WO2021169080A1 - 基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决方法和系统 - Google Patents
基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决方法和系统 Download PDFInfo
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- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/008—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols involving homomorphic encryption
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- the invention relates to the technical field of information security, in particular to a mimic defense adjudication method and system based on a partially homomorphic encryption algorithm.
- Partial homomorphic encryption is a cryptographic technique based on the computational complexity theory of mathematical problems. Perform arithmetic processing on the partially homomorphic encrypted data to get an output, and decrypt this output. The result is the same as the output result obtained by processing the unencrypted original data with some kind of arithmetic.
- Partial homomorphic encryption refers to a homomorphic encryption technology that can only take partial operations or operations on plaintext and ciphertext. For example, the homomorphic addition of the ciphertext obtained after the logarithm a and b are encrypted with the same key is consistent with the result obtained after the addition of a and b and then encrypted with the above key. This kind of encryption is called this kind of encryption.
- the scheme is an additive homomorphic encryption scheme.
- multiplicative homomorphic encryption is common.
- Addition homomorphic encryption can complete the homomorphic operation of addition and subtraction
- multiplication homomorphic encryption can complete the homomorphic operation of multiplication and division.
- Both additive homomorphic encryption technology and multiplicative homomorphic encryption technology are called partial homomorphic encryption technology.
- partial homomorphic encryption technology There are already many partial homomorphic encryption technologies used in the security field. Common ones include RSA encryption and elliptical encryption. Among them, elliptic encryption means that the ECC encryption algorithm and Paillier algorithm meet the additive homomorphic encryption technology, and the RSA algorithm meets the multiplicative homomorphic encryption technology.
- Figure 1 shows a typical dynamic heterogeneous redundancy architecture of a traditional mimic defense system. From left to right, there are execution modules, multi-mode/policy voting modules, policy scheduling modules, heterogeneous collections, and heterogeneous pools.
- the execution module refers to the various computing systems that perform tasks.
- the role of the scheduling module is to dynamically schedule a collection of heterogeneous executives, and the collection of heterogeneous executives is composed of heterogeneous execution modules with different structures but the same function.
- a heterogeneous executive body is composed of various heterogeneous elements in a reconfigurable and recombinable way.
- the strategy scheduling module selects a certain amount of heterogeneous executors and inputs them into the execution module to make them executable online.
- the strategy distribution module is responsible for publishing computing tasks to these online executors, and the multi-mode/strategy voting module receives exceptions.
- the output of the structure executive body set is judged, and the judgment result is output, and at the same time, it is fed back to the strategy scheduling module.
- Commonly used ruling methods include unanimous rulings, large-number ruling algorithms, maximum approximate rulings, weighted rulings based on historical information, etc. If random numbers or timestamps are not introduced in the transmission of the results of the executive body, these ruling methods are vulnerable to replay attacks in the multi-mode/policy voting system. If random numbers, timestamps, etc. are used, these schemes need to be corrected. The ciphertext is decrypted and the judgment is made. At this time, hackers or internal spies will break into the multi-mode/strategic voting system, which will cause direct data leakage, and the decryption operation in the multi-mode/strategic voting module will also reduce system performance.
- the patent document with the publication number CN 110750802 A discloses an architecture that protects critical data based on mimic defense. Through the dynamic scheduling of encryption and decryption execution bodies, the attack surface of the data is in dynamic changes. Combining the necessary data hash storage and hiding technology, etc., improve the security of information. For key data processing, the calculation is large and the equipment performance requirements are high, and it is not convenient to quickly find the wrong execution body.
- the present invention provides a mimic defense ruling method and system based on a partially homomorphic encryption algorithm.
- the system includes a homomorphic encryption module, a ciphertext operation module, a multi-mode ruling/strategy voting module, etc., which are output through the execution module
- the adjudication module performs ciphertext adjudication to achieve the goal of not only protecting user privacy, but also improving the security and stability of the entire mimic defense system.
- a mimic defense adjudication method based on a partially homomorphic encryption algorithm is characterized in that it is used in a mimic defense adjudication system.
- the mimic defense adjudication system includes a policy scheduling module and several heterogeneous executive bodies, and includes the steps:
- the policy scheduling module generates a number of random numbers and key pairs, and the key pairs include an encryption key and a decryption key;
- the policy scheduling module allocates a random number and encryption key to each heterogeneous executor that executes the task;
- the heterogeneous executor executes the task and obtains the execution result
- the heterogeneous executor encrypts the random number by using an encryption key to obtain a random number encryption result; executes an agreed operation on the combination of the execution result and the random number to obtain the operation result;
- the random number encryption result and operation result are regarded as objects to be judged.
- the mimic defense adjudication system includes a multi-mode and strategy voting module, including the steps:
- the multi-mode and strategy voting module performs inverse operation on the execution result, and judges the inverse operation result, and if there is an error, sends the corresponding random number encryption result to the strategy scheduling module;
- the strategy scheduling module decrypts the random number encryption result, obtains the random number, and finds the heterogeneous executor with the error according to the random number.
- the policy scheduling module sends the same encryption key for heterogeneous executives.
- the agreed operation is a partial homomorphic encryption operation.
- the present invention also provides a mimic defense adjudication system based on a partially homomorphic encryption algorithm, which is characterized in that it includes a policy scheduling module, an execution module, a multi-mode and policy voting module, a collection of isomers, and a heterogeneous pool.
- the strategy scheduling module is used to extract a number of isomers from the heterogeneous pool to form an isomer set, select a preset number of isomers from the isomer set and send them to the execution module, and is equipped with random Number generation module;
- the execution module is used to implement task execution and send the execution result to the multi-mode and strategy voting module;
- the multi-mode and strategy voting module is used for arbitration and feedback on the execution result
- the strategy scheduling module is also used to execute the feedback message sent by the multi-mode and strategy voting module.
- the execution module is provided with a homomorphic encryption module for performing homomorphic encryption operations on tasks by heterogeneous executors.
- the present invention sets a random number generation module in the policy scheduling module to allocate random numbers and encryption keys to heterogeneous actors, reducing or avoiding replay attacks in the multi-mode/policy voting system by the ruling method, etc.
- the execution module outputs the ciphertext, and the ruling module performs the ciphertext ruling, achieving the goal of not only protecting user privacy, but also improving the security and stability of the entire mimic defense system;
- the present invention is based on a partial homomorphic encryption algorithm.
- the award module uses partial homomorphic encryption when completing the award function.
- the multi-mode/policy voting module obtains the result of encrypting each execution result using the same key.
- This encryption The process uses the same partially homomorphic encryption algorithm, and these results must be the same when the system is not attacked. Therefore, the original ruling method can still be used under the system of the present invention; the ruling object of the original mimic ruling system is the execution result In the present invention, the object of the judgment is the ciphertext after the partial homomorphic encryption algorithm is used for the execution result, and the inverse homomorphic operation is performed on the ciphertext;
- the feedback mechanism adopted in the present invention guarantees the confidentiality of the wrong executive body, prevents attackers from discovering weak links in the executive module, and has higher security; the present invention can increase the complexity of isomers and reduce multiple exceptions.
- the probability that the structure is sensitive to an attack reduces the risk of being attacked to a certain extent; and the encryption and decryption operations are completed by different modules, which reduces the burden of the multi-mode/policy ruling module, and it is not easy to cause the performance of the module to decrease.
- Figure 1 shows a typical dynamic heterogeneous redundant architecture of a traditional mimic defense system
- Figure 2 is the architecture of the mimic defense adjudication system based on a partially homomorphic encryption algorithm of the present invention.
- a homomorphic encryption module is added to the execution module, that is, a homomorphic encryption module is added to combine with the execution body in Figure 1 to form a new execution body; strategy;
- the scheduling module only needs to add a random number generation module, and there is no need to change the hardware of the original system, which is convenient for upgrading the existing system.
- the method of the present invention includes the following steps:
- Step (1.1) After the task is input to the mimic defense system, the strategy scheduling module selects a certain amount of heterogeneous executors to enter the execution module to execute the task, and at the same time generates a random number and the public key of this operation to assign to the heterogeneous executor ;
- Step (1.2) After performing the same calculation task, all executive bodies use public keys to encrypt their assigned random numbers, and at the same time perform the agreed homomorphic operation with the random number, which can be either homomorphic addition or Homomorphic multiplication, or other agreed operations, still use public key encryption for the result obtained;
- Step (1.3) sending the result of encrypting the random number and the result of performing the homomorphic operation to the multi-mode/policy voting module;
- the arbitration module completes the two functions of arbitration and feedback, and when the arbitration module completes the arbitration function, it performs the inverse operation of partial homomorphic encryption.
- the multi-mode/strategy voting module obtains each execution result and uses the same key to encrypt As a result, this encryption process uses the same partially homomorphic encryption algorithm.
- the ruling object of the original mimic ruling system is the plaintext of the execution result. After the improvement, the ruling object becomes the use of the execution result.
- the ciphertext after the partial homomorphic encryption algorithm performs inverse homomorphic operation on the ciphertext.
- the multi-mode/strategy voting module includes the following steps:
- Step (2.1) After the encrypted result enters the multi-mode/policy voting module, the module obtains the execution result of each executive body and the encrypted result after random number operation and the result of random number encryption. The module performs inverse homomorphism on the result Operation.
- Step (2.2) If the system is attacked, the multi-mode/policy voting module will feed back the execution result of the problem to the policy scheduling module. Only by decrypting the encrypted random number, the problematic heterogeneous execution can be located and reversed. The feedback mechanism has also been improved.
- Figure 2 is a system structure diagram after the present invention is applied to a typical dynamic heterogeneous redundant architecture of a traditional mimic defense system.
- the above system includes an execution module, a multi-mode/policy voting module, a policy scheduling module, and a collection of isomers And heterogeneous pools.
- the strategy scheduling module calls a certain number (set to n) of isomers in the heterogeneous pool according to different tasks and security requirements to form an isomer set, and generates n random numbers at the same time
- the random numbers are denoted as r 1 , r 2 ,...r n
- the encryption key is denoted as K u
- the decryption key is denoted as K r
- the policy distribution mechanism will input data m 0 and encrypt The key K u and the corresponding random number are distributed to these n heterogeneous actors.
- the execution module receives a data m 0, K u, after the start of the m 0 r a performs arithmetic operation, while using the key K u r a random number encryption, the encryption result is noted as R a.
- the operation is completed m 0 referred to as a computation result m a
- m a calculation result with the random number r a homomorphic operation here in the same state as an example the addition result is noted as c a
- finishing operation execution module is as follows :
- E refers to the encryption operation, the formula using the key K u Encryption operation is performed r a.
- the execution module a packages Ra and c a and sends them to the multi-mode/strategy voting module.
- the multi-mode/strategy voting module obtains the random number encryption result Ra and the operation result ca sent by each execution module.
- the multi-mode/strategy voting module performs inverse homomorphic operation on these two results, and the execution result should be obtained using the encryption key
- the result of Ku encryption, the operation is as follows:
- the encrypted expression of the operation result of the executor that is, the execution result is obtained.
- the mimic defense idea it can be known that the execution results of each executor should be consistent. The same key and the same method are used to encrypt the consistent result, and the encrypted result is obtained. It must also be unanimous, and the result can be judged based on this unanimity.
- a multi-mode / voting policy module corresponding to the result of this random number encrypted result is sent back to the policy R a scheduling module, the module R a scheduling policy for the decrypted random number r a, and r a positioning error by executable perform the corresponding action.
- This feedback mechanism ensures the confidentiality of the wrong execution body and prevents attackers from discovering the weak links in the execution module.
- the present invention finally realizes the use of partial homomorphic encryption to encrypt the execution result and then judges, not only can greatly improve the security, but also protect the privacy of the customer. Upgrade on various mimic defense systems.
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Abstract
本发明公开了一种基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决方法和系统,裁决方法中为异构执行体分配随机数和加密密钥,通过执行模块输出密文,裁决对象是执行结果使用约定算法得到的密文,且具有方便核查和保密性好的反馈体制;系统包括策略调度模块、执行模块、多模及策略表决模块和异构体集合等,策略调度模块设有随机数生成模块,执行模块设有同态加密模块。本发明的方法和系统,能够减少或避免裁决方式在多模/策略表决系统中受到重放攻击等,达到保护用户隐私、防止数据泄露、提升整个拟态防御系统安全性和稳定性的目的。
Description
本发明涉及信息安全技术领域,具体涉及一种基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决方法和系统。
部分同态加密是基于数学难题的计算复杂性理论的密码学技术。对经过部分同态加密的数据进行运算处理得到一个输出,将这一输出进行解密,其结果与用某种运算处理未加密的原始数据得到的输出结果是一样的。部分同态加密指只能对明文和密文采取部分运算或操作的同态加密技术。例如对数a和b分别使用同一个密钥加密后得到的密文做同态加法,与对a和b做加法后再使用上述密钥加密后得到的结果是一致的,就称这种加密方案为加法同态加密方案。同理常见的还有乘法同态加密。加法同态加密可以完成加减法的同态运算,乘法同态加密可以完成乘除法的同态运算。无论加法同态加密技术还是乘法同态加密技术都称作部分同态加密技术。现在已经有很多部分同态加密技术应用于安全领域,常见的有RSA加密、椭圆加密等。其中椭圆加密即ECC加密算法和Paillier算法满足加法同态加密技术,RSA算法则满足乘法同态加密技术。
图1为传统拟态防御系统典型动态异构冗余架构,从左至右依次为执行模块、多模/策略表决模块、策略调度模块、异构体集合以及异构池。执行模块顾名思义指的就是执行任务的各个计算系统,调度模块的作用是对异构执行体集合进行动态调度,而异构执行体集合是由结构不同但是功能相同的异构执行模块组成的,每个异构执行体则是由各个异构元素通过可重构、可重组的方式组合而来的。
当任务输入进来后,策略调度模块选取一定量的异构执行体输入执行模块中使其在线可执行,策略分发模块负责将计算任务发布到这些在线执行体上,多模/策略表决模块接收异构执行体集的输出进行裁决,并将裁决结果输出,同时反馈到策略调度模块上。
常用的裁决方法包括全体一致裁决、大数裁决算法、最大近似裁决、基于历史信息的加权裁决等。如果在执行体结果传输过程中不引入随机数或者时间戳,这些裁决方式在多模/策略表决系统中都容易受到重放攻击,假如使用了随机数、时间戳等,这些方案就都需要对密文解密后进行裁决,此时黑客或者内部间谍人员攻入多模/策略表决系统都会导致直接的数据泄露,而且在多模/策略表决模块中进行解密操作也会降低系统性能。此外,在现实应用中,执行体不能完全异构,因此会产生共模逃逸现象,即假设 多个异构体均无法防御同一种攻击,那么如果某次执行过程中选取了这些异构体中的多个,使用这一种攻击方式就能同时使多个异构体崩溃。
公开号为CN 110750802 A的专利文献,公开了一种基于拟态防御针对关键数据进行保护的架构,通过动态性调度加解密执行体使得数据的攻击表面处在动态变化当中,通过利用冗余思想并结合必要的数据散列存储及隐藏技术等,提高信息安全性,其针对关键数据处理,计算量较大且对设备性能要求高,也不方便快速查找出错的执行体等。
发明内容
技术目的:本发明提供了一种基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决方法和系统,所述系统包括同态加密模块、密文运算模块和多模裁决/策略表决模块等,通过执行模块输出密文,裁决模块进行密文裁决,达到既能够保护用户隐私,同时也能够提升拟态防御整个系统的安全性和稳定性的目的。
技术方案:
一种基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决方法,其特征在于,用于拟态防御裁决系统,所述拟态防御裁决系统包括策略调度模块和若干个异构执行体,包括步骤:
所述策略调度模块生成若干随机数和密钥对,密钥对包括加密密钥和解密密钥;
所述策略调度模块为每个执行任务的异构执行体分配一个随机数和加密密钥;
所述异构执行体执行任务并得到执行结果;
所述异构执行体对随机数采用加密密钥进行加密得到随机数加密结果;对执行结果和随机数的组合执行约定的运算得到运算结果;
所述随机数加密结果和运算结果作为待裁决对象。
优选地,所述拟态防御裁决系统包括多模及策略表决模块,包括步骤:
所述多模及策略表决模块对执行结果进行逆运算,并判断逆运算结果,如果有误,将对应的随机数加密结果发送给策略调度模块;
所述策略调度模块对随机数加密结果进行解密,得到随机数并根据随机数查找到发生错误的异构执行体。
优选地,所述策略调度模块为异构执行体发送相同的加密密钥。
优选地,所述约定的运算为部分同态加密运算。
本发明还提供了一种基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决系统,其特征在于:包括策略调度模块、执行模块、多模及策略表决模块、异构体集合和异构池,其中,
所述策略调度模块,用于在异构池中调取若干异构体构成异构体集合、从异构体集合中选取预设数量的异构执行体并送入执行模块,并设有随机数生成模块;
所述执行模块,用于实现对任务进行执行并将执行结果发送给多模及策略表决模块;
所述多模及策略表决模块,用于对执行结果进行裁决和反馈;
所述策略调度模块,还用于执行多模及策略表决模块发送的反馈消息。
优选地,所述执行模块设有同态加密模块,用于异构执行体对任务执行同态加密运算。
技术效果:由于采用了上述技术方案,本发明具有如下技术效果:
(1)、本发明在策略调度模块中设置随机数发生模块,为异构执行体分配随机数和加密密钥,减少或避免裁决方式在多模/策略表决系统中受到重放攻击等,通过执行模块输出密文,裁决模块进行密文裁决,达到既能够保护用户隐私,同时也能够提升拟态防御整个系统的安全性和稳定性的目的;
(2)、本发明基于部分同态加密算法,裁决模块完成裁决功能时使用部分同态加密,此时多模/策略表决模块获得了各个执行结果使用同一个密钥进行加密的结果,此加密过程使用同一种部分同态加密算法,在系统没有遭受攻击的情况下这些结果必然是相同的,因此采用本发明的系统下仍可使用原来的裁决方法;原拟态裁决系统的裁决对象是执行结果的明文,本发明为裁决对象是执行结果使用部分同态加密算法后的密文,对该密文执行逆同态运算;
(3)、本发明采用的反馈机制保证了错误执行体的保密性,防止攻击者发现执行模块中的薄弱环节,安全性更高;本发明可增加异构体复杂度,减小多个异构体对一种攻击敏感的概率,在一定程度上降低被攻击的风险;且加密和解密操作由不同的模块完成,减轻了多模/策略裁决模块的负担,不易造成模块性能降低。
图1为传统的拟态防御系统典型动态异构冗余架构;
图2为本发明的基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决系统的架构。
下面结合附图和具体实施例,进一步阐明本发明,应理解这些实施例仅用于说明本发明而不用于限制本发明的范围。
本发明的基于部分同态加密的拟态防御裁决体系中,执行模块中增加了一个同态加 密模块,即增加了一个同态加密模块与图1中的执行体相结合构成新的执行体;策略调度模块仅需要增加一个随机数生成模块,不需要对原有系统在硬件上做改变,方便对现有的系统进行升级。
本发明的方法包括如下步骤:
步骤(1.1)、在任务输入到拟态防御系统后,策略调度模块选取一定量的异构执行体进入执行模块执行任务,同时生成随机数和本次运算的公钥分配给所述异构执行体;
步骤(1.2)、所有执行体在执行完相同计算任务后使用公钥对其分配到的随机数加密,同时将执行结果与随机数执行约定的同态运算,既可以是同态加法也可以是同态乘法,或者其它约定运算,对得到的结果仍使用公钥加密;
步骤(1.3)、把对随机数加密的结果和执行同态运算后加密的结果都发送到多模/策略表决模块中;
本发明中,裁决模块完成裁决和反馈两个功能,裁决模块完成裁决功能时执行部分同态加密的逆运算,此时多模/策略表决模块获得了各个执行结果使用同一个密钥进行加密的结果,此加密过程使用同一种部分同态加密算法。在系统没有遭受攻击的情况下这些结果必然是相同的,因此在该体系下仍可使用原来的裁决方法,原拟态裁决体系的裁决对象是执行结果的明文,改进后裁决对象变为执行结果使用部分同态加密算法后的密文,对该密文执行逆同态运算。
多模/策略表决模块包括如下步骤:
步骤(2.1)加密后的结果进入多模/策略表决模块后,该模块获得每个执行体的执行结果与随机数运算后加密的结果以及随机数加密的结果,该模块对结果执行逆同态运算。
步骤(2.2)如果系统遭受了攻击,多模/策略表决模块把出现问题的执行结果反馈给策略调度模块,只需要将加密后的随机数解密,就可以定位、反查出现问题的异构执行体,反馈机制也得到了完善。
图2为本发明应用于传统拟态防御系统典型动态异构冗余架构后的系统结构图,如图所示,上述系统包含执行模块、多模/策略表决模块、策略调度模块、异构体集合以及异构池。
1.策略调度模块
当任务输入到该拟态防御系统,策略调度模块根据任务不同和安全性要求在异构池 中调取一定数量(设为n个)的异构体构成异构体集合,同时生成n个随机数和加解密密钥对,随机数记为r
1,r
2,...r
n,加密密钥记为K
u,解密密钥记为K
r,然后策略分发机制将输入数据m
0、加密密钥K
u和对应的随机数分发给这n个异构执行体。
2.执行模块
执行模块a收到数据m
0、K
u、r
a后开始对m
0执行运算操作,同时使用密钥K
u对随机数r
a加密,加密结果记为R
a。m
0运算完毕后获得运算结果记为m
a,对计算结果m
a与随机数r
a进行同态运算,此处以同态加法为例,结果记为c
a,在执行模块中的操作整理如下:
E指加密操作,上式表示使用密钥K
u对r
a执行加密操作。
完成上述操作后,执行模块a将R
a和c
a打包后发送到多模/策略表决模块中。
3.多模/策略表决模块
多模/策略表决模块得到了每个执行模块发过来的随机数加密结果Ra和运算结果ca,多模/策略表决模块对这两个结果执行逆同态运算,应该获得执行结果利用加密密钥Ku加密后的结果,操作如下:
此时获得了执行体运算结果即执行结果的加密表达,利用拟态防御思想可知各个执行体执行结果应该是一致的,使用同一个密钥和同一种方式对一致的结果进行加密,得到的加密结果也一定是一致,基于此一致性就可以对结果进行裁决。
4.反馈机制
在裁决结束后,对于明显错误的结果,多模/策略表决模块将此结果对应的随机数加密结果R
a发送回策略调度模块,策略调度模块对R
a进行解密后得到随机数r
a,并通过r
a定位到错误执行体执行相应处理措施。这步反馈机制保证了错误执行体的保密性,防止攻击者发现执行模块中的薄弱环节。
本发明最终实现了利用部分同态加密的方式对执行结果进行加密后进行裁决,不仅 能够大大提高安全性还保护了客户的隐私,同时本发明对原有系统改动很小,很适合在原有的各类拟态防御系统上进行升级。
Claims (6)
- 一种基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决方法,其特征在于,用于拟态防御裁决系统,所述拟态防御裁决系统包括策略调度模块和若干个异构执行体,包括步骤:所述策略调度模块生成若干随机数和密钥对,密钥对包括加密密钥(K u)和解密密钥(K r);所述策略调度模块为每个执行任务的异构执行体分配一个随机数(r a)和加密密钥(K u);所述异构执行体执行任务并得到执行结果(m a);所述异构执行体对随机数(r a)采用加密密钥(K u)进行加密得到随机数加密结果(R a);对执行结果(m a)和随机数(r a)的组合执行约定的运算得到运算结果(c a);所述随机数加密结果(R a)和运算结果(c a)作为待裁决对象。
- 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决方法,其特征在于,所述拟态防御裁决系统包括多模及策略表决模块,包括步骤:所述多模及策略表决模块对执行结果(m a)进行逆运算,并判断逆运算结果,如果有误,将对应的随机数加密结果(R a)发送给策略调度模块;所述策略调度模块对随机数加密结果(R a)进行解密,得到随机数(r a)并根据随机数(ra)查找到发生错误的异构执行体。
- 根据权利要求1所述的基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决方法,其特征在于:所述策略调度模块为异构执行体发送相同的加密密钥。
- 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决方法,其特征在于,所述约定的运算为部分同态加密运算。
- 一种基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决系统,其特征在于:包括策略调度模块、执行模块、多模及策略表决模块、异构体集合和异构池,其中,所述策略调度模块,用于在异构池中调取若干异构体构成异构体集合、从异构体集合中选取预设数量的异构执行体并送入执行模块,并设有随机数生成模块;所述执行模块,用于实现对任务进行执行并将执行结果发送给多模及策略表决模块;所述多模及策略表决模块,用于对执行结果进行裁决和反馈;所述策略调度模块,还用于执行多模及策略表决模块发送的反馈消息。
- 根据权利要求5所述的一种基于部分同态加密算法的拟态防御裁决系统,其特征在于,所述执行模块设有同态加密模块,用于异构执行体对任务执行同态加密运算。
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