WO2021107408A1 - Procédé de consensus de chaîne de blocs sans gouvernance et dispositif associé - Google Patents

Procédé de consensus de chaîne de blocs sans gouvernance et dispositif associé Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2021107408A1
WO2021107408A1 PCT/KR2020/014398 KR2020014398W WO2021107408A1 WO 2021107408 A1 WO2021107408 A1 WO 2021107408A1 KR 2020014398 W KR2020014398 W KR 2020014398W WO 2021107408 A1 WO2021107408 A1 WO 2021107408A1
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block
node
signature
random value
valid
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PCT/KR2020/014398
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English (en)
Korean (ko)
Inventor
이춘화
임수양
산티아고 롤던카를로스
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한양대학교 산학협력단
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
    • H04L9/0631—Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/24—Key scheduling, i.e. generating round keys or sub-keys for block encryption

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to a leaderless blockchain consensus method and apparatus.
  • the present invention is a patent applied for as part of the information communication broadcasting research technology development project of the Ministry of Science and ICT, and related matters are as follows.
  • a blockchain is a list of records called blocks that are linked using encryption. Each block contains a cryptographic hash of the previous block, making the blockchain resistant to modification.
  • the blockchain is an open, decentralized ledger that enables efficient, verifiable, and permanent recording of transactions between two parties.
  • PoW Nakamoto Consensus
  • BoW Proof of Work
  • BFT Byzantine Fault Tolerance
  • PBFT pragmatic Byzantine Fault Tolerance
  • PBFT has excellent performance, Since it has message complexity, it has the disadvantage that it cannot be applied to several block chains of nodes.
  • the present invention is to provide a leaderless blockchain consensus method and apparatus.
  • Another object of the present invention is to provide a leaderless blockchain consensus method and apparatus in which each node can independently select the same block proposer in a single round.
  • the present invention provides even if the number of nodes increases It is to provide a leaderless blockchain consensus method and device that can enable blockchain consensus within.
  • a leaderless blockchain consensus method is provided.
  • (a) calculating a random value for the current round; (b) selecting a block proposal node using the calculated random value; (c) receiving a block generated from the block proposal node; and (d) verifying the received block and, if valid, adding a signature to the header of the block, and transmitting only the block header information to which the signature is added to another node. may be provided.
  • the random value for the current round may be calculated using the random value used in the previous round and the signature of the block generated in the previous round.
  • the method further comprises the step of receiving a shared signature added to the block header from other neighboring nodes, but adding the block to the block chain when a valid signature is greater than or equal to a security threshold by analyzing the shared signature It may further include the step of
  • the security threshold may be set to half of the total number of shard members.
  • Steps (a) to (d) are performed in one round, but may be independently performed at each node.
  • the method may include generating an empty block, signing it, and transmitting it to the other node.
  • step (d) when two valid blocks are received from the block proposal node, only one block is verified and signed, and the other block can be ignored.
  • a device capable of agreeing on a blockchain without a leader.
  • a memory for storing at least one instruction; a processor executing an instruction stored in the memory, the instruction comprising: (a) calculating a random value for a current round; (b) selecting a block proposal node using the calculated random value; (c) receiving a block generated from the block proposal node; and (d) after verifying the received block, if valid, adding a signature to the header of the block, and transmitting only the block header information to which the signature is added to another node may be provided.
  • each node can independently select the same block proposer in a single round.
  • the present invention provides even if the number of nodes increases It can enable blockchain consensus within the
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart illustrating a branchless blockchain consensus method without a leader according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating block verification pseudocode according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a diagram illustrating a method of selecting a block proposer in each node according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating a pseudo code for a block consensus process according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a block diagram schematically illustrating the configuration of a node according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • shard members each node independently generate random values in each round, and based on this, any one of the shard members can be independently selected as a block proposer.
  • the block can be added to the block chain as a valid consensus for all shard members.
  • a block is arbitrary data, even if there is no separate description. It goes without saying that data can also be transactional data, and the format of the data itself can vary widely.
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart illustrating a branchless blockchain consensus method without a leader according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a diagram illustrating block verification pseudocode according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is this It is a diagram illustrating a method of selecting a block proposer in each node according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 4 is a diagram illustrating a pseudo code for a block consensus process according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • each node 100 calculates a random value.
  • each node 100 recovers and knows the list of public keys for all shard members.
  • a block proposer is selected in one round, and after the signature and verification of the block generated by the block proposer is completed, it may be added to the block chain. This will be more clearly understood by the following description.
  • Each node 100 has a verification vector ( ) and a private key. , and t is defined as the security threshold.
  • m represents the size of each node (ie, shard member).
  • j represents the shard member index
  • the shared signature generated by the shard member (j) is and j can be verified.
  • each node has the list of public keys sorted from low to high according to the hash value of the public key after recovering the list of public keys of all shard members. .
  • each node 100 may calculate the random value of the current round based on the random value of the previous round. That is, each node 100 may calculate a random value by using the hash value of the random value used in the previous round.
  • each node 100 may calculate a random value to be used in the current round using Equation (2).
  • each node 100 may calculate the random value used in the previous round and the result (hash value) of applying the signature of the previous round to the hash function as a random value.
  • each node 100 selects a block proposer using the calculated random value.
  • each node 100 may select a block proposer using Equation 3 below.
  • mod() represents the remainder operator. That is, each node 100 may select a block proposer by performing a mod operation on a random value using the shard member size.
  • each node 100 calculates a random value by applying the same hash function with the same information and selects a block proposer with an index corresponding to the result of mod operation with the shard member size, the same result is derived (Fig. see 3).
  • each node 100 may independently calculate a random value without a separate interaction.
  • each node 100 since each node 100 already knows the shard member list, each node 100 can select the same block proposer based on the same random value.
  • each node 100 determines whether a valid block is received from the block proposer (block proposal node) within the block waiting time.
  • each node 100 signs the empty block and then erases the block wait time stamp.
  • each node 100 may select a block proposer according to the same operation result. Accordingly, each node 100 already knows information about the selected block proposer.
  • a generation point that is a random number ( ) is set as the random value of the round. In other words, It is assumed that is information of the block proposer.
  • Each node can sign the message using the shared private key after applying the message to the hash function. If this is expressed as an equation, it is the same as in equation (4).
  • Each node (shard member) has a public key ( ), so use it to sign ( ) can be verified. If this is expressed as an equation, it is as in Equation 5.
  • the signature included in the block header received from the block proposer (the signature of the block proposer) and Each node can verify the validity of the block received from the block proposer by judging whether the result derived by applying , the result of each node hashing the message and the result of applying the public key to the verification function are the same.
  • Each node receives t different signatures based on “Lagrage interpolaton” for signature sharing, and can recover the aggregated signatures in the current round. If this is expressed as an equation, it is expressed as equation (6).
  • the result of the aggregated signature is unique. Accordingly, the aggregated signature can be verified using the public key.
  • Equation (7) This can be expressed as Equation (7).
  • each node 100 verifies the block, adds a signature to the block header, and transmits it to a neighboring node.
  • the block proposer (block proposal node) selected by each node creates a block by inserting the block proposer's signature into the block header using the gossip protocol in the Bitcoin P2P network.
  • Any node 100 may receive a block generated from a block proposer (block proposal node).
  • block proposal node the block proposer's signature may be included in the header.
  • the node receiving the block from the block proposer can verify the signature included in the block using the verification vector and the random value (bpp). That is, when a block is received, an honest node can check the validity of the block, including the block proposer's index, a pointer to the previous block, and a list of transactions.
  • each node 100 determines whether a majority consensus on blocks received from the block proposer is completed.
  • each node 100 After verifying the block, each node 100 adds a signature to the block header, and does not randomly transmit it. However, each node 100 shares the block header signature with the neighboring nodes and receives the signature list from the neighboring nodes.
  • each node can transmit the signature list to all neighboring nodes after adding the signature to a list (referred to as a signature list for convenience) when a signature is shared from a neighboring node. That is, when any node receives a signature list from a neighboring node, the signature list may be updated and then transmitted again.
  • a signature list for convenience
  • honest nodes can share more than t signatures from honest shard members (nodes).
  • each node 100 adds a block to the block chain.
  • each node 100 signs an empty block and then resets the time stamp of the signature waiting time.
  • the pseudo code for block verification is shown in FIG. 2 .
  • connection bandwidth between each node is limited to 20Mbps, and the latency of all communication links is 100ms.
  • Each node has 12 neighbors, adding a signature to the block, sending the block along with the description.
  • time Honest nodes within can receive signatures and blocks from other honest nodes.
  • An honest node can restore signatures as a group signature. Time to send group signature becomes Therefore, all 2 time is needed
  • a message can be received from the entire network after about 12 to 15 hops, with a latency of 100 ms on all communication links. It can be seen that it takes about 3 seconds for the block to be agreed upon.
  • each node should be understood as a device constituting a shard network, and may be a computing device having computational power and communication capability.
  • the node 100 includes a communication unit 510 , a memory 515 , and a processor 520 .
  • the communication unit 510 is a means for transmitting and receiving data with other devices (eg, other nodes) through a communication network.
  • the communication unit 510 may receive a block from another node, a block header including a signature, and the like.
  • the communication unit 510 may transmit a block header including its own signature to another node under the control of the processor 520 .
  • the memory 515 stores at least one instruction (program code) necessary to perform the leaderless branchless blockchain consensus method.
  • the processor 520 is a means for controlling components (eg, the communication unit 510 , the memory 515 , etc.) of each node according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the instruction executed by the processor 520 may perform each step for the leaderless branchless blockchain consensus method described with reference to FIGS. 1 to 4 .
  • the apparatus and method according to an embodiment of the present invention may be implemented in the form of program instructions that can be executed through various computer means and recorded in a computer-readable medium.
  • the computer-readable medium may include program instructions, data files, data structures, and the like, alone or in combination.
  • the program instructions recorded on the computer readable medium may be specially designed and configured for the present invention, or may be known and available to those skilled in the computer software field.
  • Examples of the computer-readable recording medium include magnetic media such as hard disks, floppy disks and magnetic tapes, optical media such as CD-ROMs and DVDs, and magnetic media such as floppy disks.
  • Examples of program instructions include not only machine language codes such as those generated by a compiler, but also high-level language codes that can be executed by a computer using an interpreter or the like.
  • the hardware devices described above may be configured to operate as one or more software modules to perform the operations of the present invention, and vice versa.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Information Retrieval, Db Structures And Fs Structures Therefor (AREA)

Abstract

L'invention concerne un procédé de consensus de chaîne de blocs sans gouvernance et un dispositif associé. Un procédé de consensus de chaîne de blocs sans gouvernance comprend les étapes consistant à : (a) calculer une valeur aléatoire pour un tour actuel ; (b) sélectionner un nœud de proposition de bloc à l'aide de la valeur aléatoire calculée ; (c) réceptionner un bloc généré à partir du nœud de proposition de bloc ; et (d) après vérification du bloc reçu, ajouter une signature à l'en-tête du bloc si valide et transmettre, à un autre nœud, uniquement les informations d'en-tête de bloc auxquelles la signature est ajoutée.
PCT/KR2020/014398 2019-11-26 2020-10-21 Procédé de consensus de chaîne de blocs sans gouvernance et dispositif associé WO2021107408A1 (fr)

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KR1020190153426A KR102372422B1 (ko) 2019-11-26 2019-11-26 리더가 없는 블록 체인 합의 방법 및 그 장치
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CN115392912B (zh) * 2022-10-26 2023-03-14 南方科技大学 随机数生成方法、系统、设备及存储介质

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KR20170040079A (ko) * 2016-05-03 2017-04-12 안규태 블록 검증을 위한 복수의 일방향 함수를 지원하는 블록 체인
KR20180089670A (ko) * 2017-02-01 2018-08-09 주식회사 더루프 키 관리가 필요없는 블록체인을 기반한 전자서명 또는 메시지 인증 코드를 생성 및 검증 방법
WO2019032891A1 (fr) * 2017-08-09 2019-02-14 Visa International Service Association Système et procédé de vérification d'interactions
KR20190093012A (ko) * 2018-01-31 2019-08-08 지송학 블록 체인 시스템에서의 블록 생성 및 검증 방법
KR20190123624A (ko) * 2018-04-24 2019-11-01 (주)스마트코인 블록체인 내에서 블록생성 및 검증, 그리고 해킹 방지를 위한 블록체인 플랫폼 시스템

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