WO2021103772A1 - Procédé et appareil de transmission de données - Google Patents

Procédé et appareil de transmission de données Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2021103772A1
WO2021103772A1 PCT/CN2020/116374 CN2020116374W WO2021103772A1 WO 2021103772 A1 WO2021103772 A1 WO 2021103772A1 CN 2020116374 W CN2020116374 W CN 2020116374W WO 2021103772 A1 WO2021103772 A1 WO 2021103772A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
base station
public key
broadcast message
message
private key
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2020/116374
Other languages
English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
欧锻灏
Original Assignee
华为技术有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by 华为技术有限公司 filed Critical 华为技术有限公司
Publication of WO2021103772A1 publication Critical patent/WO2021103772A1/fr

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H04W12/121—Wireless intrusion detection systems [WIDS]; Wireless intrusion prevention systems [WIPS]
    • H04W12/122—Counter-measures against attacks; Protection against rogue devices
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W48/00—Access restriction; Network selection; Access point selection
    • H04W48/20—Selecting an access point

Definitions

  • the UE When the broadcast message comes from a legitimate base station, the UE sends a response message of the broadcast message to the base station.
  • the response message of the broadcast message includes first encryption information, and the first encryption information is the UE Obtained by encrypting the first information according to the base station public key and the master public key.
  • the UE verifies the signature information according to the master public key and the base station public key;
  • a fourth aspect of the present application provides a base station, including:
  • the receiving module is used to receive a broadcast message sent by a base station, the broadcast message includes signature information and a base station public key, the signature information is obtained by the base station through the base station private key signature, and the base station private key is a core network device Sent to the base station;
  • the sending module is configured to send a response message of the broadcast message to the base station, and the response message of the broadcast message includes the first encryption information.
  • the network elements of the core network of the 5G network may also include other functional units.
  • PKG and 5G network are deployed independently, which requires pseudo base stations and PKG to redesign the authentication mechanism.
  • the base station Before broadcasting the message, the base station needs to send the base station public key to the UE for storage.
  • the pseudo base station may initiate a large number of useless base station public keys to the UE to exhaust the storage resources of the UE and make the UE unavailable.
  • the base station needs to store the corresponding base station private key during the validity period of the public key. Since the base station has limited resources compared with the PKG, the base station private key cannot be well protected, and the base station private key stored in the base station may be leaked.
  • the base station may request the base station private key from the core network device in the following situations:
  • the base station sends a broadcast message to the UE.
  • the broadcast message includes signature information and the base station public key.
  • the signature information is obtained by the base station through the base station private key signature.
  • the base station uses the base station private key to decrypt the first encrypted information.
  • the UE uses the base station public key, the master public key, and the first time information to encrypt the first information to obtain the first encrypted information, where the first time information is the current timestamp when the UE was encrypted As for the first time interval, the UE can calculate the first time information in the same manner as the second time information, which will not be repeated here.
  • the base station sends a first request message to the UDM network element, where the first request message includes the base station public key.
  • the sending module 13 is configured to send a broadcast message to the UE, and the broadcast message includes the signature information and the base station public key.
  • the receiving module 14 is configured to receive a response message of the broadcast message sent by the UE.
  • the response message of the broadcast message includes first encryption information, and the first encryption information is the UE according to the base station public key. It is obtained by encrypting the first information with the stored master public key.
  • the base station public key includes a base station identity and a validity period of the base station public key.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

Des modes de réalisation de la présente demande fournissent un procédé et un appareil de transmission de données. Le procédé fait appel aux étapes suivantes : un dispositif de réseau central peut transmettre, à une station de base, une clé privée de station de base correspondant à une clé publique de station de base ; et lors de la transmission d'un message de diffusion à un UE, la station de base obtient des informations de signature au moyen d'une signature de clé privée de station de base, et porte les informations de signature et la clé publique de station de base dans le message de diffusion et transmet à l'UE. En portant, dans le message de diffusion, les informations de signature, qui utilisent la signature de clé privée de station de base, et la clé publique de la station de base, l'UE peut vérifier, selon les informations de signature et la clé publique de station de base, si le message provient d'une station de base légitime, de manière à refuser l'opération d'une pseudo-station de base, et la clé publique de station de base est portée dans le message de diffusion et transmise à l'UE, et ainsi, la présente invention peut éviter le problème selon lequel l'UE n'est pas disponible en raison du fait que la pseudo-station de base transmet intentionnellement un grand nombre de clés publiques gaspillées pour appauvrir la ressource de stockage de l'UE.
PCT/CN2020/116374 2019-11-30 2020-09-21 Procédé et appareil de transmission de données WO2021103772A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
CN201911208412.3A CN112887971B (zh) 2019-11-30 2019-11-30 数据传输方法和装置
CN201911208412.3 2019-11-30

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2021103772A1 true WO2021103772A1 (fr) 2021-06-03

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Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/CN2020/116374 WO2021103772A1 (fr) 2019-11-30 2020-09-21 Procédé et appareil de transmission de données

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CN (1) CN112887971B (fr)
WO (1) WO2021103772A1 (fr)

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2024065312A1 (fr) * 2022-09-28 2024-04-04 北京小米移动软件有限公司 Appareil et procédé de traitement d'informations, dispositif de communication et support d'enregistrement

Families Citing this family (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN115442801A (zh) * 2021-06-03 2022-12-06 华为技术有限公司 传输系统消息的方法和装置
CN116669034A (zh) * 2022-02-18 2023-08-29 华为技术有限公司 检测伪基站的方法和装置

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101552668A (zh) * 2008-03-31 2009-10-07 展讯通信（上海）有限公司 用户设备接入网络时的认证方法、用户设备及基站
CN101742500A (zh) * 2010-01-21 2010-06-16 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种派生空口密钥的方法及系统
US20180367998A1 (en) * 2017-06-16 2018-12-20 Motorola Mobility Llc Reporting monitored parameter information
CN110521228A (zh) * 2017-06-16 2019-11-29 摩托罗拉移动有限责任公司 恶意单元检测信息

Family Cites Families (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN107592281B (zh) * 2016-07-06 2022-04-05 华为技术有限公司 一种传输数据的保护系统、方法及装置
WO2018076190A1 (fr) * 2016-10-26 2018-05-03 华为技术有限公司 Procédé de communication, terminal, dispositif de plan utilisateur de réseau central et dispositif de réseau d'accès
CN108011856B (zh) * 2016-10-31 2020-05-08 华为技术有限公司 一种传输数据的方法和装置

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN101552668A (zh) * 2008-03-31 2009-10-07 展讯通信（上海）有限公司 用户设备接入网络时的认证方法、用户设备及基站
CN101742500A (zh) * 2010-01-21 2010-06-16 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种派生空口密钥的方法及系统
US20180367998A1 (en) * 2017-06-16 2018-12-20 Motorola Mobility Llc Reporting monitored parameter information
CN110521228A (zh) * 2017-06-16 2019-11-29 摩托罗拉移动有限责任公司 恶意单元检测信息

Cited By (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2024065312A1 (fr) * 2022-09-28 2024-04-04 北京小米移动软件有限公司 Appareil et procédé de traitement d'informations, dispositif de communication et support d'enregistrement

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CN112887971B (zh) 2023-03-21
CN112887971A (zh) 2021-06-01

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