WO2021218872A1 - 确定安全保护方法、系统及装置 - Google Patents

确定安全保护方法、系统及装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2021218872A1
WO2021218872A1 PCT/CN2021/089719 CN2021089719W WO2021218872A1 WO 2021218872 A1 WO2021218872 A1 WO 2021218872A1 CN 2021089719 W CN2021089719 W CN 2021089719W WO 2021218872 A1 WO2021218872 A1 WO 2021218872A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
information
control plane
protection
integrity
protected
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PCT/CN2021/089719
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
雷骜
李�赫
吴义壮
吴�荣
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华为技术有限公司
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Publication of WO2021218872A1 publication Critical patent/WO2021218872A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/10—Connection setup
    • H04W76/14—Direct-mode setup

Definitions

  • This application relates to the field of communication technology, and in particular to methods, systems and devices for determining security protection.
  • terminal devices In traditional cellular network communications, terminal devices usually cannot communicate directly, and any piece of signaling sent between terminal devices is processed by the base station before being forwarded. After the base station processing, it means that the terminal device communicates with the base station through the Uu interface.
  • the terminal device A communicates with the base station through the Uu interface
  • the terminal device D communicates with the base station through the Uu interface.
  • the communication between the terminal equipment and the base station through the Uu interface can be called Uu communication.
  • D2D device-to-device
  • V2X vehicle-to-everything
  • PC5 interface is the interface used for D2D short-distance direct communication.
  • data and signaling no longer pass through the base station transmission.
  • terminal equipment C and terminal equipment B communicate directly through the PC5 interface
  • terminal equipment B and terminal equipment A communicate through the PC5 interface Communicate directly.
  • the direct communication between terminal devices through the PC5 interface can be called PC5 unicast communication.
  • the two ends of the PC5 unicast communication can be divided into the initiator and the receiver according to who initiates the connection establishment. Because the PC5 unicast communication is simple to implement, the information transmitted between the initiator and the receiver may be tampered with. In view of this, how to improve the security of information transmission is a technical problem to be solved urgently.
  • the present application provides a method, system, and device for determining security protection, which can reduce the risk of information being tampered with, thereby improving the security of information transmission.
  • the first aspect of the present application provides a method for determining security protection, which can be applied to a short-distance direct communication scenario.
  • the method can be executed by the first device or by a device (such as a processor or a chip, etc.) in the first device. implement.
  • This method takes the first device as an example, and includes the following content.
  • the first device receives the direct connection safety mode command message from the second device, the direct connection safety mode command message includes the indication information that the control plane integrity protection is not turned on and the first integrity verification information; according to the first device and the second device
  • the shared key between the two devices is used to verify the first integrity verification information; if the first integrity verification information is verified, it is determined not to open the control plane integrity protection according to the instruction information of the control plane integrity protection. Integrity protection of the control plane between the two.
  • the first device when it is determined that the control plane integrity protection is not enabled, can determine whether there is an attacker tampering with the transmission between the first device and the second device by verifying the first integrity verification information.
  • Information which can reduce the risk of tampering with information, thereby improving the security of information transmission.
  • the first integrity verification information is generated to perform the information element in the direct connection security mode command message to be sent to the first device. Integrity protection to prevent the information elements in the direct connection security mode command message from being tampered with. Specifically, the second device calculates the first information to be protected according to the shared key and the first algorithm to obtain the first integrity verification information, and the first information to be protected includes any one of the direct connection security mode command messages or Multiple information elements; for example, the first information to be protected may be any one or more information elements that need to be protected in the direct connection security mode command message.
  • the first to-be-protected information may be the indication information that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on, or may be the security capability of the first device or the integrity protection policy of the first device, and so on.
  • the first device calculates the first information to be protected according to the shared key and the first algorithm, and determines the expected information corresponding to the first information to be protected; determines whether the expected information is consistent with the first integrity verification information; if they are consistent, determines the first The verification of the integrity verification information passes; or, if it is inconsistent, the verification of the first integrity verification information fails.
  • the first device can identify the information in the direct connection security mode command message and whether the corresponding information of the direct connection security mode command message has been tampered with by an attacker, thereby reducing the risk of information tampering. Improve the security of information transmission.
  • the first algorithm is an algorithm pre-configured on the first device and the second device, or it can be an algorithm negotiated between the first device and the second device.
  • the first algorithm can be a hash algorithm or the second device determines and informs you The algorithm of the first device (such as encryption algorithm, etc.), etc.
  • the second device protects the first to-be-protected information according to the shared key under the condition that the control plane integrity protection is not enabled, and the protected first to-be-protected information (that is, the first An integrity verification information), the first to-be-protected information includes any one or more information elements in the direct connection security mode command message; the first device verifies the first integrity verification information according to the shared key, and if verified Through, the first device determines not to turn on the control plane integrity protection between the first device and the second device according to the instruction information of not turning on the control plane integrity protection, thereby reducing the risk of information tampering and improving the security of information transmission.
  • the protected first to-be-protected information that is, the first An integrity verification information
  • the first to-be-protected information includes any one or more information elements in the direct connection security mode command message
  • the first device sends a direct connection communication request message to the second device for requesting to establish communication with the second device.
  • the direct communication request message includes the control plane integrity protection strategy of the first device, so that the second device determines whether to enable the first device according to the control plane integrity protection strategy of the first device and the control plane integrity protection strategy of the second device. The integrity protection of the control plane between one device and the second device.
  • the direct communication request message further includes first indication information, and the first indication information is used to indicate that the second device does not enable control plane integrity protection between the first device and the second device. Trigger mutual authentication with the first device, so that the second device verifies whether the first device is a legitimate user, and the first device verifies whether the second device is a legitimate user.
  • the first indication information is also used to instruct the second device to establish a shared key after mutual authentication, and instruct the second device to process the first information to be protected according to the shared key to obtain the first 1. Integrity verification information.
  • the first device sends a direct connection security mode completion message to the second device, and the direct connection security mode completion message includes instruction information for turning off control plane integrity protection and second integrity verification information.
  • the second integrity verification information is used to perform integrity protection on the information elements in the direct connection security mode completion message, so as to prevent the information elements in the direct connection security mode completion message from being tampered with.
  • the second integrity verification information is calculated by the first device on the second information to be protected according to the shared key and the first algorithm; the second information to be protected includes any one or more information elements in the direct connection security mode completion message
  • the second to-be-protected information may be the instruction information for turning off the integrity protection of the control plane included in the direct connection security mode completion message.
  • the second integrity verification information is verified to ensure that the information included in the direct connection security mode completion message has not been tampered with by an attacker.
  • the first device sends a connection establishment rejection message to the second device, and the connection establishment rejection message includes the rejection reason value and the third integrity Verification information; the third integrity verification information is used to perform integrity protection on the information elements in the connection establishment rejection message, so as to prevent the information elements in the connection establishment rejection message from being tampered with.
  • the third integrity verification information is calculated by the first device on the third information to be protected according to the shared key and the first algorithm; the third information to be protected includes any one or more information elements in the connection establishment rejection message, such as The third information to be protected may be the rejection reason value included in the connection establishment rejection message.
  • the third integrity verification information is verified to ensure that the information included in the connection establishment rejection message has not been tampered with by an attacker.
  • the indication information that the control plane integrity protection is not turned on is that the control plane integrity protection algorithm is a null value.
  • the indication information that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on is the control plane activation indication information that indicates that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on.
  • the second aspect of the present application provides a method for determining security protection, which can be applied in a short-distance direct communication scenario.
  • the method can be executed by a second device or a device (such as a processor or a chip, etc.) in the second device. implement.
  • This method takes the second device as an example, and includes the following content.
  • the second device determines not to enable the integrity protection of the control plane with the first device, obtains the shared key between the first device and the second device;
  • the protection information is calculated to obtain the first integrity verification information;
  • the first information to be protected is any one or more information elements in the direct connection security mode command message to be sent to the first device; the direct connection security is sent to the first device
  • the mode command message and the direct connection safety mode command message include the indication information that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on and the first integrity verification information.
  • the first information to be protected is protected by the shared key and the first algorithm to obtain the first integrity verification information, and the first device By verifying the first integrity verification information, it can be determined whether an attacker has tampered with the information transmitted between the first device and the second device, thereby reducing the risk of information tampering, thereby improving the security of information transmission.
  • the first algorithm is an algorithm pre-configured on the first device and the second device, or it can be an algorithm negotiated between the first device and the second device.
  • the first algorithm can be a hash algorithm or the second device determines and informs you The algorithm of the first device (such as encryption algorithm, etc.), etc.
  • the second device when the second device determines not to enable control plane integrity protection, it performs protection processing on the first to-be-protected information according to the shared key to obtain the protected first to-be-protected information (that is, First integrity verification information), the first to-be-protected information includes any one or more of the information elements in the direct connection security mode command message; for example, the first to-be-protected information may be that the control plane integrity protection is disabled
  • the indication information of may also be the security capability of the first device or the integrity protection policy of the first device, and so on.
  • the first device verifies the first integrity verification information according to the shared key. If the verification passes, the first device determines not to enable the control plane integrity between the second device and the control plane according to the instruction information not to turn on the control plane integrity protection Protection, thereby reducing the risk of information being tampered with, and improving the security of information transmission.
  • the second device receives a direct communication request message from the first device, and the direct communication request message includes the control plane integrity protection policy of the first device; according to the control plane integrity of the first device The protection strategy and the control plane integrity protection strategy of the second device determine not to enable the control plane integrity protection with the first device.
  • the direct communication request message further includes the first indication information; the second device triggers the control plane integrity protection with the first device according to the first indication information without opening the control plane integrity protection with the first device Perform mutual authentication with the first device, so that the second device verifies whether the first device is a legitimate user, and the first device verifies whether the second device is a legitimate user.
  • the second device establishes a shared key between the first device and the second device after the first device performs mutual authentication according to the first instruction information.
  • the second device also calculates the first information to be protected according to the first instruction information, the shared key and the first algorithm to obtain the first integrity verification information.
  • the second device receives a direct connection security mode completion message from the first device, and the direct connection security mode completion message includes instruction information for turning off control plane integrity protection and second integrity verification information, so
  • the second integrity verification information is used to perform integrity protection on the information elements in the direct connection security mode completion message, so as to prevent the information elements in the direct connection security mode completion message from being tampered with.
  • the second integrity verification information is calculated by the first device on the second information to be protected according to the shared key and the first algorithm; the second information to be protected includes any one or more information elements in the direct connection security mode completion message
  • the second to-be-protected information may be the instruction information for turning off the integrity protection of the control plane included in the direct connection security mode completion message.
  • the second device verifies the second integrity verification information; if the second integrity verification information passes the verification, the integrity protection of the control plane with the first device is turned off.
  • the second integrity verification information is verified to ensure that the information included in the direct connection security mode completion message has not been tampered with by the attacker, and only when it is determined that there is no tampering by the attacker, the integrity of the control plane with the first device is closed Sexual protection.
  • the second device releases the connection with the first device. If the direct connection security mode completion message returned by the first device is not received within the time period, it indicates that the connection fails or the verification fails when the first device verifies the first integrity verification information.
  • the second device receives a connection establishment rejection message from the first device, the connection establishment rejection message includes the rejection reason value, and third integrity verification information; the third integrity verification information is used for Integrity protection is performed on the information elements in the connection establishment rejection message to prevent the information elements in the connection establishment rejection message from being tampered with.
  • the third integrity verification information is calculated by the first device on the third information to be protected according to the shared key and the first algorithm; the third information to be protected includes any one or more information elements in the connection establishment rejection message; for example, , The third information to be protected may be the rejection reason value included in the connection establishment rejection message.
  • the second device verifies the third integrity verification information; if the third integrity verification information is verified, the connection with the first device is released.
  • the third integrity verification information is verified to ensure that the information included in the connection establishment rejection message has not been tampered with by an attacker.
  • the indication information that the control plane integrity protection is not turned on is that the control plane integrity protection algorithm is a null value.
  • the indication information that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on is the control plane activation indication information that indicates that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on.
  • the third aspect of the embodiments of the present application provides a method for determining security protection, which can be applied in a short-distance direct-connection communication scenario.
  • Etc. Execution. This method takes the first device as an example, and includes the following content.
  • the first device receives a direct connection security mode command message from the second device.
  • the direct connection security mode command message includes indication information not to enable control plane integrity protection and first integrity verification information; the first integrity verification information is the first integrity verification information.
  • a key upper layer information, the first key upper layer information carries the first to-be-protected information; the first to-be-protected information includes any one or more information elements in the direct connection security mode command message; the application layer of the first device starts from the first
  • the first information to be protected is obtained from the upper layer information of the key and transferred to the V2X layer of the first device.
  • the V2X layer of the first device determines whether the first information to be protected obtained from the application layer is consistent with the first information to be protected. If they are consistent, it is determined not to enable the control plane integrity protection between the second device and the control plane according to the instruction information of not turning on the control plane integrity protection.
  • the application layer and the V2X layer are used to verify whether the first information to be protected has been tampered with, thereby reducing the risk of information tampering and improving the security of information transmission.
  • the first device sends a direct connection security mode completion message to the second device
  • the direct connection security mode completion message includes instruction information for turning off control plane integrity protection and second integrity verification information
  • the second integrity verification information is the upper layer information of the second key, and the upper layer information of the second key carries the second information to be protected
  • the second information to be protected includes any one or more information elements in the direct connection security mode completion message, for example
  • the second to-be-protected information may be the instruction information for turning off the integrity protection of the control plane included in the direct connection security mode completion message.
  • the second integrity verification information is verified to ensure that the information included in the direct connection security mode completion message has not been tampered with by an attacker.
  • the first device sends a connection establishment rejection message to the second device, and the connection establishment rejection message includes the rejection reason value and the third integrity Verification information;
  • the third integrity verification information is the upper layer information of the third key, and the upper layer information of the third key carries the third information to be protected;
  • the third information to be protected includes any one or more information elements in the connection establishment rejection message,
  • the third information to be protected may be the rejection reason value included in the connection establishment rejection message.
  • the third integrity verification information is verified to ensure that the information included in the establishment rejection message has not been tampered with by an attacker.
  • the fourth aspect of the present application provides a method for determining security protection, which can be applied in a short-distance direct communication scenario.
  • the method can be executed by a second device or a device (such as a processor or a chip, etc.) in the second device. implement.
  • This method takes the second device as an example, and includes the following content.
  • the second device When the second device determines not to enable the integrity protection of the control plane with the first device, it carries the first information to be protected in the upper layer information of the first key to obtain the first integrity verification information;
  • the protection information is any one or more information elements in the direct connection safety mode command message to be sent to the first device; the direct connection safety mode command message is sent to the first device, and the direct connection safety mode command message includes the first integrity verification Information and instructions to disable integrity protection of the control plane.
  • the information to be protected is protected by the upper layer information of the key, thereby reducing the risk of information being tampered with, thereby improving the security of information transmission.
  • the second device receives a direct connection safety mode completion message from the first device, and the direct connection safety mode completion message includes instruction information for turning off control plane integrity protection, second information to be protected, and second Integrity verification information, where the second integrity verification information is the upper layer information of the second key, and the upper layer information of the second key carries the second to-be-protected information; the second to-be-protected information includes any one of the direct connection security mode completion message Or multiple information elements; for example, the second to-be-protected information may be the instruction information for turning off the integrity protection of the control plane included in the direct connection security mode completion message.
  • the application layer of the second device obtains the second to-be-protected information from the upper-layer information of the second key and transmits it to the V2X layer of the second device.
  • the V2X layer of the second device determines that the second to-be-protected information obtained from the application layer is the same as Whether the second information to be protected carried in the direct connection security mode completion message is consistent, and if consistent, the control plane integrity protection with the first device is turned off.
  • the second integrity verification information is verified to ensure that the information included in the direct connection security mode completion message has not been tampered with by the attacker, and only when it is determined that there is no tampering by the attacker, the integrity of the control plane with the first device is closed Sexual protection.
  • the second device releases the connection with the first device. If the direct connection security mode completion message returned by the first device is not received within the time period, it indicates that the connection fails or the verification fails when the first device verifies the first integrity verification information.
  • the second device receives a connection establishment rejection message from the first device, the connection establishment rejection message includes the rejection reason value, the third information to be protected, and the third integrity verification information; the third integrity verification The information is the upper layer information of the third key, and the upper layer information of the third key carries the third information to be protected; the third information to be protected includes any one or more information elements in the connection establishment rejection message; for example, the third information to be protected may be The rejection reason value included in the connection establishment rejection message.
  • the application layer of the second device obtains the third information to be protected from the upper layer information of the third key and transmits it to the V2X layer of the second device.
  • the V2X layer of the second device determines that the third information to be protected obtained from the application layer is the same as the third information to be protected. Whether the third information to be protected carried in the connection establishment rejection message is consistent; if consistent, the connection with the first device is released. The third integrity verification information is verified to ensure that the information included in the connection establishment rejection message has not been tampered with by an attacker.
  • a fifth aspect of the present application provides a communication device.
  • the communication device may be a first device or a device in the first device.
  • the device may include modules corresponding to the methods/operations/steps/actions described in the first aspect or the third aspect and various possible implementation modes.
  • the module may be a hardware circuit or It is software, or it can be realized by hardware circuit combined with software.
  • the device may include a processing module and a transceiver module. Exemplary,
  • the transceiver unit is configured to receive a direct connection safety mode command message from the second device, where the direct connection safety mode command message includes indication information for not opening control plane integrity protection and first integrity verification information;
  • the processing unit is configured to verify the first integrity verification information according to the shared key between the first device and the second device; if the first integrity verification information is verified, the control plane integrity is not turned on The protection instruction information determines that the control plane integrity protection with the second device is not enabled.
  • a sixth aspect of the present application provides a communication device, which includes a processor, configured to implement the method described in the first aspect or the third aspect.
  • the device may also include a memory for storing instructions and data.
  • the memory is coupled with the processor.
  • the processor executes the instructions stored in the memory, the device can realize the foregoing first aspect and each possible implementation manner of the first aspect, or the third aspect and each possible implementation of the third aspect.
  • the device may also include a communication interface for the device to communicate with other devices.
  • the communication interface may be a circuit hardware module such as a transceiver and a bus, and the other device may be a second device.
  • the device includes:
  • Memory used to store program instructions
  • the processor is configured to receive a direct connection safety mode command message from the second device, where the direct connection safety mode command message includes indication information not to enable control plane integrity protection and first integrity verification information; according to the first device and the first device The shared key between the two devices verifies the first integrity verification information; if the first integrity verification information is verified, it is determined not to enable the Integrity protection of the control plane between devices.
  • the seventh aspect of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, including instructions, which when run on a computer, cause the computer to execute the first aspect and each possible implementation manner of the first aspect, or the third aspect and the third aspect The methods provided by each possible implementation.
  • An eighth aspect of the present application provides a chip system, which includes a processor and may also include a memory, which is used to implement the foregoing first aspect and each possible implementation manner of the first aspect, or each of the third aspect and the third aspect It is possible to implement the method provided by the method.
  • the chip system can be composed of chips, or it can include chips and other discrete devices.
  • a ninth aspect of the present application provides a communication device.
  • the communication device may be a second device or a device in the second device.
  • the device may include modules corresponding to the methods/operations/steps/actions described in the second aspect or the fourth aspect and various possible implementation modes.
  • the module may be a hardware circuit or It is software, or it can be realized by hardware circuit combined with software.
  • the device may include a processing module and a transceiver module. Exemplary,
  • the transceiver unit is configured to obtain the shared key between the first device and the second device when the processing unit determines that the control plane integrity protection between the first device and the first device is not enabled;
  • the processing unit is configured to calculate the first information to be protected according to the shared key and the first algorithm to obtain the first integrity verification information; the first information to be protected is in the direct connection security mode command message to be sent to the first device Any one or more information elements of;
  • the transceiver unit is further configured to send a direct connection safety mode command message to the first device, where the direct connection safety mode command message includes indication information for not opening control plane integrity protection and first integrity verification information.
  • a tenth aspect of the present application provides a communication device, which includes a processor, configured to implement the method described in the second or fourth aspect.
  • the device may also include a memory for storing instructions and data.
  • the memory is coupled with the processor, and when the processor executes the instructions stored in the memory, the device can realize the above-mentioned second aspect and each possible implementation manner of the second aspect, or the fourth aspect and each possible aspect of the fourth aspect Implement the method described in the method.
  • the device may also include a communication interface for the device to communicate with other devices.
  • the communication interface may be a circuit hardware module such as a transceiver and a bus, and the other device may be a first device or the like.
  • the device includes:
  • Memory used to store program instructions
  • the processor is configured to obtain a shared key between the first device and the second device when it is determined that the control plane integrity protection between the first device and the first device is not turned on;
  • the information to be protected is calculated to obtain the first integrity verification information;
  • the first information to be protected is any one or more information elements in the direct connection security mode command message to be sent to the first device;
  • the connection safety mode command message, the direct connection safety mode command message includes the indication information that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on and the first integrity verification information.
  • the eleventh aspect of the present application provides a computer-readable storage medium, including instructions, which when run on a computer, cause the computer to execute the second aspect and each possible implementation manner of the second aspect, or the fourth aspect and the fourth aspect The methods provided by each possible implementation.
  • a twelfth aspect of the present application provides a chip system.
  • the chip system includes a processor and may also include a memory, which is used to implement the foregoing second aspect and each possible implementation manner of the second aspect, or the fourth aspect and the fourth aspect.
  • the chip system can be composed of chips, or it can include chips and other discrete devices.
  • a thirteenth aspect of the present application provides a communication system.
  • the communication system includes the first device described in the first aspect and the second device described in the second aspect, or includes the first device and the fourth device described in the third aspect.
  • the second device described in the aspect includes the first device described in the aspect.
  • Figure 1 is an example diagram of Uu communication and PC5 unicast communication
  • Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the process of establishing a PC5 unicast communication
  • Figure 2a is an example diagram of tampering by an attacker
  • Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a network architecture applying an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of a method for determining security protection provided by Embodiment 1 of this application;
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of a method for determining security protection provided by Embodiment 2 of this application;
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart of a method for determining a security protection provided by Embodiment 3 of this application;
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic flowchart of a method for determining a security protection provided by Embodiment 4 of this application.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided by an embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of another communication device provided by an embodiment of this application.
  • the security policy is used to describe whether to enable the security protection policy, which can be divided into three types, namely, required, not needed, and preferred.
  • the security policy is required, which means that the security protection needs to be turned on; the security policy is not needed, which means that the security protection does not need to be turned on; the security policy is preferred, which means that the security protection can be turned on or not.
  • When a security policy is sent generally only one of the three types (required, not needed, and preferred) is selected for transmission. In some special scenarios, at least two types of transmission may be selected, and one of them is preferred. . For example, when not needed and preferred are sent, it means that they tend not to turn on security protection; when required and preferred are sent, they tend to turn on security protection.
  • the security strategy may include a control plane security strategy and a user plane security strategy.
  • the control plane security policy is used to indicate whether the control plane confidentiality protection and/or control plane integrity protection is enabled.
  • the user-plane security policy is used to indicate whether the user-plane confidentiality protection and/or user-plane integrity protection is enabled.
  • the values of the control plane confidentiality protection strategy, the control plane integrity protection strategy, the user plane confidentiality protection strategy and/or the user plane integrity protection strategy can all include required and not needed. ) And optional (preferred).
  • the policy is required, which means that the protection needs to be turned on; the policy is not needed, which means that the protection does not need to be turned on; the policy is preferred, which means that the protection can be turned on or not. For example, if the control plane confidentiality protection policy is not needed and the control plane integrity protection policy is required, it means that the control plane confidentiality protection does not need to be enabled, and the control plane integrity protection needs to be enabled.
  • Control plane confidentiality protection means protecting the confidentiality of signaling during transmission. Control plane confidentiality protection can also be called control plane encryption protection. Confidentiality means that the true content cannot be seen directly. Control plane integrity protection is to protect the integrity of signaling during transmission. Integrity means that it is consistent with the original signaling and has not been modified. User-plane confidentiality protection means protecting the confidentiality of user-plane data during transmission, and user-plane confidentiality protection can also be called user-plane encryption protection. User plane integrity protection means protecting the integrity of user plane data during transmission. Integrity means that it is consistent with the original user plane data and has not been modified.
  • Security policy can be used to determine the security protection method.
  • the initiator informs the receiver of its security policy.
  • the receiver can determine the security protection method with the initiator according to the security policy of the initiator and the security policy of the receiver.
  • the security protection method may include a control plane security protection method and a user plane security protection method.
  • the control plane security protection method refers to whether the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled and/or the control plane integrity protection is enabled.
  • control plane security protection method is to enable control plane confidentiality protection and enable control plane integrity protection;
  • user plane The security protection method refers to whether user-plane confidentiality protection is enabled, and/or whether user-plane integrity protection is enabled, for example, the user-plane security protection method is to enable user-plane confidentiality protection and not to enable user-plane integrity protection.
  • the security algorithm includes: at least one encryption algorithm, and at least one integrity protection algorithm.
  • Security algorithms can be further divided into control plane security algorithms and user plane security algorithms.
  • the control panel security algorithm is used to protect signaling, including control panel encryption algorithm and control plane integrity protection algorithm;
  • the security algorithm used by the user plane is used to protect user plane data, which can include user plane encryption algorithm and user plane integrity protection algorithm .
  • the user plane security algorithm and the control plane security algorithm may be the same or different. It should be noted that when the value of the security algorithm is a null value, it can mean that the security protection is not turned on. For example, if the control plane integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the first device and the second device is a null value, it may indicate that the control plane integrity protection is not enabled between the first device and the second device.
  • control plane security algorithm and the control plane security key are used to protect the control plane data (ie signaling), and the user plane security algorithm and the user plane security key are used to protect users.
  • control plane data ie signaling
  • user plane security algorithm and the user plane security key are used to protect users.
  • security protection includes:
  • User-plane confidentiality protection Use user-plane encryption keys and user-plane encryption algorithms to encrypt and protect user-plane data
  • Control plane confidentiality protection use control plane encryption keys and control plane encryption algorithms to encrypt and protect control plane data
  • Control plane integrity protection Use the control plane integrity protection key and the control plane integrity protection algorithm to protect the integrity of the control plane data.
  • the embodiment of this application does not limit the sequence relationship between encryption protection and integrity protection, that is, user plane/control plane data can be encrypted and protected first, and then integrity protection; user plane/control plane integrity can also be protected first, Then encrypt and protect the user plane/control plane data.
  • the user plane and the control plane may not use the same execution sequence.
  • control plane security algorithm and the control plane security key are used together to obtain the original control plane data
  • user plane security algorithm and the user plane security key are used together to obtain the original user.
  • Control plane decryption Use the control plane encryption key and the control plane encryption algorithm to decrypt the encrypted control plane data
  • Control plane integrity verification Use the control plane integrity protection key and the control plane integrity protection algorithm to perform integrity protection verification on the control plane data.
  • the embodiment of the present application does not limit the sequence of decryption and verification of integrity protection. But it needs to be understood that if the user plane/control plane data is encrypted and protected first, and then the integrity protection, the solution security protection is to verify the integrity protection first, and then decrypt the encrypted user plane data; if the user plane /Control plane data is integrity protected first, and then encrypted, the sequence of unlocking security protection is to decrypt the encrypted data first, and then perform integrity protection verification.
  • Unsafe protection is opposite to opening safety protection, that is, unsafe protection is only needed when safety protection is turned on.
  • the initiating end and the receiving end negotiate to determine whether the security of the PC5 is turned on, that is, to determine the security protection method between the two ends.
  • the initiating end and the receiving end can negotiate through control plane messages (or called signaling messages). For example, during the establishment of PC5 unicast communication, the negotiation is conducted through control plane messages, as shown in FIG. 2.
  • a user equipment (UE) 1 initiates a connection establishment request to a UE 2, that is, the initiator is UE 1, and the receiver is UE 2.
  • Step 201 UE 1 sends a direct communication request (direct communication request) message to UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the direct communication request message from UE 1.
  • the direct communication request message may include the identity of the UE 1, the security capabilities of the UE 1, the control plane security policy of the UE 1, and optionally the random number 1 (nonce_1) generated by the UE 1.
  • the identity of the UE 1 may be an application layer (identifier, ID) of the UE 1, or may be other information used to identify the identity of the UE 1, such as a device identity.
  • the security capability of the UE 1 may include a security algorithm supported by the UE 1, and the security algorithm supported by the UE 1 may be a security algorithm supported by the UE 1 during this connection process, or may be a security algorithm supported by the UE 1 itself.
  • the control plane security policy of UE1 is the control plane security policy that UE1 wants to use during this connection. For example, UE1 wants to enable control plane confidentiality protection and control plane integrity protection during this connection process.
  • the direct communication request message may also include key upper layer information (Key_Est_Info), and the key upper layer information may be an information container (container) for carrying upper layer information required to establish a key.
  • Key_Est_Info key upper layer information
  • the key upper layer information may be an information container (container) for carrying upper layer information required to establish a key.
  • UE 1 and UE 2 can establish a shared key between UE 1 and UE 2 by exchanging key upper layer information.
  • the direct communication request message may also include the root key identifier (KNRP ID).
  • KNRP ID is used to identify the root key KNRP.
  • the KNRP may be the mutual authentication process and key before the UE 1 and UE 2 perform step 201. Establish the shared key established by the process. If the UE 1 can perceive the identity of the UE 2 and the UE 1 saves part of the context information between the UE 2 and the UE 1, the direct communication request message includes the KNRP ID. UE 1 can perceive the identity of UE 2, that is, it can determine which user UE 2 is. UE1 stores part of the context information with UE2, that is, UE1 and UE2 have communicated before, and UE1 stores part of the context information between UE2 and UE1. This part of the context information includes UE1 and UE2. Between the KNRP and KNRP ID.
  • the UE 2 determines the control plane security protection method with the UE 1, that is, the UE 2 determines whether the control plane integrity protection is enabled for the signaling between the UE 2 and the UE 1, and whether the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled. And select the security algorithm.
  • the UE 2 determines the control plane security protection method with the UE 1 according to the control plane security policy of the UE 1 and the control plane security policy of the UE 2.
  • UE 2 can determine whether to enable control plane integrity protection according to the following method:
  • the control plane integrity protection strategy of UE 1 is preferred, and the control plane integrity protection strategy of UE 2 is preferred. Then UE 2 determines whether to enable control plane integrity protection with UE 1 according to its own strategy; for example, , The default policy is to enable control plane integrity protection with UE1, or determine whether to enable control plane integrity protection with UE1 according to the performance of UE2; the specific policy settings are not limited ;
  • the method for UE 2 to determine whether to enable control plane confidentiality protection is similar to the foregoing method for determining whether to enable control plane integrity protection, and will not be repeated. Further, in a possible implementation manner, if the UE 2 determines not to enable the control plane integrity protection with the UE 1, the UE 2 determines not to enable the control plane confidentiality protection with the UE 1; if the UE 2 If it is determined to enable the control plane integrity protection with the UE 1, the method for the UE 2 to determine whether to enable the control plane confidentiality protection with the UE 1 is similar to the above method for determining whether to enable the control plane integrity protection.
  • the UE 2 determines a security algorithm according to the control plane security protection method determined with the UE 1.
  • UE 2 determines that it needs to enable control plane confidentiality protection with UE 1, UE 2 selects an encryption algorithm as the encryption algorithm for performing control plane confidentiality protection between UE 1 and UE 2. Specifically, the UE 2 may determine an encryption algorithm supported by both the UE 1 and the UE 2 as the control plane encryption algorithm between the UE 1 and the UE 2 according to its own security capability and the security capability of the UE 1. Optionally, if the UE 2 determines that the confidentiality protection of the control plane with the UE 1 needs not to be enabled, the UE 2 determines an algorithm with a null value as the control plane encryption algorithm between the UE 1 and the UE 2.
  • UE 2 determines that it needs to enable control plane integrity protection with UE 1, UE 2 selects an integrity protection algorithm. Specifically, the UE 2 may determine an integrity protection algorithm supported by both the UE 1 and the UE 2 as the control plane integrity protection algorithm between the UE 1 and the UE 2 according to its own security capabilities and the security capabilities of the UE 1. Optionally, if the UE 2 determines that the control plane integrity protection with the UE 1 is not enabled, the UE 2 determines a null value algorithm as the control plane integrity protection algorithm between the UE 1 and UE 2. . When the UE 2 determines to enable the control plane integrity protection with the UE 1, the subsequent procedures 203-206 are executed; when the UE 2 determines not to enable the control plane integrity protection with the UE 1, the subsequent procedures are executed Processes 207-209.
  • Step 203 UE 1 and UE 2 perform a mutual authentication process and a key establishment process.
  • step 203 does not need to be performed. If the direct communication request message includes the KNRP ID, the UE 2 determines the shared key KNRP with the UE 1 according to the KNRP ID, and thus step 203 may not be performed.
  • the UE 2 sends an integrity-protected direct security mode command (direct security mode command) message to the UE 1.
  • the UE 1 receives the integrity-protected direct connection security mode command message from the UE 2.
  • the direct connection security mode command message may include the selected security algorithm (chosen_algs), and the selected security algorithm may include the security algorithm selected by the UE 2 in step 202.
  • the direct connection security mode command message carries the control plane integrity protection algorithm and the control plane encryption algorithm determined by the UE 2.
  • the direct connection security mode command message may also include the random number 2 (nonce_2) generated by the UE 2, the security capability of the UE 1, and the control plane security policy of the UE 1.
  • the security capability of the UE 1 and the control plane security policy of the UE 1 are the security capability of the UE 1 and the control plane security policy of the UE 1 received by the UE 2 from the message in step 201. Since the UE 2 opens the control plane integrity protection, the UE 2 can perform integrity protection on the direct connection security mode command message.
  • the direct connection security mode command message is not encrypted regardless of whether the control plane encryption protection is turned on.
  • step 205 the UE 1 determines the control plane security protection method with the UE 2, that is, the UE 1 determines whether the control plane integrity protection is enabled for the signaling between the UE 1 and the UE 2, and whether the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled.
  • the UE 1 determines the control plane security protection method with the UE 2 according to the selected security algorithm included in the direct connection security mode command message. That is, the selected security algorithm included in the direct connection security mode command message is used to indicate the security algorithm used between UE 1 and UE 2, and implicitly indicates whether to enable the corresponding control plane security protection. For example, if the encryption algorithm is a non-null value, the UE 1 determines to enable control plane confidentiality protection, and uses the direct connection security mode command message to carry the encryption algorithm to protect the confidentiality of subsequent control plane messages; the integrity protection algorithm is a non-null value , The UE 1 determines to enable control plane integrity protection, and uses the control plane integrity protection algorithm carried in the direct connection security mode command message to perform integrity protection on subsequent control plane messages.
  • the selected security algorithm included in the direct connection security mode command message is used to indicate the security algorithm used between UE 1 and UE 2, and implicitly indicates whether to enable the corresponding control plane security protection. For example, if the encryption algorithm is a non-null value,
  • the UE 1 may verify whether the determined control plane security protection method matches the control plane security policy of the UE 1. For example, if the control plane confidentiality protection policy is not needed, then the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled to match the control plane confidentiality protection policy not needed; if the control plane confidentiality protection policy is required, then the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled.
  • the control plane confidentiality protection strategy requires matching; if the control plane confidentiality protection strategy is preferred, then the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled or not, and the control plane confidentiality protection strategy is preferred to match.
  • the UE 1 uses KNRP to calculate the session key KNRP-sess. And UE 1 further uses KNRP-sess to calculate the integrity protection key (NRPIK) used in the PC5 unicast communication.
  • the control plane security protection method is to enable control plane confidentiality protection, the UE 1 further uses KNRP-sess to calculate the encryption key (NRPEK) used in the PC5 unicast communication.
  • UE1 Before activating the control plane security between UE1 and UE2, UE1 performs the following three verification procedures:
  • the UE 1 verifies whether the security capability of the UE 1 in the direct connection security mode command message is the same as the security capability sent to the UE 2;
  • the UE1 verifies whether the security policy of the UE1 in the direct connection security mode command message is the same as the security policy sent to the UE2;
  • the UE 1 activates the control plane security between it and the UE 2. If any one of the above three verifications fails, the UE 1 releases the connection with the UE 2 and sends a connection establishment rejection message to the UE 2.
  • the connection establishment rejection message also carries the rejection reason value. It should be noted that this application does not limit the sequence of execution of the above three verifications.
  • Step 206 UE 1 sends a direct security mode complete (direct security mode complete) message to UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message from UE 1.
  • the direct connection security mode completion message may include the user plane security policy of the UE 1, which is used to negotiate with the UE 2 to determine the user plane security protection method.
  • the UE 1 performs integrity protection on the direct connection security mode completion message. If the control plane encryption protection is also enabled between the UE 1 and the UE 2, the UE 1 encrypts and protects the direct connection security mode completion message.
  • the UE 2 sends a direct security mode command (direct security mode command) message to the UE 1.
  • UE 1 receives the direct connection security mode command message from UE 2.
  • the direct connection security mode command message may include the selected security algorithm (chosen_algs), and the selected security algorithm may include the security algorithm selected by the UE 2 in step 202.
  • the direct connection security mode command message carries a null value control plane integrity protection algorithm and a null value control plane encryption algorithm.
  • the direct connection security mode command message may also include the security capabilities of the UE 1 and the control plane security policy of the UE 1.
  • the security capability of the UE 1 and the control plane security policy of the UE 1 are the security capability of the UE 1 and the control plane security policy of the UE 1 received by the UE 2 from the message in step 201. Since the UE 2 does not enable control plane integrity protection, the UE 2 does not need to perform integrity protection on the direct connection security mode command message.
  • the UE 1 determines the control plane security protection method with the UE 2, that is, the UE 1 determines whether the control plane integrity protection is enabled for the signaling between the UE 1 and the UE 2, and whether the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled.
  • the UE 1 determines the control plane security protection method with the UE 2 according to the selected security algorithm included in the direct connection security mode command message. That is, the selected security algorithm included in the direct connection security mode command message is used to indicate the security algorithm used between UE 1 and UE 2, and implicitly indicates whether to enable the corresponding control plane security protection. For example, if the encryption algorithm is a null value, the UE 1 determines not to enable control plane confidentiality protection; if the integrity protection algorithm is a null value, then the UE 1 determines not to enable control plane integrity protection.
  • the UE 1 may verify whether the determined control plane security protection method matches the control plane security policy of the UE 1. For example, if the control plane confidentiality protection policy is not needed, then the control plane confidentiality protection is not enabled to match the control plane confidentiality protection policy not needed; if the control plane confidentiality protection policy is required, then the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled.
  • the control plane confidentiality protection strategy requires matching; if the control plane confidentiality protection strategy is preferred, then the control plane confidentiality protection is enabled or not, and the control plane confidentiality protection strategy is preferred to match.
  • UE1 Before UE1 determines not to enable the control plane security between activation and UE2, it performs the following two verification procedures:
  • the UE 1 verifies whether the security capability of the UE 1 in the direct connection security mode command message is the same as the security capability sent to the UE 2;
  • the UE1 verifies whether the security policy of the UE1 in the direct connection security mode command message is the same as the security policy sent to the UE2;
  • the UE 1 does not activate the control plane security between it and the UE 2. If any one of the above three verifications fails, the UE 1 releases the connection with the UE 2 and sends a connection establishment rejection message to the UE 2.
  • the connection establishment rejection message also carries the rejection reason value. It should be noted that this application does not limit the sequence of execution of the above three verifications.
  • Step 209 UE 1 sends a direct security mode complete (direct security mode complete) message to UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message from UE 1.
  • the direct connection security mode completion message may include the user plane security policy of the UE 1, which is used to negotiate with the UE 2 to determine the user plane security protection method.
  • the direct security mode complete (direct security mode complete) message sent by the UE 1 to the UE 2 is not integrity protected. It can be seen from the embodiment in FIG. 2 that when the UE 2 determines to enable control plane integrity protection, the UE 1 can verify the integrity of the direct connection security mode command message, thereby verifying whether the transmitted information has been tampered with. However, if the UE 2 determines that the control plane integrity protection is not enabled, the UE 1 cannot verify whether the transmitted information has been tampered with, and there will be a man-in-the-middle attack problem.
  • the attacker sends UE 1’s control plane integrity protection policy carried in the direct communication request message sent by UE 1 to UE 2 Change to not needed, and then send the modified direct communication request message to UE 2.
  • the UE 2 determines the control plane integrity protection method, it determines not to enable the control plane integrity protection. Since the control plane integrity protection is not enabled, the direct connection security mode command message sent by UE 2 to UE 1 (carried in the control plane integrity protection policy of UE 1 is not needed) is not integrity protected. At this time, the attacker does not have integrity protection.
  • the control plane integrity protection policy of the UE 1 carried in the direct connection security mode command message is tampered with back to preferred.
  • the UE 1 only performs the two verifications in step 208, and will not be able to know the existence of the attacker in the middle.
  • Subsequent control plane security between UE 1 and UE 2 is forcibly not enabled control plane integrity protection under the interference of the attacker.
  • the original control plane integrity protection between UE 1 and UE 2 can be enabled.
  • the attacker turned off the integrity protection of the control plane between UE 1 and UE 2 through tampering, resulting in a lower security level and a potential security hazard.
  • the subsequent user plane security policy will also be further attacked by the attacker due to the lack of control plane integrity protection during the negotiation process, thereby affecting the security of signaling and user plane data transmission.
  • an error occurs when UE 1 accesses UE 2, causing UE 2 to reply to UE 1 with a failure message, and the failure message may carry a failure reason value.
  • the UE 1 can trigger related policies according to the failure reason value. For example, if a cause value indicates that UE 1 cannot connect to UE 2 temporarily, UE 1 will start a timer according to a preset policy, and will not try to access UE 2 for a certain period of time. For another example, if a cause value indicates that UE 1 immediately initiates a reconnection to UE 2, then UE 1 will immediately initiate a reconnection to UE 2 to reconnect to UE 2. Without enabling the integrity protection of the control plane, the failure cause value sent by the UE 2 may be tampered with by an attacker, causing the UE 1 to implement the wrong policy, contrary to the wishes of the UE 2.
  • the embodiments of the present application provide a method, system, and device for determining security protection, which can reduce the risk of information being tampered with, thereby improving the security of information transmission. Further, when the determined control plane security protection method is not to enable control plane integrity protection, the information included in the signaling can be effectively prevented from being tampered with.
  • the technology described in the embodiments of this application can be used in various communication systems, such as the fourth generation (4G) communication system, 4.5G communication system, 5G communication system, a system that integrates multiple communication systems, or a communication system that will evolve in the future .
  • 4G fourth generation
  • 4.5G communication system 4.5G communication system
  • 5G communication system a system that integrates multiple communication systems
  • a communication system that will evolve in the future a communication system that will evolve in the future .
  • the terminal device (also referred to as a terminal) involved in the embodiments of this application can be a device with a wireless transceiver function, which can be deployed on land, including indoor or outdoor, handheld or vehicle-mounted; and can also be deployed on water (such as a ship Etc.); can also be deployed in the air (such as aircraft, balloons and satellites, etc.).
  • the terminal device may be a UE, and the UE includes a handheld device, a vehicle-mounted device, a wearable device, or a computing device with wireless communication functions.
  • the UE may be a mobile phone, a tablet computer, or a computer with a wireless transceiver function.
  • Terminal equipment can also be virtual reality (VR) terminal equipment, augmented reality (AR) terminal equipment, smart vehicle terminal equipment, wireless terminal in industrial control, wireless terminal in unmanned driving , Wireless terminal in telemedicine, wireless terminal in smart grid, wireless terminal in smart city, wireless terminal in smart home, etc.
  • the device used to implement the function of the terminal device may be a terminal device; it may also be a device capable of supporting the terminal device to implement the function, such as a chip system. The device may be installed in the terminal device or connected to the terminal device. Matching use, such as a processor.
  • the device used to implement the functions of the terminal device is a terminal device as an example to describe the technical solutions provided in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the terminal device can be a terminal device in a D2D communication system, a terminal device in a V2X communication system, a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication system, etc., or other The terminal equipment in the short-distance direct connection communication system.
  • V2V vehicle-to-vehicle
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a network architecture to which an embodiment of the present application is applied.
  • FIG. 3 includes a first device 301 and a second device 302.
  • the device can be a terminal device, a network device, or a core network device.
  • the network equipment can be, for example, base stations in various communication systems, and the core network equipment can be, for example, user plane function (UPF), access and mobility management function (AMF), or multiple access Multi-access edge computing (MEC) equipment, etc.
  • the first device 301 and the second device 302 may be devices of the same type, for example, both UEs, or devices of different types, for example, the first device 301 is a terminal device, and the second device 302 is a network device or an AMF network element.
  • the first device 301 and the second device 302 can communicate through the PC5 interface as shown in FIG. 1, and the first device 301 and the second device 302 can be any two terminal devices in the communication system.
  • the interface used may be a Uu port or other interfaces that can be used directly, or use a logical link composed of several interfaces.
  • the UE needs to pass through the air interface Uu interface to the MEC, the N3 interface from the base station to the UPF, and the N6 interface from the UPF to the MEC.
  • the first device 301 initiates a connection to the second device 302, that is, the first device 301 is the initiating end, and the second device 302 is the receiving end.
  • the first device 301 initiates a connection to the second device 302 through a direct connection communication request message.
  • the direct communication request message includes the control plane integrity protection policy of the first device 301 and the security capability of the first device 301.
  • the second device 302 can determine whether to enable control plane integrity protection according to different methods, for example, according to the control plane integrity protection policy of the first device 301 and the second device 301
  • the control plane integrity protection strategy of the device 302 determines whether to enable control plane integrity protection with the first device 301; the second device 302 can also determine whether to enable control with the first device 301 according to other pre-configured policies Surface integrity protection.
  • the second device 302 may perform protection processing on the information to be protected according to a pre-configured method or the instruction information sent by the first device 301.
  • the pre-configured method is used to indicate a method of performing protection processing on the information to be protected when the integrity protection of the control plane between the first device 301 and the second device 302 is not enabled.
  • the information to be protected can be one or more information elements in a message, or the entire message.
  • the direct communication request message further includes first indication information
  • the first indication information is used to indicate the operation that the second device 302 needs to perform when it determines that the control plane integrity protection is not enabled.
  • the second device 302 determines that the control plane integrity protection is not turned on, it determines according to the first indication information that it is necessary to trigger the mutual authentication with the first device 301.
  • the first indication information is also used to instruct the second device 302 to generate a shared key after mutual authentication, and instruct the second device 302 to perform protection processing on the information to be protected according to the shared key to prevent integrity protection of the control plane from being turned on.
  • the information to be protected is maliciously tampered with.
  • the first device 301 may determine whether it needs to carry the first indication information according to its control plane security protection policy. For example, the first device 301 may carry the first indication information in the direct communication request message when its control plane security protection policy is preferred or not needed; the first device 301 may carry the first indication information in its control plane security protection policy as required In this case, it is not necessary to carry the first indication information in the direct communication request message.
  • the second device 302 can trigger the first device 301 and the second device 302 to obtain the shared key between the two ends.
  • the second device 302 calculates the first information to be protected according to the shared key and the first algorithm to obtain the first integrity verification information.
  • the first information to be protected includes any one or more of the above-mentioned direct connection security mode command messages. Element, or the entire direct communication request message.
  • the first algorithm may be a hash algorithm or an encryption algorithm.
  • the second device 302 sends a direct connection security mode command message to the first device 301, and the direct connection security mode command message may instruct the first device 301 not to enable control plane integrity protection.
  • the direct connection security mode command message includes first integrity verification information.
  • the first device 302 when receiving the direct connection security mode command message, the first device 302 verifies the first integrity verification information according to the shared key between the two ends. For example, the first information to be protected is calculated according to the shared key and the first algorithm, and the expected information corresponding to the first information to be protected is obtained. It is judged whether the expected information is consistent with the first integrity verification information. pass through. In the case where the first integrity verification information is verified, the first device 302 determines not to enable the control plane integrity protection according to the instruction information of not enabling the control plane integrity protection.
  • the indication information that the control plane integrity protection is not turned on may be a null value for the control plane integrity protection algorithm, or it may be the control plane activation indication information that indicates not to turn on the control plane integrity protection.
  • the second device 302 if the control plane security protection method determined by the second device 302 includes not enabling control plane integrity protection, then the second device 302 carries the first information to be protected in the upper layer information of the first key. , Send a direct connection security mode command message to the first device 301.
  • the direct connection security mode command message includes the upper layer information of the first key and the indication information that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on.
  • the upper layer for example, the application layer
  • the upper layer obtains the first information to be protected from the upper layer information of the first key, and submits it to the V2X layer.
  • the layer verifies whether the first information to be protected transmitted from the upper layer is consistent with the first information to be protected sent from the first device 301 to the second device 302, if they are consistent, the verification is passed, otherwise the verification is not passed.
  • the first device 301 determines not to turn on the control plane integrity protection according to the instruction information of not turning on the control plane integrity protection.
  • the first device 301 can verify whether an attacker has tampered with the information during the process of negotiating the control plane security protection method, thereby improving information transmission. Security.
  • the second device 302 should determine that the control plane integrity protection is not enabled according to the control plane integrity protection policies of the first device 301 and the second device 302. But in some scenarios, for example, the second device 302 needs to pass security sensitive parameters (such as the updated temporary identity of the first device 301), or the second device needs to determine that the identity of the first access device 301 is indeed claimed The first access device 301 and the second device 302 determine that the control plane integrity protection needs to be turned on. This method can also be called the method of covering the control plane security protection method. Further, the second device 302 generates an integrity protection key and selects a non-empty integrity protection algorithm.
  • the second device 302 sends a direct connection safety mode command message to the first device 301, where the direct connection safety mode command message is integrity protected.
  • the full mode command message carries security-sensitive parameters.
  • the first device 301 performs de-integrity protection on the direct connection security mode command message. Specifically, for example, if the control plane integrity protection policy sent by the first device 301 is not needed, and the control plane integrity protection policy of the second device 302 is preferred, the second device 302 should not enable the control plane integrity protection.
  • the second device 302 needs to send the updated temporary identity of the first device 301 to the first device 301, and this message requires both control plane encryption protection and control plane integrity protection, then the second device 302 first activates control Plane integrity protection and control plane confidentiality protection, and then send the first device 301's temporary identity in the subsequent existing control plane encryption protection and control plane integrity protection messages to the first device 301.
  • the method of covering the control plane security protection method can occur when the second device 302 determines the control plane security protection method for the first time, and can also be used in the case that the control plane security has been determined not to be activated.
  • the coverage can be permanent or temporary.
  • the second device 302 can clearly indicate the coverage conditions, for example, several messages are covered, for example, only the current process is covered. After the coverage condition fails, the previous control plane security protection method can be restored.
  • the second device 302 ignores the control plane integrity protection policy carried by the first device 301.
  • the second device 302 may carry instruction information in the direct connection security mode command message, which is used to inform the first device 301 that the security protection type enabled by this message does not match the original intention of the first device 301, and the first device 301 is required to execute according to the current decision .
  • the first device 301 and the second device 302 may continue to perform control plane security protection on other control plane messages in accordance with the control plane security protection method specified by the direct connection security mode command message in subsequent messages. It is also possible to execute the control plane security protection method that should be used in subsequent messages.
  • the instruction information can be carried in each mandatory message, and when it is no longer carried, it can be opened according to the control plane security method that should be used.
  • the direct connection security mode command message also has indication information that can indicate that the security protection method is used in several subsequent messages. After the number of messages reaches the number indicated by the indication information, the first device 301 and the second device 302 can follow The safe opening method of the control surface that should have been used.
  • the second device 302 needs to send the failure reason value to the first device 301 in the case of certain scenarios.
  • the first device 301 decides to initiate the connection again immediately, or wait for a period of time to initiate the connection again.
  • the second device 302 can override the original control plane security protection method, that is, decide to turn on the control plane integrity protection. Then pass the failure reason value in the integrity-protected control plane message.
  • the second device 302 can command the control plane security protection method after the message transfer coverage in the direct connection security mode.
  • the first device 301 receives the direct connection security mode command message, and activates the control plane security protection according to the control plane security protection method indicated in the direct connection security mode command message.
  • the method for determining security protection provided in the embodiments of the present application will be described in detail below.
  • the first device uses UE 1 as an example
  • the second device uses UE 2 as an example.
  • the name of the message between each network element or the name of each parameter in the message in the following embodiments of the present application is just an example, and other names may also be used in specific implementations. The embodiments of this application do not make specific details about this limited.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of the process of determining the security protection method provided in the first embodiment of this application.
  • the process may include but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Step 401 UE 1 sends a direct communication request message to UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the direct communication request message from UE 1.
  • the direct communication request message may include the control plane integrity protection policy of the UE 1, which is used to negotiate with the UE 2 to determine whether to enable the control plane integrity protection.
  • the security policy of the UE 1 can be configured by the core network element and the UE 1 is notified, for example, the policy control function (PCF) network element in the 5G core network configures the security policy for the UE 1 and informs the UE; It may also be configured by an application function (AF) network element and notified to the UE 1; or it may be configured by an AF network element and notified to the UE 1 through a PCF network element.
  • PCF policy control function
  • AF application function
  • This application does not limit how the UE obtains its own control plane integrity protection strategy.
  • the direct communication request message may also include the security capability of the UE 1, and the security capability of the UE 1 indicates the security algorithm supported by the UE 1.
  • the direct communication request message may also include the random number 1 generated by the UE 1, and the random number 1 can be used to generate a control plane encryption key (NRPEK) and an integrity protection key (NRPIK).
  • NRPEK control plane encryption key
  • NRPIK integrity protection key
  • step 402 the UE 2 determines that the control plane integrity protection is not enabled, and then triggers the UE 1 and the UE 2 to obtain the shared key, that is, step 403 is triggered.
  • Step 403 UE 1 and UE 2 obtain a shared key.
  • the shared key is KNRP.
  • step 403 is not performed.
  • step 403 is executed to protect the information to be protected according to the shared key obtained in step 403 to prevent the control plane security negotiation process from not having control plane integrity. Attacker attacks brought about by sexual protection.
  • the shared key here refers to the key that both UE 1 and UE 2 know and use.
  • the method for performing mutual authentication and then establishing a key can be the same as in the case where UE 2 determines that it needs to enable control plane integrity protection with UE 1 in the prior art, that is, refer to the steps of the embodiment in FIG. 2 above. 203.
  • the UE 2 may also trigger step 403.
  • the operator can choose to execute step 403 every time, that is, execute step 403 regardless of whether the control plane integrity protection is enabled.
  • the subsequent procedures of UE1 and UE2 if the message is not integrity protected, it is necessary to obtain a shared key in order to securely protect the message without integrity protection.
  • UE 1 and UE 2 may obtain the shared key in the following four ways:
  • Method 1 When UE 2 determines that the control plane security protection method includes not enabling control plane integrity protection, UE 2 triggers the mutual authentication process with UE 1, and performs key establishment with UE 1 after mutual authentication Process.
  • the mutual authentication process is used to verify the identities of both parties, that is, the UE 2 verifies whether the UE 1 is a legitimate user, and the UE 1 verifies whether the UE 2 is a legitimate user.
  • the key establishment process is executed so that both parties can obtain the shared key.
  • Manner 2 UE 1 and UE 2 are pre-configured with a shared key between the two, and both ends can obtain the shared key from the pre-configuration when the shared key is needed.
  • Method 3 Public and private keys and certificates are pre-configured on UE1 and UE2, and both ends can generate a shared key based on the public and private key and the certificate when they need to share the key.
  • UE1 is configured with the public key of UE1, the private key of UE1, and the certificate of UE1.
  • the certificate of UE1 contains the public key of UE1; the public key of UE2 and the private key of UE2 are configured on UE2.
  • the certificate of UE2, the certificate of UE2 contains the public key of UE2.
  • the process of using public and private keys and certificates to generate a shared key can be as follows: Take the UE 2 initiates the process of establishing a shared key as an example, the UE 2 sends its own certificate to the UE 1, and the UE 1 verifies the validity of the UE 2 certificate and then uses the UE 2 After the public key encrypts the shared information 1 provided by the UE 1, the UE 1 sends the certificate of the UE 1 and the encrypted shared information 1 to the UE 2. After UE 2 receives it, after verifying the legitimacy of the UE 1 certificate, it uses the private key of UE 2 to decrypt the encrypted shared information 1 to obtain shared information 1, and uses the decrypted shared information 1 and self-generated shared information 2 to generate shared information Key.
  • the UE 2 uses the public key of the UE 1 to encrypt the shared information 2, the UE 2 sends the certificate of the UE 2 and the encrypted shared information 2 to the UE 1, and then the UE 1 decrypts the shared information 2 and generates the shared information together with the shared information 1. Key.
  • Manner 4 UE 1 and UE 2 have partial context information, so UE 1 and UE 2 can directly obtain the shared key from the partial context information.
  • the UE 1 and the UE 2 When the UE 1 accesses the UE 2 for the first time, the UE 1 and the UE 2 perform a mutual authentication process and a password establishment process to obtain a shared key.
  • UE 1 and UE 2 can generate encryption key NRPEK and/or integrity protection key NRPIK according to random number 1, random number 2 and the session key KNRP-sess generated by the shared key.
  • UE 1 and UE 2 adopt corresponding keys for security protection according to the determined security protection method.
  • NRPEK and NRPIK are deleted, for example, NRPEK and NRPIK are deleted when context information is deleted.
  • Step 404 The UE 2 calculates the first information to be protected according to the shared key and the first algorithm to obtain the first integrity verification information.
  • the UE 2 determines the protection key according to the shared key, and uses the protection key and the first algorithm to calculate the first information to be protected to obtain the first integrity verification information.
  • the first algorithm for example, may be a hash-based message authentication code (keyed-hash message authentication code or hash-based message authentication code) algorithm, and the first integrity verification information is the HMAC corresponding to the first information to be protected.
  • the first algorithm can be pre-configured on UE 1 and UE 2, or pre-arranged by UE 1 and UE 2.
  • the UE 2 determines the protection key according to the shared key, which can be directly using the shared key KNRP as the protection key; it can also calculate the KNRP-sess based on the shared key, and use KNRP-sess as the protection key; it can also be based on The shared key is calculated to obtain KNRP-sess, and the protection key is generated according to KNRP-sess.
  • the protection key can be the integrity protection key NRPIK or the encryption key NRPEK.
  • the specific protection key used by UE 1 and UE 2 may be pre-configured, or agreed or negotiated by both ends in advance.
  • the UE 2 uses the protection key and the HMAC algorithm to calculate the HMAC corresponding to the first information to be protected.
  • the protection key and the first information to be protected are input into the HMAC algorithm for calculation.
  • the output of the HMAC algorithm corresponds to the first information to be protected HMAC.
  • the information to be protected can also be described as information that needs to be protected, parameters that need to be protected, and so on.
  • the first information to be protected may be any one or more information elements (information element, IE) in the directly connected security command message.
  • the direct connection security command message may include information indicating that the control plane integrity protection is not enabled, the control plane integrity protection policy of the UE 1, and/or the security capability of the UE 1.
  • the first information to be protected may be, for example, the information that carries UE 1.
  • the UE 2 determines that the value of the security algorithm is null when the control plane security protection is not enabled.
  • the process of selecting the security algorithm can be referred to the related description in Figure 2, which will not be repeated here. For example, when the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on, and the confidentiality protection of the control plane is not turned on, the integrity protection algorithm and the integrity confidentiality algorithm both take the value of null.
  • step 404 If the protection key is not used in step 404, that is, only the first information to be protected is input into the HMAC algorithm, there may still be a risk of tampering, and the security is low.
  • Step 405 UE 2 sends a direct connection security mode command message to UE 1.
  • UE 1 receives the direct connection security mode command message from UE 2.
  • the indication information that the control plane integrity protection is not turned on carried in the direct connection security mode command message may be a null value for the selected control plane security protection algorithm, or it may be the control plane activation indication information that indicates that the control plane integrity protection is not turned on.
  • Step 406 The UE 1 verifies the first integrity verification information.
  • the UE 1 determines that the direct connection security mode command message is not integrity protected according to the indication information that the control plane integrity protection is not enabled in the direct connection security mode command message.
  • the UE 1 obtains the shared key with the UE 2 and determines the protection key, and uses the protection key and the same first algorithm (such as the HMAC algorithm) as the UE 2 to calculate the first information to be protected
  • the corresponding expected HMAC that is, the UE 1 inputs the protection key and the first information to be protected into the HMAC algorithm for calculation, and the output of the HMAC algorithm is the expected HMAC corresponding to the first information to be protected.
  • the UE1 judges whether the expected HMAC is consistent with the HMAC carried in step 405. If they are consistent, the HMAC corresponding to the first information to be protected passes the verification, indicating that the UE2 correctly received the first information to be protected sent by the UE1; if they are inconsistent, the first information to be protected The HMC corresponding to the protected information fails the verification, indicating that an attacker has tampered with the information between UE 1 and UE 2.
  • the UE 1 determines not to enable the control plane integrity protection according to the instruction information of not turning on the control plane integrity protection carried in step 405.
  • the first information to be protected is the control plane integrity protection policy of the UE 1, and the control plane integrity protection policy is preferred, and the UE 2 determines not to enable the control plane integrity protection. If the expected HMAC corresponding to the control plane integrity protection policy of UE1 calculated by UE1 is HMAC1, and the HMAC carried in step 405 is HMAC2, the two are inconsistent, indicating that the attacker may have tampered with the control plane integrity protection policy of UE1. It may be that the attacker tampered with the direct connection communication request message sent by the UE 1 to the UE 2, or it may be tampered with when the UE 2 sent the direct connection security mode command message to the UE 1.
  • step 407a if the verification in step 406 fails, the UE 1 sends a connection establishment rejection message to the UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the connection establishment rejection message from UE 1.
  • connection establishment rejection message may include the rejection reason value and the third integrity verification information.
  • the third integrity verification information is calculated based on the shared key and the HMAC algorithm for the third information to be protected.
  • the third information to be protected includes any one or more IEs in the connection establishment rejection message, for example, an IE carrying a rejection reason value. .
  • the third integrity verification information is the HMAC corresponding to the rejection reason value.
  • the UE 1 uses the protection key and the HMAC algorithm to calculate the HMAC corresponding to the rejection reason value, that is, the UE 1 inputs the protection key and the rejection reason value into the HMAC algorithm for calculation, and the output of the HMAC algorithm is the HMAC corresponding to the rejection reason value.
  • the HMAC corresponding to the rejection reason value may also be carried.
  • step 408a the UE 2 verifies the third integrity verification information.
  • the third integrity verification information is the HMAC corresponding to the rejection reason value.
  • the UE 2 uses the protection key and the first algorithm (such as the HMAC algorithm) to calculate the expected HMAC corresponding to the rejection reason value, and judges the expected HMAC and the HMAC carried in step 407a. Whether they are consistent, if they are consistent, the verification is passed, and the UE 2 can release the connection with the UE 1.
  • the HMAC corresponding to the rejection reason value is verified, and the UE 2 does not need to reply to any message. If they are inconsistent, the UE 2 ignores the received connection establishment rejection message. Specifically, the connection with the UE 1 may not be released.
  • UE 2 After UE 2 sends a direct connection security mode command message, it starts a timer. If the timer expires and has not received the direct connection security mode completion message or connection establishment rejection message from UE 1, the UE 2 releases the connection with the UE. The connection between 1.
  • the context information between the two can be deleted, for example, the NRPIK is deleted.
  • step 407b if the verification in step 406 is passed, the UE 1 sends a direct connection security mode completion message to the UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message from UE 1.
  • the direct connection security mode completion message may include instruction information for turning off the integrity protection of the control plane, and second integrity verification information.
  • the instruction information for turning off the integrity protection of the control plane is used to instruct to turn off the integrity protection of the control plane.
  • the second integrity verification information is calculated on the second information to be protected according to the shared key and the first algorithm.
  • the second information to be protected includes any one or more IEs in the direct connection security mode completion message, for example, closing the control plane IE carried in the instruction information of integrity protection.
  • the second integrity verification information is the HMAC corresponding to the instruction information for turning off the integrity protection of the control plane.
  • the UE 1 uses the protection key and the HMAC algorithm in step 404 to calculate the HMAC corresponding to the instruction information to turn off the integrity protection of the control plane, that is, the UE 1 inputs the protection key and the instruction information to turn off the integrity protection of the control plane into the HMAC algorithm for processing. Calculate to obtain the HMAC corresponding to the instruction information for turning off the integrity protection of the control plane.
  • step 408b the UE 2 verifies the second integrity verification information.
  • the UE 2 uses the protection key and the first algorithm (such as the HMAC algorithm) to calculate the expected HMAC corresponding to the instruction information for turning off the integrity protection of the control plane, and determines whether the expected HMAC is consistent with the HMAC carried in step 407b. If they are consistent, the verification is passed. , And turn off the integrity protection of the control plane. If they are inconsistent, UE 2 releases the connection with UE 1.
  • the first algorithm such as the HMAC algorithm
  • the information transferred between the UE 1 and the UE 2 is secured using the shared key between the UE 1 and the UE 2 Protection to prevent attackers from tampering with unprotected information.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of the method for determining security protection provided in the second embodiment of this application.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart of the method for determining security protection provided in the second embodiment of this application.
  • the process shown in Figure 5 may include but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Step 501 UE 1 sends a direct communication request message to UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the direct communication request message from UE 1.
  • step 502 the UE 2 determines that the control plane security protection method includes not turning on the control plane integrity protection, and then triggers the UE 1 and the UE 2 to obtain the shared key, that is, triggers step 503.
  • Step 503 UE 1 and UE 2 obtain a shared key.
  • step 501 to step 503 please refer to the specific description of step 401 to step 403, which will not be repeated here.
  • step 504 the UE 2 determines a protection key according to the shared key, uses the protection key to protect the first information to be protected, and obtains the first integrity verification information.
  • the UE 2 determines a protection key according to the shared key, uses the protection key to protect the first information to be protected, and obtains the first integrity verification information.
  • the UE 2 determines the protection key according to the shared key, which can be calculated based on the shared key to obtain KNRP-sess, using KNRP-sess as the protection key; it can also be calculated based on the shared key to obtain KNRP-sess, and continue to use KNRP-sess Generate a key and use the key as a protection key.
  • the protection key can be NRPEK or NRPIK.
  • the specific protection key used by UE 1 and UE 2 may be pre-configured or agreed in advance by both ends.
  • the UE 2 uses the protection key to perform encryption protection and/or integrity protection on the first information to be protected, and obtains the first integrity verification information, that is, the first information to be protected after encryption protection and/or integrity protection.
  • step 504 if the protection key is not used, the first information to be protected cannot be encrypted and/or integrity protected, and there is a risk of tampering with the information to be protected.
  • Step 505 UE 2 sends a direct connection security mode command message to UE 1.
  • UE 1 receives the direct connection security mode command message from UE 2.
  • the direct connection security mode command message may include the first integrity verification information and indication information that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on.
  • the indication information that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on may be a null value of the selected control plane security protection algorithm, or it may be the control plane activation indication information that indicates that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on.
  • Step 506 The UE 1 verifies the first integrity verification information.
  • the UE 1 uses the protection key to decrypt the first integrity verification information, and determines whether the decrypted information is the same as the first information to be protected sent by the UE 1 to the UE 2 If they are consistent, the verification is passed, otherwise the verification is not passed. Or the UE 1 judges whether the decrypted information is consistent with the first information to be protected sent by the UE 2 to the UE 1.
  • the direct connection security mode command message in step 505 also includes the first information to be protected without any protection processing. Protect information.
  • the UE 1 uses the protection key to perform integrity protection verification on the first integrity verification information.
  • the verification method is to re-use the first information to be protected sent by UE 1 to UE 2 or reuse the protection key to protect the integrity of the information to be protected, and judge to reuse it. Whether the first information to be protected after the protection key performs integrity protection on the first information to be protected is consistent with the first information to be protected after the integrity protection using the protection key sent by the UE 2 to the UE 1
  • the verification is passed, otherwise the verification is not passed.
  • the UE 1 uses the protection key to decrypt and verify the integrity of the first integrity verification information.
  • the UE 1 determines not to enable the control plane integrity protection according to the instruction information of not turning on the control plane integrity protection carried in step 505.
  • step 507a if the verification fails in step 506, the UE 1 sends a connection establishment rejection message to the UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the connection establishment rejection message from UE 1.
  • the connection establishment rejection message may include the rejection reason value and the third integrity verification information.
  • the third integrity verification information is obtained after protecting the third information to be protected according to the shared key. If the UE 2 encrypts and protects the third information to be protected, then the UE 1 uses the protection key to encrypt the rejection reason value; if the UE 2 protects the integrity of the third information to be protected, then the UE 1 uses the protected secret. The key performs integrity protection on the rejection reason value; if the UE 2 performs encryption protection and integrity protection on the third information to be protected, then the UE 1 uses the protection key to perform encryption protection and integrity protection on the rejection reason value.
  • step 508a the UE 2 verifies the third integrity verification information.
  • the verification can refer to the verification process of step 506, and the execution subject is different.
  • the UE 2 starts a timer after sending the direct connection security mode command message. If the timer expires and has not received the direct connection security mode completion message from the UE 1, the UE 2 releases the connection with the UE 1. .
  • step 507b if the verification in step 508a is passed, the UE 1 sends a direct connection security mode completion message to the UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message from UE 1.
  • the direct connection security mode completion message may include instruction information for turning off the integrity protection of the control plane, and second integrity verification information.
  • step 508b the UE 2 verifies the second integrity verification information.
  • the verification can refer to the verification process of step 506.
  • the verification in step 508b is different from the verification type in step 506, and the execution subject is different. If the verification in step 508b is passed, the control plane integrity protection is turned off; if the verification in step 508b is not passed, the connection with the UE 1 is released.
  • FIG. 5 uses the protection key and the first algorithm for protection
  • FIG. 5 uses the protection key. Encryption protection and/or integrity protection are performed.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart of the method for determining security protection provided in the third embodiment of this application.
  • the process shown in Figure 6 may include but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Step 601 UE 1 sends a direct communication request message to UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the direct communication request message from UE 1.
  • the direct communication request message includes the first indication information in addition to the control plane integrity protection policy of the UE 1, the security capability of the UE 1, and the random number 1 generated by the UE 1.
  • the first indication information is used to instruct UE 2 and UE 1 to perform mutual authentication.
  • the first indication information is also used to instruct UE 2 and UE 1 to establish a shared key.
  • the indication information instructs the UE 2 to establish a shared key after mutual authentication, and instructs the UE 2 to protect the information to be protected according to the shared key.
  • the protection processing method may be the use of the HMAC algorithm shown in FIG. 4, or the use of the protection key shown in FIG. 5 for encryption protection and/or integrity protection.
  • the UE 1 can carry the indication information in the direct communication request message when its control plane integrity protection policy is preferred or not needed.
  • the control plane integrity protection policy of UE 1 is preferred or not needed, which indicates that UE 1 may prefer not to enable control plane integrity protection.
  • Step 602 UE 2 determines not to enable control plane integrity protection, and triggers a mutual authentication process between UE 1 and UE 2 according to the first indication information.
  • step 402 and step 502 The difference from step 402 and step 502 is that in step 402 and step 502, the UE 2 can directly trigger the mutual authentication process when it determines that the control plane integrity protection is not enabled, while in step 602, the UE 2 determines that it does not When the integrity protection of the control plane is turned on, the mutual authentication process is triggered in combination with the instruction information.
  • Step 603 UE 1 and UE 2 perform a mutual authentication process.
  • the UE 2 also establishes a shared key after mutual authentication according to the instruction information.
  • UE 2 and UE 1 may obtain the shared key according to the second method or the third method or the fourth method in step 403.
  • Step 604 The UE 2 calculates the first information to be protected according to the shared key and the first algorithm to obtain the first integrity verification information.
  • the first information to be protected For the description of the first information to be protected, reference may be made to the specific description in step 404, which will not be repeated here.
  • Step 605 UE 2 sends a direct connection security mode command message to UE 1.
  • UE 1 receives the direct connection security mode command message from UE 2.
  • the direct connection security mode command message may include the first integrity verification information and indication information that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on.
  • the indication information that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on may be a null value for the selected control plane security protection algorithm, or it may be the control plane activation indication information that indicates that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on.
  • the direct connection security mode command message may further include second indication information, and the second indication information is used to instruct the UE 1 to verify the first integrity verification information according to the shared key.
  • the UE 1 may also directly verify the first integrity verification information according to the shared key.
  • step 606 the UE 1 verifies the first integrity verification information.
  • the UE 2 verifies the first integrity verification information according to the shared key.
  • step 607a if the verification fails in step 606, the UE 1 sends a connection establishment rejection message to the UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the connection establishment rejection message from UE 1.
  • step 608a the UE 2 verifies the third integrity verification information.
  • step 607b if the verification in step 606 is passed, the UE 1 sends a direct connection security mode completion message to the UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message from UE 1.
  • step 608b the UE 2 verifies the third integrity verification information.
  • the first indication information sent by the UE 1 is combined to trigger the acquisition of the shared key, so that the information to be protected is performed according to the shared key. Protection processing, which can effectively prevent attackers from tampering with unprotected information.
  • the embodiment shown in Fig. 6 is different from the embodiment shown in Fig. 4 or Fig. 5 in that the UE 2 combines the first indication information sent by the UE 1 in the case of determining that the control plane integrity protection is not enabled. Trigger the acquisition of the shared key, and in Figure 4 or Figure 5, the UE 2 can trigger the acquisition of the shared key if it determines that the control plane integrity protection is not turned on.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of the process of determining the security protection method provided in the fourth embodiment of this application.
  • the process may include but is not limited to the following steps:
  • Step 701 UE 1 sends a direct communication request message to UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the direct communication request message from UE 1.
  • the direct communication request message includes the first key upper layer information (Key_Est_Info) in addition to the control plane integrity protection policy of the UE 1 and the security capability of the UE 1.
  • the upper layer information of the key can be understood as an information container. It is understandable that the information carried in the upper layer information of the key can only be obtained by the application layer, and the V2X layer cannot obtain the information carried in the upper layer information of the key. In this way, the information to be protected is carried by the upper layer information of the key, which is safe.
  • step 702 the UE 2 determines not to enable control plane integrity protection, and carries the first information to be protected in the upper layer information of the first key.
  • the UE 2 determines not to enable control plane integrity protection, and carries the first information to be protected in the upper layer information of the first key.
  • the UE 2 may also carry the first to-be-protected information in the upper layer information of the first key when determining to enable control plane integrity protection, so as to protect the confidentiality of the first to-be-protected information.
  • Step 703 UE 2 sends a direct connection security mode command message to UE 1.
  • UE 1 receives the direct connection security mode command message from UE 2.
  • the direct connection security mode command message may include upper layer information of the first key carrying the first information to be protected, and may also include the first information to be protected.
  • the direct connection security mode command message may also include the indication information that the integrity protection of the control plane is not turned on and the random number 2 generated by the UE2.
  • step 704 the UE 1 verifies the upper layer information of the first key.
  • the direct connection security mode command message may include the upper layer information of the first key carrying the first information to be protected and the first information to be protected, and then the upper layer (for example, the application layer) of the UE 1 receives the first key from the The first information to be protected is obtained from the upper layer information and submitted to the V2X layer.
  • V2X verifies whether the first information to be protected obtained from the upper layer is consistent with the first information to be protected included in the direct connection security mode command message. If they are consistent, pass Verify, otherwise it fails the verification.
  • the direct connection security mode command message may include the upper layer information of the first key carrying the first information to be protected, and the upper layer (for example, the application layer) of the UE 1 obtains the upper layer information of the first key from the upper layer information of the first key.
  • the information to be protected is submitted to the V2X layer, and V2X verifies whether the first information to be protected obtained from the upper layer is consistent with the first information to be protected sent by the UE 1 to the UE 2. If they are consistent, the verification is passed, otherwise the verification is not passed .
  • step 705a if the verification fails in step 704, the UE 1 sends a connection establishment rejection message to the UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the connection establishment rejection message from UE 1.
  • connection establishment rejection message includes the rejection reason value and the third key upper layer information carrying the third information to be protected.
  • step 706a the UE 2 verifies the upper layer information of the third key.
  • the third information to be protected is the rejection reason value
  • the upper layer of UE 2 obtains the rejection reason value from the upper layer information of the third key and submits it to the V2X layer.
  • V2X verifies the rejection reason value obtained from the upper layer and the connection establishment rejection. Whether the rejection reason values carried in the message are consistent, if they are consistent, the verification is passed, and the UE 2 can release the connection with the UE 1.
  • step 705b if the verification in step 704 is passed, the UE 1 sends a direct connection security mode completion message to the UE 2.
  • UE 2 receives the direct connection security mode completion message from UE 1.
  • the direct connection security mode completion message may include instruction information for turning off the integrity protection of the control plane, and upper layer information of the second key carrying the second information to be protected.
  • step 706b the UE 2 verifies the upper layer information of the second key.
  • the third information to be protected is the instruction information for turning off the integrity protection of the control plane.
  • the upper layer of the UE 2 obtains the instruction information for turning off the integrity protection of the control plane from the upper layer information of the second key, and submits it to the V2X layer. Verify whether the instruction information for closing the integrity protection of the control plane obtained from the upper layer is consistent with the control plane security shutdown instruction information carried in the connection establishment rejection message. If they are consistent, the verification is passed, otherwise the verification is not passed. In the case of passing the verification, the UE 2 turns off the control plane security.
  • the information to be protected is carried in the upper layer information of the key to prevent an attacker from tampering with the unprotected information.
  • the information to be protected is carried in the upper layer information of the key to prevent an attacker from tampering with the unprotected information.
  • the embodiments of the present application also provide corresponding devices, including corresponding modules for executing the foregoing embodiments.
  • the module can be software, hardware, or a combination of software and hardware.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of a communication device provided in this application.
  • the communication device 800 shown in FIG. 8 includes a transceiving unit 801 and a processing unit 802.
  • the device 800 is the first device:
  • the transceiver unit 801 is configured to receive a direct connection security mode command message from the second device, where the direct connection security mode command message includes indication information for disabling control plane integrity protection and first integrity verification information;
  • the processing unit 802 is configured to verify the first integrity verification information according to the shared key between the first device and the second device; in the case where the first integrity verification information is verified, the integrity verification information is not turned on.
  • the instruction information of the sexual protection determines that the integrity protection of the control plane with the second device is not enabled.
  • This example is used to implement the function of UE 1 in the embodiment shown in Figs. 4 to 6.
  • the device 800 is the first device, it is also used to implement the function of UE 1 in the embodiment shown in Fig. 7.
  • Fig. 4 The corresponding description of UE 1 in the embodiment shown in 7.
  • the device 800 is the second device:
  • the transceiver unit 801 is configured to obtain a shared key between the first device and the second device when the processing unit determines that the control plane integrity protection with the first device is not enabled;
  • the processing unit 802 is configured to calculate the first information to be protected according to the shared key and the first algorithm to obtain the first integrity verification information; the first information to be protected is the direct connection security mode to be sent to the first device Any one or more information elements in the command message;
  • the transceiving unit 801 is further configured to send a direct connection safety mode command message to the first device, where the direct connection safety mode command message includes indication information for disabling control plane integrity protection and first integrity verification information.
  • This example is used to implement the function of UE 2 in the embodiment shown in Fig. 4 to Fig. 6.
  • the device 800 is the second device, it is also used to implement the function of UE 2 in the embodiment shown in Fig. 7.
  • Fig. 4 The corresponding description of UE 2 in the embodiment shown in 7.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of another communication device provided by this application.
  • the communication device 900 shown in FIG. 9 includes at least one processor 901, a memory 902, and optionally, a communication interface 903.
  • the memory 902 may be a volatile memory, such as a random access memory; the memory may also be a non-volatile memory, such as a read-only memory, flash memory, hard disk drive (HDD) or solid-state drive (solid-state drive, SSD) or memory 902 is any other medium that can be used to carry or store desired program codes in the form of instructions or data structures and that can be accessed by a computer, but is not limited thereto.
  • the memory 902 may be a combination of the above-mentioned memories.
  • the specific connection medium between the foregoing processor 901 and the memory 902 is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the memory 902 and the processor 901 are connected through a bus 904 in the figure.
  • the bus 904 is represented by a thick line in the figure. Is limited.
  • the bus 904 can be divided into an address bus, a data bus, a control bus, and so on. For ease of representation, only one thick line is used in FIG. 9, but it does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.
  • the processor 901 may have a data transceiving function and can communicate with other devices.
  • an independent data transceiving module such as a communication interface 903, may be set to transmit and receive data; the processor 901 is communicating with other devices. During communication, data transmission can be performed through the communication interface 903.
  • the processor in FIG. 9 can call the computer execution instructions stored in the memory 902, so that the UE 1 executes the UE 1 in any of the foregoing method embodiments. Method of execution.
  • the processor in FIG. 9 can call the computer execution instructions stored in the memory 902, so that the UE 2 executes the UE 2 in any of the foregoing method embodiments. Method of execution.
  • the functions/implementation process of the processing unit and the transceiving unit in FIG. 8 can all be implemented by the processor 901 in FIG. 9 invoking a computer execution instruction stored in the memory 902.
  • the function/implementation process of the processing unit in FIG. 8 may be implemented by the processor 901 in FIG. 9 calling computer execution instructions stored in the memory 902, and the function/implementation process of the transceiver unit in FIG. 8 may be implemented through the communication in FIG. 9 Interface 903 is implemented.
  • the embodiment of the present application also provides a communication system, which may include UE 1 and UE 2 in FIG. 4 to FIG. 7.
  • the processing unit used to execute these technologies at a communication device can be implemented in one or more general-purpose processors, digital signal processors ( digital signal processor, DSP), digital signal processing device, application specific integrated circuit (ASIC), programmable logic device, field programmable gate array (FPGA), or other programmable logic device, Discrete gate or transistor logic, discrete hardware components, or any combination of the above.
  • the general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor.
  • the general-purpose processor may also be any traditional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine.
  • the processor can also be implemented by a combination of computing devices, such as a digital signal processor and a microprocessor, multiple microprocessors, one or more microprocessors combined with a digital signal processor core, or any other similar configuration. accomplish.
  • the memory in the embodiments of the present application may be a volatile memory or a non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memory.
  • the non-volatile memory can be read-only memory (ROM), programmable read-only memory (programmable ROM, PROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (erasable PROM, EPROM), and electrically available Erase programmable read-only memory (electrically EPROM, EEPROM) or flash memory.
  • the volatile memory may be random access memory (RAM), which is used as an external cache.
  • RAM random access memory
  • static random access memory static random access memory
  • dynamic RAM dynamic RAM
  • DRAM dynamic random access memory
  • synchronous dynamic random access memory synchronous DRAM, SDRAM
  • double data rate synchronous dynamic random access memory double data rate SDRAM, DDR SDRAM
  • enhanced synchronous dynamic random access memory enhanced SDRAM, ESDRAM
  • synchronous connection dynamic random access memory serial DRAM, SLDRAM
  • direct rambus RAM direct rambus RAM
  • the present application also provides a computer-readable medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a computer, the function of any of the foregoing method embodiments is realized.
  • This application also provides a computer program product, which, when executed by a computer, realizes the functions of any of the foregoing method embodiments.
  • the computer program product includes one or more computer instructions.
  • the computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable devices.
  • the computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium.
  • the computer instructions may be transmitted from a website, computer, server, or data center.
  • the computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server or a data center integrated with one or more available media.
  • the usable medium may be a magnetic medium (for example, a floppy disk, a hard disk, and a magnetic tape), an optical medium (for example, a high-density digital video disc (digital video disc, DVD)), or a semiconductor medium (for example, a solid state disk, SSD)) etc.
  • system and “network” in this article are often used interchangeably in this article.
  • the term “and/or” in this article is only an association relationship describing the associated objects, which means that there can be three relationships, for example, A and/or B, which can mean: A alone exists, A and B exist at the same time, exist alone In the three cases of B, A can be singular or plural, and B can be singular or plural.
  • B corresponding to A means that B is associated with A, and B can be determined according to A.
  • determining B based on A does not mean that B is determined only based on A, and B can also be determined based on A and/or other information.
  • the corresponding relationships shown in the tables in this application can be configured or pre-defined.
  • the value of the information in each table is only an example, and can be configured to other values, which is not limited in this application.
  • the corresponding relationship shown in some rows may not be configured.
  • appropriate deformation adjustments can be made based on the above table, such as splitting, merging, and so on.
  • the names of the parameters shown in the titles in the above tables may also be other names that can be understood by the communication device, and the values or expressions of the parameters may also be other values or expressions that can be understood by the communication device.
  • other data structures can also be used, such as arrays, queues, containers, stacks, linear tables, pointers, linked lists, trees, graphs, structures, classes, heaps, hash tables, or hash tables. Wait.
  • the pre-definition in this application can be understood as definition, pre-definition, storage, pre-storage, pre-negotiation, pre-configuration, curing, or pre-fired.
  • the systems, devices, and methods described in this application can also be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative.
  • the division of the units is only a logical function division, and there may be other divisions in actual implementation, for example, multiple units or components may be combined or It can be integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not implemented.
  • the displayed or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.
  • the units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the objectives of the solutions of the embodiments.
  • the functional units in the various embodiments of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
  • the function is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer readable storage medium.
  • the technical solution of the present application essentially or the part that contributes to the existing technology or the part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including Several instructions are used to make a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application.
  • the aforementioned storage media include: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (read-only memory, ROM), random access memory (random access memory, RAM), magnetic disks or optical disks and other media that can store program codes. .

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Abstract

本申请提供一种确定安全保护方法、系统及装置，其中方法可包括：第二设备在确定不开启与第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，获取与第二设备之间的共享密钥；根据共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行计算，得到第一完整性验证信息；向第一设备发送直连安全模式命令消息，直连安全模式命令消息包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第一完整性验证信息；第一设备根据共享密钥对第一完整性验证信息进行验证；在第一完整性验证信息验证通过的情况下，根据不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启与第二设备之间的控制面完整性保护。采用本申请，可以降低待保护信息被篡改的风险，从而提高信息传输的安全性。

Description

确定安全保护方法、系统及装置
本申请要求于2020年4月30日提交中国国家知识产权局、申请号为202010368356.6、申请名称为“确定安全保护方法、系统及装置”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本申请涉及通信技术领域，尤其涉及确定安全保护的方法、系统及装置。
背景技术
在传统的蜂窝网络通信中，终端设备之间通常不能直接进行通信，终端设备之间发送的任何一条信令经过基站处理后再转发。经过基站处理，表示终端设备与基站通过Uu接口进行通信，例如图1中，终端设备A与基站通过Uu接口进行通信，终端设备D与基站通过Uu接口进行通信。终端设备与基站通过Uu接口进行通信的方式可称为Uu通信。但是在设备到设备(device-to-device，D2D)和车联网(vehicle-to-everything，V2X)的短距离直连通信需求下，D2D技术提供了基于终端设备之间短距离直连通信的PC5接口，PC5接口即D2D短距离直连通信使用的接口。终端设备之间通过PC5接口进行通信时，数据和信令不再经过基站传输，例如图1中，终端设备C与终端设备B通过PC5接口直接进行通信，终端设备B与终端设备A通过PC5接口直接进行通信。终端设备之间通过PC5接口直接进行通信的方式可称为PC5单播通信。
进行PC5单播通信的两端，根据连接建立由谁发起可分为发起端和接收端。由于PC5单播通信实现简单，发起端与接收端之间传输的信息存在被篡改的风险。鉴于此，如何提高信息传输的安全性是亟待解决的技术问题。
发明内容
本申请提供一种确定安全保护方法、系统及装置，可以降低信息被篡改的风险，从而提高信息传输的安全性。
本申请第一方面提供一种确定安全保护方法，可以应用于短距离直连通信场景中，该方法可以由第一设备执行，也可以由第一设备中的装置(例如处理器或芯片等)执行。该方法以第一设备为例，包括以下内容。
第一设备接收来自第二设备的直连安全模式命令消息，该直连安全模式命令消息包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第一完整性验证信息；根据第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥，对第一完整性验证信息进行验证；在第一完整性验证信息验证通过的情况下，根据不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启与第二设备之间的控制面完整性保护。
本申请第一方面，在确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，第一设备通过验证第一完整性验证信息，可以判断出是否存在攻击者篡改第一设备与第二设备之间传输的信息，从而可以降低信息被篡改的风险，从而提高信息传输的安全性。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第二设备在确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，生成第一完整性验证信息对待发送给第一设备的直连安全模式命令消息中的信息元素进行完整性保护，以防止所述直连安全模式命令消息中的信息元素被篡改。具体的，所述第二设备根据共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行计算，得到第一完整性验证信息，第一待保护信息包括直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；例如，第一待保护信息可以是直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个需要保护的信息元素。例如，所述第一待保护信息可以是所述不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，也可以是所述第一设备的安全能力或者所述第一设备的完整性保护策略等等。第一设备根据共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行计算，确定第一待保护信息对应的期望信息；判断期望信息与第一完整性验证信息是否一致；如果一致，则确定第一完整性验证信息验证通过；或者，如果不一致，则第一完整性验证信息验证不通过。第一设备通过对第一完整性验证信息进行验证，可以识别直连安全模式命令消息中的信息，以及直连安全模式命令消息相应的信息是否被攻击者篡改，从而降低信息被篡改的风险，提高信息传输的安全性。
其中，第一算法是预配置在第一设备和第二设备上的算法，也可以是第一设备和第二设备协商的算法，例如第一算法可以是哈希算法或第二设备确定并通知第一设备的算法(如加密算法等)等。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第二设备在确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，根据共享密钥对第一待保护信息进行保护，得到保护后的第一待保护信息(即第一完整性验证信息)，第一待保护信息包括直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；第一设备根据共享密钥对所述第一完整性验证信息进行验证，若验证通过，第一设备根据不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启与第二设备之间的控制面完整性保护，从而降低信息被篡改的风险，提高信息传输的安全性。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第一设备向第二设备发送直连通信请求消息，用于请求建立与第二设备之间的通信。其中，直连通信请求消息包括第一设备的控制面完整性保护策略，以便第二设备根据第一设备的控制面完整性保护策略和第二设备的控制面完整性保护策略，确定是否开启第一设备与第二设备之间的控制面完整性保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，直连通信请求消息还包括第一指示信息，第一指示信息用于指示第二设备在不开启与第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，触发与第一设备进行互鉴权，以实现第二设备验证第一设备是否为合法用户，第一设备验证第二设备是否为合法用户。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第一指示信息还用于指示第二设备在互鉴权之后建立共享密钥，并指示第二设备根据共享密钥对第一待保护信息进行处理，得到第一完整性验证信息。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第一设备向第二设备发送直连安全模式完成消息，直连安全模式完成消息包括关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第二完整性验证信息，所述第二完整性验证信息用于对所述直连安全模式完成消息中的信息元素进行完整性保护，以防止所述直连安全模式完成消息中的信息元素被篡改。例如，第二完整性验证信息由第一设备根据共享密钥和第一算法对第二待保护信息计算得到；第二待保护信息包括直连安全模式 完成消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素，例如第二待保护信息可以是直连安全模式完成消息中包括的关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息。通过验证第二完整性验证信息，以确保直连安全模式完成消息所包括的信息未被攻击者篡改。
在一种可能的实现方式中，在第一完整性验证信息未通过验证的情况下，第一设备向第二设备发送连接建立拒绝消息，连接建立拒绝消息包括拒绝原因值，以及第三完整性验证信息；所述第三完整性验证信息用于对所述连接建立拒绝消息中的信息元素进行完整性保护，以防止所述连接建立拒绝消息中的信息元素被篡改。例如，第三完整性验证信息由第一设备根据共享密钥和第一算法对第三待保护信息计算得到；第三待保护信息包括连接建立拒绝消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素，例如第三待保护信息可以是连接建立拒绝消息中包括的拒绝原因值。通过验证第三完整性验证信息，以确保连接建立拒绝消息所包括的信息未被攻击者篡改。
在一种可能的实现方式中，不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息是控制面完整性保护算法为空值。
在一种可能的实现方式中，不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息是指示不开启控制面完整性保护的控制面激活指示信息。
本申请第二方面提供一种确定安全保护方法，可以应用于短距离直连通信场景中，该方法可以由第二设备执行，也可以由第二设备中的装置(例如处理器或芯片等)执行。该方法以第二设备为例，包括以下内容。
第二设备在确定不开启与第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，获取第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥；根据共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行计算，得到第一完整性验证信息；第一待保护信息为待发送给第一设备的直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；向第一设备发送直连安全模式命令消息，直连安全模式命令消息包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第一完整性验证信息。
本申请第二方面，第二设备在确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，通过共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行保护，得到第一完整性验证信息，第一设备通过验证第一完整性验证信息，可以判断出是否存在攻击者篡改第一设备与第二设备之间传输的信息，从而可以降低信息被篡改的风险，从而提高信息传输的安全性。
其中，第一算法是预配置在第一设备和第二设备上的算法，也可以是第一设备和第二设备协商的算法，例如第一算法可以是哈希算法或第二设备确定并通知第一设备的算法(如加密算法等)等。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第二设备在确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，根据共享密钥对第一待保护信息进行保护处理，得到保护后的第一待保护信息(即第一完整性验证信息)，第一待保护信息包括直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；例如，所述第一待保护信息可以是所述不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，也可以是所述第一设备的安全能力或者所述第一设备的完整性保护策略等等。第一设备根据共享密钥对第一完整性验证信息进行验证，若验证通过，第一设备根据不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启与第二设备之间的控制面完整性保护，从而降低信息被篡改的风险，提高信息传输的安全性。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第二设备接收来自第一设备的直连通信请求消息，直连通信请求消息包括第一设备的控制面完整性保护策略；根据第一设备的控制面完整性保护策略和第二设备的控制面完整性保护策略，确定不开启与第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，直连通信请求消息还包括第一指示信息；第二设备根据第一指示信息，在不开启与第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，触发与第一设备进行互鉴权，以实现第二设备验证第一设备是否为合法用户，第一设备验证第二设备是否为合法用户。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第二设备根据第一指示信息，在第一设备进行互鉴权之后，建立第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥。第二设备还根据第一指示信息，共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行计算，得到第一完整性验证信息。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第二设备接收来自第一设备的直连安全模式完成消息，直连安全模式完成消息包括关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第二完整性验证信息，所述第二完整性验证信息用于对所述直连安全模式完成消息中的信息元素进行完整性保护，以防止所述直连安全模式完成消息中的信息元素被篡改。例如，第二完整性验证信息由第一设备根据共享密钥和第一算法对第二待保护信息计算得到；第二待保护信息包括直连安全模式完成消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素，例如第二待保护信息可以是直连安全模式完成消息中包括的关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息。第二设备对第二完整性验证信息进行验证；在第二完整性验证信息通过验证的情况下，关闭与第一设备之间控制面完整性保护。通过验证第二完整性验证信息，以确保直连安全模式完成消息所包括的信息未被攻击者篡改，并在确定出无攻击者篡改的情况下，才关闭与第一设备之间控制面完整性保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，在定时时长内，没有接收到第一设备返回的直连安全模式完成消息的情况下，第二设备释放与第一设备之间的连接。在定时时长内没有接收到第一设备返回的直连安全模式完成消息，表明连接失败或第一设备验证第一完整性验证信息时验证不通过。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第二设备接收来自第一设备的连接建立拒绝消息，连接建立拒绝消息包括拒绝原因值，以及第三完整性验证信息；所述第三完整性验证信息用于对所述连接建立拒绝消息中的信息元素进行完整性保护，以防止所述连接建立拒绝消息中的信息元素被篡改。例如，第三完整性验证信息由第一设备根据共享密钥和第一算法对第三待保护信息计算得到；第三待保护信息包括连接建立拒绝消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；例如，第三待保护信息可以是连接建立拒绝消息中包括的拒绝原因值。第二设备对第三完整性验证信息进行验证；在第三完整性验证信息验证通过的情况下，释放与第一设备之间的连接。通过验证第三完整性验证信息，以确保连接建立拒绝消息所包括的信息未被攻击者篡改。
在一种可能的实现方式中，不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息是控制面完整性保护算法为空值。
在一种可能的实现方式中，不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息是指示不开启控制面完整性保护的控制面激活指示信息。
本申请实施例第三方面提供一种确定安全保护方法，可以应用于短距离直连通信场景 中，该方法可以由第一设备执行，也可以由第一设备中的装置(例如处理器或芯片等)执行。该方法以第一设备为例，包括以下内容。
第一设备接收来自第二设备的直连安全模式命令消息，该直连安全模式命令消息包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第一完整性验证信息；第一完整性验证信息为第一密钥上层信息，第一密钥上层信息携带第一待保护信息；第一待保护信息包括直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；第一设备的应用层从第一密钥上层信息中获取第一待保护信息并将其传递至第一设备的V2X层，第一设备的V2X层判断从应用层获取的第一待保护信息与第一待保护信息是否一致，若一致，则根据不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启与第二设备之间的控制面完整性保护。
本申请第三方面，通过应用层与V2X层对第一待保护信息是否被篡改进行验证，从而可以降低信息被篡改的风险，从而提高信息传输的安全性。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第一设备向第二设备发送直连安全模式完成消息，直连安全模式完成消息包括关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第二完整性验证信息，其中，第二完整性验证信息为第二密钥上层信息，第二密钥上层信息携带第二待保护信息；第二待保护信息包括直连安全模式完成消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素，例如第二待保护信息可以是直连安全模式完成消息中包括的关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息。通过验证第二完整性验证信息，以确保直连安全模式完成消息所包括的信息未被攻击者篡改。
在一种可能的实现方式中，在第一完整性验证信息未通过验证的情况下，第一设备向第二设备发送连接建立拒绝消息，连接建立拒绝消息包括拒绝原因值，以及第三完整性验证信息；第三完整性验证信息为第三密钥上层信息，第三密钥上层信息携带第三待保护信息；第三待保护信息包括连接建立拒绝消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素，例如第三待保护信息可以是连接建立拒绝消息中包括的拒绝原因值。通过验证第三完整性验证信息，以确保建立拒绝消息所包括的信息未被攻击者篡改。
本申请第四方面提供一种确定安全保护方法，可以应用于短距离直连通信场景中，该方法可以由第二设备执行，也可以由第二设备中的装置(例如处理器或芯片等)执行。该方法以第二设备为例，包括以下内容。
第二设备在确定不开启与第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，将第一待保护信息携带在第一密钥上层信息中，得到第一完整性验证信息；第一待保护信息为待发送给第一设备的直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；向第一设备发送直连安全模式命令消息，直连安全模式命令消息包括第一完整性验证信息和不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息。
本申请第四方面，通过密钥上层信息对待保护信息进行保护，从而可以降低信息被篡改的风险，从而提高信息传输的安全性。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第二设备接收来自第一设备的直连安全模式完成消息，直连安全模式完成消息包括关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息、第二待保护信息和第二完整性验证信息，其中，第二完整性验证信息为第二密钥上层信息，第二密钥上层信息携带第二待保护信息；第二待保护信息包括直连安全模式完成消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；例如第二待保护信息可以是直连安全模式完成消息中包括的关闭控制面完整性保护的 指示信息。第二设备的应用层从第二密钥上层信息中获取第二待保护信息并将其传递至第二设备的V2X层，第二设备的V2X层判断从应用层获取的第二待保护信息与直连安全模式完成消息携带的第二待保护信息是否一致，若一致关闭与第一设备之间控制面完整性保护。通过验证第二完整性验证信息，以确保直连安全模式完成消息所包括的信息未被攻击者篡改，并在确定出无攻击者篡改的情况下，才关闭与第一设备之间控制面完整性保护。
在一种可能的实现方式中，在定时时长内，没有接收到第一设备返回的直连安全模式完成消息的情况下，第二设备释放与第一设备之间的连接。在定时时长内没有接收到第一设备返回的直连安全模式完成消息，表明连接失败或第一设备验证第一完整性验证信息时验证不通过。
在一种可能的实现方式中，第二设备接收来自第一设备的连接建立拒绝消息，连接建立拒绝消息包括拒绝原因值，第三待保护信息以及第三完整性验证信息；第三完整性验证信息为第三密钥上层信息，第三密钥上层信息携带第三待保护信息；第三待保护信息包括连接建立拒绝消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；例如第三待保护信息可以是连接建立拒绝消息中包括的拒绝原因值。第二设备的应用层从第三密钥上层信息中获取第三待保护信息并将其传递至第二设备的V2X层，第二设备的V2X层判断从应用层获取的第三待保护信息与连接建立拒绝消息携带的第三待保护信息是否一致；一致则释放与第一设备之间的连接。通过验证第三完整性验证信息，以确保连接建立拒绝消息所包括的信息未被攻击者篡改。
本申请第五方面提供一种通信装置，该通信装置可以是第一设备，也可以是第一设备中的装置。一种设计中，该装置可以包括执行第一方面或第三方面中，以及各种可能性实现方式所描述的方法/操作/步骤/动作所对应的模块，该模块可以是硬件电路，也可以是软件，也可以是硬件电路结合软件实现。一种设计中，该装置可以包括处理模块和收发模块。示例性的，
收发单元，用于接收来自第二设备的直连安全模式命令消息，该直连安全模式命令消息包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第一完整性验证信息；
处理单元，用于根据第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥，对第一完整性验证信息进行验证；在第一完整性验证信息验证通过的情况下，根据不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启与第二设备之间的控制面完整性保护。
本申请第六方面提供一种通信装置，该装置包括处理器，用于实现上述第一方面或第三方面描述的方法。该装置还可以包括存储器，用于存储指令和数据。该存储器与该处理器耦合，该处理器执行该存储器中存储的指令时，可以使该装置实现上述第一方面以及第一方面的各个可能实现方式，或第三方面以及第三方面的各个可能实现方式所描述的方法。该装置还可以包括通信接口，该通信接口用于该装置与其它设备进行通信，示例性的，通信接口可以是收发器、总线等电路硬件模块，其它设备可以为第二设备等。在一种可能的设计中，该装置包括：
存储器，用于存储程序指令；
处理器，用于接收来自第二设备的直连安全模式命令消息，该直连安全模式命令消息包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第一完整性验证信息；根据第一设备与第二设 备之间的共享密钥，对第一完整性验证信息进行验证；在第一完整性验证信息验证通过的情况下，根据不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启与第二设备之间的控制面完整性保护。
本申请第七方面提供一种计算机可读存储介质，包括指令，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行第一方面以及第一方面的各个可能实现方式，或第三方面以及第三方面的各个可能实现方式提供的方法。
本申请第八方面提供一种芯片系统，该芯片系统包括处理器，还可以包括存储器，用于实现上述第一方面以及第一方面的各个可能实现方式，或第三方面以及第三方面的各个可能实现方式提供的方法。该芯片系统可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其他分立器件。
本申请第九方面提供一种通信装置，该通信装置可以是第二设备，也可以是第二设备中的装置。一种设计中，该装置可以包括执行第二方面或第四方面中，以及各种可能性实现方式所描述的方法/操作/步骤/动作所对应的模块，该模块可以是硬件电路，也可以是软件，也可以是硬件电路结合软件实现。一种设计中，该装置可以包括处理模块和收发模块。示例性的，
收发单元，用于在处理单元确定不开启与第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，获取第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥；
处理单元，用于根据共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行计算，得到第一完整性验证信息；第一待保护信息为待发送给第一设备的直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；
收发单元，还用于向第一设备发送直连安全模式命令消息，直连安全模式命令消息包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第一完整性验证信息。
本申请第十方面提供一种通信装置，该装置包括处理器，用于实现上述第二方面或第四方面描述的方法。该装置还可以包括存储器，用于存储指令和数据。该存储器与该处理器耦合，该处理器执行该存储器中存储的指令时，可以使该装置实现上述第二方面以及第二方面的各个可能实现方式，或第四方面以及第四方面的各个可能实现方式所描述的方法。该装置还可以包括通信接口，该通信接口用于该装置与其它设备进行通信，示例性的，通信接口可以是收发器、总线等电路硬件模块，其它设备可以为第一设备等。在一种可能的设计中，该装置包括：
存储器，用于存储程序指令；
处理器，用于在确定不开启与第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，获取第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥；根据共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行计算，得到第一完整性验证信息；第一待保护信息为待发送给第一设备的直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；向第一设备发送直连安全模式命令消息，直连安全模式命令消息包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第一完整性验证信息。
本申请第十一方面提供一种计算机可读存储介质，包括指令，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行第二方面以及第二方面的各个可能实现方式，或第四方面以及第四方面的各个可能实现方式提供的方法。
本申请第十二方面提供一种芯片系统，该芯片系统包括处理器，还可以包括存储器， 用于实现上述第二方面以及第二方面的各个可能实现方式，或第四方面以及第四方面的各个可能实现方式提供的方法。该芯片系统可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其他分立器件。
本申请第十三方面提供一种通信系统，该通信系统包括第一方面所述的第一设备和第二方面所述的第二设备，或包括第三方面所述的第一设备和第四方面所述的第二设备。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本申请实施例或现有技术中的技术方案，下面将对实施例或现有技术描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍。
图1为Uu通信和PC5单播通信的示例图；
图2为PC5单播通信建立过程的流程示意图；
图2a为攻击者篡改的一种示例图；
图3为应用本申请实施例的网络架构示意图；
图4为本申请实施例一提供的确定安全保护方法的流程示意图；
图5为本申请实施例二提供的确定安全保护方法的流程示意图；
图6为本申请实施例三提供的确定安全保护方法的流程示意图；
图7为本申请实施例四提供的确定安全保护方法的流程示意图；
图8为本申请实施例提供一种通信装置的结构示意图；
图9为本申请实施例提供的另一种通信装置的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
为了更好地理解本申请实施例提供的技术方案，首先对本申请实施例涉及的技术术语进行介绍。
1、安全策略和安全算法
安全策略用于描述是否开启安全保护的策略，可分为三种，分别为开启(required)、不开启(not needed)和可选(preferred)。安全策略为required，表示需要开启安全保护；安全策略为not needed，表示不需要开启安全保护；安全策略为preferred，表示可以开启安全保护也可以不开启安全保护。安全策略在被发送的时候，一般情况下只会选择三种(required、not needed和preferred)中的一种发送，在某些殊的场景下可能会选择至少2种发送，并且其中一个是preferred。比如，在发送not needed和preferred的时候，代表倾向不开启安全保护；发送required和preferred，则是倾向开启安全保护。
安全策略可包括控制面安全策略和用户面安全策略。控制面安全策略用于表示控制面机密性保护和/或控制面完整性保护是否开启的策略。用户面安全策略用于表示用户面机密性保护和/或用户面完整性保护是否开启的策略。其中，控制面机密性保护的策略、控制面完整性保护的策略、用户面机密性保护的策略和/或用户面完整性保护的策略取值均可以包括开启(required)、不开启(not needed)和可选(preferred)。策略为required，表示需要开启保护；策略为not needed，表示不需要开启保护；策略为preferred，表示可以开启保护也可以不开启保护。例如，如果控制面机密性保护的策略为not needed，控制面完整性保 护的策略为required，则表示控制面机密性保护不需要开启，控制面完整性保护需要开启。
控制面机密性保护即保护信令在传输过程中的机密性，控制面机密性保护也可以称为控制面加密保护，机密性是指无法被直接看出真实内容。控制面完整性保护即保护信令在传输过程中的完整性，完整性是指与原始的信令一致，没有被修改。用户面机密性保护即保护用户面数据在传输过程中的机密性，用户面机密性保护也可以称为用户面加密保护。用户面完整性保护即保护用户面数据在传输过程中的完整性，完整性是指与原始的用户面数据一致，没有被修改。
安全策略可用于确定安全保护方法，例如PC5单播通信中，发起端将其安全策略告知接收端，接收端根据发起端的安全策略和接收端的安全策略，可确定与发起端之间的安全保护方法。安全保护方法可包括控制面安全保护方法和用户面安全保护方法。控制面安全保护方法指的是控制面机密性保护是否开启，和/或控制面完整性保护是否开启，例如控制面安全保护方法为开启控制面机密性保护和开启控制面完整性保护；用户面安全保护方法指的是用户面机密性保护是否开启，和/或用户面完整性保护是否开启，例如用户面安全保护方法为开启用户面机密性保护和不开启用户面完整性保护。
安全算法包括：至少一个加密算法，和至少一个完整性保护算法。安全算法可以进一步分为控制面安全算法和用户面安全算法。其中控制面板安全算法用于保护信令，包括控制面板加密算法和控制面完整性保护算法；用户面使用的安全算法用于保护用户面数据，可以包括用户面加密算法和用户面完整性保护算法。用户面安全算法与控制面安全算法可以相同，也可以不相同。需要说明的是，当安全算法的值为空(null)值，可以表示不开启安全保护。例如，如果第一设备和第二设备之间协商后的控制面完整性保护算法为空值，则可以表示第一设备和第二设备之间不开启控制面完整性保护。
安全保护，对于执行安全功能的节点而言，控制面安全算法和控制面安全密钥一起用于保护控制面数据(即信令)，用户面安全算法和用户面安全密钥一起用于保护用户面数据。具体地，安全保护包括：
(1)用户面机密性保护：使用用户面加密密钥和用户面加密算法对用户面数据进行加密保护；
(2)用户面完整性保护：使用用户面完整性保护密钥和用户面完整性保护算法对用户面数据进行完整性保护；
(3)控制面机密性保护：使用控制面加密密钥和控制面加密算法对控制面数据进行加密保护；
(4)控制面完整性保护：使用控制面完整性保护密钥和控制面完整性保护算法对控制面数据进行完整性保护。
本申请实施例不限定加密保护和完整性保护的顺序关系，即可以先对用户面/控制面数据进行加密保护，再做完整性保护；也可以先对用户面/控制面进行完整性保护，再对用户面/控制面数据进行加密保护。当然，用户面和控制面可以不使用相同的执行顺序。
解安全保护，对于执行安全功能的节点而言，控制面安全算法和控制面安全密钥一起用于获得原始的控制面数据，用户面安全算法和用户面安全密钥一起用于获得原始的用户面数据。具体地，解安全保护包括：
(1)用户面解密：使用用户面加密密钥和用户面加密算法对加密的用户面数据进行解密；
(2)用户面完整性验证：使用用户面完整性保护密钥和用户面完整性保护算法对用户面数据进行完整性保护验证；
(3)控制面解密：使用控制面加密密钥和控制面加密算法对加密的控制面数据进行解密；
(4)控制面完整性验证：使用控制面完整性保护密钥和控制面完整性保护算法对控制面数据进行完整性保护验证。
本申请实施例不限定解密和验证完整性保护的顺序。但需要理解的是，如果是用户面/控制面数据先被加密保护，再被完整性保护，则解安全保护是先验证完整性保护、再对加密后的用户面数据进行解密；如果用户面/控制面数据先被完整性保护，再被加密，则解安全保护的顺序为先解密加密后的数据，再进行完整性保护验证。解安全保护与开启安全保护相对，即只有开启安全保护才需要解安全保护。
2、PC5控制面安全
在PC5单播通信中，发起端与接收端通过协商，确定PC5的安全是否开启，即确定两端之间的安全保护方法。发起端与接收端可通过控制面消息(或称为信令消息(signalling messages))进行协商，例如在PC5单播通信建立过程中通过控制面消息进行协商，可参见图2所示。图2中，用户设备(user equipment，UE)1向UE 2发起连接建立请求，即发起端为UE 1，接收端为UE 2。具体的：
步骤201，UE 1向UE 2发送直连通信请求(direct communication request)消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的直连通信请求消息。
其中，直连通信请求消息可包括UE 1的身份标识，UE 1的安全能力(security capabilities)，UE 1的控制面安全策略以及可选的包括UE 1生成的随机数1(nonce_1)。UE 1的身份标识可以是UE 1的应用层(application layer)标识(identifier，ID)，也可以是其它用于标识UE 1身份的信息，例如设备标识等。UE 1的安全能力可以包括UE 1支持的安全算法，UE 1支持的安全算法可以是UE 1在本次连接过程中支持的安全算法，也可以是UE 1自身支持的安全算法。UE 1的控制面安全策略即UE 1希望在本次连接过程中使用的控制面安全策略，例如UE 1希望在本次连接过程中开启控制面机密性保护，开启控制面完整性保护。
直连通信请求消息还可包括密钥上层信息(Key_Est_Info)，密钥上层信息可以是一个信息容器(container)，用于携带建立密钥所需的上层信息。UE 1和UE 2通过交互密钥上层信息可建立UE 1与UE 2之间的共享密钥。
可选的，直连通信请求消息还可包括根密钥标识(KNRP ID)，KNRP ID用于标识根密钥KNRP，KNRP可以是UE 1与UE 2执行步骤201之前互鉴权流程和密钥建立流程建立的共享密钥。若UE 1能够感知UE 2的身份且UE 1保存有与UE 2之间的部分上下文信息，则直连通信请求消息包括KNRP ID。UE 1能够感知UE 2的身份，即能够确定出UE 2是哪个用户。UE 1保存有与UE 2之间的部分上下文信息，即UE 1与UE 2之前进行过通信，UE 1上保存有与UE 2之间的部分上下文信息，该部分上下文信息包括UE 1与UE 2 之间的KNRP以及KNRP ID。
步骤202，UE 2确定与UE 1之间的控制面安全保护方法，即UE 2确定针对UE 2与UE 1之间的信令是否开启控制面完整性保护，以及是否开启控制面机密性保护。并选择安全算法。
UE 2根据UE 1的控制面安全策略和UE 2的控制面安全策略，确定与UE 1之间的控制面安全保护方法。
例如，UE 2可以按照如下方法确定是否开启控制面完整性保护：
(1)UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略为required，UE 2的控制面完整性保护策略为preferred或者required，则UE 2确定开启与UE 1之间的控制面完整性保护；
(2)UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略为required或者preferred，UE 2的控制面完整性保护策略为required，则UE 2确定开启与UE 1之间的控制面完整性保护；
(3)UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略为preferred，UE 2的控制面完整性保护策略为preferred，则UE 2根据自身的策略确定是否开启与UE 1之间的控制面完整性保护；例如，可以默认的策略是可以开启与UE 1之间的控制面完整性保护，或者是根据UE 2的性能情况确定是否开启与UE 1之间的控制面完整性保护；具体策略的设置不做限定；
(4)当UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略和UE 2的控制面完整性保护策略中任一个是not needed，且另外一个不是required时，UE 2确定不开启与UE 1之间的控制面完整性保护；
(5)当UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略和UE 2的控制面完整性保护策略中任一个是not needed，且另外一个是required时，UE 2和UE 1之间无法建立安全连接。
UE 2确定是否开启控制面机密性保护的方法与上述确定是否开启控制面完整性保护的方法类似，不再赘述。进一步的，一种可能的实现方式中，如果UE 2确定不开启与UE 1之间的控制面完整性保护，则UE 2确定也不开启与UE 1之间的控制面机密性保护；如果UE 2确定开启与UE 1之间的控制面完整性保护，则UE 2确定是否开启与UE 1之间的控制面机密性保护的方法与上述确定是否开启控制面完整性保护的方法类似。
进一步的，UE 2根据与UE 1之间确定的控制面安全保护方法，确定安全算法。
例如，如果UE 2确定需要开启与UE 1之间的控制面机密性保护，则UE 2选择一个加密算法作为UE 1和UE 2之间执行控制面机密性保护的加密算法。具体的，UE 2可以根据自身的安全能力以及UE 1的安全能力，确定UE 1和UE 2都支持的一个加密算法作为UE 1和UE 2之间的控制面加密算法。可选的，如果UE 2确定需要不开启与UE 1之间的控制面机密性保护，则UE 2确定一个空(null)值的算法作为UE 1和UE 2之间的控制面加密算法。
如果UE 2确定需要开启与UE 1之间的控制面完整性保护，那么UE 2选择一个完整性保护算法。具体的，UE 2可以根据自身的安全能力以及UE 1的安全能力，确定UE 1和UE 2都支持的一个完整性保护算法作为UE 1和UE 2之间的控制面完整性保护算法。可选的，如果UE 2确定需要不开启与UE 1之间的控制面完整性保护，则UE 2确定一个空(null)值的算法作为UE 1和UE 2之间的控制面完整性保护算法。当UE 2确定开启与UE 1之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，执行后续流程203-206；当UE 2确定不开启与UE 1之间 的控制面完整性保护的情况下，执行后续流程207-209。
步骤203，UE 1与UE 2执行互鉴权流程和密钥建立流程。
在现有技术中，如果UE 2确定开启控制面完整性保护，且找不到与UE 1之间的共享密钥，则需要触发与UE 1之间的互鉴权流程和密钥建立流程。如果UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护，则不需要执行步骤203。若直连通信请求消息包括KNRP ID，那么UE 2根据KNRP ID确定与UE 1之间的共享密钥KNRP，从而也可以不执行步骤203。
步骤204，UE 2向UE 1发送完整性保护后的直连安全模式命令(direct security mode command)消息。相应的，UE 1接收来自UE 2的完整性保护后的直连安全模式命令消息。其中，直连安全模式命令消息可包括选择的安全算法(chosen_algs)，选择的安全算法可包括步骤202中UE 2选择的安全算法。例如，在UE 2确定开启控制面完整性保护和开启控制面加密保护的情况下，直连安全模式命令消息中携带UE 2确定好的控制面完整性保护算法和控制面加密算法。
直连安全模式命令消息还可包括UE 2生成的随机数2(nonce_2)，UE 1的安全能力和UE 1的控制面安全策略。UE 1的安全能力和UE 1的控制面安全策略为步骤201中UE 2从该消息中收到的UE 1的安全能力和UE 1的控制面安全策略。由于UE 2开启控制面完整性保护，那么UE 2可对直连安全模式命令消息进行完整性保护。
可选的，不管是否开启控制面加密保护，都不对直连安全模式命令消息进行加密。
步骤205，UE 1确定与UE 2之间的控制面安全保护方法，即UE 1确定针对UE 1与UE 2之间的信令是否开启控制面完整性保护，以及是否开启控制面机密性保护。
UE 1根据直连安全模式命令消息所包括的选择的安全算法，确定与UE 2之间的控制面安全保护方法。即直连安全模式命令消息所包括的选择的安全算法即用于指示UE 1与UE 2之间使用的安全算法，又隐式的指示了是否开启相应的控制面安全保护。例如，加密算法为非null值，则UE 1确定开启控制面机密性保护，并使用直连安全模式命令消息中携带加密算法对后续控制面消息进行机密性保护；完整性保护算法为非null值，则UE 1确定开启控制面完整性保护，并使用直连安全模式命令消息中携带的控制面完整性保护算法对后续控制面消息进行完整性保护。
UE 1可以验证确定的控制面安全保护方法与UE 1的控制面安全策略是否匹配。例如，若控制面机密性保护策略为not needed，那么不开启控制面机密性保护与控制面机密性保护策略not needed匹配；若控制面机密性保护策略为required，那么开启控制面机密性保护与控制面机密性保护策略required匹配；若控制面机密性保护策略为preferred，那么开启控制面机密性保护或不开启控制面机密性保护，与控制面机密性保护策略preferred匹配。
进一步的，在控制面完整性保护开启的情况下，UE 1使用KNRP计算出会话密钥KNRP-sess。并UE 1进一步使用KNRP-sess计算得到本PC5单播通信中使用的完整性保护密钥(NRPIK)。在控制面安全保护方法为开启控制面机密性保护的情况下，UE 1进一步使用KNRP-sess计算得到本PC5单播通信中使用的加密密钥(NRPEK)。
UE 1在激活与UE 2之间的控制面安全之前，执行以下三种验证过程：
A、UE 1验证直连安全模式命令消息中的UE 1的安全能力是否与其发给UE 2的安全能力相同；
B、UE 1验证直连安全模式命令消息中的UE 1的安全策略是否与其发给UE 2的安全策略相同；
C、如果开启完整性保护，则对直连安全模式命令消息进行完整性验证，如果没有开启完整性保护，则不需要验证完整性。
上述三种验证都通过的情况下，UE 1激活其与UE 2之间的控制面安全。若上述三种验证中任何一个验证不通过，则UE 1释放与UE 2之间的连接，并向UE 2发送连接建立拒绝消息，连接建立拒绝消息也携带拒绝原因值。需要说明的是，本申请不限定上述三种验证执行的先后顺序。
步骤206，UE 1向UE 2发送直连安全模式完成(direct security mode complete)消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的直连安全模式完成消息。
其中，直连安全模式完成消息可包括UE 1的用户面安全策略，用于与UE 2协商以确定用户面安全保护方法。
可选的，所述UE 1对所述直连安全模式完成消息进行完整性保护。如果所述UE 1和UE 2之间还开启了控制面加密保护，则UE 1对所述直连安全模式完成消息进行加密保护。
207、UE 2向UE 1发送直连安全模式命令(direct security mode command)消息。相应的，UE 1接收来自UE 2的直连安全模式命令消息。其中，直连安全模式命令消息可包括选择的安全算法(chosen_algs)，选择的安全算法可包括步骤202中UE 2选择的安全算法。例如，在UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护和开启控制面加密保护的情况下，直连安全模式命令消息中携带空值的控制面完整性保护算法和空值的控制面加密算法。
直连安全模式命令消息还可包括UE 1的安全能力和UE 1的控制面安全策略。UE 1的安全能力和UE 1的控制面安全策略为步骤201中UE 2从该消息中收到的UE 1的安全能力和UE 1的控制面安全策略。由于UE 2不开启控制面完整性保护，那么UE 2不用对直连安全模式命令消息进行完整性保护。
步骤208，UE 1确定与UE 2之间的控制面安全保护方法，即UE 1确定针对UE 1与UE 2之间的信令是否开启控制面完整性保护，以及是否开启控制面机密性保护。
UE 1根据直连安全模式命令消息所包括的选择的安全算法，确定与UE 2之间的控制面安全保护方法。即直连安全模式命令消息所包括的选择的安全算法即用于指示UE 1与UE 2之间使用的安全算法，又隐式的指示了是否开启相应的控制面安全保护。例如，加密算法为null值，则UE 1确定不开启控制面机密性保护；完整性保护算法为null值，则UE 1确定不开启控制面完整性保护。
UE 1可以验证确定的控制面安全保护方法与UE 1的控制面安全策略是否匹配。例如，若控制面机密性保护策略为not needed，那么不开启控制面机密性保护与控制面机密性保护策略not needed匹配；若控制面机密性保护策略为required，那么开启控制面机密性保护与控制面机密性保护策略required匹配；若控制面机密性保护策略为preferred，那么开启控制面机密性保护或不开启控制面机密性保护，与控制面机密性保护策略preferred匹配。
UE 1在确定不开启激活与UE 2之间的控制面安全之前，执行以下2种验证过程：
A、UE 1验证直连安全模式命令消息中的UE 1的安全能力是否与其发给UE 2的安全能力相同；
B、UE 1验证直连安全模式命令消息中的UE 1的安全策略是否与其发给UE 2的安全策略相同；
上述2种验证都通过的情况下，UE 1不激活其与UE 2之间的控制面安全。若上述三种验证中任何一个验证不通过，则UE 1释放与UE 2之间的连接，并向UE 2发送连接建立拒绝消息，连接建立拒绝消息也携带拒绝原因值。需要说明的是，本申请不限定上述三种验证执行的先后顺序。
步骤209，UE 1向UE 2发送直连安全模式完成(direct security mode complete)消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的直连安全模式完成消息。
其中，直连安全模式完成消息可包括UE 1的用户面安全策略，用于与UE 2协商以确定用户面安全保护方法。需要说明的是，由于UE 1和UE 2之间没有开启控制面完整性保护，所以UE 1向UE 2发送的直连安全模式完成(direct security mode complete)消息是没有进行完整性保护的。通过图2实施例可知，在UE 2确定开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，UE 1可以通过对直连安全模式命令消息进行完整性验证，从而验证传输的信息是否被篡改。但是在UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，UE 1无法验证传输的信息是否被篡改，将会存在中间人攻击的问题。
示例性的，在UE 1和UE 2的控制面完整性保护策略均为preferred的情况下，攻击者将UE 1发送给UE 2的直连通信请求消息携带的UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略篡改为not needed，然后将修改后的直连通信请求消息发送UE 2。这样UE 2在确定控制面完整性保护方法时，确定不开启控制面完整性保护。由于不开启控制面完整性保护，因此UE 2发送给UE 1的直连安全模式命令消息(携带的UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略为not needed)未被完整性保护，此时攻击者再将直连安全模式命令消息携带的UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略篡改回preferred。这种情况下，UE 1仅仅执行步骤208中的两种验证，将无法获知中间攻击者的存在。后续UE 1与UE 2之间的控制面安全则在攻击者干扰下，强行不开启控制面完整性保护。但是在UE 1和UE 2的控制面完整性策略均为preferred的情况下，原来UE 1与UE 2之间的控制面完整性保护是可以开启的。攻击者通过篡改，关闭了UE 1与UE 2之间的控制面完整性保护，造成安全等级降低，存在安全隐患。且后续用户面安全策略在协商过程也会因为没有控制面完整性保护，导致被攻击者进一步攻击，进而影响信令和用户面数据传输的安全性。
示例性的，UE 1在接入UE 2时发生错误，导致UE 2需要向UE 1回复失败消息，失败消息可携带失败原因值。UE 1可根据失败原因值触发相关的策略。例如，一种原因值指示UE 1暂时不可以与UE 2连接，那么UE 1根据预置策略，会启动定时器，在一定时间内不再尝试接入UE 2。再例如，一种原因值指示UE 1立即向UE 2发起重连接，那么UE 1会立即向UE 2发起重连接，以重新接入UE 2。在不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，UE 2发送的失败原因值可能被攻击者篡改，导致UE 1执行错误的策略，违背UE 2的意愿。
鉴于此，本申请实施例提供一种确定安全保护方法、系统及装置，可以降低信息被篡改的风险，从而提高信息传输的安全性。进一步的，在确定的控制面安全保护方法为不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，可以有效防止信令所包括的信息被篡改。
在本申请实施例中的附图中，各个实施例所示的步骤，以及步骤之间的先后顺序用于 举例，并不构成对本申请实施例的限定。应理解，执行图示中的部分步骤或调整步骤的顺序进行具体实施，均落在本申请的保护范围内。
本申请实施例描述的技术可用于各种通信系统，例如第四代(4th generation，4G)通信系统，4.5G通信系统，5G通信系统，多种通信系统融合的系统，或者未来演进的通信系统。
本申请实施例涉及的终端设备(也可称为终端)可以是一种具有无线收发功能的设备，可以部署在陆地上，包括室内或室外、手持或车载；也可以部署在水面上(如轮船等)；还可以部署在空中(例如飞机、气球和人造卫星上等)。终端设备可以是UE，UE包括具有无线通信功能的手持式设备、车载设备、穿戴式设备或计算设备。示例性地，UE可以是手机(mobile phone)、平板电脑或带无线收发功能的电脑。终端设备还可以是虚拟现实(virtual reality，VR)终端设备、增强现实(augmented reality，AR)终端设备、智能汽车(smart vehicle)终端设备、工业控制中的无线终端、无人驾驶中的无线终端、远程医疗中的无线终端、智能电网中的无线终端、智慧城市(smart city)中的无线终端、智慧家庭(smart home)中的无线终端、等等。本申请实施例中，用于实现终端设备的功能的装置可以是终端设备；也可以是能够支持终端设备实现该功能的装置，例如芯片系统，该装置可以被安装在终端设备中或者和终端设备匹配使用，例如处理器。在本申请实施例提供的技术方案中，以用于实现终端设备的功能的装置是终端设备为例，描述本申请实施例提供的技术方案。
在本申请中，终端设备可以是D2D通信系统中的终端设备，也可以是V2X通信系统中的终端设备、车到车(vehicle to vehicle，V2V)通信系统中的车载终端等，还可以是其他短距离直连通信系统中的终端设备。
请参见图3，为应用本申请实施例的网络架构示意图。图3包括第一设备301和第二设备302。
设备可以是终端设备，也可以是网络设备，也可以是核心网设备。网络设备例如可以是各种通信系统中的基站，核心网设备例如可以是用户面功能(user plane function，UPF)，接入和移动性管理(access and mobility management function，AMF)，或多接入边缘计算(multi-access edge computing，MEC)设备等。第一设备301与第二设备302可以是同类型的设备，例如均为UE，也可以是不同类型的设备，例如第一设备301为终端设备，第二设备302为网络设备或AMF网元。
第一设备301和第二设备302可通过如图1所示的PC5接口进行通信，第一设备301和第二设备302可以是通信系统中的任意两个终端设备。第一设备301和第二设备302中至少一个是网络设备或核心网设备时，使用的接口可以是Uu口或其他可以直接使用的接口，或使用由若干接口组成的逻辑链路。比如，UE到MEC要经过空口Uu口，基站到UPF的N3接口，以及UPF到MEC的N6接口。应用在本申请中，假设第一设备301向第二设备302发起连接，即第一设备301为发起端，第二设备302为接收端。
第一设备301通过直连通信请求消息，向第二设备302发起连接。直连通信请求消息包括第一设备301的控制面完整性保护策略和第一设备301的安全能力。第二设备302在接收到直连通信请求消息时，第二设备302可以根据不同的方法来确定是否开启控制面完 整性保护，例如可根据第一设备301的控制面完整性保护策略和第二设备302的控制面完整性保护策略，确定与第一设备301之间是否开启控制面完整性保护；第二设备302也可以根据其他预配置的策略，确定与第一设备301之间是否开启控制面完整性保护。
在确定与第一设备301之间不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，所述第二设备302可以根据预配置的方法或者第一设备301发送的指示信息对待保护信息进行保护处理。所述预配置的方法，用于指示在第一设备301和第二设备302之间的控制面完整性保护没有开启的情况下对待保护信息进行保护处理的方法。待保护信息可以一条消息中的一个或者多个信息元素，或者整条消息。
可选的，直连通信请求消息还包括第一指示信息，第一指示信息用于指示第二设备302在确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，需要执行的操作。例如，第二设备302在确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，根据所述第一指示信息确定需要触发与第一设备301进行互鉴权。第一指示信息还用于指示第二设备302在互鉴权之后生成共享密钥，并指示第二设备302根据共享密钥对待保护信息进行保护处理，以防止在不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，所述待保护信息被恶意篡改。可选的，第一设备301可以根据其控制面安全保护策略来确定是否需要携带所述第一指示信息。例如，第一设备301在其控制面安全保护策略为preferred或not needed的情况下，可在直连通信请求消息中携带第一指示信息；第一设备301在其控制面安全保护策略为required的情况下，可以不用在直连通信请求消息中携带第一指示信息。
在一种可能的实现方式中，若第二设备302确定不开启控制面完整性保护，那么第二设备302可触发第一设备301和第二设备302获取两端之间的共享密钥。第二设备302根据共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行计算，得到第一完整性验证信息，第一待保护信息包括上述直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素，或者整条直连通信请求消息。其中，第一算法可以是哈希算法或加密算法等。第二设备302向第一设备301发送直连安全模式命令消息，该直连安全模式命令消息可以指示第一设备301不开启控制面完整性保护。该直连安全模式命令消息包括第一完整性验证信息。
相应的，第一设备302在接收到该直连安全模式命令消息时，根据两端之间的共享密钥对第一完整性验证信息进行验证。例如根据共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行计算，得到第一待保护信息对应的期望信息，判断期望信息与第一完整性验证信息是否一致，一致则验证通过，反之验证不通过。在第一完整性验证信息验证通过的情况下，第一设备302根据不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启控制面完整性保护。
其中，不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息可以是控制面完整性保护算法为空值，也可以是指示不开启控制面完整性保护的控制面激活指示信息。
在另一种可能的实现方式中，若第二设备302确定的控制面安全保护方法包括不开启控制面完整性保护，那么第二设备302将第一待保护信息携带在第一密钥上层信息中，向第一设备301发送直连安全模式命令消息。直连安全模式命令消息包括第一密钥上层信息和不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息。
第一设备301在接收到直连安全模式命令消息时，第一设备301的上层(例如应用层)从第一密钥上层信息中获取第一待保护信息，并将其递交至V2X层，V2X层验证从上层传 来的第一待保护信息与第一设备301向第二设备302发送的第一待保护信息是否一致，若一致则通过验证，否则不通过验证。验证通过，第一设备301根据不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启控制面完整性保护。
在本申请实施例中，在确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，第一设备301可以验证出在协商控制面安全保护方法的过程中，是否存在攻击者篡改信息，从而可以提高信息传输的安全性。
在又一种可能的实现方式中，第二设备302根据第一设备301和第二设备302的控制面完整性保护策略，应该确定为不开启控制面完整性保护。但是在某些场景下，比如，第二设备302要传递安全敏感参数(比如更新后的第一设备301的临时身份)，或者第二设备需要确定第一接入设备301的身份确实是声称的第一接入设备301，第二设备302则确定需要开启控制面完整性保护。该方法又可以称为覆盖控制面安全保护方法的方法。进一步地，第二设备302生成完整性保护密钥，并选择非空的完整性保护算法。第二设备302向第一设备301发送直连安全模式命令消息，所述直连安全模式命令消息是被完整性保护的。所述全模式命令消息携带需安全敏感参数。相应的，第一设备301对直连安全模式命令消息进行解完整性保护。具体地，比如第一设备301发送的控制面完整性保护策略是not needed，第二设备302的控制面完整性保护策略是preferred，则第二设备302应该不开启控制面完整性保护。此时第二设备302需要将更新后的第一设备301的临时身份发送给第一设备301，并且这条消息既需要控制面加密保护和控制面完整性保护，则第二设备302首先激活控制面完整性保护和控制面机密性保护，再将第一设备301的临时身份在随后的既有控制面加密保护和控制面完整性保护的消息发送给第一设备301。需要说明的是，覆盖控制面安全保护方法的方法可以发生在第二设备302在首次确定控制面安全保护方法的时候，也可以用于在已经确定不激活控制面安全的情况下，后续因为特殊场景触第二设备302发起覆盖已有确定的控制面安全保护的过程。另外，该覆盖可以是永久的覆盖，也可以是临时的覆盖。如果是永久的覆盖，则安全激活后就一直存在，除非断开连接重新协商。如果是临时的覆盖，第二设备302可以明确的指示覆盖条件，比如有几条消息被覆盖，比如只有当前这个流程被覆盖。覆盖条件失效后，可以恢复到之前的控制面安全保护方法。
其中，某些场景可以是为了传递、协商有隐私内容的消息，也可以是者传递重要的控制面参数的场景。此时，第二设备302忽略第一设备301携带的控制面完整性保护策略。第二设备302可以在直连安全模式命令消息中携带指示信息，用于告知第一设备301这条消息开启的安全保护类型与第一设备301的初衷不符，要求第一设备301按照当前决定执行。第一设备301和第二设备302可以在后续消息中继续按照直连安全模式命令消息指定的控制面安全保护方法对其他控制面消息进行控制面安全保护。也可以在后续消息中执行本应该使用的控制面安全保护方法。比如，指示信息可以在每一条强制消息中携带，当不再携带的时候，就可以按照本应该使用的控制面安全开启方法。或者直连安全模式命令消息中还有可以指示该安全保护方法用于后续几条消息中的指示信息，在消息数目达到指示信息指示的数目后，第一设备301和第二设备302就可以按照本应该使用的控制面安全开启方法。
在另一种实现方式中，在所述某些场景发生情况下，第二设备302要发送失败原因值 给第一设备301。第一设备301根据失败原因值决定立即再次发起连接，或者等候一段时间再发起连接。此时，第二设备302可以覆盖原本控制面安全保护方法，即决定开启控制面完整性保护。再在有完整性保护的控制面消息中传递失败原因值。
第二设备302可以在直连安全模式命令消息传递覆盖后的控制面安全保护方法。相应的，第一设备301接收直连安全模式命令消息，并根据直连安全模式命令消息中指示的控制面安全保护方法激活控制面安全保护。
下面将对本申请实施例提供的确定安全保护方法进行具体阐述，第一设备以UE 1为例，第二设备以UE 2为例。需要说明的是，本申请下述实施例中各个网元之间的消息名字或消息中各参数的名字等只是一个示例，具体实现中也可以是其他的名字，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。
请参见图4，为本申请实施例一提供的确定安全保护方法的流程示意图，该流程可包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤401，UE 1向UE 2发送直连通信请求消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的直连通信请求消息。
其中，直连通信请求消息可包括UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略，用于与UE 2协商，以确定是否开启控制面完整性保护。UE 1的安全策略可以是核心网网元为其配置的，并告知UE 1，例如5G核心网中的策略控制功能(policy control function，PCF)网元为UE 1配置安全策略，并告知UE；也可以是应用功能(application function，AF)网元为其配置的，并告知UE 1；还可以是AF网元为其配置的，通过PCF网元告知UE 1。本申请对于UE如何获得各自的控制面完整性保护策略不做限定。
直连通信请求消息还可包括UE 1的安全能力，UE 1的安全能力表示UE 1支持的安全算法。直连通信请求消息还可以包括UE 1生成的随机数1，随机数1可用于生成控制面加密密钥(NRPEK)和完整性保护密钥(NRPIK)。
步骤402，UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护，则触发UE 1和UE 2获取共享密钥，即触发步骤403。
UE 2确定是否开启控制面完整性保护的过程可参见图2、图2a以及图3中相关步骤的具体描述，这里不再赘述。在UE 2确定出控制面安全保护方法包括不开启控制面完整性保护时，触发UE 1和UE 2获取两者之间的共享密钥。本申请中，不开启控制面完整性保护时，默认也不开启控制面机密性保护，也不开启用户面安全保护。
步骤403，UE 1和UE 2获取共享密钥。共享密钥即KNRP。
目前，在UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，不执行步骤403。而本申请，在UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，执行步骤403，以根据步骤403获取的共享密钥对待保护信息进行保护，防止控制面安全协商流程中因没有控制面完整性保护而带来的攻击者攻击。需要说明的是，本申请对UE 1和UE 2获取共享密钥的具体实现方式不做限定，这里的共享密钥是指UE 1和UE 2都知晓并使用的密钥。例如，可以与现有技术中UE 2确定需要开启与UE 1之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，执行互鉴权，进而建立密钥的方法相同，即参考上述图2实施例的步骤203。
可选的，在UE 2确定开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，UE 2也可以触发步骤403。例 如，运营商可以选择每次都执行步骤403，即不管是否开启控制面完整性保护都执行步骤403。再例如，UE 1与UE 2后续流程中，消息没有完整性保护的情况下，都需要获取共享密钥以便于对这个没有完整性保护的消息进行安全保护。
示例性的，UE 1和UE 2获取共享密钥可以包括以下四种方式：
方式一，UE 2在确定出控制面安全保护方法包括不开启控制面完整性保护时，UE 2触发与UE 1之间的互鉴权流程，并在互鉴权之后与UE 1执行密钥建立流程。互鉴权流程用于验证双方的身份，即UE 2验证UE 1是否为合法用户，UE 1验证UE 2是否为合法用户。在双方均为合法用户时，执行密钥建立流程，以使得双方都可以获得共享密钥。
方式二，UE 1和UE 2上预配置有两者之间的共享密钥，两端可以在需要共享密钥时从预配置中获取。
方式三，UE 1和UE 2上预配置有公私钥和证书，两端可以在需要共享密钥时，根据公私钥和证书生成共享密钥。
其中UE 1上配置有UE 1的公钥、UE 1的私钥和UE 1的证书，UE 1的证书中包含UE 1的公钥；UE 2上配置UE 2的公钥、UE 2的私钥和UE 2的证书，UE 2的证书中包含UE 2的公钥。使用公私钥和证书生成共享密钥的流程可以是：以UE 2发起建立共享密钥流程为例，UE 2将自己的证书发送给UE 1，UE 1验证UE 2证书合法性后使用UE 2的公钥加密UE 1提供的共享信息1后，UE 1将UE 1的证书和加密后的共享信息1发送给UE 2。UE 2收到后，验证UE 1证书的合法性后，使用UE 2的私钥解密加密后的共享信息1得到共享信息1，并使用解密得到的共享信息1和自己生成的共享信息2生成共享密钥。之后UE 2使用UE 1公钥加密共享信息2后，UE 2将UE 2的证书和加密后的共享信息2发送给UE 1，后续UE 1解密后获取共享信息2并连同共享信息1一起生成共享密钥。
方式四，UE 1和UE 2上保存有部分上下文信息，那么UE 1和UE 2可以直接从部分上下文信息中获取共享密钥。
在UE 1首次接入UE 2的情况下，UE 1与UE 2执行互鉴权流程和密码建立流程，以获得共享密钥。UE 1和UE 2可根据随机数1、随机数2和由共享密钥生成的会话密钥KNRP-sess，生成加密密钥NRPEK和/或完整性保护密钥NRPIK。UE 1和UE 2根据确定的安全保护方法采用相应的密钥进行安全保护。在UE 1与UE 2断开之后，删除NRPEK和NRPIK，例如删除上下文信息时便删除了NRPEK和NRPIK。当UE 1再次接入UE 2时，UE 1和UE 2需获取上下文信息中的共享密钥，以生成NRPEK和/或NRPIK。
步骤404，UE 2根据共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行计算，得到第一完整性验证信息。
例如，UE 2根据共享密钥确定保护密钥，使用保护密钥和第一算法，对第一待保护信息进行计算，得到第一完整性验证信息。第一算法，例如可以是基于哈希的消息验证码(keyed-hash message authentication code或hash-based message authentication code)算法，第一完整性验证信息即第一待保护信息对应的HMAC。第一算法可以预配置在UE 1和UE 2上，或由UE 1与UE 2预先约定。
UE 2根据共享密钥确定保护密钥，可以是直接将共享密钥KNRP作为保护密钥；也可以是根据共享密钥计算得到KNRP-sess，将KNRP-sess作为保护密钥；也可以是根据共享 密钥计算得到KNRP-sess，根据KNRP-sess生成保护密钥，此时保护密钥可以是完整性保护密钥NRPIK，也可以是加密密钥NRPEK。实际应用中，UE 1和UE 2具体采用哪种保护密钥可以是预配置的，或者由两端预先约定或者协商的。
UE 2使用保护密钥和HMAC算法，计算第一待保护信息对应的HMAC，具体的，将保护密钥和第一待保护信息输入HMAC算法进行计算，HMAC算法的输出即第一待保护信息对应的HMAC。其中，待保护信息也可以描述为需要保护的信息、需要保护的参数等。第一待保护信息可以是直连安全命令消息中的任意一个或多个信息元素(information element，IE)。直连安全命令消息可包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息、UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略和/或UE 1的安全能力等信息，第一待保护信息例如可以是携带UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略的IE和/或携带不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息的IE。
进一步的，UE 2在不开启控制面安全保护时，确定安全算法的取值为null。选择安全算法的过程可参见图2中相关描述，这里不再赘述。例如，在不开启控制面完整性保护，也不开启控制面机密性保护的情况下，完整性保护算法和完整性机密性算法均取值为null。
若步骤404中，不使用保护密钥，即只将第一待保护信息输入HMAC算法，可能依然存在被篡改的风险，安全性较低。
步骤405，UE 2向UE 1发送直连安全模式命令消息。相应的，UE 1接收来自UE 2的直连安全模式命令消息。
直连安全模式命令消息中携带的不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息可以是选择的控制面安全保护算法为null值，也可以是指示不开启控制面完整性保护的控制面激活指示信息。
步骤406，UE 1对第一完整性验证信息进行验证。
具体的，UE 1根据直连安全模式命令消息中携带的不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定直连安全模式命令消息没有被完整性保护。为了确保没有中间人攻击，UE 1获取与UE 2之间的共享密钥，并确定保护密钥，使用保护密钥和与UE 2相同的第一算法(例如HMAC算法)，计算第一待保护信息对应的期望HMAC，即UE 1将保护密钥和第一待保护信息输入HMAC算法进行计算，HMAC算法的输出即第一待保护信息对应的期望HMAC。UE 1判断期望HMAC与步骤405携带的HMAC是否一致，若一致则第一待保护信息对应的HMAC通过验证，表明UE 2正确接收了UE 1发送的第一待保护信息；若不一致则第一待保护信息对应的HAMC未通过验证，表明存在攻击者篡改了UE 1和UE 2之间的信息。
在第一完整性验证信息验证通过的情况下，UE 1根据步骤405中携带的不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启控制面完整性保护。
例如，第一待保护信息为UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略，控制面完整性保护策略为preferred，UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护。若UE 1计算的UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略对应的期望HMAC为HMAC1，而步骤405携带的HMAC为HMAC2，两者不一致，表明攻击者可能篡改了UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略，可能是攻击者在UE 1向UE 2发送直连通信请求消息的过程中进行了篡改，也可能是在UE 2向UE 1发送直连安全模式命令消息的过程中进行了篡改。
可选的，步骤407a，若步骤406验证不通过，则UE 1向UE 2发送连接建立拒绝消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的连接建立拒绝消息。
其中，连接建立拒绝消息可包括拒绝原因值和第三完整性验证信息。第三完整性验证信息为根据共享密钥和HMAC算法对第三待保护信息计算得到，第三待保护信息包括连接建立拒绝消息中的任意一个或者多个IE，例如为携带拒绝原因值的IE。
例如，第三完整性验证信息为拒绝原因值对应的HMAC。UE 1使用保护密钥和HMAC算法，计算拒绝原因值对应的HMAC，即UE 1将保护密钥和拒绝原因值输入HMAC算法进行计算，HMAC算法的输出即拒绝原因值对应的HMAC。
可选的，在UE 1确定开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，在向UE 2发送连接建立拒绝消息时，也可以携带拒绝原因值对应的HMAC。
可选的，步骤408a，UE 2对第三完整性验证信息进行验证。
例如，第三完整性验证信息为拒绝原因值对应的HMAC，UE 2使用保护密钥和第一算法(例如HMAC算法)，计算拒绝原因值对应的期望HMAC，判断期望HMAC与步骤407a携带的HMAC是否一致，若一致则通过验证，UE 2可释放与UE 1之间的连接。拒绝原因值对应的HMAC通过验证，UE 2可不回复任何消息。若不一致，则UE 2忽略接收到的连接建立拒绝消息，具体的，可以不释放与UE 1之间的连接。
可选的，UE 2在发送直连安全模式命令消息之后，启动定时器，该定时器超时还未接收到来自UE 1的直连安全模式完成消息或者连接建立拒绝消息，则UE 2释放与UE 1之间的连接。
UE 2在释放与UE 1之间的连接之后，可删除两者之间的上下文信息，例如删除NRPIK。
步骤407b，若步骤406验证通过，则UE 1向UE 2发送直连安全模式完成消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的直连安全模式完成消息。
其中，直连安全模式完成消息可包括关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息，和第二完整性验证信息。关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息用于指示关闭控制面完整性保护。第二完整性验证信息为根据共享密钥和第一算法对第二待保护信息计算得到，第二待保护信息包括直连安全模式完成消息中的任意一个或者多个IE，例如为关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息携带的IE。
例如，第二完整性验证信息为关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息对应的HMAC。UE 1使用保护密钥和采用步骤404中的HMAC算法，计算关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息对应的HMAC，即UE 1将保护密钥和关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息输入HMAC算法进行计算，得到关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息对应的HMAC。
步骤408b，UE 2对第二完整性验证信息进行验证。
例如，UE 2使用保护密钥和第一算法(例如HMAC算法)，计算关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息对应的期望HMAC，判断期望HMAC与步骤407b携带的HMAC是否一致，若一致则通过验证，并关闭控制面完整性保护。若不一致则UE 2释放与UE 1之间的连接。
在图4所示的实施例中，在UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，UE 1和UE 2之间传递的信息都使用UE 1和UE 2之间的共享密钥进行安全保护，以防止攻击者篡改 未受到保护的信息。
请参见图5，为本申请实施例二提供的确定安全保护方法的流程示意图。图5所示流程中与图4相同或类似的部分，可参见图4所示实施例中相应的描述。图5所示流程可包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤501，UE 1向UE 2发送直连通信请求消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的直连通信请求消息。
步骤502，UE 2确定出控制面安全保护方法包括不开启控制面完整性保护，则触发UE 1和UE 2获取共享密钥，即触发步骤503。
步骤503，UE 1和UE 2获取共享密钥。
步骤501-步骤503可参考步骤401-步骤403的具体描述，在此不再赘述。
步骤504，UE 2根据共享密钥确定保护密钥，使用保护密钥对第一待保护信息进行保护，得到第一完整性验证信息。第一待保护信息的描述可参考步骤404中具体描述，此处不再赘述。
UE 2根据共享密钥确定保护密钥，可以是根据共享密钥计算得到KNRP-sess，将KNRP-sess作为保护密钥；也可以是根据共享密钥计算得到KNRP-sess，继续根据KNRP-sess生成密钥，将该密钥作为保护密钥，此时保护密钥可以是NRPEK或NRPIK。实际应用中，UE 1和UE 2具体采用哪种保护密钥可以是预配置的，或者由两端预先约定的。
UE 2使用保护密钥对第一待保护信息进行加密保护和/或完整性保护，得到第一完整性验证信息，即加密保护和/或完整性保护后的第一待保护信息。
步骤504中，若不使用保护密钥，那么无法对第一待保护信息进行加密保护和/或完整性保护，存在待保护信息被篡改的风险。
步骤505，UE 2向UE 1发送直连安全模式命令消息。相应的，UE 1接收来自UE 2的直连安全模式命令消息。
其中，直连安全模式命令消息可包括第一完整性验证信息和不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息。不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息可以是选择的控制面安全保护算法的取值为null值，也可以是指示不开启控制面完整性保护的控制面激活指示信息。
步骤506，UE 1对第一完整性验证信息进行验证。
若UE 2对第一待保护信息进行了加密保护，那么UE 1使用保护密钥对第一完整性验证信息进行解密，判断解密后的信息与UE 1向UE 2发送的第一待保护信息是否一致，一致则通过验证，否则不通过验证。或UE 1判断解密后的信息与UE 2向UE 1发送的第一待保护信息是否一致，该种情况下，步骤505中的直连安全模式命令消息还包括未做任何保护处理的第一待保护信息。
若UE 2对第一待保护信息进行了完整性保护，那么UE 1使用保护密钥对第一完整性验证信息进行完整性保护验证。验证方式为对UE 1向UE 2发送的第一待保护信息，或对UE 2向UE 1发送的第一待保护信息重新使用所述保护密钥对待保护信息进行完整性保护，并判断重新使用所述保护密钥对第一待保护信息进行完整性保护后的第一待保护信息，与UE 2发送给UE 1的使用保护密钥对完整性保护后的第一待保护信息是否一致，一致则通过验证，否则不通过验证。
若UE 2对第一待保护信息进行了加密保护和完整性保护，那么UE 1使用保护密钥对第一完整性验证信息进行解密和完整性保护验证。
在第一完整性验证信息验证通过的情况下，UE 1根据步骤505中携带的不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启控制面完整性保护。
可选的，步骤507a，若步骤506验证不通过，则UE 1向UE 2发送连接建立拒绝消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的连接建立拒绝消息。
其中，连接建立拒绝消息可包括拒绝原因值和第三完整性验证信息。第三完整性验证信息为根据共享密钥对第三待保护信息进行保护后得到的。若UE 2对第三待保护信息进行了加密保护，那么UE 1使用保护密钥对拒绝原因值进行加密保护；若UE 2对第三待保护信息进行了完整性保护，那么UE 1使用保护密钥对拒绝原因值进行完整性保护；若UE 2对第三待保护信息进行了加密保护和完整性保护，那么UE 1使用保护密钥对拒绝原因值进行加密保护和完整性保护。
可选的，步骤508a，UE 2对第三完整性验证信息进行验证。该验证可参考步骤506的验证过程，执行主体不同。
可选的，UE 2在发送直连安全模式命令消息之后，启动定时器，该定时器超时还未接收到来自UE 1的直连安全模式完成消息，则UE 2释放与UE 1之间的连接。
步骤507b，若步骤508a验证通过，则UE 1向UE 2发送直连安全模式完成消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的直连安全模式完成消息。
其中，直连安全模式完成消息可包括关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息，和第二完整性验证信息。
步骤508b，UE 2对第二完整性验证信息进行验证。该验证可参考步骤506的验证过程。
步骤508b中的验证与步骤506中的验证类型，执行主体不同。若步骤508b验证通过，关闭控制面完整性保护；若步骤508b验证不通过，则释放与UE 1之间的连接。
在图5所示的实施例中，在UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，UE 1和UE2之间传递的信息都使用UE 1和UE 2之间的共享密钥进行安全保护，以防止攻击者篡改未受到保护的信息。
图5所示的实施例与图4所示的实施例的不同之处在于，采用的保护处理方式不一样，图4是采用保护密钥和第一算法进行保护，图5是采用保护密钥进行加密保护和/或解完整性保护。
请参见图6，为本申请实施例三提供的确定安全保护方法的流程示意图。图6所示流程中与图4或图5相同或类似的部分，可参见图4或图5所示实施例中相应的描述。图6所示流程可包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤601，UE 1向UE 2发送直连通信请求消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的直连通信请求消息。
其中，直连通信请求消息除了UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略，UE 1的安全能力，UE 1生成的随机数1之外，还包括第一指示信息。该第一指示信息用于指示UE 2与UE 1进行互鉴权。该第一指示信息还用于指示UE 2与UE 1建立共享密钥。例如，该指示信息指示UE 2在互鉴权之后建立共享密钥，并指示UE 2根据共享密钥对待保护信息进行保护处 理。保护处理方式可以是图4所示的采用HMAC算法，也可以是图5所示的采用保护密钥进行加密保护和/或解完整性保护。
UE 1在其控制面完整性保护策略为preferred或not needed的情况下，可在直连通信请求消息中携带该指示信息。UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略为preferred或not needed，表明UE 1可能倾向于不开启控制面完整性保护。
步骤602，UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护，根据第一指示信息触发UE 1与UE 2之间的互鉴权流程。
与步骤402和步骤502的区别在于，步骤402和步骤502中，UE 2可在确定出不开启控制面完整性保护时，直接触发互鉴权流程，而步骤602中，UE 2在确定出不开启控制面完整性保护时，结合指示信息触发互鉴权流程。
步骤603，UE 1与UE 2执行互鉴权流程。
可选的，UE 2还根据指示信息在互鉴权之后建立共享密钥。可选的，UE 2和UE 1可根据步骤403中的方式二或方式三或方式四获取共享密钥。
步骤604，UE 2根据共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行计算，得到第一完整性验证信息。第一待保护信息的描述可参考步骤404中具体描述，此处不再赘述。
步骤605，UE 2向UE 1发送直连安全模式命令消息。相应的，UE 1接收来自UE 2的直连安全模式命令消息。
其中，直连安全模式命令消息可包括第一完整性验证信息和不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息。不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息可以是选择的控制面安全保护算法为null值，也可以是指示不开启控制面完整性保护的控制面激活指示信息。
可选的，直连安全模式命令消息还可包括第二指示信息，第二指示信息用于指示UE 1根据共享密钥对第一完整性验证信息进行验证。UE 1也可直接根据共享密钥对第一完整性验证信息进行验证。
步骤606，UE 1对第一完整性验证信息进行验证。
可选的，在直连安全模式命令消息包括指示信息的情况下，UE 2根据共享密钥对第一完整性验证信息进行验证。
步骤607a，若步骤606验证不通过，则UE 1向UE 2发送连接建立拒绝消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的连接建立拒绝消息。
步骤608a，UE 2对第三完整性验证信息进行验证。
步骤607b，若步骤606验证通过，则UE 1向UE 2发送直连安全模式完成消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的直连安全模式完成消息。
步骤608b，UE 2对第三完整性验证信息进行验证。
在图6所示的实施例中，在UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，结合UE 1发送的第一指示信息触发共享密钥的获取，以根据共享密钥对待保护信息进行保护处理，从而可以有效防止攻击者篡改未受到保护的信息。
图6所示的实施例，与图4或图5所示的实施例的不同之处在于，UE 2在确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，结合UE 1发送的第一指示信息，触发共享密钥的获取，而图4或图5中，UE 2在确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，便能触发共享密钥的获取。
请参见图7，为本申请实施例四提供的确定安全保护方法的流程示意图，该流程可包括但不限于如下步骤：
步骤701，UE 1向UE 2发送直连通信请求消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的直连通信请求消息。
其中，直连通信请求消息除了UE 1的控制面完整性保护策略和UE 1的安全能力之外，还包括第一密钥上层信息(Key_Est_Info)。密钥上层信息可以理解为信息容器。可以理解的是，密钥上层信息所携带的信息是应用层才能获取的，V2X层无法获取密钥上层信息中所携带的信息，这样通过密钥上层信息携带待保护信息，具有安全性。
步骤702，UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护，将第一待保护信息携带在第一密钥上层信息中。第一待保护信息的描述可参考步骤404中具体描述，此处不再赘述。
可选的，UE 2也可在确定开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，将第一待保护信息携带在第一密钥上层信息中，以保护第一待保护信息的机密性。
步骤703，UE 2向UE 1发送直连安全模式命令消息。相应的，UE 1接收来自UE 2的直连安全模式命令消息。
其中，直连安全模式命令消息可包括携带第一待保护信息的第一密钥上层信息，还可包括第一待保护信息。直连安全模式命令消息还可包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和UE 2生成的随机数2。
步骤704，UE 1对第一密钥上层信息进行验证。
在一种实现方式中，直连安全模式命令消息可包括携带第一待保护信息的第一密钥上层信息和第一待保护信息，那么UE 1的上层(例如应用层)从第一密钥上层信息中获取第一待保护信息，并将其递交至V2X层，V2X验证从上层获取的第一待保护信息与直连安全模式命令消息所包括第一待保护信息是否一致，若一致则通过验证，否则不通过验证。
在另一种实现方式中，直连安全模式命令消息可包括携带第一待保护信息的第一密钥上层信息，那么UE 1的上层(例如应用层)从第一密钥上层信息中获取第一待保护信息，并将其递交至V2X层，V2X验证从上层获取的第一待保护信息与UE 1向UE 2发送的第一待保护信息是否一致，若一致则通过验证，否则不通过验证。
步骤705a，若步骤704验证不通过，则UE 1向UE 2发送连接建立拒绝消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的连接建立拒绝消息。
其中，连接建立拒绝消息包括拒绝原因值和携带第三待保护信息的第三密钥上层信息。
步骤706a，UE 2对第三密钥上层信息进行验证。
例如，第三待保护信息为拒绝原因值，UE 2的上层从第三密钥上层信息中获取拒绝原因值，并将其递交至V2X层，V2X验证从上层获取的拒绝原因值与连接建立拒绝消息携带的拒绝原因值是否一致，若一致则通过验证，UE 2可释放与UE 1之间的连接。
步骤705b，若步骤704验证通过，则UE 1向UE 2发送直连安全模式完成消息。相应的，UE 2接收来自UE 1的直连安全模式完成消息。
其中，直连安全模式完成消息可包括关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息，和携带第二待保护信息的第二密钥上层信息。
步骤706b，UE 2对第二密钥上层信息进行验证。
例如，第三待保护信息为关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息，UE 2的上层从第二密钥上层信息中获取关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息，并将其递交至V2X层，V2X验证从上层获取的关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息与连接建立拒绝消息携带的控制面安全关闭指示信息是否一致，若一致则通过验证，否则不通过验证。在通过验证的情况下，UE 2关闭控制面安全。
在图7所示的实施例中，在UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，将待保护信息携带在密钥上层信息中，以防止攻击者篡改未受到保护的信息。
在图7所示的实施例中，在UE 2确定不开启控制面完整性保护的情况下，将待保护的信息携带在密钥上层信息中，以防止攻击者篡改未受到保护的信息。
相应于上述方法实施例给出的方法，本申请实施例还提供了相应的装置，包括用于执行上述实施例相应的模块。所述模块可以是软件，也可以是硬件，或者是软件和硬件结合。
请参见图8，为本申请提供的一种通信装置的结构示意图。图8所示的通信装置800包括收发单元801和处理单元802。
在一种设计中，装置800为第一设备：
示例性的，收发单元801，用于接收来自第二设备的直连安全模式命令消息，该直连安全模式命令消息包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第一完整性验证信息；
处理单元802，用于根据第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥，对第一完整性验证信息进行验证；在第一完整性验证信息验证通过的情况下，根据不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启与第二设备之间的控制面完整性保护。
该示例用于实现图4-图6所示实施例中UE 1的功能，装置800为第一设备时还用于实现图7所示实施例中UE 1的功能，具体可参见图4-图7所示实施例中UE 1的相应描述。
在一种设计中，装置800为第二设备：
示例性的，收发单元801，用于在处理单元确定不开启与第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，获取第一设备与第二设备之间的共享密钥；
处理单元802，用于根据共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护的信息进行计算，得到第一完整性验证信息；第一待保护的信息为待发送给第一设备的直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；
收发单元801，还用于向第一设备发送直连安全模式命令消息，直连安全模式命令消息包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第一完整性验证信息。
该示例用于实现图4-图6所示实施例中UE 2的功能，装置800为第二设备时还用于实现图7所示实施例中UE 2的功能，具体可参见图4-图7所示实施例中UE 2的相应描述。
请参见图9，为本申请提供的另一种通信装置的结构示意图。图9所示的通信装置900包括至少一个处理器901、存储器902，可选的，还可包括通信接口903。
存储器902可以是易失性存储器，例如随机存取存储器；存储器也可以是非易失性存储器，例如只读存储器，快闪存储器，硬盘(hard disk drive，HDD)或固态硬盘(solid-state drive，SSD)、或者存储器902是能够用于携带或存储具有指令或数据结构形式的期望的程序代码并能够由计算机存取的任何其他介质，但不限于此。存储器902可以是上述存储器的组合。
本申请实施例中不限定上述处理器901以及存储器902之间的具体连接介质。本申请实施例在图中以存储器902和处理器901之间通过总线904连接，总线904在图中以粗线表示，其它部件之间的连接方式，仅是进行示意性说明，并不引以为限。该总线904可以分为地址总线、数据总线、控制总线等。为便于表示，图9中仅用一条粗线表示，但并不表示仅有一根总线或一种类型的总线。
处理器901可以具有数据收发功能，能够与其他设备进行通信，在如图9装置中，也可以设置独立的数据收发模块，例如通信接口903，用于收发数据；处理器901在与其他设备进行通信时，可以通过通信接口903进行数据传输。
一种示例中，当第一设备采用图9所示的形式时，图9中的处理器可以通过调用存储器902中存储的计算机执行指令，使得UE 1执行上述任一方法实施例中的UE 1执行的方法。
一种示例中，当第二设备采用图9所示的形式时，图9中的处理器可以通过调用存储器902中存储的计算机执行指令，使得UE 2执行上述任一方法实施例中的UE 2执行的方法。
具体的，图8的处理单元和收发单元的功能/实现过程均可以通过图9中的处理器901调用存储器902中存储的计算机执行指令来实现。或者，图8的处理单元的功能/实现过程可以通过图9中的处理器901调用存储器902中存储的计算机执行指令来实现，图8的收发单元的功能/实现过程可以通过图9中的通信接口903来实现。
本申请实施例还提供一种通信系统，该系统可以包括图4-图7中的UE 1和UE 2。
可以理解的是，本申请实施例中的一些可选的特征，在某些场景下，可以不依赖于其他特征，比如其当前所基于的方案，而独立实施，解决相应的技术问题，达到相应的效果，也可以在某些场景下，依据需求与其他特征进行结合。相应的，本申请实施例中给出的装置也可以相应的实现这些特征或功能，在此不予赘述。
本领域技术人员还可以理解到本申请实施例列出的各种说明性逻辑块(illustrative logical block)和步骤(step)可以通过电子硬件、电脑软件，或两者的结合进行实现。这样的功能是通过硬件还是软件来实现取决于特定的应用和整个系统的设计要求。本领域技术人员对于相应的应用，可以使用各种方法实现所述的功能，但这种实现不应被理解为超出本申请实施例保护的范围。
本申请所描述的方案可通过各种方式来实现。例如，这些技术可以用硬件、软件或者硬件结合的方式来实现。对于硬件实现，用于在通信装置(例如，基站，终端、网络实体、核心网网元或芯片)处执行这些技术的处理单元，可以实现在一个或多个通用处理器、数字信号处理器(digital signal processor，DSP)、数字信号处理器件、专用集成电路(application specific integrated circuit，ASIC)、可编程逻辑器件、现场可编程门阵列(field programmable gate array，FPGA)、或其它可编程逻辑装置，离散门或晶体管逻辑，离散硬件部件，或上述任何组合中。通用处理器可以为微处理器，可选地，该通用处理器也可以为任何传统的处理器、控制器、微控制器或状态机。处理器也可以通过计算装置的组合来实现，例如数字信号处理器和微处理器，多个微处理器，一个或多个微处理器联合一个数字信号处理器核，或任何其它类似的配置来实现。
可以理解，本申请实施例中的存储器可以是易失性存储器或非易失性存储器，或可包括易失性和非易失性存储器两者。其中，非易失性存储器可以是只读存储器(read-only memory，ROM)、可编程只读存储器(programmable ROM，PROM)、可擦除可编程只读存储器(erasable PROM，EPROM)、电可擦除可编程只读存储器(electrically EPROM，EEPROM)或闪存。易失性存储器可以是随机存取存储器(random access memory，RAM)，其用作外部高速缓存。通过示例性但不是限制性说明，许多形式的RAM可用，例如静态随机存取存储器(static RAM，SRAM)、动态随机存取存储器(dynamic RAM，DRAM)、同步动态随机存取存储器(synchronous DRAM，SDRAM)、双倍数据速率同步动态随机存取存储器(double data rate SDRAM，DDR SDRAM)、增强型同步动态随机存取存储器(enhanced SDRAM，ESDRAM)、同步连接动态随机存取存储器(synchlink DRAM，SLDRAM)和直接内存总线随机存取存储器(direct rambus RAM，DR RAM)。应注意，本文描述的系统和方法的存储器旨在包括但不限于这些和任意其它适合类型的存储器。
本申请还提供了一种计算机可读介质，其上存储有计算机程序，该计算机程序被计算机执行时实现上述任一方法实施例的功能。
本申请还提供了一种计算机程序产品，该计算机程序产品被计算机执行时实现上述任一方法实施例的功能。
在上述实施例中，可以全部或部分地通过软件、硬件、固件或者其任意组合来实现。当使用软件实现时，可以全部或部分地以计算机程序产品的形式实现。所述计算机程序产品包括一个或多个计算机指令。在计算机上加载和执行所述计算机指令时，全部或部分地产生按照本申请实施例所述的流程或功能。所述计算机可以是通用计算机、专用计算机、计算机网络、或者其他可编程装置。所述计算机指令可以存储在计算机可读存储介质中，或者从一个计算机可读存储介质向另一个计算机可读存储介质传输，例如，所述计算机指令可以从一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心通过有线(例如同轴电缆、光纤、数字用户线(digital subscriber line，DSL))或无线(例如红外、无线、微波等)方式向另一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心进行传输。所述计算机可读存储介质可以是计算机能够存取的任何可用介质或者是包含一个或多个可用介质集成的服务器、数据中心等数据存储设备。所述可用介质可以是磁性介质(例如，软盘、硬盘、磁带)、光介质(例如，高密度数字视频光盘(digital video disc，DVD))、或者半导体介质(例如，固态硬盘(solid state disk，SSD))等。
可以理解，说明书通篇中提到的“实施例”意味着与实施例有关的特定特征、结构或特性包括在本申请的至少一个实施例中。因此，在整个说明书各个实施例未必一定指相同的实施例。此外，这些特定的特征、结构或特性可以任意适合的方式结合在一个或多个实施例中。可以理解，在本申请的各种实施例中，上述各过程的序号的大小并不意味着执行顺序的先后，各过程的执行顺序应以其功能和内在逻辑确定，而不应对本申请实施例的实施过程构成任何限定。
可以理解，在本申请中，“当…时”、“若”以及“如果”均指在某种客观情况下装置会做出相应的处理，并非是限定时间，且也不要求装置实现时一定要有判断的动作，也不意味着存在其它限定。
本申请中的“同时”可以理解为在相同的时间点，也可以理解为在一段时间段内，还可以理解为在同一个周期内。
本申请中对于使用单数表示的元素旨在用于表示“一个或多个”，而并非表示“一个且仅一个”，除非有特别说明。本申请中，在没有特别说明的情况下，“至少一个”旨在用于表示“一个或者多个”，“多个”旨在用于表示“两个或两个以上”。
另外，本文中术语“系统”和“网络”在本文中常被可互换使用。本文中术语“和/或”，仅仅是一种描述关联对象的关联关系，表示可以存在三种关系，例如，A和/或B，可以表示：单独存在A，同时存在A和B，单独存在B这三种情况，其中A可以是单数或者复数，B可以是单数或者复数。
可以理解，在本申请各实施例中，“与A相应的B”表示B与A相关联，根据A可以确定B。但还应理解，根据A确定B并不意味着仅仅根据A确定B，还可以根据A和/或其它信息确定B。
本申请中各表所示的对应关系可以被配置，也可以是预定义的。各表中的信息的取值仅仅是举例，可以配置为其他值，本申请并不限定。在配置信息与各参数的对应关系时，并不一定要求必须配置各表中示意出的所有对应关系。例如，本申请中的表格中，某些行示出的对应关系也可以不配置。又例如，可以基于上述表格做适当的变形调整，例如，拆分，合并等等。上述各表中标题示出参数的名称也可以采用通信装置可理解的其他名称，其参数的取值或表示方式也可以通信装置可理解的其他取值或表示方式。上述各表在实现时，也可以采用其他的数据结构，例如可以采用数组、队列、容器、栈、线性表、指针、链表、树、图、结构体、类、堆、散列表或哈希表等。
本申请中的预定义可以理解为定义、预先定义、存储、预存储、预协商、预配置、固化、或预烧制。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤，能够以电子硬件、或者计算机软件和电子硬件的结合来实现。这些功能究竟以硬件还是软件方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解，为描述的方便和简洁，上述描述的系统、装置和单元的具体工作过程，可以参考前述方法实施例中的对应过程，在此不再赘述。
可以理解，本申请中描述的系统、装置和方法也可以通过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个系统，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是或者也可以不是物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个网络单元上。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外，在本申请各个实施例中的各功能单元可以集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是各个单元单独物理存在，也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中。
所述功能如果以软件功能单元的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本申请的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分或者该技术方案的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络设备等)执行本申请各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括：U盘、移动硬盘、只读存储器(read-only memory，ROM)、随机存取存储器(random access memory，RAM)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
本申请中各个实施例之间相同或相似的部分可以互相参考。在本申请中各个实施例、以及各实施例中的各个实施方式/实施方法/实现方法中，如果没有特殊说明以及逻辑冲突，不同的实施例之间、以及各实施例中的各个实施方式/实施方法/实现方法之间的术语和/或描述具有一致性、且可以相互引用，不同的实施例、以及各实施例中的各个实施方式/实施方法/实现方法中的技术特征根据其内在的逻辑关系可以组合形成新的实施例、实施方式、实施方法、或实现方法。以上所述的本申请实施方式并不构成对本申请保护范围的限定。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本申请揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。

Claims (29)

  1. 一种确定安全保护的方法，其特征在于，包括：
    第一设备接收来自第二设备的直连安全模式命令消息，所述直连安全模式命令消息包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第一完整性验证信息；
    所述第一设备根据所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间的共享密钥，对所述第一完整性验证信息进行验证；
    在所述第一完整性验证信息验证通过的情况下，所述第一设备根据所述不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启与所述第二设备之间的控制面完整性保护。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一完整性验证信息由所述第二设备根据所述共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息计算得到；所述第一待保护信息包括所述直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；
    所述第一设备根据所述共享密钥，对所述第一完整性验证信息进行验证，包括：
    所述第一设备根据所述共享密钥和所述第一算法对所述第一待保护信息进行计算，确定所述第一待保护信息对应的期望信息；
    所述第一设备判断所述期望信息与所述第一完整性验证信息是否一致；
    如果一致，则确定所述第一完整性验证信息验证通过；或者，如果不一致，则所述第一完整性验证信息验证不通过。
  3. 根据权利要求1或2所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一设备向所述第二设备发送直连通信请求消息，所述直连通信请求消息包括所述第一设备的控制面完整性保护策略。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的方法，其特征在于，所述直连通信请求消息还包括第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述第二设备在不开启与所述第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，触发与所述第一设备进行互鉴权。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一指示信息还用于指示所述第二设备在互鉴权之后建立所述共享密钥，并指示所述第二设备根据所述共享密钥得到第一完整性验证信息。
  6. 根据权利要求3所述的方法，其特征在于，所述直连通信请求消息还包括密钥上层信息，所述密钥上层信息所携带的信息可被所述第二设备的应用层获取。
  7. 根据权利要求1-6任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一设备向所述第二设备发送直连安全模式完成消息，所述直连安全模式完成消息包括关闭控制面完整性保护的指示信息和第二完整性验证信息，其中，所述第二完整性验证信息由所述第一设备根据所述共享密钥和所述第一算法对第二待保护信息计算得到；所述第二待保护信息包括所述直连安全模式完成消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素。
  8. 根据权利要求1-7任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    在所述第一完整性验证信息未通过验证的情况下，所述第一设备向所述第二设备发送连接建立拒绝消息，所述连接建立拒绝消息包括拒绝原因值，以及第三完整性验证信息；所述第三完整性验证信息由所述第一设备根据所述共享密钥和所述第一算法对第三待保护 信息计算得到；所述第三待保护信息包括所述连接建立拒绝消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素。
  9. 根据权利要求1-8任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息是控制面完整性保护算法为空值。
  10. 一种确定安全保护方法，其特征在于，包括：
    第二设备在确定不开启与第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，获取所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间的共享密钥；
    所述第二设备根据所述共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行计算，得到第一完整性验证信息；所述第一待保护信息为待发送给所述第一设备的直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；
    所述第二设备向所述第一设备发送所述直连安全模式命令消息，所述直连安全模式命令消息包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和所述第一完整性验证信息。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第二设备接收来自所述第一设备的直连通信请求消息，所述直连通信请求消息包括所述第一设备的控制面完整性保护策略；
    所述第二设备根据所述第一设备的控制面完整性保护策略和所述第二设备的控制面完整性保护策略，确定不开启与所述第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其特征在于，所述直连通信请求消息还包括第一指示信息；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述第二设备根据所述第一指示信息，在不开启与所述第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，触发与所述第一设备进行互鉴权。
  13. 根据权利要求12所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二设备获取所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间的共享密钥，包括：
    所述第二设备根据所述第一指示信息，在所述第一设备进行互鉴权之后，建立所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间的共享密钥。
  14. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其特征在于，所述直连通信请求消息还包括密钥上层信息，所述方法还包括：
    所述第二设备的应用层获取所述密钥上层信息所携带的信息。
  15. 根据权利要求10-14任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第二设备接收来自所述第一设备的直连安全模式完成消息，所述直连安全模式完成消息包括关闭控制面完整性保根据所述共享密钥护的指示信息和第二完整性验证信息，其中，所述第二完整性验证信息由所述第一设备和所述第一算法对第二待保护信息计算得到；所述第二待保护信息包括所述直连安全模式完成消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；
    所述第二设备对所述第二完整性验证信息进行验证；
    在所述第二完整性验证信息通过验证的情况下，所述第二设备关闭与所述第一设备之间控制面完整性保护。
  16. 根据权利要求10-14任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    在定时时长内，没有接收到所述第一设备返回的直连安全模式完成消息的情况下，所述第二设备释放与所述第一设备之间的连接。
  17. 根据权利要求10-15任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第二设备接收来自所述第一设备的连接建立拒绝消息，所述连接建立拒绝消息包括拒绝原因值，以及第三完整性验证信息；所述第三完整性验证信息由所述第一设备根据所述共享密钥和所述第一算法对第三待保护信息计算得到；所述第三待保护信息包括所述连接建立拒绝消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；
    所述第二设备对所述第三完整性验证信息进行验证；
    在所述第三完整性验证信息验证通过的情况下，所述第二设备释放与所述第一设备之间的连接。
  18. 根据权利要求10-17任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息是控制面完整性保护算法为空值。
  19. 一种确定安全保护的方法，其特征在于，包括：
    第一设备接收来自第二设备的第一消息，所述第一消息包括第二完整性验证信息；
    在所述第一设备确定所述第一消息未开启完整性保护的情况下，所述第一设备获取所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间的共享密钥；
    所述第一设备根据所述共享密钥对所述第二完整性验证信息进行验证。
  20. 一种确定安全保护的方法，其特征在于，包括：
    在第二设备确定第二待保护信息未开启完整性保护的情况下，所述第二设备获取第一设备与所述第二设备之间的共享密钥，所述第二待保护信息为待发送给所述第一设备的消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；
    所述第二设备根据所述共享密钥和第一算法对所述第二待保护信息进行计算，得到第二完整性验证信息；
    所述第二设备向所述第一设备发送所述第二完整性验证信息。
  21. 一种通信系统，其特征在于，包括第一设备和第二设备；
    所述第二设备，用于在确定不开启与所述第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，获取所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间的共享密钥；根据所述共享密钥和第一算法对第一待保护信息进行计算，得到第一完整性验证信息；所述第一待保护信息为待发送给所述第一设备的直连安全模式命令消息中的任意一个或者多个信息元素；向所述第一设备发送所述直连安全模式命令消息，所述直连安全模式命令消息包括不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息和所述第一完整性验证信息；
    所述第二设备，用于根据所述第一设备与所述第二设备之间的共享密钥，对所述第一完整性验证信息进行验证；在所述第一完整性验证信息验证通过的情况下，根据所述不开启控制面完整性保护的指示信息，确定不开启与所述第二设备之间的控制面完整性保护。
  22. 根据权利要求21所述的系统，其特征在于，所述第一设备用于根据所述共享密钥，对所述第一完整性验证信息进行验证时，具体用于根据所述共享密钥和所述第一算法对所述第一待保护信息进行计算，确定所述第一待保护信息对应的期望信息；判断所述期望信息与所述第一完整性验证信息是否一致；如果一致，则确定所述第一完整性验证信息验证 通过；或者，如果不一致，则所述第一完整性验证信息验证不通过。
  23. 根据权利要求21或22所述的系统，其特征在于，
    所述第一设备，还用于向所述第二设备发送直连通信请求消息，所述直连通信请求消息包括所述第一设备的控制面完整性保护策略；
    所述第二设备，还用于根据所述第一设备的控制面完整性保护策略和所述第二设备的控制面完整性保护策略，确定不开启与所述第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护。
  24. 根据权利要求23所述的系统，其特征在于，所述直连通信请求消息还包括第一指示信息；
    所述第二设备，还用于根据所述第一指示信息，在不开启与所述第一设备之间的控制面完整性保护的情况下，触发与所述第一设备进行互鉴权。
  25. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，所述装置包括处理单元和收发单元，所述处理单元和所述收发单元用于所述装置执行权利要求1至9中任一项所述的方法，或者用于执行权利要求10至18中任一项所述的方法，或者用于执行权利要求19所述的方法，或者用于执行权利要求20所述的方法。
  26. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，所述装置用于执行权利要求1至9中任一项所述的方法，或者，用于执行权利要求10至18中任一项所述的方法，或者用于执行权利要求19所述的方法，或者用于执行权利要求20所述的方法。
  27. 一种通信装置，包括：处理器，所述处理器与存储器耦合，所述存储器用于存储程序或指令，当所述程序或指令被所述处理器执行时，使得所述装置执行如权利要求1至9中任一项所述的方法，或者执行权利要求10至18中任一项所述的方法，或者执行权利要求19所述的方法，或者执行权利要求20所述的方法。
  28. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，其特征在于，所述计算机程序被执行时使得计算机执行如权利要求1至9中任一项所述的方法，或者如权利要求10至18中任一项所述的方法，或者如权利要求19所述的方法，或者如权利要求20所述的方法。
  29. 一种芯片，其特征在于，包括处理器，所述处理器与存储器耦合，所述存储器用于存储程序，当所述程序被所述处理器执行时，使得包含所述芯片的装置执行如权利要求1至9中任一项所述的方法，或者如权利要求10至18中任一项所述的方法，或者如权利要求19所述的方法，或者如权利要求20所述的方法。
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