WO2021190452A1 - 用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法 - Google Patents

用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法 Download PDF

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WO2021190452A1
WO2021190452A1 PCT/CN2021/082095 CN2021082095W WO2021190452A1 WO 2021190452 A1 WO2021190452 A1 WO 2021190452A1 CN 2021082095 W CN2021082095 W CN 2021082095W WO 2021190452 A1 WO2021190452 A1 WO 2021190452A1
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signature
key
attribute
decryption
outsourcing
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PCT/CN2021/082095
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French (fr)
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禹继国
刘苏慧
董安明
王英龙
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齐鲁工业大学
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/123—Applying verification of the received information received data contents, e.g. message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0869—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords involving random numbers or seeds
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/088—Usage controlling of secret information, e.g. techniques for restricting cryptographic keys to pre-authorized uses, different access levels, validity of crypto-period, different key- or password length, or different strong and weak cryptographic algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
    • H04L9/3073—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves involving pairings, e.g. identity based encryption [IBE], bilinear mappings or bilinear pairings, e.g. Weil or Tate pairing
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/72—Signcrypting, i.e. digital signing and encrypting simultaneously

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of attribute-based signcryption, in particular to a lightweight attribute-based signcryption method used for cloud-assisted Internet of Things.
  • the Internet of Things is the development and extension of the traditional Internet. It connects physical objects in the real world with the network world, and provides more efficient and intelligent services for people's lives. Compared with traditional networks, the Internet of Things has two major differences: First, there are many Internet of Things devices. According to Cisco's annual visual network index, by 2022, machine-to-machine (M2M) connections that support Internet of Things applications will account for 28.5 billion globally. More than half of the connected devices; second, the Internet of Things devices are heterogeneous, and resources (storage and computing, etc.) are very limited. Therefore, data management issues in the Internet of Things are becoming more and more important.
  • M2M machine-to-machine
  • Cloud assisted Internet of Things is to store a large amount of data generated by the Internet of Things in a cloud storage center, which is managed by cloud devices with rich resources.
  • outsourcing storage will inevitably cause a series of security problems.
  • the confidentiality and reliability of data are difficult to guarantee.
  • attribute-based encryption is considered the most promising solution to this problem. Attribute-based encryption cannot guarantee data security, and can achieve fine-grained data sharing. But regardless of whether it is encrypted first, then signed or signed first, then encrypted, the complexity of the scheme will be the sum of the complexity of the two cryptographic primitives. Based on this, how to reduce the computational burden required for signature and encryption is a problem that needs to be solved.
  • the technical task of the present invention is to address the above shortcomings, and provide a lightweight attribute-based signcryption method for cloud-assisted Internet of Things. On the basis of achieving data confidentiality and reliability, it solves how to reduce the amount of signature and decryption required. The problem of computational burden.
  • a lightweight attribute-based signcryption method for cloud-assisted IoT of the present invention includes the following steps:
  • the central organization initializes the system, generates a system key pair, and discloses a public key, which includes a symmetric encryption algorithm and a key generation function;
  • the central organization specifies a set of decryption attributes for the registered data user, and based on the set of decryption attributes, generates a decryption key and an outsourced decryption key corresponding to the data user, and the central organization specifies a signature access structure for the data owner , And generate a signature key and an outsourced signature key corresponding to the data owner based on the signature access structure;
  • the data owner selects a set of attributes that satisfy the signature access structure, and calls the fog node based on the outsourcing signature key to perform outsourcing signatures.
  • the data owner symmetrically encrypts the plaintext based on the symmetric key, and based on a custom encrypted access structure Perform attribute signcryption on the symmetric key, generate a signcryption text and send the signcryption text to the cloud storage center;
  • the fog node For the data user whose attribute set meets the encrypted access structure, the fog node is called for outsourcing signature verification, and the fog node is called for outsourcing decryption. After the data user verifies that the signature is legal based on the outsourced signature verification result, the ciphertext is performed based on the outsourced decryption result. Decrypt symmetrically to get the plaintext.
  • the data user symmetrically encrypts the plaintext data according to the symmetric key to generate the ciphertext.
  • the structure performs attribute signcryption on the symmetric key, which not only guarantees the confidentiality and reliability of the symmetric key, but also realizes the one-to-many sharing of the symmetric key; access control is performed on the data user through the encrypted access structure, so that only the attribute Data users that meet the access structure can access encrypted data and prevent unauthorized users from accessing encrypted data; the cipher text is stored through the cloud storage center, and the fog node assists the data owner to sign and decrypt, which greatly reduces the burden on the equipment.
  • the expression of the key pair (PP, MSK) is:
  • G and G T are both p factorial group, g is the generator of G, and v is an element of G;
  • e is the symmetric bilinear mapping function e: G ⁇ G ⁇ G T , H 1 , H 2 and H 3 are all anti-collision hash functions, H 3 : ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ * ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ 1 ;
  • Y e(g,g) ⁇ , ⁇ is the subgroup Select a random value in;
  • ⁇ SE (Enc, Dec) is the initialized symmetric encryption algorithm, and KDF is the initialized key generation function;
  • ⁇ 1 , ⁇ 2 , u', v', K 0 , u 0 are all subgroups Random values selected in, the array ⁇ u i ⁇ i ⁇ [l] is the subgroup A set of random values selected in.
  • the decryption key The expression is:
  • uid is the user number generated by the data user after registering with the central organization
  • U d,uid ⁇ U e is a set of decryption attributes selected by the central organization for data users
  • t is the slave group Select a random value in
  • ⁇ is an extra attribute selected from the attribute set
  • r ⁇ is the subgroup for attribute ⁇ A random number selected in;
  • (M s , ⁇ s ) is a signature access structure designated by the central organization for the data owner
  • M s is the matrix of l s ⁇ k s
  • ⁇ s is the row mapping function
  • r i is for the i-th row in the M s matrix (M s , ⁇ s) from the group Choose a random value in.
  • the data owner selects a set of attributes that satisfy the signature access structure, and calls the fog node to perform the outsourcing signature based on the outsourcing signature key, including the following steps:
  • M s,i represents the ith row of the M s matrix
  • i represents the attribute mapped by the ith row of the M s matrix in the attribute set I s
  • w i represents the corresponding constant
  • the data owner sets the set of constants And the outsourced decryption key is sent to the fog node, which serves as an outsourced signature fog node;
  • the outsourced signature fog node sends the outsourced signature ⁇ 'to the data owner.
  • the data owner performs symmetric encryption on the plaintext based on the symmetric key, and performs attribute signcryption on the symmetric key based on a custom encrypted access structure to generate a signcryption ciphertext, including the following steps:
  • the data owner constructs a symmetric key based on the key generation function KDF, and symmetrically encrypts the plaintext according to the symmetric key to generate a ciphertext;
  • a data owner custom encrypted access structure (M e, ⁇ e), M e l e ⁇ k e is a matrix, ⁇ e is the row mapping function;
  • ⁇ 1 g ⁇ ⁇ '1
  • tt represents the current time when signing, which is recorded as the signature time identifier
  • the data user sends the encrypted access structure, the signed ciphertext, and the signature time identifier tt to the cloud storage center.
  • calling the fog node to perform outsourcing signature verification includes the following steps:
  • tt' represents the current time when the outsourcing signature verification is performed, which is recorded as the signature verification time identifier
  • the data consumer calculates the following parameters:
  • the data user sends the ⁇ , R, (f 1 ,..., f l ), and TCT s to the fog node, and the fog node serves as an outsourced verification fog node;
  • the outsourcing verification fog node performs outsourcing signature verification and generates a signature verification result VR.
  • the expression of the signature verification result VR is:
  • calling the fog node to perform outsourcing decryption includes the following steps:
  • a group of attribute sets satisfying the encrypted access structure (M e , ⁇ s ) is selected for decryption, and the attribute set is:
  • I d ⁇ i: ⁇ s (i) ⁇ U s,sid ⁇ ;
  • the outsourcing decryption fog node performs outsourcing decryption to obtain the outsourcing decryption result.
  • the outsourcing decryption calculation formula is:
  • the outsourced decryption fog node sends the outsourced decryption result to the data user.
  • the data user verifies the validity of the signature according to the following signature verification formula:
  • the data user verifies the integrity of the ciphertext through the following ciphertext verification formula after verifying that the signature is legal according to the signature verification result:
  • Y s is recovered based on the outsourced decryption result, and a symmetric key is generated based on the key generation function, and symmetric decryption is performed according to the symmetric key.
  • the plaintext data is encrypted by a symmetric encryption algorithm, which improves the efficiency and practicability of encryption, making it more suitable for mass data;
  • This attribute-based signcryption method realizes the confidentiality and reliability of data at the same time.
  • the attribute-based encryption of the ciphertext strategy is used to encrypt the symmetric key, which realizes the security of the symmetric key and one-to-many sharing.
  • the access structure controls the access of data users. Only data users whose attributes meet the access structure can decrypt and recover the symmetric key, which can prevent illegal users from accessing the encrypted data; on the other hand, this method uses the attribute-based signature of the key strategy Compared with the ciphertext strategy, the signature practicability and applicability is better, and because the signature size is fixed, the system transmission consumption is reduced; in summary, this method is a practical mixed strategy attribute-based signcryption scheme;
  • the data owner outsources ciphertext storage to the cloud storage center, and uses the fog node to assist in signing, which greatly reduces the storage and calculation burden; the data user performs outsourcing signature verification through the fog node, and outsources most of the decryption burden to the fog Nodes and devices have very low computational overhead, which is suitable for devices with limited resources.
  • Fig. 1 is a flow diagram of an embodiment of a lightweight attribute-based signcryption method for cloud-assisted Internet of Things.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a lightweight attribute-based signcryption method for cloud and fog assisting the Internet of Things, which is used to solve the problem of how to reduce the computational burden required for signature and decryption on the basis of realizing data confidentiality and reliability.
  • the lightweight attribute-based signcryption method for cloud assisted IoT of the present invention includes the following steps:
  • the central organization performs system initialization, generates a system key pair, and discloses a public key, where the public key includes a symmetric encryption algorithm and a key generation function;
  • the central organization designates a set of decryption attributes for the registered data user, and generates a decryption key and an outsourced decryption key corresponding to the data user based on the decryption attribute set, and the central organization designates a signature for the data owner Access a structure, and generate a signature key and an outsourced signature key corresponding to the data owner based on the signature access structure;
  • the data owner selects a set of attributes that satisfy the signature access structure, and calls the fog node to perform the outsourcing signature based on the outsourcing signature key.
  • the data owner symmetrically encrypts the plaintext based on the symmetric key and based on custom encryption
  • the access structure performs attribute signcryption on the symmetric key, generates a signcryption ciphertext and sends the signcryption ciphertext to the cloud storage center;
  • step S100 the key pair is generated through the following steps:
  • H 1 , H 2 and H 3 choose three anti-collision hash functions H 1 , H 2 and H 3 , respectively: H 3 : ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ * ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ 1 ;
  • step S200 a decryption key is generated through the following steps:
  • the data user applies for registration to the central agency and obtains its user number uid;
  • the central organization selects a set of decryption attributes U d,uid ⁇ U e for data users;
  • the central organization specifies a special signature access structure (M s , ⁇ s ) for the data owner, M s is a matrix of l s ⁇ k s , ⁇ s is the row mapping function, and the signature access structure (M s , ⁇ s) ) Is converted to the LSSS matrix to obtain the signature access matrix M s ;
  • step S300 the fog node assists the data owner to sign, and the specific steps are as follows:
  • M s,i represents the ith row of the M s matrix
  • i represents the attribute mapped by the ith row of the M s matrix in the attribute set I s
  • w i represents the corresponding constant
  • the data owner sets the above set of constants And the outsourced decryption key is sent to the fog node, which serves as the outsourced signature fog node;
  • the outsourced signature fog node sends the outsourced signature ⁇ 'to the data owner.
  • the above outsourcing signature is a half-signature. After the half-signature is sent to the data owner, the data owner encrypts the plaintext and continues to sign.
  • the specific steps include:
  • the data owner constructs a symmetric key based on the key generation function KDF, and symmetrically encrypts the plaintext according to the symmetric key to generate a ciphertext;
  • a data owner custom encrypted access structure (M e, ⁇ e), M e l e ⁇ k e is a matrix, ⁇ e is the row mapping function;
  • E 4 Enc(SEK
  • d is a symmetric key constructed by the data owner based on the key generation function KDF:
  • tt represents the current time when signing, and it is recorded as the signature time identifier
  • m is the plaintext data that the data owner wants to encrypt
  • the data user sends the encrypted access structure, the signed ciphertext, and the signature time identifier tt to the cloud storage center.
  • Step S400 The fog node assists the data user to decrypt the sign encryption.
  • the outsourced signature verification is performed through the fog node. The specific steps are as follows:
  • tt' represents the current time when the outsourcing signature verification is performed, which is recorded as the signature verification time identifier
  • the data consumer calculates the following parameters:
  • the data user sends the ⁇ , R, (f 1 ,..., f l ), and TCT s to the fog node, and the fog node serves as an outsourced verification fog node;
  • the outsourcing verification fog performs outsourcing signature verification and generates a signature verification result VR.
  • the expression of the signature verification result VR is:
  • the outsourcing decryption fog node performs outsourcing decryption, the steps are as follows:
  • a group of attribute sets satisfying the encrypted access structure (M e , ⁇ s ) is selected for decryption, and the attribute set is:
  • I d ⁇ i: ⁇ s (i) ⁇ U s,sid ⁇ ;
  • the outsourcing decryption fog node performs outsourcing decryption to obtain the outsourcing decryption result.
  • the outsourcing decryption calculation formula is:
  • the outsourced decryption fog node sends the outsourced decryption result to the data user.
  • the outsourcing decryption result obtained through outsourcing decryption by the fog node is a semi-cipher text.
  • the fog node sends the semi-cipher text to the data user, and the data user performs the decryption.
  • the specific steps are as follows:
  • Y s is recovered based on the outsourced decryption result, and a symmetric key is generated based on the key generation function, and symmetric decryption is performed according to the symmetric key to obtain the plaintext.

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Abstract

发明公开了一种用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，属于属性基签密领域，要解决的技术问题为在实现数据机密性和可靠性基础上，如何减少签名和解密所需计算负担的问题。方法包括：中心机构进行系统初始化生成系统密钥对并公开其中的公钥，包括一个对称加密算法和一个密钥生成函数；中心机构基于数据使用者的解密属性集为其生成解密密钥、外包解密密钥，基于签名访问结构为其生成签名密钥和外包签名密钥；数据拥有者调用雾节点进行外包签名，基于对称密钥对明文进行对称加密、并基于自定义的加密访问结构属性签密所述对称密钥；数据使用者调用雾节点进行外包签名验证，并调用雾节点进行外包解密，最后基于外包解密结果对密文进行对称解密。

Description

用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法 技术领域
本发明涉及属性基签密领域，具体地说是一种用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法。
背景技术
物联网是传统互联网的发展和延伸，它将现实世界中的物理对象与网络世界联系起来，为人们的生活提供更高效、更智能的服务。物联网相较于传统网络有两个大的不同：第一、物联网设备众多，根据思科年度视觉网络指数，到2022年，支持物联网应用的机器对机器(M2M)连接将占全球285亿个连接设备的一半以上；第二、物联网设备异构、资源(存储和计算等)非常有限。因此，物联网中的数据管理问题越来越重要。
为了解决物联网大量数据与有限的设备存储资源之间的矛盾，云协助物联网被提出，云协助物联网即将物联网产生的大量数据存储到云存储中心，由资源丰富的云设备统一管理。但外包存储必然引起一系列的安全问题，数据的机密性和可靠性均难以保证，有两种直接的方法用于解决这些问题：先加密后签名，或者先签名后加密。
传统的公钥加密方法虽然可以保证数据的机密性，但是仅能实现一对一的共享，违背了物联网设计的初衷即通过数据共享提供更高效更智能的服务。目前，基于属性的加密被认为是这一问题最有前景的解决方法。基于属性的加密不能能保证数据的安全性，而且可以实现细粒度的数据共享。但不论先加密后签名还是先签名后加密，其方案的复杂性就会是两个密码原语的复杂性之和。基于此，如何减少签名和加密所需的计算负担是需要解决的问题。
近年来，为了在同时保证数据的机密性和可靠性条件下，尽量压缩计算所需的负担，提出了许多属性签密方案。基本的属性加密方案在应用到物联网场景下会遇到许多问题，首先，密文策略的签名方案意味着设备可自行定义访问结构，这与现实情况不符，通常来说，证物联网场景中的匿名认证大多由中心机构控制；其次，密钥策略的加密又导致数据拥有者无法自行定义访问结构， 这意味着访问控制权没有直接交到数据拥有者手中。此外，属性加密的安全性大多基于困难的数学假设，这意味着解密负担对资源有限的物联网设备来说难以负载。
如何在实现数据机密性和可靠性基础上，减少签名和解密所需的计算负担使方案更适用于资源有限的物联网，是需要解决的技术问题。
发明内容
本发明的技术任务是针对以上不足，提供一种用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，在实现数据机密性和可靠性基础上，来解决如何减少签名和解密所需的计算负担的问题。
本发明的一种用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，包括如下步骤：
中心机构进行系统初始化，生成系统密钥对，并公开公钥，所述公钥包括一个对称加密算法和一个密钥生成函数；
中心机构为注册的数据使用者指定一个解密属性集合，并基于所述解密属性集合生成与所述数据使用者对应的解密密钥和外包解密密钥，中心机构为数据拥有者指定一个签名访问结构，并基于所述签名访问结构生成与所述数据拥有者对应的签名密钥和外包签名密钥；
数据拥有者选择一组满足所述签名访问结构的属性集合，并基于外包签名密钥调用雾节点进行外包签名，数据拥有者基于对称密钥对明文进行对称加密、并基于自定义的加密访问结构对对称密钥进行属性签密，生成签密密文并将签密密文发送至云存储中心；
对于其属性集合满足加密访问结构的数据使用者，调用雾节点进行外包签名验证，并调用雾节点进行外包解密，数据使用者根据外包签名验证结果验证签名合法后，基于外包解密结果对密文进行对称解密，得到明文。
在上述实施方式中，数据使用者根据对称密钥对明文数据进行对称加密生成密文，相对于直接将大量数据进行属性加密，提高了运算速度和实用性；基于数据使用者自定义的加密访问结构对对称密钥进行属性签密，不仅保证了对称密钥的机密性和可靠性，还实现了对称密钥的一对多共享；通过加密访问结 构对数据使用者进行访问控制，从而仅属性满足访问结构的数据使用者可以访问加密的数据，阻止非法用户访问加密的数据；通过云存储中心存储密文，通过雾节点辅助数据拥有者签名和解密，大大减轻了设备负担。
作为优选，所述密钥对(PP,MSK)的表达式为：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000001
MSK＝{α}
其中，G和G T均为p阶乘法群，g为G的生成元，v为G的一个元素；
e为对称双线性映射函数e:G×G→G T，H 1、H 2和H 3均为抗碰撞哈希函数，
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000002
H 3:{0,1} *→{0,1} 1；
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000003
为对于U e中第w个属性从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000004
中选择的一个随机值；
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000005
为对于U s中第w个属性从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000006
中选择的一个随机值；
Y＝e(g,g) α，α为从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000007
中选择一个随机值；
∏ SE(Enc,Dec)为初始化的对称加密算法，KDF为初始化的密钥生成函数；
δ 1、δ 2、u'、v'、K 0、u 0均为从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000008
中选择的随机值，数组{u i} i∈[l]为从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000009
中选择的一组随机值。
作为优选，解密密钥
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000010
的表达式为：
SK＝g αv t
SK'＝g t
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000011
其中，uid为数据使用者向中心机构注册后产生的用户号，
U d,uid∈U e，为中心机构为数据使用者选择的一个解密属性集合，
t为从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000012
中选择一个随机值；
外包解密密钥
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000013
的表达式为：
TK＝g α·t′v t·t′
TK'＝g t·t′
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000014
其中，t'为中心机构从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000015
中选择一个随机值，t'作为解密验证密钥VK d＝t'；
签名密钥SK s＝(D 0,D' 0)的表达式为：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000016
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000017
其中，α1为中心机构从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000018
中选择一个随机值，α 1＜α，α 2＝α-α 1，
τ为从属性集合中选取的一个额外属性，
r τ为对于属性τ从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000019
中选择的一个随机数；
外包签名密钥TSK s＝({D i,D' iD i,w} i∈[ls])的表达式为：，
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000020
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000021
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000022
其中，(M s,ρ s)为中心机构为数据拥有者指定的一个签名访问结构，M s为l s×k s的矩阵，ρ s为行映射函数，
(v 2,v 3,......,v ks)为中心机构从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000023
中选择一组随机数。
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000024
为基于随机值α1构建的随机向量，
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000025
r i为对于M s矩阵(M s,ρ s)中第i行从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000026
中选择一个随机值。
作为优选，数据拥有者选择一组满足所述签名访问结构的属性集合，并基于外包签名密钥调用雾节点进行外包签名，包括如下步骤：
数据拥有者选择一组满足签名访问结构(M s,ρ s)的属性集合用于签名，所述属性集合为：I s＝{i：ρ s(i)∈U s，sid}；
基于上述属性集合，找到一组常数
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000027
满足如下公式：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000028
其中，M s,i表示M s矩阵的第i行，i表示属性集合I s中M s矩阵的第i行所映射的属性，w i表示对应的常数；
数据拥有者将所述一组常数
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000029
及外包解密密钥发送至雾节点，所述雾节点作为外包签名雾节点；
外包签名雾节点从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000030
中选择一个随机数ξ进行外包签名，得到的签名记为外包签名σ'，外包签名σ'＝(σ 1',σ' 2)的表达式为：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000031
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000032
外包签名雾节点将外包签名σ'发送至数据拥有者。
作为优选，数据拥有者基于对称密钥对明文进行对称加密、并基于自定义的加密访问结构对对称密钥进行属性签密，生成签密密文，包括如下步骤：
数据拥有者基于密钥生成函数KDF构建对称密钥，并根据对称密钥对明文进行对称加密，生成密文；
数据拥有者自定义一个加密访问结构(M e,ρ e)，M e为l e×k e的矩阵，ρ e为行映射函数；
数据拥有者从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000033
中选择一个随机值s作为秘密指数，并从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000034
中选择一组随机值(a 2,a 3,......,a ke)，并构建一个随机向量a＝(s,a 2,a 3,......,a ke)；
将加密访问结构转换为LSSS矩阵，得到加密访问矩阵M e，对于加密访问矩阵M e中的每一行M e,i，计算
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000035
数据拥有者从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000036
中选择随机值ζ和q k，进行签名；
所述签密密文的表达式为：
E 1＝g s
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000037
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000038
E 4＝Enc(SEK||d,m)
σ 0＝u' H(SEK)v' H(d)
σ 1＝g ξσ' 1
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000039
其中，μ＝H 1(E 1)
key＝Y s||σ 0||tt)
R＝H 2(E 1||E 2||E 3||E 4||σ 0||σ 1||M e||U s,sid)
(f 1,.......,f l)∈{0,1} l＝H 3(σ 1,tt,M e,U s,sid)
SEK||d表示密钥，
tt表示进行签名时当前时间，记为签名时间标识；
数据使用者将所述加密访问结构、签密密文以及签名时间标识tt发送至云存储中心。
作为优选，对于其属性集合满足加密访问结构的数据使用者，调用雾节点进行外包签名验证，包括如下步骤：
数据使用者验证下列等式是否成立：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000040
其中，tt'表示进行外包签名验证时的当前时间，记为签名验证时间标识，
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000041
表示系统默认的最大时间差；
如果上述等式成立，验证数据使用者的属性集合是否满足加密访问结构；
如果数据使用者的属性集合满足加密访问结构，数据使用者计算如下参数：
μ＝H 1(E 1)
R＝H 2(E 1||E 2||E 3||E 4||σ 0||σ 1||M e||U s,sid)
(f 1,.......,f l)∈{0,1} l＝H 3(σ 1,tt,M e,U s,sid)；
数据使用者从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000042
中选择的一个随机值x作为签名验证密钥VK s，重计算部分签密密文，生成
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000043
数据使用者将所述μ、R、(f 1,.......,f l)以及TCT s发送至雾节点，所述雾节点作为外包验证雾节点；
外包验证雾节点进行外包签名验证，生成签名认证结果VR，签名认证结果VR的表达为：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000044
作为优选，对于其属性集合满足加密访问结构的数据使用者，调用雾节点进行外包解密，包括如下步骤：
选择一组满足加密访问结构(M e,ρ s)的属性集合用于解密，所述属性集合为：
I d＝{i:ρ s(i)∈U s,sid}；
基于所述属性集合找到一组常数
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000045
满足如下公式：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000046
其中，下标i与M e矩阵中的行一一对应；
外包解密雾节点进行外包解密得到外包解密结果，外包解密计算公式为：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000047
外包解密雾节点将外包解密结果发送至数据使用者。
作为优选，数据使用者根据如下签名验证公式对签名合法性进行验证：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000048
作为优选，数据使用者根据签名验证结果验证签名合法后，通过如下密文验证公式对密文进行完整性验证：
σ 4＝u′ H(SEK)v′ H(d)
验证密文完整后，基于外包解密结果恢复出Y s，并基于密钥生成函数生成对称密钥，根据对称密钥进行对称解密。
本发明的用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法具有以下优点：
1、通过对称加密算法对明文数据进行加密，提高了加密的效率和实用性，使其更适用于海量数据；
2、此属性基签密方法同时实现了数据的机密性和可靠性，一方面采用密文策略的属性基加密加密对称密钥，实现了对称密钥的安全性和一对多共享，通过加密访问结构对数据使用者进行访问控制，仅属性满足访问结构的数据使用者可以解密恢复出对称密钥，可阻止非法用户访问加密的数据；另一方面，该方法采用密钥策略的属性基签名，相对于密文策略的签名实用性和适用性更好，且由于签名大小固定，降低了系统传输消耗；综上，该方法为一个实用的混合策略的属性基签密方案；
3、数据拥有者将密文存储外包给云存储中心，并通过雾节点辅助签名，大大减轻了存储和计算负担；数据使用者通过雾节点进行外包签名验证，并将大部分解密负担外包给雾节点，设备的计算开销非常低，适用于资源有限的设备。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例中的技术方案，下面将对实施例中描述中所需要使用的附图作简要介绍，显而易见地，下面描述中的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例，对于本领域的普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
下面结合附图对本发明进一步说明。
附图1为实施例用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法的流程框图。
具体实施方式
下面结合附图和具体实施例对本发明作进一步说明，以使本领域的技术人员可以更好地理解本发明并能予以实施，但所举实施例不作为对本发明的限定，在不冲突的情况下，本发明实施例以及实施例中的技术特征可以相互结合。
本发明实施例提供一种用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，用于解决在实现数据机密性和可靠性基础上，如何减少签名和解密所需的计算负担的问题。
实施例：
如附图1所示，本发明的用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，包括如下步骤：
S100、中心机构进行系统初始化，生成系统密钥对，并公开公钥，所述公钥包括一个对称加密算法和一个密钥生成函数；
S200、中心机构为注册的数据使用者指定一个解密属性集合，并基于所述解密属性集合生成与所述数据使用者对应的解密密钥和外包解密密钥，中心机构为数据拥有者指定一个签名访问结构，并基于所述签名访问结构生成与所述数据拥有者对应的签名密钥和外包签名密钥；
S300、数据拥有者选择一组满足所述签名访问结构的属性集合，并基于外包签名密钥调用雾节点进行外包签名，数据拥有者基于对称密钥对明文进行对称加密、并基于自定义的加密访问结构对对称密钥进行属性签密，生成签密密文并将签密密文发送至云存储中心；
S400、对于其属性集合满足加密访问结构的数据使用者，调用雾节点进行外包签名验证，并调用雾节点进行外包解密，数据使用者根据外包签名验证结果验证签名合法后，基于外包解密结果对密文进行对称解密，得到明文。
其中，步骤S100中通过如下步骤生成密钥对：
输入安全参数λ，选择两个p阶的乘法群G和G T，g为G的生成元，v为G的一个元素；
选择一个对称双线性映射e:G×G→G T；
选择三个抗碰撞哈希函数H 1、H 2和H 3，分别为：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000049
H 3:{0,1} *→{0,1} 1；
初始化U e为加密属性的全集，初始化U s为签名属性的全集，中心机构为U e中每个属性选择一个随机值
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000050
为U s中每个属性选择一个随机值
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000051
中心机构从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000052
中选择一个随机值α，计算Y＝e(g,g) α；
中心机构从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000053
中选择随机值δ 1、δ 2、u'、v'、K 0和u 0，并选择一组随机值{u i} i∈[l]；
初始化对称加密算法∏ SE(Enc,Dec)，并初始化一个密钥生成函数KDF；
基于上述生成密钥对，密钥对(PP,MSK)的表达式为：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000054
MSK＝{α}。
步骤S200中，通过如下步骤生成解密密钥：
数据使用者向中心机构申请注册，得到其用户号uid；
中心机构为数据使用者选择一个解密属性集合U d,uid∈U e；
中心机构从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000055
中选择一个随机值t，计算解密密钥，解密密钥
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000056
的表达式为：
SK＝g αv t
SK'＝g t
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000057
通过如下步骤生成解密密钥：
中心机构从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000058
中选择一个随机值t'，作为解密验证密钥VK d＝t'，并计算外包解密密钥，外包解密密钥
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000059
的表达式为：
TK＝g α·t′v t·t′
TK'＝g t·t′
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000060
通过如下步骤生成签名密钥：
中心机构从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000061
中选择一个随机值α1，α1＜α，并计算α2＝α-α 1；
中心机构从属性集中选择一个额外属性τ，并从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000062
中为该属性τ选择一个随机数r τ，计算签名密钥SK s，签名密钥SK s＝(D 0,D' 0)的表达式为：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000063
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000064
通过如下步骤生成外包签名密钥：
中心机构为数据拥有者指定一个特殊的签名访问结构(M s,ρ s)，M s为l s×k s的矩阵，ρ s为行映射函数，将该签名访问结构(M s,ρ s)转换为LSSS矩阵，得到签名访问矩阵M s；
中心机构从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000065
中选择一组随机数(v 2,v 3,......,v ks)，利用随机值α1组成随机向量
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000066
并计算
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000067
对于签名访问矩阵M s中每一行，从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000068
中选择一个随机值r i，计算外包签名密钥，外包签名密钥TSK s＝({D i,D' iD i,w} i∈[ls])的表达式为：，
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000069
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000070
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000071
步骤S300中通过雾节点辅助数据拥有者进行签名，具体步骤为：
数据拥有者选择一组满足签名访问结构(M s,ρ s)的属性集合用于签名，该属性集合为：I s＝{i：ρ s(i)∈U s，sid}
基于上述属性集合找到一组常数
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000072
满足如下公式：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000073
其中，M s,i表示M s矩阵的第i行，i表示属性集合I s中M s矩阵的第i行所映射的属性，w i表示对应的常数；
数据拥有者将上述一组常数
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000074
及外包解密密钥发送至雾节点，该雾节点作为外包签名雾节点；
外包签名雾节点从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000075
中选择一个随机数ξ进行外包签名，得到的签名记为外包签名σ'，外包签名σ'＝(σ 1',σ' 2)的表达式为：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000076
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000077
外包签名雾节点将外包签名σ'发送至数据拥有者。
上述外包签名得的为半签名，该半签名发送给数据拥有者后，数据拥有者进行对明文加密、并继续签名，具体步骤包括：
数据拥有者基于密钥生成函数KDF构建对称密钥，并根据对称密钥对明文进行对称加密，生成密文；
数据拥有者自定义一个加密访问结构(M e,ρ e)，M e为l e×k e的矩阵，ρ e为行映射函数；
数据拥有者从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000078
中选择一个随机值s作为秘密指数，并从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000079
中选择一组随机值(a 2,a 3,......,a ke)，并构建一个随机向量a＝(s,a 2,a 3,......,a ke)；
将加密访问结构转换为LSSS矩阵，得到加密访问矩阵M e，对于加密访问矩阵M e中的每一行M e,i，计算
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000080
数据拥有者从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000081
中选择随机值ζ和q k，进行签密得到签密密文，签密密文的表达式为：
E 1＝g s
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000082
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000083
E 4＝Enc(SEK||d,m)
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000084
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000085
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000086
σ 3＝u' H(SEK)v' H(d)
其中，μ＝H 1(E 1)，
E 4＝Enc(SEK||d,m)，为根据对称密钥对明文对称加密生成的密文，
SEK||d为数据拥有者基于密钥生成函数KDF构建的对称密钥：
KDF(key,1)＝SEK||d
key＝Y s||σ 0||tt,
tt表示进行签名时当前时间，记为签名时间标识，
m为数据拥有者想要加密的明文数据，
R＝H 2(E 1||E 2||E 3||E 4||σ 0||σ 1||M e||U s,sid)，
(f 1,.......,f l)∈{0,1} l＝H 3(σ 1,tt,M e,U s,sid)；
数据使用者将所述加密访问结构、签密密文以及签名时间标识tt发送至云存储中心。
步骤S400雾节点辅助数据使用者解签密，首先，通过雾节点进行外包签名验证，具体步骤为：
数据使用者验证下列等式是否成立：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000087
其中，tt'表示进行外包签名验证时的当前时间，记为签名验证时间标识，
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000088
表示系统默认的最大时间差；
如果上述等式成立，验证数据使用者的属性集合是否满足加密访问结构；
如果数据使用者的属性集合满足加密访问结构，数据使用者计算如下参数：
μ＝H 1(E 1)
R＝H 2(E 1||E 2||E 3||E 4||σ 0||σ 1||M e||U s,sid)
(f 1,.......,f l)∈{0,1} l＝H 3(σ 1,tt,M e,U s,sid)；
数据使用者从群
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000089
中选择的一个随机值x作为签名验证密钥VK s，重计算部分签密密文，生成
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000090
数据使用者将所述μ、R、(f 1,.......,f l)以及TCT s发送至雾节点，所述雾节点作为外包验证雾节点；
外包验证雾进行外包签名验证，生成签名认证结果VR，签名认证结果VR的表达为：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000091
外包签名验证通过后，外包解密雾节点进行外包解密，步骤为：
选择一组满足加密访问结构(M e,ρ s)的属性集合用于解密，所述属性集合为：
I d＝{i:ρ s(i)∈U s,sid}；
基于所述属性集合找到一组常数
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000092
满足如下公式：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000093
其中，下标i与M e矩阵中的行一一对应；
外包解密雾节点进行外包解密得到外包解密结果，外包解密计算公式为：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000094
外包解密雾节点将外包解密结果发送至数据使用者。
通过雾节点进行外包解密得到的外包解密结果为半密文，雾节点将半密文发送给数据使用者，数据使用者进行解密，具体步骤为：
数据使用者根据如下签名验证公式对签名合法性进行验证：
Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-000095
数据使用者根据签名验证结果验证签名合法后，通过如下密文验证公式对密文进行完整性验证：
σ 4＝u′ H(SEK)v′ H(d)
验证密文完整后，基于外包解密结果恢复出Y s，并基于密钥生成函数生成对称密钥，根据对称密钥进行对称解密，得到明文。
以上所述实施例仅是为充分说明本发明而所举的较佳的实施例，本发明的保护范围不限于此。本技术领域的技术人员在本发明基础上所作的等同替代或变换，均在本发明的保护范围之内。本发明的保护范围以权利要求书为准。

Claims (9)

  1. 用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，其特征在于包括如下步骤：
    中心机构进行系统初始化，生成系统密钥对，并公开公钥，所述公钥包括一个对称加密算法和一个密钥生成函数；
    中心机构为注册成功的数据使用者指定一个解密属性集合，并基于所述解密属性集合生成与所述数据使用者对应的解密密钥和外包解密密钥，中心机构为数据拥有者指定一个签名访问结构，并基于所述签名访问结构生成与所述数据拥有者对应的签名密钥和外包签名密钥；
    数据拥有者选择一组满足所述签名访问结构的属性集合，并基于外包签名密钥调用雾节点进行外包签名，数据拥有者基于对称密钥对明文进行对称加密、并基于自定义的加密访问结构对对称密钥进行属性签密，生成签密密文并将签密密文发送至云存储中心；
    对于其属性集合满足加密访问结构的数据使用者，调用雾节点进行外包签名验证，并调用雾节点进行外包解密，数据使用者根据外包签名验证结果验证签名合法后，基于外包解密结果对密文进行对称解密，得到明文。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，其特征在于所述密钥对(PP,MSK)的表达式为：
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100001
    MSK＝{α}
    其中，G和G T均为p阶乘法群，g为G的生成元，v为G的一个元素；
    e为对称双线性映射函数e:G×G→G T，H 1、H 2和H 3均为抗碰撞哈希函数，
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100002
    H 3:{0,1} *→{0,1} 1；
    U e为初始化后的加密属性的全集，U s为初始化后签名属性的全集；
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100003
    为对于U e中第w个属性从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100004
    中选择的一个随机值；
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100005
    为对于U s中第w个属性从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100006
    中选择的一个随机值；
    Y＝e(g,g) α，α为从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100007
    中选择一个随机值；
    Π SE(Enc,Dec)为初始化的对称加密算法，KDF为初始化的密钥生成函数；
    δ 1、δ 2、u'、v'、K 0、u 0均为从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100008
    中选择的随机值，数组{u i} i∈[l]为从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100009
    中选择的一组随机值。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，其特征在于解密密钥
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100010
    的表达式为：
    SK＝g αv t
    SK'＝g t
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100011
    其中，uid为数据使用者向中心机构注册后产生的用户号，
    U d,uid∈U e，为中心机构为数据使用者指定的一个解密属性集合，
    t为从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100012
    中选择一个随机值；
    外包解密密钥
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100013
    的表达式为：
    TK＝g α·t′v t·t′
    TK'＝g t·t′
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100014
    其中，t'为中心机构从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100015
    中选择一个随机值，t'作为解密验证密钥VK d＝t'；
    签名密钥SK s＝(D 0,D' 0)的表达式为：
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100016
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100017
    其中，α1为中心机构从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100018
    中选择一个随机值，α 1＜α，α 2＝α-α 1，
    τ为从属性集合中选取的一个额外属性，
    r τ为对于属性τ从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100019
    中选择的一个随机数；
    外包签名密钥TSK s＝({D i,D′ iD i,w} i∈[ls])的表达式为：，
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100020
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100021
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100022
    其中，(M s,ρ s)为中心机构为数据拥有者指定的一个签名访问结构，M s为l s×k s的矩阵，ρ s为行映射函数，
    (v 2,v 3,......,v ks)为中心机构从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100023
    中选择一组随机数。
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100024
    为基于随机值α1构建的随机向量，
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100025
    r i为对于M s矩阵(M s,ρ s)中第i行从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100026
    中选择一个随机值。
  4. [根据细则91更正 29.04.2021]　
    根据权利要求3所述的用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，其特征在于数据拥有者选择一组满足所述签名访问结构的属性集合，并基于外包签名密钥调用雾节点进行外包签名，包括如下步骤：
    数据拥有者选择一组满足签名访问结构(M s,ρ s)的属性集合用于签名，所述属性集合为：
    Figure WO-DOC-FIGURE-1

    基于上述属性集合，找到一组常数
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100027
    满足如下公式：
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100028

    其中，M s,i表示M s矩阵的第i行，i表示属性集合I s中M s矩阵的第i行所映射的属性，w i表示对应的常数；
    数据拥有者将所述一组常数
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100029
    及外包解密密钥发送至雾节点，所述雾节点作为外包签名雾节点；
    外包签名雾节点从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100030
    中选择一个随机数ξ进行外包签名，得到的签名记为外包签名σ'，外包签名σ'＝(σ′ 1,σ′ 2)的表达式为：
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100031

    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100032

    外包签名雾节点将外包签名σ'发送至数据拥有者。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，其特征在于数据拥有者基于对称密钥对明文进行对称加密、并基于自定义的加密访问结构对对称密钥进行属性签密，生成签密密文，包括如下步骤：
    数据拥有者自定义一个加密访问结构(M e,ρ e)，M e为l e×k e的矩阵，ρ e为行映射函数；
    数据拥有者从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100033
    中选择一个随机值s作为秘密指数，并从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100034
    中选择一组随机值(a 2,a 3,......,a ke)，并构建一个随机向量a＝(s,a 2,a 3,......,a ke)；
    将加密访问结构转换为LSSS矩阵，得到加密访问矩阵M e，对于加密访问矩阵M e中的每一行M e,i，计算
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100035
    数据拥有者从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100036
    中选择随机值ζ和q κ，进行签密得到签密密文，所述签密密文的表达式为：
    E 1＝g s
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100037
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100038
    E 4＝Enc(SEK||d,m)
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100039
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100040
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100041
    σ 3＝u' H(SEK)v' H(d)
    其中，μ＝H 1(E 1)，
    E 4＝Enc(SEK||d,m)，为根据对称密钥对明文对称加密生成的密文，
    SEK||d为数据拥有者基于密钥生成函数KDF构建的对称密钥：
    KDF(key,1)＝SEK||d
    key＝Y s||σ 0||tt,
    tt表示进行签名时当前时间，记为签名时间标识，
    m为数据拥有者想要加密的明文数据，
    R＝H 2(E 1||E 2||E 3||E 4||σ 0||σ 1||M e||U s,sid)，
    (f 1,.......,f l)∈{0,1} l＝H 3(σ 1,tt,M e,U s,sid)；
    数据使用者将所述加密访问结构、签密密文以及签名时间标识tt发送至云存储中心。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，其特征在于对于其属性集合满足加密访问结构的数据使用者，调用雾节点进行外包签名验证，包括如下步骤：
    数据使用者验证下列等式是否成立：
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100042
    其中，tt'表示进行外包签名验证时的当前时间，记为签名验证时间标识，
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100043
    表示系统默认的最大时间差；
    如果上述等式成立，验证数据使用者的属性集合是否满足加密访问结构；
    如果数据使用者的属性集合满足加密访问结构，数据使用者计算如下参数：
    μ＝H 1(E 1)
    R＝H 2(E 1||E 2||E 3||E 4||σ 0||σ 1||M e||U s,sid)
    (f 1,.......,f l)∈{0,1} l＝H 3(σ 1,tt,M e,U s,sid)；
    数据使用者从群
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100044
    中选择的一个随机值x作为签名验证密钥VK s，重计算部分签密密文，生成
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100045
    数据使用者将所述μ、R、(f 1,.......,f l)以及TCT s发送至雾节点，所述雾节点作为外包验证雾节点；
    外包验证雾节点进行外包签名验证，生成签名认证结果VR，签名认证结果VR的表达为：
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100046
  7. 根据权利要求6所述的用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，其特征在于对于其属性集合满足加密访问结构的数据使用者，调用雾节点进行外包解密，包括如下步骤：
    选择一组满足加密访问结构(M e,ρ s)的属性集合用于解密，所述属性集合为：
    I d＝{i:ρ s(i)∈U s,sid}；
    基于所述属性集合找到一组常数
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100047
    满足如下公式：
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100048
    其中，下标i与M e矩阵中的行一一对应；
    外包解密雾节点进行外包解密得到外包解密结果，外包解密的计算公式为：
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100049
    外包解密雾节点将外包解密结果发送至数据使用者。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，其特征在于数据使用者根据如下签名验证公式对签名合法性进行验证：
    Figure PCTCN2021082095-appb-100050
  9. 根据权利要求8所述的用于云雾协助物联网的轻量级属性基签密方法，其特征在于数据使用者根据签名验证结果验证签名合法后，通过如下密文验证公式对密文进行完整性验证：
    σ 4＝u′ H(SEK)v′ H(d)
    验证密文完整后，基于外包解密结果恢复出Y s，并基于密钥生成函数生成对称密钥，根据对称密钥进行对称解密。
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