WO2020228278A1

WO2020228278A1 - Single-point login tamper-proof method, apparatus, computer device and storage medium

Info

Publication number: WO2020228278A1
Application number: PCT/CN2019/117662
Authority: WO
Inventors: 祝伟
Original assignee: 平安科技（深圳）有限公司
Priority date: 2019-05-13
Filing date: 2019-11-12
Publication date: 2020-11-19
Also published as: CN110266640A; CN110266640B

Abstract

Provided in the present application are a single-point login tamper-proof method and apparatus, a computer device and a storage medium, the method comprising: obtaining first login information of a user logging in to a server, and associating the first login information with a first label to generate a mutually bound private key and public key, the first label being encapsulated and encrypted in the public key, and the public key being stored in a session library of the server to achieve the encryption of the label so as to prevent an unauthorized person from inputting a label into the session library and directly entering the server; then sending the private key to a pre-associated terminal device; obtaining a private key to be verified that is inputted by a user by means of a terminal device; determining whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key, and if the same, finding out from in the session library whether a public key corresponding to the private key is present, and if present, decrypting the public key using the private key to obtain the first label, and obtaining first login information corresponding to the first label so as to log in to the server again by means of the first login information, thereby achieving user single-point login.

Description

Single sign-on anti-tampering method, device, computer equipment and storage medium

This application claims the priority of a Chinese patent application filed with the Chinese Patent Office on May 13, 2019, with the application number 2019103945301, and the application titled "Single Sign-On Tamper-proof Method, Device, Computer Equipment, and Storage Medium", and its entire contents Incorporated in this application by reference.

Technical field

This application relates to the field of computer security technology, and in particular to a single sign-on anti-tampering method, device, computer equipment and storage medium.

Background technique

CAS (Central Authentication Service, Central Authentication Service), the current business system login through the CAS authentication method to achieve single sign-on, the login process is: the central system provides a unified CAS.JAR program package for login, access in the user terminal During the process of the target address, the CAS.JAR package will intercept the access of the user terminal by default. When the user completes the account and password login, the access to the target address is allowed. After the login is completed, the user’s login information is recorded through the CAS.JAR package for label storage In the session, the user does not need to enter the account password next time. The login information includes the user ID, login time and login password.

Therefore, there is a problem. SESSION (session control) refers to the time that elapses from the time the user terminal logs into the system to log out and exits the system. If necessary, there is a certain operating space; if the illegal person puts the user ID and the user ID into the session through SESSION At login time, the system will search for the tag corresponding to the user ID in the CAS.JAR package according to the user ID. After verifying that the login time matches the time associated with the tag, it may cause the CAS.JAR package to misjudge during the login process. The login information allows illegal persons to bypass the login process of entering the account and password through the CAS single sign-on method, so there are hidden dangers.

technical problem

In view of the shortcomings of the prior art, this application proposes a single sign-on anti-tampering method, device, computer equipment and storage medium, aiming to solve the problem of illegal persons entering the system through single sign-on.

Technical solutions

The technical solution proposed in this application is:

This application provides a single sign-on anti-tampering method, including:

Obtain the first login information of the user logging in to the server for the first time, and determine whether the user enters a single sign-on instruction, the single sign-on instruction being an instruction for the user to log in to the server without entering the first login information;

If so, generate a first tag, and associate the first login information with the first tag, where the first tag is a tag that calls the first login information to log in to the server;

Generate a private key and a public key that are bound to each other, encapsulate the first tag in the public key, store the public key of the encapsulated first tag in the session database, and store the private The key is sent to the pre-associated terminal device;

When the user uses the single sign-on to log in to the server, obtain the private key to be verified input by the user, and verify whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key;

If they are the same, the public key corresponding to the private key is found from the conversation library, and the public key is decrypted by the private key to obtain the first label, which is called by the first label The first login information to log in to the server again.

This application provides a single sign-on anti-tampering device, including:

The first login unit is used to obtain the first login information of the user logging in to the server for the first time, and determine whether the user enters a single sign-on instruction, the single sign-on instruction is for the user to log in to the server without entering the first login information instruction;

The tag association unit is configured to generate a first tag if yes, and associate the first login information with the first tag, where the first tag is a tag for calling the first login information to log in to the server ；

The encapsulation encryption unit is configured to generate a private key and a public key that are bound to each other, encapsulate the first label in the public key, and store the public key of the encapsulated first label in the session database , And sending the private key to the pre-associated terminal device;

The private key obtaining unit is configured to obtain the private key to be verified input by the user when the user uses the single sign-on to log in to the server, and verify whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key;

The second login unit is configured to, if the same, find the public key corresponding to the private key from the conversation library, and decrypt the public key by the private key to obtain the first label, The first login information is called through the first tag to log in to the server again.

The present application provides a computer device including a memory and a processor, the memory stores a computer program, and the processor implements the steps of the single sign-on anti-tampering method when executing the computer program.

The present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the aforementioned single sign-on anti-tampering method are realized.

Beneficial effect

The server obtains the first login information of the user logging in to the server, associates the first login information with the first tag, generates a private key and public key that are bound to each other, encapsulates the first tag in the public key, and encapsulates the first tag. The public key of a label is stored in the server’s session library to achieve label encryption, preventing illegal persons from entering the label into the session library and directly entering the server, sending the private key to the pre-associated terminal device; when the user needs single sign-on, The server obtains the private key to be verified entered by the user through the terminal device, and judges whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key. If they are the same, it checks whether there is a public key corresponding to the private key from the session database. If it exists, the private key is used The public key is decrypted to obtain the first tag, and the first login information is obtained according to the first tag to log in to the server again through the first login information, thereby realizing the user's single sign-on; because the encryption protection of the first tag is adopted, it is guaranteed The first label will not be stolen, which effectively prevents illegal persons from entering the first label into SESSION and bypassing the user login process.

Description of the drawings

FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of an embodiment of the single sign-on anti-tampering method of this application;

2 is a structural block diagram of an embodiment of the single sign-on anti-tampering device of this application;

FIG. 3 is a schematic block diagram of the structure of an embodiment of a computer device of this application.

The best implementation of this application

Referring to Figure 1, the flow diagram of the single sign-on anti-tampering method provided by this application includes:

S100: Obtain the first login information of the user logging in to the server for the first time, and determine whether the user inputs a single sign-on instruction. The single sign-on instruction is an instruction for the user to log in to the server without entering the first login information.

The first login information includes user ID and password information. The user needs to register before logging in to the server for the first time. The user registers in the server through the terminal device to obtain the login information; the login information can be multiple according to different users. In this solution The user inputs the first login information to the terminal device to log in to the server.

When the user logs in to the server for the first time, the server determines whether the user operates the terminal device to enter a single sign-on instruction. For example, the user enters the first login information in the terminal device application, and the server determines whether the user selects "Remember the first" in the application program. "Login information" and other instructions, so as to realize the process of the server to determine whether the user enters a single sign-on instruction.

S200, if yes, generate a first tag, and associate the first login information with the first tag, where the first tag is a tag for calling the first login information to log in to the server;

The server creates a first tag, and the first tag is associated with the first login information. When the user performs single sign-on through the terminal device, the first tag is used to find the first login information corresponding to the first tag in the session database of the server. To help users achieve single sign-on.

S300: Generate a private key and a public key that are bound to each other, encapsulate and encrypt the first label in the public key, and store the public key in the session database of the server that has encapsulated the first label, and send the private key to the pre-association Terminal equipment;

It can be seen from the above S200 that the server generates the first tag associated with the first login information, and replaces the first login information with the first tag to help users single sign-on to enter the server, but to prevent illegal persons from stealing the first tag, then Enter the first label to the server, and enter the technical problem of the user's server account, propose the following technical means:

The server generates a private key and a public key that are bound to each other. The private key can be understood as a key, and the public key can be understood as a lockbox. The first label is encapsulated in the public key, and the first label is encrypted by the public key to ensure that the first label is obtained. A tag needs to decrypt the public key first to achieve the anti-theft effect of the first tag. Then, the public key encapsulated in the first tag is stored in the session database of the server. The illegal person enters the session database through SESSION, but because of the public key Encrypt the first label so that illegal persons cannot steal the first label.

The above private key is a random number, and the server sends the private key to the terminal device.

S400: When the user uses the single sign-on to log in to the server, obtain the private key to be verified input by the user, and verify whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key.

After obtaining the private key through the terminal device, the user inputs the private key to be verified to the server through the terminal device, and the server verifies whether the private key to be verified and the private key are the same.

It can be seen from the above that the private key is a random number, so the user operates the terminal device to input the private key to be verified on the application program, and the server verifies the private key to be verified.

S500, if they are the same, find the public key corresponding to the private key from the session database, decrypt the public key by the private key to obtain the first tag, and call the first login information through the first tag to log in to the server again.

If the server determines that the private key to be verified is the same as the private key, it queries the server’s session database for the public key through the private key. The query method is: import the private key into the pre-associated random formula, where the random formula is to generate the private key. When the key is the formula bound to the private key, the recognized private key is imported into the random formula to determine whether the public key can be obtained to determine whether the entered private key is correct. For example: X+Y=Z, where X is the private key, Y is other value, Z is the public key, and both Y and Z are locked. The server imports X into the formula to determine whether Z can be found. If Z is obtained, the server determines that the entered private key X is correct.

If the server verifies that the private key is correct, the corresponding public key can be found through the above random formula, and the public key can be decrypted, so that the computer device can obtain the first label. From the above, it can be seen that when the user logs in to the server, The first tag has been associated with the first login information, so the server can obtain the first login information, and log in to the server again according to the first login information.

By attaching the encryption relationship between the private key and the public key to the first tag, the first tag is not easily stolen.

In another embodiment, after the user logs in to the server through the first login information for the first time and inputs a single sign-on instruction to the server, the user can log in to the server again by using a different terminal to enter the private key to log in to the server again, for example: The terminal logs in to the server and obtains the private key fed back by the server. The user can input the private key to be verified into the second terminal. After the server verifies that the private key to be verified is correct, the second terminal can log in to the server to realize the second terminal single sign-on server The effect of this greatly improves the convenience of logging in and at the same time enhances security.

In an embodiment, the step of generating a private key and a public key that are bound to each other includes:

S201: Generate a random formula. The random formula is any combination of mathematical calculations between evaluation, obtained value and other values, and the obtained value and other values are randomly generated constants;

In S202, the evaluation in the random formula is regarded as a private key, and the value obtained in the random formula is regarded as a public key.

The server randomly generates a random formula, any combination of mathematical calculations between the obtained value and other values, the obtained value and other values are randomly generated constants, the evaluation in the random formula is regarded as a private key, and the random formula is The value of is regarded as the public key, as follows:

The server generates a random formula. The random formula includes evaluation, obtained value and other values. The evaluation is regarded as a private key. When the private key is decrypted and disclosed, the user enters the private key (ie, evaluation). If the server determines that the random formula is valid, then Decryption is successful; the value obtained is regarded as the public key, the value is locked; other values are also locked, continue to use the above example: X+Y=Z, X is evaluation, Y is other value, Z is obtained value, X can be understood Since the private key is input by the user, the Y and Z values are locked, and the generation of the private key and the public key is further determined by the random formula generated by the server, so as to realize the generation and mutual binding of the private key and the public key.

In one embodiment, the step of searching whether there is a public key corresponding to the private key in the session database includes:

S501: Obtain a first random formula binding a private key and a public key, so as to find a public key corresponding to the private key through the first random formula.

This embodiment is a specific method for finding the public key corresponding to the private key in the session database. The first random calculation is the calculation that is bound to the private key carried when the server generates the private key, and the first random calculation is stored in In the server’s session database, the server recognizes the first random formula bound to the private key in the session database; then, continue to use the above example: X+Y=Z, import the first evaluation X corresponding to the private key to the first In a random calculation formula, if the first value Z of the public key can be obtained correctly, the computer device determines that the public key corresponding to the first value is the public key bound to the private key.

In one embodiment, the step of decrypting the public key with the private key to obtain the first tag and obtaining the first login information corresponding to the first tag includes:

S510: If the first evaluation of the private key is imported into the first random formula and the first value corresponding to the public key can be obtained, it is determined that the public key is decrypted by the private key, and the first encapsulated and encrypted in the public key is obtained. label.

From the above, X+Y=Z, the first evaluation X corresponding to the private key is imported into the first random calculation. If the first value Z of the public key can be obtained correctly, the computer device determines that the public key is private The key is decrypted, and then the server can obtain the first label in the encapsulated encryption and public key.

S520: Acquire first login information associated with the first tag.

After the computer device obtains the first tag, because the first tag and the first login information are already associated with each other when the user first registers to log in to the server, the computer device can obtain the first tag after obtaining the first tag. The first login information.

In one embodiment, the random calculation uses RSA algorithm (RSA encryption algorithm), AES algorithm (Advanced Encryption Standard (Advanced Encryption Standard) and ElGamal algorithm; but in another embodiment, the random calculation formula can also be various equations, such as a linear equation, Ohm's law equation, etc.

In an embodiment, the step of sending the private key to the pre-associated terminal device includes:

S310: Obtain the terminal number entered when the user operates the terminal device to log in to the server for the first time, and the terminal number is a number applied to the terminal device;

S320: Send the private key to the terminal device corresponding to the terminal number.

Terminal devices include computer equipment, smart phones, and tablet phones. When a user logs in to the server for the first time by operating a terminal device, the server will request the user to register, and the user’s registration information is the login information. At this time, the server also requests the user to input and the terminal device The associated terminal number to bind the login information with the mobile terminal.

After the server generates the private key and public key that are bound to each other, the public key is stored in the server's session library, and the private key is sent to the mobile terminal bound to the terminal number.

In one embodiment, the steps of obtaining the private key to be verified input by the user and verifying whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key include:

S410: Receive a login instruction input by a terminal device;

S420: Generate a private key input request according to the login instruction, and send the private key input request to the terminal device;

S430: Obtain the private key to be verified input by the user according to the private key input request to verify whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key.

If the user needs to log in to the server with one-key single sign-on, enter the login instruction to the terminal to log in to the server again with one-click through the login instruction; the server records the first login information for the first login, and the server outputs the first login information after obtaining the login instruction. The login information corresponds to the private key input request of the associated private key to the terminal device to request the user to input the private key to be verified through the private key input request. After the user enters the private key to be verified, compare whether the private key to be verified and the private key are the same, If it is the same, the server searches the session database for the first random algorithm bound to the private key and calculates the public key, so that the computer device obtains the first label after decrypting the public key, and logs in to the server through the first label to achieve login the process of.

In summary, the server obtains the first login information of the user logging in to the server, and associates the first login information with the first tag, generates a private key and public key that are bound to each other, and encapsulates and encrypts the first tag in the public key , Store the public key of the encapsulated first label in the session library of the server to realize the encryption of the label, prevent illegal persons from entering the label into the session library and directly enter the server, and send the private key to the pre-associated terminal device; when the user needs During single sign-on, the server obtains the private key to be verified entered by the user through the terminal device, and judges whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key. If they are the same, it searches the session database to see if there is a public key corresponding to the private key. , The public key is decrypted by the private key to obtain the first tag, and the first login information is obtained according to the first tag, so as to log in to the server again through the first login information, so as to realize the user's single sign-on; Encryption protection ensures that the first label will not be stolen, and effectively prevents illegal persons from entering the first label into SESSION and bypassing the user login process.

Referring to Figure 2, the structure block diagram of the single sign-on tamper-proof device provided by this application, the device includes:

The first login unit 10 is configured to obtain the first login information of the user logging in to the server for the first time, and determine whether the user enters a single sign-on instruction. The single sign-on instruction is an instruction for the user to log in to the server without entering the first login information.

The tag associating unit 20 is configured to, if yes, generate a first tag and associate the first login information with the first tag, the first tag being a tag for calling the first login information to log in to the server;

The encapsulation encryption unit 30 is used to generate a private key and a public key that are bound to each other, encapsulate and encrypt the first label in the public key, and store the public key of the first label in the session database of the server, and send Private key to pre-associated terminal equipment;

It can be seen from the above that the server generates the first tag associated with the first login information, and replaces the first login information with the first tag to help users single sign-on to enter the server, but to prevent illegal persons from stealing the first tag, then The server enters the first label and enters the technical problem of the user's server account, and proposes the following technical means:

The private key obtaining unit 40 is configured to obtain the private key to be verified input by the user when the user uses the single sign-on to log in to the server, and verify whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key.

The second login unit 50 is used to find the public key corresponding to the private key from the session database if the same, and decrypt the public key by the private key to obtain the first label, and call the first login information through the first label to again Log in to the server.

In one embodiment, the encapsulation encryption unit 30 includes:

The formula association module is used to generate random formulas. A random formula is any combination of mathematical calculations between evaluation, obtained value and other values. The obtained value and other values are randomly generated constants;

The key determination module is used to treat the evaluation in the random formula as the private key and the value in the random formula as the public key.

In an embodiment, the second login unit 50 includes:

The public key search module is used to obtain the first random formula binding the private key and the public key, so as to find the public key corresponding to the private key through the first random formula.

In an embodiment, the second login unit 50 further includes:

The decryption module is used to determine that the public key is decrypted by the private key if the first evaluation of the private key is imported into the first random calculation to obtain the first value corresponding to the public key, and the package is encrypted in the public key The first label.

Obtain the first login information associated with the first tag.

In one embodiment, the encapsulation encryption unit 30 includes:

The number obtaining module is used to obtain the terminal number entered when the user operates the terminal device to log in to the server for the first time, and the terminal number is the number applied to the terminal device;

The private key sending module is used to send the private key to the terminal device corresponding to the terminal number.

In an embodiment, the private key acquisition unit includes:

The instruction receiving module is used to receive the login instruction input by the terminal device;

The request generation module is used to generate a private key input request according to the login instruction, and send the private key input request to the terminal device;

The obtaining module is used to obtain the private key to be verified input by the user according to the private key input request to verify whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key.

3, an embodiment of the present application also provides a computer device. The computer device may be a server, and its internal structure may be as shown in FIG. 3. The computer equipment includes a processor, a memory, a network interface and a database connected through a system bus. Among them, the computer designed processor is used to provide calculation and control capabilities. The memory of the computer device includes a non-volatile storage medium and an internal memory. The non-volatile storage medium stores an operating system, a computer program, and a database. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer programs in the non-volatile storage medium. The database of the computer equipment is used to store test data tables and other data. The network interface of the computer device is used to communicate with an external terminal through a network connection. The computer program is executed by the processor to realize a single sign-on anti-tampering method.

An embodiment of the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of a single sign-on anti-tampering method are realized. The computer-readable storage medium is, for example, a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium or a volatile computer-readable storage medium.

Claims

A single sign-on anti-tampering method, which is characterized in that it includes:

Obtain the first login information of the user logging in to the server for the first time, and determine whether the user enters a single sign-on instruction, the single sign-on instruction being an instruction for the user to log in to the server without entering the first login information;

If so, generate a first tag, and associate the first login information with the first tag, where the first tag is a tag that calls the first login information to log in to the server;

Generate a private key and a public key that are bound to each other, encapsulate the first tag in the public key, store the public key of the encapsulated first tag in the session database, and store the private The key is sent to the pre-associated terminal device;

When the user uses the single sign-on to log in to the server, obtain the private key to be verified input by the user, and verify whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key;

If they are the same, the public key corresponding to the private key is found from the conversation library, and the public key is decrypted by the private key to obtain the first label, which is called by the first label The first login information to log in to the server again.
The single sign-on anti-tampering method according to claim 1, wherein the step of generating a private key and a public key that are bound to each other comprises:

Generating a random formula, the random formula being an arbitrary mathematical calculation combination between evaluation, obtaining and other values, the obtained value and the other values are randomly generated constants;

The evaluation in the random formula is regarded as a private key, and the value obtained in the random formula is regarded as a public key.
The single sign-on tamper-proof method according to claim 2, wherein the step of finding the public key corresponding to the private key from the session database comprises:

Obtain a first random formula binding the private key and the public key to find the public key corresponding to the private key through the first random formula.
The single sign-on tamper-proof method according to claim 3, wherein the step of decrypting the public key by the private key to obtain the first label comprises:

If the first evaluation of the private key is imported into the first random calculation formula and the first obtained value corresponding to the public key can be obtained, it is determined that the public key is decrypted by the private key;

Obtain the first label encapsulated and encrypted in the public key.
The single sign-on tamper-proof method according to claim 1, wherein the step of finding the public key corresponding to the private key from the session database comprises:

The public key is queried from the server’s session database through the private key. The query method is: import the private key into the pre-associated random formula. The random formula is the formula bound to the private key when the private key is generated. The private key of is imported into the random formula to determine whether the public key can be obtained to determine whether the entered private key is correct;

If the server verifies that the private key is correct, it queries the corresponding public key through a random formula.
The single sign-on anti-tampering method according to claim 1, wherein the step of sending the private key to a pre-associated terminal device comprises:

Acquiring the terminal number entered when the user operates the terminal device to log in to the server for the first time, where the terminal number is a number applied to the terminal device;

Sending the private key to the terminal device corresponding to the terminal number.
The single sign-on anti-tampering method according to claim 1, wherein the step of obtaining the private key to be verified input by the user and verifying whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key comprises:

Receiving a login instruction input by the terminal device;

Generate a private key input request according to the login instruction, and send the private key input request to the terminal device;

Obtain the private key to be verified input by the user according to the private key input request to verify whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key.
An anti-tampering device for single sign-on, which is characterized in that it comprises:

The first login unit is used to obtain the first login information of the user logging in to the server for the first time, and determine whether the user enters a single sign-on instruction, the single sign-on instruction is for the user to log in to the server without entering the first login information instruction;

The tag association unit is configured to generate a first tag if yes, and associate the first login information with the first tag, where the first tag is a tag for calling the first login information to log in to the server ；

The encapsulation encryption unit is configured to generate a private key and a public key that are bound to each other, encapsulate the first label in the public key, and store the public key of the encapsulated first label in the session database , And sending the private key to the pre-associated terminal device;

The private key obtaining unit is configured to obtain the private key to be verified input by the user when the user uses the single sign-on to log in to the server, and verify whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key;

The second login unit is configured to, if the same, find the public key corresponding to the private key from the conversation library, and decrypt the public key by the private key to obtain the first label, The first login information is called through the first tag to log in to the server again.
The single sign-on tamper-resistant device according to claim 8, wherein the encapsulation encryption unit comprises:

The formula association module is used to generate a random formula, where the random formula is any combination of mathematical calculations between evaluation, obtained value and other values, and the obtained value and the other values are randomly generated constants;

The key determination module is used to treat the evaluation in the random formula as a private key and the value obtained in the random formula as a public key.
The single sign-on anti-tampering device according to claim 9, wherein the second login unit comprises:

The public key search module is configured to obtain a first random formula binding the private key and the public key, so as to find the public key corresponding to the private key through the first random formula.
The single sign-on anti-tampering device according to claim 10, wherein the second login unit further comprises:

The decryption module is configured to determine that if the first evaluation of the private key is imported into the first random formula and the first obtained value corresponding to the public key can be obtained, it is determined that the public key is Private key decryption; obtain the first label encapsulated and encrypted in the public key.
The single sign-on tamper-proof device according to claim 9, wherein the random calculation formula adopts any one of RSA algorithm, AES algorithm and ElGamal algorithm.
The single sign-on tamper-resistant device according to claim 8, wherein the encapsulation encryption unit comprises:

A number obtaining module, configured to obtain a terminal number entered when a user operates the terminal device to log in to the server for the first time, and the terminal number is a number applied to the terminal device;

The private key sending module is used to send the private key to the terminal device corresponding to the terminal number.
The single sign-on tamper-proof device according to claim 8, wherein the private key obtaining unit comprises:

An instruction receiving module, configured to receive a login instruction input by the terminal device;

A request generation module, configured to generate a private key input request according to the login instruction, and send the private key input request to the terminal device;

The obtaining module is configured to obtain the private key to be verified input by the user according to the private key input request to verify whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key.
A computer device includes a memory and a processor, wherein a computer program is stored in the memory, and is characterized in that, when the processor executes the computer program, the steps of a single sign-on anti-tampering method are implemented, and the method includes:

Obtain the first login information of the user logging in to the server for the first time, and determine whether the user enters a single sign-on instruction, the single sign-on instruction being an instruction for the user to log in to the server without entering the first login information;

If so, generate a first tag, and associate the first login information with the first tag, where the first tag is a tag that calls the first login information to log in to the server;

Generate a private key and a public key that are bound to each other, encapsulate the first tag in the public key, store the public key of the encapsulated first tag in the session database, and store the private The key is sent to the pre-associated terminal device;

When the user uses the single sign-on to log in to the server, obtain the private key to be verified input by the user, and verify whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key;

If they are the same, the public key corresponding to the private key is found from the conversation library, and the public key is decrypted by the private key to obtain the first label, which is called by the first label The first login information to log in to the server again.
The computer device according to claim 15, wherein the step of generating a private key and a public key that are bound to each other comprises:

Generating a random formula, the random formula being an arbitrary mathematical calculation combination between evaluation, obtaining and other values, the obtained value and the other values are randomly generated constants;

The evaluation in the random formula is regarded as a private key, and the value obtained in the random formula is regarded as a public key.
The computer device according to claim 16, wherein the step of finding the public key corresponding to the private key from a session database comprises:

Obtain a first random formula binding the private key and the public key to find the public key corresponding to the private key through the first random formula.
18. The computer device according to claim 17, wherein the step of decrypting the public key by the private key to obtain the first label comprises:

If the first evaluation of the private key is imported into the first random calculation formula and the first obtained value corresponding to the public key can be obtained, it is determined that the public key is decrypted by the private key;

Obtain the first label encapsulated and encrypted in the public key.
A computer-readable storage medium with a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of a single sign-on tamper-proof method are implemented, the method comprising:

Obtain the first login information of the user logging in to the server for the first time, and determine whether the user enters a single sign-on instruction, the single sign-on instruction being an instruction for the user to log in to the server without entering the first login information;

If so, generate a first tag, and associate the first login information with the first tag, where the first tag is a tag that calls the first login information to log in to the server;

Generate a private key and a public key that are bound to each other, encapsulate the first tag in the public key, store the public key of the encapsulated first tag in the session database, and store the private The key is sent to the pre-associated terminal device;

When the user uses the single sign-on to log in to the server, obtain the private key to be verified input by the user, and verify whether the private key to be verified is the same as the private key;

If they are the same, the public key corresponding to the private key is found from the conversation library, and the public key is decrypted by the private key to obtain the first label, which is called by the first label The first login information to log in to the server again.
The computer-readable storage medium according to claim 19, wherein the step of generating a private key and a public key that are bound to each other comprises:

Generating a random formula, the random formula being an arbitrary mathematical calculation combination between evaluation, obtaining and other values, the obtained value and the other values are randomly generated constants;

The evaluation in the random formula is regarded as a private key, and the value obtained in the random formula is regarded as a public key.