WO2021212611A1

WO2021212611A1 - Encrypted data peer-to-peer relationship parameter inspection method and apparatus, and device and storage medium

Info

Publication number: WO2021212611A1
Application number: PCT/CN2020/093525
Authority: WO
Inventors: 陆陈一帆; 来学嘉; 贾牧; 张鹏程; 谢丹力
Original assignee: 平安科技（深圳）有限公司
Priority date: 2020-04-23
Filing date: 2020-05-29
Publication date: 2021-10-28
Also published as: CN111628865B; CN111628865A

Abstract

The present application relates to blockchain technology. Disclosed is an encrypted data peer-to-peer relationship parameter inspection method. The method comprises: after receiving an encrypted data comparison request initiated by a second participant, a first participant providing check parameters and proof parameters for the second participant, wherein the check parameters are generated by the first participant according to first encrypted data [a], second encrypted data [b] and secret data, and are used for enabling the second participant to make a comparison to determine whether first original data a and second original data b are equal; and the second participant inspecting, according to the proof parameters, whether the check parameters are generated according to the secret data. Further disclosed are an encrypted data peer-to-peer relationship parameter inspection apparatus, an electronic device and a computer-readable storage medium. By means of the present application, a first participant can be prevented from providing false check parameters, thereby ensuring that a second participant smoothly carries out encrypted data peer-to-peer relationship comparison.

Description

Encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification method, device, equipment and storage medium

This application claims the priority of a Chinese patent application filed with the Chinese Patent Office on April 23, 2020, the application number is 202010326385.6, and the invention title is "Encrypted Data Peer Relationship Parameter Inspection Method, Device, and Storage Medium". The entire content of the application is approved The reference is incorporated in the application.

Technical field

This application relates to the field of blockchain technology, and in particular to a method, device, electronic equipment, and computer-readable storage medium for verifying encrypted data peer-to-peer relationship parameters.

Background technique

Zero-Knowledge Proof (Zero-Knowledge Proof) was proposed by S. Gold wasser, S. Micali and C. Rackoff in the early 1980s. It refers to the ability of the prover to convince the verifier that a certain assertion is correct without providing any useful information to the verifier. Zero-knowledge proof is essentially an agreement involving two or more parties, that is, a series of steps that two or more parties need to take to complete a task. The prover proves to the verifier and makes it believe that he knows or possesses a certain message, but the certification process cannot disclose any information about the certified message to the verifier.

At present, in the zero-knowledge proof, if the comparison participant is required to check whether the second encrypted data is equal to the first encrypted data encrypted by the providing comparison participant, it is necessary to provide the comparison participant direction and request the comparison participant to provide Some calibration parameters. However, the inventor realizes that the current solution cannot guarantee whether these verification parameters are correct. Even if the second encrypted data is equal to the first encrypted data, the comparison participant can still maliciously create some false verification parameters to make the requesting participant believe that the second encrypted data is not equal to the first encrypted data.

Therefore, how to avoid providing false verification parameters provided by the comparing participants when comparing whether two data encrypted by the keys of different participants are equal has become a technical problem to be solved urgently.

Summary of the invention

In view of the above content, this application provides a method, device, electronic device, and computer-readable storage medium for verifying encrypted data peer relationship parameters, the main purpose of which is to solve the above technical problems.

In order to achieve the above objective, this application provides a method for verifying encrypted data peer relationship parameters, which includes:

After receiving the encrypted data comparison request initiated by the second participant, the first participant provides verification parameters and certification parameters to the second participant. A key x encrypts the first original data a to obtain the first encrypted data [a]; the second participant is a participant that requires comparison, and the second original data b is encrypted with the second key y to obtain the first encrypted data [a]; Second encrypted data [b]; the verification parameter is generated by the first participant according to the first encrypted data [a], the second encrypted data [b] and the secret data, and is used to make the first encrypted data [b] The two participants compare whether the first original data a and the second original data b are equal; and

The second participant checks whether the verification parameter is generated according to the secret data according to the certification parameter.

In addition, in order to achieve the above objective, the present application also provides a device for verifying encrypted data peer-to-peer relationship parameters, which includes:

The receiving module is used for the first participant to provide verification parameters and certification parameters to the second participant after receiving the encrypted data comparison request initiated by the second participant, wherein the first participant provides the comparison The participant uses the first key x to encrypt the first original data a to obtain the first encrypted data [a]; the second participant is the participant who requires the comparison, and uses the second key y to perform b is encrypted to obtain the second encrypted data [b]; the verification parameter is generated by the first participant according to the first encrypted data [a], the second encrypted data [b], and the secret data, using To enable the second participant to compare whether the first original data a and the second original data b are equal; and

The verification module is used for the second participant to verify, according to the certification parameter, whether the verification parameter is generated according to the secret data.

In addition, in order to achieve the above object, the present application also provides an electronic device, which includes a memory and a processor, and an encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification system that can run on the processor is stored in the memory. When the encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification system is executed by the processor, the following steps are implemented:

Further, in order to achieve the above object, the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium that stores an encrypted data peer-to-peer relationship parameter verification system, and the encrypted data peer-to-peer relationship parameter verification system can be At least one processor executes, so that the at least one processor executes the following steps:

In the method, device, electronic equipment, and computer-readable storage medium for verifying the encrypted data peer relationship parameter proposed in this application, the first participant provides verification parameters to encourage the second participant to compare the first original data a with the first participant. In addition to whether the original data b is equal, another set of proof parameters is also provided to prove the correctness of the verification parameters. If the verification parameter is not generated in accordance with the regulations, the first participant cannot create the certification parameter. This application can prevent the first participant from providing false verification parameters, so as to ensure the smooth comparison of the encrypted data by the second participant, and improve the accuracy of the comparison result.

Description of the drawings

FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a preferred embodiment of a method for verifying peer-to-peer relationship parameters of encrypted data according to this application;

Fig. 2 is a detailed flowchart of step S2 in Fig. 1;

FIG. 3 is a detailed flowchart of step S22 in FIG. 2;

FIG. 4 is a detailed flowchart of step S24 in FIG. 2;

FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of a preferred embodiment of the electronic device of this application;

FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of modules of a preferred embodiment of an apparatus for verifying a peer relationship parameter of encrypted data according to this application;

The realization, functional characteristics, and advantages of the purpose of this application will be further described in conjunction with the embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings.

Detailed ways

In order to make the purpose, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer and clearer, the following further describes the application in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described here are only used to explain the application, and are not used to limit the application. Based on the embodiments in this application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative work shall fall within the protection scope of this application.

It should be noted that the descriptions related to "first", "second", etc. in this application are only for descriptive purposes, and cannot be understood as indicating or implying their relative importance or implicitly indicating the number of indicated technical features . Therefore, the features defined with "first" and "second" may explicitly or implicitly include at least one of the features. In addition, the technical solutions between the various embodiments can be combined with each other, but it must be based on what can be achieved by a person of ordinary skill in the art. When the combination of technical solutions is contradictory or cannot be achieved, it should be considered that such a combination of technical solutions does not exist. , Is not within the scope of protection required by this application.

Before explaining the scheme of this application, the nouns, data, etc. used are explained.

Term definition:

Independent data storage system: Refers to third-party platforms such as blockchain networks, distributed databases, cloud servers, and distributed systems.

Public data storage system: it can be cloud storage or blockchain network. The public data storage system is mainly used to store public parameters (basis points), and can also store parameters related to the zero-knowledge proof protocol. Before the zero-knowledge proof protocol can be used, one or more trusted third parties must first create base points g, h, and i and upload them to the public data storage system. Among them, the base point g is a public parameter, and the base point h and the base point i are set by a trusted third party or by multiple trusted third parties' own platforms through the network (such as the Internet, blockchain network) collaboratively set and uploaded to the public In the data storage system.

Bilinear mapping: for any g1 ∈ G1; g2 ∈ G2; a, b ∈ Zp, e(g1^a, g2^b)=e(g1,g2)^ab holds. Among them, e is called bilinear mapping. G1 and G2 are primitive groups. In the bilinear mapping algorithm, G1 and G2 can be the same group or different groups. This application does not distinguish between the original groups G1 and G2. The base points of G1 and G2 are both the original group base point g Make presentations. For ease of presentation, the following descriptions are presented as e(g^a,g^b)=e(g,g)^ab. In this application, e(g,g)^ab can also be represented by gt^ab. gt is the base point of the mapping group, which corresponds to the base point g of the original group.

Primitive group and mapping group: Any point on the original group can be mapped to the point of the corresponding mapping group through bilinear mapping. In this application, the three points g, h, and i are the base points of the original group and are generated on the original group. gt is the mapping from the original group base point g to the mapping group, ht is the mapping from the original group base point h to the mapping group, and it is the mapping from the original group base point i to the mapping group.

Parameter label definition: The traditional label is used in this application, and the parameter created by the base point g and the secret data δ is expressed with the label g^x. The corresponding elliptic curve label is δG, where G represents the base point on the elliptic curve.

Discrete logarithm: It is known that the finite cyclic group G=<g>{g^n|k=0,1,2,...}, and its generator g and order n=|G|, in the discrete logarithm problem There is h=g^n in the operation of, where g is the basis. Due to the complexity of the discrete logarithm problem, it is difficult to calculate the value of the integer n when h and g are known. Therefore, the calculation environment involved in this application is based on calculations on an elliptic curve. In an elliptic curve, the basis is a point, not a number.

Pedersen Commitment encryption algorithm: In the computing environment of the discrete logarithm problem, a is the original text, x is the key, and the encrypted text of a is [a]=g^a*h^x, ( The elliptic curve expression method is: aG+xH) where g and h each represent a base, h=g^n (the elliptic curve expression method is: H=nG). Pedersen's promise algorithm has additive homomorphism and can be used as a parameter (input factor) in the bilinear mapping formula.

Data definition:

(1) Original data and encrypted data

a: The first raw data, only the first participant (participant who provides the comparison) knows.

b: The second original data, only the second participant (required to compare participants) knows.

[a]: The first encrypted data, the data obtained by the first participant encrypting the first original data a with the first key x, that is, [a]=g^a*h^x.

[b]: The second encrypted data, the data obtained by the second participant encrypting the second original data b with the second key y, that is, [b]=g^b*h^y.

The first encrypted data [a] and the second encrypted data [b] can be on a public data storage system, such as a public cloud or a blockchain network, and participants can also transfer the first encrypted data to each other in a peer-to-peer manner [a ] And the second encrypted data [b].

(2) Secret data

x: The first key, used to encrypt the first original data a, only the first participant knows.

α: Secret parameter, randomly generated by the first participant, only the first participant knows.

(3) Calibration parameters

It is generated by the first participant according to the above-mentioned encrypted data and secret data, and provided to the second participant, so that the second participant can check whether the first original data a and the second original data b are equal according to the verification parameter.

[a']: The first verification parameter, which is generated from the first encrypted data [a] and the secret parameter α, [a']=g^aα*h^xα.

[b']: The second verification parameter, which is generated from the second encrypted data [b] and the secret parameter α, [b']=g^bα*h^yα.

v11: The third verification parameter, which is generated on the base point ht of the mapping group through the first key x and the secret parameter α, v11=ht^xα. It is also the public key corresponding to the key xα, where xα is the product of the first key x and the secret parameter α.

v12: The fourth verification parameter, which is generated on the base point h of the original group by the secret parameter α, v12=h^α.

(4) Proof parameters

It is provided by the first participant to the second participant to prove that the verification parameter is indeed generated by the encrypted data and the secret data.

p_α: the first proof parameter, generated by the secret parameter α, p_α=g^α ^-1 . Among them, α^-1 is the inverse value of α, that is, α*α^-1=1. In the formula, the result of multiplying a number μ by the inverse value α^-1 of the number α is equal to the result of dividing the number μ by the number α.

ht_sig: the second certification parameter, which is the digital signature corresponding to the key xα corresponding to the public key ht^xα at the base point ht of the mapping group.

gt_sig: The third certification parameter, which is a digital signature corresponding to the key aα corresponding to the public key gt^aα at the base point gt of the mapping group.

This application provides a method for checking the peer relationship parameters of encrypted data.

Referring to FIG. 1, it is a flowchart of a preferred embodiment of a method for verifying peer-to-peer relationship parameters of encrypted data according to this application. In this embodiment, according to different requirements, the execution order of the steps in the flowchart shown in FIG. 1 can be changed, and some steps can be omitted. The method includes the steps:

S1: After receiving the encrypted data comparison request initiated by the second participant, the first participant provides the verification parameter and the certification parameter to the second participant.

Specifically, the first participant provides a comparison participant, and uses the first key x to encrypt the first original data a to obtain the first encrypted data [a]; the second participant requires the comparison participant Side, use the second key y to encrypt the second original data b to obtain the second encrypted data [b]. The comparison participant is required to know whether the first original data a corresponding to the first encrypted data [a] of the other party (providing the comparison participant) and the second original data b corresponding to the second encrypted data [b] of the other party are equal, An encrypted data comparison request will be initiated to the participant who provides the comparison.

Provide comparison participants receive the encrypted data comparison request sent by the comparison participants, and if they agree to the comparison, the first verification parameter [a'], the second verification parameter [b'], and the The four verification parameters, the third verification parameter v11 and the fourth verification parameter v12, are sent to the participants that require the comparison. The verification parameter is generated by the participant who provides the comparison based on the first encrypted data [a], the second encrypted data [b], the first key x and the secret parameter α (randomly generated by the participant who provides the comparison) , Used to enable the required comparison participant to compare whether the first original data a and the second original data b are equal according to the verification parameter.

At the same time, in this embodiment, in order to prevent the comparison participants from providing false verification parameters, it is also necessary to provide the first certification parameter p_α, the second certification parameter ht_sig, and the third certification parameter gt_sig to the comparison participants. A proof parameter used to prove that the verification parameter is indeed passed through the encrypted data (first encrypted data [a], second encrypted data [b]) and secret data (first key x, secret parameter α) Generated.

S2: The second participant checks, according to the certification parameter, whether the verification parameter is generated according to the secret data.

If the verification is passed, that is, the verification parameter is generated by the same secret data (the first key x, the secret parameter α), it means that the comparison participant has not provided a false verification parameter. If the verification fails, it means that the verification parameter provided by the comparison participant is false or incorrect.

Specifically, referring to FIG. 2, it is a detailed flowchart of step S2. In this embodiment, this step specifically includes the following steps:

S22. The second participant checks whether the first verification parameter [a'] and the second verification parameter [b'] are changed by the same secret data according to the certification parameter. ] And the second encrypted data [b] are generated.

Specifically, referring to FIG. 3, it is a detailed flowchart of step S22. After the comparison participants are required to receive the verification parameters and the certification parameters, they can verify the first verification parameter [a'] and the second verification parameter [b'] through the following steps:

S221: Convert the first verification parameter [a'] back to the value of the first encrypted data [a] at the base points gt and ht of the mapping group through the bilinear mapping and the first proof parameter p_α (the first conversion result).

Specifically, the conversion is performed according to the following formula:

e([a'],p_α)=e(g^aα*h^xα,g^α ^-1 )=gt^a*ht^x

S222: Convert the first encrypted data [a] to the base points gt and ht of the mapping group through bilinear mapping (the second conversion result).

Specifically, the conversion is performed according to the following formula:

e([a],g)=e(g^a*h^x,g)=gt^a*ht^x

S223: Compare whether the two conversion results (the first conversion result and the second conversion result) are equal. When the first conversion result and the second conversion result are equal, it is confirmed that the first verification parameter [a'] is generated by the secret parameter α corresponding to the first encrypted data [a] and the first certification parameter p_α.

S224: Convert the second verification parameter [b'] back to the value of the second encrypted data [b] at the base points gt and ht of the mapping group through the bilinear mapping and the first proof parameter p_α (the third conversion result).

Specifically, the conversion is performed according to the following formula:

e([b'],p_α)=e(g^bα*h^yα,g^α ^-1 )=gt^b*ht^y

S225: Convert the second encrypted data [b] to the base points gt and ht of the mapping group through bilinear mapping (the fourth conversion result).

Specifically, the conversion is performed according to the following formula:

e([b],g)=e(g^b*h^y,g)=gt^b*ht^y

S226: Compare whether the above two conversion results (the third conversion result and the fourth conversion result) are equal. When the third conversion result and the fourth conversion result are equal, confirm that the second verification parameter [b'] is generated by the second encrypted data [b] and the secret parameter α corresponding to the first proof parameter p_α .

Principle: Through the same proof parameter p_α, it can be proved that the first verification parameter [a'] and the second verification parameter [b'] are changed by the same secret data to the first encrypted data [a] and the second Encrypted data [b] generated.

Returning to FIG. 2, in step S23, the second participant checks whether the fourth verification parameter v12 is also generated on the base point ht of the mapping group through the same secret data according to the certification parameter.

Specifically, it is required that the comparison participant can verify whether the fourth verification parameter v12 is also generated by the secret parameter α corresponding to the first certification parameter p_α through the bilinear mapping and the first certification parameter p_α ( It is the same as generating the secret data of the first verification parameter [a'] and the second verification parameter [b']). Among them, the mapping is performed according to the following formula:

e(v12,p_α)=e(h^α,g^α ^-1 )=ht

If the result of the mapping is the base point ht of the mapping group, the verification is passed (that is, the fourth verification parameter v12 is also generated by the secret parameter α corresponding to the first proof parameter p_α).

Principle: Through the same proof parameter p_α, it can be proved that the fourth verification parameter v12 is generated using the same secret data as the first verification parameter [a'] and the second verification parameter [b'].

S24: The second participant checks whether the third verification parameter v11 is also generated on the base point ht of the mapping group through the same secret data according to the certification parameter.

Specifically, refer to FIG. 4, which is a detailed flowchart of step S24. According to the second certification parameter ht_sig and the third certification parameter gt_sig, the participants in the comparison are required to check whether the third verification parameter v11 is the product of the first key x and the secret parameter α on the base point ht of the mapping group by the following steps Generated:

S241: Find out the public key gt_pk corresponding to the third certification parameter gt_sig according to the first verification parameter [a'] and the third verification parameter v11.

The specific formula is as follows:

gt_pk=e([a’],g)/v11

＝e(g^aα*h^xα,g)/ht^xα

＝gt^aα*ht^xα/ht^xα

=gt^aα

S242: Check whether the second certification parameter ht_sig is the digital signature of the key corresponding to the third verification parameter v11 (here v11 is the public key, and xα is the corresponding private key), and the third certification parameter is checked by the digital signature verification method. Whether gt_sig is the digital signature of the key corresponding to the public key gt_pk.

S243: When the above two check results are both yes, the third check parameter v11 is checked (that is, the third check parameter v11 is the product of the first key x and the secret parameter α on the base point ht of the mapping group Generated).

Principle: If the third verification parameter v11 is not generated at the base point ht of the mapping group by the key xα, then according to the discrete logarithm complex problem, it is impossible to find the one that satisfies the following conditions? Value, the third proof parameter gt_sig cannot be provided.

gt^? *ht^(xα+λ)==gt^aα*ht^xα

Among them, λ represents the additional value of tampering with the key xα.

In the embodiment of this application, in addition to providing verification parameters to prompt the comparison participants to compare whether the first original data a and the second original data b are equal, they also provide another set of proof parameters. Prove the binding relationship between the verification parameter and the encrypted data and prove the binding relationship between several verification parameters to prove the correctness of the verification parameters. If the verification parameter is not generated in accordance with the regulations, the participant providing the comparison (or any participant providing the verification parameter) cannot create the certification parameter. This embodiment of the application can avoid providing comparison participants (or any participant providing verification parameters) to provide false verification parameters, so as to ensure that the comparison participants are required to perform encrypted data peer-to-peer relationship comparisons and improve the comparison results Accuracy.

This application also proposes an electronic device. Refer to FIG. 5, which is a schematic diagram of a preferred embodiment of the electronic device of this application.

In this embodiment, the electronic device 1 is applicable to the above-mentioned encryption data peer relationship parameter verification method. The electronic device 1 includes a memory 11, a processor 12, and a network interface 13.

The memory 11 includes at least one type of readable storage medium, and the readable storage medium includes flash memory, hard disk, multimedia card, card-type memory (for example, SD or DX memory, etc.), magnetic memory, magnetic disk, optical disk, and the like. The memory 11 may be an internal storage unit of the electronic device 1 in some embodiments, such as a hard disk of the electronic device 1. In other embodiments, the memory 11 may also be an external storage device of the electronic device 1, such as a plug-in hard disk, a smart media card (SMC), and a secure digital (Secure Digital) equipped on the electronic device 1. , SD) card, flash card (Flash Card), etc. Further, the memory 11 may also include both an internal storage unit of the electronic device 1 and an external storage device.

The memory 11 can not only be used to store application software and various data installed in the electronic device 1, for example, the program code of the encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification system 10 corresponding to the encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification method, etc., It can also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or will be output.

In some embodiments, the processor 12 may be a central processing unit (CPU), controller, microcontroller, microprocessor, or other data processing chip, for running program codes or processing stored in the memory 11 Data, for example, the program code of the encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification system 10 corresponding to the encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification method.

The network interface 13 may optionally include a standard wired interface and a wireless interface (such as a WI-FI interface), and is generally used to establish a communication connection between the electronic device 1 and other electronic devices. The components 11-13 of the electronic device 1 communicate with each other via a communication bus.

FIG. 5 only shows the electronic device 1 with components 11-13. Those skilled in the art can understand that the structure shown in FIG. 5 does not constitute a limitation on the electronic device 1, and may include less or more Multiple components, or a combination of certain components, or different component arrangements.

The specific implementation of the electronic device of the present application is substantially the same as the specific implementation of the above-mentioned encryption data peer relationship parameter verification method, and will not be repeated here.

In addition, the embodiment of the present application also proposes a device for verifying the peer relationship parameter of encrypted data.

Referring to FIG. 6, it is a schematic diagram of modules of a preferred embodiment of an apparatus for verifying a peer relationship parameter of encrypted data according to this application.

The device 2 for verifying the encrypted data peer relationship parameter in this embodiment may include: a module 210-module 220 according to the realized function. The module can also be called a unit, which refers to a series of computer program segments that can be executed by the processor of the electronic device and can complete fixed functions, and are stored in the memory of the electronic device.

In an embodiment of the device 2 for verifying the peer relationship parameter of encrypted data of the present application, the functions of each module/unit are as follows:

The receiving module 210 is used for the first participant to provide verification parameters and certification parameters to the second participant after receiving the encrypted data comparison request initiated by the second participant, wherein the first participant provides the comparison For the participant, use the first key x to encrypt the first original data a and obtain the first encrypted data [a]; The data b is encrypted to obtain the second encrypted data [b]; the verification parameter is generated by the first participant according to the first encrypted data [a], the second encrypted data [b] and the secret data, Used to enable the second participant to compare whether the first original data a and the second original data b are equal; and

The verification module 220 is used for the second participant to verify, according to the certification parameter, whether the verification parameter is generated according to the secret data.

The functions or operation steps implemented by the modules 210-220 are similar to the above, and will not be described in detail here.

In addition, the embodiment of the present application also proposes a computer-readable storage medium, and the computer scale storage medium may be non-volatile or volatile. The computer-readable storage medium includes the program code of the encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification system 10 corresponding to the encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification method, and the program code corresponding to the encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification method When the program code of the encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification system 10 is executed by the processor, the steps of the encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification method are implemented.

The specific implementation of the computer-readable storage medium of the present application is substantially the same as the specific implementation of the above-mentioned encryption data peer relationship parameter verification method, and will not be repeated here.

The serial numbers of the foregoing embodiments of the present application are for description only, and do not represent the superiority or inferiority of the embodiments.

It should be noted that in this article, the terms "include", "include" or any other variants thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, so that a process, device, article or method including a series of elements not only includes those elements, It also includes other elements not explicitly listed, or elements inherent to the process, device, article, or method. If there are no more restrictions, the element defined by the sentence "including a..." does not exclude the existence of other identical elements in the process, device, article, or method that includes the element.

Through the description of the above implementation manners, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the above-mentioned embodiment method can be implemented by means of software plus the necessary general hardware platform, of course, it can also be implemented by hardware, but in many cases the former is better.的实施方式。 Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application essentially or the part that contributes to the existing technology can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium (such as ROM/RAM) as described above. , Magnetic disk, optical disk), including several instructions to make a terminal device (can be a mobile phone, a computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) execute the method described in each embodiment of the present application.

The above are only the preferred embodiments of the application, and do not limit the scope of the patent for this application. Any equivalent structure or equivalent process transformation made using the content of the description and drawings of the application, or directly or indirectly applied to other related technical fields , The same reason is included in the scope of patent protection of this application.

Claims

A method for verifying peer-to-peer relationship parameters of encrypted data, wherein the method includes:

After receiving the encrypted data comparison request initiated by the second participant, the first participant provides verification parameters and certification parameters to the second participant. A key x encrypts the first original data a to obtain the first encrypted data [a]; the second participant is a participant that requires comparison, and the second original data b is encrypted with the second key y to obtain the first encrypted data [a]; Second encrypted data [b]; the verification parameter is generated by the first participant according to the first encrypted data [a], the second encrypted data [b] and the secret data, and is used to make the first encrypted data [b] The two participants compare whether the first original data a and the second original data b are equal; and

The second participant checks whether the verification parameter is generated according to the secret data according to the certification parameter.
The method for verifying the peer relationship parameter of encrypted data according to claim 1, wherein the secret data includes the first key x and a secret parameter α, and the secret parameter α is randomly generated by the first participant.
The method for verifying the peer relationship parameter of encrypted data according to claim 2, wherein the verification parameter includes a first verification parameter [a'], a second verification parameter [b'], and a third verification parameter v11 And the fourth verification parameter v12, where:

The first verification parameter [a'] is generated from the first encrypted data [a] and the secret parameter α, [a']=g^aα*h^xα;

The second verification parameter [b'] is generated from the second encrypted data [b] and the secret parameter α, [b']=g^bα*h^yα;

The third verification parameter v11 is generated on the base point ht of the mapping group through the first key x and the secret parameter α, and is also the public key of the corresponding key xα, v11=ht^xα;

The fourth verification parameter v12 is generated on the original group base point h through the secret parameter α, v12=h^α.
The method for verifying peer-to-peer relationship parameters of encrypted data according to claim 2, wherein the attestation parameter includes a first attestation parameter p_α, a second attestation parameter ht_sig, and a third attestation parameter gt_sig, wherein:

The first proof parameter number p_α is generated by the secret parameter α, p_α=g^α -1 ;

The second proof parameter ht_sig is a digital signature corresponding to the key xα corresponding to the public key ht^xα at the base point ht of the mapping group;

The third certification parameter gt_sig is a digital signature corresponding to the key aα corresponding to the public key gt^aα at the base point gt of the mapping group.
The method for verifying the peer relationship parameter of encrypted data according to claim 3 or 4, wherein the step of the second participant verifying whether the verification parameter is generated based on the secret data according to the certification parameter comprises:

The second participant checks whether the first verification parameter [a'] and the second verification parameter [b'] are changed by the same secret data according to the certification parameter. ] And the second encrypted data [b] are generated;

The second participant checks whether the fourth verification parameter v12 is also generated on the base point ht of the mapping group through the same secret data according to the certification parameter; and

The second participant checks whether the third verification parameter v11 is also generated on the base point ht of the mapping group through the same secret data according to the certification parameter.
The method for verifying the peer relationship parameter of encrypted data according to claim 5, wherein the second participant verifies the first verification parameter [a'] and the second verification parameter [ b'] Whether to modify the first encrypted data [a] and the second encrypted data [b] through the same secret data, the steps for generating include:

Through bilinear mapping and the first proof parameter p_α, the first verification parameter [a'] is converted back to the value of the first encrypted data [a] at the base points gt and ht of the mapping group to obtain the first verification parameter [a'] A conversion result;

Convert the first encrypted data [a] to the base points gt and ht of the mapping group by bilinear mapping to obtain a second conversion result;

Comparing whether the first conversion result and the second conversion result are equal;

When the first conversion result and the second conversion result are equal, confirm that the first verification parameter [a'] is generated from the first encrypted data [a] and the secret parameter α;

Through bilinear mapping and the first proof parameter p_α, the second verification parameter [b'] is converted back to the value of the second encrypted data [b] at the base points gt and ht of the mapping group to obtain the first Three conversion results;

Convert the second encrypted data [b] to the base points gt and ht of the mapping group through bilinear mapping to obtain a fourth conversion result;

Comparing whether the third conversion result and the fourth conversion result are equal;

When the third conversion result and the fourth conversion result are equal, it is confirmed that the second verification parameter [b'] is generated from the second encrypted data [b] and the secret parameter α.
The method for verifying the peer relationship parameter of encrypted data according to claim 5, wherein the second participant verifies whether the fourth verification parameter v12 also passes the same secret data in the mapping group according to the certification parameter. The steps generated on the base point ht include:

It is verified by bilinear mapping and the first proof parameter p_α whether the fourth verification parameter v12 is also generated by the secret parameter α, wherein if the result obtained by mapping the fourth verification parameter v12 is Mapping the group base point ht, the test passes.
The method for verifying the peer relationship parameter of encrypted data according to claim 5, wherein the second participant verifies whether the third verification parameter v11 also passes the same secret data in the mapping group according to the certification parameter. The steps generated on the base point ht include:

Finding out the public key gt_pk corresponding to the third certification parameter gt_sig according to the first verification parameter [a'] and the third verification parameter v11;

Check whether the second certification parameter ht_sig is the digital signature of the key corresponding to the third verification parameter v11, and whether the third certification parameter gt_sig is the same as the public key gt_pk through the digital signature verification method. The digital signature of the corresponding key;

When the results of the above two inspections are both yes, the inspection of the third verification parameter v11 is passed.
An electronic device, wherein the device includes a memory and a processor, and an encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification system that can run on the processor is stored in the memory, and the encrypted data peer relationship parameter verification system When executed by the processor, the following steps are implemented:

After receiving the encrypted data comparison request initiated by the second participant, the first participant provides verification parameters and certification parameters to the second participant. A key x encrypts the first original data a to obtain the first encrypted data [a]; the second participant is a participant that requires comparison, and the second original data b is encrypted with the second key y to obtain the first encrypted data [a]; Second encrypted data [b]; the verification parameter is generated by the first participant according to the first encrypted data [a], the second encrypted data [b] and the secret data, and is used to make the first encrypted data [b] The two participants compare whether the first original data a and the second original data b are equal; and

The second participant checks whether the verification parameter is generated according to the secret data according to the certification parameter.
The electronic device according to claim 9, wherein the secret data includes the first key x and a secret parameter α, and the secret parameter α is randomly generated by the first participant.
The electronic device according to claim 10, wherein the verification parameter comprises a first verification parameter [a'], a second verification parameter [b'], a third verification parameter v11, and a fourth verification parameter v12, where:

The first verification parameter [a'] is generated from the first encrypted data [a] and the secret parameter α, [a']=g^aα*h^xα;

The second verification parameter [b'] is generated from the second encrypted data [b] and the secret parameter α, [b']=g^bα*h^yα;

The third verification parameter v11 is generated on the base point ht of the mapping group through the first key x and the secret parameter α, and is also the public key of the corresponding key xα, v11=ht^xα;

The fourth verification parameter v12 is generated on the original group base point h through the secret parameter α, v12=h^α.
The electronic device according to claim 10, wherein the certification parameter includes a first certification parameter p_α, a second certification parameter ht_sig, and a third certification parameter gt_sig, wherein:

The first proof parameter number p_α is generated by the secret parameter α, p_α=g^α -1 ;

The second proof parameter ht_sig is a digital signature corresponding to the key xα corresponding to the public key ht^xα at the base point ht of the mapping group;

The third certification parameter gt_sig is a digital signature corresponding to the key aα corresponding to the public key gt^aα at the base point gt of the mapping group.
The electronic device according to claim 11 or 12, wherein the step of the second participant checking whether the verification parameter is generated according to the secret data according to the certification parameter comprises:

The second participant checks whether the first verification parameter [a'] and the second verification parameter [b'] are changed by the same secret data according to the certification parameter. ] And the second encrypted data [b] are generated;

The second participant checks whether the fourth verification parameter v12 is also generated on the base point ht of the mapping group through the same secret data according to the certification parameter; and

The second participant checks whether the third verification parameter v11 is also generated on the base point ht of the mapping group through the same secret data according to the certification parameter.
The electronic device according to claim 13, wherein the second participant checks whether the first verification parameter [a'] and the second verification parameter [b'] pass the same verification according to the certification parameter. The steps of generating the secret data to modify the first encrypted data [a] and the second encrypted data [b] include:

Through bilinear mapping and the first proof parameter p_α, the first verification parameter [a'] is converted back to the value of the first encrypted data [a] at the base points gt and ht of the mapping group to obtain the first A conversion result;

Convert the first encrypted data [a] to the base points gt and ht of the mapping group by bilinear mapping to obtain a second conversion result;

Comparing whether the first conversion result and the second conversion result are equal;

When the first conversion result and the second conversion result are equal, confirm that the first verification parameter [a'] is generated from the first encrypted data [a] and the secret parameter α;

Through bilinear mapping and the first proof parameter p_α, the second verification parameter [b'] is converted back to the value of the second encrypted data [b] at the base points gt and ht of the mapping group to obtain the first Three conversion results;

Convert the second encrypted data [b] to the base points gt and ht of the mapping group through bilinear mapping to obtain a fourth conversion result;

Comparing whether the third conversion result and the fourth conversion result are equal;

When the third conversion result and the fourth conversion result are equal, it is confirmed that the second verification parameter [b'] is generated from the second encrypted data [b] and the secret parameter α.
The electronic device according to claim 13, wherein the second participant checks whether the fourth verification parameter v12 is also generated on the base point ht of the mapping group by the same secret data according to the certification parameter include:

It is verified by bilinear mapping and the first proof parameter p_α whether the fourth verification parameter v12 is also generated by the secret parameter α, wherein if the result obtained by mapping the fourth verification parameter v12 is Mapping the group base point ht, the test passes.
The electronic device according to claim 13, wherein the second participant checks whether the third verification parameter v11 is also generated on the base point ht of the mapping group by the same secret data according to the certification parameter include:

Finding out the public key gt_pk corresponding to the third certification parameter gt_sig according to the first verification parameter [a'] and the third verification parameter v11;

Check whether the second certification parameter ht_sig is the digital signature of the key corresponding to the third verification parameter v11, and whether the third certification parameter gt_sig is the same as the public key gt_pk through the digital signature verification method. The digital signature of the corresponding key;

When the results of the above two inspections are both yes, the inspection of the third verification parameter v11 is passed.
An encryption data peer-to-peer relationship parameter verification device, wherein the device includes:

The receiving module is used for the first participant to provide verification parameters and certification parameters to the second participant after receiving the encrypted data comparison request initiated by the second participant, wherein the first participant provides the comparison The participant uses the first key x to encrypt the first original data a to obtain the first encrypted data [a]; the second participant is the participant who requires the comparison, and uses the second key y to perform b is encrypted to obtain the second encrypted data [b]; the verification parameter is generated by the first participant according to the first encrypted data [a], the second encrypted data [b], and the secret data, using To enable the second participant to compare whether the first original data a and the second original data b are equal; and

The verification module is used for the second participant to verify, according to the certification parameter, whether the verification parameter is generated according to the secret data.
A computer-readable storage medium, wherein the computer-readable storage medium stores an encrypted data peer-to-peer relationship parameter verification system, and the encrypted data peer-to-peer relationship parameter verification system can be executed by at least one processor to enable the At least one processor performs the following steps:

After receiving the encrypted data comparison request initiated by the second participant, the first participant provides verification parameters and certification parameters to the second participant. A key x encrypts the first original data a to obtain the first encrypted data [a]; the second participant is a participant that requires comparison, and the second original data b is encrypted with the second key y to obtain the first encrypted data [a]; Second encrypted data [b]; the verification parameter is generated by the first participant according to the first encrypted data [a], the second encrypted data [b] and the secret data, and is used to make the first encrypted data [b] The two participants compare whether the first original data a and the second original data b are equal; and

The second participant checks whether the verification parameter is generated according to the secret data according to the certification parameter.
The computer-readable storage medium according to claim 18, wherein the secret data includes the first key x and a secret parameter α, the secret parameter α being randomly generated by the first participant.
The computer-readable storage medium according to claim 19, wherein the verification parameter includes a first verification parameter [a'], a second verification parameter [b'], a third verification parameter v11, and a fourth verification parameter. Verification parameter v12, where:

The first verification parameter [a'] is generated from the first encrypted data [a] and the secret parameter α, [a']=g^aα*h^xα;

The second verification parameter [b'] is generated from the second encrypted data [b] and the secret parameter α, [b']=g^bα*h^yα;

The third verification parameter v11 is generated on the base point ht of the mapping group through the first key x and the secret parameter α, and is also the public key of the corresponding key xα, v11=ht^xα; and

The fourth verification parameter v12 is generated on the original group base point h through the secret parameter α, v12=h^α.