WO2021086597A1 - Proxied cross-ledger authentication - Google Patents
Proxied cross-ledger authentication Download PDFInfo
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- WO2021086597A1 WO2021086597A1 PCT/US2020/055426 US2020055426W WO2021086597A1 WO 2021086597 A1 WO2021086597 A1 WO 2021086597A1 US 2020055426 W US2020055426 W US 2020055426W WO 2021086597 A1 WO2021086597 A1 WO 2021086597A1
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- ledger
- issuer
- verifier
- client
- market maker
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- 238000000034 method Methods 0.000 claims abstract description 24
- 238000004590 computer program Methods 0.000 claims description 3
- 230000000977 initiatory effect Effects 0.000 description 16
- 238000010586 diagram Methods 0.000 description 8
- 239000000284 extract Substances 0.000 description 2
- 230000001934 delay Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000006870 function Effects 0.000 description 1
- 230000007774 longterm Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000000203 mixture Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000012986 modification Methods 0.000 description 1
- 230000004048 modification Effects 0.000 description 1
- 239000004557 technical material Substances 0.000 description 1
- 238000010200 validation analysis Methods 0.000 description 1
Classifications
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- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
- G06Q20/06—Private payment circuits, e.g. involving electronic currency used among participants of a common payment scheme
- G06Q20/065—Private payment circuits, e.g. involving electronic currency used among participants of a common payment scheme using e-cash
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- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
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- H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
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- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
- H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
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- G06Q2220/00—Business processing using cryptography
Definitions
- Distributed ledger technology such as blockchain technology, has been used to provide distributed ledger-based identity networks.
- Distributed ledger technology enables user identity and/or other claims (e.g., postal address, social security number, passport number, bank account number, etc.), potentially from different issuers, to be verified while protecting privacy and control by each user/owner of the user/owner’s data.
- claims e.g., postal address, social security number, passport number, bank account number, etc.
- More than one distributed ledger-based identity network exists.
- An entity wishing to be authenticated and or to have a claim verified (sometimes referred to herein as a Client) may be on a different distributed ledger based identity network than the entity seeking to verify the Client (sometimes referred to herein as a Verifier).
- a Client may be on a different distributed ledger based identity network than the entity seeking to verify the Client (sometimes referred to herein as a Verifier).
- each network must include cross-ledger transaction capability for that ledger pair.
- Figure 1 A is a block diagram illustrating an embodiment of a proxied cross ledger authentication system and environment.
- Figure IB is a block diagram illustrating an embodiment of a proxied cross- ledger authentication system.
- Figures 2A and 2B are flow diagrams illustrating an embodiment of a process to perform proxied cross-ledger authentication.
- Figure 3 is a call sequence diagram illustrating an embodiment of a Zero-
- ZKCP Knowledge Contingent Payment
- the invention can be implemented in numerous ways, including as a process; an apparatus; a system; a composition of matter; a computer program product embodied on a computer readable storage medium; and/or a processor, such as a processor configured to execute instructions stored on and or provided by a memory coupled to the processor.
- these implementations, or any other form that the invention may take, may be referred to as techniques.
- the order of the steps of disclosed processes may be altered within the scope of the invention.
- a component such as a processor or a memory described as being configured to perform a task may be implemented as a general component that is temporarily configured to perform the task at a given time or a specific component that is manufactured to perform the task.
- processor refers to one or more devices, circuits, and or processing cores configured to process data, such as computer program instructions.
- Market Maker provides cross-ledger liquidity for all participating token types and enables Client- Verifier rendezvous across ledgers.
- a solution as disclosed herein allows users of a distributed ledger-based identity network (“Clients”) to authenticate to relying parties (“Verifiers”) on different ledgers.
- a solution as disclosed herein has one or more of the following properties, in various embodiments:
- a solution as disclosed herein may involve one or more of the following roles:
- Client entity wishing to be authenticated by a Verifier. An example is an individual user.
- Issuer entity that signs the Client's public key, binding it to a set of attributes.
- An example is a passport agency that binds the Client's nationality, date of birth, etc.
- Market Maker intermediary in the authentication transaction. Provides cross-ledger liquidity for all participating token types and enables Client-Verifier rendezvous.
- Trust Source signer of Issuer's signing key. May also be signer of Market Maker's key (though the Market Maker can be its own trust source). The Trust Source's public key is available on all participating ledgers.
- Verifier the relying party in a transaction.
- An example is an online store.
- a solution as disclosed herein may be used to facilitate cross-ledger transactions, including but not limited to cross-ledger payments.
- a Verifier may make a payment to a Client and/or Issuer on another ledger, such as to pay the Issuer for verifying that a claim issued/signed by the Issuer has not been revoked, or paying a Client to provide the user’s identity credential and or other data.
- Authentication Initiation Contract smart contract written by the Client to the Market Maker Ledger to initiate an authentication transaction. Pledges a time locked Authentication Security Deposit, which is released back to the Client upon timeout or contract completion.
- Maker Ledger Tokens and time locked by the Client in the Authentication Initiation Contract The purpose of this object is to discourage spend-forcing attacks against Verifiers.
- Client Authentication Address address or key pair on the Client Ledger, created by the Client for the purpose of conducting a cross-ledger authentication transaction
- Client Handle unique identifier for the Client. Consists of the Client
- Client Ledger Token cryptocurrency unit on the Client Ledger.
- Client Public Key public component of a cryptographic key pair owned by the Client and associated with the Client Authentication Address.
- Client Revocation Data Client-supplied component of publicly verifiable revocation (or validity) data pertaining to the Client Public Key. For example, in a bilinear- map revocation scheme, this would correspond to the witness.
- Issuer Authentication Contract smart contract between Issuer and Verifier, written to the Market Maker Ledger. Stipulates the Issuer Fee amount (to be paid by the Verifier) and commits to release of the Issuer Revocation Data upon payment.
- Issuer Fee fee paid by the Verifier to the Issuer in exchange for the Issuer
- Issuer Handle unique identifier for the Issuer. Consists of the Issuer's address on the Market Maker Ledger and the Issuer's public key.
- Issuer Revocation Data Issuer-supplied component of publicly verifiable revocation (or validity) data pertaining to the Client Public Key. For example, in a bilinear- map revocation scheme, this would correspond to the accumulator. In other implementations, it may be a simple certificate revocation list. In any case, this value is signed by the Issuer.
- Market Maker Ledger a distributed ledger associated with a Market Maker.
- a Market Maker may have and/or comprise its own distributed ledger and or may use or otherwise be on and or associated with a distributed ledger operated by another entity, including in some embodiments a ledger on which the Client and or Verifier happen to be on.
- Market Maker Ledger Token cryptocurrency unit on the Market Maker
- off-ledger address (for example, a
- Validation Requirements Issuer's requirements for supplying the Issuer's component of the Validity Proof. At minimum, this will include the Issuer Fee expressed in Client Ledger tokens.
- Validity Proof proof of the validity of the Client Public Key. This may be in any agreed form. For example, in a bilinear-map revocation scheme, this would be an actual validity proof (including the Issuer Revocation Data). In other implementations, it may be a simple certificate revocation list.
- Verifier Exchange Rate exchange rate between Verifier Ledger Tokens and Market Maker Ledger Tokens when the Authentication Initiation Contract is instantiated.
- Verifier Handle cross-ledger unique identifier for the Verifier's account on the Market Maker Ledger. Consists of the Market Maker Ledger Identifier, the Verifier's address on the Market Maker Ledger, and the Verifier Public Key.
- Verifier Off-Ledger Address off-ledger address (for example, a URL) at which a transaction participant may communicate with the Verifier
- Verifier Presentation Requirements list of Verifier's requirements for performing authentication of a Client, written on the Verifier Ledger. This includes the Verifier Off-Ledger Address, required Client Security Deposit amount, and Security Deposit Target Currency, and may include, for example, a liveness requirement for revocation data.
- the values in this structure may optionally default to values supplied by the Market Maker via any on- or off-ledger channel.
- Verifier Public Key public component of the cryptographic key pair owned by the Verifier.
- Figure 1 A is a block diagram illustrating an embodiment of a proxied cross ledger authentication system and environment.
- system 100 includes a plurality of distributed ledger-based identity networks, represented in Figure 1 A by distributed ledger-based identity networks 102, 104, and 106.
- a market maker system 108 e.g., a computer server configured to operate as a Market Maker as disclosed herein, is connected via one or more network connections to each of the distributed ledger-based identity networks comprising the plurality of distributed ledger-based identity networks, such as distributed ledger-based identity networks 102, 104, and 106, in this example.
- the market maker system 108 acts as an intermediary in authentication transactions, as disclosed herein, including by providing cross-ledger liquidity for all participating token types to facilitate transactions when a client and verifier (or other transaction participant) are on different identity networks.
- market maker system 108 and enables Client- Verifier rendezvous, such as by enabling Clients and or Verifiers to establish identities and or to initiate and or consummate transactions on a Market Maker Ledger associated with the market maker system 108.
- market maker system 108 is represented as being external to the distributed ledger-based identity networks 102, 104, and 106.
- market maker system 108 may be included in (e.g., be an entity having an identity and or participating on) one or more of the distributed ledger-based identity networks 102, 104, and 106.
- Clients, Issuers, and or Verifiers may each establish a temporary and or a more permanent or long term use address on a Market Maker Ledger, as disclosed herein, for use in performing authentication and or other transactions via the
- a Market Maker maintains an account on each of a plurality of participating ledgers and the Market Maker uses its respective accounts on each ledger to perform the Market Maker function disclosed herein.
- participants such as Clients, Issuers, Verifiers, and/or the Market Maker may use a universal address that is recognized by/on each participating ledger and or which can be resolved to an address usable on each ledger.
- Figure IB is a block diagram illustrating an embodiment of a proxied cross ledger authentication system.
- market maker system 108 of Figure 1A is shown to be on a Market Maker Ledger 120.
- Market maker system 108 is connected, e.g., via one or more networks, to Client 122 on Client Ledger 124 and Verifier 126 on Verifier Ledger 128.
- Client 122, Verifier 126, and Market Maker 108 are all on separate distributed ledgers, and the Client 122 and Issuer 130 are on the same ledger 124.
- Client 122, Issuer 130, and Verifier 126 each has an address on the Market Maker Ledger 126, and monitors its transactions on Market Maker Ledger 126.
- the public keys of Trust Source 132 are available on all participating Ledgers 120, 124, 128 (and or installed on Client 122, Issuer 130, and Verifier 126 devices).
- the Client 122 knows the Verifier Flandle of Verifier 126 (consisting of the Verifier's address on the Market Maker Ledger 120 and the Verifier's public key). This is obtained, in various embodiments, via the Verifier's web site, a QR code, e-mail, text message, or other such mechanism.
- all off-ledger channels are encrypted and authenticated via some standard protocol such as TLS.
- the Client 122 and Verifier 126 are on different ledgers, with a Market Maker Ledger 120 serving as an intermediary, in various embodiments, the Client 122 and Verifier 126 may be on the same ledger. In some embodiments, in cases in which the Client 122 and Verifier 126 are on the same ledger the Market Maker Ledger 120 is not needed or used to perform techniques disclosed herein, including without limitation one or more of the following: Verifier paying Issuer for revocation data; Verifier paying Client for client revocation data and or other Client data; and requiring the Client to make a security deposit to discourage spend-forcing attacks against the Verifier.
- a client such as Client 122
- a verifying entity such as Verifier 126
- the Client 122 may determine the Verifier’s 126 presentation requirements and initiate a transaction on Market Maker Ledger 120, e.g., an Authentication Initiation Contract.
- the Client 122 may initiate the transaction by writing an Authentication Initiation Contract on a ledger other than the Market Maker Ledger 120.
- the presentation requirements may include a requirement to provide a Client Revocation Data pertaining to the Client Public Key, e.g., a “witness” data in the case of a bilinear-map revocation scheme.
- the Client 122 may include in the Authentication Initiation Contract information such as the Client Handle, Issuer Handle, Verifier Handle, in some embodiments a refundable deposit (to protect against spend force attacks, e.g., as described below), the Client Revocation Data, and any other information required by the Verifier Presentation Requirements.
- the Verifier 126 reads the Authentication Initiation Contract instance from the
- a transaction such as described above may include one or more payments, such as a deposit in a nominal amount by the Client 122, which is refunded or otherwise released at the conclusion of the authentication process.
- Such a deposit may protect against a “spend force” attack, such as by repeatedly initiating authentication transactions to force a Verifier to spend money (e.g., cryptocurrency) or other resources.
- a Verifier may also make payments, such as to a Client and or Issuer, to obtain the Client’s data or the Issuer Revocation Data.
- a Market Maker and or Market Maker Ledger as disclosed herein may facilitate cross-ledger transactions by providing cross-ledger liquidity, e.g., by acting as a cryptocurrency exchange and or by holding funds for Clients and or Verifiers, e.g., in a currency of the Market Maker Ledger, for use to conduct future transactions.
- a transaction as described above but including payments as described above may be conducted as follows: Client reads Verifier Presentation Requirements from the Market Maker Ledger or from the Verifier via an off-ledger channel Client creates a Client Authentication Address on the Market Maker Ledger for conducting the authentication protocol. If applicable, the controlling key for this address may be signed by another key owned by the Client or belong to an enclosing account structure controlled by the Client Client reads the exchange rate for converting Client Ledger Tokens into Security Deposit Target Currency from any authoritative on- or off-ledger source. For example, this information may be periodically written to the Market Maker Ledger or simply posted on a web site.
- the Client obtains this information directly from the Market Maker through an off-ledger channel
- Client exchanges Client Ledger Tokens for Market Maker Ledger Tokens sufficient for making the Authentication Security Deposit (both values of which, i.e., the Security Deposit Target Currency and the Security Deposit amount, are specified in the Verifier Presentation Requirements read in step 1). This occurs according to the
- Client creates an Authentication Initiation Contract instance on Market Maker Ledger with the Client Handle, Issuer Handle, Verifier Handle, Client Revocation Data (if any), and Authentication Security Deposit (obtained in step 4, above) supplied as arguments, ensuring that the included Client Revocation Data complies with the Verifier Presentation Requirements (received in step 1).
- the Authentication Initiation Contract time locks the Client's Authentication Security Deposit (for example, by means of a check-lock-time-verify command) for a duration specified in the Verifier Presentation Requirements.
- Client may optionally include a higher Deposit amount than the computed required amount in order to compensate for possible exchange-rate fluctuations.
- the Issuer Handle and Authentication Security Deposit may be written to the Market Maker Ledger separately from the Authentication Initiation Contract (but referenced from it), and the remaining informational contents of the Contract traded to the Verifier through a Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment
- Verifier reads the Authentication Initiation Contract instance from the Market Maker Ledger. If Verifier is dissatisfied with any of the Contract terms, the transaction stops and the Client is notified via any on- or off-ledger channel 7. Verifier obtains the exchange rate between Verifier Ledger Tokens and Market Maker
- Ledger tokens in a manner analogous to step 3, above, then determines if the Authentication Security Deposit is adequate. If not, the transaction stops and the Client is notified via any on- or off-ledger channel
- Verifier connects to Issuer via any on- or off-ledger channel and sends its Verifier Handle.
- this step may be required to be on ledger in order to discourage spend-forcing attacks against Issuers
- Issuer supplies Issuer Revocation Data to Verifier in exchange for the Issuer Fee via any trustless exchange protocol, such as Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment (see below), or through an escrow service provided by a third party (such as the Market Maker) or via any escrow protocol, such as a multi-signature scheme.
- any trustless exchange protocol such as Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment (see below)
- escrow service provided by a third party (such as the Market Maker)
- any escrow protocol such as a multi-signature scheme.
- Zero-Knowledge Contingent Payment a. Issuer encrypts Issuer Revocation Data with Verifier's public key (extracted from the Verifier Handle received in the previous step) to create the first encrypted image El b. Issuer generates a random symmetric key K and uses it to encrypt El, resulting in the second encrypted image E2 c. Issuer hashes K to create the hash image H d. Issuer creates a signed Issuer Authentication Contract instance that includes E2, H, the required Issuer Fee amount (expressed in either Client Ledger Tokens or Market Maker Ledger tokens), and any other relevant terms, and sends it to the Verifier via any on- or off-ledger channel e.
- Verifier looks up the current exchange rate between Verifier Ledger Tokens and the currency denominating the required Issuer Fee (received in step d, above) in a manner analogous to step 3, above g. Verifier exchanges (through the Market Maker) the required quantity of Verifier Ledger Tokens (calculated from the exchange rate obtained in the previous step) for the Issuer Fee, denominated in Market Maker Ledger Tokens h.
- Verifier creates a signed, hashed time-lock contract instance C containing the Issuer Fee (payable to the Issuer), with the hash condition set to H (the timeout condition may be any value of the Verifier's choosing) i.
- Verifier writes C to the Market Maker Ledger j.
- Issuer reads C from the Market Maker Ledger. If it is dissatisfied with any contract terms, the transaction stops and Issuer is notified via any on- or off- ledger channel; the Issuer, in turn, then notifies the Client k.
- Issuer writes K to the ledger (which is the pre-image of H), thus receiving the payment contained in C l.
- Verifier reads K from the ledger and uses it to decrypt E2, which yields El m. Verifier uses its private key to decrypt El, which yields the Issuer Revocation Data 10.
- Verifier constructs the Validity Proof from the Issuer Revocation Data and the Client
- FIGS. 2A and 2B are flow diagrams illustrating an embodiment of a process to perform proxied cross-ledger authentication.
- Figure 2A shows the authentication process 200 as performed by a client system, device, and/or application, such as Client 122 in the example shown in Figure IB
- Figure 2B shows the authentication process 200 as performed by a verifier, such as Verifier 126 in the example shown in Figure IB.
- the Client determines the Verifier’s Presentation Requirements.
- the client initiates an authentication transaction on the Market Maker Ledger, including by providing any required deposit, if any.
- the Verifier reads the Client’s data from the Market Maker Ledger and determines whether the data satisfies the Verifier’s Presentation Requirements. If not, the Verifier terminates the transaction (not shown). If so, at 208 the Verifier obtains Issuer Revocation Data from the Issuer associated with the Client’s data (e.g., the Client’s Public Key).
- the Verifier uses the Client Revocation Data provided by the Client, via the Market Maker Ledger, and the Issuer Revocation Data obtained from the Issuer to construct and verify the Validity Proof. If the Validity Proof fails, the Verifier terminates the transaction (not shown).
- the Verifier determines the Client has been authenticated and releases the Client’s security deposit (if any).
- the Client receives an indication that the authentication has been completed successfully and the deposit is returned (or released) to the Client.
- Figure 3 is a call sequence diagram illustrating an embodiment of a Zero-
- ZKCP Knowledge Contingent Payment
- the system, process, and protocol of Figure 3 may be used to make a zero- knowledge contingent payment in connection with an authentication operation as disclosed herein, such as a payment to a Client for supplying client information or a payment by an Issuer to provide, for example, Issuer Revocation Data.
- the payment may be made via a Market Maker Ledger, as disclosed herein.
- the system, process, and protocol of Figure 3 may be used by Seller 302 to sell information to Buyer 304, e.g., for some pre-agreed and/or dynamically negotiated price.
- Buyer 304 may trust that information disclosed by Seller 302 is correct but does not otherwise need to trust Seller 302 if the technique illustrated in Figure 3 is used. Likewise, Seller 302 does not need to trust Buyer 304.
- payment can occur on any ledger that supports hashing and time locking, while disclosure can occur on any ledger (e.g., Ledger 306, as shown) or off ledger (not shown in Figure 3).
- the disclosed information is known only to Seller 302 and Buyer 304 (that is, it is not disclosed publicly).
- the protocol of Figure 3 is used to guarantee payment to Seller 302 upon release of the Seller’s information, and to guarantee to Buyer 304 that the Seller’s information will be available to Buyer 304 upon release of payment.
- the protocol is may be used in situations where it is in Seller’s 302 interest to reveal correct information (for example, if Seller 302 is an Issuer or Seller 302 is a Client or other user in a context in which the Seller 302 is highly motivated to disclose only correct information).
- Seller 302 encrypts plaintext data P with Buyer 304’s public key Bpub to create a first encrypted image El.
- Seller 302 generates a random symmetric key K and uses it to encrypt El, resulting in a second encrypted image E2.
- Seller 302 hashes K to create the hashed key image H and Seller 302 sends E2 and H to Buyer 304 via any on- or off-ledger channel.
- These values (E2, H) may optionally be signed by Seller 302 to allow Buyer 304 to verify their source.
- Buyer 304 creates a signed, hashed time-lock contract instance C containing a payment to Seller 302, with the hash condition set to H (the timeout condition may be any value of Buyer’s 304 choosing) and writes C to Ledger 306.
- Seller 302 reads C from the Ledger 306 and writes K (which is the pre-image of H) to the Ledger 306, thus receiving the payment contained in C.
- Buyer 304 reads K from the Ledger 306 and uses it to decrypt E2, which yields El.
- Buyer 304 uses its private key (corresponding to Bpub) to decrypt El, which yields P, thus completing the transaction.
- An example retail commercial transaction facilitated using techniques as disclosed herein follows.
- a retailer purchaser referred to as “Customer” purchases from a retail store “Store” a product called “Product” which requires the Store to obtain satisfactory proof that the Customer is at least 21 years of age.
- the “Client” is an app on the Customer’s phone or other mobile device
- the “Issuer” of the credential that will be presented e.g., a credentialized data affirming that Customer is age 21 years or older, but which does not disclose the Customer’s actual age or birth date
- the DMV the “Verifier” is the “Store” or its service provider.
- the Client and Issuer ore on a “First Ledger” e.g., OmniOneTM
- the Verifier is on a “Second Ledger” (e.g., SovrinTM).
- the entities may be on the same and/or different ledgers.
- Customer arrives at a checkout station at the Store and presents the Product for purchase. Customer will use a DMV-issued digital credential on his phone to prove Customer is 21 years or older. Customer begins the authentication process by starting his authentication app (his Client) and scanning a QR code, for example, displayed or presented at the checkout station. The Client then conducts the following protocol, in various embodiments:
- Client extracts a URL from the scanned QR code, connects to it, and downloads the Verifiers Presentation Requirements (i.e., Store’s presentation requirements, in this example).
- Verifiers Presentation Requirements i.e., Store
- Customer has a decentralized identity account on the First Ledger blockchain, but the
- the Client therefore creates an address on the Market Maker Ledger blockchain, which it will use as an intermediary.
- the Client creates a single-use address.
- the Client may have a pre-existing, non-single-use address on the Market Maker Ledger and may use the pre-existing address.
- the Presentation Requirements inform Customer’s Client that the Store requires one Second Ledger token as Authentication Security Deposit, to be held for ten minutes (the purpose of which is to discourage spend-forcing attacks).
- the Client Upon reading the current exchange rates from the Market Maker Ledger, the Client learns that the current exchange rate between Second Ledger tokens and Market Maker Ledger tokens is 3-2, and the rate between First Ledger tokens and Market Maker Ledger tokens is 4-5.
- the required Authentication Security Deposit is therefore 8/15 of a First Ledger token.
- Customer’s Client computes that 2/3 of a First Ledger token should be sufficient to meet the Deposit requirement. It therefore presents a screen on his phone that reads, “Store needs a security deposit of 2/3 of an First Ledger token for ten minutes. Do you agree?” Customer taps the “Yes” button.
- Customer’s Client converts 2/3 of a First Ledger token into Market Maker Ledger tokens through the Market Maker’s exchange service. This exchange happens according to Market Maker’s native exchange protocol. 5.
- Customer’s Client creates an Authentication Initiation Contract on the Market Maker Ledger blockchain. This contract time locks Customer’s 2/3 Market Maker Ledger token for ten minutes (as stipulated in step 3, above). The contract also includes a unique identifier extracted from the QR code scanned at the beginning of the transaction.
- DMV encrypts the Issuer Revocation Data and writes it to the Market Maker Ledger blockchain, along with the price.
- Store purchases the key to the Issuer Revocation Data through a ZKCP protocol (e.g., Figure 3 above), checking exchange rates and exchanging Second Ledger tokens for Market Maker Ledger tokens as needed (similarly to steps 3 and 4, above).
- DMV converts the fee into its own native tokens, i.e., First Ledger tokens in this example, but it could be any ledger. 10.
- Store sees from Customer’s Client Revocation Data (extracted from the
- techniques disclosed herein may be used to facilitate cross-ledger authentication and other cross-ledger transactions and operations, without having to build cross-ledger transaction capability for every ledger pair.
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Abstract
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JP2022525180A JP2023500260A (en) | 2019-10-31 | 2020-10-13 | Proxy mutual ledger authentication |
EP20880816.2A EP4052206A4 (en) | 2019-10-31 | 2020-10-13 | Proxied cross-ledger authentication |
KR1020227014549A KR20220070303A (en) | 2019-10-31 | 2020-10-13 | Proxyed Ledger-to-Ledger Authentication |
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US11669812B2 (en) * | 2020-06-05 | 2023-06-06 | Serge M Krasnyansky | Contingent payments for virtual currencies |
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EP4052206A1 (en) | 2022-09-07 |
JP2023500260A (en) | 2023-01-05 |
EP4052206A4 (en) | 2023-11-22 |
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