WO2021042735A1 - Session key management method in encryption device of water conservancy industrial control system - Google Patents

Session key management method in encryption device of water conservancy industrial control system Download PDF

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WO2021042735A1
WO2021042735A1 PCT/CN2020/085870 CN2020085870W WO2021042735A1 WO 2021042735 A1 WO2021042735 A1 WO 2021042735A1 CN 2020085870 W CN2020085870 W CN 2020085870W WO 2021042735 A1 WO2021042735 A1 WO 2021042735A1
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encryption
session key
encryption device
dadr
water conservancy
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PCT/CN2020/085870
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French (fr)
Chinese (zh)
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陈宁
高祥涛
王美玲
朱月
曹晓宁
张磊
王培�
陈辉
陆明
赵峰
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江苏省水文水资源勘测局
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    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • HELECTRICITY
    • H04ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04LTRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying

Definitions

  • the invention belongs to the field of information technology, and particularly relates to a session key management method in an encryption device of a water conservancy industrial control system.
  • ADU Modbus Application Data Unit
  • PDU protocol data unit
  • the integrity check mechanism is too simple and easy to be tampered with
  • the secure transmission of ADU can be realized by deploying encryption equipment between the upper computer, the lower computer and other automation control equipment and the fieldbus. How to manage the keys of such encryption devices is currently a more important issue.
  • PKI public key infrastructure
  • CA certification center
  • the present invention proposes a session key management method in an encryption device of a water conservancy industrial control system to realize a decentralized distributed encryption device key management function.
  • the technical solution adopted by the present invention is: a session key management method in an encryption device of a water conservancy industrial control system, which includes the following steps:
  • S1 Set up a field bus FB of the water conservancy industrial control system, connect the encryption device between the control device and the field bus network physical interface, and initialize the encryption device.
  • the initialization process includes the encryption device session key generation and the encryption device session secret Key pre-distribution;
  • step S1 the encryption device is initialized in step S1; the method is as follows:
  • the built-in symmetric encryption module of the encryption device to generate a session key PK
  • the corresponding symmetric encryption algorithm includes but not limited to DES, AES, SM1; set the address code of the control device connected to the encryption device as DADR;
  • PK and DADR as a two-tuple and write them into the memory of the encrypted device, which includes but not limited to NAND Flash and eMMC; use PK and DADR as a two-tuple and export them to the mobile device MD for pre-allocation
  • the form of MD of the mobile device includes but not limited to mobile hard disk, U disk, SD card;
  • the pre-distribution operation is performed on each encryption device. After the pre-distribution is completed, the initialization process ends.
  • control device connected to the encryption device is the master device (Master)
  • slave devices Slave
  • the fieldbus FB exports all the encryption devices connected to other slave devices (Slave) on the fieldbus FB to the two-tuple PK and DADR of the mobile device MD, and write them to the master device respectively In the storage of the connected encryption device;
  • control device connected to the encryption device is a slave device (Slave)
  • step S2 when the address code of the control device DD on the field bus FB changes, update the session key of the encrypted device connected to the control device DD; suppose the original address code of the control device DD is DADR, and for its connection
  • the encryption device of, the update method is as follows:
  • S2.1 Use the built-in symmetric encryption module of the encryption device to regenerate a session key PK_NEW of the encryption device.
  • the corresponding symmetric encryption algorithm includes but not limited to DES, AES, SM1; set the new address code of the control device DD Is DADR_NEW;
  • PK_NEW and DADR_NEW as a two-tuple into the storage of the encrypted device and overwrite the original two-tuple PK and DADR of the encrypted device; use PK_NEW and DADR_NEW as a two-tuple to export to the mobile device MD, and Overwrite the original two-tuple PK and DADR of the encrypted device stored in the MD for use in the pre-allocation phase.
  • the form of the mobile device MD includes but not limited to mobile hard disk, U disk, SD card;
  • control device DD whose address code connected to the encryption device changes is the master device (Master)
  • the master device Master
  • export the encryption device to the two-tuple PK_NEW and DADR_NEW of the mobile device MD, and write them to all other slaves connected to the fieldbus FB.
  • control device DD whose address code changes to the encrypted device is a slave device (Slave)
  • export the encrypted device to the two-tuple PK_NEW, DADR_NEW of the mobile device MD, and write it to the only connected master device on the field bus FB (Master) in the storage of the encryption device;
  • step S2.4 After the pre-allocation of step S2.3 is completed, the update process ends.
  • step S3 when the control device DD on the field bus FB temporarily or permanently disconnects the logical connection with other devices on the field bus FB, the session key in the encryption device connected to the control device DD is moved. Except; suppose the original address code of the control device DD is DADR, for the encrypted device connected to it, the removal method is as follows:
  • the invention realizes the decentralized distributed management of the key of the field bus channel encryption device through the method of offline distribution, update and removal of the symmetric session key.
  • the fieldbus network of the existing water conservancy industrial control system there is no need to establish a separate public key infrastructure (Public Key Infrastructure) and a certification center (Certificate Authority) to realize the identity authentication of the control equipment, which has strong equipment compatibility .
  • Public Key Infrastructure Public Key Infrastructure
  • a certification center Certificate Authority
  • the invention is compatible with the existing bus-type topology network, does not need to modify the field bus physical layer and the link layer, and can effectively prevent unauthorized and illegal devices from monitoring, intercepting, tampering and other man-in-the-middle attacks on the field bus channel.
  • the symmetric encryption scheme adopted in the session key of the present invention has the characteristics of high access efficiency and low time overhead, and therefore has a higher competitive advantage in terms of equipment cost and node processing delay.
  • it reduces the security risk of the fieldbus channel in the industrial control system of the water conservancy industry, and provides a reliable security guarantee for the critical infrastructure in the national economy.
  • Figure 1 is a hierarchical structure diagram of the method of the present invention
  • FIG. 1 is an initialization flowchart of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is an update flow chart of the present invention.
  • Figure 4 is a removal flow chart of the present invention.
  • control devices D1, D2, and D3 on a field bus FB, where D1 is the upper computer, set to master mode, and the address is 0x01; D2, D3 are lower computers, set to slave mode , The addresses are 0x02 and 0x03 respectively.
  • the control devices D1, D2, and D3 are directly connected to the field bus FB, and no encryption device is deployed between the field bus FB.
  • the session key management method in the encryption device of the water conservancy industrial control system described in this embodiment, as shown in FIG. 1, includes the following steps:
  • SM1 Use the built-in symmetric encryption module of ND1 to generate a session key PK1, and its corresponding symmetric encryption algorithm is SM1.
  • the address code DADR1 of the control device D1 connected to ND1 is 0x01, and PK1 and DADR1 are used as a two-tuple and written into the memory of ND1, which is NAND Flash.
  • PK1 and DADR1 are exported as a two-tuple to the mobile device MD, and the mobile device MD is in the form of a U disk.
  • SM1 Use the built-in symmetric encryption module of ND2 to generate a session key PK2, and its corresponding symmetric encryption algorithm is SM1.
  • the address code DADR2 of the control device D2 connected to ND2 is 0x02, and PK2 and DADR2 are used as a two-tuple and written into the memory of ND2, which is NAND Flash. Export PK2 and DADR2 as a two-tuple to the mobile device MD.
  • SM3 Use the built-in symmetric encryption module of ND3 to generate a session key PK3, and its corresponding symmetric encryption algorithm is SM1.
  • the address code DADR3 of the control device D3 connected to ND3 is 0x03, and PK3 and DADR3 are used as a two-tuple and written into the memory of ND3, which is NAND Flash. Export PK3 and DADR3 as a two-tuple to the mobile device MD.
  • the control device D1 connected to ND1 is the master device (Master), and all the encryption devices ND2, ND3 connected to the other slave devices (Slave) D2 and D3 on the fieldbus FB are exported to the two-tuples PK2, DADR2 and PK3 of the mobile device MD , DADR3, respectively write into the memory of ND1.
  • the control device D2 connected to ND2 is a slave device (Slave), which exports the only encryption device ND1 connected to the master device (Master) D1 on the fieldbus FB to the binary group PK1, DADR1 of the mobile device MD, and writes it to the memory of ND2 in.
  • Master master device
  • DADR1 binary group PK1, DADR1 of the mobile device MD
  • the control device D3 connected to ND3 is the slave device (Slave), which exports the only encryption device ND1 connected to the master device (Master) D1 on the fieldbus FB to the binary group PK1, DADR1 of the mobile device MD, and writes it to the memory of ND3 in.
  • Master master device
  • DADR1 binary group PK1, DADR1 of the mobile device MD
  • ND1 can perform data communication with ND2 and ND3 respectively, and data communication cannot be performed between ND2 and ND3 due to the lack of the other party's session key, thus realizing communication data isolation between slave devices.
  • the initialization process is shown in Figure 2.
  • SM1 Use the built-in symmetric encryption module of ND2 to regenerate a session key PK4, and its corresponding symmetric encryption algorithm is SM1.
  • the new address code DADR4 of the new device D2 connected to ND2 is 0x04, and PK4 and DADR4 are written as a two-tuple into the memory of ND2, and the original two-tuple PK2 and DADR2 are overwritten.
  • Export PK4 and DADR4 as a two-tuple to the mobile device MD, and overwrite the original two-tuple PK2 and DADR2 stored in the MD.
  • control device D2 is a slave device (Slave)
  • the two tuples PK4 and DADR4 exported to the mobile device MD are written into the memory of the encryption device ND1, which is the only encryption device connected to the master device (Master) D1 on the field bus FB.
  • the update process ends.
  • the PK2 of the original device D2 is removed from the memory of the encryption device ND2. Even if the original device D2 is connected to the field bus FB through the encryption device ND2, it cannot communicate with the master device D1. The new device D2 can communicate with the main device D1 normally.
  • the update process is shown in Figure 3.
  • the original two-tuples PK3 and DADR3 of the ND3 that have been written in the memory of the encryption device ND1 connected to the master device D1 are deleted, and the two-tuples are deleted.

Abstract

Disclosed in the present invention is a session key management method in an encryption device of a water conservancy industrial control system. The method achieves the distributed credibility of all the nodes on a field bus of the water conservancy industrial control system by distributing, updating, and removing a session key for an encryption device connected to the water conservancy industrial control system. On the field bus of the water conservancy industrial control system, the encryption device is deployed between each node connected to the bus and the bus, and the session key based on a symmetric encryption algorithm is distributed for each encryption device, so that the identity authentication of the device can be realized, and thus, compared with an asymmetric encryption algorithm, the present invention has the advantages of being high in access efficiency, small in time overhead, and strong in compatibility. The present invention does not need to improve an existing bus-type network topology structure, and has high resistance to man-in-the-middle attack. In an automatic control system of the water conservancy industry, the safety risk caused because a field bus channel is subjected to invasion can be reduced, and reliable safety guarantee is provided for key infrastructures in the national economy field.

Description

一种水利工业控制系统加密设备中会话密钥管理方法A session key management method in encryption equipment of water conservancy industry control system 技术领域Technical field
本发明属于信息技术领域,尤其涉及一种水利工业控制系统加密设备中会话密钥管理方法。The invention belongs to the field of information technology, and particularly relates to a session key management method in an encryption device of a water conservancy industrial control system.
背景技术Background technique
在我国现有的水利工业控制系统中,上位机与下位机之间绝大部分使用现场总线网络实现数据通信,通信协议多为Modbus。Modbus应用数据单元(ADU)的结构在系统安全性方面存在较高的脆弱性:其中的协议数据单元(PDU)以明文传输,缺乏保密性;完整性校验机制过于简单,易被篡改;对重放攻击没有任何抵抗性。为了针对现场总线网络中由于上述脆弱性导致的安全风险,可通过在上位机、下位机等自动化控制设备,与现场总线之间部署加密设备,实现ADU的安全传输。如何对此类加密设备的密钥进行管理,目前是一个较为重要的问题。In our country's existing water conservancy industry control system, most of the upper computer and the lower computer use fieldbus network to realize data communication, and the communication protocol is mostly Modbus. The structure of Modbus Application Data Unit (ADU) has a high vulnerability in system security: the protocol data unit (PDU) is transmitted in plain text and lacks confidentiality; the integrity check mechanism is too simple and easy to be tampered with; There is no resistance to replay attacks. In order to address the security risks caused by the above-mentioned vulnerabilities in the fieldbus network, the secure transmission of ADU can be realized by deploying encryption equipment between the upper computer, the lower computer and other automation control equipment and the fieldbus. How to manage the keys of such encryption devices is currently a more important issue.
由于总线型网络的信道共享特性,以及自动化控制设备较低的通信速率,在现场总线中建立单独的公钥基础设施(PKI)和认证中心(CA)实现中心化的密钥分配与管理,将会对系统的效率产生较大影响,甚至有可能造成可用性的降低。Due to the channel sharing characteristics of the bus-type network and the lower communication rate of the automation control equipment, a separate public key infrastructure (PKI) and certification center (CA) are established in the field bus to achieve centralized key distribution and management. It will have a greater impact on the efficiency of the system, and may even cause a decrease in availability.
因此,如何在保证系统效率和可用性的前提下,设计一套去中心化的现场总线信道加密设备密钥管理方法,实现便捷、高效的密钥分配、更新及移除,提高对于中间人攻击的抵抗能力,预防未经授权的非法设备在现场总线的信道上监听、拦截、篡改数据监测及控制信息,降低在水利行业的工业自动化控制系统中因现场总线信道受到侵入而产生的安全风险,对于国民经济领域中关键性基础设施提供可靠的安全保障,是一个具有较高学术及应用价值的课题。Therefore, how to design a set of decentralized fieldbus channel encryption device key management method under the premise of ensuring system efficiency and availability, realize convenient and efficient key distribution, update and removal, and improve the resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks Ability to prevent unauthorized and illegal devices from monitoring, intercepting, and tampering with data monitoring and control information on the field bus channel, and reduce the security risk caused by the intrusion of the field bus channel in the industrial automation control system of the water conservancy industry. The provision of reliable security guarantees by critical infrastructure in the economic field is a subject of high academic and application value.
发明内容Summary of the invention
发明目的:针对以上问题,本发明提出一种水利工业控制系统加密设备中会话密钥管理方法,实现去中心化的分布式加密设备密钥管理功能。Purpose of the invention: In view of the above problems, the present invention proposes a session key management method in an encryption device of a water conservancy industrial control system to realize a decentralized distributed encryption device key management function.
技术方案:为实现本发明的目的,本发明所采用的技术方案是:一种水利工业控制系统加密设备中会话密钥管理方法,包括如下步骤:Technical solution: In order to achieve the purpose of the present invention, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is: a session key management method in an encryption device of a water conservancy industrial control system, which includes the following steps:
S1:设水利工业控制系统的某一条现场总线FB,在控制设备与现场总线的网络物理接口之间接入加密设备,对加密设备进行初始化,初始化过程包括加密设备会话密钥生成及加密设备会话密钥预分配;S1: Set up a field bus FB of the water conservancy industrial control system, connect the encryption device between the control device and the field bus network physical interface, and initialize the encryption device. The initialization process includes the encryption device session key generation and the encryption device session secret Key pre-distribution;
S2:当现场总线FB上的控制设备DD的地址码发生变化,对控制设备DD所连接的加密设备会话密钥进行更新,更新过程包括生成该加密设备新会话密钥,撤销原会话密钥以及加密设备会话密钥预分配;S2: When the address code of the control device DD on the fieldbus FB changes, the session key of the encrypted device connected to the control device DD is updated. The update process includes generating a new session key for the encrypted device, revoking the original session key, and Encryption device session key pre-distribution;
S3:当现场总线FB上的控制设备DD暂时或永久性地断开与现场总线FB上其他设备的逻辑连接,对该控制设备DD所连接的加密设备中的会话密钥进行移除处理,移除过程包括该加密设备的会话密钥重置,并将该加密设备原密钥从现场总线FB上的其他每一台加密 设备中删除。S3: When the control device DD on the fieldbus FB temporarily or permanently disconnects the logical connection with other devices on the fieldbus FB, remove the session key in the encryption device connected to the control device DD, and move The removal process includes resetting the session key of the encryption device, and deleting the original encryption device key from every other encryption device on the fieldbus FB.
进一步,步骤S1所述对加密设备进行初始化;方法如下:Further, the encryption device is initialized in step S1; the method is as follows:
使用加密设备内置的对称加密模块,生成一个会话密钥PK,其对应的对称加密算法包括但不限于DES、AES、SM1;设加密设备连接的控制设备的地址码为DADR;Use the built-in symmetric encryption module of the encryption device to generate a session key PK, the corresponding symmetric encryption algorithm includes but not limited to DES, AES, SM1; set the address code of the control device connected to the encryption device as DADR;
将PK、DADR作为一个二元组,写入加密设备的存储器中,该存储器包括但不限于NAND Flash、eMMC;将PK、DADR作为一个二元组,导出至移动设备MD中,以备预分配阶段使用,移动设备MD的形态包括但不限于移动硬盘、U盘、SD卡;Use PK and DADR as a two-tuple and write them into the memory of the encrypted device, which includes but not limited to NAND Flash and eMMC; use PK and DADR as a two-tuple and export them to the mobile device MD for pre-allocation For stage use, the form of MD of the mobile device includes but not limited to mobile hard disk, U disk, SD card;
完成现场总线FB上所有加密设备的会话密钥生成后,对每一台加密设备分别执行预分配操作,预分配完成后,初始化过程结束。After the session key generation of all encryption devices on the fieldbus FB is completed, the pre-distribution operation is performed on each encryption device. After the pre-distribution is completed, the initialization process ends.
进一步,对现场总线FB上的每一台加密设备分别执行预分配操作;方法如下:Further, perform pre-allocation operations on each encryption device on the fieldbus FB; the method is as follows:
若加密设备连接的控制设备为主设备(Master),将现场总线FB上所有连接其他从设备(Slave)的加密设备中导出至移动设备MD的二元组PK、DADR,分别写入与主设备连接的该加密设备的存储器中;If the control device connected to the encryption device is the master device (Master), export all the encryption devices connected to other slave devices (Slave) on the fieldbus FB to the two-tuple PK and DADR of the mobile device MD, and write them to the master device respectively In the storage of the connected encryption device;
若加密设备连接的控制设备为从设备(Slave),将现场总线FB上唯一的连接主设备(Master)的加密设备中导出至移动设备MD的二元组PK、DADR,写入与从设备连接的该加密设备的存储器中。If the control device connected to the encryption device is a slave device (Slave), export the only encryption device connected to the master device (Master) on the fieldbus FB to the two-tuple PK, DADR of the mobile device MD, and write it to connect with the slave device Of the encrypted device’s memory.
进一步,步骤S2所述当现场总线FB上的控制设备DD的地址码发生变化,对控制设备DD所连接的加密设备会话密钥进行更新;设控制设备DD的原地址码为DADR,对于其连接的加密设备,更新方法如下:Further, in step S2, when the address code of the control device DD on the field bus FB changes, update the session key of the encrypted device connected to the control device DD; suppose the original address code of the control device DD is DADR, and for its connection The encryption device of, the update method is as follows:
S2.1:使用该加密设备内置的对称加密模块,重新生成该加密设备的一个会话密钥PK_NEW,其对应的对称加密算法包括但不限于DES、AES、SM1;设控制设备DD的新地址码为DADR_NEW;S2.1: Use the built-in symmetric encryption module of the encryption device to regenerate a session key PK_NEW of the encryption device. The corresponding symmetric encryption algorithm includes but not limited to DES, AES, SM1; set the new address code of the control device DD Is DADR_NEW;
将PK_NEW、DADR_NEW作为一个二元组,写入该加密设备的存储器中,并覆盖该加密设备的原二元组PK、DADR;将PK_NEW、DADR_NEW作为一个二元组,导出至移动设备MD,并覆盖MD中已存储的该加密设备的原二元组PK、DADR,以备预分配阶段使用,移动设备MD的形态包括但不限于移动硬盘、U盘、SD卡;Write PK_NEW and DADR_NEW as a two-tuple into the storage of the encrypted device and overwrite the original two-tuple PK and DADR of the encrypted device; use PK_NEW and DADR_NEW as a two-tuple to export to the mobile device MD, and Overwrite the original two-tuple PK and DADR of the encrypted device stored in the MD for use in the pre-allocation phase. The form of the mobile device MD includes but not limited to mobile hard disk, U disk, SD card;
S2.2:完成该加密设备的新会话密钥生成后,对现场总线FB上其他每一台加密设备分别执行撤销该加密设备原会话密钥操作,若现场总线FB上其他加密设备的存储器中存在已写入的该加密设备的原二元组PK、DADR,将该二元组删除;S2.2: After completing the generation of the new session key of the encryption device, perform the operation of revoking the original session key of the encryption device on each other encryption device on the fieldbus FB. If the memory of the other encryption device on the fieldbus FB is If there is the original two-tuple PK and DADR of the encryption device that have been written, delete the two-tuple;
S2.3:完成所有其他加密设备对该加密设备原会话密钥的撤销后,对该加密设备执行预分配操作;S2.3: After all other encryption devices revoke the original session key of the encryption device, perform a pre-distribution operation on the encryption device;
若该加密设备所连接的地址码发生变化的控制设备DD为主设备(Master),将该加密设备导出至移动设备MD的二元组PK_NEW、DADR_NEW,分别写入现场总线FB上所有连接其他从设备(Slave)的加密设备的存储器中;If the control device DD whose address code connected to the encryption device changes is the master device (Master), export the encryption device to the two-tuple PK_NEW and DADR_NEW of the mobile device MD, and write them to all other slaves connected to the fieldbus FB. In the storage of the encrypted device of the device (Slave);
若该加密设备所连接的地址码发生变化的控制设备DD为从设备(Slave),将该加密设备导出至移动设备MD的二元组PK_NEW、DADR_NEW,写入现场总线FB上唯一的连接主设备(Master)的加密设备的存储器中;If the control device DD whose address code changes to the encrypted device is a slave device (Slave), export the encrypted device to the two-tuple PK_NEW, DADR_NEW of the mobile device MD, and write it to the only connected master device on the field bus FB (Master) in the storage of the encryption device;
S2.4:步骤S2.3执行预分配完成后,更新过程结束。S2.4: After the pre-allocation of step S2.3 is completed, the update process ends.
进一步,步骤S3所述当现场总线FB上的控制设备DD暂时或永久性地断开与现场总 线FB上其他设备的逻辑连接,将该控制设备DD所连接的加密设备中的会话密钥进行移除;设该控制设备DD的原地址码为DADR,对于与其连接的加密设备,移除方法如下:Further, in step S3, when the control device DD on the field bus FB temporarily or permanently disconnects the logical connection with other devices on the field bus FB, the session key in the encryption device connected to the control device DD is moved. Except; suppose the original address code of the control device DD is DADR, for the encrypted device connected to it, the removal method is as follows:
S3.1:若该加密设备的存储器中存在已写入的二元组PK、DADR,将该二元组删除,将该加密设备的存储器重置为原始状态;S3.1: If there are two-tuples PK and DADR that have been written in the memory of the encryption device, delete the two-tuples and reset the memory of the encryption device to the original state;
S3.2:该加密设备重置完成后,对现场总线FB上其他每一台加密设备分别执行撤销该加密设备原会话密钥操作;若其他加密设备的存储器中存在已写入的该加密设备的原二元组PK、DADR,将该二元组删除;S3.2: After resetting the encrypted device, perform the operation of revoking the original session key of the encrypted device on each other encrypted device on the fieldbus FB; if the encrypted device has been written in the memory of the other encrypted device The original two-tuple PK, DADR of, delete the two-tuple;
S3.3:完成所有其他加密设备对该加密设备原会话密钥的撤销后,移除过程结束。S3.3: After all other encryption devices revoke the original session key of the encryption device, the removal process ends.
有益效果:与现有技术相比,本发明的技术方案具有以下有益的技术效果:。Beneficial effects: Compared with the prior art, the technical solution of the present invention has the following beneficial technical effects:
本发明通过对称会话密钥离线分配、更新及移除的方法,实现了现场总线信道加密设备密钥去中心化的分布式管理。在现有水利工业控制系统的现场总线网络中,无需建立单独的公钥基础设施(Public Key Infrastructure)与认证中心(Certificate Authority),即可实现控制设备的身份认证,具有较强的设备兼容性。本发明兼容现有的总线型拓扑网络,无需对现场总线物理层及链路层进行改造,能够有效预防未经授权的非法设备在现场总线的信道上实施监听、拦截、篡改等中间人攻击。与非对称加密方案相比,本发明在会话密钥中所采用的对称加密方案具有访问效率高、时间开销少的特点,因而在设备成本及节点处理时延上具有较高的竞争优势,能够在节约计算资源的前提下降低在水利行业的工业控制系统中现场总线信道的安全风险,对于国民经济领域中关键性基础设施提供可靠的安全保障。The invention realizes the decentralized distributed management of the key of the field bus channel encryption device through the method of offline distribution, update and removal of the symmetric session key. In the fieldbus network of the existing water conservancy industrial control system, there is no need to establish a separate public key infrastructure (Public Key Infrastructure) and a certification center (Certificate Authority) to realize the identity authentication of the control equipment, which has strong equipment compatibility . The invention is compatible with the existing bus-type topology network, does not need to modify the field bus physical layer and the link layer, and can effectively prevent unauthorized and illegal devices from monitoring, intercepting, tampering and other man-in-the-middle attacks on the field bus channel. Compared with the asymmetric encryption scheme, the symmetric encryption scheme adopted in the session key of the present invention has the characteristics of high access efficiency and low time overhead, and therefore has a higher competitive advantage in terms of equipment cost and node processing delay. On the premise of saving computing resources, it reduces the security risk of the fieldbus channel in the industrial control system of the water conservancy industry, and provides a reliable security guarantee for the critical infrastructure in the national economy.
附图说明Description of the drawings
图1是本发明方法层次结构图;Figure 1 is a hierarchical structure diagram of the method of the present invention;
图2是本发明初始化流程图;Figure 2 is an initialization flowchart of the present invention;
图3是本发明更新流程图;Figure 3 is an update flow chart of the present invention;
图4是本发明移除流程图。Figure 4 is a removal flow chart of the present invention.
具体实施方式detailed description
下面结合附图和实施例对本发明的技术方案作进一步的说明。The technical solution of the present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the drawings and embodiments.
设某水利工业控制系统中,一条现场总线FB上,分别存在控制设备D1、D2、D3,其中D1为上位机,设为master模式,地址为0x01;D2、D3为下位机,设为slave模式,地址分别为0x02、0x03。控制设备D1、D2、D3均直接连接至现场总线FB,与现场总线FB之间未部署任何加密设备。Suppose that in a water conservancy industrial control system, there are control devices D1, D2, and D3 on a field bus FB, where D1 is the upper computer, set to master mode, and the address is 0x01; D2, D3 are lower computers, set to slave mode , The addresses are 0x02 and 0x03 respectively. The control devices D1, D2, and D3 are directly connected to the field bus FB, and no encryption device is deployed between the field bus FB.
本实施例所述的一种水利工业控制系统加密设备中会话密钥管理方法,如图1所示,包括以下步骤:The session key management method in the encryption device of the water conservancy industrial control system described in this embodiment, as shown in FIG. 1, includes the following steps:
S1:将新的加密设备ND1、ND2、ND3分别部署至控制设备D1、D2、D3与现场总线FB之间,依次对ND1、ND2、ND3执行以下操作:S1: Deploy the new encryption devices ND1, ND2, and ND3 between the control devices D1, D2, D3 and the fieldbus FB respectively, and perform the following operations on ND1, ND2, and ND3 in turn:
使用ND1内置的对称加密模块,生成一个会话密钥PK1,其对应的对称加密算法为SM1。ND1连接的控制设备D1的地址码DADR1为0x01,将PK1、DADR1作为一个二元组,写入ND1的存储器中,该存储器为NAND Flash。将PK1、DADR1作为一个二元组,导出至移动设备MD中, 移动设备MD的形态为U盘。Use the built-in symmetric encryption module of ND1 to generate a session key PK1, and its corresponding symmetric encryption algorithm is SM1. The address code DADR1 of the control device D1 connected to ND1 is 0x01, and PK1 and DADR1 are used as a two-tuple and written into the memory of ND1, which is NAND Flash. PK1 and DADR1 are exported as a two-tuple to the mobile device MD, and the mobile device MD is in the form of a U disk.
使用ND2内置的对称加密模块,生成一个会话密钥PK2,其对应的对称加密算法为SM1。ND2连接的控制设备D2的地址码DADR2为0x02,将PK2、DADR2作为一个二元组,写入ND2的存储器中,该存储器为NAND Flash。将PK2、DADR2作为一个二元组,导出至移动设备MD中。Use the built-in symmetric encryption module of ND2 to generate a session key PK2, and its corresponding symmetric encryption algorithm is SM1. The address code DADR2 of the control device D2 connected to ND2 is 0x02, and PK2 and DADR2 are used as a two-tuple and written into the memory of ND2, which is NAND Flash. Export PK2 and DADR2 as a two-tuple to the mobile device MD.
使用ND3内置的对称加密模块,生成一个会话密钥PK3,其对应的对称加密算法为SM1。ND3连接的控制设备D3的地址码DADR3为0x03,将PK3、DADR3作为一个二元组,写入ND3的存储器中,该存储器为NAND Flash。将PK3、DADR3作为一个二元组,导出至移动设备MD中。Use the built-in symmetric encryption module of ND3 to generate a session key PK3, and its corresponding symmetric encryption algorithm is SM1. The address code DADR3 of the control device D3 connected to ND3 is 0x03, and PK3 and DADR3 are used as a two-tuple and written into the memory of ND3, which is NAND Flash. Export PK3 and DADR3 as a two-tuple to the mobile device MD.
ND1连接的控制设备D1为主设备(Master),将现场总线FB上所有连接其他从设备(Slave)D2、D3的加密设备ND2、ND3中导出至移动设备MD的二元组PK2、DADR2和PK3、DADR3,分别写入ND1的存储器中。The control device D1 connected to ND1 is the master device (Master), and all the encryption devices ND2, ND3 connected to the other slave devices (Slave) D2 and D3 on the fieldbus FB are exported to the two-tuples PK2, DADR2 and PK3 of the mobile device MD , DADR3, respectively write into the memory of ND1.
ND2连接的控制设备D2为从设备(Slave),将现场总线FB上唯一的连接主设备(Master)D1的加密设备ND1中导出至移动设备MD的二元组PK1、DADR1,写入ND2的存储器中。The control device D2 connected to ND2 is a slave device (Slave), which exports the only encryption device ND1 connected to the master device (Master) D1 on the fieldbus FB to the binary group PK1, DADR1 of the mobile device MD, and writes it to the memory of ND2 in.
ND3连接的控制设备D3为从设备(Slave),将现场总线FB上唯一的连接主设备(Master)D1的加密设备ND1中导出至移动设备MD的二元组PK1、DADR1,写入ND3的存储器中。The control device D3 connected to ND3 is the slave device (Slave), which exports the only encryption device ND1 connected to the master device (Master) D1 on the fieldbus FB to the binary group PK1, DADR1 of the mobile device MD, and writes it to the memory of ND3 in.
此时,初始化过程结束,ND1、ND2、ND3的存储器中均写入了自己的会话密钥。其中,ND1的存储器中写入了ND2、ND3的地址与会话密钥,ND2、ND3的存储器中写入了ND1的地址与会话密钥。因此,ND1可以分别与ND2、ND3进行数据通信,ND2与ND3之间由于缺少对方的会话密钥,无法进行数据通信,实现了从设备间的通信数据隔离。初始化流程如图2所示。At this point, the initialization process is over, and their own session keys are written in the memories of ND1, ND2, and ND3. Among them, the addresses of ND2 and ND3 and the session key are written into the memory of ND1, and the addresses and the session key of ND1 are written into the memory of ND2 and ND3. Therefore, ND1 can perform data communication with ND2 and ND3 respectively, and data communication cannot be performed between ND2 and ND3 due to the lack of the other party's session key, thus realizing communication data isolation between slave devices. The initialization process is shown in Figure 2.
S2:当现场总线FB上的控制设备D2因故障需要更换,更换后的新设备D2的地址码从0x02变为0x04,对于已部署在D2和FB之间的ND2,依次执行以下操作:S2: When the control device D2 on the fieldbus FB needs to be replaced due to a fault, the address code of the new device D2 after the replacement is changed from 0x02 to 0x04. For the ND2 that has been deployed between D2 and FB, perform the following operations in sequence:
使用ND2内置的对称加密模块,重新生成一个会话密钥PK4,其对应的对称加密算法为SM1。ND2连接的新设备D2的新地址码DADR4为0x04,将PK4、DADR4作为一个二元组,写入ND2的存储器中,并覆盖原二元组PK2、DADR2。将PK4、DADR4作为一个二元组,导出至移动设备MD,并覆盖MD中已存储的原二元组PK2、DADR2。Use the built-in symmetric encryption module of ND2 to regenerate a session key PK4, and its corresponding symmetric encryption algorithm is SM1. The new address code DADR4 of the new device D2 connected to ND2 is 0x04, and PK4 and DADR4 are written as a two-tuple into the memory of ND2, and the original two-tuple PK2 and DADR2 are overwritten. Export PK4 and DADR4 as a two-tuple to the mobile device MD, and overwrite the original two-tuple PK2 and DADR2 stored in the MD.
然后,依次在ND1、ND3的存储器中查找ND2的原二元组PK2、DADR2,由于ND1的存储器中已写入该二元组,故需要执行撤销ND2原密钥操作,将ND1存储器中的该二元组进行删除。Then, search for the original two-tuple PK2 and DADR2 of ND2 in the memory of ND1 and ND3 in turn. Since the two-tuple has been written in the memory of ND1, it is necessary to perform the operation of revoking the original key of ND2, and change the original key of ND2 in the memory of ND1. The two-tuple is deleted.
最后,执行预分配操作。由于控制设备D2为从设备(Slave),将导出至移动设备MD的二元组PK4、DADR4,写入现场总线FB上唯一的连接主设备(Master)D1的加密设备ND1的存储器中。Finally, perform the pre-allocation operation. Since the control device D2 is a slave device (Slave), the two tuples PK4 and DADR4 exported to the mobile device MD are written into the memory of the encryption device ND1, which is the only encryption device connected to the master device (Master) D1 on the field bus FB.
此时,更新过程结束。原设备D2的PK2均被从加密设备ND2的存储器中移除,即使将原设备D2通过加密设备ND2连接现场总线FB,也无法与主设备D1进行通信。新设备D2可以正常与主设备D1进行通信。更新流程如图3所示。At this point, the update process ends. The PK2 of the original device D2 is removed from the memory of the encryption device ND2. Even if the original device D2 is connected to the field bus FB through the encryption device ND2, it cannot communicate with the master device D1. The new device D2 can communicate with the main device D1 normally. The update process is shown in Figure 3.
S3:当现场总线FB上的控制设备D3报废,需要永久性地断开与D1、D2的逻辑连接,对于已部署在D3和FB之间的加密设备ND3,依次执行以下操作:S3: When the control device D3 on the fieldbus FB is scrapped, it needs to permanently disconnect the logical connection with D1 and D2. For the encryption device ND3 that has been deployed between D3 and FB, perform the following operations in sequence:
由于ND3的存储器中存在已写入的二元组PK3、DADR3,先将该二元组删除,然后将ND3的存储器重置为初始化过程之前的状态。Since there are two-tuples PK3 and DADR3 that have been written in the memory of ND3, first delete the two-tuples, and then reset the memory of ND3 to the state before the initialization process.
与主设备D1连接的加密设备ND1的存储器中存在已写入的ND3的原二元组PK3、DADR3,将该二元组删除。The original two-tuples PK3 and DADR3 of the ND3 that have been written in the memory of the encryption device ND1 connected to the master device D1 are deleted, and the two-tuples are deleted.
此时,移除过程结束。ND1、ND2、ND3中均不存在PK3,D3无法与D1进行任何数据通信。此时,即使报废后的D3被恶意攻击者获取,接入加密设备ND3后也不能对现场总线FB上的D1、D2进行攻击。若需要将新的控制设备与加密设备ND3连接并接入现场总线FB时,则需要重新对加密设备ND1、ND2、ND3进行初始化。移除流程如图4所示。At this point, the removal process ends. PK3 does not exist in ND1, ND2, and ND3, and D3 cannot communicate with D1. At this time, even if the scrapped D3 is obtained by a malicious attacker, the D1 and D2 on the fieldbus FB cannot be attacked after accessing the encryption device ND3. If it is necessary to connect a new control device to the encryption device ND3 and access the field bus FB, the encryption devices ND1, ND2, and ND3 need to be initialized again. The removal process is shown in Figure 4.
实施例仅为说明本发明的技术思想,不能以此限定本发明的保护范围,凡是按照本发明提出的技术思想,在技术方案基础上所做的任何改动,均落入本发明保护范围之内。The embodiments are only to illustrate the technical ideas of the present invention, and cannot be used to limit the scope of protection of the present invention. Any changes made on the basis of the technical solutions based on the technical ideas proposed by the present invention fall into the protection scope of the present invention. .

Claims (7)

  1. 一种水利工业控制系统加密设备中会话密钥管理方法,其特征在于:该方法包括如下步骤:A session key management method in an encryption device of a water conservancy industry control system, characterized in that: the method includes the following steps:
    S1:对于水利工业控制系统的一条现场总线,在控制设备与现场总线的网络物理接口之间接入加密设备,对加密设备进行初始化;初始化过程包括加密设备会话密钥生成及加密设备会话密钥预分配;S1: For a field bus of a water conservancy industrial control system, connect an encryption device between the control device and the network physical interface of the field bus to initialize the encryption device; the initialization process includes encryption device session key generation and encryption device session key preprocessing distribution;
    S2:当水利工业控制系统现场总线上的控制设备的地址码发生变化,对该控制设备所连接的加密设备会话密钥进行更新处理;更新过程包括生成该加密设备新会话密钥,撤销原会话密钥以及加密设备会话密钥预分配;S2: When the address code of the control device on the field bus of the water conservancy industrial control system changes, update the session key of the encrypted device connected to the control device; the update process includes generating a new session key for the encrypted device and revoking the original session Pre-distribution of the key and the session key of the encryption device;
    S3:当水利工业控制系统现场总线上的控制设备暂时或永久性地断开与现场总线上其他设备的逻辑连接,对该控制设备所连接的加密设备中的会话密钥进行移除处理;移除过程包括该加密设备的会话密钥重置,并将该加密设备原会话密钥从现场总线上的其他每一台加密设备中删除。S3: When the control device on the field bus of the water conservancy industrial control system temporarily or permanently disconnects the logical connection with other devices on the field bus, remove the session key in the encrypted device connected to the control device; The removal process includes resetting the session key of the encryption device and deleting the original session key of the encryption device from every other encryption device on the fieldbus.
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的一种水利工业控制系统加密设备中会话密钥管理方法,其特征在于:步骤S1所述对加密设备进行初始化;方法如下:The session key management method in the encryption device of the water conservancy industry control system according to claim 1, wherein the encryption device is initialized in step S1; the method is as follows:
    使用加密设备内置的对称加密模块,生成一个会话密钥PK;设加密设备连接的控制设备的地址码为DADR;Use the built-in symmetric encryption module of the encryption device to generate a session key PK; set the address code of the control device connected to the encryption device as DADR;
    将PK、DADR作为一个二元组,写入加密设备的存储器中;将PK、DADR作为一个二元组,导出至移动设备MD中;Use PK and DADR as a two-tuple and write them into the storage of the encrypted device; use PK and DADR as a two-tuple and export them to the mobile device MD;
    完成现场总线上所有加密设备的会话密钥生成后,对每一台加密设备分别执行预分配操作,预分配完成后,初始化过程结束。After the session key generation of all encryption devices on the field bus is completed, the pre-distribution operation is performed on each encryption device. After the pre-distribution is completed, the initialization process ends.
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的一种水利工业控制系统加密设备中会话密钥管理方法,其特征在于:对每一台加密设备分别执行预分配操作,方法如下:The session key management method in the encryption device of the water conservancy industrial control system according to claim 2, wherein the pre-distribution operation is performed on each encryption device separately, and the method is as follows:
    若该加密设备连接的控制设备为主设备(Master),将现场总线上所有连接其他从设备(Slave)的加密设备中导出至移动设备MD的二元组PK、DADR,分别写入与主设备连接的该加密设备的存储器中;If the control device connected to the encryption device is the master device (Master), export all the encryption devices connected to other slave devices (Slave) on the field bus to the two-tuple PK and DADR of the mobile device MD, and write them to the master device respectively. In the storage of the connected encryption device;
    若该加密设备连接的控制设备为从设备(Slave),将现场总线上唯一的连接主设备(Master)的加密设备中导出至移动设备MD的二元组PK、DADR,写入与从设备连接的该加密设备的存储器中。If the control device connected to the encryption device is a slave device (Slave), export the only encryption device connected to the master device (Master) on the fieldbus to the two-tuple PK, DADR of the mobile device MD, and write it to connect with the slave device Of the encrypted device’s memory.
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的一种水利工业控制系统加密设备中会话密钥管理方法,其特征在于:步骤S2所述当现场总线上的控制设备的地址码发生变化,对控制设备所连接的加密设备密钥进行更新;设控制设备的原地址码为DADR,对于其连接的加密设备,更新方法如下:The session key management method in the encryption equipment of the water conservancy industry control system according to claim 3, characterized in that: in step S2, when the address code of the control equipment on the field bus changes, encrypt the control equipment connected to it. The device key is updated; suppose the original address code of the control device is DADR. For the encrypted device connected to it, the update method is as follows:
    S2.1:使用该加密设备内置的对称加密模块,重新生成该加密设备的一个会话密钥PK_NEW;设控制设备的新地址码为DADR_NEW;S2.1: Use the built-in symmetric encryption module of the encryption device to regenerate a session key PK_NEW of the encryption device; set the new address code of the control device as DADR_NEW;
    将PK_NEW、DADR_NEW作为一个二元组,写入该加密设备的存储器中,并覆盖该加密设备的原二元组PK、DADR;将PK_NEW、DADR_NEW作为一个二元组,导出至移动设备MD,并覆盖MD中已存储的该加密设备的原二元组PK、DADR;Write PK_NEW and DADR_NEW as a two-tuple into the storage of the encrypted device and overwrite the original two-tuple PK and DADR of the encrypted device; use PK_NEW and DADR_NEW as a two-tuple to export to the mobile device MD, and Overwrite the original two-tuple PK and DADR of the encryption device stored in the MD;
    S2.2:完成该加密设备的新会话密钥生成后,对现场总线上其他每一台加密设备分别执行撤销该加密设备原会话密钥操作,若现场总线上其他加密设备的存储器中存在已写入 的该加密设备的原二元组PK、DADR,将该二元组删除;S2.2: After completing the generation of the new session key of the encryption device, perform the operation of revoking the original session key of the encryption device on each other encryption device on the field bus. If there are already existing session keys in the memory of the other encryption device on the field bus. The written original two-tuple PK and DADR of the encryption device, delete the two-tuple;
    S2.3:完成所有其他加密设备对该加密设备原会话密钥的撤销后,对该加密设备执行预分配操作;S2.3: After all other encryption devices revoke the original session key of the encryption device, perform a pre-distribution operation on the encryption device;
    若该加密设备所连接的地址码发生变化的控制设备为主设备(Master),将该加密设备导出至移动设备MD的二元组PK_NEW、DADR_NEW,分别写入现场总线上所有连接其他从设备(Slave)的加密设备的存储器中;If the control device whose address code is changed to the encrypted device is the master device (Master), export the encrypted device to the two tuples PK_NEW and DADR_NEW of the mobile device MD, and write them into all other slave devices connected to the field bus ( Slave) in the storage of the encrypted device;
    若该加密设备所连接的地址码发生变化的控制设备为从设备(Slave),将该加密设备导出至移动设备MD的二元组PK_NEW、DADR_NEW,写入现场总线上唯一的连接主设备(Master)的加密设备的存储器中;If the control device whose address code changes to the encrypted device is a slave device (Slave), export the encrypted device to the two-tuple PK_NEW, DADR_NEW of the mobile device MD, and write it to the only connected master device (Master) on the field bus. ) In the storage of the encrypted device;
    S2.4:步骤S2.3执行预分配完成后,更新过程结束。S2.4: After the pre-allocation of step S2.3 is completed, the update process ends.
  5. 根据权利要求2或3或4所述的一种水利工业控制系统加密设备中会话密钥管理方法,其特征在于:步骤S3所述当现场总线上的控制设备暂时或永久性地断开与现场总线上其他设备的逻辑连接,对该控制设备所连接的加密设备中的会话密钥进行移除处理;设该控制设备的原地址码为DADR,对于与其连接的加密设备,移除方法如下:The session key management method in the encryption equipment of the water conservancy industry control system according to claim 2 or 3 or 4, characterized in that: in step S3, when the control equipment on the field bus is temporarily or permanently disconnected from the field For the logical connection of other devices on the bus, remove the session key in the encrypted device connected to the control device; suppose the original address code of the control device is DADR. For the encrypted device connected to it, the removal method is as follows:
    S3.1:若该加密设备的存储器中存在已写入的二元组PK、DADR,将该二元组删除,将该加密设备的存储器重置为原始状态;S3.1: If there are two-tuples PK and DADR that have been written in the memory of the encryption device, delete the two-tuples and reset the memory of the encryption device to the original state;
    S3.2:该加密设备重置完成后,对现场总线上其他每一台加密设备分别执行撤销该加密设备原会话密钥操作;若其他加密设备的存储器中存在已写入的该加密设备的原二元组PK、DADR,将该二元组删除;S3.2: After resetting the encryption device, perform the operation of revoking the original session key of the encryption device on each other encryption device on the field bus; if there is an encrypted device written in the memory of the other encryption device The original two-tuple PK, DADR, delete the two-tuple;
    S3.3:完成所有其他加密设备对该加密设备原会话密钥的撤销后,移除过程结束。S3.3: After all other encryption devices revoke the original session key of the encryption device, the removal process ends.
  6. 根据权利要求2或4所述的一种水利工业控制系统加密设备中会话密钥管理方法,其特征在于:使用加密设备内置的对称加密模块,生成一个会话密钥PK,其对应的对称加密算法包括但不限于DES、AES、SM1。A session key management method in an encryption device of a water conservancy industry control system according to claim 2 or 4, characterized in that: a symmetric encryption module built into the encryption device is used to generate a session key PK, and its corresponding symmetric encryption algorithm Including but not limited to DES, AES, SM1.
  7. 根据权利要求2或4所述的一种水利工业控制系统加密设备中会话密钥管理方法,其特征在于:加密设备的存储器包括但不限于NAND Flash、eMMC;移动设备MD的形态包括但不限于移动硬盘、U盘、SD卡。According to claim 2 or 4, a session key management method in an encryption device of a water conservancy industry control system, characterized in that: the memory of the encryption device includes but is not limited to NAND Flash, eMMC; the form of the MD of the mobile device includes but is not limited to Mobile hard disk, U disk, SD card.
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