WO2021133074A2 - Procédé d'authentification d'entité ou de message dédié à un dispositif léger, et dispositifs de réalisation de celui-ci - Google Patents

Procédé d'authentification d'entité ou de message dédié à un dispositif léger, et dispositifs de réalisation de celui-ci Download PDF

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WO2021133074A2
WO2021133074A2 PCT/KR2020/019033 KR2020019033W WO2021133074A2 WO 2021133074 A2 WO2021133074 A2 WO 2021133074A2 KR 2020019033 W KR2020019033 W KR 2020019033W WO 2021133074 A2 WO2021133074 A2 WO 2021133074A2
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
electronic device
authentication
message
response
mac
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PCT/KR2020/019033
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English (en)
Korean (ko)
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WO2021133074A3 (fr
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홍종필
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주식회사 제이에스전자
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Priority claimed from KR1020190176844A external-priority patent/KR20210083992A/ko
Priority claimed from KR1020190176843A external-priority patent/KR20210083991A/ko
Application filed by 주식회사 제이에스전자 filed Critical 주식회사 제이에스전자
Publication of WO2021133074A2 publication Critical patent/WO2021133074A2/fr
Publication of WO2021133074A3 publication Critical patent/WO2021133074A3/fr

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials

Definitions

  • the embodiments below relate to a light-weight device-only object or message authentication method and devices for performing the same.
  • a lightweight device may have the characteristics of being very small, low power and low cost.
  • the reliability of the conventional security system implemented in software may be characterized in that it is proportional to the amount of computation of the algorithm. Therefore, the conventional security system is weak in that it relies on algorithmic operation.
  • the conventional security system when a key is shared between a client and a server, the key must be stored in a memory in a lightweight device.
  • the conventional security system has a disadvantage in that it contains a risk of hacking due to storage of a shared key in a lightweight device.
  • the conventional security system has a disadvantage in that it is difficult to cryptographically analyze and/or prove the reliability.
  • Embodiments may provide a technology for performing object authentication or message authentication for an electronic device through a security chip, which is hardware based on TRNG PUF and CRP PUF, and an object authentication server.
  • An object authentication method includes: authenticating, by a first electronic device, an object authentication server; transmitting, by the electronic device, an ID of a second electronic device to be accessed to the object authentication server; and the first electronic device connecting the second electronic device to the second electronic device based on an authentication result of the object authentication server for the second electronic device. Including the step of authenticating.
  • the authenticating of the entity authentication server includes generating a random number through a first physical unclonable function (PUF) circuit included in the first electronic device, and the entity authentication server including the random number. transmitting a challenge signal for authentication to the entity authentication server; inputting the challenge signal to a second PUF circuit included in the first electronic device to output a response signal; Receiving the cipher text generated using a signal, decrypting the cipher text using the response signal, comparing the decrypted value obtained by decrypting the cipher text with the challenge signal to authenticate the individual authentication server may include
  • the step of authenticating the entity authentication server by comparing the decryption value obtained by decrypting the ciphertext and the challenge signal according to an embodiment, when the decryption value and the challenge signal are the same, the authentication of the entity authentication server is determined to be successful or, when the decryption value and the challenge signal are not the same, determining the authentication of the entity authentication server as failure.
  • the object authentication method may include performing, by the first electronic device, access to the second electronic device through the object authentication server in response to successful authentication with respect to the object authentication server and the second electronic device. may further include.
  • the entity authentication method may further include generating, by the entity authentication server, the cipher text in response to the challenge signal, and transmitting, by the entity authentication server, the cipher text to the first electronic device.
  • the generating of the ciphertext includes extracting a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal from a CRP list (challenge to response pairs list) in response to the challenge signal, and using the extracted response signal. generating the ciphertext by encrypting the challenge signal.
  • the object authentication method includes: authenticating, by the object authentication server, the second electronic device in response to the ID of the second electronic device; The method may further include transmitting to the first electronic device, and transmitting, by the entity authentication server, a request for access to the second electronic device of the first electronic device to the second electronic device.
  • the step of authenticating the second electronic device in response to the ID of the second electronic device by the entity authentication server includes generating a random number and using the random number as a challenge signal for authenticating the second electronic device. transmitting to a second electronic device; extracting a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal from a CRP list corresponding to the second electronic device; and ciphertext generated by using the challenge signal from the second electronic device.
  • the method may include receiving , decrypting the cipher text using the extracted response signal, and authenticating the second electronic device by comparing a decrypted value obtained by decrypting the cipher text with the challenge signal.
  • An electronic device includes a transceiver communicating with an entity authentication server, authenticating the entity authentication server, and the different electronic devices based on authentication results of different electronic devices to which the electronic device of the entity authentication server will access. It contains a security chip that authenticates the device.
  • the security chip includes a first PUF circuit that generates a random number and outputs the random number as a first challenge signal for authenticating the entity authentication server, and a first response signal in response to the first challenge signal a second PUF circuit for outputting , a decrypter for receiving a first cipher text generated using the first challenge signal from the entity authentication server, and decrypting the first cipher text using the first response signal; Authenticating the object authentication server by comparing the first decryption value obtained by decrypting the first cipher text with the first challenge signal, and authenticating the different electronic device in response to the authentication success of the object authentication server for the different electronic device It may include an authenticator.
  • the second PUF circuit encrypts the second challenge signal using a second response signal output by the entity authentication server in response to a second challenge signal for authenticating the electronic device.
  • the apparatus may further include an encryptor for generating a second cipher text, wherein the second cipher text may be transmitted to the entity authentication server in order for the entity authentication server to authenticate the electronic device.
  • the transceiver may transmit the ID of the different electronic device to the entity authentication server in response to successful authentication with respect to the entity authentication server.
  • the electronic device may perform access to the different electronic device through the object authentication server in response to successful authentication of the object authentication server and the different electronic device.
  • a light-weight device-only message authentication method includes the steps of: receiving, by a first electronic device, a packet generated by a message authentication server; and performing authentication on the message included in the packet in response to authentication success.
  • the performing according to an embodiment may include extracting a challenge signal, a first message authentication code (MAC), and the message from the packet, and providing a physical unclonable function (PUF) circuit included in the first electronic device. outputting a response signal by inputting a challenge signal, generating a second MAC using the message and the response signal, and authenticating the message by comparing the first MAC and the second MAC.
  • MAC message authentication code
  • PAF physical unclonable function
  • the authenticating when the first MAC and the second MAC are the same, determining that the authentication for the message is successful, or when the first MAC and the second MAC are not the same , determining that authentication for the message fails.
  • the message authentication method includes the steps of: receiving, by the message authentication server, a packet generated by the second electronic device; and the message authentication server responding to the message included in the packet generated by the second electronic device.
  • the method may include performing authentication for the message, and transmitting, by the message authentication server, an authentication result for the message to the second electronic device.
  • the step of the message authentication server authenticating the message included in the packet generated by the second electronic device includes a challenge signal, the first MAC and the packet generated by the second electronic device. extracting a message; extracting a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal from a list of challenge to response pairs (CRP); generating a second MAC using the message and the response signal; Comparing the first MAC and the second MAC may include authenticating the message.
  • the authenticating when the first MAC and the second MAC are the same, determining that the authentication for the message is successful, or when the first MAC and the second MAC are not the same , determining that authentication for the message fails.
  • the message authentication server transmits a packet generated by the message authentication server to the first electronic device in response to the ID of the first electronic device transmitted from the second electronic device. It may include further steps.
  • the transmitting includes generating a random number in response to the ID of the first electronic device, converting the random number into a challenge signal for authenticating the message, and a challenge to response (CRP). pairs) extracting a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal from a list, generating a MAC using the message and the response signal, and packetizing the challenge signal, the message, and the MAC. can do.
  • CCP challenge to response
  • An electronic device communicates with a message authentication device to receive a packet generated by the message authentication device and a transceiver in response to authentication success for messages transmitted by different electronic devices of the message authentication server
  • a security chip for authenticating the message included in the packet may be included.
  • the security chip includes a PUF circuit for outputting a response signal in response to a challenge signal included in the packet, a generator for generating a MAC using the message and the response signal, the generated MAC and the packet It may include an authenticator for authenticating the message by comparing the MAC included in the.
  • the authenticator determines that authentication of the message is successful when the generated MAC and the MAC included in the packet are the same, or when the generated MAC and the MAC included in the packet are not the same, It may be determined that the authentication of the message fails.
  • the transceiver may be implemented in the security chip.
  • 1A shows an example for explaining an entity authentication method.
  • 1B shows an example for explaining a message authentication method.
  • FIG. 2 shows an example for explaining a physically non-replicable function for generating a random number.
  • FIG. 3 shows an example for explaining a physically non-replicable function for generating a challenge-response pair.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic block diagram of an entity authentication system according to an embodiment.
  • 5A is a schematic block diagram of the first electronic device shown in FIG. 4 .
  • FIG. 5B is a schematic block diagram of the first electronic device shown in FIG. 4 according to another exemplary embodiment.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic block diagram of the entity authentication server shown in FIG. 4 .
  • 7A illustrates an example for describing an entity authentication operation between electronic devices and a server.
  • 7B illustrates another example for describing an entity authentication operation between electronic devices and a server.
  • FIG. 8A is a flowchart illustrating entity authentication for authenticating a second electronic device to be accessed by the first electronic device illustrated in FIG. 4 .
  • 8B is a flowchart illustrating message authentication for authenticating a second electronic device to be accessed by the first electronic device illustrated in FIG. 4 .
  • first or second may be used to describe various elements, but the elements should not be limited by the terms. The terms are only for the purpose of distinguishing one element from another element, for example, without departing from the scope of rights according to the concept of the embodiment, a first element may be named as a second element, and similarly The second component may also be referred to as the first component.
  • 1A shows an example for explaining an entity authentication method.
  • Entity authentication is a process in which one entity (or one electronic device) authenticates (or verifies) the identity of another entity (or different electronic device) having the correct key. Entity authentication authenticates an asserter, an entity that asserts entity authentication, so that communication is performed between devices on which entity authentication has been performed. In this case, the entire communication and authentication between devices is maintained for one session.
  • Entity authentication methods perform entity authentication through various methods such as a challenge-response method, password, bit commitment, and zero-knowledge proof.
  • the existing object authentication method performs object authentication between a first device (alice) and a second device (bob) through an object authentication protocol.
  • the entity authentication protocol may be a protocol based on a pseudo-random number generator, an encryption algorithm, a decryption algorithm, and a shared key.
  • the first device (alice) and the second device (bob) perform entity authentication through the existing entity authentication method.
  • a first alice is a claimant claiming entity authentication.
  • the second device (bob) is a verifier that proves the entity authentication.
  • the first device (alice) and the second device (bob) may have already performed a procedure of distributing and sharing the key (K shared) in advance through a secure channel.
  • the second device bob generates a first random number N B using a pseudo-random number generator to perform entity authentication for the first device alice.
  • the second device (bob) transmits the first random number (N B ) to the first device (alice) among several entities.
  • the first device receives the first random number (N B ) transmitted from the second device (bob), and a pre-shared key (K shared ) shared in advance with the second device (bob) and / Alternatively, the first random number N B is encrypted using an encryption algorithm promised in advance.
  • the first device (alice) generates a ciphertext (E) in which the first random number (N B ) is encrypted through an encryption process, and transmits the generated ciphertext (E) to the second device (bob).
  • the ciphertext (E) may include K shared , N B .
  • the second device receives the ciphertext (E) transmitted from the first device (alice), and decrypts the received ciphertext (E) using the pre-shared key (K shared).
  • the second device (bob) generates a second random number (N B ') from which the cipher text (E) is decrypted through a decryption process.
  • the second device bob compares the first random number N B with the second random number N B ′ to authenticate entities between the first device alice and the second device bob, that is, the first device. (alice) is authenticated.
  • the second device bob determines that the authentication for the first device alice is successful and authenticates the first device alice. do.
  • 1B shows an example for explaining a message authentication method.
  • Message authentication is a process of authenticating that a message is a safe and reliable message depending on whether the other party has the same key as itself.
  • the existing message authentication method performs message authentication through a message authentication protocol based on a hash function, a message authentication code (MAC), and a shared key.
  • MAC message authentication code
  • Existing message authentication protocols generate a MAC using a hash function and a shared secret key when sending a message.
  • the existing message authentication protocol may be a protocol based on MAC and shared key that performs authentication on a message by transmitting the MAC along with the message.
  • a MAC may be a small data block.
  • the hash function used when generating the MAC may be a function that maps data of an arbitrary length to data (or hash value) of a fixed length.
  • Existing message authentication protocols can generate evidence values that detect errors or tampering with input messages through hash functions.
  • the message authentication method performs message authentication between a first device (alice) and a second device (bob) through an existing message authentication protocol.
  • the first device (alice) and the second device (bob) perform message authentication through the existing message authentication method.
  • the first alice is a claimant claiming message authentication.
  • the second device (bob) is a verifier that proves message authentication.
  • the first device (alice) and the second device (bob) may have already performed a procedure of distributing and sharing the key (K shared) in advance through a secure channel.
  • a first device (alice) generates a first MAC (K shared , m) through a hash function using a pre-shared key (K shared ) shared in advance with a message (m) as an input.
  • the first device (alice) transmits the first MAC together with the message (m) to the second device (bob).
  • the second device receives the message (m) transmitted from the first device (alice) as an input and uses the pre-shared key (K shared ) as a key through a hash function to obtain a second MAC (K shared m) create
  • the second device (bob) authenticates the message between the first device (alice) and the second device (bob) through the process of comparing the first MAC and the second MAC, that is, the message authentication for the message of the first device (alice) carry out When the first MAC and the second MAC match, it may be determined that message authentication between the first device (alice) and the second device (bob) is successful.
  • the existing message authentication method verifies message integrity and message origin authentication by individually performing authentication procedures for individual messages through MAC. Since the existing message authentication method has an effect of compressing a large-capacity message into data of a fixed length, there is an advantage in that communication costs are reduced.
  • FIG. 2 shows an example for explaining a physically non-replicable function for generating a random number
  • FIG. 3 shows an example for explaining a physically non-replicable function for generating a challenge-response pair.
  • the physically unclonable function (PUF) system may be a system based on a complementary metal-oxide semiconductor (CMOS) process.
  • CMOS complementary metal-oxide semiconductor
  • the CMOS process may be a process having advantages of high integration and low cost.
  • a physical unclonable function (PUF) system can rapidly and randomly generate a unique value based on a specific input.
  • a particular input may be a challenge.
  • the unique value is a value corresponding to an input and may be an ID or a response.
  • CMOS complementary metal-oxide-semiconductor
  • the fact that the physically non-replicable function has the same physical value corresponding to the input by the same input regardless of changes in the external environment can be expressed as a probabilistic property of reproducibility and/or stability.
  • the probabilistic property may be one of the important performance indicators of the physically non-replicable function.
  • the fact that the physically non-replicable function has different physical values for different inputs can be expressed as uniqueness, randomness, or identity.
  • a true random number generator physical unclonable function (TRNG PUF) for generating random numbers may generate a random random number value according to a specific signal (response generation start signal).
  • TRNG PUF true random number generator physical unclonable function
  • the TRNG PUF may generate a different random number value for each chip even if the chips have the same structure.
  • a random number value generated by one chip may have a completely different random number value when it is regenerated.
  • a challenge to response pairs physical unclonable function may generate a unique random response to a specific challenge input.
  • a challenge-response pair (CRP) may be a pair between a particular challenge and a response corresponding to the challenge.
  • the challenge-response pair list (CRP List) may be a list of challenge-response pairs.
  • the CRP PUF is a chip having the same structure, there may be a feature of having a different challenge-response pair for each chip. However, the CRP PUF should generate the same response to the same challenge input within one chip. CRP PUFs must generate different responses for different challenge inputs.
  • FIG. 4 shows a schematic block diagram of a system according to an embodiment.
  • the system 10 may be an object authentication system dedicated to lightweight devices that replaces the existing object authentication system.
  • the system 10 may perform entity authentication or message authentication using an entity authentication or message authentication technique based on the physically non-replicable function described in FIGS. 2 and 3 .
  • the system 10 may include a first electronic device 100 , a server 300 , and a second electronic device 500 .
  • the system 10 may be a message authentication system dedicated to a lightweight device that replaces the existing message authentication system.
  • the system 10 may perform message authentication using a message authentication technique based on the physically non-replicable function described with reference to FIGS. 2 and 3 .
  • the system 10 may include a first electronic device 100 , a server 300 , and a second electronic device 500 .
  • the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may be lightweight devices having the same structure.
  • the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may be electronic devices in which a processor (or a microprocessor), a memory, and a software-based CRP and random number generator are difficult to be installed (or embedded, mounted).
  • the server 300 described herein is not limited by its name, and may collectively refer to a device operated by an institution capable of reliable authentication.
  • the above-described server may collectively refer to a device used by an institution recognized as an institution capable of authentication by the state to perform authentication.
  • the electronic devices 100 and 500 may be various devices, such as an Internet of Things (IoT) device or a portable electronic device that does not require a large amount of computation.
  • Portable electronic devices include a laptop computer, a mobile phone, a smart phone, a tablet PC, a mobile internet device (MID), a personal digital assistant (PDA), and an enterprise digital assistant (EDA).
  • MID mobile internet device
  • PDA personal digital assistant
  • EDA enterprise digital assistant
  • e-book e-book
  • the smart device may be implemented as a smart watch or a smart band.
  • the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 share a CRP list (challenge to response pairs list, or CRP table) corresponding to each electronic device with the server 300 through a secure channel. can do.
  • the server 300 may store the first CRP list corresponding to the first electronic device 100 and the second CRP list corresponding to the second electronic device 500 in the database.
  • the first CRP list is a CRP list in which a pair of a challenge signal and a response signal that can be input and output by the first electronic device 100 is sorted, and the second CRP list can be input and output by the second electronic device 500
  • the challenge signal and the response signal pair may be an ordered CRP list.
  • the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may perform message authentication on messages transmitted from each other through the server 300 in order to perform message authentication on messages transmitted to each other.
  • the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may perform object authentication for each other through the server 300 in order to access and communicate with each other.
  • the first electronic device 100 pre-authenticates the server 300 in order to access the second electronic device 500 and perform communication, and the second electronic device 500 through the authenticated server 300 .
  • the second electronic device 500 also performs pre-authentication of the server 300 in order to access and communicate with the first electronic device 100 , and to authenticate the first electronic device 100 through the authenticated server 300 .
  • the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may perform entity authentication or message authentication through a security chip that is hardware including a TRNG PUF and a CRP PUF.
  • the security chip included in each of the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may be a semiconductor chip based on a TRNG PUF and a CRP PUF.
  • the electronic devices 100 and 500 may perform object authentication or message authentication without a processor (or microprocessor), memory, software-based CRP, and random number generator. That is, the electronic devices 100 and 500 do not generate a cryptographically secure random number through an operation based on an existing software algorithm, but perform object authentication or message authentication using hardware that is a PUF-based semiconductor that relies on natural laws. can do.
  • Object authentication or message authentication through the electronic devices 100 and 500 does not require storing a shared key in an internal memory, so security and reliability can be efficiently improved, and a large amount of computation that is difficult to utilize in a lightweight device is required. It can replace the existing object authentication or message authentication method.
  • the existing object authentication method (or the existing object authentication platform, the existing security platform) or the message authentication method (or the existing object authentication platform) that the object authentication or message authentication through the security chip and server 300 is dependent on algorithm operation through software of message authentication platform and existing security platform), it is a low-cost, low-power, and high-efficiency authentication system that makes it difficult to apply a security system using software in various fields. can be used in
  • the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may perform object authentication or message authentication by performing the same object authentication operation or message authentication operation. Since the structures and object authentication operations of the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 are the same, hereinafter, for convenience of explanation, the first electronic device 100 connects to the second electronic device 500 . Assuming that it is, explain it. All contents of the first electronic device 100 may be applied to the second electronic device 500 , and all contents of the second electronic device 500 may be applied to the first electronic device 100 .
  • 5A is an exemplary block diagram of the first electronic device illustrated in FIG. 4 .
  • the first electronic device 100 may include a transceiver 110 and a security chip 130 .
  • the transceiver 110 may communicate with the server 300 . Also, the transceiver 110 may communicate with the second electronic device 500 through the server 300 .
  • the transceiver 110 is implemented to be distinct from the security chip 130 as shown in FIG. 5A , the present invention is not limited thereto.
  • the transceiver 110 may be implemented in the security chip 130 .
  • the object authentication-related operations performed by the security chip 130 for example, an ID transmission operation of the second electronic device 500 , an authentication result reception operation for the second electronic device 500 , and an ciphertext transmission operation are performed by the transceiver 110 .
  • the transceiver 110 may perform a communication operation in conjunction with the security chip 130 .
  • the security chip 130 performs the object authentication of the first electronic device 100 when the first electronic device 100 performs object authentication on the second electronic device 500 and the second electronic device 500 performs object authentication on the first electronic device 100 .
  • the security chip 130 may include a first PUF circuit 131 , a second PUF circuit 133 , a decrypter 135 , an encryptor 137 , and an authenticator 139 .
  • the security chip 130 may be implemented as a printed circuit board (PCB) such as a motherboard, an integrated circuit (IC), and/or a system on chip (SoC).
  • PCB printed circuit board
  • IC integrated circuit
  • SoC system on chip
  • the first PUF circuit 131 may be used for object authentication of the first electronic device 100 with respect to the second electronic device 500 .
  • the first PUF circuit 131 may be a TRNG PUF-based circuit.
  • the first PUF circuit 131 may generate a random number.
  • the first PUF circuit 131 may output the generated random number to the server 300 and the second PUF circuit 133 as a challenge signal for authenticating the server 300 .
  • the ID (or identifier) of the first electronic device 100 may also be transmitted to the entity authentication server 300 together with the challenge signal. have.
  • the ID of the first electronic device 100 may be transmitted as included in the challenge signal, transmitted independently, or may be packetized together with the challenge signal and transmitted as one packet.
  • the packet may include a challenge signal and an ID of the first electronic device 100 .
  • the second PUF circuit 133 is to be used for object authentication for the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 and object authentication for the first electronic device 100 of the second electronic device 500 .
  • the second PUF circuit 133 may be a CRP PUF-based circuit.
  • the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal in response to an input signal.
  • the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal used for object authentication for the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 .
  • the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal in response to a challenge signal for authenticating the server 300 .
  • the challenge signal output from the first PUF circuit 131 may be input to the second PUF circuit 133 as an input signal, and the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal as an output signal.
  • the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal used for object authentication of the first electronic device 100 of the second electronic device 500 .
  • the second PUF circuit 133 may generate a response signal in response to a challenge signal generated by the server 300 to authenticate the first electronic device 100 .
  • the challenge signal generated by the server 300 may be input to the second PUF circuit 133 as an input signal, and the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal as an output signal.
  • the decryptor 135 may be used for object authentication of the first electronic device 100 with respect to the second electronic device 500 .
  • the decryptor 135 may receive the ciphertext generated by using the challenge signal output by the first PUF circuit 131 from the server 300 .
  • the cipher text may be cipher text generated by the server 300 .
  • the decryptor 135 may decrypt the encrypted text generated by the server 300 using a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal output by the first PUF circuit 131 .
  • the encryptor 137 may be used for object authentication of the second electronic device 500 with respect to the first electronic device 100 .
  • the encryptor 137 may generate an encrypted text so that the first electronic device 100 is authenticated by the server 300 and the second electronic device 500 .
  • the encryptor 137 may generate a cipher text by encrypting the challenge signal generated by the server 300 using a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal generated by the server 300 .
  • the encryptor 137 may transmit the encrypted text generated by the encryptor 137 to the server 300 through the transceiver 110 .
  • the authenticator 139 may be used for object authentication of the first electronic device 100 with respect to the second electronic device 500 .
  • the authenticator 139 may authenticate the server 300 by comparing the decryption value obtained by decrypting the ciphertext generated by the server 300 with the challenge signal output by the first PUF circuit 131 . When the decryption value and the challenge signal output by the first PUF circuit 131 are the same, the authenticator 139 may determine that the authentication of the server 300 is successful. When the decryption value and the challenge signal output by the first PUF circuit 131 are not the same, the authenticator 139 may determine the authentication of the server 300 as failure.
  • the authenticator 139 may authenticate the second electronic device 500 in response to the server 300's successful authentication with respect to the second electronic device 500 .
  • the authenticator 139 may determine that the authentication of the second electronic device 500 is successful.
  • the authenticator 139 may determine that the authentication of the second electronic device 500 fails.
  • the first electronic device 100 accesses the second electronic device 500 through the server 300 in response to the successful authentication of the server 300 and the second electronic device 500 performed by the authenticator 139 . can be performed.
  • the server 300 and the second electronic device 500 are authenticated, the first electronic device 100 connects to the second electronic device 500 through the server 300 and communicates with the second electronic device 500 . can be performed.
  • the server 300 and the second electronic device 500 are not authenticated, the first electronic device 100 does not connect to the second electronic device 500 through the server 300 and the second electronic device 500 ) and may not communicate.
  • the object authentication operation for authenticating the first electronic device 100 to which the second electronic device 500 will access may be the same as the object authentication operation for authenticating the second electronic device 500 to which the first electronic device 100 will access. Therefore, a detailed description will be omitted.
  • FIG. 5B is a schematic block diagram of the first electronic device shown in FIG. 4 according to various embodiments of the present disclosure
  • the first electronic device 100 may include a transceiver 110 and a security chip 130 .
  • the transceiver 110 may communicate with the server 300 .
  • the transceiver 100 may transmit a packet generated by the first electronic device 100 to the server 300 so that authentication of the message generated by the first electronic device 100 is performed.
  • the transceiver 110 may receive a packet transmitted from the server 300 to authenticate the message generated by the second electronic device 500 .
  • the message may be various messages, signals and/or data generated, collected, and/or acquired by each electronic device.
  • the packet transmitted from the server 300 may be a packet generated by the server 300 .
  • the transceiver 110 is implemented to be distinct from the security chip 130 as shown in FIG. 5B , the present invention is not limited thereto.
  • the transceiver 110 may be implemented in the security chip 130 .
  • the transceiver 110 may include a packetizer 111 and a depacketizer 113 .
  • the packetizer 111 may generate a packet by packetizing the message, the challenge signal, and the MAC generated by the first electronic device 100 .
  • a packet may include a message, a challenge signal, and a MAC.
  • the packetizer 111 may transmit the packet to the server 300 .
  • the packetizer 110 may transmit the ID (or identifier) of the first electronic device 100 to the server 300 together with the packet.
  • the ID of the first electronic device 100 may be transmitted independently from the packet or may be transmitted while being included in the packet.
  • the depacketizer 113 may depacketize the packet transmitted from the server 300 to extract a challenge signal, MAC, and message.
  • the extracted challenge signal and MAC may be the challenge signal and MAC generated by the server 300 .
  • the extracted message may be a message generated by the second electronic device 500 .
  • the message generated by the second electronic device 500 is transmitted from the second electronic device 500 to the server 300 , and message authentication is performed by the server 300 , and when the message authentication is successful, the first message from the server 300 is transmitted. It may be transmitted to the electronic device 100 .
  • the depacketizer 113 may transmit the extracted challenge signal, MAC, and message to the security chip 130 .
  • the second electronic device 500 receives the message from the first electronic device 100 .
  • an operation related to message authentication may be performed.
  • the security chip 130 may include a first PUF circuit 131 , a second PUF circuit 133 , a generator 135 , and an authenticator 137 .
  • the security chip 130 may be implemented as a printed circuit board (PCB) such as a motherboard, an integrated circuit (IC), and/or a system on chip (SoC). .
  • PCB printed circuit board
  • IC integrated circuit
  • SoC system on chip
  • the first PUF circuit 131 may be used for message authentication for a message transmitted from the first electronic device 100 of the second electronic device 500 .
  • the first PUF circuit 131 may be a TRNG PUF-based circuit.
  • the first PUF circuit 131 may generate a random number.
  • the first PUF circuit 131 may output the generated random number as a challenge signal for authenticating the message generated by the first electronic device 100 .
  • the second PUF circuit 133 authenticates the message transmitted from the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 and transmits the message transmitted from the first electronic device 100 of the second electronic device 500 . It can be used for message authentication for messages.
  • the second PUF circuit 133 may be a CRP PUF-based circuit.
  • the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal in response to an input signal.
  • the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal used for message authentication with respect to a message transmitted from the first electronic device 100 of the second electronic device 500 .
  • the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal in response to the challenge signal output from the first PUF circuit 131 .
  • the challenge signal output from the first PUF circuit 131 is input to the second PUF circuit 133 as an input signal, and the second PUF circuit 133 corresponds to the challenge signal output from the first PUF circuit 131 .
  • a response signal can be output as an output signal.
  • the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal used for message authentication with respect to a message transmitted from the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 .
  • the second PUF circuit 133 may output a response signal in response to the challenge signal extracted from the depacketizer 133 .
  • the challenge signal extracted from the depacketizer 133 is input to the second PUF circuit 133 as an input signal, and the second PUF circuit 133 is a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal extracted from the depacketizer 133 . can be printed out.
  • the generator 135 performs message authentication for a message transmitted from the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 and performs authentication for a message transmitted from the first electronic device 100 of the second electronic device 500 . It can be used for message authentication.
  • the generator 135 may generate a MAC using the message and the response signal.
  • the generator 135 may generate a MAC used for message authentication for a message transmitted from the first electronic device 100 of the second electronic device 500 .
  • the generator 135 may generate a MAC by using the message generated by the first electronic device 100 and a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal output from the first PUF circuit 131 .
  • the generator 135 may generate a MAC used for message authentication for a message transmitted from the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 .
  • the generator 135 may generate a MAC using a message extracted from the depacketizer 133 and a response signal corresponding to a challenge signal extracted from the depacketizer 133 .
  • the authenticator 137 may be used for message authentication for a message transmitted from the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 .
  • the authenticator 137 may authenticate the message extracted from the depacketizer 133 by comparing the MAC extracted from the depacketizer 133 and the MAC generated by the generator 135 .
  • the authenticator 137 transmits the message extracted from the depacketizer 133 from the second electronic device 500 .
  • the authentication for the message can be determined as success.
  • the authenticator 137 receives the message extracted from the depacketizer 133 from the second electronic device 500 . It may decide to fail authentication for the transmitted message. Since the message authentication operation for the message transmitted by the first electronic device 100 is the same as the message authentication operation for the message transmitted by the second electronic device 500 , a detailed description thereof will be omitted.
  • FIG. 6 shows a schematic block diagram of the server shown in FIG. 4 .
  • FIG. 6 an object authentication operation or a message authentication operation performed by the server 300 to authenticate the second electronic device 500 to which the first electronic device 100 will access will be described. This is substantially the same as an object authentication operation or a message authentication operation performed by the server 300 to authenticate the first electronic device 100 to which the second electronic device 500 will access.
  • the server 300 may include a memory 310 and a processor 330 .
  • the memory 310 may store instructions (or programs) executable by the processor 330 .
  • the instructions may include instructions for executing an operation of the processor 330 and/or an operation of each component of the processor 330 .
  • the processor 330 may process data stored in the memory 310 .
  • the processor 330 may execute computer readable code (eg, software) stored in the memory 310 and instructions induced by the processor 330 .
  • the processor 330 may be a hardware-implemented data processing device having a circuit having a physical structure for executing desired operations.
  • desired operations may include code or instructions included in a program.
  • a data processing device implemented as hardware includes a microprocessor, a central processing unit, a processor core, a multi-core processor, and a multiprocessor. , an Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), and a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA).
  • ASIC Application-Specific Integrated Circuit
  • FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
  • the processor 330 may control the overall operation of the server 300 .
  • the processor 330 may control the operation of the memory 310 .
  • the processor 330 may generate a cipher text in response to the challenge signal transmitted from the first electronic device 100 , and transmit the generated cipher text to the first electronic device 100 .
  • the processor 330 based on the ID of the first electronic device 100 transmitted together with the challenge signal transmitted from the first electronic device 100, the first CRP of the first CRP list and the second CRP list You can get (or extract) a list.
  • the processor 330 may extract a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal transmitted from the first electronic device 100 from the first CRP list in response to the challenge signal transmitted from the first electronic device 100 .
  • the processor 330 may generate a ciphertext by encrypting the challenge signal transmitted from the first electronic device 100 using the extracted response signal.
  • the processor 330 may authenticate the second electronic device 500 in response to the ID of the second electronic device 500 transmitted from the first electronic device 100 .
  • the processor 330 may generate a random number based on the TRNG PUF in response to the ID of the second electronic device 500 .
  • the processor 330 may transmit the generated random number to the second electronic device 500 as a challenge signal for authenticating the second electronic device 500 .
  • the processor 330 may extract a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal generated by the processor 330 from the second CRP list.
  • the processor 330 may receive a ciphertext generated by using the challenge signal generated by the processor 330 from the second electronic device 500 that has received the challenge signal generated by the processor 330 .
  • the encrypted text may be an encrypted text generated by the second electronic device 500 .
  • the processor 330 may decrypt the encrypted text generated by the second electronic device 500 using the extracted response signal.
  • the processor 330 may authenticate the second electronic device 500 by comparing the decryption value obtained by decrypting the ciphertext generated by the second electronic device 500 with the challenge signal generated by the processor 330 .
  • the processor 330 may determine the authentication of the second electronic device 500 as success.
  • the processor 330 may determine the authentication of the second electronic device 500 as failure.
  • the processor 330 may transmit an authentication result for the second electronic device 500 to the first electronic device 100 .
  • the processor 330 transmits to the second electronic device 500 an access request for the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 in response to the authentication success for the second electronic device 500 to the second electronic device 500 .
  • the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 may be connected.
  • the processor 330 may receive a packet generated by the second electronic device 500 .
  • the processor 330 may receive the ID of the second electronic device 500 .
  • the ID of the second electronic device 500 may be transmitted independently from the packet generated by the second electronic device 500 or included in the packet generated by the second electronic device 500 and transmitted.
  • the processor 330 may authenticate the message included in the packet generated by the second electronic device 500 .
  • the processor 330 may extract the challenge signal, the MAC, and the message from the packet generated by the second electronic device 500 .
  • the extracted message may be a message generated by the second electronic device 500 .
  • the extracted challenge signal and MAC may be the challenge signal and MAC generated by the second electronic device 500 so that authentication of the message generated by the second electronic device 500 is performed.
  • the processor 330 selects the second electronic device 500 from the packet generated by the second electronic device 500 . ID can be extracted.
  • the processor 330 may obtain (or extract) a second CRP list corresponding to the second electronic device 500 from among the shared CRP lists by using the ID of the second electronic device 500 .
  • the processor 330 may extract a response signal corresponding to the challenge signal extracted from the second CRP list.
  • the processor 330 may generate a MAC using the extracted message and the extracted response signal.
  • the processor 330 may authenticate the extracted message by comparing the extracted MAC and the generated MAC. When the extracted MAC and the generated MAC are the same, the processor 330 may determine that authentication of the extracted message is successful. When the extracted MAC and the generated MAC are not the same, the processor 330 may determine that authentication of the extracted message is failed. The processor 330 may transmit an authentication result for the message generated by the second electronic device 500 that is the extracted message to the second electronic device 500 . The processor 330 may transmit a packet generated by the processor 330 to the first electronic device 100 in response to the ID of the first electronic device 100 transmitted from the second electronic device 500 .
  • the processor 330 may generate a random number based on the TRNG PUF in response to the ID of the first electronic device 100 transmitted from the second electronic device 500 .
  • the processor 330 may convert the random number into a challenge signal for authenticating the message generated by the second electronic device 500 by the first electronic device 100 .
  • the processor 330 may extract a response signal corresponding to the converted challenge signal from the first CRP list corresponding to the first electronic device 100 .
  • the processor 330 may generate a MAC using the message generated by the second electronic device 500 and the extracted response signal.
  • the processor 330 may generate a packet by packetizing the converted challenge signal, the message generated by the second electronic device 500, and the generated MAC.
  • FIG. 7A illustrates an example for describing an object authentication operation or a message authentication operation between electronic devices and a server
  • FIG. 7B illustrates another example for describing an object authentication operation or a message authentication operation between electronic devices and a server.
  • the individual electronic device is a lightweight device and does not include a memory for storing a shared key, but a TRNG PUF circuit and a CRP PUF circuit may be built-in.
  • a TRNG PUF a random number distribution map and an autocorrelation function graph may be performance indicators of authentication randomness.
  • a Hamming distance and a bit error rate may be performance indicators of authentication identification and authentication stability.
  • the entity authentication or message authentication operation cannot be directly performed by an individual electronic device, but may be performed through the trusted entity authentication server 300 knowing the PUF input/output values of all electronic devices.
  • the server 300 may perform object authentication or message authentication between the second to fourth electronic devices 500 , 700 , and 900 based on the first electronic device 100 .
  • the server 300 performs object authentication or message authentication between the second to fourth electronic devices 500 , 700 , and 900 based on the first electronic device 100 , the limitation is not limited thereto. no.
  • the server 300 may configure the first to fourth electronic devices 100, 500, 700 and 900), object authentication or message authentication may be performed between the other electronic devices except for any one electronic device.
  • object authentication or message authentication between the electronic devices 100, 500, 700, and 900 is performed through an object authentication or message authentication process based on a physically non-replicable function, and is applicable to the object authentication server 300 and lightweight devices. , can be effective.
  • the most efficient method of object authentication or message authentication may be a case in which object authentication or message authentication is performed between the electronic devices 100 , 500 , 700 and 900 through the server 300 .
  • the secret key is not stored inside the lightweight device, and object authentication or message authentication is performed whenever necessary through a generation process based on a physically impossible function, so security and hardware (
  • HW hard ware
  • the object authentication or message authentication through the server 300 can overcome the problem that the existing object authentication or message authentication method is difficult to be employed in lightweight devices, and can lower the risk of hacking.
  • FIG. 8A is a flowchart illustrating entity authentication for authenticating a second electronic device to be accessed by the first electronic device illustrated in FIG. 4 .
  • the first electronic device 100 may share the first CRP list corresponding to the first electronic device 100 with the server 300 through a secure channel.
  • the second electronic device 500 may share the second CRP list corresponding to the second electronic device 500 with the server 300 through a secure channel.
  • the first electronic device 100 may authenticate the server 300 to access the second electronic device 500 .
  • the first electronic device 100 generates a random number based on the TRNG PUF through the first PUF circuit 131 included in the first electronic device 100 and uses the generated random number as a first challenge signal to the server ( 300) can be transmitted (811).
  • the first electronic device 100 may transmit the ID of the first electronic device 100 to the server 300 together with the first challenge signal.
  • the first electronic device 100 inputs a first challenge signal to the second PUF circuit 133 included in the first electronic device 100 so that the second PUF circuit 133 receives a first response corresponding to the first challenge signal.
  • a response signal can be output.
  • the server 300 may receive the first challenge signal and the ID of the first electronic device 100 transmitted from the first electronic device 100 ( S831 ).
  • the server 300 may extract a first CRP list corresponding to the first electronic device 100 from among the stored CRP lists by using the ID of the first electronic device 100 .
  • the server 300 may extract a response signal corresponding to the first challenge signal from the first CRP list.
  • the server 300 may generate the first cipher text by encrypting the first challenge signal using the extracted response signal.
  • the extracted response signal may be an encryption key for encrypting the first challenge signal.
  • the first cipher text may be a cipher text in which the first challenge signal is encrypted.
  • the entity authentication server 300 may transmit the first encrypted text to the first electronic device 100 (832).
  • the first electronic device 100 may receive the first cipher text transmitted from the entity authentication server 300 ( 812 ) and decrypt the first cipher text using the first response signal ( 813 ).
  • the first response signal may be a decryption key for decrypting the first ciphertext.
  • the first electronic device 100 may authenticate the server 300 by comparing the first decryption value from which the first ciphertext is decrypted with the first challenge signal ( 814 ). When the first decryption value and the first challenge signal are the same, the first electronic device 100 may determine that the authentication of the server 300 is successful ( 814a ). When the first decryption value and the first challenge signal are not the same, the first electronic device 100 may determine the authentication of the server 300 as failure ( 814b ).
  • the first electronic device 100 may transmit the ID of the second electronic device 500 to the entity authentication server 300 to request access to the second electronic device 500 . (815).
  • the server 300 may authenticate the second electronic device 500 in response to a request for access to the second electronic device 500 of the first electronic device 100 .
  • the server 300 may receive the ID of the second electronic device 500 ( 833 ) and generate a random number based on the TRNG PUF in response to the ID of the second electronic device 500 .
  • the server 300 may transmit the generated random number to the second electronic device 500 as a second challenge signal ( 834 ).
  • the server 300 may extract a second CRP list corresponding to the second electronic device 500 from among the stored CRP lists by using the ID of the second electronic device 500 .
  • the server 300 may extract a response signal corresponding to the second challenge signal from the second CRP list.
  • the second electronic device 500 may receive the second challenge signal transmitted from the server 300 ( 851 ).
  • the second electronic device 500 may input the second challenge signal to the second PUF circuit included in the second electronic device 500 and output a second response signal corresponding to the second challenge signal.
  • the second PUF circuit included in the second electronic device 500 may be a CRP PUF-based circuit like the second PUF circuit 133 included in the first electronic device 100 .
  • the second electronic device 500 may generate the second cipher text by encrypting the second challenge signal using the second response signal.
  • the second response signal may be an encryption key for encrypting the second challenge signal.
  • the second cipher text may be a cipher text in which the second challenge signal is encrypted.
  • the second electronic device 500 may transmit the second encrypted text to the entity authentication server 300 ( 852 ).
  • the server 300 may receive the second cipher text transmitted from the second electronic device 500 ( 835 ) and decrypt the second cipher text using the second response signal ( 836 ).
  • the second response signal may be a decryption key for decrypting the second ciphertext.
  • the server 300 may authenticate the second electronic device 500 by comparing the second decryption value obtained by decrypting the second ciphertext with the second challenge signal ( 837 ). When the second decryption value and the second challenge signal are the same, the server 300 may determine that the authentication of the second electronic device 500 is successful ( 837a ). When the second decryption value and the second challenge signal are not the same, the server 300 may determine that the authentication of the second electronic device 500 fails ( 837b ).
  • the server 300 transmits a connection request of the first electronic device 100 to the second electronic device 500 (838) to communicate with the first electronic device 100 Connection between the two electronic devices 500 may be performed.
  • the second electronic device 500 may allow the access request of the first electronic device 100 in response to the access request of the first electronic device 100 transmitted from the server 300 ( 853 ). . Accordingly, the second electronic device 500 may communicate with the first electronic device 100 by completing object authentication between the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 ( 854 ).
  • the server 300 transmits the authentication result for the second electronic device 500 to the first electronic device 100 (839) so that the first electronic device 100 is The second electronic device 500 may be connected.
  • the first electronic device 100 may receive an authentication result for the second electronic device 500 transmitted from the server 300 ( 817 ).
  • the first electronic device 100 completes the object authentication between the first electronic device 100 and the second electronic device 500 according to the authentication success of the second electronic device 500 to connect with the second electronic device 500 It is possible to freely access and perform communication (817).
  • the first electronic device 100 , the object authentication server 300 , and the second electronic device 500 may re-perform the object authentication by repeating the above-described object authentication process.
  • 8B is a flowchart illustrating message authentication for authenticating a message generated by the second electronic device shown in FIG. 4 .
  • the first electronic device 100 may share the first CRP list corresponding to the first electronic device 100 with the server 300 through a secure channel.
  • the second electronic device 500 may share the second CRP list corresponding to the second electronic device 500 with the server 300 through a secure channel.
  • the second electronic device 500 may generate a first packet including the first message and transmit the first packet to the server 300 . (811).
  • the second electronic device 500 may generate a TRNG PUF-based random number through the first PUF circuit included in the second electronic device 500 and convert the generated random number into a first challenge signal.
  • the second electronic device 500 inputs a first challenge signal to the second PUF circuit included in the second electronic device 500 so that the second PUF circuit outputs a first response signal corresponding to the first challenge signal.
  • the second electronic device 500 may generate the first MAC by using the first message and the first response signal through the generator included in the second electronic device 500 .
  • the first response signal may be an encryption key for generating the first MAC by encrypting the first message.
  • the second electronic device 500 may generate a first packet by packetizing the first message, the first challenge signal, and the first MAC through the packetizer included in the second electronic device 500 .
  • the second electronic device 500 may include the ID of the second electronic device 500 in the first packet.
  • the second electronic device 500 may transmit the first packet to the server 300 .
  • the server 300 may receive the first packet (831) and authenticate the first message included in the first packet.
  • the server 300 may extract the first message, the first challenge signal, and the first MAC from the first packet. In this case, the server 300 may also extract the ID of the second electronic device 500 from the first packet.
  • the server 300 may obtain a second CRP list corresponding to the second electronic device 500 from among the shared CRP lists by using the ID of the second electronic device 500 .
  • the server 300 may extract a response signal corresponding to the first challenge signal from the second CRP list.
  • the server 300 may generate the second MAC by using the first message and the response signal corresponding to the first challenge signal (833).
  • the response signal corresponding to the first challenge signal may be an encryption key for generating the second MAC by encrypting the first message.
  • the server 300 may authenticate the first message by comparing the first MAC and the second MAC ( 835 ). If the first MAC and the second MAC are the same, the server 300 may determine that the authentication for the first message is successful ( 835a ). If the first MAC and the second MAC are not the same, the server 300 may determine the authentication for the first message as failure ( 835b ).
  • the server 300 may transmit the authentication result to the second electronic device 500 .
  • the second electronic device 500 may transmit the ID of the first electronic device 100 to the server 300 in response to the successful authentication of the first message from the server 300 ( 813 ).
  • the server 300 generates a second packet including the first message in response to the ID of the first electronic device 100 so that the first message is authenticated by the first electronic device 100 ( 837 ), and 2 packets may be transmitted to the first electronic device 100 ( 839 ).
  • the server 300 may generate a random number based on the TRNG PUF in response to the ID of the first electronic device 100 .
  • the server 300 may convert the generated random number into a second challenge signal.
  • the server 300 may obtain a first CRP list corresponding to the first electronic device 100 from among the shared CRP lists by using the ID of the first electronic device 100 .
  • the server 300 may extract a response signal corresponding to the second challenge signal from the first CRP list.
  • the server 300 may generate a third MAC by using a response signal corresponding to the first message and the second challenge signal.
  • the response signal corresponding to the second challenge signal may be an encryption key for generating a third MAC by encrypting the first message.
  • the server 300 may generate a second packet by packetizing the first message, the second challenge signal, and the third MAC.
  • the server 300 may transmit the second packet to the first electronic device 100 .
  • the first electronic device 100 may receive the second packet generated by the message authentication server 300 (851) and authenticate the first message included in the second packet.
  • the first electronic device 100 may depacketize the second packet through the depacketizer 113 to extract the first message, the second challenge signal, and the third MAC included in the second packet. .
  • the first electronic device 100 may input a second challenge signal to the second PUF circuit 133 to cause the second PUF circuit 133 to output a second response signal corresponding to the second challenge signal.
  • the first electronic device 100 may generate a fourth MAC by using the first message and the second response signal through the generator 135 ( 853 ).
  • the second response signal may be an encryption key for generating a fourth MAC by encrypting the first message.
  • the first electronic device 100 may authenticate the first message by comparing the third MAC and the fourth MAC through the authenticator 137 ( 855 ). When the third MAC and the fourth MAC are the same, the first electronic device 100 may determine that the authentication of the first message is successful ( 855a ). When the third MAC and the fourth MAC are not the same, the first electronic device 100 may determine that the authentication of the first message fails ( 855b ).
  • the first electronic device 100 may check the integrity of the first message. In this case, the first electronic device 100 may communicate with the second electronic device 500 by identifying the second electronic device 500 as a correct sender who has transmitted the correct message.
  • the first electronic device 100 , the server 300 , and the second electronic device 500 may repeat the message authentication process to perform message authentication again.
  • the method according to the embodiment may be implemented in the form of program instructions that can be executed through various computer means and recorded in a computer-readable medium.
  • the computer-readable medium may include program instructions, data files, data structures, etc. alone or in combination.
  • the program instructions recorded on the medium may be specially designed and configured for the embodiment, or may be known and available to those skilled in the art of computer software.
  • Examples of the computer-readable recording medium include magnetic media such as hard disks, floppy disks and magnetic tapes, optical media such as CD-ROMs and DVDs, and magnetic such as floppy disks.
  • - includes magneto-optical media, and hardware devices specially configured to store and carry out program instructions, such as ROM, RAM, flash memory, and the like.
  • Examples of program instructions include not only machine language codes such as those generated by a compiler, but also high-level language codes that can be executed by a computer using an interpreter or the like.
  • the hardware devices described above may be configured to operate as one or more software modules to perform the operations of the embodiments, and vice versa.
  • the software may comprise a computer program, code, instructions, or a combination of one or more thereof, which configures a processing device to operate as desired or is independently or collectively processed You can command the device.
  • the software and/or data may be any kind of machine, component, physical device, virtual equipment, computer storage medium or device, to be interpreted by or to provide instructions or data to the processing device. , or may be permanently or temporarily embody in a transmitted signal wave.
  • the software may be distributed over networked computer systems, and stored or executed in a distributed manner. Software and data may be stored in one or more computer-readable recording media.

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Abstract

Procédé d'authentification d'entité dédié à un dispositif léger et dispositifs de réalisation de celui-ci. Un procédé d'authentification d'entité dédié à un dispositif léger, selon un mode de réalisation, comprend les étapes dans lesquelles : un premier dispositif électronique authentifie un serveur d'authentification d'entité; le premier dispositif électronique transmet, au serveur d'authentification d'entité, un ID d'un second dispositif électronique devant faire l'objet d'un accès par le premier dispositif électronique en réponse à une authentification réussie du serveur d'authentification d'entité; et le premier dispositif électronique authentifie le second dispositif électronique sur la base d'un résultat d'authentification du second dispositif électronique du serveur d'authentification d'entité.
PCT/KR2020/019033 2019-12-27 2020-12-23 Procédé d'authentification d'entité ou de message dédié à un dispositif léger, et dispositifs de réalisation de celui-ci WO2021133074A2 (fr)

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KR1020190176844A KR20210083992A (ko) 2019-12-27 2019-12-27 경량 기기 전용 개체 인증 방법 및 이를 수행하는 장치들
KR10-2019-0176844 2019-12-27
KR1020190176843A KR20210083991A (ko) 2019-12-27 2019-12-27 경량 기기 전용 메시지 인증 방법 및 이를 수행하는 장치들
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CN114710299A (zh) * 2022-06-07 2022-07-05 杭州雅观科技有限公司 适用于云端led照明节能系统的轻量认证方法
CN114710299B (zh) * 2022-06-07 2022-08-30 杭州雅观科技有限公司 适用于云端led照明节能系统的轻量认证方法

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