WO2020258060A2 - Modèle de confiance de protection de confidentialité basé sur une chaîne de blocs pour l'internet des véhicules - Google Patents

Modèle de confiance de protection de confidentialité basé sur une chaîne de blocs pour l'internet des véhicules Download PDF

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WO2020258060A2
WO2020258060A2 PCT/CN2019/092883 CN2019092883W WO2020258060A2 WO 2020258060 A2 WO2020258060 A2 WO 2020258060A2 CN 2019092883 W CN2019092883 W CN 2019092883W WO 2020258060 A2 WO2020258060 A2 WO 2020258060A2
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vehicle
vehicles
message
supporting
blockchain
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PCT/CN2019/092883
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Chinese (zh)
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WO2020258060A3 (fr
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黄海平
马子洋
肖甫
刘星晨
戴华
王汝传
孙翔
朱鹏
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南京邮电大学
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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0407—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the identity of one or more communicating identities is hidden
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0435—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply symmetric encryption, i.e. same key used for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L67/00—Network arrangements or protocols for supporting network services or applications
    • H04L67/01—Protocols
    • H04L67/12—Protocols specially adapted for proprietary or special-purpose networking environments, e.g. medical networks, sensor networks, networks in vehicles or remote metering networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H04L9/3255—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures using group based signatures, e.g. ring or threshold signatures

Definitions

  • the invention relates to the technical fields of car networking communication security, and in particular to a blockchain-based car networking privacy protection trust model.
  • VANETs have been regarded as the infrastructure of intelligent transportation systems, which can improve traffic efficiency and ensure the safety of vehicles and pedestrians.
  • V2V vehicle-to-vehicle
  • V2I vehicle-to-infrastructure
  • RSU roadside unit
  • the internal attackers in the vehicular ad hoc network can not only obtain private information by analyzing all broadcast messages in the network and easily track the location of other vehicles, but also can forge messages, causing major safety risks to road traffic.
  • the trust management system can help the vehicle judge whether the received message is credible.
  • the existing trust management system is usually divided into two types: centralized and decentralized. In a centralized system, all execution processes are carried out on the central server, which may cause serious delays and is not suitable for the high service quality requirements of the vehicle-mounted ad hoc network. In a decentralized system, the trust management system is usually deployed in the roadside unit (RSU), but the RSU may be maliciously attacked. The attacker will wantonly tamper with the vehicle reputation information stored in the RSU, so how Effective provision of trust management services has also become an important issue that needs to be resolved.
  • RSU roadside unit
  • the present invention proposes a blockchain-based privacy protection trust model for the Internet of Vehicles to solve the privacy and trust issues between vehicles in an untrusted environment of the Internet of Vehicles.
  • the present invention adopts ring signature technology and pseudonym (public key address) to hide the ID of communication between vehicle users to ensure privacy between vehicles.
  • a blockchain-based privacy protection trust model for the Internet of Vehicles includes the following steps:
  • Step 1 The trusted authority center TA selects E k (x) as a symmetric encryption protocol that uses a key k to encrypt x, and the public key and private key of the symmetric encryption protocol are the same key, and at the same time selects or generates public parameters or objects;
  • Step 2 When the vehicle joins the vehicle ad hoc network for the first time, the reputation score is initialized; at the same time, the vehicle user uses his real identity ID to obtain his public-private key pair and pseudonym, that is, the public key address, from the trusted authority center TA;
  • Step 3 When a vehicle witnesses a traffic incident on the road, he will share this traffic message msg with other vehicles in the on-board ad hoc network, and call this vehicle the initiating vehicle; others around are witnesses to help prove The vehicle with the authenticity of the msg message is called the corroborating vehicle;
  • Step 4 After the initiating vehicle witnesses the traffic incident, in order to obtain feedback from other supporting vehicles on the message, and to ensure the reliability of the message, a request message RQP is generated;
  • Step 5 the initiating vehicle will be broadcast anonymously; after the supporting vehicle receives the information of the initiating vehicle, it will return the supporting message RPP and the cipher text information EM of whether the generated message is reliable, that is, whether the supporting vehicle is reliable or not Encrypted data of the message;
  • RSU adjacent roadside unit
  • Step 7 After the RSU receives the AGP of the initiating vehicle, it does the following:
  • Step 7-1 obtain ( ⁇ ID 1 , ⁇ 1 , m 1 , ⁇ 1 , ⁇ 1 >,..., ⁇ ID r , ⁇ r , m r , ⁇ r , ⁇ r >, msg, t) from AGP;
  • Step 7-2 for each ID i , calculate (h j is the content of the jth bit of H(ID), Y j is The content of bit j);
  • Step 8 RSU queries the reputation scores of the initiating vehicles and supporting vehicles in the blockchain maintained by the RSU. Based on the reputation scores, the RSU will calculate the reliability of the message msg;
  • RSU packs the updated information of the vehicle reputation score into blocks and broadcasts it to the consensus network;
  • Step 10 The RSU responsible for the consensus work in the vehicle ad hoc network carries out a consensus on the update of the vehicle reputation score. After the consensus phase is over, all RSUs record the new vehicle reputation score in the blockchain ledger maintained by themselves.
  • step 1 the public parameters or objects selected or generated in step 1 are as follows:
  • Step 1-1 select G as the additive group whose point is on the elliptic curve, q is the order of G, and g is the generator of G;
  • Step 1-2 select H as the hash function, H: ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ * ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ n , that is, map an arbitrary length of 0,1 data set to a 0,1 data set of length n;
  • Step 1-4 generate To manage the private key vector, To manage the public key vector.
  • step 2 specifically includes the following sub-steps:
  • Step 2-1 TA initializes the reputation score of the vehicle as R (0 ⁇ R ⁇ 1);
  • the public key address addrpk H(sk ID ); the private key of the vehicle user is stored in the TA and is not publicly disclosed; the public and private key pair of the vehicle user is used in the signature, and the public key address, namely the pseudonym, is used in the blockchain;
  • Step 2-3 all roadside units (RSU) in the vehicle ad hoc network store the pseudonym addrpk and reputation score R of the vehicle into the blockchain maintained by themselves.
  • step 4 specifically, to ensure the reliability of the message, perform the following operations to generate the request message RQP:
  • Step 4-1 generate a ring signature to protect the privacy of the initiating vehicle.
  • Step 4-3 for each ID i ⁇ S', calculate h j is the content of the jth bit of H(ID), and Y j is The content of the j-th bit;
  • Step 4-4 for each ID i ⁇ S', generate Means from A set of integers of arbitrary length with order q, randomly selected elements in the set are assigned to ⁇ i , and ⁇ i is used as the index of ID i ;
  • Step 4-5 calculate the EC-Elgamal signature for each ID i ⁇ S'; generate a i , Means from A set of integers of arbitrary length with order q, randomly select elements in the set and assign values to a i and b i , calculate
  • ⁇ i a i ⁇ g+b i ⁇ PK i
  • m i a i ⁇ ⁇ i.
  • step 5 specifically includes the following sub-steps:
  • Step 5-1 supporting the vehicle to obtain the information (msg, r, t, ⁇ ) in the request message RQP;
  • Step 5-2 generate And ⁇ does not belong to the set ⁇ 1 ,..., ⁇ rt ⁇ , as the ID index of the supporting vehicle;
  • EM E k (z), send EM to RSU.
  • step 8 is as follows:
  • Step 8-1 calculate the total reputation score
  • Step 8-2 determine the weight
  • Step 8-3 weighting calculation
  • Step 8-4 judge the reliability of the message msg
  • the message msg is considered reliable, and minRe is the threshold.
  • step 10 is as follows:
  • Step 10-2 each r sz will try its best to collect the vehicle reputation score update information broadcast in the consensus network (denoted as ). Before the start of each round of consensus, a total vehicle reputation score update information set needs to be initialized To get this set, r sz will With its trusted node collection The vehicle reputation score update information collected by the mid-node is merged to obtain
  • Step 10-3 Node pair set Each vehicle’s reputation score update information is voted, and the number of voting rounds is equal to the set The total number of messages in. If a node does not vote in time at each voting stage, it will be removed And cannot vote in the later voting stage;
  • Step 10-4 in the voting stage, if the information being voted for is less than p, the information will be re-inserted Waiting for the next consensus, if the voting rate is greater than or equal to p, then this information is voted through. Where p is the threshold for the rate of yes votes.
  • the reputation evaluation mechanism is used to evaluate the information in the Internet of Vehicles, effectively preventing internal attackers from forging information to damage the security of Internet of Vehicles.
  • Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of the system model of the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of the blockchain storage data according to the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a flowchart of specific steps of the present invention.
  • a blockchain-based privacy protection trust model for the Internet of Vehicles includes the following steps:
  • Step 1 The trusted authority center TA chooses E k (x) as a symmetric encryption protocol that uses a key k to encrypt x.
  • the public key and private key of the symmetric encryption protocol are the same key, and at the same time select or generate the following public parameters or Object:
  • Step 1-1 select G as the additive group whose point is on the elliptic curve, q is the order of G, and g is the generator of G.
  • Step 1-2 choose H as the hash function, H: ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ * ⁇ 0,1 ⁇ n , that is, map an arbitrary length of 0,1 data set to a 0,1 data set of length n.
  • Step 1-4 generate To manage the private key vector, To manage the public key vector.
  • Step 2 When the vehicle joins the vehicle ad hoc network for the first time, the reputation score is initialized; at the same time, the vehicle user uses his real identity ID to obtain his public-private key pair and pseudonym, that is, the public key address from the trusted authority center TA.
  • the step 2 specifically includes the following sub-steps:
  • Step 2-1 TA initializes the reputation score of the vehicle to R (0 ⁇ R ⁇ 1).
  • the public key address addrpk H(sk ID ); the private key of the vehicle-mounted user is stored in the TA and is not publicly disclosed; the public-private key pair of the vehicle-mounted user is used in the signature, and the public key address, namely the pseudonym, is used in the blockchain.
  • Step 2-3 all roadside units (RSU) in the vehicle ad hoc network store the pseudonym addrpk and reputation score R of the vehicle into the blockchain maintained by themselves.
  • Step 3 When a vehicle witnesses a traffic incident on the road, he will share this traffic message msg with other vehicles in the on-board ad hoc network, and call this vehicle the initiating vehicle; others around are witnesses to help prove The vehicle that reports the authenticity of the msg is called the corroborating vehicle.
  • Step 4 After the initiating vehicle witnesses the traffic incident, in order to obtain feedback from other supporting vehicles on the message, and to ensure the reliability of the message, a request message RQP is generated.
  • step 4 specifically, to ensure the reliability of the message, perform the following operations to generate a request message RQP:
  • Step 4-1 generate a ring signature to protect the privacy of the initiating vehicle.
  • Step 4-3 for each ID i ⁇ S', calculate h j is the content of the jth bit of H(ID), and Y j is The content of the jth bit.
  • Step 4-4 for each ID i ⁇ S', generate Means from A set of integers of arbitrary length with order q, any selected element in the set is assigned to ⁇ i , and ⁇ i is used as the index of ID i .
  • Step 4-5 calculate the EC-Elgamal signature for each ID i ⁇ S'; generate a i , Means from A set of integers of arbitrary length with order q, randomly select elements in the set and assign values to a i and b i , calculate
  • ⁇ i a i ⁇ g+b i ⁇ PK i
  • m i a i ⁇ ⁇ i.
  • Step 5 Through the ring signature, the initiating vehicle will be broadcast anonymously; after the supporting vehicle receives the information of the initiating vehicle, it will return the supporting message RPP and the cipher text information EM of whether the generated message is reliable, that is, whether the supporting vehicle is reliable or not The encrypted data of the message.
  • the step 5 specifically includes the following sub-steps:
  • Step 5-1 to verify that the vehicle obtains the information (msg, r, t, ⁇ ) in the request message RQP.
  • Step 5-2 generate And ⁇ does not belong to the set ⁇ 1 ,..., ⁇ rt ⁇ , as the ID index of the supporting vehicle.
  • EM E k (z), send EM to RSU.
  • AGP ( ⁇ 1 , m 1 , ⁇ 1 , ⁇ 1 >,..., ⁇ r , m r , ⁇ r , ⁇ r >, msg, t, S ⁇ S')
  • Step 7 After the RSU receives the AGP of the initiating vehicle, it does the following:
  • Step 7-1 obtain ( ⁇ ID 1 , ⁇ 1 , m 1 , ⁇ 1 , ⁇ 1 >,..., ⁇ ID r , ⁇ r , m r , ⁇ r , ⁇ r >, msg, t) from AGP.
  • Step 7-2 for each ID i , calculate (h j is the content of the jth bit of H(ID), Y j is The content of the jth bit).
  • Step 8 The RSU queries the reputation scores of the initiating vehicles and supporting vehicles in the blockchain maintained by the RSU. Based on the reputation scores, the RSU will calculate the reliability of the message msg.
  • the reliability calculation process in step 8 is as follows:
  • Step 8-1 calculate the total reputation score value.
  • Step 8-2 determine the weight.
  • Step 8-3 weighting calculation.
  • Step 8-4 judge the reliability of the message msg.
  • the message msg is considered reliable, and minRe is the threshold.
  • RSU packs the updated information of the vehicle reputation score into blocks and broadcasts it to the consensus network.
  • Step 10 The RSU responsible for the consensus work in the vehicle ad hoc network carries out a consensus on the update of the vehicle reputation score. After the consensus phase is over, all RSUs record the new vehicle reputation score in the blockchain ledger maintained by themselves.
  • step 10 The consensus process of step 10 is as follows:
  • Step 10-2 each r sz will try its best to collect the vehicle reputation score update information broadcast in the consensus network (denoted as ). Before the start of each round of consensus, a total vehicle reputation score update information set needs to be initialized To get this set, r sz will With its trusted node collection The vehicle reputation score update information collected by the mid-node is merged to obtain
  • Step 10-3 Node pair set Each vehicle’s reputation score update information is voted, and the number of voting rounds is equal to the set The total number of messages in. If a node does not vote in time at each voting stage, it will be removed And cannot vote in the later voting stage.
  • Step 10-4 in the voting stage, if the information being voted for is less than p, the information will be re-inserted Waiting for the next consensus, if the voting rate is greater than or equal to p, then this information is voted through. Where p is the threshold for the rate of yes votes.

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Abstract

La présente invention concerne un modèle de confiance de protection de confidentialité basé sur une chaîne de blocs pour l'Internet des véhicules. Les véhicules sur une route génèrent et diffusent des messages au moyen d'un réseau ad hoc véhiculaire afin de partager des informations de trafic de l'environnement en vue d'améliorer l'efficacité et la sécurité du trafic. Cependant, en raison de l'environnement de réseau non sûr de réseaux ad-hoc véhiculaires, des véhicules peuvent facilement exposer des informations privées et ne peuvent pas déterminer si un message reçu est fiable. Dans la présente invention, un véhicule est amené à envoyer un message de manière anonyme au moyen d'une technologie de signature en cercle, empêchant le suivi du véhicule par un véhicule malveillant. Des messages envoyés par des véhicules sont évalués et filtrés au moyen d'un mécanisme d'évaluation de crédibilité basé sur une technologie de chaîne de blocs, en filtrant les fausses informations au sein de ceux-ci. Sur la base des caractéristiques de la chaîne de blocs elle-même, il est garanti que la crédibilité du véhicule ne sera pas sujette à une altération malveillante, et la mise à jour synchrone en temps réel de la crédibilité du véhicule est rendue possible, améliorant en outre la sécurité et la facilité d'utilisation de réseaux ad hoc véhiculaires.
PCT/CN2019/092883 2019-06-25 2019-06-26 Modèle de confiance de protection de confidentialité basé sur une chaîne de blocs pour l'internet des véhicules WO2020258060A2 (fr)

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