WO2021109817A1 - Key update method, data decryption method, and digital signature authentication method - Google Patents

Abstract

Embodiments of the present application provide a key update method, a data decryption method, and a digital signature authentication method. In the methods, a first key is generated by performing, according to a first-processing count, one-way mapping processing operations on a reference value, a second key is generated by performing, according to a second-processing count, one-way mapping processing operations on the reference value, the second-processing count being less than the first-processing count, wherein the first key is stored locally and used as a primary key, and upon receiving a key update instruction, one-way mapping processing operations are performed on the locally stored reference value according to the second-processing count to generate the second key, and the second key is used as a new primary key, thereby completing an update of the primary key. If information encrypted or signed by the first key is received, the first key is obtained simply by performing one-way mapping processing on the second key, and then the first key is used for decryption or signature authentication. In this way, the invention realizes a key update, and enables one-way derivation of an old key from a current key.

Description

Key update method, data decryption method, digital signature verification method

This application requires the priority of a Chinese patent application filed with the Chinese Patent Office, the application number is 201911221985.X, and the application name is "Key Update Method, Data Decryption Method, and Digital Signature Verification Method" on December 3, 2019. The entire content is incorporated into this application by reference.

Technical field

This application relates to the field of information security technology, in particular to a method for updating a key, a method for decrypting data, and a method for verifying digital signatures.

Background technique

In order to prevent data from being acquired by a third party during transmission, encryption technology is usually used to encrypt the data to protect the data. Encryption technology includes two important factors: encryption algorithm and key. The encryption algorithm uses the key to process the data to be protected to obtain encrypted data.

Transmitting encrypted data can prevent third parties from directly obtaining the data to be protected. However, due to various situations such as leakage or expiration of the key, it is necessary to update the key in a timely manner.

In related technologies, after the key is updated, the old key needs to be stored to prevent the data encrypted by the old key from being received and cannot be decrypted. Therefore, the data transmission party needs to manage all the old keys. On the one hand, it occupies the hardware resources of the data transmission party. On the other hand, once the old key stored by the data transmission party is lost, it cannot be restored based on the current key. The data encrypted by the old key is decrypted.

Summary of the invention

This application provides a method for updating a key, a method for decrypting data, and a method for verifying a digital signature, so as to update the key and be able to deduce the old key in one direction based on the current key. There is no need to store the old key, which saves the resources of the data transmission party, and there is no need to worry about the loss of the old key, and the current key cannot be derived from the old key.

In the first aspect, the present application provides a method for updating a key, the method includes: receiving a key update instruction; obtaining a first key and a reference value stored locally; wherein the first key is assigned by the The reference value is generated after the one-way mapping processing of the first processing times; the one-way mapping processing of the second processing times is performed on the reference value to generate a second key; wherein, the second processing The number of times is less than the first processing number; the first key is replaced with the second key. As a result, the update of the key is realized, and the old key can be deduced in one direction from the current key. There is no need to store the old key, which saves the resources of the data transmission party, and there is no need to worry about the loss of the old key, and the current key cannot be derived from the old key. After receiving the new key sent by the data transmission partner, there is no need for a third party to verify the legality of the new key.

In the above-mentioned key update method, in order to facilitate the correspondence between the version number of the key and the number of one-way mapping processing times, a possible implementation manner is that the difference between the first processing times and the second processing times is One.

In order to ensure the uniqueness of the one-way mapping processing result, a possible implementation manner is that the one-way mapping processing steps include: using a hash algorithm for processing.

In order to enhance the reliability of the key in the embodiment of the present application, one possible implementation is that the processing using a hash algorithm includes: splicing the input of the one-way mapping process with the local identifier, and combining the spliced The result of is used as the input of the hash algorithm.

In order to enable the key update method provided in the embodiment of the present application to be used in asymmetric encryption technology, a possible implementation manner is that the first key is a key in an asymmetric key pair.

In order to avoid the storage risk of the reference value, a possible implementation is that the reference value is obtained from the hardware area of the device, issued by the cloud server, and obtained by any method of external input.

In a second aspect, this application provides a data decryption method. The method includes: receiving encrypted data and a first processing count, and comparing the first processing count with a locally stored second processing count; and according to the comparison result , Determine whether the encrypted data can be decrypted; if so, determine the first key corresponding to the first processing times; use the first key to decrypt the encrypted data. Thus, it is realized that only the updated key is stored locally, when the encrypted data corresponding to the old key is received, the updated key is used to generate the old key, and the old key is used to decrypt the encrypted data.

In the above data decryption method, in order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation is that the judging whether the encrypted data can be decrypted according to the comparison result includes: judging the Whether the first processing number is less than the second processing number; if so, it is determined that the encrypted data cannot be decrypted.

In order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, a possible implementation manner is that, according to the comparison result, determining whether the encrypted data can be decrypted includes: determining whether the first processing times are equal to the The second number of processing times; if yes, use the locally stored second key as the first key.

In order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation manner is that, according to the comparison result, determining whether the encrypted data can be decrypted includes: determining whether the first processing times are greater than the The second number of processing times; if it is, a one-way mapping process of the third number of processing times is performed on the locally stored second key to generate the first key; wherein, the third number of processing times is the first The difference between the number of processing times and the second number of processing times.

In order to ensure the uniqueness of the one-way mapping processing result, one possible implementation manner is that the steps of the one-way mapping processing include: using a hash algorithm for processing.

In order to enhance the reliability of the key in the embodiment of the present application, one possible implementation is that the processing using a hash algorithm includes: splicing the input of the one-way mapping process with the local identifier, and combining the spliced The result of is used as the input of the hash algorithm.

In order to enable the terminal provided by the embodiment of the present application to perform asymmetric encryption/decryption, a possible implementation manner is that the first key is a key in an asymmetric key pair.

In order to avoid the storage risk of the reference value, one possible implementation is that the first key is related to the reference value, and the reference value is obtained from the hardware area of the device, issued by the cloud server, and input by the outside world. One way to obtain.

In a third aspect, the present application provides a digital signature verification method, the method includes: receiving a digital signature and a first processing count, and comparing the first processing count with a locally stored second processing count; According to the comparison result, it is judged whether the digital signature can be verified; if so, the first key pair corresponding to the first processing times is determined; wherein, the first key pair is an asymmetric key pair, so The first key pair includes a first key; the first key pair is used to verify the digital signature. As a result, it is realized that only the updated key pair needs to be stored locally, and when the digital signature corresponding to the old key pair is received, the updated key pair is used to generate the old key pair, and then the old key pair is used The digital signature is verified.

In the above-mentioned digital signature verification method, in order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, a possible implementation manner is that the judging whether the digital signature can be verified according to the comparison result includes: judging Whether the first processing times are less than the second processing times; if so, it is determined that the digital signature cannot be verified.

In order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, a possible implementation manner is that the judging whether the digital signature can be verified according to the comparison result includes: judging whether the first processing times are equal to the The second number of processing times; if yes, use the locally stored second key pair as the first key pair.

In order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation manner is that the judging whether the digital signature can be verified according to the comparison result includes: judging whether the first processing times are greater than the The second number of processing times; if it is, a one-way mapping process of the third number of processing times is performed on the second key in the locally stored second key pair to generate the first key; wherein, the third The processing times are the difference between the first processing times and the second processing times; the first key pair is generated according to the first key.

In order to ensure the uniqueness of the one-way mapping processing result, one possible implementation manner is that the steps of the one-way mapping processing include: using a hash algorithm for processing.

In order to enhance the reliability of the key in the embodiment of the present application, one possible implementation is that the processing using a hash algorithm includes: splicing the input of the one-way mapping process with the local identifier, and combining the spliced The result of is used as the input of the hash algorithm.

In order to avoid the storage risk of the reference value, one possible implementation is that the first key is related to the reference value, and the reference value is obtained from the hardware area of the device, issued by the cloud server, and input by the outside world. One way to obtain.

In the fourth aspect, this application provides a terminal to implement the aforementioned key update method. The terminal includes: a first receiving module, configured to receive a key update instruction; an acquiring module, configured to acquire a first key and a reference value stored locally; wherein the first key is determined by the reference value The one-way mapping process of the first number of processing times is generated; a first processing module is configured to perform the one-way mapping process of the second number of processing times on the reference value to generate a second key; wherein, the The second processing times are less than the first processing times; the replacement module is configured to replace the first key with the second key.

In the foregoing terminal, in order to facilitate the correspondence between the version number of the key and the number of one-way mapping processing times, a possible implementation manner is that the difference between the first processing number and the second processing number is one.

In order to ensure the uniqueness of the unidirectional mapping processing result, a possible implementation manner is that the first processing module is specifically configured to use a hash algorithm to process the reference value for the second number of processing times.

In order to enhance the reliability of the key in the embodiment of the present application, a possible implementation manner is that the first processing module includes: a splicing sub-module for splicing the input of the first processing module with the local identifier; The first setting sub-module is used to use the spliced result as the input of the hash algorithm.

In order to enable the key update method provided in the embodiment of the present application to be used in asymmetric encryption technology, a possible implementation manner is that the first key is a key in an asymmetric key pair.

In order to avoid the storage risk of the reference value, a possible implementation is that the reference value is obtained from the hardware area of the device, issued by the cloud server, and obtained by any method of external input.

In the fifth aspect, this application provides a terminal to implement the aforementioned data decryption method. The terminal includes: a second receiving module for receiving encrypted data and a first processing count; a first comparing module for comparing the first processing count with a locally stored second processing count; a first judging module , Used to determine whether the encrypted data can be decrypted according to the comparison result; a first determining module, used to determine the first processing times when the first determining module determines that the encrypted data can be decrypted Corresponding first key; a decryption module for decrypting the encrypted data using the first key.

In the above terminal, in order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation is that the first judgment module includes: a first judgment sub-module for judging the first processing times Whether it is less than the second processing times; a first determining sub-module for determining that the encrypted data cannot be decrypted when the first determining sub-module determines that the first processing times are less than the second processing times .

In order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation is that the first judgment module includes: a second judgment sub-module for judging whether the first processing times are equal to the second processing times. Processing times; a second setting submodule, for when the second judgment submodule determines that the first processing times are equal to the second processing times, use a locally stored second key as the first key .

In order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation is that the first judgment module includes: a third judgment sub-module for judging whether the first processing times are greater than the second processing times. Processing times; the first processing sub-module, when the third judging sub-module determines that the first processing times are greater than the second processing times, perform a third processing times order on the locally stored second key Mapping processing to generate the first key; wherein the third processing number is the difference between the first processing number and the second processing number.

In order to ensure the uniqueness of the unidirectional mapping processing result, a possible implementation manner is that the first processing submodule is specifically configured to use a hash algorithm to process the reference value for a third number of processing times.

In order to enhance the reliability of the key in the embodiment of the present application, a possible implementation is that the first processing submodule includes: a first splicing unit for combining the input of the one-way mapping process with the local identifier Perform splicing; the first setting unit is used to use the spliced result as the input of the hash algorithm.

In order to enable the terminal provided by the embodiment of the present application to perform asymmetric encryption/decryption, a possible implementation manner is that the first key is a key in an asymmetric key pair.

In order to avoid the storage risk of the reference value, one possible implementation is that the first key is related to the reference value, and the reference value is obtained from the hardware area of the device, issued by the cloud server, and input by the outside world. One way to obtain.

In the sixth aspect, this application provides a terminal to implement the aforementioned digital signature verification method. The terminal includes: a third receiving module for receiving a digital signature and a first processing count; a second comparing module for comparing the first processing count with a locally stored second processing count; and a second judging module , For determining whether the digital signature can be verified according to the comparison result; a second determining module, for determining the first processing times when the second determining module determines that the digital signature can be verified Corresponding first key pair; wherein, the first key pair is an asymmetric key pair, and the first key pair includes a first key; the verification module is configured to use the first key pair The digital signature is verified.

In the above-mentioned terminal, in order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation is that the second judgment module includes: a fourth judgment sub-module for judging the first processing times Whether it is less than the second processing times; a second determining sub-module for determining that the digital signature cannot be verified when the fourth determining sub-module determines that the first processing times are less than the second processing times .

In order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, a possible implementation is that the second judgment module includes: a fifth judgment sub-module for judging whether the first processing times are equal to the second processing times. Processing times; the third setting submodule is used for when the fifth judgment submodule determines that the first processing times are equal to the second processing times, use the locally stored second key pair as the first secret Key pair.

In order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation is that the second judgment module includes: a sixth judgment sub-module for judging whether the first processing times are greater than the second processing times. Processing times; a second processing sub-module for determining the second key in the locally stored second key pair when the sixth judging sub-module determines that the first processing times are greater than the second processing times Perform a one-way mapping process of a third number of processing times to generate the first key; wherein, the third number of processing times is the difference between the first number of processing times and the second number of processing times; a generation sub-module, It is used to generate the first key pair according to the first key.

In order to ensure the uniqueness of the one-way mapping processing result, a possible implementation manner is that the second processing submodule is specifically configured to use a hash algorithm to process the reference value for a third number of processing times.

In order to enhance the reliability of the key in the embodiment of the present application, a possible implementation is that the second processing submodule includes: a second splicing unit for combining the input of the one-way mapping process with the local identifier Perform splicing; the second setting unit is used to use the spliced result as the input of the hash algorithm.

In order to avoid the storage risk of the reference value, one possible implementation is that the first key is related to the reference value, and the reference value is obtained from the hardware area of the device, issued by the cloud server, and input by the outside world. One way to obtain.

In a seventh aspect, the present application provides an electronic device, including: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and capable of running on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the electronic device executes such as The method of the first, second, or third aspect.

In an eighth aspect, this application provides a computer-readable storage medium in which a computer program is stored, and when it runs on a computer, the computer can execute the first, second, or third aspect The method described.

Description of the drawings

Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of symmetric encryption technology;

Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of asymmetric encryption technology;

Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a digital signature verification method;

4 is a schematic flowchart of a method for updating a key provided by an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 5a is a schematic diagram of a method for generating a symmetric key provided by an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 5b is a schematic diagram of another method for generating a symmetric key provided by an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 6a is a schematic diagram of an asymmetric key generation method based on a large integer factorization problem provided by an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 6b is a schematic diagram of another asymmetric key generation method based on a large integer factorization problem provided by an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 7a is a schematic diagram of an asymmetric key generation method based on the discrete logarithm problem on integers according to an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 7b is a schematic diagram of another asymmetric key generation method based on the discrete logarithm problem on integers according to an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 7c is a schematic diagram of yet another method for generating an asymmetric key based on the discrete logarithm problem on integers according to an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 7d is a schematic diagram of yet another method for generating an asymmetric key based on the discrete logarithm problem on integers according to an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 8a is a schematic diagram of an asymmetric key generation method based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem provided by an embodiment of the application;

8b is a schematic diagram of another asymmetric key generation method based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem provided by an embodiment of the application;

Fig. 8c is a schematic diagram of yet another method for generating an asymmetric key based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem provided by an embodiment of the application;

8d is a schematic diagram of yet another method for generating an asymmetric key based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem provided by an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 9 is a schematic flowchart of a data decryption method proposed in an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 10 is a schematic flowchart of a digital signature verification method proposed by an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 11a is a schematic diagram of the structure of generating keys of different versions of a terminal application provided by an embodiment of the application; FIG.

FIG. 11b is a schematic diagram of a flow of generating keys of different versions by the key generation module provided in an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 12a is a schematic diagram of the structure of a terminal application that generates an updated key according to an embodiment of the application; FIG.

FIG. 12b is a schematic diagram of the process of generating an updated key by the key generation module provided by an embodiment of the application; FIG.

FIG. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal application provided by an embodiment of the application for encryption, decryption/digital signature verification;

FIG. 14 is a schematic structural diagram of a home device provided by an embodiment of the application for key verification;

FIG. 15 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal provided by an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 16 is a schematic structural diagram of another terminal proposed in an embodiment of this application;

FIG. 17 is a schematic structural diagram of another terminal according to an embodiment of the application;

FIG. 18 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the application; and

FIG. 19 is a schematic structural diagram of a computer-readable storage medium proposed in an embodiment of this application.

Detailed ways

The embodiments of the present application are described in detail below. Examples of the embodiments are shown in the accompanying drawings, wherein the same or similar reference numerals indicate the same or similar elements or elements with the same or similar functions. The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary, and are intended to explain the technical solutions of the present application, and should not be understood as a limitation to the present application.

The following describes the key update method, data decryption method, digital signature verification method, terminal, and computer-readable storage medium of the embodiments of the present application with reference to the accompanying drawings.

In order to clearly explain the key update method, data decryption method, and digital signature verification method provided in the embodiments of the present application, first, the encryption technology and the digital signature verification technology are described.

In the process of data transmission from the sender to the receiver, both parties of the data transmission do not want the transmitted data to be obtained by a third party. It is convenient for the transmission to encrypt the data using encryption technology.

In the encryption process, the data to be transmitted is called the original text, and the original text is encrypted to obtain the cipher text. The cipher text is usually in the form of garbled codes. If the ciphertext is transmitted on an open channel, even if a third party intercepts the information, only the ciphertext can be obtained, but the original text cannot be obtained.

The sender uses encryption technology to encrypt the original text and sends the cipher text to the receiver. Correspondingly, after receiving the ciphertext, the receiver needs to decrypt the ciphertext to restore the ciphertext to the original text, so as to realize the encrypted transmission of data from the sender to the receiver.

Encryption technology includes two important factors: encryption algorithm and key. The encryption algorithm calculates the original text and the key to get the ciphertext. For both parties of data transmission, in order to prevent the encryption method from being cracked by a third party, the encryption method is usually updated by updating the key. In other words, both parties of data transmission always use the same encryption algorithm, and use different keys to encrypt the original text, making it impossible for a third party to crack the encryption method, thereby ensuring the security of data transmission.

Among related technologies, encryption technologies can be divided into two categories, one is symmetric encryption technology, and the other is asymmetric encryption technology.

Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of symmetric encryption technology. As shown in Figure 1, in symmetric encryption technology, the keys used for data encryption and decryption are the same, that is, the sender uses the same key for encryption and the receiver uses the same key for decryption. Once the key is known by a third party, the key can be used to decrypt the intercepted ciphertext, and the encryption technology is cracked. Therefore, in symmetric encryption technology, the key can only be known by the sender and receiver, and different senders and receivers will use different keys during data transmission.

Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of asymmetric encryption technology. As shown in Figure 2, in the asymmetric encryption technology, a set of key pairs are used to complete data encryption and decryption. A set of keys includes a public key and a private key. The public key is disclosed by the recipient to the public, and the sender uses the public key disclosed by the recipient to encrypt the original text when transmitting data with the recipient. After receiving the ciphertext, the receiver uses the private key corresponding to the public key to decrypt the ciphertext. For the receiver, a set of key pairs can be used to encrypt data transmission with multiple senders.

It should be noted that, unlike symmetric encryption technology, in asymmetric encryption technology, a public key and a private key form a set of key pairs. The public key and the private key are different, and the corresponding private key cannot be determined based on the public key.

In addition, similar to symmetric encryption technology, in asymmetric encryption technology, the public key is used for encryption, and the corresponding private key can be used for decryption. If the private key is used for encryption, the corresponding public key can also be used for decryption. In other words, in a set of key pairs, the distinction between a public key and a private key does not lie in whether it is used for encryption or decryption, but whether it is disclosed to the public. The public key is called the public key and cannot be known by others. It is called a private key.

Figure 3 is a schematic diagram of a digital signature verification method. As shown in Figure 3, based on the above features of asymmetric encryption technology, asymmetric encryption technology can also be used for digital signature verification, that is, the sender uses the private key to digitally sign the original text, and the receiver uses the public key to verify the digital signature. Specifically, the method of digital signature is to use a private key to encrypt the original text, and the method of verification is to use a public key to decrypt the cipher text. If the decrypted content is the same as the original, the identity of the sender can be confirmed.

Further, in order to facilitate the receiver to determine whether the decrypted content is the same as the original text, a possible implementation manner is that the sender sends the information abstract of the original text together with the ciphertext to the receiver. Among them, the information digest of the original text is generated after the original text is processed by a hash function. The hash function is a function that can compress any length of the original text to a fixed-length message digest, which is difficult to reverse. In other words, regardless of the length of the original text, after the hash function is processed, a fixed-length message digest will be generated, and the content of the original text cannot be restored through the message digest. Correspondingly, if there is a difference in the content of the original text, even if it is a subtle difference, the message digest generated will be different.

Therefore, after the receiver uses the public key to decrypt the ciphertext, the decrypted content is processed using a hash function to generate a message digest of the decrypted content, which is then compared with the received message digest of the original text. If the two are exactly the same, it can be determined that the decrypted content is the same as the original, so as to confirm the identity of the sender.

Based on the foregoing description of symmetric encryption technology and asymmetric encryption technology, it can be known that once the key in the symmetric encryption technology is known by a third party, the symmetric encryption technology will be cracked. Once the private key in the asymmetric encryption technology is known by a third party, the asymmetric encryption technology is cracked. Therefore, preventing third parties from obtaining keys and private keys is the key to encryption technology, and regular updating of keys or key pairs has become an important means to improve the reliability of encryption technology.

It can be understood that the update of the key or the key pair requires the sender and the receiver to perform synchronously. If one party uses the updated key and the other party uses the old key, data transmission cannot be realized.

In the prior art, different solutions are adopted to solve the above-mentioned problems, and the existing technical solutions are described and analyzed below.

In the first scheme, the data transmission party stores the old key after completing the key update, and uses the key version number to manage the old keys of different versions. Once it is found that the other party uses the old key for data transmission encryption or digital signature, the corresponding version of the key is used for decryption or digital signature verification.

For the first scheme, although the data transmission party can quickly obtain the old key, it needs to continuously store and manage the old key. As the number of key updates increases, the number of old keys gradually increases, and the old key is stored and managed. The key needs to consume a lot of resources, especially when the key is frequently updated, the number of old keys grows more rapidly. In addition, once the data transmission party loses the stored old key and cannot be restored, the old key cannot be used.

In the second scheme, the two parties of the data transmission synchronously store a large number of keys of different versions in advance, and use the key version number to manage the keys of different versions. When the key is updated, the data transmission party determines the updated key version and can obtain the corresponding version of the key locally. Once it is found that the other party uses the old key for data transmission encryption or digital signature, the corresponding version of the key is used for decryption or digital signature verification.

For the second scheme, although the integrity of the key can be ensured when the key is updated, there is no need to verify the integrity of the updated key, but both parties of the data transmission need to store and manage a large number of different versions of the key, which consumes a lot of Resources. In addition, similar to the first scheme, once the data transmission party loses the stored key and cannot be restored, the key cannot be used.

In the third scheme, the data transmission party stores the master key and generates keys of different versions based on the master key. That is, the data transmission party can generate the key corresponding to the version number based on the version number based on the master key. Specifically, the master key and the version number can be subjected to a function operation to generate the corresponding key.

For the third scheme, the data transmission party does not need to store and manage a large number of keys, but the keys between different versions are not connected, and the old keys cannot be derived one-way from the updated keys. It needs to be generated based on the master key. Old key.

Based on the above description and analysis of the existing technical solutions, it can be known that in the prior art, after the key update is completed, it is necessary to store the old key or regenerate the old key based on the master key. To get the old key.

In order to solve the above problem, the embodiment of the present application proposes a key update method. When receiving the information encrypted by the old key or digitally signed, the current key is subjected to a one-way mapping process to obtain the old key. Key, and then use the old key for decryption or signature verification. Both can realize the update of the key, and can deduce the old key one-way according to the current key.

FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of a method for updating a key provided by an embodiment of the application. As shown in Figure 4, the method includes:

Step S101: Receive a key update instruction.

Based on the foregoing description of the encryption technology, it can be known that the key can be updated periodically during use, or it can be updated when the key is found to be leaked or there is a risk of leakage to ensure the security of the key.

Step S102: Obtain a first key and a reference value stored locally.

Wherein, the first key is generated from the reference value after the one-way mapping process of the first processing times. One-way mapping refers to an irreversible mapping. For example, A gets B through one-way mapping, but B cannot be reduced to A. Therefore, after the one-way mapping process for the first number of times of processing is performed on the reference value, the first key can be obtained, but the first key cannot be restored.

It should be noted that, in the method for updating the key in the embodiment of the present application, the key currently in use, that is, the first key, is stored on the data transmission party.

It can be understood that since the keys of each version of the data transmission party in the embodiment of the present application are generated based on the reference value, in order to ensure that the generated keys are different, the reference value of different data transmission parties cannot be the same. In addition, in order to prevent the key from leaking, the reference value used to generate the key should also be kept secret.

The first possible implementation is that the data transmission party uses its own hardware key as the reference value, and the hardware key is stored in the hardware area of the data transmission party, which is safe and reliable.

The second possible implementation is that when the data transmission party registers with the cloud server, the cloud server generates a corresponding reference value according to the hardware information of the data transmission party, and the reference value is stored on the cloud server. The cloud server sends the reference value to the data transmission party in a safe manner, avoiding the data transmission party to directly store the reference value.

The third possible implementation is that the user manually enters the user password as the reference value to avoid the data transmission party directly storing the reference value.

In the above-mentioned second and third possible implementation manners, the data transmission party does not store the reference value, and each time the reference value needs to be used, the reference value is generated by accessing the cloud server or prompting the user to enter the user password.

Step S103: Perform one-way mapping processing for the second number of processing times on the reference value to generate a second key.

Wherein, the second processing times are less than the first processing times.

It can be understood that the second key is the updated key. In the key update method provided in the embodiment of this application, the method of generating the first key is similar to that of generating the second key, both of which are based on the reference value. Multiple one-way mapping processing, but the second processing times corresponding to the second key are less than the first processing times of the first key. Based on the foregoing description of the one-way mapping, it can be known that by performing a preset number of one-way mappings on the second key, the first key can be obtained, but the second key cannot be generated based on the first key.

That is to say, the embodiment of the present application can generate the key before the update based on the key after the update, but cannot generate the key after the update based on the key before the update. It can prevent a third party from deriving the updated key based on the leaked old key.

Step S104: Replace the first key with the second key.

It can be understood that after the updated key is generated, the current key needs to be replaced to complete the key update, and there is no need to store the old key.

In addition, in the process of data transmission, the sender and receiver of the data transmission need to be synchronized to realize the key update. In the existing key update method, usually one party of the data transmission completes the key update, and then the updated key is sent to the other party of the data transmission to complete the key synchronization. However, when the updated key is transmitted to the other party of data transmission, there may be a risk of data loss or tampering, and it is necessary to rely on a trusted third party to verify the updated key.

In the method for updating the key provided by the embodiment of the present application, after receiving the second key sent by the data transmission partner and the corresponding second processing times, the second processing times and the first processing times are first compared.

If the second processing times are greater than or equal to the first processing times, it indicates that the second key sent by the data transmission partner is an old key, and the second key does not need to be authenticated, and there is no need to update the locally stored first key.

If the second number of processing times is less than the first number of processing times, one-way mapping processing of the third number of processing times can be performed on the second key, and the processed result can be verified with the first key stored locally in a fixed field. If passed, the locally stored first key is replaced with the second key. Wherein, the third processing number is the difference between the first processing number and the second processing number.

In summary, the method for updating the key provided by the embodiment of the present application includes: receiving a key update instruction. Obtain the first key and reference value stored locally. Wherein, the first key is generated from the reference value after the one-way mapping process of the first processing times. A one-way mapping process of the second number of processing times is performed on the reference value to generate a second key. Wherein, the second processing times are less than the first processing times. Replace the first key with the second key. As a result, the update of the key is realized, and the old key can be deduced in one direction from the current key. There is no need to store the old key, which saves the resources of the data transmission party, and there is no need to worry about the loss of the old key, and the current key cannot be derived from the old key. After receiving the new key sent by the data transmission partner, there is no need for a third party to verify the legality of the new key.

Further, in order to facilitate the correspondence between the version number of the key and the number of one-way mapping processing times, a possible implementation manner is that the difference between the first processing number and the second processing number is one. It can be understood that the first processing times and the second processing times are respectively the processing times corresponding to the first key before the update and the second key after the update in a key update process, and the first key before the update It is one version different from the updated second key. Therefore, when the difference between the first processing times and the second processing times is one, the first processing times can be used to identify the version of the first key, and the second processing times can be used to identify the version of the first key. Identifies the version of the second key.

It should be noted that the second processing times are less than the first processing times, so the version identifier of the updated second key is numerically smaller than the version identifier of the first key before the update. In other words, the newer the generated key, the smaller the corresponding processing times, and the smaller the version identification value.

In addition, the one-way mapping processing steps in the embodiment of the present application may include using a hash algorithm for processing, and the hash algorithm generates a unique corresponding hash value by performing a hash operation on the input content.

In the process of generating the first key, the reference value is hashed for the first number of processing times (for example, 6 times) to generate the corresponding hash value as the first key.

When the first key is updated, the reference value is hashed for the second number of processing times (for example, 5 times) to generate the corresponding hash value, as the second key, replace the first key with the second key Key to complete the update of the first key.

It can be understood that the first key is generated from the reference value through 6 hash operations. In the process of generating the first key, when the reference value is hashed 5 times, the hash value obtained is the same as the second The keys are exactly the same, and one more hash operation is performed to get the first key. Therefore, the second key can generate the first key after one hash operation. After completing the update of the first key, the data transmission party can directly generate the first key based on the second key. On the contrary, due to the difficult-to-reverse characteristic of the hash algorithm, the data transmission party cannot directly generate the second key based on the first key.

It should be particularly noted that the hash algorithm in the embodiment of the present application may be any known hash algorithm such as SHA-256 and SHA-512, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.

Further, in order to enhance the reliability of the key in the embodiment of the present application, one possible implementation is that the foregoing processing using a hash algorithm includes: splicing the input of the one-way mapping process with the local identification, and then splicing The result is used as the input of the hash algorithm.

Among them, the local identifier is the unique identifier of the data transmission party, and it always remains unchanged. That is, in each one-way mapping process, the input of the one-way mapping process is spliced with the local identifier, and then the spliced result is input to the hash algorithm for hash operation. Specifically, the local identification may use the hardware identification of the data transmission party, or may use the application identification of the software application for data transmission, or may also use an artificially set identification, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.

Therefore, the input of each hash operation is the result of the splicing of the input of the previous hash operation and the fixed identifier, which enhances the complexity of the hash algorithm and further improves the security of the generated key.

Based on the foregoing description of related technologies, it can be known that in symmetric encryption technology, the sender and receiver of data transmission use the same key. When the key is updated, it is only necessary to replace the first key before the update with the one after the update. The second key.

In asymmetric key technology, the sender and receiver of data transmission use a set of key pairs. When the key is updated, both the private key and the public key in the key pair need to be updated.

In the embodiment of this application, a possible implementation is to use the first key as the private key, and the third key matching the first key as the public key, and the first key and the third key are composed of Asymmetric key pair. When generating the asymmetric key pair, perform a one-way mapping of the first processing times on the reference value to generate the first key, and then generate the third key after calculation from the first key, thereby generating the asymmetric key Correct.

Another possible implementation is to use the first key as the public key, and the third key matching the first key as the private key, and the first key and the third key form an asymmetric key pair. When generating the asymmetric key pair, perform a one-way mapping of the first processing times on the reference value to generate the first key, and then generate the third key after calculation from the first key, thereby generating the asymmetric key Correct.

In order to more clearly illustrate the method for updating the key provided in the embodiment of the present application, an example is given below.

Fig. 5a is a schematic diagram of a method for generating a symmetric key provided by an embodiment of the application. Fig. 5b is a schematic diagram of another method for generating a symmetric key provided by an embodiment of the application. As shown in Figure 5a, MK in the figure represents the reference value. In order to facilitate the unified identification of the key version, Key _{-1 is} used to represent MK. After the reference value is hashed 1 to m times, respectively, m can be obtained. One version of the key, namely Key ₀ ~ Key _m . In the process of using the key, first use Key _m as the key, and replace Key _{m with Key m-1} to realize an update to the key. And so on, until Key _{0 is} used to replace Key _1.

Similarly, as shown in FIG. 5b, before each hash operation is performed, the output of the previous hash operation is spliced with the local identification APPTAG, and then the spliced result is hashed. Specifically, the reference value MK is spliced with the local identification APPTAG, and the spliced result (Key _-1 |APPTAG) is hashed to obtain Key ₀ . The Key ₀ and the local identification APPTAG are spliced together, and then the spliced result (Key ₀ |APPTAG) is hashed to obtain Key ₁ . By analogy, m versions of keys can be obtained respectively, namely Key ₀ to Key _m . In the process of using the key, the way of realizing the key update is the same as the process in Figure 5a, and will not be repeated here.

Fig. 6a is a schematic diagram of an asymmetric key generation method based on a large integer factorization problem provided by an embodiment of the application. Fig. 6b is a schematic diagram of another method for generating an asymmetric key based on a large integer factorization problem provided by an embodiment of the application.

What needs to be explained first is that the asymmetric encryption technology based on the decomposition of large integers is also known as RSA encryption technology. RSA encryption technology has the common characteristics of asymmetric encryption technology, that is, through a set of keys including public and private keys. To complete data encryption and decryption.

In addition, RSA encryption technology mainly relies on the problem of prime factor decomposition of large numbers to ensure the reliability of encryption technology. Specifically, given the product of two large prime numbers, it is impossible to directly perform prime factor decomposition on the product to obtain the corresponding two large prime numbers, thereby ensuring the reliability of the encryption technology.

The principle of the RSA encryption algorithm is as follows. First, select two large prime numbers p and q, calculate the value of p*q and the value of (p-1)*(q-1), and generate and (p-1)*(q- 1) A relatively prime random number e.

According to the formula: (d*e)mod(p-1)*(q-1)=1, calculate the possible value of d. It should be noted that there are multiple possible values of d that meet the above formula, and any one of them Any value as d is acceptable. Using (e, n) as the public key of the RSA encryption algorithm and (d, n) as the private key of the RSA encryption algorithm, a set of key pairs of the RSA encryption algorithm can be generated. It can be understood that due to the difficulty of decomposing the prime factor of n, under the premise of knowing the public key (e, n), the value of p and q cannot be calculated based on the value of n, so it is impossible to determine (p-1)* The value of (q-1), so the value of d cannot be determined. In other words, the private key (d, n) cannot be determined from the public key (e, n).

When encrypting, use the formula: ciphertext = original text ^e modn to encrypt the original text, and when decrypting, use the formula: original text = cipher text ^d modn to decrypt the cipher text. The specific decryption algorithm principle is: ciphertext ^d modn=(original ^e modn) ^d modn=original ^ed modn=original ^{(p-1)*(q-1)+1} modn=original, thus ensuring that the private key can be used to The ciphertext encrypted by the public key is decrypted.

When digitally signing, use the formula: ciphertext = original text ^d modn to encrypt the original text, and when verifying the digital signature, use the formula: original text = cipher text ^e modn to decrypt the cipher text. The principle of the specific digital signature verification is similar to the principle of the decryption algorithm, and will not be repeated here.

As shown in Figure 6a, after a hash operation is performed on the reference value MK, _{the specified part of the large number n 0} in the RSA encryption algorithm is generated, and the entire large number n _{0 is} further generated. Based on the foregoing description of the RSA encryption algorithm, you can It is known that the generated large number n ₀ is the product of two large prime numbers p ₀ and q ₀ , and then _{a random number e 0 that is relatively prime to (p 0} -1)*(q ₀ -1) is randomly generated. In order to save computing resources, 65537 can also be directly used as the random number e ₀ . According to the formula: (d ₀ *e ₀ )mod(p ₀ -1)*(q ₀ -1)=1, the value of d ₀ is calculated. Use (e ₀ , n ₀ ) as the public key and (d ₀ , n ₀ ) as the private key to generate a set of key pairs.

After performing a hash operation on n _{0 , generate the specified part of the large number n 1} in the RSA encryption algorithm, and further generate the entire large number n ₁ , the generated large number n ₁ is the two large prime numbers p ₁ and q ₁ Multiply the product, and then randomly generate a random number e _{1 that is relatively prime to (p 1} -1)*(q ₁ -1). In order to save computing resources, 65537 can also be directly used as the random number e ₁ . According to the formula: (d ₁ *e ₁ )mod(p ₁ -1)*(q ₁ -1)=1, the value of d ₁ is calculated. Using (e ₁ , n ₁ ) as the public key and (d ₁ , n ₁ ) as the private key, a set of key pairs are generated.

By analogy, after m processing, m groups of key pairs are generated. In the process of using the key, first use (e _m , n _m ), (d _m , n _m ) as the key pair, use (e _m-1 , n _m-1 ), (d _m-1 , n _{m -1) (e m, n m),} (d m, n m) is replaced, the key update realize pair. By analogy, until (e ₀ , n ₀ ), (d ₀ , n ₀ ) is used to replace (e ₁ , n ₁ ), (d ₁ , n _{1 ).}

It should be noted that in the above-mentioned key pair generation process, the values of e, n, and d generated in each one-way mapping process are not unique. For example, after performing a hash operation on the reference value MK, _{the specified part of the large number n 0} in the RSA encryption algorithm is generated, and the entire large number n _{0 is} further generated, so that the large number n ₀ is two large prime numbers p ₀ and q _{The product of 0} , the large number n ₀ that meets the condition is not unique. For another example, the random number e _{0 that is relatively prime to (p 0} -1)*(q ₀ -1) also has a variety of possible values, which conforms to the formula (d ₀ *e ₀ )mod(p ₀ -1)*( There are also various values _{of d 0} required for q ₀ -1)=1.

It is understandable that if the value of the key pair generated after each one-way mapping process is not unique, the number of one-way mapping processes cannot be one-to-one correspondence with keys of different versions, and the current key cannot be one-way mapped. After processing, the old key is generated.

In order to make the key pair generated after each one-way mapping process have an exact value, the possible values of n, e, and d can be selected according to certain rules to determine the unique value. In the process of determining the value of the large number n, the first large number searched according to certain rules is selected. In the selection process of the random number e, certain rules need to be followed to ensure that the new key pair is hashed. The old key can be decomposed, and when the value of d is determined, the smallest value that conforms to the formula can be selected as the value of d. Therefore, after each one-way mapping process, the numerical value of n, e, and d is unique.

As shown in Figure 6b, the reference value MK is spliced with the local identification APPTAG, and after a hash operation is performed on the spliced result, _{the specified part of the large number n 0} in the RSA encryption algorithm is generated, and the entire large number n is further generated. ₀ , based on the foregoing description of the RSA encryption algorithm, it can be known that the generated large number n ₀ is the product of two large prime numbers p ₀ and q ₀ , and then randomly generated and (p ₀ -1)*(q ₀ -1) A relatively prime random number e ₀ . In order to save computing resources, 65537 can also be directly used as the random number e ₀ . According to the formula (d ₀ *e ₀ )mod(p ₀ -1)*(q ₀ -1)=1, the value of d ₀ is calculated. Use n ₀ as the public key and d ₀ as the private key to generate a set of key pairs.

Splice n ₀ with the local identification APPTAG, and perform a hash operation on the spliced result to generate _{the specified part of the large number n 1} in the RSA encryption algorithm, and further generate the entire large number n ₁ , the generated large number n ₁ is the product of two large prime numbers p ₁ and q ₁ , and then randomly generates a random number e _{1 that is relatively prime to (p 1} -1)*(q ₁ -1). In order to save computing resources, 65537 can also be directly used as the random number e ₁ . According to the formula: (d ₁ *e ₁ )mod(p ₁ -1)*(q ₁ -1)=1, the value of d ₁ is calculated. Use n ₁ as the public key and d ₁ as the private key to generate a set of key pairs.

By analogy, after m operations, m groups of key pairs are generated.

In order to ensure that the key pair generated after each one-way mapping process has an exact value, the aforementioned method can be used to determine a unique value from the possible values of n, e, and d, which will not be repeated here.

In the process of using the key, the way of realizing the key update is the same as the process in Fig. 6a, and will not be repeated here.

FIG. 7a is a schematic diagram of an asymmetric key generation method based on a discrete logarithm problem on integers provided by an embodiment of the application. Fig. 7b is a schematic diagram of another asymmetric key generation method based on the discrete logarithm problem on integers provided by an embodiment of the application. FIG. 7c is a schematic diagram of another asymmetric key generation method based on the discrete logarithm problem on integers provided by an embodiment of the application. FIG. 7d is a schematic diagram of yet another method for generating an asymmetric key based on the discrete logarithm problem on integers provided by an embodiment of the application.

It needs to be explained first that the asymmetric encryption technology based on the discrete logarithm problem on integers is also known as DSA encryption technology. Unlike the aforementioned RSA encryption technology, DSA encryption technology mainly relies on the discrete logarithm problem on integers to ensure The encryption technology is reliable, and although the DSA encryption algorithm has a key pair including a public key z and a private key d, it is a one-way encryption algorithm, that is, the ciphertext generated after the public key is encrypted cannot be restored to the original text by the private key. Therefore, it is only suitable for the verification of digital signatures, not for data encryption.

As shown in Figure 7a, after a hash operation is performed on the reference value MK, the modulo operation of (q-1) is added and one is added to obtain the private key d ₀ in the DSA encryption algorithm, where q is agreed in advance Public prime numbers. According to the formula: z ₀ =g^d ₀ modp, calculate the public key z ₀ to generate a set of key pairs. Among them, p is the public prime number agreed in advance, g is a generator on the agreed finite field, and q is the order of g.

After performing a hash operation on d ₀ , then add one after modulo (q-1) to obtain the private key d ₁ in the DSA encryption algorithm. According to the formula: z ₁ =g^d ₁ modp, calculate the public key z ₁ to generate a set of key pairs.

By analogy, after m processing, m groups of key pairs are generated. In the process of using the key, first use (d _m , z _m ) as the key pair, and use (d _m-1 , z _m-1 ) to _{replace (d m} , z _m ) to realize the key pair Update once. And so on, until (d ₀ , z ₀ ) is used to replace (d ₁ , z _{1 ).}

As shown in Figure 7b, the reference value MK is spliced with the local identification APPTAG, and the spliced structure is hashed once, and then the (q-1) modulo operation is added and one is added to obtain the privacy in the DSA encryption algorithm. The key d ₀ , where q is the public prime number agreed in advance. According to the formula: z ₀ =g^d ₀ modp, calculate the public key z ₀ to generate a set of key pairs. Among them, p is the public prime number agreed in advance, g is a generator on the agreed finite field, and q is the order of g.

Splicing d ₀ with the local identification APPTAG, performing a hash operation on the spliced result, and then modulo (q-1) and adding one to obtain the private key d ₁ in the DSA encryption algorithm. According to the formula: z ₁ =g^d ₁ modp, calculate the public key z ₁ to generate a set of key pairs.

By analogy, after m processing, m groups of key pairs are generated. In the process of using the key, first use (d _m , z _m ) as the key pair, and use (d _m-1 , z _m-1 ) to _{replace (d m} , z _m ) to realize the key pair Update once. And so on, until (d ₀ , z ₀ ) is used to replace (d ₁ , z _{1 ).}

As shown in Figure 7c, after a hash operation is performed on the reference value MK, the modulo operation of (q-1) is added and one is added to obtain the private key d ₀ in the DSA encryption algorithm, where q is agreed in advance Public prime numbers. According to the formula: z ₀ =g^d ₀ modp, calculate the public key z ₀ to generate a set of key pairs. Among them, p is the public prime number agreed in advance, g is a generator on the agreed finite field, and q is the order of g.

After performing a hash operation on z ₀ , then add one after modulo (q-1) to obtain the private key d ₁ in the DSA encryption algorithm. According to the formula: z ₁ =g^d ₁ modp, calculate the public key z ₁ to generate a set of key pairs.

By analogy, after m processing, m groups of key pairs are generated. In the process of using the key, first use (d _m , z _m ) as the key pair, and use (d _m-1 , z _m-1 ) to _{replace (d m} , z _m ) to realize the key pair Update once. And so on, until (d ₀ , z ₀ ) is used to replace (d ₁ , z _{1 ).}

As shown in Figure 7d, the reference value MK and the local identification APPTAG are spliced, and the spliced structure is hashed once, and then the modulus of (q-1) is added and one is added to obtain the privacy in the DSA encryption algorithm. The key d ₀ , where q is the public prime number agreed in advance. According to the formula: z ₀ =g^d ₀ modp, calculate the public key z ₀ to generate a set of key pairs. Among them, p is the public prime number agreed in advance, g is a generator on the agreed finite field, and q is the order of g.

Splicing z ₀ with the local identification APPTAG, performing a hash operation on the spliced result, and then modulo (q-1) and adding one to obtain the private key d ₁ in the DSA encryption algorithm. According to the formula: z ₁ =g^d ₁ modp, calculate the public key z ₁ to generate a set of key pairs.

By analogy, after m processing, m groups of key pairs are generated. In the process of using the key, first use (d _m , z _m ) as the key pair, and use (d _m-1 , z _m-1 ) to _{replace (d m} , z _m ) to realize the key pair Update once. And so on, until (d ₀ , z ₀ ) is used to replace (d ₁ , z _{1 ).}

FIG. 8a is a schematic diagram of an asymmetric key generation method based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem provided by an embodiment of the application. Fig. 8b is a schematic diagram of another asymmetric key generation method based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem provided by an embodiment of the application. FIG. 8c is a schematic diagram of yet another method for generating an asymmetric key based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem provided by an embodiment of the application. FIG. 8d is a schematic diagram of yet another method for generating an asymmetric key based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem provided by an embodiment of the application.

What needs to be explained first is that the asymmetric encryption technology based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem is also called ECDSA encryption technology. Unlike the aforementioned RSA encryption technology, the ECDSA encryption technology mainly relies on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem to ensure The encryption technology is reliable, and although the ECDSA encryption algorithm has a key pair including the public key Q and the private key d, it is a one-way encryption algorithm, that is, the ciphertext generated after the public key is encrypted cannot be restored to the original text by the private key. Therefore, it is only suitable for the verification of digital signatures, not for data encryption.

As shown in Figure 8a, after a hash operation is performed on the reference value MK, the modulo operation of (n-1) is added and one is added to obtain the private key d ₀ in the ECDSA encryption algorithm, where n is agreed in advance Public prime numbers. According to the formula: Q ₀ =d ₀ G, the public key Q _{0 is} calculated to generate a set of key pairs. Among them, G is the public elliptic curve base point agreed in advance, and n is the order of G.

After performing a hash operation on d ₀ , then add one after modulo (n-1) to obtain the private key d ₁ in the ECDSA encryption algorithm. According to the formula: Q ₁ =d ₁ G, calculate the public key Q ₁ to generate a set of key pairs.

By analogy, after m processing, m groups of key pairs are generated. In the process of using the key, first use (d _m , Q _m ) as the key pair, and use (d _m-1 , Q _m-1 ) to _{replace (d m} , Q _m ) to realize the key pair Update once. And so on, until (d ₀ , Q ₀ ) is used to replace (d ₁ , Q _{1 ).}

As shown in Figure 8b, the reference value MK and the local identification APPTAG are spliced, and the spliced structure is hashed once, and then the (n-1) modulo operation is added and one is added to obtain the privacy in the ECDSA encryption algorithm. The key d ₀ , where n is the public prime number agreed in advance. According to the formula: Q ₀ =d ₀ G, calculate the public key Q ₀ to generate a set of key pairs. Among them, G is the public elliptic curve base point agreed in advance, and n is the order of G.

Splicing d ₀ with the local identification APPTAG, performing a hash operation on the spliced result, and then modulo (n-1) and adding one to obtain the private key d ₁ in the ECDSA encryption algorithm. According to the formula: Q ₁ =d ₁ G, calculate the public key Q ₁ to generate a set of key pairs.

By analogy, after m processing, m groups of key pairs are generated. In the process of using the key, first use (d _m , Q _m ) as the key pair, and use (d _m-1 , Q _m-1 ) to _{replace (d m} , Q _m ) to realize the key pair Update once. And so on, until (d ₀ , Q ₀ ) is used to replace (d ₁ , Q _{1 ).}

As shown in Figure 8c, after a hash operation is performed on the reference value MK, the modulo operation of (n-1) is added and one is added to obtain the private key d ₀ in the ECDSA encryption algorithm, where n is agreed in advance Public prime numbers. According to the formula: Q ₀ =d ₀ G, calculate the public key Q ₀ to generate a set of key pairs. Among them, G is the public elliptic curve base point agreed in advance, and n is the order of G.

After performing a hash operation on Q ₀ , and then modulo (n-1) and adding one to it, the private key d ₁ in the ECDSA encryption algorithm is obtained. According to the formula: Q ₁ =d ₁ G, calculate the public key Q ₁ to generate a set of key pairs.

By analogy, after m processing, m groups of key pairs are generated. In the process of using the key, first use (d _m , Q _m ) as the key pair, and use (d _m-1 , Q _m-1 ) to _{replace (d m} , Q _m ) to realize the key pair Update once. And so on, until (d ₀ , Q ₀ ) is used to replace (d ₁ , Q _{1 ).}

As shown in Figure 7d, the reference value MK is spliced with the local identification APPTAG, and the spliced structure is hashed once, then the (n-1) modulo operation is added and one is added to obtain the privacy in the ECDSA encryption algorithm. The key d ₀ , where n is the public prime number agreed in advance. According to the formula: Q ₀ =d ₀ G, calculate the public key Q ₀ to generate a set of key pairs. Among them, G is the public elliptic curve base point agreed in advance, and n is the order of G.

The Q ₀ and the local identification APPTAG are spliced together, and the spliced result is subjected to a hash operation, and then the modulus operation of (n-1) is added and one is added to obtain the private key d ₁ in the ECDSA encryption algorithm. According to the formula: Q ₁ =d ₁ G, calculate the public key Q ₁ to generate a set of key pairs.

By analogy, after m processing, m groups of key pairs are generated. In the process of using the key, first use (d _m , z _m ) as the key pair, and use (d _m-1 , z _m-1 ) to _{replace (d m} , z _m ) to realize the key pair Update once. And so on, until (d ₀ , z ₀ ) is used to replace (d ₁ , z _{1 ).}

The foregoing examples of the method for generating symmetric keys and the method for generating asymmetric keys are only examples of the method for updating the key proposed in this application, and not as a limitation to the embodiments of this application.

Based on the foregoing description of the embodiment of the key update method proposed in the embodiment of this application, it can be known that the different versions of the key proposed in the embodiment of this application are processed by one-way mapping with different processing times from the reference value. The first processing times corresponding to the first key generated and before the update are greater than the second processing times corresponding to the second key after the update. Therefore, the first key before the update can be obtained by performing one-way mapping processing several times on the updated second key.

For the one-way derivation relationship between the above different versions of keys, in the data transmission process, the receiver can generate the encrypted data or digital signature according to the number of processing times corresponding to the encrypted data or the number of processing times corresponding to the digital signature after receiving the encrypted data or digital signature. The corresponding key is used to process the encrypted data or digital signature.

In the process of data decryption, an embodiment of the present application proposes a data decryption method. FIG. 9 is a schematic flowchart of a data decryption method proposed in an embodiment of the present application. As shown in Figure 9, the method includes:

Step S201: Receive the encrypted data and the first processing count, and compare the first processing count with the locally stored second processing count.

It should be noted that, for the method for updating the key provided in the embodiment of the present application, in actual use, there may be situations in which the two parties of the data transmission do not synchronize the key version in time. That is to say, as the receiver of data transmission, there may be three situations between the version of the key corresponding to the received encrypted data and the version of the key being used by the receiver. One possible situation is that the key corresponding to the received encrypted data is newer than the key being used by the recipient. Another possible situation is that the key corresponding to the received encrypted data is the same as the key being used by the recipient. The key version is the same. Another possible situation is that the key corresponding to the received encrypted data is older than the key being used by the receiver.

It can be understood that the different versions of the keys in the embodiment of the present application are generated after the reference value has undergone one-way mapping processing with different processing times, so the version of the key corresponds to the processing times in a one-to-one manner. In order for the receiver to determine the key version corresponding to the decrypted data, the sender of the data transmission sends the first processing times corresponding to the encrypted data to the receiver together with the encrypted data. After receiving the encrypted data and the first processing count, the receiver compares the first processing count with the locally stored second processing count. Wherein, the second processing times stored locally is the processing times corresponding to the key being used by the receiver.

Step S202: Determine whether the encrypted data can be decrypted according to the comparison result.

It can be understood that the magnitude relationship between the first processing times and the second processing times determines the old and new relationship between the key version corresponding to the encrypted data and the key version used by the receiver.

For the above three possible situations, correspondingly, the first processing times may be less than the second processing times, may also be equal to the second processing times, or may be greater than the second processing times.

Specifically, it is determined whether the first processing number is less than the second processing number. Based on the foregoing description, it can be known that when the first processing number is less than the second processing number, it means that the key corresponding to the received encrypted data is greater than the encryption key being used by the receiver. If the key is new, the recipient cannot derive the key corresponding to the encrypted data through the key in use, and is sure that the encrypted data cannot be decrypted.

It should be noted that in the key update process, in order to prevent the old key from being obtained by illegal third parties, the method of updating the key is usually used to ensure the security of data transmission. If the recipient is an illegal third party, without obtaining the new version of the key, the old key cannot be used to decrypt the encrypted data, ensuring the security of data transmission.

Determine whether the first processing times are equal to the second processing times. It can be understood that when the first processing times are equal to the second processing times, it means that the key version corresponding to the encrypted data is the same as the version of the second key being used by the recipient. Directly use the locally stored second key as the first key corresponding to the encrypted data to decrypt the encrypted data.

Determine whether the first processing times are greater than the second processing times. Based on the foregoing description, it can be known that when the first processing times are greater than the second processing times, it means that the key corresponding to the received encrypted data is older than the key being used by the recipient. The receiver can derive the key corresponding to the encrypted data through the key being used. Specifically, a one-way mapping process of a third number of processing times may be performed on the locally stored second key to generate the first key corresponding to the encrypted data. Wherein, the third processing times is the difference between the first processing times and the second processing times.

It can be understood that the first key is generated after the reference value undergoes one-way mapping processing for the first number of processing times, and the second key is generated after the reference value undergoes one-way mapping processing for the second number of processing times. Therefore, by first performing the one-way mapping processing for the second number of processing times on the reference value, the second key can be generated, and then performing the one-way mapping processing for the third number of processing times on the second key to generate the first key.

Step S203, if yes, determine the first key corresponding to the first processing times.

Wherein, the first key can be generated from the reference value after the one-way mapping processing of the first number of processing times.

It can be understood that in the above three cases, when the first processing times are greater than or equal to the second processing times, the first key can be generated by the second key, or the second key can be directly used as the first key. I won't repeat them here.

Step S204: Use the first key to decrypt the encrypted data.

It should be particularly noted that when the first processing times are greater than the second processing times, after the encrypted data is decrypted using the first key, the first key is not stored, and only the second key is still stored locally. If the encrypted data corresponding to the first key is still received in the future, the first key is still generated by the locally stored second key to decrypt the encrypted data.

In summary, the data decryption method proposed in the embodiment of the present application includes: receiving encrypted data and a first processing count, and comparing the first processing count with a locally stored second processing count. According to the comparison result, it is determined whether the encrypted data can be decrypted, and if so, the first key corresponding to the first processing times is determined. Use the first key to decrypt the encrypted data. Thus, it is realized that only the updated key is stored locally, when the encrypted data corresponding to the old key is received, the updated key is used to generate the old key, and the old key is used to decrypt the encrypted data.

In addition, the one-way mapping processing steps in the embodiment of the present application may include using a hash algorithm for processing, and the hash algorithm generates a unique corresponding hash value by performing a hash operation on the input content.

Further, in order to enhance the reliability of the key in the embodiment of the present application, a possible implementation is that the foregoing processing using a hash algorithm includes: splicing the input of the one-way mapping process with the local identifier, and combining the spliced The result is used as the input of the hash algorithm.

It can be understood that in symmetric encryption technology and asymmetric encryption technology, keys and key pairs are used to implement encryption and decryption, respectively. Based on the foregoing description of the asymmetric encryption technology, it can be known that when the data transmission parties use the asymmetric encryption technology, the first key is one of the asymmetric key pairs.

It should be particularly noted that the foregoing explanation of the embodiment of the key update method is also applicable to the data decryption method of the embodiment of the present application, which will not be repeated in the embodiment of the present application.

In the verification process of the digital signature, an embodiment of the application proposes a method for verifying a digital signature. FIG. 10 is a schematic flowchart of a method for verifying a digital signature proposed by an embodiment of the application. As shown in Figure 10, the method includes:

Step S301: Receive the digital signature and the first processing count, and compare the first processing count with the locally stored second processing count.

Based on the foregoing description of encryption technology, it can be known that for the verification process of digital signatures, symmetric encryption technology is not applicable, that is, only asymmetric encryption technology can be used for digital signature verification.

Contrary to the aforementioned data decryption process, in the data decryption process, the receiver uses the receiver's private key to decrypt the ciphertext encrypted by the receiver's public key. If the decryption is successful, the encrypted transmission of the data is completed. In the digital signature verification process, the receiver uses the sender's public key to decrypt the ciphertext encrypted by the sender's private key, and the verification of the sender's digital signature is completed if the decryption is successful.

Step S302: According to the comparison result, it is judged whether the digital signature can be verified.

It can be understood that in the decryption process, the key pair corresponding to the encrypted data needs to be compared with the version of the key pair used by the recipient. Accordingly, in the verification process of the digital signature, the key pair corresponding to the digital signature needs to be compared with the receiving party. The version of the key pair used by the party. That is, the number of processing times corresponding to the key pair used by the digital signature, and the number of processing times corresponding to the key pair being used by the receiver.

Specifically, it is determined whether the first processing number is less than the second processing number. Based on the foregoing description, it can be known that when the first processing number is less than the second processing number, it indicates that the key corresponding to the received digital signature is compared with the encryption key being used by the recipient. The key pair is new, and the receiver cannot derive the key pair corresponding to the digital signature through the key pair in use, and it is determined that the digital signature cannot be verified.

Determine whether the first processing count is equal to the second processing count. It can be understood that when the first processing count is equal to the second processing count, it means that the key version corresponding to the digital signature is the same as the version of the second key pair being used by the receiver. The locally stored second key pair can be directly used as the first key pair corresponding to the digital signature to verify the digital signature.

Determine whether the first processing times are greater than the second processing times. Based on the foregoing description, it can be known that when the first processing times are greater than the second processing times, it means that the key corresponding to the received digital signature is compared with the key pair being used by the recipient. , The receiver can derive the key pair corresponding to the digital signature through the key pair being used. Specifically, the second key in the locally stored second key pair may be subjected to one-way mapping processing for the third number of times to generate the first key. Wherein, the third processing times is the difference between the first processing times and the second processing times. According to the first key, a first key pair is generated.

It can be understood that the first key is generated after the reference value undergoes one-way mapping processing for the first number of processing times, and the second key is generated after the reference value undergoes one-way mapping processing for the second number of processing times. Therefore, by first performing the one-way mapping processing for the second number of processing times on the reference value, the second key can be generated, and then performing the one-way mapping processing for the third number of processing times on the second key to generate the first key.

Step S303, if yes, determine the first key pair corresponding to the first processing times.

Wherein, the first key pair is an asymmetric key pair, the first key pair includes the first key, and the first key may be generated from a reference value after one-way mapping processing for the first number of processing times.

Based on the foregoing description, it can be known that only asymmetric encryption technology can be used for digital signature verification. Therefore, the first key pair provided in the embodiment of the present application is an asymmetric key pair.

Step S304: Use the first key pair to verify the digital signature.

It should be noted that when the first processing times are greater than the second processing times, after the first key pair is used to verify the digital signature, the first key pair is not saved, and only the second key pair is still stored locally. . If the digital signature corresponding to the first key pair is received in the future, the first key pair is still generated by the locally stored second key pair to verify the digital signature.

In summary, the digital signature verification method proposed in the embodiment of the present application includes: receiving a digital signature and a first processing count, and comparing the first processing count with a locally stored second processing count. According to the comparison result, it is judged whether the digital signature can be verified. If yes, determine the first key pair corresponding to the first processing times. Wherein, the first key pair is an asymmetric key pair, and the first key pair includes the first key. The digital signature is verified using the first key pair. As a result, it is realized that only the updated key pair needs to be stored locally, and when the digital signature corresponding to the old key pair is received, the updated key pair is used to generate the old key pair, and then the old key pair is used The digital signature is verified.

In addition, the one-way mapping processing steps in the embodiment of the present application may include using a hash algorithm for processing, and the hash algorithm generates a unique corresponding hash value by performing a hash operation on the input content.

Further, in order to enhance the reliability of the key pair in the embodiment of the present application, one possible implementation is that the foregoing processing using a hash algorithm includes: splicing the input of the one-way mapping process with the local identifier, and splicing The latter result is used as the input of the hash algorithm.

It should be particularly noted that the foregoing explanation of the embodiment of the key update method is also applicable to the data decryption method of the embodiment of the present application, which will not be repeated in the embodiment of the present application.

In order to clearly illustrate the key update method, data decryption method, and digital signature verification method provided by the embodiments of the present application, examples are described below.

In the IOT distributed scenario, when an application on a terminal such as a mobile phone (such as a home application) and other devices (such as a home device) are initially bound, an application key pair must be transmitted to the device. When sending a message (such as command transmission), the private key can be used to digitally sign the session, so that the communication peer can verify the validity of the session key. When the terminal application needs to update the key pair for various reasons (such as regular update), all the devices that have been bound need to re-authenticate the validity of their new keys.

For terminals and other devices that have established initial trust, the terminal application can use the key update method provided by the embodiments of this application to update the key, and the updated key can be compatible with all old versions of the key. signature. The data transmission peer can also authenticate the new key applied by the terminal without re-binding based on the old version key that has been authenticated.

FIG. 11a is a schematic diagram of the structure of generating keys of different versions of a terminal application provided by an embodiment of the application. Fig. 11b is a schematic diagram of the process of generating keys of different versions by the key generation module provided in an embodiment of the application. Fig. 12a is a schematic diagram of the structure of a terminal application that generates an updated key according to an embodiment of the application. Fig. 12b is a schematic diagram of a process of generating an updated key by the key generation module provided by an embodiment of the application. FIG. 13 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal application provided by an embodiment of the application for encryption, decryption/digital signature verification. FIG. 14 is a schematic diagram of the structure of the home device provided by an embodiment of the application for key verification. The specific implementation is as follows:

(1) As shown in Figure 11a and Figure 11b, the terminal application first requests the key generation module to generate a version key pair (taking RSA key pair as an example), generates a series of version keys, and obtains the version key pair ( n ₁₀₀ , d ₁₀₀ ) and version number 100, that is, the key pair with version number 100 is first enabled.

(2) The terminal application is initially bound with the home device, the home device obtains and authenticates the public key n ₁₀₀ and the version number 100, and the home device uses n _{100 to} verify the signature of the terminal application.

(3) As shown in Figure 12a and Figure 12b, when the terminal application regularly updates the key pair, the updated version number of 99 is passed to the key generation module, and the updated key pair (n ₉₉ , d ₉₉ ) and version number 99.

(4) As shown in FIG. 13, for _{the data encrypted by the old version key n 100} for household equipment, the terminal application can generate (n ₁₀₀ , d ₁₀₀ ) based on the current version key n ₉₉ and decrypt the data.

(5) As shown in Figure 14, when the terminal application releases the new version of the public key n ₉₉ and version number 99 to the household device, the household device can call the key verification module to calculate the one-way calculation value of the _{new version key n 99.} And compare with the old version public key n ₁₀₀ stored locally to verify the integrity of _{n 99.}

In the above example, after the key is updated, the terminal application can independently derive the old version key based on the new version key, so as to be compatible with the data processed by the old version key and reduce the complexity of key management.

The household device may not need to re-bind with the terminal application, and can authenticate the legitimacy of the new version key based on the locally stored old version key.

In order to implement the foregoing embodiment, an embodiment of the present application also proposes a terminal. FIG. 15 is a schematic structural diagram of a terminal provided by an embodiment of the present application. As shown in FIG. 15, the terminal includes: a first receiving module 410, an obtaining module 420, a first processing module 430, and a replacement module 440.

The first receiving module 410 is configured to receive a key update instruction.

The obtaining module 420 is configured to obtain the first key and the reference value stored locally.

Wherein, the first key is generated from the reference value after the one-way mapping process of the first processing times.

The first processing module 430 is configured to perform one-way mapping processing for the second number of processing times on the reference value to generate a second key.

Wherein, the second processing times are less than the first processing times.

The replacement module 440 is used to replace the first key with the second key.

Further, in order to facilitate the correspondence between the version number of the key and the number of one-way mapping processing times, a possible implementation manner is that the difference between the first processing number and the second processing number is one.

Further, in order to ensure the uniqueness of the unidirectional mapping processing result, a possible implementation manner is that the first processing module 430 is specifically configured to use a hash algorithm to process the reference value for the second number of times.

Further, in order to enhance the reliability of the key in the embodiment of the present application, a possible implementation manner is that the first processing module 430 includes: a splicing sub-module 431, which is used to perform the input of the first processing module 430 with the local identification. Splicing. The first setting sub-module 432 is used to use the spliced result as the input of the hash algorithm.

Further, in order to enable the terminal provided by the embodiment of the present application to be used for asymmetric encryption/decryption and digital signature verification, the first key is a key in the asymmetric key pair.

Further, in order to avoid the storage risk of the reference value, a possible implementation manner is that the reference value is obtained from the hardware area of the device, issued by the cloud server, and obtained by any method of external input.

It should be noted that the foregoing explanation of the embodiment of the method for updating the key is also applicable to the terminal of the embodiment of the present application, and will not be repeated here.

In summary, the terminal provided in the embodiment of the present application. When the key is updated, the key update instruction is received. Obtain the first key and reference value stored locally. Wherein, the first key is generated from the reference value after the one-way mapping process of the first processing times. A one-way mapping process of the second number of processing times is performed on the reference value to generate a second key. Wherein, the second processing times are less than the first processing times. Replace the first key with the second key. As a result, the update of the key is realized, and the old key can be deduced in one direction from the current key. There is no need to store the old key, which saves the resources of the data transmission party, and there is no need to worry about the loss of the old key, and the current key cannot be derived from the old key. After receiving the new key sent by the data transmission partner, there is no need for a third party to verify the legality of the new key.

In order to implement the foregoing embodiment, the embodiment of the present application also proposes another terminal. FIG. 16 is a schematic structural diagram of another terminal proposed in the embodiment of the present application. As shown in FIG. 16, the terminal includes: a second receiving module 510, a first comparing module 520, a first determining module 530, a first determining module 540, and a decrypting module 550.

The second receiving module 510 is configured to receive encrypted data and the first processing times.

The first comparison module 520 is configured to compare the first processing count with the locally stored second processing count.

The first judgment module 530 is configured to judge whether the encrypted data can be decrypted according to the comparison result.

The first determining module 540 is configured to determine the first key corresponding to the first processing times when the first determining module 530 determines that the encrypted data can be decrypted.

Wherein, the first key can be generated from the reference value after the one-way mapping processing of the first number of processing times.

The decryption module 550 is used to decrypt the encrypted data using the first key.

Further, in order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation is that the first judgment module 530 includes: a first judgment sub-module 531 for judging whether the first processing times are less than the second processing times. frequency. The first determining sub-module 532 is configured to determine that the encrypted data cannot be decrypted when the first determining sub-module 531 determines that the first processing number is less than the second processing number.

Further, in order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation is that the first judgment module 530 includes: a second judgment sub-module 533 for judging whether the first processing times are equal to the second processing times. frequency. The second setting submodule 534 is configured to use the locally stored second key as the first key when the second judgment submodule 533 determines that the first processing number is equal to the second processing number.

Further, in order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation is that the first judgment module 530 includes: a third judgment sub-module 535 for judging whether the first processing times are greater than the second processing times frequency. The first processing sub-module 536 is configured to, when the third determining sub-module 535 determines that the first processing times are greater than the second processing times, perform one-way mapping processing for the third processing times on the locally stored second key to generate the first One key. Wherein, the third processing times is the difference between the first processing times and the second processing times.

Further, in order to ensure the uniqueness of the one-way mapping processing result, a possible implementation manner is that the first processing sub-module 536 is specifically configured to use a hash algorithm to process the reference value for the third number of times.

Further, in order to enhance the reliability of the key in the embodiment of the present application, a possible implementation is that the first processing sub-module 536 includes: a first splicing unit 536a, which is used to combine the input of one-way mapping processing with the local The logo is spliced. The first setting unit 536b is used to use the spliced result as the input of the hash algorithm.

Further, in order to enable the terminal provided in the embodiment of the present application to perform asymmetric encryption/decryption, a possible implementation manner is that the first key is a key in the asymmetric key pair.

Further, in order to avoid the storage risk of the reference value, one possible implementation is that the reference value is obtained from the hardware area of the device, issued by the cloud server, and obtained by any method of external input.

It should be noted that the foregoing explanation of the embodiment of the data decryption method is also applicable to the terminal of the embodiment of the present application, and will not be repeated here.

In summary, the terminal proposed in the embodiment of the present application. During data decryption, the encrypted data and the first processing count are received, and the first processing count is compared with the locally stored second processing count. According to the comparison result, it is determined whether the encrypted data can be decrypted, and if so, the first key corresponding to the first processing times is determined. Wherein, the first key is generated from the reference value after the one-way mapping process of the first processing times. Use the first key to decrypt the encrypted data. Thus, it is realized that only the updated key is stored locally, when the encrypted data corresponding to the old key is received, the updated key is used to generate the old key, and the old key is used to decrypt the encrypted data.

In order to implement the foregoing embodiment, the embodiment of the present application also proposes another terminal. FIG. 17 is a schematic structural diagram of another terminal proposed in the embodiment of the application. As shown in FIG. 17, the terminal includes: a third receiving module 610, a second comparing module 620, a second determining module 630, a second determining module 640, and a verification module 650.

The third receiving module 610 is configured to receive the digital signature and the first processing times.

The second comparison module 620 is configured to compare the first processing count with the locally stored second processing count.

The second judgment module 630 is used for judging whether the digital signature can be verified according to the comparison result.

The second determining module 640 is configured to determine the first key pair corresponding to the first processing times when the second determining module 630 determines that the digital signature can be verified.

Wherein, the first key pair is an asymmetric key pair, the first key pair includes the first key, and the first key may be generated from a reference value after one-way mapping processing for the first number of processing times.

The verification module 650 is configured to use the first key pair to verify the digital signature.

Further, in order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation is that the second judgment module 630 includes: a fourth judgment sub-module 631 for judging whether the first processing times are less than the second processing times frequency. The second determining sub-module 632 is configured to determine that the digital signature cannot be verified when the fourth determining sub-module 631 determines that the first processing number is less than the second processing number.

Further, in order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation is that the second judgment module 630 includes: a fifth judgment sub-module 633 for judging whether the first processing times are equal to the second processing times. frequency. The third setting submodule 634 is configured to use the locally stored second key pair as the first key pair when the fifth judgment submodule 633 determines that the first processing count is equal to the second processing count.

Further, in order to compare the first processing times and the second processing times, one possible implementation is that the second judgment module 630 includes: a sixth judgment sub-module 635 for judging whether the first processing times are greater than the second processing times frequency. The second processing sub-module 636 is configured to perform a third processing number order on the second key in the locally stored second key pair when the sixth judgment sub-module 635 determines that the first processing number is greater than the second processing number. To map processing to generate the first key. Wherein, the third processing times is the difference between the first processing times and the second processing times. The generation sub-module 637 is configured to generate a first key pair according to the first key.

Further, in order to ensure the uniqueness of the unidirectional mapping processing result, a possible implementation manner is that the second processing submodule 636 is specifically configured to use a hash algorithm to process the reference value for the third number of processing times.

Further, in order to enhance the reliability of the key in the embodiment of the present application, a possible implementation is that the second processing sub-module 636 includes a second splicing unit 636a, which is used to combine the input of one-way mapping processing with the local The logo is spliced. The second setting unit 636b is used to use the spliced result as the input of the hash algorithm.

Further, in order to avoid the storage risk of the reference value, one possible implementation is that the reference value is obtained from the hardware area of the device, issued by the cloud server, and obtained by any method of external input.

It should be noted that the foregoing explanations of the embodiments of the digital signature verification method are also applicable to the terminals of the embodiments of the present application, and will not be repeated here.

In summary, the terminal proposed in the embodiment of the present application. When verifying the digital signature, the digital signature and the first processing count are received, and the first processing count is compared with the locally stored second processing count. According to the comparison result, it is judged whether the digital signature can be verified. If yes, determine the first key pair corresponding to the first processing times. Wherein, the first key pair is an asymmetric key pair, the first key pair includes the first key, and the first key is generated from the reference value after the one-way mapping process of the first number of processing times. The digital signature is verified using the first key pair. As a result, it is realized that only the updated key pair needs to be stored locally, and when the digital signature corresponding to the old key pair is received, the updated key pair is used to generate the old key pair, and then the old key pair is used The digital signature is verified.

FIG. 18 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic device provided by an embodiment of the application.

In order to implement the above-mentioned embodiment, the embodiment of the present application also proposes an electronic device, as shown in FIG. 18, comprising: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor. The processor When executing the computer program, perform the following steps:

Step S101: Receive a key update instruction.

Based on the foregoing description of the encryption technology, it can be known that the key can be updated periodically during use, or it can be updated when the key is found to be leaked or there is a risk of leakage to ensure the security of the key.

Step S102: Obtain a first key and a reference value stored locally.

Wherein, the first key is generated from the reference value after the one-way mapping process of the first processing times. One-way mapping refers to an irreversible mapping. For example, A gets B through one-way mapping, but B cannot be reduced to A. Therefore, after the one-way mapping process for the first number of times of processing is performed on the reference value, the first key can be obtained, but the first key cannot be restored.

It should be noted that, in the method for updating the key in the embodiment of the present application, the key currently in use, that is, the first key, is stored on the data transmission party.

It can be understood that since the keys of each version of the data transmission party in the embodiment of the present application are generated based on the reference value, in order to ensure that the generated keys are different, the reference value of different data transmission parties cannot be the same. In addition, in order to prevent the key from leaking, the reference value used to generate the key should also be kept secret.

The first possible implementation is that the data transmission party uses its own hardware key as the reference value, and the hardware key is stored in the hardware area of the data transmission party, which is safe and reliable.

The second possible implementation is that when the data transmission party registers with the cloud server, the cloud server generates a corresponding reference value according to the hardware information of the data transmission party, and the reference value is stored on the cloud server. The cloud server sends the reference value to the data transmission party in a safe manner, avoiding the data transmission party to directly store the reference value.

The third possible implementation is that the user manually enters the user password as the reference value to avoid the data transmission party directly storing the reference value.

In the above-mentioned second and third possible implementation manners, the data transmission party does not store the reference value, and each time the reference value needs to be used, the reference value is generated by accessing the cloud server or prompting the user to enter the user password.

Step S103: Perform one-way mapping processing for the second number of processing times on the reference value to generate a second key.

Wherein, the second processing times are less than the first processing times.

It can be understood that the second key is the updated key. In the key update method provided in the embodiment of this application, the method of generating the first key is similar to that of generating the second key, both of which are based on the reference value. Multiple one-way mapping processing, but the second processing times corresponding to the second key are less than the first processing times of the first key. Based on the foregoing description of the one-way mapping, it can be known that by performing a preset number of one-way mappings on the second key, the first key can be obtained, but the second key cannot be generated based on the first key.

That is to say, the embodiment of the present application can generate the key before the update based on the key after the update, but cannot generate the key after the update based on the key before the update. It can prevent a third party from deriving the updated key based on the leaked old key.

Step S104: Replace the first key with the second key.

It can be understood that after the updated key is generated, the current key needs to be replaced to complete the key update, and there is no need to store the old key.

In addition, in the process of data transmission, the sender and receiver of the data transmission need to be synchronized to realize the key update. In the existing key update method, usually one party of the data transmission completes the key update, and then the updated key is sent to the other party of the data transmission to complete the key synchronization. However, when the updated key is transmitted to the other party of data transmission, there may be a risk of data loss or tampering, and it is necessary to rely on a trusted third party to verify the updated key.

However, the electronic device provided in the embodiment of the present application, after receiving the second key sent by the data transmission partner and the corresponding second processing times, first compares the second processing times and the first processing times.

If the second processing times are greater than or equal to the first processing times, it indicates that the second key sent by the data transmission partner is an old key, and the second key does not need to be authenticated, and there is no need to update the locally stored first key.

If the second number of processing times is less than the first number of processing times, one-way mapping processing of the third number of processing times can be performed on the second key, and the processed result can be verified with the first key stored locally in a fixed field. If passed, the locally stored first key is replaced with the second key. Wherein, the third processing number is the difference between the first processing number and the second processing number.

In summary, the electronic device provided in the embodiment of the present application receives a key update instruction when performing key processing. Obtain the first key and reference value stored locally. Wherein, the first key is generated from the reference value after the one-way mapping process of the first processing times. A one-way mapping process of the second number of processing times is performed on the reference value to generate a second key. Wherein, the second processing times are less than the first processing times. Replace the first key with the second key. As a result, the update of the key is realized, and the old key can be deduced in one direction from the current key. There is no need to store the old key, which saves the resources of the data transmission party, and there is no need to worry about the loss of the old key, and the current key cannot be derived from the old key. After receiving the new key sent by the data transmission partner, there is no need for a third party to verify the legality of the new key.

Further, in order to facilitate the correspondence between the version number of the key and the number of one-way mapping processing times, a possible implementation manner is that the difference between the first processing number and the second processing number is one. It can be understood that the first processing times and the second processing times are respectively the processing times corresponding to the first key before the update and the second key after the update in a key update process, and the first key before the update It is one version different from the updated second key. Therefore, when the difference between the first processing times and the second processing times is one, the first processing times can be used to identify the version of the first key, and the second processing times can be used to identify the version of the first key. Identifies the version of the second key.

It should be noted that the second processing times are less than the first processing times, so the version identifier of the updated second key is numerically smaller than the version identifier of the first key before the update. In other words, the newer the generated key, the smaller the corresponding processing times, and the smaller the version identification value.

In addition, the step of performing one-way mapping processing by the electronic device in the embodiment of the present application may include using a hash algorithm for processing, and the hash algorithm generates a unique corresponding hash value by performing a hash operation on the input content.

In the process of generating the first key, the reference value is hashed for the first number of processing times (for example, 6 times) to generate the corresponding hash value as the first key.

When the first key is updated, the reference value is hashed for the second number of times (for example, 5 times) to generate the corresponding hash value, as the second key, replace the first key with the second key Key to complete the update of the first key.

It can be understood that the first key is generated from the reference value through 6 hash operations. In the process of generating the first key, when the reference value is hashed 5 times, the hash value obtained is the same as the second The keys are exactly the same, and one more hash operation is performed to get the first key. Therefore, the second key can generate the first key after one hash operation. After completing the update of the first key, the data transmission party can directly generate the first key based on the second key. On the contrary, due to the difficult-to-reverse characteristic of the hash algorithm, the data transmission party cannot directly generate the second key based on the first key.

It should be particularly noted that the hash algorithm in the embodiment of the present application may be any known hash algorithm such as SHA-256 and SHA-512, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.

Further, in order to enhance the reliability of the key in the embodiment of the present application, one possible implementation is that the electronic device uses a hash algorithm to process including: splicing the input of one-way mapping processing with the local identifier, and splicing The latter result is used as the input of the hash algorithm.

Among them, the local identifier is the unique identifier of the data transmission party, and it always remains unchanged. In other words, in each one-way mapping process, the input of the one-way mapping process is spliced with the local identifier, and then the spliced result is input to the hash algorithm for hash operation. Specifically, the local identification may use the hardware identification of the data transmission party, or may use the application identification of the software application for data transmission, or may also use an artificially set identification, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.

Therefore, the input of each hash operation is the result of the splicing of the input of the previous hash operation and the fixed identifier, which enhances the complexity of the hash algorithm and further improves the security of the generated key.

Based on the foregoing description of related technologies, it can be known that in symmetric encryption technology, the sender and receiver of data transmission use the same key. When the key is updated, it is only necessary to replace the first key before the update with the one after the update. The second key.

In asymmetric key technology, the sender and receiver of data transmission use a set of key pairs. When the key is updated, both the private key and the public key in the key pair need to be updated.

In the embodiment of this application, a possible implementation is to use the first key as the private key, and the third key matching the first key as the public key, and the first key and the third key are composed of Asymmetric key pair. When generating the asymmetric key pair, perform a one-way mapping of the first processing times on the reference value to generate the first key, and then generate the third key after calculation from the first key, thereby generating the asymmetric key Correct.

Another possible implementation is to use the first key as the public key, and the third key matching the first key as the private key, and the first key and the third key form an asymmetric key pair. When generating the asymmetric key pair, perform a one-way mapping of the first processing times on the reference value to generate the first key, and then generate the third key after calculation from the first key, thereby generating the asymmetric key Correct.

In order to implement the above-mentioned embodiment, the embodiment of the present application also proposes an electronic device, as shown in FIG. 18, comprising: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor. The processor When executing the computer program, perform the following steps:

Step S201: Receive the encrypted data and the first processing count, and compare the first processing count with the locally stored second processing count.

It should be noted that, for the electronic device provided in the foregoing embodiment of the present application, in actual use, there may be situations in which the two parties of the data transmission fail to synchronize the key version in time. That is to say, as the receiver of data transmission, there may be three situations between the version of the key corresponding to the received encrypted data and the version of the key being used by the receiver. One possible situation is that the key corresponding to the received encrypted data is newer than the key being used by the recipient. Another possible situation is that the key corresponding to the received encrypted data is the same as the key being used by the recipient. The key version is the same. Another possible situation is that the key corresponding to the received encrypted data is older than the key being used by the receiver.

It can be understood that the different versions of the keys in the embodiment of the present application are generated after the reference value has undergone one-way mapping processing with different processing times, so the version of the key corresponds to the processing times in a one-to-one manner. In order for the receiver to determine the key version corresponding to the decrypted data, the sender of the data transmission sends the first processing times corresponding to the encrypted data to the receiver together with the encrypted data. After receiving the encrypted data and the first processing count, the receiver compares the first processing count with the locally stored second processing count. Wherein, the second processing times stored locally is the processing times corresponding to the key being used by the receiver.

Step S202: Determine whether the encrypted data can be decrypted according to the comparison result.

It can be understood that the relationship between the first processing times and the second processing times determines the old and new relationship between the key version corresponding to the encrypted data and the key version used by the receiver.

For the above three possible situations, correspondingly, the first processing times may be less than the second processing times, may also be equal to the second processing times, or may be greater than the second processing times.

Specifically, it is determined whether the first processing number is less than the second processing number. Based on the foregoing description, it can be known that when the first processing number is less than the second processing number, it means that the key corresponding to the received encrypted data is greater than the encryption key being used by the receiver. If the key is new, the recipient cannot derive the key corresponding to the encrypted data through the key in use, and is sure that the encrypted data cannot be decrypted.

It should be noted that in the key update process, in order to prevent the old key from being obtained by illegal third parties, the method of updating the key is usually used to ensure the security of data transmission. If the recipient is an illegal third party, without obtaining the new version of the key, the old key cannot be used to decrypt the encrypted data, ensuring the security of data transmission.

Determine whether the first processing times are equal to the second processing times. It can be understood that when the first processing times are equal to the second processing times, it means that the key version corresponding to the encrypted data is the same as the version of the second key being used by the recipient. Directly use the locally stored second key as the first key corresponding to the encrypted data to decrypt the encrypted data.

Determine whether the first processing times are greater than the second processing times. Based on the foregoing description, it can be known that when the first processing times are greater than the second processing times, it means that the key corresponding to the received encrypted data is older than the key being used by the recipient. The receiver can derive the key corresponding to the encrypted data through the key being used. Specifically, a one-way mapping process of a third number of processing times may be performed on the locally stored second key to generate the first key corresponding to the encrypted data. Wherein, the third processing times is the difference between the first processing times and the second processing times.

It can be understood that the first key is generated after the reference value undergoes one-way mapping processing for the first number of processing times, and the second key is generated after the reference value undergoes one-way mapping processing for the second number of processing times. Therefore, by first performing the one-way mapping processing for the second number of processing times on the reference value, the second key can be generated, and then performing the one-way mapping processing for the third number of processing times on the second key to generate the first key.

Step S203, if yes, determine the first key corresponding to the first processing times.

Wherein, the first key can be generated from the reference value after the one-way mapping processing of the first number of processing times.

It can be understood that in the above three cases, when the first processing times are greater than or equal to the second processing times, the first key can be generated by the second key, or the second key can be directly used as the first key. I won't repeat them here.

Step S204: Use the first key to decrypt the encrypted data.

It should be particularly noted that when the first processing times are greater than the second processing times, after the encrypted data is decrypted using the first key, the first key is not stored, and only the second key is still stored locally. If the encrypted data corresponding to the first key is still received in the future, the first key is still generated by the locally stored second key to decrypt the encrypted data.

In summary, the electronic device proposed in the embodiment of the present application receives encrypted data and the first processing count when decrypting data, and compares the first processing count with the locally stored second processing count. According to the comparison result, it is determined whether the encrypted data can be decrypted, and if so, the first key corresponding to the first processing times is determined. Use the first key to decrypt the encrypted data. Thus, it is realized that only the updated key is stored locally, when the encrypted data corresponding to the old key is received, the updated key is used to generate the old key, and the old key is used to decrypt the encrypted data.

In addition, the step of the one-way mapping processing of the electronic device in the embodiment of the present application may include using a hash algorithm for processing, and the hash algorithm generates a unique corresponding hash value by performing a hash operation on the input content.

Further, in order to enhance the reliability of the key in the embodiment of the present application, one possible implementation is that the electronic device uses a hash algorithm to process including: splicing the input of one-way mapping processing with the local identifier, and splicing The latter result is used as the input of the hash algorithm.

It can be understood that in symmetric encryption technology and asymmetric encryption technology, keys and key pairs are used to implement encryption and decryption, respectively. Based on the foregoing description of the asymmetric encryption technology, it can be known that when the data transmission parties use the asymmetric encryption technology, the first key is one of the asymmetric key pairs.

It should be particularly noted that the foregoing explanation of key update on an electronic device is also applicable to data decryption performed by an electronic device, which will not be repeated in the embodiment of the present application.

In order to implement the above-mentioned embodiment, the embodiment of the present application also proposes an electronic device, as shown in FIG. 18, comprising: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and running on the processor. The processor When executing the computer program, perform the following steps:

Step S301: Receive the digital signature and the first processing count, and compare the first processing count with the locally stored second processing count.

Based on the foregoing description of encryption technology, it can be known that for the verification process of digital signatures, symmetric encryption technology is not applicable, that is, only asymmetric encryption technology can be used for digital signature verification.

Contrary to the aforementioned data decryption process, in the data decryption process, the receiver uses the receiver's private key to decrypt the ciphertext encrypted by the receiver's public key. If the decryption is successful, the encrypted transmission of the data is completed. In the digital signature verification process, the receiver uses the sender's public key to decrypt the ciphertext encrypted by the sender's private key, and the verification of the sender's digital signature is completed if the decryption is successful.

Step S302: According to the comparison result, it is judged whether the digital signature can be verified.

It can be understood that in the decryption process, the key pair corresponding to the encrypted data needs to be compared with the version of the key pair used by the recipient. Accordingly, in the verification process of the digital signature, the key pair corresponding to the digital signature needs to be compared with the receiving party. The version of the key pair used by the party. That is, the number of processing times corresponding to the key pair used by the digital signature, and the number of processing times corresponding to the key pair being used by the receiver.

Specifically, it is determined whether the first processing number is less than the second processing number. Based on the foregoing description, it can be known that when the first processing number is less than the second processing number, it indicates that the key corresponding to the received digital signature is compared with the encryption key being used by the recipient. The key pair is new, and the receiver cannot derive the key pair corresponding to the digital signature through the key pair in use, and it is determined that the digital signature cannot be verified.

Determine whether the first processing count is equal to the second processing count. It can be understood that when the first processing count is equal to the second processing count, it means that the key version corresponding to the digital signature is the same as the version of the second key pair being used by the receiver. The locally stored second key pair can be directly used as the first key pair corresponding to the digital signature to verify the digital signature.

Determine whether the first processing times are greater than the second processing times. Based on the foregoing description, it can be known that when the first processing times are greater than the second processing times, it means that the key corresponding to the received digital signature is compared with the key pair being used by the recipient. , The receiver can derive the key pair corresponding to the digital signature through the key pair being used. Specifically, the second key in the locally stored second key pair may be subjected to one-way mapping processing for the third number of times to generate the first key. Wherein, the third processing times is the difference between the first processing times and the second processing times. According to the first key, a first key pair is generated.

It can be understood that the first key is generated after the reference value undergoes one-way mapping processing for the first number of processing times, and the second key is generated after the reference value undergoes one-way mapping processing for the second number of processing times. Therefore, by first performing the one-way mapping processing for the second number of processing times on the reference value, the second key can be generated, and then performing the one-way mapping processing for the third number of processing times on the second key to generate the first key.

Step S303, if yes, determine the first key pair corresponding to the first processing times.

Wherein, the first key pair is an asymmetric key pair, the first key pair includes the first key, and the first key may be generated from a reference value after one-way mapping processing for the first number of processing times.

Based on the foregoing description, it can be known that only asymmetric encryption technology can be used for digital signature verification. Therefore, the first key pair provided in the embodiment of the present application is an asymmetric key pair.

Step S304: Use the first key pair to verify the digital signature.

It should be noted that when the first processing times are greater than the second processing times, after the first key pair is used to verify the digital signature, the first key pair is not saved, and only the second key pair is still stored locally. . If the digital signature corresponding to the first key pair is received in the future, the first key pair is still generated by the locally stored second key pair to verify the digital signature.

In summary, the electronic device proposed in the embodiment of the present application receives the digital signature and the first processing count when verifying the digital signature, and compares the first processing count with the locally stored second processing count. According to the comparison result, it is judged whether the digital signature can be verified. If yes, determine the first key pair corresponding to the first processing times. Wherein, the first key pair is an asymmetric key pair, and the first key pair includes the first key. The digital signature is verified using the first key pair. As a result, it is realized that only the updated key pair needs to be stored locally, and when the digital signature corresponding to the old key pair is received, the updated key pair is used to generate the old key pair, and then the old key pair is used The digital signature is verified.

In addition, the step of performing one-way mapping processing by the electronic device in the embodiment of the present application may include using a hash algorithm for processing, and the hash algorithm generates a unique corresponding hash value by performing a hash operation on the input content.

Further, in order to enhance the reliability of the key pair in the embodiments of the present application, a possible implementation manner is that the electronic device uses a hash algorithm to process including: concatenating the input of the one-way mapping process with the local identification, and combining The spliced result is used as the input of the hash algorithm.

It should be particularly noted that the foregoing explanation of key update on an electronic device is also applicable to data decryption performed by an electronic device, which will not be repeated in the embodiment of the present application.

FIG. 19 is a schematic structural diagram of a computer-readable storage medium proposed in an embodiment of this application.

In order to implement the above-mentioned embodiments, the embodiments of the present application also propose a computer-readable storage medium, as shown in FIG. 19, the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when it runs on a computer, the computer executes The key update method in the foregoing embodiment.

In order to implement the above-mentioned embodiments, the embodiments of the present application also propose a computer-readable storage medium, as shown in FIG. 19, the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when it runs on a computer, the computer executes The data decryption method in the foregoing embodiment.

In order to implement the above-mentioned embodiments, the embodiments of the present application also propose a computer-readable storage medium, as shown in FIG. 19, the computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program, and when it runs on a computer, the computer executes The verification method of the digital signature in the foregoing embodiment.

In the embodiments of the present application, "at least one" refers to one or more, and "multiple" refers to two or more than two. "And/or" describes the association relationship of the associated objects, indicating that there can be three types of relationships, for example, A and/or B, which can mean that A exists alone, A and B exist at the same time, and B exists alone. Among them, A and B can be singular or plural. The character "/" generally indicates that the associated objects before and after are in an "or" relationship. "The following at least one item" and similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of single items or plural items. For example, at least one of a, b, and c can represent: a, b, c, a and b, a and c, b and c, or a and b and c, where a, b, and c can be single, or There can be more than one.

A person of ordinary skill in the art may be aware that the units and algorithm steps described in the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented by a combination of electronic hardware, computer software, and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are executed by hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraint conditions of the technical solution. Professionals and technicians can use different methods for each specific application to implement the described functions, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

Those skilled in the art can clearly understand that, for the convenience and conciseness of description, the specific working process of the system, device and unit described above can refer to the corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

In the several embodiments provided in this application, if any function is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present application essentially or the part that contributes to the existing technology or the part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, and the computer software product is stored in a storage medium, including Several instructions are used to make a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of the present application. The aforementioned storage media include: U disk, mobile hard disk, read-only memory (Read-Only Memory; hereinafter referred to as ROM), random access memory (Random Access Memory; hereinafter referred to as RAM), magnetic disks or optical disks, etc. A medium that can store program codes.

The above are only specific implementations of this application. Any person skilled in the art can easily conceive of changes or substitutions within the technical scope disclosed in this application, and they should all be covered by the protection scope of this application. The protection scope of this application shall be subject to the protection scope of the claims.

Claims (36)

1. A method for updating a key, which is characterized in that it includes:

   Receive key update instructions;

   Acquiring a first key and a reference value stored locally; wherein, the first key is generated from the reference value after one-way mapping processing of the first number of processing times;

   Performing the one-way mapping process for the second number of processing times on the reference value to generate a second key; wherein the second number of processing times is less than the first number of processing times;

   Replace the first key with the second key.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein the difference between the first processing number and the second processing number is one.
3. The method according to claim 1, wherein the step of one-way mapping processing comprises:

   Use a hash algorithm for processing.
4. A method for data decryption, characterized in that it comprises:

   Receiving encrypted data and a first processing count, and comparing the first processing count with a locally stored second processing count;

   According to the comparison result, determine whether the encrypted data can be decrypted;

   If yes, determine the first key corresponding to the first number of processing times;

   Use the first key to decrypt the encrypted data.
5. The method according to claim 4, wherein the judging whether the encrypted data can be decrypted according to the comparison result comprises:

   Judging whether the first processing count is less than the second processing count;

   If it is, it is determined that the encrypted data cannot be decrypted.
6. The method according to claim 4, wherein the judging whether the encrypted data can be decrypted according to the comparison result comprises:

   Judging whether the first processing count is equal to the second processing count;

   If so, use the locally stored second key as the first key.
7. The method according to claim 4, wherein the judging whether the encrypted data can be decrypted according to the comparison result comprises:

   Judging whether the first processing count is greater than the second processing count;

   If so, perform a one-way mapping process of a third number of processing times on the locally stored second key to generate the first key; wherein, the third number of processing times is the first number of processing times and the number of The difference between the second processing times.
8. A method for verifying digital signature, which is characterized in that it comprises:

   Receiving a digital signature and a first processing count, and comparing the first processing count with a locally stored second processing count;

   According to the comparison result, determine whether the digital signature can be verified;

   If yes, determine the first key pair corresponding to the first number of times of processing; wherein, the first key pair is an asymmetric key pair, and the first key pair includes the first key;

   The digital signature is verified using the first key pair.
9. 8. The method according to claim 8, wherein the judging whether the digital signature can be verified according to the comparison result comprises:

   Judging whether the first processing count is less than the second processing count;

   If it is, it is determined that the digital signature cannot be verified.
10. 8. The method according to claim 8, wherein the judging whether the digital signature can be verified according to the comparison result comprises:

    Judging whether the first processing count is equal to the second processing count;

    If so, use the locally stored second key pair as the first key pair.
11. 8. The method according to claim 8, wherein the judging whether the digital signature can be verified according to the comparison result comprises:

    Judging whether the first processing count is greater than the second processing count;

    If yes, perform a one-way mapping process of the third number of processing times on the second key in the locally stored second key pair to generate the first key; wherein, the third number of processing times is the The difference between the first processing times and the second processing times;

    According to the first key, the first key pair is generated.
12. A terminal, characterized in that it comprises:

    The first receiving module is configured to receive a key update instruction;

    An obtaining module, configured to obtain a locally stored first key and a reference value; wherein the first key is generated from the reference value after the one-way mapping process of the first processing times;

    The first processing module is configured to perform the one-way mapping processing for a second number of processing times on the reference value to generate a second key; wherein the second number of processing times is less than the first number of processing times;

    The replacement module is used to replace the first key with the second key.
13. The terminal according to claim 12, wherein the difference between the first processing number and the second processing number is one.
14. The terminal according to claim 12, wherein the first processing module is specifically configured to use a hash algorithm to process the reference value for a second number of times.
15. A terminal, characterized in that it comprises:

    The second receiving module is configured to receive encrypted data and the first processing times;

    A first comparison module, configured to compare the first processing count with a locally stored second processing count;

    The first judgment module is used to judge whether the encrypted data can be decrypted according to the comparison result;

    A first determining module, configured to determine the first key corresponding to the first processing count when the first determining module determines that the encrypted data can be decrypted;

    The decryption module is configured to use the first key to decrypt the encrypted data.
16. The terminal according to claim 15, wherein the first judgment module comprises:

    The first judging sub-module is used to judge whether the first processing times are less than the second processing times;

    The first determining submodule is configured to determine that the encrypted data cannot be decrypted when the first determining submodule determines that the first processing number is less than the second processing number.
17. The terminal according to claim 15, wherein the first judgment module comprises:

    The second judgment sub-module is used to judge whether the first processing times are equal to the second processing times;

    The second setting submodule is configured to use a locally stored second key as the first key when the second judgment submodule determines that the first processing count is equal to the second processing count.
18. The terminal according to claim 15, wherein the first judgment module comprises:

    The third judging sub-module is used to judge whether the first processing times are greater than the second processing times;

    The first processing submodule is configured to perform unidirectional mapping processing for the third processing times on the locally stored second key when the third judging submodule determines that the first processing times are greater than the second processing times , To generate the first key; wherein the third processing times are the difference between the first processing times and the second processing times.
19. A terminal, characterized in that it comprises:

    The third receiving module is used to receive the digital signature and the first processing times;

    A second comparison module, configured to compare the first processing count with a locally stored second processing count;

    The second judgment module is used to judge whether the digital signature can be verified according to the comparison result;

    The second determining module is configured to determine the first key pair corresponding to the first processing times when the second determining module determines that the digital signature can be verified; wherein, the first key pair is An asymmetric key pair, where the first key pair includes a first key;

    The verification module is configured to use the first key pair to verify the digital signature.
20. The terminal according to claim 19, wherein the second judgment module comprises:

    The fourth judging sub-module is used to judge whether the first processing times are less than the second processing times;

    The second determining submodule is configured to determine that the digital signature cannot be verified when the fourth determining submodule determines that the first processing count is less than the second processing count.
21. The terminal according to claim 19, wherein the second judgment module comprises:

    A fifth judging sub-module, configured to judge whether the first processing times are equal to the second processing times;

    The third setting submodule is configured to use a locally stored second key pair as the first key pair when the fifth judgment submodule determines that the first processing count is equal to the second processing count.
22. The terminal according to claim 19, wherein the second judgment module comprises:

    The sixth judgment sub-module is used to judge whether the first processing times are greater than the second processing times;

    The second processing submodule is configured to perform a third operation on the second key in the locally stored second key pair when the sixth judgment submodule determines that the first processing times are greater than the second processing times. One-way mapping processing of processing times to generate the first key; wherein, the third processing times is the difference between the first processing times and the second processing times;

    A generating submodule is used to generate the first key pair according to the first key.
23. An electronic device, characterized by comprising: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and capable of running on the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, the following steps are performed:

    Receive key update instructions;

    Acquiring a first key and a reference value stored locally; wherein, the first key is generated from the reference value after one-way mapping processing of the first number of processing times;

    Performing the one-way mapping process for the second number of processing times on the reference value to generate a second key; wherein the second number of processing times is less than the first number of processing times;

    Replace the first key with the second key.
24. The electronic device according to claim 23, wherein the difference between the first processing number and the second processing number is one.
25. The electronic device according to claim 23, wherein the step of performing one-way mapping processing by the electronic device comprises:

    Use a hash algorithm for processing.
26. An electronic device, characterized by comprising: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and capable of running on the processor, and when the processor executes the computer program, the following steps are performed:

    Receiving encrypted data and a first processing count, and comparing the first processing count with a locally stored second processing count;

    According to the comparison result, determine whether the encrypted data can be decrypted;

    If yes, determine the first key corresponding to the first number of processing times;

    Use the first key to decrypt the encrypted data.
27. The electronic device according to claim 26, wherein the electronic device determines whether the encrypted data can be decrypted according to the comparison result, which specifically includes the following steps:

    Judging whether the first processing count is less than the second processing count;

    If it is, it is determined that the encrypted data cannot be decrypted.
28. The electronic device according to claim 26, wherein the electronic device determines whether the encrypted data can be decrypted according to the comparison result, which specifically includes the following steps:

    Judging whether the first processing count is equal to the second processing count;

    If so, use the locally stored second key as the first key.
29. The electronic device according to claim 26, wherein the electronic device determines whether the encrypted data can be decrypted according to the comparison result, which specifically includes the following steps:

    Judging whether the first processing count is greater than the second processing count;

    If so, perform a one-way mapping process of a third number of processing times on the locally stored second key to generate the first key; wherein, the third number of processing times is the first number of processing times and the number of The difference between the second processing times.
30. An electronic device, characterized by comprising: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and capable of running on the processor. When the processor executes the computer program, the following steps are executed:

    Receiving a digital signature and a first processing count, and comparing the first processing count with a locally stored second processing count;

    According to the comparison result, determine whether the digital signature can be verified;

    If yes, determine the first key pair corresponding to the first number of times of processing; wherein, the first key pair is an asymmetric key pair, and the first key pair includes the first key;

    The digital signature is verified using the first key pair.
31. The electronic device according to claim 30, wherein the electronic device determines whether the digital signature can be verified according to the comparison result, which specifically includes the following steps:

    Judging whether the first processing count is less than the second processing count;

    If it is, it is determined that the digital signature cannot be verified.
32. The electronic device of claim 30, wherein the electronic device determines whether the digital signature can be verified according to the comparison result, which specifically includes the following steps:

    Judging whether the first processing count is equal to the second processing count;

    If so, use the locally stored second key pair as the first key pair.
33. The electronic device of claim 30, wherein the electronic device determines whether the digital signature can be verified according to the comparison result, which specifically includes the following steps:

    Judging whether the first processing count is greater than the second processing count;

    If yes, perform a one-way mapping process of the third number of processing times on the second key in the locally stored second key pair to generate the first key; wherein, the third number of processing times is the The difference between the first processing times and the second processing times;

    According to the first key, the first key pair is generated.
34. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that a computer program is stored in the computer-readable storage medium, which when running on a computer, causes the computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 1-3.
35. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that a computer program is stored in the computer-readable storage medium, which when running on a computer, causes the computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 4-7.
36. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that a computer program is stored in the computer-readable storage medium, which when running on a computer, causes the computer to execute the method according to any one of claims 8-11.

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