and characters may comprise letters, numbers, and symbols.
  • a bar code 2505 may be generated.
  • a processing generator 2546 may use a bar code precursor to generate a bar code 2505.
  • a bar code 2505 may comprise any type of barcode 2505, including without limitation any linear barcode, 2-dimensional bar code, or any type of readable indicia readily known to a person having ordinary skill in the art.
  • a bar code 2505 may comprise a QR code.
  • a bar code 2505 may be generated from any combination of a first public key 2503, a first private key 2504, a random key 2527, and any other information necessary for generating a bar code 2500.
  • a bar code 2505 may be generated by a data manipulator 2544 of a first server 2525 and may be based on a first public key 2503 and a random key 2527.
  • a first server 2525 may be configured to transfer information to an internet application 2590.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2541 of a first server 2525 may transmit information to an internet application 2590.
  • a first server 2525 may transmit a bar code 2505 to an internet application 2590.
  • An internet application 2590 may receive a bar code 2505 at a transmitter/receiver 2541 and may display a bar code 2505 at a visual display 2590 of an internet application 2590.
  • a web authentication method may comprise generating one or more keys, illustrated in Figures 26, 27, and 28.
  • generating one or more keys 2600 may comprise a first device 2650 scanning a bar code 2605.
  • a data manipulator 2644 of a first device 2650 may generate a random key 2627, a first public key 2603, or a random key 2627 and a first public key 2603 from information contained within a bar code 2605.
  • a data manipulator 2644 may extrapolate any information contained within a bar code 2605 for the purpose of generating one or more keys 2600.
  • a processing generator 2646 of a first device 2650 may generate a second key agreement protocol pair 2651.
  • a second key agreement protocol pair 2651 may comprise any key agreement protocol pair that is readily known to a person having ordinary skill in the art.
  • a second key agreement protocol pair 2651 may comprise an Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) pair.
  • ECDH Elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman
  • a second key agreement protocol pair 2651 may comprise a second private key 2652 and a second public key 2653.
  • a second private key 2652 and a first public key 2603 extrapolated from a bar code 2605 may be combined by a data manipulator 2644 to generate a secret key 2654.
  • a processing generator 2646 of a first device 2650 may generate any combination of a salt 2655, an initializing vector 2656, and an iteration number 2657.
  • a processing generator 2646 of a first device 2650 may generate each of a salt 2655, an initializing vector 2656, and an iteration number 2657.
  • a salt 2655, an initializing vector 2656, and an iteration number 2657 may respectively comprise a one or more strings of characters of any length and characters may comprise any combination of letters, numbers, or symbols.
  • An initializing vector 2656 may comprise a number of characters equal to n, and may additionally comprise an IV first part 2658 and an IV second part 2659.
  • An IV first part 2658 and an IV second part 2659 may each comprise a number of characters between one and n-1.
  • An iteration number 2657 may comprise a number of characters equal to n, and additionally comprise an IN first part 2660 and an IN second part 2661.
  • An IN first part 2660 and an IN second part 2661 may each comprise a number of characters between one and n-1.
  • a data manipulator 2644 may produce an IV first part 2658 and an IV second part 2659 from an initializing vector 2656.
  • a data manipulator 2644 may produce an IN first part 2660 and an IN second part 2661 from an iteration number 2657.
  • a secret key 2654, a salt 2655, an IV first part 2658, and an IN first part 2660 may be converted 2612 by a data converter 2645 to a masked secret key 2662, a masked salt 2663, a masked IV first part 2664, and a masked IN first part 2665, respectively.
  • an initializing vector 2656 may be converted 2612 by a data converter 2645 to a masked IV first part 2664.
  • an iteration number 2657 may be converted 2612 by a data converter 2645 to a masked IN first part 2665.
  • conversion 2612 may comprise using hash algorithms. In other embodiments, conversion 2612 may comprise using encryption methods.
  • Yet other embodiments may comprise conversion 2612 using a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • an iteration number 2657 may remain intact, not generating an IN first part 2660 and an IN second part 2661 and a resulting IN first part 2660 may not be converted 2612.
  • a processing generator 2646 of a first device 2650 may generate a client key 2666.
  • a client key 2666 may comprise a one or more strings of characters of any length and characters may comprise any combination of letters, numbers, or symbols.
  • a client key 2666 may be converted 2612 by a data converter 2645 to a first masked client key 2667.
  • a client key 2667 may be converted 2612 by a data converter 2645 to a second masked client key 2668.
  • a client key 2666 may be converted 2612 by a data converter 2645 into each of a first masked client key 2667 and a second masked client key 2668. Conversion 2612 may comprise using hash algorithms.
  • conversion 2612 may comprise using encryption methods. In some embodiments, conversion 2612 may comprise a combination of hash algorithms and encryption methods.
  • a first device 2650 may be configured to transmit information to a first server 2625.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2641 of a first device 2650 may transmit any combination of a first masked client key 2667, a second masked client key 2668, a masked secret key 2662, a masked salt 2663, a masked IV first part 2664, and a masked IN first part 2665 to a first server 2625.
  • a first device 2650 may display each of an IV second part 2659 and an IN second part 2661 on a visual display 2669 of a first device 2650.
  • an iteration number 2657 may be displayed in its entirety on a visual display 2669 of a first device 2650.
  • generating one or more keys may comprise a first server 2725 receiving information from a first device 2750.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2741 of a first server 2725 may receive any combination of a masked secret key 2762, a second masked client key 2768, a masked salt 2763, a masked IV first part 2764, a masked IN first part 2765, and a first masked client key 2767 from a first device 2750.
  • a processing migrator 2742 of a first server 2725 may store one or more of a masked secret key 2762, a second masked client key 2768, a masked salt 2763, a masked IV first part 2764, a masked IN first part 2765, and a first masked client key 2767 received from a first device 2750 in a database 2729 of a first server 2725.
  • a processing migrator 2742 of a first server 2725 may store a first masked client key 2767 in a database 2729 of a first server 2729.
  • a first server 2725 may be configured to transmit information to an internet application 2790.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2741 of a first server 2725 may transmit any combination of a masked secret key 2762, a second masked client key 2768, a masked salt 2763, a masked IV first part 2764, a masked IN first part 2765, and a first masked client key 2767 to a first server 2725.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2741 of a first server 2725 may transmit a masked secret key 2762, a second masked client key 2768, a masked salt 2763, a masked IV first part 2764, and a masked IN first part 2765 to a first server 2725.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2741 of a first server 2725 may transmit any combination of a masked secret key 2762, a second masked client key 2768, a masked salt 2763, and a masked IV first part 2764 to an internet application 2790 (collectively referred to as “received data 2728” from this point forward).
  • generating one or more keys 2800 may comprise a transmitter/receiver 2841 of an internet application 2890 receiving received data 2828 from a first server 2825.
  • a first device 2850 may contain user input 2869, which may comprise an IV second part 2659 and an IN second part 2661 (see Figure 26), which may respectively comprise strings of characters.
  • User input 2869 may comprise an IV first part and an iteration number.
  • user input 2869 may be displayed on a graphical display 2869 of a first device 2850.
  • Generating one or more keys may comprise user input 2869 being entered into an internet application 2890.
  • a data converter 2844 of an internet application 2890 may convert 2812 received data 2828 into one or more of a secret key 2854, an IN first part 2860, a salt 2855, an IV first part 2858, and a client key 2866.
  • Conversion 2812 may comprise using hash algorithms. Additionally, conversion 2812 may comprise using encryption methods. Conversion may comprise using decryption methods. In some embodiments, conversion 2812 may comprise any combination of hash algorithms, encryption methods, or decryption methods.
  • a data converter 2844 of an internet application 2890 may use both user input 2869 and received data 2828 to convert 2812 received data 2828 into one or more of a secret key 2854, an IN first part 2860, a salt 2855, an IV first part 2858, and a client key 2866.
  • a processing migrator 2842 may store a client key 2866 in a storage 2891 of an internet application 2890.
  • a data converter 2845 of an internet application 2890 may convert 2812 a client key 2866 into a third masked client key 2892.
  • a third masked client key 2892 may be migrated by a processing migrator 2842 to a transmitter/receiver 2841 of an internet application 2890.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2841 of an internet application 2890 may transmit a third masked client key 2892 to a first server 2825.
  • a web authentication method may comprise establishing a web session. Illustrated in Figure 29, a transmitter/receiver 2941 of a first server 2825 may receive a third masked client key 2992 from an internet application 2990. According to some embodiments, a processing migrator 2942 of a first server 2825 may retrieve a stored first masked client key 2967 from a database 2929 of a first server 2825. A processing verifier 2947 may compare a retrieved first masked client key 2967 to a third masked client key 2992 received from an internet application 2990. A processing generator 2946 may generate a result 2930 based on the identity of a first masked client key 2967 and a third masked client key 2992.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2941 of a first server 2825 may transmit a result 2930 to a second server 2980.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2941 of a second server 2980 may receive a result 2930 from a first server 2825 and generate a web token 2931.
  • a web token 2931 may be generated by a processing generator 2946. In some embodiments, a web token 2931 may be any means known in the art for authorizing the establishment of a web session.
  • a second server 2980 may transmit a generated web token 2931 to first server 2825.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2941 of a first server 2825 may receive a web token 2931 from a second server 2980 and may transmit a received web token 2931 to an internet application 2990.
  • a transmitter/receiver 2941 of an internet application 2990 may receive a web token 2931 from a first server 2825.
  • an internet application may transmit a received web token to a second server.
  • a second server may receive a web token from a web browser and may establish a web session. Further, a second server may be configured to transmit information to a first server. In some embodiments, a second server may transmit information regarding receipt of a web token from an internet application. Information regarding receipt of a web token from an internet application may comprise without limitation any information about the internet application, information about a user of an internet application, information about access to a web session, spatial and/or temporal information about any component of a system described herein.
  • a first server may receive information regarding receipt of a web token from a second server. In some embodiments, a first server may be configured to transmit information to a first device, including without limitation, information regarding receipt of a web token.
  • keys may be generated in order to protect the contents of sensitive data transmissions.
  • a first data comprises sensitive information such as biometric data, sensitive communications, etc.
  • using controlled corruption to generate keys may provide an elegant means by which the sensitive data (e.g., first data), may be protected against a third-party interception.
  • Sensitive data e.g., first data
  • Sensitive data may comprise any number of data types, for example and without limitation, biometric data, documents, text messages, email messages, or other types of sensitive communications.
  • systems and methods of generating keys (e.g., privacy keys) using controlled corruption may include one or more computing devices (e.g., first computing device, second computing device, third computing device, etc.) and one or more servers.
  • the one or more servers may comprise security engine, an action engine, and one or more libraries.
  • one or more servers may further comprise a client layer comprising the one or more computing device (e.g., first computing device, second computing device, etc.) may comprise a mobile platform and one or more libraries.
  • a computing device e.g., first computing device, second computing device, etc.
  • FIGURE 30 is an example system, according to a specific embodiment, for generating keys using controlled corruption 3000.
  • the system may include a web layer 3010 comprising a first computing device 3012, an administrative layer 3020 comprising one or more servers 3022, and a client layer 3030 comprising one or more servers 3022.
  • a system 3000 may additionally include one or more communications channels (e.g., internet gateways and one or more virtual private network (VPN) tunnels), shown in dotted lines.
  • communications channels e.g., internet gateways and one or more virtual private network (VPN) tunnels
  • the web layer 3010 may further comprise an administrative mobile platform (AMP) 3014 comprising an administrative mobile library (AML) and a partner mobile library (PML) and an administrative web platform (AWP) 3016 comprising an administrative web library (AWL) and a partner web library (PWL).
  • AMP administrative mobile platform
  • AML administrative mobile library
  • PML partner mobile library
  • ABP administrative web platform
  • AML administrative web library
  • PWL partner web library
  • any library may mean, without limitation, any application, application database, database, and/or data.
  • the administrative layer 3020 may further comprise an administrative security engine (ASE), 3024 an action engine (AE) 3026, an administrative partner library (APL) 3028, and one or more nodes 3029 associated with the administrative layer.
  • the one or more nodes 3029 may comprise one or more databases, one or more user devices (e.g., computing devices), or any combination of one or more databases and one or more user devices (e.g., computing devices).
  • the client layer 3030 may additionally comprise an administrative client library (ACL) 3034 and a client server application (CSA) 3036.
  • ACL administrative client library
  • CSA client server application
  • the client layer 3030 and the administrative layer 3020 may be in communication with one another using a VPN tunnel.
  • FIGURE 31 is an example server-side (e.g., comprised in the administrative layer 3020) method of generating keys using controlled corruption 3100, according to a specific embodiment, which may comprise registering a first computing device at one or more servers 3140; receiving, at the one or more servers, a first privacy code and one or more parameters associated with first data from the first computing device 3142; generating, at the one or more servers, a chunk count and a public key 3143; transmitting the chunk count and public key to the first computing device 3144; receiving, at the one or more servers, a quantity of first privacy keys and a second privacy code 3146; and generating, at the one or more servers, second data based on the privacy keys 3148.
  • registering a first computing device at one or more servers 3140 may comprise registering a first computing device at one or more servers 3140; receiving, at the one or more servers, a first privacy code and one or more parameters associated with first data from the first computing device 3142; generating, at the one or more servers, a chunk count
  • Registering a computing device (e.g., first computing device) 3140 may comprise installing one or more applications on the computing device, where the one or more applications may comprise a mobile platform and one or more libraries.
  • the computing device and one or more applications may comprise a web layer of a system for generating privacy keys.
  • a computing device may be in communication (e.g., network communication, internet communication, virtual private network (VPN communication)) with one or more servers which may comprise an administrative layer.
  • VPN communication virtual private network
  • registration of a computing device comprised in the web layer may include initiating communications and transmission of information between the administrative layer (e.g., an ASE), the client layer (e.g., a CSA), and the web layer (e.g., an AML and/or AWL comprised in a computing device).
  • the administrative layer e.g., an ASE
  • the client layer e.g., a CSA
  • the web layer e.g., an AML and/or AWL comprised in a computing device.
  • One or more servers comprised in an administrative layer may receive, from a computing device (e.g., first computing device) a first privacy code and one or more parameters associated with first data 3142.
  • first data may comprise any data (e.g., biometric data, documents, messages, etc.) which a user may desire to protect in transmission.
  • One or more parameters associated with first data may include any information about the first data, including without limitation, device identifiers, camera identifiers, file size, data format, application identifiers, user identifiers, personal identifiers, metadata, etc.
  • one or more parameters associated with the first data may include a file size, a public key associated with an asymmetric cryptographic key pair (which may identify the origin of the first data), and a manipulated version of the first data (e.g., a compressed or “zipped” version of the data).
  • parameters associated with a first data may include a base 64 version of a compressed (e.g., zipped) first data.
  • a privacy code may comprise a string of alphanumeric and/or symbolic characters associated with a user of the computing device or with the origin of the first data.
  • a privacy code is a first user input comprising a personal identification number (e.g., PIN) selected by a user of the computing device.
  • a privacy code may be based on user input, for example, an encrypted version, a hashed version, a truncated version, or a rearranged version of a user input.
  • a privacy code may be generated automatically by a component of the system (e.g., server, first computing device, etc.).
  • a privacy code may comprise and/or may be based on a digital footprint of a user.
  • a user’s digital footprint may comprise information about a user’s digital habits including, but not limited to, browsing history, browsing times/duration/frequency, usage habits, application usage, purchasing habits, geolocation data, etc.
  • One or more servers comprised in an administrative layer may generate a chunk count, chunk names, and a public key associated with an APL 3143.
  • the chunk count and chunk names may be based, at least in part, on the received parameters associated with a first data.
  • a chunk count may be an integer that informs a downstream process of generating privacy keys.
  • Chunk names may be alphanumeric and/or symbolic identifiers which may be associated with one or more privacy keys generated in a downstream process.
  • a chunk count is generated based on parameters associated with a first data, for example, one or more of the size of the first data, the size of a compressed first data, or the size of a compressed first data that has been converted to a base 64 file.
  • Chunk names may be generated based on the chunk count. For example, where a chunk count is an integer equal to three, then three chunk names will be generated, each designed to be associated with a downstream privacy key. As another example, where a generated chunk count is equal to seven, then seven chunk names will also be generated. In a downstream step, seven privacy keys will be generated and each of the seven privacy keys will be assigned one of the chunk names.
  • a public key may be associated with an asymmetric cryptographic key pair associated with an APL comprised in the administrative layer.
  • a chunk count, chunk names, and public key may be transmitted from one or more servers comprised in an administrative layer to a computing device comprised in the web layer.
  • a quantity of privacy keys (based on one or more of the first data, the chunk count, the chunk names, and the privacy code) may be generated by a computing device comprised in the web layer of a system for generating privacy keys.
  • FIGURE 32 is a computing device-side illustration of a method of generating privacy keys 3200 according to come embodiments.
  • a computing device 3212 (e.g., a first computing device) comprised in the web layer of the system may receive a chunk count 3260, chunk names 3261, and a public key 3262 from one or more servers comprised in the administrative layer of the system.
  • a first data 3263 may comprise any data that a user may consider secure and desire to protect in transit.
  • a computing device 3212 may condense (e.g., zip) a first data 3263 to generate a compressed first data 3264.
  • a computing device 3212 may generate a base 64 of the compressed first data 3265 where the base 64 of the compressed first data 3265 comprises a base 64 version of the compressed first data 3264.
  • a computing device 3212 may generate a first pre-key 3267 by adding a corruptor (e.g., first corruptor 3266) to the base 64 of the compressed first data 3265.
  • a corruptor 3266 may comprise a string of alphanumeric and/or symbolic characters.
  • a first corruptor 3266 may be based on a formula. For example, a first corruptor 3266 may be generated by a computing device 3212 by summing the first 30 characters comprised in the base 64 of the compressed first data 3265.
  • a first corruptor 3266 may be generated by summing the first and third characters the comprised in the base 64 of the compressed first data 3265, summing the second and fourth characters comprised in the base 64 of the compressed first data 3265, summing the third and fifth characters comprised in the base 64 of the compressed first data 3265, etc., and concatenating the results to generate a string of numeric characters which may then comprise a first corruptor 3266.
  • Any number of formulas may be used to generate a corruptor (e.g., first corruptor 3266, second corruptor 3268, third corruptor 3273, etc.) and the possibilities are not limited to the examples above.
  • a computing device 3212 may generate a second pre-key 3269 by adding a corruptor (e.g., second corruptor 3268) to the first pre-key 3267.
  • a corruptor e.g., second corruptor 3268
  • a corruptor e.g., second corruptor 3268
  • a second corruptor 3268 may be based on a formula.
  • a computing device 3212 may generate a salt 3270 and an initializing vector (IV) 3271.
  • IV initializing vector
  • a salt 3270 and IV 3271 may be added to a second pre key 3269 to generate a third pre-key 3272. It should be appreciated that this addition (e.g., salt 3270 and IV 3271) is not always present when generating privacy keys and that, according to some embodiments, a second pre-key 3269 may be used to generate chunks 3274 based on the chunk count 3260 without the addition of a salt 3270, IV 3271, or third corruptor 3273.
  • a third corruptor 3273 may be added to a third pre-key 3272.
  • a third corruptor 3273 may be generated by a computing device 3212 in any manner described above for a corruptor (e.g., first corruptor 3266, second corruptor 3268).
  • a third corruptor 3273 may be based on a formula.
  • a third corruptor 3273 is added to a third pre-key 3272 and the resulting string is then divided into chunks 3274 based on the chunk count 3260 received from the administrative layer.
  • a chunk count 3260 is an integer that directs the number of chunks 3274 to be generated in a method of generating keys 3200.
  • a computing device 3212 will divide the pre-key (e.g., third pre-key 3272, second pre-key 3269, third pre-key 3272 with a third corruptor 3273) into three chunks 3274.
  • the pre-key e.g., third pre-key 3272, second pre-key 3269, third pre-key 3272 with a third corruptor 3273
  • a third pre-key 3272 may be divided into chunks 3274, which may then be used to generate privacy keys 3275 without using a third corruptor 3273.
  • a third pre-key 3272 may be divided into chunks 3274 and one or more third corruptors 3273 (or first corruptors, second corruptors, etc.) may be added to the chunks 3274 to generate the privacy keys.
  • Chunks 3274 may be named according to chunk names 3261 to generate privacy keys 3275.
  • chunk names 3261 may be generated at an administrative layer and received at a computing device 3212 comprised in the web layer.
  • Chunk names 3261 may be based at least in part on information received as part of parameters associated with a first data (e.g., an initial package).
  • the number of chunk names 3261 received is equal to the chunk count 3260. For example, where a chunk count 3260 is equal to three, three chunk names 3261 will be generated at the administrative layer and received at a computing device 3212. Accordingly, in this embodiment, three chunks
  • Chunk names 3261 are useful in downstream processes to organize privacy keys
  • a resulting string from controlled corruption may comprise the string ‘ 123455436789’. If the chunk count 3260 is equal to three and the chunk names are One’, ‘Two’, and ‘Three’, the resulting privacy keys may comprise the following:
  • Chunk names 3261 may, according to some embodiments, facilitate downstream ordering of the privacy keys 3275 to recreate the initial string.
  • chunk names 3261 e.g., One’, ‘Two’, ‘Three’
  • the initial string ‘123455436789’ can be recreated on the server (e.g., administrative layer) side.
  • a computing device 3212 comprised in a web layer may transmit a quantity (equal to the chunk count 3260) of privacy keys 3275 to one or more servers comprised in an administrative layer.
  • a computing device 3212 may generate a second privacy code 3277 based on the first privacy code 3276.
  • a second privacy code 3277 may be an alphanumeric and/or symbolic string of characters.
  • a second privacy code 3277 may be a manipulated (e.g., compressed, hashed, encrypted, rearranged, truncated, etc.) first privacy code 3276.
  • a second privacy code 3277 is a hashed first privacy code 3276.
  • a privacy code (e.g., first privacy code 3276, second privacy code 3277) may be transmitted from a computing device 3212 comprised in the web layer of the system to one or more servers comprised in an administrative layer of the system.
  • a method of generating keys using controlled corruption may comprise receiving a quantity of privacy keys and a second privacy code from a computing device 3146, and generating second data based on the privacy keys 3148.
  • FIGURE 33 illustrates a specific embodiment of generating second data based on the privacy keys 3300.
  • a second data 3382 may comprise a reconstructed version of a first data.
  • a first data may originate at a computing device comprised in a web layer of the system.
  • the first data may be used to generate privacy keys 3375, which may be a corrupted version of the first data which may be then transmitted in corrupted chunks (e.g., privacy keys) to one or more servers comprised in the administrative layer.
  • the privacy keys 3375 may be concatenated and the corruptors (e.g., first corruptor 3366, second corruptor 3368, third corruptor 3373, etc.) removed in a systematic fashion such that the resulting second data 3382 is a reconstructed version of the original first data.
  • the corruptors e.g., first corruptor 3366, second corruptor 3368, third corruptor 3373, etc.
  • One or more servers 3322 comprised in the administrative layer of the system may receive a quantity (e.g., one or more, two or more, three or more) of privacy keys 3375 from a computing device comprised in the web layer of the system.
  • One or more servers 3322 may receive a second privacy code 3377 from a computing device.
  • the one or more servers 3322 may concatenate the quantity (e.g., one or more, two or more, three or more) of privacy keys 3375 to generate a concatenated key 3376.
  • chunk names 3361 may guide the process of concatenation, may determine the order in which the privacy keys 3375 should be joined, or may direct the arrangement of the privacy keys 3375 to generate a concatenated key 3376.
  • One or more servers 3322 may remove a third corruptor 3373 to generate a first cleaned data 3377, remove a salt 3370 and IV 3371 to generate a second cleaned data 3378, remove a second corruptor 3368 to generate a third cleaned data 3379, and remove a first corruptor 3366 to generate a base64 file of a compressed second data 3380.
  • removal of corruptors may require recognition of the corruptors (e.g., first corruptor 3366, second corruptor 3368, third corruptor 3373, etc.) which need to be removed.
  • the one or more servers may use different recognition tools to recognize corruptors.
  • one or more servers may generate a privacy code from a received second privacy code 3377.
  • a second privacy code 3377 is used to remove one or more corruptors (e.g., first corruptor 3366, second corruptor 3368, third corruptor 3373, etc.).
  • the one or more servers 3322 use a formula to generate a corruptor (e.g., the same formula used to generate a corruptor at the computing device) and use the newly generated corruptor to recognize a corruptor embedded in a cleaned data (e.g., first cleaned data 3377, second cleaned data 3378, third cleaned data 3379, etc.) and remove it.
  • a characteristic of one or more servers 3322 is the ability to recognize corruptors (e.g., first corruptor 3366, second corruptor
  • a concatenated key 3376 may be decrypted to generate a first cleaned data 3377.
  • a base 64 file of a compressed second data 3380 may be converted (e.g., decoded) to a compressed second data 3381.
  • a compressed second data 3381 may be converted (e.g., unzipped) to a second data 3382.
  • a second data 3382 may be a reconstructed version of a first data.
  • a first data is information about a biometric scan
  • the second data will be a reconstructed version of the original information about the biometric scan.
  • a first data is a sensitive email, text, or other communication
  • a second data is a reconstructed version of the sensitive email, text, or other communication.
  • any method or operation performed by the one or more servers comprised in an administrative layer may also be performed by a processor comprised in a second computing device.
  • the first data is a text message originating from a mobile device comprising a first computing device
  • the second data (e.g., the reconstructed text message) may be generated at a processor comprised in a second mobile device (e.g., a second computing device).
  • Privacy keys may be used to authenticate identity from a first computing device (e.g., a mobile computing device).
  • a first data may comprise a biometric scan, login password or code, or any other first data which may be based on a user input.
  • a method for generating privacy keys using controlled corruption, and distributing, storing, and/or retrieving stored privacy keys to authenticate identity may include an enrollment module and a sign in module.
  • An enrollment module may comprise methods to generate keys (e.g., privacy keys) using controlled corruption and distribute and store keys for later use.
  • keys e.g., privacy keys
  • privacy keys may be generated from the first data using controlled corruption, transmitted to a server, and stored on multiple nodes associated with the server.
  • a user subsequently enters their user input (e.g., biometric scan, password, first data, third data, etc.) into a first computing device in a sign in module
  • the privacy keys generated by controlled corruption and based on the user input in that module can be compared to privacy keys generated using a first data in the enrollment module and a user’s identity can be authenticated.
  • a user’s input such as biometric data, may be protected.
  • FIGURE 34 is an example server-side (e.g., comprised in the administrative layer 3020) method of generating and distributing keys using controlled corruption 3400, according to a specific embodiment, which may comprise registering a first computing device at one or more servers 3440; receiving, at the one or more servers, a first privacy code and one or more parameters associated with first data from the first computing device 3442; generating, at the one or more servers, a chunk count and a public key 3443; transmitting the chunk count and public key to the first computing device 3444; receiving, at the one or more servers, a quantity of first privacy keys and a second privacy code 3446; and generating, at the one or more servers, second data based on the privacy keys 3448.
  • registering a first computing device at one or more servers 3440 may comprise registering a first computing device at one or more servers 3440; receiving, at the one or more servers, a first privacy code and one or more parameters associated with first data from the first computing device 3442; generating, at the one or more servers,
  • privacy keys may be stored at one or more nodes associated with the one or more servers for later uses, for example, authenticating identity.
  • a method for generating and distributing keys 3400 may further comprise generating a result 3450, generating a receiver identifier and a privacy code identifier 3452, and distributing privacy keys, the receiver identifier, and the privacy code identifier to one or more of the nodes associated with the one or more servers 3454.
  • a method 3400 may include generating a result 3450.
  • a base 64 file of compressed second data (such as 3380 of FIGURE 33) may be compared to a base 64 of compressed first data which may be received as a parameter associated with first data (such as in 3142 of FIGURE 31).
  • the two base 64 files may be compared and a result may be generated 3450. Where the two base 64 files are identical, a result may be positive. Where the two base 64 files are not identical, a result may be negative.
  • a result 3450 may be generated by comparing a compressed second data 3381 to a compressed first data. In some embodiments, a result 3450 may be generated by comparing a second data 3382 to a first data. In some embodiments, a result may be generated by comparing multiple elements (e.g., first and second data, compressed first and compressed second data, base64 of compressed first and base64 of compressed second data, etc.). Iterative learning may be utilized when generating a result 3450. For example, many second data 3382 may be generated over time and these second data 3382 may be compared to one another, over time, to generate a result 3450. Although second data 3382 is used as an example, a result 3450 may be generated by comparing any of the elements (e.g., first data, compressed data, base64 compressed data, privacy codes, etc.) overtime.
  • the elements e.g., first data, compressed data, base64 compressed data, privacy codes, etc.
  • a positive result may prompt the one or more servers comprised in an administrative layer to generate a receiver identifier and a privacy code identifier 3452.
  • a positive result may prompt one or more servers comprised in an administrative layer to generate two or more copies of each privacy key received from a computing device 3446.
  • the privacy keys, receiver identifier, and privacy code identifier may be transmitted to one or more nodes associated with the one or more servers for storage 3454.
  • the privacy keys, receiver identifier, and privacy code identifier may be manipulated before transmission.
  • Distributing privacy keys to one or more nodes for storage 3454 may be done using a ledgerless non-descriptive distribution.
  • This method of distribution may comprise using sender identifiers in conjunction with receiver identifiers, privacy codes, and/or other user specific codes (e.g., biometrics, etc.) to generate unique piece descriptions for each privacy key.
  • a sender identifier may be a string of alphanumeric and/or symbolic characters used to identify any combination of users, transactions, applications, and/or computing devices.
  • a system may manipulate one or more of privacy keys, privacy codes, receiver identifiers, and sender identifiers to generate a unique piece description for each privacy key distributed.
  • Piece descriptions may be created on an “as-needed” basis, eliminating the need for keeping ledgers or other records of privacy keys destinations (e.g., nodes) at the server.
  • the privacy keys, receiver identifier, and privacy code identifier may be stored for later uses, including identity authentication in the sign in module.
  • Sign In Module When a user (e.g., system user at a computing device comprised in the web layer) wishes to use stored privacy keys to authenticate identity in a sign in module, a user enters a first user input (e.g., a privacy code) and a second user input (e.g., a biometric scan, a third data).
  • a first user input e.g., a privacy code
  • a second user input e.g., a biometric scan, a third data.
  • FIGURE 35 A method for authenticating identity using privacy keys is illustrated in FIGURE 35.
  • Privacy keys based on third data 3590 are generated in the same manner as described above and as illustrated in FIGURES 31 and 32.
  • the resulting privacy keys 3590 are transmitted to one or more servers comprised in the administrative layer of the system.
  • the one or more servers locates and retrieves the stored privacy keys 3591 from the one or more nodes associated with the one or more servers.
  • retrieval is based at least partially on a receiver identifier and/or privacy code identifier.
  • Each of the privacy keys based on third data 3590 (e.g., privacy keys received from a computing device during the sign in module) is used to generate a fourth data in the same manner illustrated in FIGURE 33.
  • a fourth data may be sign in data 3592.
  • Each of the stored privacy keys 3591 retrieved from one or more nodes is used to generate a fifth data 3593 in the same manner illustrated in FIGURE 33.
  • a fifth data may be enrollment data 3593.
  • a fourth data (e.g., sign in data 3592) may be compared to a fifth data (e.g., enrollment data 3593) to generate a result 3594.
  • a fourth data 3592 is the same as a fifth data 3593, then the result 3594 is positive.
  • a data e.g., a first data, a second data, a third data, a fourth data 3952, a fifth data 3593
  • identity can be confirmed if the fourth data 3952 (e.g., data entered during sign in) is the same as a fifth data (e.g., data entered during enrollment and stored as privacy keys).
  • a positive result may allow a user to access one or more protected systems.
  • privacy keys may be used for secure data storage.
  • a first data may comprise a sensitive document.
  • the first data may be used in the manner described above to generate privacy keys which may then be stored.
  • Privacy keys may be retrieved in these embodiments, and a second data generated in the manner described above.
  • the system allows for the temporary storage of the data (e.g., first data, second data) at a landing zone for editing.
  • a landing zone may be comprised in any one or more of the one or more servers, a temporary database, first computing devices, second computing devices, or application.
  • a landing zone may comprise an external application such as Google Docs, Microsoft Word, or other application.
  • the edited data may then be used, in the manner described above, to generate a new set of privacy keys which may then be stored for later use.

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Abstract

L'invention concerne une plateforme et/ou un procédé agnostique et un système pouvant servir à protéger des données, des documents, des dispositifs, des communications et des transactions. Certains modes de réalisation de la présente invention peuvent être applicables à une authentification d'utilisateurs et peuvent être applicables à n'importe quel système client. Le procédé et le système peuvent servir à distribuer des parties uniques d'informations associées anonymes entre de multiples dispositifs. Ces dispositifs distribuent des parties uniques d'informations anonymes et sont utilisés par la solution pour protéger des transmissions de données sensibles et pour authentifier des utilisateurs, des données, des documents, un dispositif et des transactions. Lorsqu'elles sont utilisées à des fins d'authentification, les informations relatives à la connexion ne sont pas mémorisées dans n'importe quelle partie de la solution, les utilisateurs et les dispositifs sont authentifiés de manière anonyme. La solution permet également à un utilisateur d'accéder à des parties sécurisées du système client par un processus semi-autonome et sans avoir à révéler la clé de l'utilisateur.
PCT/IB2021/053964 2020-05-11 2021-05-10 Génération de clés par corruption commandée dans des réseaux informatiques WO2021229410A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (8)

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CN202180049502.1A CN116018592A (zh) 2020-05-11 2021-05-10 使用计算机网络中的受控讹误生成密钥
MX2022014179A MX2022014179A (es) 2020-05-11 2021-05-10 Generacion de claves mediante el uso de corrupcion controlada en redes informaticas.
JP2022568446A JP2023525774A (ja) 2020-05-11 2021-05-10 コンピュータネットワークにおける制御されたコラプションを用いたキー生成方法
CA3178613A CA3178613A1 (fr) 2020-05-11 2021-05-10 Generation de cles par corruption commandee dans des reseaux informatiques
KR1020227043195A KR20230024279A (ko) 2020-05-11 2021-05-10 컴퓨터 네트워크에서 제어된 손상을 이용하여 키를 생성하는 방법
BR112022023105A BR112022023105A2 (pt) 2020-05-11 2021-05-10 Gerar chaves com o uso de corrupção controlada em redes de computador
AU2021272736A AU2021272736A1 (en) 2020-05-11 2021-05-10 Generating keys using controlled corruption in computer networks
EP21804512.8A EP4150858A4 (fr) 2020-05-11 2021-05-10 Génération de clés par corruption commandée dans des réseaux informatiques

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US16/872,127 US10903997B2 (en) 2017-10-19 2020-05-11 Generating keys using controlled corruption in computer networks

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Citations (3)

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US20110150212A1 (en) * 2009-12-18 2011-06-23 Compugroup Holding Ag Computer implemented method for generating a set of identifiers from a private key, computer implemented method and computing device
WO2017127238A1 (fr) * 2016-01-20 2017-07-27 Mastercard International Incorporated Procédé et système de fourniture de clé cryptographique répartie et mémorisation par cryptographie à courbe elliptique
CA3079371A1 (fr) * 2017-10-19 2019-04-25 Autnhive Corporation Systeme et procede de generation et de depot de cles pour une authentification multi-points

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US20110150212A1 (en) * 2009-12-18 2011-06-23 Compugroup Holding Ag Computer implemented method for generating a set of identifiers from a private key, computer implemented method and computing device
WO2017127238A1 (fr) * 2016-01-20 2017-07-27 Mastercard International Incorporated Procédé et système de fourniture de clé cryptographique répartie et mémorisation par cryptographie à courbe elliptique
CA3079371A1 (fr) * 2017-10-19 2019-04-25 Autnhive Corporation Systeme et procede de generation et de depot de cles pour une authentification multi-points

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BR112022023105A2 (pt) 2023-01-17
EP4150858A4 (fr) 2024-08-28
AU2021272736A1 (en) 2023-01-19
MX2022014179A (es) 2022-12-02
EP4150858A1 (fr) 2023-03-22
CA3178613A1 (fr) 2021-11-18
CN116018592A (zh) 2023-04-25
JP2023525774A (ja) 2023-06-19

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