WO2020221019A1 - 一种密钥协商方法及装置 - Google Patents

一种密钥协商方法及装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2020221019A1
WO2020221019A1 PCT/CN2020/085203 CN2020085203W WO2020221019A1 WO 2020221019 A1 WO2020221019 A1 WO 2020221019A1 CN 2020085203 W CN2020085203 W CN 2020085203W WO 2020221019 A1 WO2020221019 A1 WO 2020221019A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
key
terminal
network element
identifier
request message
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PCT/CN2020/085203
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
张博
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华为技术有限公司
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Publication of WO2020221019A1 publication Critical patent/WO2020221019A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0838—Key agreement, i.e. key establishment technique in which a shared key is derived by parties as a function of information contributed by, or associated with, each of these
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]

Definitions

  • This application relates to the field of communications, and in particular to a key agreement method and device.
  • 5G fifth generation mobile communication network
  • 5G network for short
  • AKMA Authentication and Key Management for Applications
  • This application provides a key agreement method and device, which solves the problem of how to push the key to the terminal.
  • this application provides a key agreement method, which can be applied to a first network element, or the method can be applied to a communication device that can support the first network element to implement the method, for example, the communication device includes a chip
  • the system and the method include: after the first network element receives the first request message sent by the second network element, receiving a first indication by sending a second request message, wherein the first request message includes the identifier of the terminal; the second request message Including the terminal identifier; the first indication is used to indicate the authentication method and/or the security context corresponding to the terminal identifier. After receiving the first instruction, the first network element sends the first instruction to the second network element.
  • the method further includes: after the first network element receives the first key, deriving the second key according to the first key; and sending the second key to the second network element.
  • this application provides a key agreement method, which can be applied to a second network element, or the method can be applied to a communication device that can support the second network element to implement the method, for example, the communication device includes a chip
  • the system and the method include: the second network element sends a first request message to the first network element, and after receiving the first instruction sent by the first network element, sends the first instruction to the terminal.
  • the first request message includes the identification of the terminal; the first indication is used to indicate the authentication method and/or the security context corresponding to the identification of the terminal.
  • the method further includes: the second network element receives a second key sent by the first network element, where the second key is derived from the first key.
  • this application provides a key agreement method, which can be applied to a third network element, or the method can be applied to a communication device that can support the third network element to implement the method, for example, the communication device includes a chip
  • the system and the method include: after receiving the first request message sent by the first network element, the third network element sends a first instruction to the first network element, wherein the first request message includes the identifier of the terminal; the first instruction is used to indicate The authentication method and/or the security context corresponding to the terminal identifier.
  • the method further includes: the third network element determines the first key according to the identification of the terminal; and sending the first key to the first network element.
  • the third network element determining the first key according to the identification of the terminal includes: the third network element obtains the third key according to the identification of the terminal; and the third network element derives the first key according to the third key.
  • this application provides a key agreement method, which can be applied to a terminal, or the method can be applied to a communication device that can support the terminal to implement the method, for example, the communication device includes a chip system, and the method includes: a terminal After receiving the first instruction sent by the second network element, the third key is determined according to the first instruction, the first key is derived from the third key, and the second key is derived from the first key.
  • the first indication is used to indicate the authentication method and/or the security context corresponding to the terminal identifier.
  • the application server may first perform key agreement with the authentication and key agreement network element, and then send a first instruction to the terminal, and the terminal determines the key according to the first instruction. It is realized that the application server and the terminal do not need to be authenticated, and the key agreement can be carried out to obtain the key for encrypting the message, thereby effectively reducing the time length of authentication and key agreement, and also reducing the sending of the application server to the terminal The message delay is also longer.
  • this application also provides a communication device for implementing the method described in the first aspect.
  • the communication device is a first network element or a communication device that supports the first network element to implement the method described in the first aspect.
  • the communication device includes a chip system.
  • the communication device includes: a receiving unit, a sending unit, and a processing unit.
  • the receiving unit is configured to receive a first request message sent by a second network element, where the first request message includes the identification of the terminal; the sending unit is configured to send a second request message, and the second request message includes the identification of the terminal;
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive a first instruction, where the first instruction is used to indicate an authentication mode and/or a security context corresponding to the terminal identifier; the sending unit is further configured to send the first instruction to the second network element.
  • the receiving unit is also used to receive the first key; the processing unit is used to derive the second key according to the first key; the sending unit is also used to send the second key to the second network element key.
  • the present application also provides a communication device for implementing the method described in the second aspect.
  • the communication device is a second network element or a communication device that supports the second network element to implement the method described in the second aspect.
  • the communication device includes a chip system.
  • the communication device includes: a receiving unit, a sending unit, and a processing unit.
  • the sending unit is configured to send a first request message to a first network element, where the first request message includes an identifier of the terminal;
  • the receiving unit is configured to receive a first instruction sent by the first network element, and the first instruction is used to Indicate the authentication mode and/or the security context corresponding to the terminal identifier;
  • the sending unit is further configured to send the first instruction to the terminal.
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive a second key sent by the first network element, where the second key is derived from the first key.
  • this application also provides a communication device for implementing the method described in the third aspect.
  • the communication device is a third network element or a communication device that supports the third network element to implement the method described in the third aspect.
  • the communication device includes a chip system.
  • the communication device includes: a receiving unit, a sending unit, and a processing unit.
  • the receiving unit is configured to receive a first request message sent by a first network element, where the first request message includes an identifier of the terminal;
  • the sending unit is configured to send a first instruction to the first network element, and the first instruction is used for Indicates the authentication method and/or the security context corresponding to the terminal's identity.
  • the processing unit is configured to determine the first key according to the identification of the terminal; the sending unit is also configured to send the first key to the first network element.
  • the processing unit is specifically configured to: obtain the third key according to the identification of the terminal; and derive the first key according to the third key.
  • the present application also provides a communication device for implementing the method described in the fourth aspect.
  • the communication device is a terminal or a communication device that supports the terminal to implement the method described in the fourth aspect.
  • the communication device includes a chip system.
  • the communication device includes: a receiving unit, a sending unit, and a processing unit.
  • the receiving unit is configured to receive a first instruction sent by a second network element, where the first instruction is used to indicate an authentication method and/or a security context corresponding to the terminal identifier;
  • the processing unit is configured to determine the first instruction according to the first instruction Three keys; the processing unit is also used to derive the first key based on the third key; the processing unit is also used to derive the second key based on the first key.
  • the functional modules of the fifth aspect and the eighth aspect described above can be implemented by hardware, or by hardware executing corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above-mentioned functions.
  • the transceiver is used to complete the functions of the receiving unit and the transmitting unit
  • the processor is used to complete the function of the processing unit
  • the memory is used for the processor to process the program instructions of the method of the present application.
  • the processor, the transceiver, and the memory are connected through a bus and communicate with each other.
  • the present application also provides a communication device for implementing the methods described in the first to fourth aspects.
  • the communication device is a first network element or a communication device that supports the first network element to implement the method described in the first aspect.
  • the communication device includes a chip system, or the communication device is a second network element or supports the second network element to implement the method.
  • the communication device of the method described in the second aspect for example, the communication device includes a chip system, or the communication device is a third network element or a communication device that supports the third network element to implement the method described in the third aspect, for example, the communication device includes a chip
  • the system or communication device is a terminal or a communication device that supports the terminal to implement the method described in the fourth aspect.
  • the communication device includes a chip system.
  • the communication device includes a processor, configured to implement the functions of the methods described in the first to fourth aspects.
  • the communication device may also include a memory for storing program instructions and data.
  • the memory is coupled with the processor, and the processor can call and execute the program instructions stored in the memory to implement the functions in the methods described in the first to fourth aspects.
  • the communication device may further include a communication interface, and the communication interface is used for the communication device to communicate with other devices. Exemplarily, if the communication device is a first network element, the other equipment is a second network element or a third network element. If the communication device is a second network element, the other equipment is a terminal.
  • the communication device includes a communication interface, and the communication interface is used for communication between the communication device and other devices.
  • the communication interface may be a transceiver, and the transceiver is used to send and receive the first instruction.
  • the memory is used to store program instructions.
  • the processor is configured to determine the third key according to the first instruction, derive the first key according to the third key, and derive the second key according to the first key.
  • the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, including: computer software instructions; when the computer software instructions run in a communication device or a chip built in the communication device, the communication device executes the first aspect to The key agreement method described in any one of the fourth aspect.
  • this application also provides a computer program product containing instructions.
  • the computer program product runs in a communication device or a chip built in the communication device, the communication device executes the first to fourth aspects mentioned above.
  • the present application provides a chip system that includes a processor and may also include a memory for implementing the functions of the first network element, the second network element, the third network element, or the terminal in the above method .
  • the chip system can be composed of chips, or can include chips and other discrete devices.
  • this application also provides a communication system, the communication system comprising the first network element described in the fifth aspect or a communication device that supports the first network element to implement the method described in the first aspect, and a sixth The second network element described in the aspect or the communication device that supports the second network element to implement the method described in the second aspect, and the third network element described in the seventh aspect or the communication device that supports the third network element to implement the method described in the third aspect A device, the terminal described in the eighth aspect or a communication device that supports the terminal to implement the method described in the fourth aspect;
  • the communication system includes the first network element described in the ninth aspect or a communication device that supports the first network element to implement the method described in the first aspect, and the second network element described in the ninth aspect or supports the second network element to implement
  • the communication device of the method described in the second aspect, the third network element described in the ninth aspect or a communication device that supports the third network element to implement the method described in the third aspect, and the terminal described in the ninth aspect or a supporting terminal implements the first The communication device of the method described in four aspects.
  • the names of the first network element, the second network element, the third network element, the terminal, and the communication device do not constitute a limitation on the device itself. In actual implementation, these devices may appear under other names. As long as the function of each device is similar to that of this application, it falls within the scope of the claims of this application and equivalent technologies.
  • the first request message sent by the second network element to the first network element includes the identification of the terminal, and the identification of the terminal is usually the second identification of the terminal used in the 5G core network.
  • the embodiment of the present application provides the following method for determining the identity of the terminal.
  • this application also provides a method for determining the identity of a terminal.
  • the method can be applied to a first network function (Network Function, NF), or the method can be applied to a method that can support the first NF to implement the method.
  • the communication device for example, the communication device includes a chip system, the method includes: after the first NF receives the first request message including the first identification of the terminal sent by the first network element, the first NF sends the terminal's information to the fourth network element The first identifier receives the second identifier of the terminal sent by the fourth network element; the first NF sends the second identifier of the terminal to the second NF.
  • the method for determining the identity of the terminal allows the application server to use the first identity of the terminal for user data transmission in the 5G network, and the device in the 5G core network can obtain the second identity of the terminal according to the first identity of the terminal. Identification, using the second identification of the terminal for data transmission in the 5G core network. Therefore, the leakage of the second identification of the terminal can be avoided, and the security of user data can be effectively improved.
  • the method further includes: the first NF receives the address information of the second NF sent by the fourth network element; if the address information of the first NF is different from the address information of the second NF, the first NF sends the A network element sends the address information of the second NF.
  • the present application also provides a communication device for implementing the method described in the fourteenth aspect.
  • the communication device is a first NF or a communication device that supports the first NF to implement the method described in the first aspect.
  • the communication device includes a chip system.
  • the communication device includes: a receiving unit and a sending unit.
  • the receiving unit is configured to receive a first request message sent by a first network element, where the first request message includes a first identification of the terminal;
  • the sending unit is configured to send the first identification of the terminal to a fourth network element;
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive the second identification of the terminal sent by the fourth network element; the sending unit is also configured to send the second identification of the terminal to the second NF.
  • the receiving unit is further configured to receive the address information of the second NF sent by the fourth network element; if the address information of the first NF is different from the address information of the second NF, the sending unit , Is also used to send the address information of the second NF to the first network element.
  • the above-mentioned functional modules of the fifteenth aspect can be implemented by hardware, or by hardware executing corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the above-mentioned functions.
  • the transceiver is used to complete the functions of the receiving unit and the transmitting unit
  • the processor is used to complete the function of the processing unit
  • the memory is used for the processor to process the program instructions of the method of the present application.
  • the processor, the transceiver, and the memory are connected through a bus and communicate with each other. Specifically, refer to the function of the behavior of the first NF in the method described in the fourteenth aspect.
  • this application also provides a communication device for implementing the method described in the fourteenth aspect.
  • the communication device is a first NF or a communication device that supports the first NF to implement the method described in the fourteenth aspect.
  • the communication device includes a chip system.
  • the communication device includes a processor, configured to implement the functions of the method described in the fourteenth aspect.
  • the communication device may also include a memory for storing program instructions and data. The memory is coupled with the processor, and the processor can call and execute program instructions stored in the memory to implement the functions in the method described in the fourteenth aspect.
  • the communication device may further include a communication interface, and the communication interface is used for the communication device to communicate with other devices. Exemplarily, if the communication device is the first NF, the other device is the first network element.
  • the communication device includes a communication interface, and the communication interface is used for communication between the communication device and other devices.
  • the communication interface may be a transceiver, and the transceiver is used to send and receive the first request message.
  • the memory is used to store program instructions.
  • the present application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, including: computer software instructions; when the computer software instructions run in a communication device or a chip built in the communication device, the communication device executes the fourteenth The method for determining the identity of the terminal described in the aspect.
  • this application also provides a computer program product containing instructions.
  • the computer program product runs on a communication device or a chip built in the communication device, the communication device executes the determination described in the fourteenth aspect.
  • the method of terminal identification is described in the fourteenth aspect.
  • the present application provides a chip system, which includes a processor and may also include a memory, configured to implement the function of the first NF in the foregoing method.
  • the chip system can be composed of chips, or can include chips and other discrete devices.
  • the names of the first network element, the first NF, and the communication device do not constitute a limitation on the device itself. In actual implementation, these devices may appear under other names. As long as the function of each device is similar to that of this application, it falls within the scope of the claims of this application and equivalent technologies.
  • Figure 1 is a diagram of an example of the architecture of a communication network provided by this application.
  • Figure 2a is Figure 2 of an example of a communication network architecture provided by this application.
  • FIG. 2b is a third of an example of the architecture of a communication network provided by this application.
  • Figure 2c is Figure 4 of an example of the architecture of a communication network provided by this application.
  • Figure 3 is a flow chart 1 of a key agreement method provided by this application.
  • Figure 3a is the second flowchart of a key agreement method provided by this application.
  • Figure 3b is the third flowchart of a key agreement method provided by this application.
  • Figure 4 is a fourth flowchart of a key agreement method provided by this application.
  • Figure 5 is a flowchart five of a key agreement method provided by this application.
  • Fig. 6 is a flowchart 6 of a key agreement method provided by this application.
  • Figure 7 is Figure 1 of an example composition of a communication device provided by this application.
  • Figure 8 is Figure 2 of an example composition of a communication device provided by this application.
  • Figure 9a is Figure 5 of an example of the architecture of a communication network provided by this application.
  • Figure 9b is Figure 6 of an example of a communication network architecture provided by this application.
  • Figure 9c is Figure 7 of an example of a communication network architecture provided by this application.
  • FIG. 10 is a first flowchart of a method for determining the identity of a terminal provided by this application.
  • FIG. 11 is a second flowchart of a method for determining the identity of a terminal provided by this application.
  • FIG. 12 is a third flowchart of a method for determining the identity of a terminal provided by this application.
  • Figure 13 is Figure 3 of an example composition of a communication device provided by this application.
  • Fig. 14 is Fig. 4 of an example composition of a communication device provided by this application.
  • words such as “exemplary” or “for example” are used as examples, illustrations, or illustrations. Any embodiment or design solution described as “exemplary” or “for example” in the embodiments of the present application should not be construed as being more preferable or advantageous than other embodiments or design solutions. To be precise, words such as “exemplary” or “for example” are used to present related concepts in a specific manner.
  • the network can be a 5G network.
  • the network may include: at least one terminal 101, a network device 102, an access and mobility management network element 103, an authentication and key agreement network element 104, a data management network element 105, and an application server 106.
  • the access and mobility management network element 103, the authentication and key agreement network element 104, and the data management network element 105 may be devices located in the core network.
  • the terminal can be connected to the network device and the application server in a wireless manner, and the network device can be connected to the device in the core network in a wireless or wired manner.
  • the equipment in the core network and the network equipment can be separate and different physical equipment, or it can integrate the functions of the core network equipment and the logical functions of the network equipment on the same physical device, or it can be an integrated part of a physical device
  • the terminal can be a fixed location, or it can be movable.
  • the network architecture shown in Figure 1 is only an exemplary architecture diagram. Although not shown, in addition to the network functions shown in Figure 1, the network shown in Figure 1 may also include other functions, such as: billing network elements (Such as: Charge Function (CHF)), wireless relay equipment and wireless backhaul equipment, etc.
  • CHF Charge Function
  • the embodiments of the present application do not limit the number of terminals, network devices, and application servers included in the communication system.
  • the terminal 101 may be a user equipment (User Equipment, UE), and may also be various handheld devices, vehicle-mounted devices, wearable devices, computing devices, or other processing devices connected to a wireless modem with wireless or wired communication functions; It can include subscriber unit (subscriber unit), cellular phone (cellular phone), smart phone (smart phone), wireless data card, personal digital assistant (PDA) computer, tablet computer, wireless modem (modem), handheld Device (handheld), laptop (laptop computer), cordless phone (Wireless Local Loop, WLL) station, Machine Type Communication (MTC) terminal, mobile station (Mobile Station, MS), etc., are not restricted.
  • subscriber unit subscriber unit
  • cellular phone cellular phone
  • smart phone smart phone
  • wireless data card personal digital assistant (PDA) computer
  • tablet computer tablet computer
  • wireless modem modem
  • handheld Device handheld
  • laptop laptop computer
  • cordless phone Wireless Local Loop, WLL
  • MTC Machine Type Communication
  • the network device 102 may be a base station (BS), a base station controller, or an evolved base station (eNodeB) for wireless communication. It can also be called a wireless access point, a transceiver station, a relay station, a cell, a transmit and receive point (transmit and receive port, TRP), and so on.
  • a network device is a device deployed in a wireless access network to provide wireless communication functions for terminal devices.
  • Network equipment may include various forms of cellular base stations, home base stations, cells, wireless transmission points, macro base stations, micro base stations, relay stations, wireless access points, and so on.
  • the names of devices with network device functions may be different. For example, in a 5G NR system, it is called a 5G base station (generation Node B, gNB) and so on.
  • the names of network devices may change.
  • the network device may be another device that provides wireless communication functions for the terminal device.
  • the network device 102 may also be an access network device with other specific wired network functions.
  • the embodiment of the present application does not limit the specific technology and specific device form adopted by the network device.
  • a device that provides a terminal with a wireless communication function or a device with a wired communication function is called a network device.
  • Network equipment and terminal equipment can be deployed on land, including indoor or outdoor, handheld or vehicle-mounted; they can also be deployed on water; they can also be deployed on airborne aircraft, balloons, and satellites.
  • the embodiments of the present application do not limit the application scenarios of network equipment and terminal equipment.
  • Communication between network equipment and terminal equipment and between terminal equipment and terminal equipment can be carried out through licensed spectrum, or through unlicensed spectrum, or through both licensed and unlicensed spectrum. Communication.
  • the embodiment of the present application does not limit the spectrum resource used between the network device and the terminal device.
  • the access and mobility management network element 103 mainly implements the access control and mobility management functions of the terminal, and can also be used to authenticate the terminal and derive the key, and protect the identity information of the terminal (such as the permanent user identification of the terminal (Subscription Permanent Identifier, SUPI) etc.).
  • the access and mobility management network element can be an access and mobility management function (Access and Mobility Management Function, AMF) and a security anchor function (Security Anchor Functionality, SEAF).
  • AMF and SEAF can also be deployed independently.
  • AMF communicates with AUSF through SEAF.
  • the authentication and key agreement network element 104 is mainly used for authentication and key derivation of the terminal.
  • the authentication and key agreement network element may include application-specific authentication and key management authentication functions (Authentication and Key Management for Applications Authentication Function, AAuF) and authentication server functions (Authentication Server Function, AUSF).
  • AAuF and AUSF can be separate and different physical devices, or the logical functions of AAuF and AUSF can be integrated on the same physical device, or part of the functions and parts of AUSF can be integrated on one physical device.
  • the function of AUSF is not limited in this application.
  • the data management network element 105 is mainly used to store related information such as data contracted by the terminal, security parameters (or called authentication vectors), registration information, subscription information, group information and the like.
  • the data management network element may be unified data management (UDM).
  • the security parameter may also be referred to as an authentication vector (authentication vector, AV).
  • the application server 106 is mainly used to provide application services for the terminal.
  • the application server may be an AKMA Application Function (AKMA Application Function, AApF).
  • AKMA Application Function AApF
  • Each application can have one AApF, so AAuF and the terminal may interact with multiple AApFs.
  • Figure 1 is a 5G network
  • the access and mobility management network element 103 in Figure 1 is AMF/SEAF
  • the authentication and key agreement network element 104 is AAuF and AUSF
  • the data management network element 105 is UDM
  • the application server 106 Taking AAPF as an example, the key agreement method provided in this application is introduced.
  • AAuF may have interfaces with UDM, AUSF and AMF/SEAF.
  • AAuF is connected to AUSF and AApF respectively, and AUSF is connected to UDM and AMF/SEAF respectively.
  • AAuF is connected to UDM and AApF respectively, and AUSF is connected to UDM and AMF/SEAF respectively.
  • AAuF is connected to AMF/SEAF and AAPF respectively, and AUSF is connected to UDM and AMF/SEAF respectively.
  • connection between AUSF and AMF/SEAF can be understood as the connection between AUSF and one physical device. If AMF and SEAF are deployed on two physical devices, the connection between AUSF and AMF/SEAF can be understood as AUSF is connected with AMF and SEAF respectively.
  • connection between AAuF and AMF/SEAF can be understood as the connection between AAuF and a physical device. If AMF and SEAF are deployed on two physical devices, the connection between AAuF and AMF/SEAF can be understood as the connection between AAuF and AMF and SEAF respectively.
  • AAuF can obtain relevant parameters or keys after authentication for terminal authentication from UDM, AUSF or AMF/SEAF, and complete authentication and key negotiation for the terminal by interacting with UDM, AUSF or AMF/SEAF.
  • the terminal can also negotiate a key with AApF through AAuF.
  • terminals and devices in the core network can use the AKMA method for authentication and key negotiation.
  • the terminal needs to first send an authentication request to UDM or AUSF through AMF/SEAF, UDM or AUSF obtains security parameters, and the terminal and AAuF perform an authentication process. After the authentication is successful, AAuF sends an authentication success message to the terminal.
  • the authentication success message may include a key lifetime (LT) and a temporary (Identifier, ID).
  • AAPF when AApF needs to actively send messages to the terminal, if AApF still uses the AKMA method to authenticate with devices and terminals in the core network such as AAuF, AUSF, AMF/SEAF, and UDM, then AAPF performs keying with the terminal and AAuF After negotiation, AAPF then encrypts the information to be sent according to the negotiated key. In this case, due to the long duration of authentication and key negotiation, the time delay for AAPF to send messages to the terminal is also long. Therefore, how to directly push the key to the terminal is an urgent problem to be solved.
  • An embodiment of the present application provides a key agreement method, the method includes: AAPF sends a first request message to AAuF, and after receiving the first request message sent by AAPF, AAuF sends a second request message.
  • the first request message includes the identification of the terminal and the AAPF identification, and the identification of the terminal is used to determine the authentication method corresponding to the first security parameter and/or the security context corresponding to the identification of the terminal; the second request message includes the identification of the terminal.
  • the AUSF determines the key (Kaauf) of the AAuF according to the identification of the terminal, and sends the first security parameter and the first instruction to the AAuF.
  • the first security parameter includes the AAuF key, and the first indication is used to indicate the authentication method corresponding to the first security parameter and/or the security context corresponding to the terminal identifier.
  • the AAuF determines the AAPF key according to the AAPF key parameter, and determines the push information according to the first security parameter, and sends the push information and the AAPF key to AAPF.
  • the AAPF key parameter includes the AAuF key and the AAPF identifier
  • the push information includes the first indication. After AAPF receives the push information sent by AAuF, it sends the push information to the terminal.
  • the terminal After receiving the push information sent by AAPF, the terminal determines the AAuF key parameter according to the first instruction, determines the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter, and determines the AAPF key according to the AAPF key parameter.
  • the AAuF key parameter includes the AUSF key, or the AAuF key parameter includes the encryption key and the integrity protection key, or the AAuF key parameter includes the security context; the AAPF key parameter includes the AAuF key.
  • the application server may first perform key agreement with the authentication and key agreement network element, and then send push information to the terminal, and the terminal determines the key according to the push information.
  • the application server and the terminal do not need to be authenticated, and the key agreement can be carried out to obtain the key for encrypting the message, thereby effectively reducing the time length of authentication and key agreement, and also reducing the AAPF sending message to the terminal The delay is also longer.
  • the 5G network includes two authentication methods, namely 5G authentication and key agreement (Authentication and Key Agreement, AKA) and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) AKA', Therefore, for the two different authentication methods, the AKMA authentication process may also be different.
  • the application server sends push information to the terminal, it also needs to inform the terminal which authentication method is used, so that the terminal can determine the key.
  • the network architecture shown in Figure 2a there is a direct logical interface between AAuF and AUSF.
  • the key agreement method provided in this application is applied to the network architecture scenario shown in FIG. 2a, AAuF can interact with UDM through AUSF to determine the authentication method.
  • FIG. 3 it is a flowchart of a key agreement method provided by an embodiment of this application. The method may include the following steps:
  • AAPF sends a first request message to AAuF.
  • AAPF may send a first request message to AAuF, where the first request message includes the identity of the terminal and the identity of the AAPF.
  • the method for AAPF to obtain the terminal identifier is not limited, and it may be pre-configured, or it may be obtained by AAPF from the application layer, which is not limited.
  • the AAPF logo is optional to send.
  • the terminal’s identity can be the terminal’s subscriber permanent identity (Subscription Permanent Identifier, SUPI), or the terminal’s International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI), or the terminal’s IP Multimedia Private Identity (IP Multimedia). Private Identity, IMPI), or the terminal’s Globally Unique Temporary Identifier (GUTI), or the terminal’s IP Multimedia Public Identity (IMPU), or the terminal’s temporary mobile subscriber identifier (Temporary Mobile Subscriber) Identity, TMSI) (such as: System Architecture Evolution Temporary Mobile User Identifier (S-TMSI) or Mobility Management Function Temporary Mobile User Identifier (M-TMSI) or Packet Domain User Temporary Identifier (P-TMSI)), or terminal The International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI), or the User Sealed Identifier (Subscription Concealed Identifier, SUCI) of the terminal, or the general public subscription ID (Generic Public Subscription Identifier, GPSI), etc., are not limited. SUCI can be the terminal
  • the first request message may also include other information, such as: AAPF identifier, key validity period, and Push Temporary Identifier (P-TID).
  • AAuF sends a second request message to AUSF.
  • AAuF After receiving the first request message sent by AAPF, AAuF saves the AAPF identifier, key validity period and P-TID, and sends the terminal identifier to AUSF. For example, AAuF may send a second request message to AUSF, and the second request message includes the identification of the terminal. The second request message may also include other information, such as: AAuF server name (AAuF server name). If the first request message does not carry the AAPF identifier, AAuF may also determine the AAPF identifier through information such as the interface between AAuF and AAPF.
  • AUSF obtains the AAuF key according to the terminal identifier.
  • the AUSF After the AUSF receives the second request message sent by the AAuF, it can obtain the AAuF key according to the terminal identifier.
  • AUSF may obtain security parameters from UDM according to the identification of the terminal, and determine the key of AAuF according to the security parameters.
  • S303 may include the following detailed steps.
  • AUSF sends a third request message to UDM.
  • the third request message includes the identification of the terminal.
  • the third request message may also include other information, such as the name of the AAuF server.
  • the identification of the terminal is used to generate the second security parameter or the third security parameter. For example, it may be determined to generate the second security parameter or the third security parameter according to the subscription information corresponding to the identification of the terminal.
  • the subscription information may include root key information of the terminal and so on.
  • the UDM may determine the second security parameter or the third security parameter according to the root key information of the terminal.
  • the first safety parameter may also be determined according to the second safety parameter or the third safety parameter.
  • the first security parameter may also be called AKMA AV.
  • UDM determines the authentication mode and the security parameters corresponding to the authentication mode.
  • the UDM may determine the authentication method for authenticating the terminal indicated by the terminal identifier according to the local policy.
  • the authentication method can be 5G AKA authentication or EAP AKA' authentication.
  • the security parameter corresponding to the 5G AKA authentication method may be the second security parameter.
  • the second security parameter may also be referred to as 5G AKA AV.
  • 5G AKA AV includes AUSF key (Kausf), random number (random number, RAND), authentication token (Authentication token, AUTN), and expected user response (XRES).
  • the security parameter corresponding to the EAP AKA' authentication method may be the third security parameter.
  • the third security parameter may also be referred to as EAP AKA'AV.
  • EAP AKA’AV includes an encryption key (Cipher Key, CK’), an integrity key (IK’), RAND, AUTN, and XRES.
  • the UDM sends the security parameters and the first indication corresponding to the authentication mode to the AUSF.
  • the first indication may be used to indicate the authentication method corresponding to the first security parameter.
  • the first security parameter may be determined according to the second security parameter or the third security parameter described in S3032, specifically as described in S3034.
  • AUSF determines the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter.
  • AUSF can generate the AAuF key (or Kakma) according to the AUSF key, that is, the AAuF key parameter includes the AUSF key .
  • AUSF saves the key of AUSF.
  • AUSF can generate the AAuF key (or Kakma) according to CK’ and IK’, that is, the AAUF key parameters include CK' and IK'. It is also possible that AUSF first generates the AUSF key based on CK' and IK', and then generates the AAuF key based on the AUSF key.
  • the key for generating AUSF here can be based on the existing technology without limitation.
  • the AAuF key parameter used to generate the AAuF key may also include at least one of the following parameters, such as: AAuF server name, first fresh parameter, AKMA indication, terminal identification, first indication, RAND, AUTN, XRES.
  • AAuF server name can be sent by AAuF to AUSF, or AUSF can determine the AAuF server name based on the interface connection between AUSF and AAuF, which is not limited.
  • the first fresh parameter may include a counter for generating the AAUF key, or a random parameter (nonce) randomly selected by AUSF.
  • the AUSF can send the first fresh parameter to AAuF, so that the AAuF can be sent to the terminal through other messages; finally, the terminal can use the same parameters to derive the AAUF key.
  • the AKMA indication is used to restrict the key to be used in the AKMA scene.
  • the identification of the terminal may be the identification of the terminal sent by AAPF, or the permanent identification of the terminal determined by UDM according to the identification of the terminal sent by AUSF, and returned to AUSF.
  • AUSF may determine that the first security parameter includes the key of AAuF, RAND, AUTN, and XRES, and execute S304.
  • AUSF can determine the authentication mode according to the format of the authentication vector. For example, if the security parameter corresponding to the authentication method sent by UDM to AUSF is 5G AKA AV, AUSF can determine that the authentication method is 5G AKA authentication according to the format of 5G AKA AV, and AUSF can generate an AAuF key based on the AUSF key.
  • AUSF can determine the authentication method to be EAP AKA'AV according to the format of EAP AKA'AV, and AUSF can be generated based on CK' and IK' AAuF key.
  • AUSF can obtain the AAuF key from UDM.
  • S303 may include the following detailed steps.
  • the third request message includes the identification of the terminal.
  • the third request message may also include other information, such as the name of the AAuF server.
  • UDM determines the authentication method and the security parameters corresponding to the authentication method.
  • the authentication method can be 5G AKA authentication or EAP AKA' authentication.
  • the security parameter corresponding to the 5G AKA authentication method may be the second security parameter.
  • the security parameter corresponding to the EAP AKA' authentication method may be the third security parameter.
  • S3012 the specific explanation of the authentication method, the second security parameter, and the third security parameter, please refer to the explanation of S3012, which will not be repeated.
  • the UDM determines the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter.
  • UDM can generate the AAuF key (or Kakma) according to the AUSF key, that is, the AAuF key parameter includes the AUSF key parameter. Key.
  • UDM can generate the AAuF key (or Kakma) based on CK' and IK', that is, AAuF key
  • the parameters include CK' and IK'.
  • UDM directly generates the first security parameter (such as AKMA AV), where AKMA AV includes the key of AAuF, RAND, AUTN, and XRES.
  • the key parameter of AAuF may include CK, IK or the root key of the terminal.
  • the generation method of CK and IK can also be based on the existing technology without limitation.
  • UDM directly generates the first security parameter instead of generating it through 5G AKA or EAP AKA'
  • the authentication method at this time can be unique. No first instruction is needed at this time.
  • the flow sent by UDM to AUSF does not include the first indication.
  • the process of sending AUSF to AAuF, the process of sending AAuF to AApF, and the process of sending AAPF to the terminal may not include the first indication.
  • the AAuF key parameter used to generate the AAuF key may also include at least one of the following parameters, such as: AAUF server name, first fresh parameter, AKMA indication, terminal identification, first indication, RAND, AUTN and XRES.
  • AAUF server name AAUF server name
  • first fresh parameter AKMA indication
  • terminal identification AAUF server name
  • first indication AAUF indication
  • RAND AAuF key parameter used to generate the AAuF key
  • XRES XRES.
  • the UDM may determine that the first security parameter includes the key of AAuF, RAND, AUTN, and XRES, and execute S3038.
  • the UDM sends the first security parameter and the first indication to the AUSF. Go to S304.
  • AUSF sends the first security parameter and the first indication to the AAuF.
  • the AUSF After the AUSF obtains the first security parameter and the first indication, it forwards the first security parameter and the first indication to the AAuF.
  • the AUSF may also send the first freshness parameter to the AAuF.
  • AAuF determines the AAPF key according to the AAPF key parameter, and determines the push information according to the first security parameter.
  • AAuF After AAuF receives the first security parameter, AAuF can determine the key (Kaapf) of AAPF according to the key of AAuF.
  • the first security parameter includes the key of AAuF, RAND, AUTN and XRES.
  • the AAPF key parameter used to generate the AAPF key may include the AAuF key.
  • AAuF saves the key of AAuF.
  • the AAPF key parameter used to generate the AAPF key may also include at least one of the following parameters, such as: AAPF identifier, AAuF server name, second fresh parameter, AKMA indication, terminal identifier, first Instructions, RAND, AUTN and XRES.
  • the AAPF identifier may be sent by AAPF to AAuF.
  • the second fresh parameter may include a counter for generating the AAPF key, or a random parameter randomly selected by AAuF. The AAPF can send the second fresh parameter to the terminal; finally, the terminal can use the same parameter to derive the AAPF key.
  • the terminal identifier can be the terminal identifier of the AAPF from the terminal, or the permanent identifier of the terminal received from the AUSF.
  • the permanent identifier of the terminal is determined by UDM based on the terminal identifier sent by the AUSF and returned to the AUSF.
  • AAuF can also determine the push information according to the first security parameter.
  • the push information may include RAND, AUTN and the first indication.
  • the push information may further include at least one of the following parameters, such as: AAPF identification, key validity period, first freshness parameter, and second freshness parameter.
  • AAuF may determine the authentication mode according to the format of the first security parameter.
  • the authentication method may be determined according to the number or length of the parameters included in the first security parameter determined by 5G AKA AV and EAP AKA' AV.
  • the authentication method can also be determined according to the AT_MAC and other parameters included in EAP AKA'AV. If the first security parameter includes AT_MAC and other parameters, it can indicate that the first security parameter is determined according to EAP AKA'AV, and the authentication method is EAP AKA' authentication. the way.
  • EAP AKA’AV adopts the EAP packet format, which can indicate that the first security parameter is determined according to EAP AKA’AV, and the authentication method is EAP AKA’ authentication.
  • AAuF sends push information and the AAPF key to AAPF.
  • AAPF sends push information to the terminal.
  • the AAPF After the AAPF receives the push information sent by AAuF and the AAPF key, it sends the push message to the terminal and saves the AAPF key.
  • the push information please refer to S305, which will not be repeated.
  • the terminal determines the authentication mode according to the first instruction, then determines the AAuF key parameter, and determines the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter.
  • the terminal can determine the authentication mode according to the first instruction, and then use the verification method corresponding to the authentication mode to verify the correctness of RAND and AUTN. If the verification is successful, the terminal can obtain the AUSF key, or CK' and IK' according to the existing method. The terminal then determines the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter. Among them, the AAuF key parameter includes the AUSF key, or the AAuF key parameter includes CK' and IK'. Refer to S3034 and S3037 to determine the specific method of deriving the AAuF key.
  • the terminal determines the AAPF key according to the AAPF key parameter.
  • the terminal determines the key of AAPF according to the key of AAuF.
  • the AAPF key parameter used to generate the AAPF key includes the AAuF key.
  • the specific method of generating the AAuF key is the same as the method of generating the AAuF key by AUSF or the method of UDM generating the AAuF key; the method of generating the AAPF key is the same as the method of generating the AAPF key by AAuF, please refer to the details in the above steps , Do not repeat it.
  • the terminal when the terminal generates the AAuF key and the AAPF key, other parameters that need to be used can be sent to the terminal by other network elements through messages such as push information, or stored by the terminal itself. I limited it.
  • the key agreement method provided in this application can generate AKMA AV for different authentication methods, and add a first instruction in the push message to indicate the authentication method for generating AKMA AV, so that the terminal can complete the verification of the push information according to the first instruction. Verification, and generate the AAuF key and AAPF key. Therefore, key agreement can be realized without authentication between the application server and the terminal, and all network elements can obtain the key to encrypt the message, which effectively reduces the length of authentication and key negotiation, and reduces the AAPF sending to the terminal The message delay is also longer.
  • the AAuF sends a second request message to the UDM, and the second request message includes the identification of the terminal.
  • the UDM determines the authentication method and the security parameters corresponding to the authentication method, it determines the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter, and determines that the first security parameter includes the AAuF key, RAND, AUTN, and XRES.
  • the UDM determines the authentication mode and the security parameters corresponding to the authentication mode, it sends the security parameters and the first indication corresponding to the authentication mode to AAuF, and the AAuF determines the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter, and determines the first security parameter.
  • the manner of UDM confirming the first security parameter can refer to step S3037.
  • UDM sends the first security parameter and the first indication to AAuF.
  • AAuF can determine the AAPF key according to the AAPF key parameter, and determine the push information according to the first security parameter, and send the push information and the AAPF key to AAPF, and AAPF sends the terminal Send push messages.
  • AAuF For the network architecture shown in Figure 2c, there is a direct logical interface between AAuF and AMF/SEAF.
  • the difference from the key negotiation based on the network architecture shown in Figure 2a is that after receiving the first request message sent by AAPF, AAuF sends a second request message to AMF/SEAF, and the second request message includes the terminal's identity. .
  • AMF/SEAF sends a second request message to AUSF. After AUSF determines the authentication method and the security parameters corresponding to the authentication method, it sends the security parameters corresponding to the authentication method and the first indication to AMF/SEAF.
  • AMF/SEAF determines the AAuF according to the AAuF key parameters Key and determine the first security parameter.
  • the security parameters corresponding to the authentication mode are SEAF keys (Kseaf), RAND, AUTN, XRES, and AAuF key parameters include Kseaf.
  • the security parameters corresponding to the authentication mode are Kseaf, RAND, AUTN, XRES, and the AAuF key parameter includes Kseaf.
  • Kseaf is determined by AUSF according to the key parameters in 5G AKA or EAP AKA'.
  • Kseaf, RAND, AUTN, and XRES corresponding to the 5G AKA authentication method correspond to EAP AKA' Kseaf, RAND, AUTN and XRES are fundamentally different.
  • the AUSF determines the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter, determines the first security parameter, and sends the security parameters and the first indication corresponding to the authentication mode to AMF/SEAF.
  • UDM determines the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter, and determines the first security parameter, and sends the security parameter corresponding to the authentication method and the first security parameter to AMF/SEAF through AUSF. Instructions. Then, AMF/SEAF sends the first security parameter and the first indication to AAuF.
  • AAuF can determine the AAPF key according to the AAPF key parameter, and determine the push information according to the first security parameter, and send the push information and the AAPF key to AAPF, and AAPF sends the terminal Send push messages.
  • AMF/SEAF operations, AUSF operations, AAuF operations, AAPF operations, and terminal operations can refer to the above description of key negotiation based on the network architecture shown in FIG. 2a, and will not be repeated.
  • the difference from the foregoing embodiments is that AUSF or AMF/SEAF has already saved the security context of the terminal.
  • the application server sends push information to the terminal, it also needs to inform the terminal that the security context of the terminal is saved, so that the terminal can determine the key.
  • the network architecture shown in Figure 2a there is a direct logical interface between AAuF and AUSF.
  • AUSF can determine the AAuF key according to the security context, and send push information to the terminal.
  • FIG. 4 a flowchart of a key agreement method provided by an embodiment of this application, the method may include the following steps:
  • AAPF sends a first request message to AAuF.
  • the first request message includes the identification of the terminal and the identification of AAPF.
  • the terminal identifier is used to determine the security context corresponding to the terminal identifier.
  • the first request message may also include other information, such as the key validity period and P-TID.
  • P-TID the key validity period
  • the AAPF logo can be optionally sent. At this time, AAuF can determine the identity of AAPF through the interface information between AAuF and AAPF.
  • the specific method for obtaining the identification of the key of AUSF, the identification of the key of AMF, and the identification of the key of SEAF are not limited, and is similar to the manner of obtaining the identification of the terminal and will not be repeated here.
  • AAuF sends a second request message to AUSF.
  • AAuF After receiving the first request message sent by AAPF, AAuF saves the AAPF identifier, key validity period and P-TID, and sends the terminal identifier to AUSF. For example, AAuF may send a second request message to AUSF, and the second request message includes the identification of the terminal.
  • the second request message may also include at least one item of other information, such as: AAuF server name, AUSF key identification, AMF key identification, SEAF key identification.
  • AUSF obtains the security context according to the identifier of the terminal.
  • the security context includes the key of AUSF and/or the identification of the key of AUSF.
  • the manner in which the AUSF obtains the security context according to the terminal identifier includes any one of the following. For example, if the terminal's identity is a permanent identity (such as SUPI, IMSI, etc.), AUSF can determine the security context according to the terminal's permanent identity. If the terminal's identity is a temporary identity (such as GUTI, TMSI, etc.), AUSF can send the terminal's temporary identity to AMF or UDM, requesting to return the terminal's permanent identity, and AUSF then determines the security context based on the terminal's permanent identity.
  • a permanent identity such as SUPI, IMSI, etc.
  • AUSF can determine the security context according to the terminal's permanent identity.
  • a temporary identity such as GUTI, TMSI, etc.
  • AUSF can send the terminal's temporary identity to AMF or UDM, requesting to return the terminal's permanent
  • the terminal's identity is an encapsulated identity (for example, SUCI)
  • it can request other network functions (Network Function, NF) (such as UDM or SIDF) to decrypt SUCI to obtain a permanent identity
  • NF Network Function
  • AUSF determines the security context based on the terminal’s permanent identity .
  • the specific AUSF determines the location of AMF or UDM without restrictions.
  • the identification of the terminal is a public identification (such as GPSI, IMPU, etc.), the AUSF can determine the network identification (or temporary identification) of the terminal according to the method of determining the identification of the terminal provided in the subsequent embodiments of this application.
  • the security context includes the AMF key and/or the identification of the AMF key.
  • the security context includes the key of the SEAF and/or the identification of the key of the SEAF.
  • the manner in which the AUSF obtains the security context according to the terminal identifier includes any one of the following.
  • the terminal’s identity is a permanent identity (such as SUPI, IMSI, etc.) or a temporary identity (such as GUTI, TMSI, etc.)
  • AUSF can send the terminal’s permanent identity or temporary identity to the AMF (or SEAF), requesting to return the terminal’s AMF
  • AMF or SEAF
  • the terminal's identity is an encapsulated identity (for example, SUCI)
  • it can request other NFs (such as UDM or SIDF) to decrypt SUCI to obtain a permanent identity, and AUSF then requests AMF (or SEAF) to determine the security context based on the terminal's permanent identity.
  • NFs such as UDM or SIDF
  • AMF or SEAF
  • the authentication of the corresponding terminal is triggered, which can be AKMA authentication or an authentication method pushed by AKMA, which is not limited by this application.
  • the manner of AKMA pushing can refer to the implementation manners shown in Fig. 3, Fig. 3a, and Fig. 3b, which will not be repeated.
  • the AMF may first determine the security context, and then determine the key of the AUSF according to the identification of the key of the received AUSF. Or check whether the key identifier of the AUSF in the security context is consistent with the key identifier of the received AUSF. If they are consistent, the AUSF key identified by the AUSF key is finally determined. If they are inconsistent, the terminal is determined to be different from the AUSF key saved by AUSF, and the rejection process is triggered, and the rejection response is optionally sent to AAuF; the optional trigger for terminal authentication can be AKMA authentication or the authentication method pushed by AKMA.
  • the application is not limited.
  • the manner of AKMA pushing can refer to the implementation manners shown in Fig. 3, Fig. 3a, and Fig. 3b, which will not be repeated.
  • the AUSF can first determine the security context, and then determine the AMF key according to the received AMF key identifier. Or check whether the key identifier of the AMF in the security context is consistent with the key identifier of the received AMF. If they are consistent, the AMF key corresponding to the AMF key identifier is finally determined. If they are inconsistent, the AMF key saved by the terminal and the AMF is determined to be different, the rejection process is triggered, and the rejection response is optionally sent to AAuF; the optional trigger for terminal authentication can be AKMA authentication or the authentication method pushed by AKMA.
  • the application is not limited.
  • the manner of AKMA pushing can refer to the implementation manners shown in Fig. 3, Fig. 3a, and Fig. 3b, which will not be repeated. It is also possible that the AUSF sends the terminal's identity (the terminal's temporary identity or the terminal's permanent identity) and the received AMF key's identity to the corresponding AMF at the same time.
  • the AMF first determines the security context according to the terminal, and then according to the received AMF The identification of the key determines the key of the AMF. Or check whether the key identifier of the AMF in the security context is consistent with the key identifier of the received AMF. If they are consistent, the AMF key corresponding to the AMF key identifier is finally determined, and the AMF key is sent to AUSF.
  • AUSF AUSF triggers the rejection process, optionally sending a rejection response to AAuF; optionally triggering the authentication of the terminal, It can be AKMA authentication or the authentication method pushed by AKMA, which is not limited by this application.
  • the AUSF receives the identification of the SEAF key, it can first determine the security context, and then determine the SEAF key according to the received SEAF key identification. Or check whether the identification of the SEAF key in the security context is consistent with the identification of the received SEAF key. If they are consistent, the SEAF key corresponding to the SEAF key identifier is finally determined. If they are inconsistent, the terminal is determined to be different from the SEAF key saved by SEAF, the rejection process is triggered, and the rejection response is optionally sent to AAuF; the optional trigger for terminal authentication can be AKMA authentication or the authentication method pushed by AKMA.
  • the application is not limited.
  • the manner of AKMA pushing can refer to the implementation manners shown in Fig. 3, Fig.
  • the AUSF simultaneously sends the terminal's identity (the terminal's temporary identity or the terminal's permanent identity) and the received SEAF key identity to the corresponding SEAF.
  • SEAF first determines the security context according to the terminal, and then according to the received SEAF The identification of the key determines the key of the SEAF. Or check whether the identification of the SEAF key in the security context is consistent with the identification of the received SEAF key. If they are consistent, the SEAF key corresponding to the SEAF key identifier is finally determined, and the SEAF key is sent to AUSF.
  • AUSF determines the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter.
  • the AUSF can generate the AAuF key (or Kakma) according to the security context, that is, the AAuF key parameter includes the security context.
  • the security context includes the key of AUSF, the key of AMF, or the key of SEAF
  • AUSF can generate the key of AAuF (or Kakma) according to the key of AUSF, the key of AMF, or the key of SEAF.
  • the AAuF key parameter used to generate the AAuF key may also include at least one of the following parameters, such as: AAUF server name, AKMA indication, terminal identification, AMF key identification, AUSF key The identifier of the SEAF key, the first fresh parameter, and the first indication.
  • the first indication is used to indicate the security context corresponding to the terminal identifier.
  • AUSF may generate the AAUF key based on the AMF key corresponding to the AMF key identification .
  • AUSF may generate the key of AAUF based on the key of AUSF corresponding to the identifier of the key of AUSF.
  • AUSF may generate the AAUF key based on the SEAF key corresponding to the SEAF key identifier.
  • AUSF may determine that the first security parameter includes the AAuF key, and execute S405.
  • the first security parameter may also include the identification of the AMF key, the identification of the AUSF key, or the identification of the SEAF key, and S405 is executed.
  • AUSF sends the first security parameter to AAuF.
  • the AUSF After the AUSF obtains the first security parameter, it sends the first security parameter to the AAuF.
  • the AUSF may also send the first freshness parameter to the AAuF.
  • AUSF may also send a first indication to AAuF.
  • AAUF determines the AAPF key according to the AAPF key parameter, and determines the push information according to the first security parameter. For the specific manner of determining the AAPF key here, reference may be made to the foregoing embodiment.
  • AAuF After AAuF receives the first security parameter, AAuF can determine the key of AAPF according to the key of AAuF. Among them, the first security parameter includes the AAuF key.
  • the AAPF key parameter used to generate the AAPF key may include the AAuF key.
  • AAuF saves the key of AAuF.
  • the AAuF may be based on the identification of the AMF key
  • the AAUF key generated by the corresponding AMF key may be generated.
  • AAuF may generate the AAUF key based on the AUSF key corresponding to the AUSF key identifier.
  • the AAuF may generate the AAUF key based on the SEAF key corresponding to the SEAF key identifier. Then, AAuF determines the key of AAPF according to the key of AAuF.
  • AAuF can also determine the push information according to the AAuF key or the first instruction.
  • the push information may include the first indication.
  • AAuF can also randomly select RAND, temporary identifier, AAPF identifier, key validity period, and message authentication code (MAC).
  • the push information may also include at least one of the following parameters, such as: AMF key identification, AUSF key identification, SEAF key identification, RAND, temporary identification, AAPF identification, key validity period, MAC, The first fresh parameter and the second fresh parameter.
  • MAC is the integrity protection for all the above push information.
  • the integrity protection key may be a key derived from the AAPF-based key.
  • the integrity protection algorithm can be a pre-negotiated algorithm or an algorithm selected by AAuF.
  • the push information may also include the identification of the algorithm to facilitate notification of the identification of the algorithm to the terminal.
  • the temporary identifier may also be sent by AAPF to AAuF, which is an identifier of the terminal and is not limited.
  • AAuF may determine the authentication mode according to the format of the first security parameter. For example, there is no restriction on whether it does not contain RAND, AUTN, or contains a key identification.
  • AAuF sends push information and the AAPF key to AAPF.
  • AAPF sends push information to the terminal.
  • the AAPF After the AAPF receives the push information sent by AAuF and the AAPF key, it sends the push information to the terminal and saves the AAPF key.
  • the push information please refer to S405, which will not be repeated.
  • S409 The terminal determines the AAuF key parameter according to the first instruction, and determines the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter.
  • the terminal After the terminal receives the push information sent by AAPF, the terminal determines according to the first instruction that it needs to use the existing security context to generate the AAuF key. For example, first determine the key of AUSF, and determine the key of AAuF according to the key of AUSF. Or, determine the key of AMF, and determine the key of AAuF according to the key of AMF. Or, determine the key of SEAF, and determine the key of AAuF according to the key of SEAF.
  • the specific derivation method for generating the AAuF key is the same as the way AUSF generates the AAuF key.
  • the push information includes the identification of the key of AMF, the identification of the key of AUSF, or the identification of the key of SEAF.
  • the terminal can generate the AAUF key based on the AMF key corresponding to the AMF key identifier. If the identifier of the AMF key saved by the terminal is inconsistent with the identifier of the received AMF key, it is determined that the AMF key saved by the terminal and the AMF is different, the procedure is rejected, and a rejection indication or rejection response is optionally sent to AAPF.
  • the terminal may generate the AAUF key based on the AUSF key corresponding to the AUSF key identifier. If the identification of the AUSF key saved by the terminal is inconsistent with the identification of the received AUSF key, it is determined that the AMF key saved by the terminal is different from the AMF key saved by the AUSF, and the procedure is rejected, optionally sending a rejection indication or rejection response to AAPF.
  • the terminal may generate the AAUF key based on the SEAF key corresponding to the SEAF key identifier. If the identification of the SEAF key saved by the terminal is inconsistent with the identification of the received SEAF key, it is determined that the terminal is different from the SEAF key saved by the SEAF, and the procedure is rejected, optionally sending a rejection indication or rejection response to AAPF.
  • the terminal determines the AAPF key according to the AAPF key parameter.
  • the terminal determines the AAPF key according to the AAuF key.
  • the AAPF key parameter used to generate the AAPF key includes the AAuF key.
  • the specific method of generating the AAPF key is the same as the method of generating the AAPF key by AAuF. You can refer to the detailed description in the above steps, and will not be repeated.
  • the terminal when the terminal generates the AAuF key and the AAPF key, other parameters that need to be used can be sent to the terminal by other network elements through messages such as push information, or stored by the terminal itself. I limited it.
  • the key agreement method provided in this application can send push information to the terminal based on the existing key structure of the 5G network, and a first instruction is added to the push information to indicate the security context of the terminal, so that the terminal can complete according to the first instruction
  • the verification of the push information, and the key to generate the key of AAuF and the key of AAPF can be realized without authentication between the application server and the terminal, and all network elements can obtain the key to encrypt the message, which effectively reduces the length of authentication and key negotiation, and reduces the AAPF sending to the terminal
  • the message delay is also longer.
  • AAuF For the network architecture shown in Figure 2b, there is a direct logical interface between AAuF and UDM.
  • the difference from using the security context for key negotiation based on the network architecture shown in Figure 2a is that after the AAuF receives the first request message sent by AAPF, it sends a second request message to the UDM.
  • the second request message includes the terminal’s Logo.
  • UDM obtains the security context according to the identification of the terminal.
  • the security context can include at least one of CK', IK', AUSF key, Kamf and Kseaf.
  • UDM can determine the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter, and the AAuF key parameter includes security Context. And UDM determines that the first security parameter includes the AAuF key.
  • UDM sends the first security parameter and the first indication to AAuF.
  • AAuF can determine the AAPF key according to the AAPF key parameter, and determine the push information according to the first security parameter, and send the push information and the AAPF key to AAPF, and AAPF sends the terminal Send push messages.
  • UDM operations, AAuF operations, AAPF operations, and terminal operations reference may be made to the above-mentioned related explanations of key negotiation based on the network architecture shown in FIG. 2a, which will not be repeated.
  • the AAuF receives the first request message sent by AAPF, it sends a second request message to SEAF.
  • the second request message includes the terminal’s logo.
  • the SEAF obtains the security context according to the terminal identifier.
  • the security context may include at least one of Kamf and Kseaf.
  • the SEAF may determine the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter, and the AAuF key parameter includes the security context. And SEAF determines that the first security parameter includes the AAuF key.
  • SEAF sends the first security parameter and the first indication to AAuF.
  • AAuF can determine the AAPF key according to the AAPF key parameter, and determine the push information according to the first security parameter, and send the push information and the AAPF key to AAPF, and AAPF sends the terminal Send push messages.
  • specific explanations on the operation of SEAF, AAuF, AAPF, and terminal operation can be referred to the above-mentioned related explanations of key negotiation based on the network architecture shown in FIG. 2a, and will not be repeated.
  • the above SEAF can also be replaced by AMF, which is executed by AMF.
  • the AMF or SEAF can also send the AMF or SEAF key identifier to the AAuF.
  • the operation of AAuF here is the same as that described in the embodiment in FIG. 4.
  • the difference from the foregoing embodiments is that if the terminal has already accessed the 5G network. At this time, the push information can be directly sent to the terminal through a non-access stratum (NAS) message.
  • NAS non-access stratum
  • FIG. 5 it is a flowchart of a key agreement method provided by an embodiment of this application. The method may include the following steps:
  • AAPF sends a first request message to AAuF.
  • the first request message includes the identification of the terminal and the identification of AAPF.
  • the terminal identifier is used to determine the security context corresponding to the terminal identifier.
  • the first request message may also include other information, such as the key validity period, P-TID, temporary identification, and AAPF address.
  • P-TID key validity period
  • AAPF address temporary identification
  • AAuF sends a second request message to AUSF.
  • AAuF After receiving the first request message sent by AAPF, AAuF saves the AAPF identifier. Optionally save at least one of the key validity period, P-TID, temporary identification and AAPF address, and send the terminal identification to AUSF. For example, AAuF may send a second request message to AUSF.
  • the second request message includes the identification of the terminal, the identification of the AAPF, the key validity period and the temporary identification.
  • the second request message may also include other information, such as the name of the AAuF server.
  • AUSF determines that the terminal has been registered to the network according to the terminal's identity.
  • the AUSF can send the identification of the terminal to the UDM, and the UDM feeds back an indication of whether the terminal is registered to the network to the AUSF. If the terminal is not registered to the network, the authentication of the corresponding terminal is triggered, which can be AKMA authentication or AKMA push, which is not limited by this application.
  • AKMA authentication method refer to the embodiment corresponding to FIG. 3.
  • AUSF obtains the security context according to the identifier of the terminal.
  • the security context includes the key of AUSF and/or the identification of the key of AUSF.
  • the security context includes the AMF key and/or the identification of the AMF key.
  • the security context includes the key of the SEAF and/or the identification of the key of the SEAF.
  • AUSF determines the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter.
  • the AUSF can generate the AAuF key (or Kakma) according to the security context, that is, the AAuF key parameter includes the security context.
  • the security context includes the key of AUSF, the key of AMF, or the key of SEAF
  • AUSF can generate the key of AAuF (or Kakma) according to the key of AUSF, the key of AMF, or the key of SEAF.
  • the specific generation method refer to the corresponding embodiment in FIG. 3, which will not be repeated.
  • AUSF may determine that the first security parameter includes the AAuF key, and execute S506.
  • the first security parameter may also include the identification of the AMF key, the identification of the AUSF key, or the identification of the SEAF key, and S506 is executed.
  • AUSF sends the first security parameter to AAuF.
  • the AUSF After the AUSF obtains the first security parameter, it sends the first security parameter to the AAuF.
  • the AUSF may also send the first freshness parameter to the AAuF.
  • AUSF can also send the address of the terminal to AAuF.
  • the address of the terminal can be obtained from AMF, UDM or SEAF by AUSF.
  • AUSF may send a request message to AMF, UDM, or SMF.
  • the request message includes the identification of the terminal, and a response message containing the address of the terminal is obtained.
  • AAUF determines the AAPF key according to the AAPF key parameter.
  • AAuF After AAuF receives the first security parameter, AAuF can determine the key of AAPF according to the key of AAuF. Among them, the first security parameter includes the AAuF key. AAuF saves the AAuF key, and the AAPF key parameter includes the AAuF key.
  • the AAPF key parameter used to generate the AAPF key may further include at least one of the following parameters, such as: the AAPF identifier and the second fresh parameter.
  • AAUF sends the AAPF key to AAPF.
  • AAuF can also send the address of the terminal to AAPF. After AAPF receives the AAPF key, it saves the AAPF key.
  • AUSF sends push information to AMF/SEAF.
  • the push information may include the first indication, temporary identification, AAPF identification, and key validity period.
  • the first indication is used to indicate the security context corresponding to the terminal identifier.
  • the push information may also include at least one of the following parameters, such as the address of AAPF.
  • the AMF/SEAF sends push information to the terminal.
  • AMF/SEAF After the AMF/SEAF receives the push information sent by AUSF, it sends the push information to the terminal.
  • the push information please refer to S509, which will not be repeated.
  • AMF/SEAF can send push information to the terminal through a paging message or a downlink NAS message.
  • the terminal determines the AAuF key parameter according to the first instruction, and determines the AAuF key according to the AAuF key parameter.
  • the terminal After the terminal receives the push information sent by AAPF, the terminal determines according to the first instruction that it needs to use the existing security context to generate the AAuF key. For example, first determine the key of AUSF, and determine the key of AAuF according to the key of AUSF. Or, determine the key of AMF, and determine the key of AAuF according to the key of AMF. Or, determine the key of SEAF, and determine the key of AAuF according to the key of SEAF.
  • the specific derivation method for generating the AAuF key is the same as the way AUSF generates the AAuF key.
  • the terminal can be based on the AMF key identification corresponding to the AMF key.
  • the key of the AAUF generated by the key.
  • the terminal may generate the AAUF key based on the AUSF key corresponding to the AUSF key identifier.
  • the terminal may generate the AAUF key based on the SEAF key corresponding to the SEAF key identifier.
  • the push information includes the identification of the key of AMF, the identification of the key of AUSF, or the identification of the key of SEAF.
  • the terminal can generate the AAUF key based on the AMF key corresponding to the AMF key identifier. If the identifier of the AMF key saved by the terminal is inconsistent with the identifier of the received AMF key, it is determined that the AMF key saved by the terminal is different from the AMF key, and the procedure is rejected, optionally sending a rejection indication or rejection response to AMF/ SEAF.
  • the terminal may generate the AAUF key based on the AUSF key corresponding to the AUSF key identifier. If the identification of the AUSF key saved by the terminal is inconsistent with the identification of the received AUSF key, it is determined that the AMF key saved by the terminal is different from the AMF key saved by the AUSF, and the procedure is rejected, optionally sending a rejection indication or rejection response to AMF/ SEAF.
  • the terminal may generate the AAUF key based on the SEAF key corresponding to the SEAF key identifier. If the ID of the SEAF key saved by the terminal is inconsistent with the ID of the received SEAF key, it is determined that the terminal is different from the SEAF key saved by the SEAF, and the procedure is rejected. Optionally, a rejection indication or rejection response is sent to AMF/ SEAF.
  • S512 The terminal determines the AAPF key according to the AAPF key parameter.
  • the terminal determines the AAPF key according to the AAuF key.
  • the AAPF key parameter used to generate the AAPF key includes the AAuF key.
  • the specific method of generating the AAPF key is the same as the method of generating the AAPF key by AAuF. You can refer to the detailed description in the above steps, and will not be repeated.
  • the other parameters that need to be used can be that after AAuF calculates the AAPF key, the derived other parameters are sent to AMF/SEAF through AUSF. It can also be sent to the terminal by other network elements through messages such as push information, or it can be stored by the terminal itself, which is not limited.
  • AUSF directly generates the AAuF key and the AAPF key, and directly sends the AAuF key and the AAPF key to AAuF, so that AAuF sends the AAPF key to AAPF.
  • the key agreement method provided in this application can be based on the existing key architecture of the 5G network, and send push information to the terminal through a NAS message, indicating the security context of the terminal, so that the terminal can complete the verification of the push information according to the first instruction. And the key to generate the key of AAuF and the key of AAPF. Therefore, key agreement can be realized without authentication between the application server and the terminal, and all network elements can obtain the key to encrypt the message, which effectively reduces the length of authentication and key negotiation, and reduces the AAPF sending to the terminal The message delay is also longer.
  • AUSF determines that the terminal has been registered to the network according to the terminal's identity, the same as when the method shown in Figure 3 above is applied to the scenario shown in Figure 2a, AUSF obtains the AAuF key according to the terminal's identity, and AAuF according to the AAPF secret
  • the key parameter determines the AAPF key
  • the push information is determined according to the first security parameter.
  • AAuF directly sends push information to AMF or SEAF
  • AMF or SEAF directly sends push information to the terminal.
  • AAuF interacts with AUSF through AMF/SEAF.
  • AMF/SEAF sends a second request message to AMF/SEAF, where the second request message includes the identifier of the terminal.
  • AMF/SEAF sends a second request message to AUSF.
  • the AUSF sends the first security parameter and the first indication to the AAuF through AMF/SEAF.
  • the AMF/SEAF determines whether the terminal is registered to the network according to the identification of the terminal. For example, it can be retrieved locally according to the terminal's identity, or request UDM to obtain the current registration status of the terminal. If the terminal has registered to the network, the AMF/SEAF can obtain Kamf or Kseaf from the previous (old) AMF/SEAF, or locally store Kamf or Kseaf.
  • the old AMF refers to the AMF that has served the terminal before, which can be determined by the identification of the terminal.
  • the temporary identification of the terminal may include the location information of the old AMF.
  • AMF/SEAF generates AAuF keys based on Kamf or Kseaf, and the method of generation is similar to that of AUSF-based keys to generate AAuF keys. Then, the AMF/SEAF sends push information to the terminal.
  • the push information includes the temporary identifier, the AAPF identifier, and the key validity period.
  • AMF/SEAF can send push information to the terminal through paging messages and downlink NAS messages.
  • AAPF does not send the P-TID to AAUF, and the P-TID is determined by AAUF and then sent to AAPF.
  • AAPF does not send the temporary identifier to AAUF, and the temporary identifier is determined by AAUF and then sent to AAPF.
  • AAPF does not send the key validity period to AAUF, and the AAUF determines the key validity period before sending it to AAPF.
  • AAPF does not send the AAPF identifier to AAUF, and AAUF determines the AAPF identifier according to the interface information between AAUF and AAPF.
  • AAPF there is a logical interface between the terminal and the AAPF, which may communicate directly, or there may be multiple connection modes, such as interaction with AAPF through AMF/SEAF, etc., without limitation.
  • each functional entity first derives the key, and each functional entity saves its own key, and then sends an indication message to the terminal, indicating the rules for deriving the key, so that the terminal can derive the key according to the indication message
  • the key is used to obtain the key of each functional entity, thereby enabling each functional entity and the terminal to complete key negotiation.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a flowchart of a key agreement method, which explains the instruction message forwarding process and the key agreement process through the interaction process between the network element and the terminal.
  • the method may include the following steps:
  • the second network element sends a first request message to the first network element, where the first request message includes the identifier of the terminal.
  • the first request message may also include other information, such as: AAPF identification, key validity period, and P-TID.
  • the first network element receives the first request message sent by the second network element.
  • the first network element After receiving the first request message sent by the second network element, the first network element can obtain the identity of the terminal.
  • the first network may obtain the first key through the identification of the terminal, and the first key may be a key held by the first network element.
  • the first key can be Kaauf.
  • the first key can be obtained from the third network element, and S603 to S606 are executed.
  • the first network element sends a second request message to the third network element, where the second request message includes the identifier of the terminal.
  • the second request message may also include other information, such as the name of the AAuF server.
  • the third network element receives the second request message sent by the first network element.
  • the third network element determines the first key according to the identity of the terminal.
  • the third network element After receiving the first request message sent by the first network element, the third network element can obtain the identification of the terminal, obtain the third key according to the identification of the terminal, and derive the first key according to the third key.
  • the third key may be a key held by the third network element.
  • the third key can be Kausf, or it can be CK' and IK'.
  • the parameters for deriving the first key may also include the name of the AAuF server, the first freshness parameter, the AKMA indication, the identification of the terminal, the first indication, RAND, AUTN, XRES, etc. For details, reference may be made to the description of the foregoing embodiments.
  • the third network element sends the first key and the first instruction to the first network element.
  • the first indication is used to indicate the authentication method and/or the security context corresponding to the terminal identifier.
  • the authentication method can be 5G AKA authentication or EAP AKA' authentication.
  • the first network element receives the first key and the first instruction sent by the third network element.
  • the first network element derives the second key according to the first key.
  • the first network element may derive the second key according to the first key.
  • the second key may be a key held by the second network element.
  • the second key can be Kaapf.
  • the parameters for deriving the second key may also include at least one of AAPF identification, AAuF server name, second freshness parameter, AKMA indication, terminal identification, first indication, RAND, AUTN and XRES. For details, reference may be made to the description of the foregoing embodiments.
  • the first network element sends the first indication and the second key to the second network element.
  • the second network element receives the first indication and the second key sent by the first network element.
  • the second network element sends a first instruction to the terminal.
  • S612 The terminal receives the first instruction sent by the second network element.
  • the terminal determines the third key according to the first instruction.
  • the terminal After receiving the first instruction, the terminal can determine the authentication method according to the first instruction, and then use the verification method corresponding to the authentication method to verify the correctness of the pushed RAND and AUTN. If the verification is successful, the third key (such as Kausf, or CK' and IK') is determined. Perform S614 and S615.
  • the third key such as Kausf, or CK' and IK'
  • the terminal derives the first key according to the third key.
  • the terminal derives the second key according to the first key.
  • the name of the message between each network element or the name of each parameter in the message in the embodiment of the present application is just an example, and other names may also be used in specific implementation, and this application does not specifically limit this.
  • the foregoing first network element may be AAuF
  • the second network element may be AAPF
  • the third network element may be AUSF.
  • the methods provided by the embodiments of the present application are introduced from the perspectives of network elements, terminals, and interaction between the network elements and the terminals.
  • each network element such as the first network element, the second network element, the third network element, and the terminal, in order to realize the functions in the method provided in the above embodiments of the present application, the first network element and the second network element ,
  • the third network element and the terminal contain the corresponding hardware structure and/or software module for performing each function.
  • the present application can be implemented in the form of hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a certain function is executed by hardware or computer software-driven hardware depends on the specific application and design constraint conditions of the technical solution. Professionals and technicians can use different methods for each specific application to implement the described functions, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
  • the embodiment of the present application can divide the first network element, the second network element, the third network element, and the terminal into functional modules according to the foregoing method examples.
  • each functional module can be divided corresponding to each function, or two or two More than one function is integrated in one processing module.
  • the above-mentioned integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware or software functional modules. It should be noted that the division of modules in the embodiments of the present application is illustrative, and is only a logical function division, and there may be other division methods in actual implementation.
  • FIG. 7 shows a schematic diagram of a possible composition of the communication device involved in the foregoing and embodiments, and the communication device can execute any method in the method embodiments of the present application. The steps performed by the first network element, the second network element, the third network element, or the terminal in the embodiment.
  • the communication device may include: a receiving unit 701, a sending unit 702, and a processing unit 703.
  • the communication device When the communication device is the first network element or a communication device that supports the first network element to implement the method provided in the embodiment, for example, the communication device may be a chip system.
  • the receiving unit 701 is configured to support the communication device to execute the method described in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the receiving unit 701 is used to execute or support the communication device to execute the identification of the receiving terminal in the key agreement method shown in FIG. 3, FIG. 3a, FIG. 3b, FIG. 4, FIG. 5, and FIG. Instructions and steps related to the first key. For example, S602 and S607 in the method shown in FIG. 6.
  • the sending unit 702 is used to execute or support the communication device to execute S302 and S306 in the method shown in FIG. 3, S302 and S306 in the method shown in FIG. 3a, and S302 and S306 in the method shown in FIG. 3b.
  • S402 and S407 in the method shown in 4 S502 and S508 in the method shown in FIG. 5, and S603 and S609 in the method shown in FIG.
  • the processing unit 703 is configured to perform or support the communication device to perform S305 in the method shown in FIG. 3, S305 in the method shown in FIG. 3a, S305 in the method shown in FIG. 3b, and in the method shown in FIG. S406, S507 in the method shown in FIG. 5, and S608 in the method shown in FIG. 6.
  • the communication device When the communication device is a second network element or a communication device that supports the second network element to implement the method provided in the embodiment, for example, the communication device may be a chip system.
  • the receiving unit 701 is configured to support the communication device to execute the method described in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the receiving unit 701 is configured to execute or support the communication device to perform the receiving first instruction and second instruction in the key agreement method shown in FIG. 3, FIG. 3a, FIG. 3b, FIG. 4, FIG. 5, and FIG.
  • the steps related to the key For example, S610 in the method shown in FIG. 6.
  • the sending unit 702 is used to perform or support the communication device to perform S301 in the method shown in FIG. 3, S301 in the method shown in FIG. 3a, S301 in the method shown in FIG. 3b, and in the method shown in FIG. S401, S501 in the method shown in FIG. 5, and S601 in the method shown in FIG. 6.
  • the communication device When the communication device is a third network element or a communication device that supports the third network element to implement the method provided in the embodiment, for example, the communication device may be a chip system.
  • the receiving unit 701 is configured to support the communication device to execute the method described in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the receiving unit 701 is configured to execute or support the communication device to perform the correlation of receiving the second request message in the key agreement method shown in FIG. 3, FIG. 3a, FIG. 3b, FIG. 4, FIG. 5, and FIG. step.
  • the sending unit 702 is configured to perform or support the communication device to perform S304 in the method shown in FIG. 3, S304 in the method shown in FIG. 3a, S304 in the method shown in FIG. 3b, and in the method shown in FIG. S405, S506 in the method shown in FIG. 5, and S606 in the method shown in FIG.
  • the processing unit 703 is configured to perform or support the communication device to perform S303 in the method shown in FIG. 3, S3034 in the method shown in FIG. 3a, S403 and S404 in the method shown in FIG. S503 to S505 in the method, and S605 in the method shown in FIG. 6.
  • the communication device When the communication device is a terminal or a communication device that supports the terminal to implement the method provided in the embodiment, for example, the communication device may be a chip system.
  • the receiving unit 701 is configured to support the communication device to execute the method described in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the receiving unit 701 is configured to execute or support the communication device to perform the relevant steps of receiving the first indication in the key agreement method shown in FIG. 3, FIG. 3a, FIG. 3b, FIG. 4, FIG. 5, and FIG. .
  • the processing unit 703 is configured to perform or support the communication device to perform S308 and S309 in the method shown in FIG. 3, S308 and S309 in the method shown in FIG. 3a, and S308 and S309 in the method shown in FIG. 3b.
  • S409 and S410 in the method shown in 4 S511 to S512 in the method shown in FIG. 5, and S613 to S615 in the method shown in FIG.
  • the communication device provided in the embodiment of the present application is used to execute the method of any of the foregoing embodiments, and therefore can achieve the same effect as the method of the foregoing embodiment.
  • a communication device 800 provided in an embodiment of this application is used to implement the function of the first network element in the foregoing method.
  • the communication device 800 may be a first network element or a device in the first network element.
  • the communication device 800 may be a chip system.
  • the chip system may be composed of chips, or may include chips and other discrete devices.
  • the communication device 800 is used to implement the function of the second network element in the foregoing method.
  • the communication device 800 may be a second network element or a device in the second network element.
  • the communication device 800 may be a chip system.
  • the chip system may be composed of chips, or may include chips and other discrete devices.
  • the communication device 800 is used to implement the function of the third network element in the foregoing method.
  • the communication device 800 may be a third network element or a device in the third network element.
  • the communication device 800 may be a chip system.
  • the chip system may be composed of chips, or may include chips and other discrete devices.
  • the communication device 800 is used to implement the function of the terminal in the foregoing method.
  • the communication device 800 may be a terminal or a device in the terminal.
  • the communication device 800 may be a chip system.
  • the chip system may be composed of chips, or may include chips and other discrete devices.
  • the communication device 800 includes at least one processor 801, configured to implement the functions of the first network element, the second network element, the third network element, or the terminal in the method provided in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the processor 801 may be used for the first instruction to determine the third key, to derive the first key from the third key, and to derive the second key from the first key, etc.
  • the method example The detailed description in, will not be repeated here.
  • the communication device 800 may also include at least one memory 802 for storing program instructions and/or data.
  • the memory 802 is coupled with the processor 801.
  • the coupling in the embodiments of the present application is an indirect coupling or communication connection between devices, units, or modules, and may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms, and is used for information exchange between devices, units or modules.
  • the processor 801 may cooperate with the memory 802 to operate.
  • the processor 801 may execute program instructions stored in the memory 802. At least one of the at least one memory may be included in the processor.
  • the communication device 800 may further include a communication interface 803 for communicating with other devices through a transmission medium, so that the device used in the communication device 800 can communicate with other devices.
  • a communication interface 803 for communicating with other devices through a transmission medium, so that the device used in the communication device 800 can communicate with other devices.
  • the communication device is AUSF
  • the other equipment is AMF/SEAF.
  • the communication device is a terminal
  • the other equipment is AAPF.
  • the processor 801 uses the communication interface 803 to send and receive data, and is used to implement the first network element, the second network element, and the third network element described in the embodiments corresponding to FIGS. 3, 3a, 3b, 4, 5, and 6 The method executed by the network element or terminal.
  • connection medium between the communication interface 803, the processor 801, and the memory 802 is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication interface 803, the processor 801, and the memory 802 are connected by a bus 804 in FIG. 8.
  • the bus is represented by a thick line in FIG. 8.
  • the connection modes between other components are only for schematic illustration. , Is not limited.
  • the bus can be divided into address bus, data bus, control bus, etc. For ease of presentation, only one thick line is used in FIG. 8 to represent, but it does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.
  • the processor may be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor, an application specific integrated circuit, a field programmable gate array or other programmable logic device, a discrete gate or transistor logic device, a discrete hardware component, and may implement or Perform the methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The steps of the method disclosed in the embodiments of the present application may be directly embodied as being executed and completed by a hardware processor, or executed and completed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the processor.
  • the memory may be a non-volatile memory, such as a hard disk drive (HDD) or a solid-state drive (SSD), etc., or a volatile memory (volatile memory), for example Random-access memory (random-access memory, RAM).
  • the memory is any other medium that can be used to carry or store desired program codes in the form of instructions or data structures and that can be accessed by a computer, but is not limited thereto.
  • the memory in the embodiments of the present application may also be a circuit or any other device capable of realizing a storage function, for storing program instructions and/or data.
  • the embodiment of the application also provides a method for determining the identity of a terminal.
  • the method includes: in a 5G network, the application server can use the public identity of the terminal to transmit user data, and the devices in the 5G core network can be based on the terminal’s
  • the public identification obtains the network identification of the terminal, and uses the network identification of the terminal for data transmission in the 5G core network. Therefore, it is possible to avoid leaking the network identity of the terminal, and effectively improve the security of user data.
  • the present invention can also be applied to future networks such as 6G and 7G.
  • NEF network exposure function
  • UDM unified data storage network elements
  • UDR unified data storage network elements
  • NEF exists between AAUF and AUSF, and NEF is connected to AAUF, UDM, AUSF and UDR respectively.
  • AAUF, AUSF, NEF and UDM/UDR can communicate with each other.
  • AMF/SEAF between AAUF and AUSF
  • AMF/SEAF is connected to AAUF, AUSF, UDM and UDR respectively.
  • AMF/SEAF, AAUF, AUSF and UDR can communicate with each other.
  • AMF/SEAF stands for SEAF or AMF, and SEAF can also be deployed inside AMF.
  • connection relationship between the various network elements shown in Figure 9a, Figure 9b, and Figure 9c is only a schematic illustration.
  • the network elements in the core network are based on the service architecture networking, and each network element exists
  • Some direct or indirect logical nodes do not rule out the possibility of other communication between each network element, or the way to communicate with the target NF through other network elements, such as AUSF accessing UDR through UDM, or NEF accessing UDR through UDM, etc.
  • AAUF may also be deployed inside other network elements, such as AUSF, NEF, AMF/SEAF, etc. without restrictions.
  • NEF can obtain information from the terminal according to the first identity of the terminal.
  • the UDM or UDR obtains the second identifier of the terminal.
  • the first identification of the terminal may refer to a public identification of the terminal (for example, an identification disclosed to an external third-party application), and the second identification of the terminal may refer to a network identification of the terminal.
  • FIG. 10 it is a flowchart of a method for determining the identity of a terminal according to an embodiment of this application.
  • the NEF obtains the second identifier of the terminal from the UDR according to the first identifier of the terminal as an example for description.
  • the method can include the following steps:
  • AAPF sends a first request message to AAUF.
  • AAUF sends a second request message to NEF.
  • NEF receives the second request message sent by AAUF.
  • AAUF may receive the first request message sent by AAPF.
  • the first request message and the second request message include the first identification of the terminal.
  • the first identifier of the terminal can be any of the following, for example: SUPI, or IMSI, or IMPI, or GUTI, or IMPU, or TMSI (such as: S-TMSI, or M-TMSI, or P-TMSI), or IMEI , GPSI, or SUCI, etc., or the first temporary identification, or external identification, are not restricted.
  • SUCI can be an encrypted encapsulation of SUPI.
  • the first temporary identifier here may be obtained by AAPF and used to identify the temporary identity of the terminal.
  • the first temporary identifier may be distributed during the network authentication process between the terminal and the device in the core network before, and subsequently sent by the terminal to AAPF; or sent by the device in the core network to AAPF.
  • the first temporary identity is used to indicate the identity of the terminal, and also includes at least one of the following information: random parameters, AAPF, AAUF, AMF/SEAF, and AUSF.
  • the random parameter is used to define the randomness of the temporary identity.
  • GUTI in this application does not limit specific systems and scenarios. For example, it may be 4G GUTI or 5G GUTI.
  • the above-mentioned external identifier may be an identity specifically defined for the terminal by the operator's network, which may be used by an external application (APP) without revealing the identity privacy of the terminal.
  • APP external application
  • the first request message may also include the address of AUSF, where the address information of AUSF can be distributed during the network authentication process between the terminal and the device in the core network, and then sent to AAPF by the subsequent terminal; or the device in the core network can send it to AAPF of. There is no restriction on how AAPF can obtain the address information of AUSF. At this time, AAuF sends a second request message to the AUSF address corresponding to the AUSF address.
  • the second request message may also include the address of AUSF, where the address information of AUSF can be distributed to AAuF during the network authentication process between the terminal and the device in the core network; or sent by the terminal to AAuF after authentication; or in the core network
  • the device is sent to AAUF.
  • the AAuF obtains the address of the AUSF from the first request message, or the AAuF stores the correspondence between the address of the AUSF and the identity of the terminal, and the AAuF determines the address of the AUSF according to the identity of the terminal.
  • the NEF sends the first identifier of the terminal to the UDR.
  • the UDR receives the first identifier of the terminal sent by the NEF.
  • the UDR after receiving the first identifier of the terminal sent by the NEF, the UDR can query the corresponding relationship between the terminal identifiers, and obtain the second identifier of the terminal corresponding to the first identifier of the terminal.
  • the terminal identifier correspondence relationship may be presented in the form of a table, that is, Table 1 presents the terminal identifier correspondence relationship.
  • Table 1 only illustrates the storage form of the terminal identification correspondence in the storage device in the form of a table, and does not limit the storage form of the terminal identification correspondence in the storage device.
  • the terminal identification correspondence is stored in the storage device.
  • the storage form in the device may also be stored in other forms, which is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the network element Before the network element obtains the second identifier of the corresponding terminal according to the first identifier of the terminal, the network element needs to first obtain the corresponding relationship between the terminal identifiers.
  • the corresponding relationship between the terminal identifiers is predefined.
  • the so-called pre-defined can be understood as pre-defined in the standard or agreement.
  • the network element needs to store the pre-defined terminal identification correspondence in advance. After the network element obtains the first identifier of the terminal, the corresponding relationship between the terminal identifiers can be obtained locally to determine the second identifier of the terminal.
  • the UDR sends the second identifier of the terminal to the NEF.
  • the NEF receives the second identifier of the terminal sent by the UDR.
  • the NEF sends the second identifier of the terminal to AUSF.
  • the first request message and the second request message do not include the address information of the AUSF, and the UDR may also feed back the address information of the AUSF to the NEF.
  • the AUSF corresponding to the AUSF address information fed back by the NEF to the UDR sends the second identifier of the terminal.
  • NEF performs verification. For example, NEF receives the address information of the first AUSF sent by the UDR. NEF can first determine whether the address information of the first AUSF and the address information of the second AUSF are the same. The address information of the second AUSF is different, and the NEF sends the second identifier of the terminal to the first AUSF.
  • the first AUSF here may refer to the AUSF that has previously communicated with the AAUF, or may be understood as the AUSF that has previously served the terminal.
  • the second AUSF can be found by AAUF.
  • the NEF may also send data to the first AUSF.
  • the first AUSF transmits data to AAUF, which can be transmitted through NEF.
  • NEF can also send the address information of the first AUSF to AAUF.
  • the NEF stores the terminal identifier correspondence relationship, and the terminal identifier correspondence relationship can be queried to obtain the second identifier of the terminal corresponding to the first identifier of the terminal.
  • the NEF may also store AUSF address information corresponding to the terminal identifier (first identifier or second identifier), and can query the AUSF address information corresponding to the terminal identifier.
  • NEF can also send a request to UDR to obtain the address information of AUSF, so that NEF can send data to AUSF.
  • the terminal identifier correspondence relationship can be queried to obtain the second identifier of the terminal corresponding to the first identifier of the terminal.
  • the NEF may also store AUSF address information corresponding to the terminal identifier (first identifier or second identifier), and can query the AUSF address information corresponding to the terminal identifier.
  • NEF can also send a request to UDR to obtain the address information of AUSF, so that NEF can send data to AUSF.
  • NEF can also be deployed inside AAuF, and all actions at this time are executed by AAuF.
  • the method for determining the identity of the terminal allows the application server to use the first identity of the terminal for user data transmission in the 5G network, and the device in the 5G core network can obtain the second identity of the terminal according to the first identity of the terminal. Identification, using the second identification of the terminal for data transmission in the 5G core network. Therefore, the leakage of the second identification of the terminal can be avoided, and the security of user data can be effectively improved.
  • the AMF/SEAF can be used according to the terminal
  • the first identifier of obtains the second identifier of the terminal from the UDM or UDR.
  • FIG. 11 it is a flowchart of a method for determining the identity of a terminal according to an embodiment of this application.
  • description will be made by taking the AMF/SEAF acquiring the second identifier of the terminal from the UDR according to the first identifier of the terminal as an example.
  • the method can include the following steps:
  • AAPF sends a first request message to AAUF.
  • AAUF sends a second request message to the first AMF/SEAF.
  • the first AMF/SEAF receives the second request message sent by the AAUF.
  • AAUF may receive the first request message sent by AAPF. Both the first request message and the second request message include the first identifier of the terminal. For the description of the first identifier of the terminal, refer to the foregoing embodiment. For other explanations of the first request message and the second request message, reference may be made to the explanations of the foregoing embodiments, and details are not repeated.
  • the first request message may also include the address of the AMF/SEAF, where the address information of the AMF/SEAF can be distributed during the network authentication process between the previous terminal and the device in the core network, and then sent to the AAPF by the subsequent terminal; or in the core network
  • the device is sent to AAPF.
  • AAPF sends a second request message to the address carrying AMF/SEAF in the first request message.
  • the second request message may also include the address of AMF/SEAF, where the address information of AMF/SEAF can be distributed to AAuF during the network authentication process between the terminal and the device in the core network; or the terminal sent to AAuF after authentication; Or the device in the core network sent to AAUF.
  • the AAuF obtains the address of the AMF/SEAF from the first request message, or the AAuF stores the correspondence between the address of the AMF/SEAFF and the identification of the terminal, and the AAuF determines the address of the AMF/SEAF according to the identification of the terminal.
  • the first AMF/SEAF sends the first identifier of the terminal to the UDR.
  • the first AMF/SEAF may send the first identifier of the terminal to the UDR through AUSF or NEF.
  • the first AMF/SEAF may send the first identifier of the terminal to the UDM through AUSF or NEF.
  • the first AMF/SEAF can access the UDR through UDM, and send the first identifier of the terminal to the UDR.
  • the UDR receives the first identifier of the terminal sent by the first AMF/SEAF.
  • the UDR after the UDR receives the first identifier of the terminal sent by the first AMF/SEAF, it can query the corresponding relationship between the terminal identifiers and obtain the second identifier of the terminal corresponding to the first identifier of the terminal.
  • the UDR after the UDR receives the first identifier of the terminal sent by the first AMF/SEAF, it can query the corresponding relationship between the terminal identifiers and obtain the second identifier of the terminal corresponding to the first identifier of the terminal.
  • the UDR sends the second identifier of the terminal to the first AMF/SEAF.
  • the first AMF/SEAF receives the second identifier of the terminal sent by the UDR.
  • the first AMF/SEAF sends the second identifier of the terminal to the second AMF/SEAF.
  • the UDR may also feed back specific AMF/SEAF address information or identification to the first AMF/SEAF.
  • the first AMF/SEAF can first determine whether the address information of the first AMF/SEAF and the address information of the second AMF/SEAF are the same.
  • the address information of the first AMF/SEAF is different from the address information of the second AMF/SEAF, the first AMF/SEAF triggers AMF redirection, that is, the first AMF/SEAF sends the address information of the second AMF/SEAF to AAUF, and AAUF sends
  • the second AMF/SEAF sends data.
  • the second AMF/SEAF here can be the AMF/SEAF that has previously communicated with AAUF, or it can be understood as the AMF/SEAF that has previously served the terminal.
  • the first AMF/SEAF can be found by AAUF.
  • the first AMF/SEAF may request the second AMF/SEAF so that the second AMF/SEAF sends the address information of the second AMF/SEAF to AAUF.
  • the first AMF/SEAF sends the second identifier of the terminal to the second AMF/SEAF.
  • the first AMF/SEAF sends the address information of AAuF to the second AMF/SEAF.
  • the first AMF/SEAF stores the terminal identifier correspondence relationship, and the terminal identifier correspondence relationship can be queried to obtain the second identifier of the terminal corresponding to the first identifier of the terminal.
  • the first AMF/SEAF may be the AMF/SEAF that has previously communicated with AAUF, or it may be understood as the AMF/SEAF that has previously served the terminal. Further, the first AMF/SEAF may also send a request to the UDR to obtain the address information of the second AMF/SEAF. For other specific explanations, please refer to the above explanations, so I won’t repeat them.
  • the first AMF/SEAF sends the second identifier of the terminal to the AUSF.
  • the first AMF/SEAF also stores AUSF address information corresponding to the terminal identifier.
  • UDR returns the address information of AUSF to the first AMF/SEAF.
  • the first AMF/SEAF can determine AUSF.
  • the method for determining the identity of the terminal allows the application server to use the first identity of the terminal for user data transmission in the 5G network, and the device in the 5G core network can obtain the second identity of the terminal according to the first identity of the terminal. Identification, using the second identification of the terminal for data transmission in the 5G core network. Therefore, the leakage of the second identification of the terminal can be avoided, and the security of user data can be effectively improved.
  • the difference from the second possible design is that the executive body is different, that is, AMF/SEAF can be replaced with AUSF.
  • the first AUSF can request the second AUSF to feed back the key of the AUSF.
  • the UDR described in the foregoing embodiments can also be replaced with UDM to perform UDR related steps.
  • an embodiment of the present application also provides a flowchart of a key agreement method, which explains the process of determining the identity of the terminal through the interaction process between network elements. As shown in Figure 12, the method may include the following steps:
  • the second network element sends a first request message to the first network element.
  • the first network element receives a second request message sent by the second network element.
  • the first network element sends a second request message to the first NF.
  • Both the first request message and the second request message include the first identifier of the terminal.
  • first request message and the second request message include the first identifier of the terminal.
  • the first NF sends the first identifier of the terminal to the fourth network element.
  • the fourth network element receives the first identifier of the terminal sent by the first NF.
  • the fourth network element may query the corresponding relationship between the terminal identifiers, and obtain the second identifier of the terminal corresponding to the first identifier of the terminal.
  • the fourth network element sends the second identifier of the terminal to the first NF.
  • the first NF receives the second identifier of the terminal sent by the fourth network element.
  • the first NF sends the second identity of the terminal to the second NF.
  • the first NF receives the address information of the second NF sent by the fourth network element. If the address information of the first NF is different from the address information of the second NF, the first NF sends the address information of the second NF to the first network element.
  • the address information of the first NF is different from the address information of the second NF
  • the first NF sends the address information of the second NF to the first network element.
  • the name of the message between each network element or the name of each parameter in the message in the embodiment of the present application is just an example, and other names may also be used in specific implementation, and this application does not specifically limit this.
  • the foregoing first network element may be AAUF
  • the second network element may be AAPF
  • the fourth network element may be UDR or UDM.
  • the method for determining the identity of the terminal provided in the embodiments of the present application is introduced from the perspective of interaction between network elements and network elements. It is understandable that each network element, such as the first NF and the fourth network element, in order to implement the functions in the method provided in the above embodiments of the present application, the first NF and the fourth network element include corresponding hardware structures for performing each function And/or software modules.
  • the present application can be implemented in the form of hardware or a combination of hardware and computer software. Whether a certain function is executed by hardware or computer software-driven hardware depends on the specific application and design constraint conditions of the technical solution. Professionals and technicians can use different methods for each specific application to implement the described functions, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
  • the embodiment of the present application can divide the first NF and the fourth network element into functional modules according to the above method examples.
  • each functional module can be divided corresponding to each function, or two or more functions can be integrated into one process.
  • the above-mentioned integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware or software functional modules. It should be noted that the division of modules in the embodiments of the present application is illustrative, and is only a logical function division, and there may be other division methods in actual implementation.
  • FIG. 13 shows a schematic diagram of a possible composition of the communication device involved in the above and the embodiment, and the communication device can execute any method in the method embodiments of this application.
  • the communication device may include: a receiving unit 1301, a sending unit 1302, and a processing unit 1303.
  • the communication device When the communication device is the first NF or a communication device that supports the first NF to implement the method provided in the embodiment, for example, the communication device may be a chip system.
  • the receiving unit 1301 is used to support the communication device to execute the method described in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the receiving unit 1301 is configured to perform or support the communication device to perform the correlation between the first identifier of the receiving terminal and the second identifier of the terminal in the method for determining the terminal identifier shown in FIG. 10, FIG. 11, and FIG. step.
  • S1003 and S1007 in the method shown in FIG. 10 S1103 and S1107 in the method shown in FIG. 11, and S1203 and S1207 in the method shown in FIG.
  • the sending unit 1302 is used to execute or support the communication device to execute S1004 and S1008 in the method shown in FIG. 10, S1104 and S1108 in the method shown in FIG. 11, and S1204 and S1208 in the method shown in FIG.
  • the communication device When the communication device is a fourth network element or a communication device that supports the fourth network element to implement the method provided in the embodiment, for example, the communication device may be a chip system.
  • the receiving unit 1301 is used to support the communication device to execute the method described in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the receiving unit 1301 is configured to perform or support the communication device to perform the correlation between the first identifier of the receiving terminal and the second identifier of the terminal in the method for determining the terminal identifier shown in FIG. 10, FIG. 11, and FIG. step.
  • S1005 in the method shown in FIG. 10 S1105 in the method shown in FIG. 11, and S1205 in the method shown in FIG.
  • the sending unit 1302 is configured to perform or support the communication device to perform S1006 in the method shown in FIG. 10, S1106 in the method shown in FIG. 11, and S1206 in the method shown in FIG.
  • the communication device may further include a processing unit 1303, which is configured to determine the second identity of the terminal according to the first identity of the terminal.
  • the communication device provided in the embodiment of the present application is used to execute the method of any of the foregoing embodiments, and therefore can achieve the same effect as the method of the foregoing embodiment.
  • a communication device 1400 provided in an embodiment of the application is used to implement the function of the first NF in the foregoing method.
  • the communication device 1400 may be the first NF or a device in the first NF.
  • the communication device 1400 may be a chip system.
  • the chip system may be composed of chips, or may include chips and other discrete devices.
  • the communication device 1400 is configured to implement the function of the fourth network element in the foregoing method.
  • the communication device 1400 may be a fourth network element or a device in the fourth network element.
  • the communication device 1400 may be a chip system.
  • the chip system may be composed of chips, or may include chips and other discrete devices.
  • the communication device 1400 includes at least one processor 1401, configured to implement the function of the first NF or the fourth network element in the method provided in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the processor 1401 may be configured to determine the second identifier of the terminal and so on according to the first identifier of the terminal. For details, refer to the detailed description in the method example, which will not be repeated here.
  • the communication device 1400 may further include at least one memory 1402 for storing program instructions and/or data.
  • the memory 1402 is coupled with the processor 1401.
  • the coupling in the embodiments of the present application is an indirect coupling or communication connection between devices, units, or modules, and may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms, and is used for information exchange between devices, units or modules.
  • the processor 1401 may cooperate with the memory 1402 to operate.
  • the processor 1401 may execute program instructions stored in the memory 1402. At least one of the at least one memory may be included in the processor.
  • the communication device 1400 may further include a communication interface 1403 for communicating with other devices through a transmission medium, so that the device used in the communication device 1400 can communicate with other devices.
  • a communication interface 1403 for communicating with other devices through a transmission medium, so that the device used in the communication device 1400 can communicate with other devices.
  • the communication device is AUSF or AMF/SEAF
  • the other device is AAUF.
  • the processor 1401 uses the communication interface 1403 to send and receive data, and is used to implement the relevant steps of receiving the first identification of the terminal and the second identification of the terminal in the methods for determining the identification of the terminal shown in FIG. 10, FIG. 11, and FIG.
  • connection medium between the communication interface 1403, the processor 1401, and the memory 1402 is not limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the communication interface 1403, the processor 1401, and the memory 1402 are connected by a bus 1404 in FIG. 14.
  • the bus is represented by a thick line in FIG. 14.
  • the connection mode between other components is only for schematic illustration. , Is not limited.
  • the bus can be divided into address bus, data bus, control bus, etc. For ease of representation, only one thick line is used in FIG. 14, but it does not mean that there is only one bus or one type of bus.
  • the processor may be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor, an application specific integrated circuit, a field programmable gate array or other programmable logic device, a discrete gate or transistor logic device, a discrete hardware component, and may implement or Perform the methods, steps, and logic block diagrams disclosed in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or any conventional processor. The steps of the method disclosed in the embodiments of the present application may be directly embodied as being executed and completed by a hardware processor, or executed and completed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the processor.
  • the memory may be a non-volatile memory, such as a hard disk drive (HDD) or a solid-state drive (SSD), etc., or a volatile memory (volatile memory), for example Random-access memory (random-access memory, RAM).
  • the memory is any other medium that can be used to carry or store desired program codes in the form of instructions or data structures and that can be accessed by a computer, but is not limited thereto.
  • the memory in the embodiments of the present application may also be a circuit or any other device capable of realizing a storage function, for storing program instructions and/or data.
  • the disclosed device and method may be implemented in other ways.
  • the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative.
  • the division of the modules or units is only a logical function division.
  • there may be other division methods for example, multiple units or components may be It can be combined or integrated into another device, or some features can be omitted or not implemented.
  • the displayed or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.
  • the units described as separate parts may or may not be physically separate.
  • the parts displayed as units may be one physical unit or multiple physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or they may be distributed to multiple different places. . Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the objectives of the solutions of the embodiments.
  • each unit in each embodiment of the present application may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit.
  • the above-mentioned integrated unit can be implemented in the form of hardware or software functional unit.
  • the methods provided in the embodiments of the present application may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof.
  • software When implemented by software, it can be implemented in the form of a computer program product in whole or in part.
  • the computer program product includes one or more computer instructions.
  • the computer may be a general-purpose computer, a special-purpose computer, a computer network, a network device, a terminal, or other programmable devices.
  • the computer instructions may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium or transmitted from one computer-readable storage medium to another computer-readable storage medium. For example, the computer instructions may be transmitted from a website, computer, server, or data center.
  • the computer-readable storage medium may be any available medium that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server or data center integrated with one or more available media.
  • the usable medium may be a magnetic medium (for example, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape), an optical medium (for example, a digital video disc (digital video disc, DVD)), or a semiconductor medium (for example, SSD).

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Abstract

本申请实施例公开了一种密钥协商方法及装置，涉及通信领域，解决了如何向终端推送密钥的问题。具体方案为：在第一网元接收到第二网元发送的终端的标识之后，将终端的标识转发给第三网元，第三网元根据终端的标识确定第一密钥，第一密钥是第三网元根据第三密钥推衍得到的。在第一网元接收到第一指示和第一密钥后，根据第一密钥推衍第二密钥，并向第二网元发送第一指示和第二密钥，在第二网元接收到第一指示后，将第一指示转发给终端，终端接收到第一指示后，根据第一指示确定第三密钥，以及根据第三密钥推衍第一密钥和根据第一密钥推衍第二密钥。

Description

一种密钥协商方法及装置
本申请要求于2019年04月28日提交国家知识产权局、申请号为201910350544.3、申请名称为“一种密钥协商方法及装置”的中国专利申请的优先权，本申请还要求于2019年08月01日提交国家知识产权局、申请号为201910708652.3、申请名称为“一种密钥协商方法及装置”的中国专利申请的优先权，这些申请的全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本申请涉及通信领域，尤其涉及一种密钥协商方法及装置。
背景技术
随着无线通信技术的快速发展，第五代(the fifth generation，5G)移动通信网络(简称5G网络)应运而生，在5G网络中，为了保证数据的安全，终端可以采用针对应用的认证和密钥管理(Authentication and Key Management for Applications，AKMA)方法与服务器进行相互认证和密钥协商。但是，服务器如何向终端推送(push)密钥，目前还没有具体的方案。
发明内容
本申请提供一种密钥协商方法及装置，解决了如何向终端推送密钥的问题。
为达到上述目的，本申请采用如下技术方案：
第一方面，本申请提供了一种密钥协商方法，该方法可应用于第一网元，或者该方法可应用于可以支持第一网元实现该方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统，方法包括：在第一网元接收到第二网元发送的第一请求消息之后，通过发送第二请求消息接收第一指示，其中，第一请求消息包括终端的标识；第二请求消息包括终端的标识；第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或终端的标识对应的安全上下文。在第一网元接收到第一指示之后，向第二网元发送第一指示。
在一种可能的实现方式中，方法还包括：在第一网元接收到第一密钥之后，根据第一密钥推衍第二密钥；并向第二网元发送第二密钥。
第二方面，本申请提供了一种密钥协商方法，该方法可应用于第二网元，或者该方法可应用于可以支持第二网元实现该方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统，方法包括：第二网元向第一网元发送第一请求消息，接收到第一网元发送的第一指示之后，向终端发送第一指示。其中，第一请求消息包括终端的标识；第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或终端的标识对应的安全上下文。
在一种可能的实现方式中，方法还包括：第二网元接收第一网元发送的第二密钥，第二密钥是根据第一密钥推衍得到的。
第三方面，本申请提供了一种密钥协商方法，该方法可应用于第三网元，或者该方法可应用于可以支持第三网元实现该方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统，方法包括：第三网元接收到第一网元发送的第一请求消息之后，向第一网元发送 第一指示，其中，第一请求消息包括终端的标识；第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或终端的标识对应的安全上下文。
在一种可能的实现方式中，方法还包括：第三网元根据终端的标识确定第一密钥；以及向第一网元发送第一密钥。
进一步的，第三网元根据终端的标识确定第一密钥，包括：第三网元根据终端的标识获取第三密钥；第三网元根据第三密钥推衍第一密钥。
第四方面，本申请提供了一种密钥协商方法，该方法可应用于终端，或者该方法可应用于可以支持终端实现该方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统，方法包括：终端接收到第二网元发送的第一指示之后，根据第一指示确定第三密钥，以及根据第三密钥推衍第一密钥，和根据第一密钥推衍第二密钥。第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或终端的标识对应的安全上下文。
本申请提供的密钥协商方法，在5G网络中，应用服务器可以先与认证和密钥协商网元进行密钥协商，然后，向终端发送第一指示，终端根据第一指示确定密钥。实现了应用服务器与终端之间无需进行认证，便可以进行密钥协商，得到对消息进行加密的密钥，从而，有效地减少了认证和密钥协商的时长，也降低了应用服务器向终端发送消息的时延也较长。
第五方面，本申请还提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第一方面描述的方法。通信装置为第一网元或支持第一网元实现该第一方面描述的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统。例如，该通信装置包括：接收单元、发送单元和处理单元。所述接收单元，用于接收第二网元发送的第一请求消息，第一请求消息包括终端的标识；所述发送单元，用于发送第二请求消息，第二请求消息包括终端的标识；所述接收单元，还用于接收第一指示，第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或终端的标识对应的安全上下文；所述发送单元，还用于向第二网元发送第一指示。所述接收单元，还用于接收第一密钥；所述处理单元，用于根据第一密钥推衍第二密钥；所述发送单元，还用于向第二网元发送第二密钥。
可选地，具体推衍密钥的方法可以参考第一方面中相应的描述，这里不再赘述。
第六方面，本申请还提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第二方面描述的方法。通信装置为第二网元或支持第二网元实现该第二方面描述的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统。例如，该通信装置包括：接收单元、发送单元和处理单元。所述发送单元，用于向第一网元发送第一请求消息，第一请求消息包括终端的标识；所述接收单元，用于接收第一网元发送的第一指示，第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或终端的标识对应的安全上下文；所述发送单元，还用于向终端发送第一指示。所述接收单元，还用于接收第一网元发送的第二密钥，第二密钥是根据第一密钥推衍得到的。
可选地，具体推衍密钥的方法可以参考第二方面中相应的描述，这里不再赘述。
第七方面，本申请还提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第三方面描述的方法。通信装置为第三网元或支持第三网元实现该第三方面描述的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统。例如，该通信装置包括：接收单元、发送单元和处理单元。所述接收单元，用于接收第一网元发送的第一请求消息，第一请求消息包括终端的标 识；所述发送单元，用于向第一网元发送第一指示，第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或终端的标识对应的安全上下文。所述处理单元，用于根据终端的标识确定第一密钥；所述发送单元，还用于向第一网元发送第一密钥。所述处理单元，具体用于：根据终端的标识获取第三密钥；以及根据第三密钥推衍第一密钥。
可选地，具体推衍密钥的方法可以参考第三方面中相应的描述，这里不再赘述。
第八方面，本申请还提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第四方面描述的方法。通信装置为终端或支持终端实现该第四方面描述的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统。例如，该通信装置包括：接收单元、发送单元和处理单元。所述接收单元，用于接收第二网元发送的第一指示，第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或终端的标识对应的安全上下文；所述处理单元，用于根据第一指示确定第三密钥；所述处理单元，还用于根据第三密钥推衍第一密钥；所述处理单元，还用于根据第一密钥推衍第二密钥。
需要说明的是，上述第五方面和第八方面的功能模块可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块。例如，收发器，用于完成接收单元和发送单元的功能，处理器，用于完成处理单元的功能，存储器，用于处理器处理本申请的方法的程序指令。处理器、收发器和存储器通过总线连接并完成相互间的通信。具体的，可以参考第一方面所述的方法至第四方面所述的方法中的第一网元、第二网元、第三网元或终端的行为的功能。
第九方面，本申请还提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第一方面至第四方面描述的方法。通信装置为第一网元或支持第一网元实现该第一方面描述的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统，或者，通信装置为第二网元或支持第二网元实现该第二方面描述的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统，或通信装置为第三网元或支持第三网元实现该第三方面描述的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统，或通信装置为终端或支持终端实现该第四方面描述的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统。例如所述通信装置包括处理器，用于实现上述第一方面至第四方面描述的方法的功能。所述通信装置还可以包括存储器，用于存储程序指令和数据。所述存储器与所述处理器耦合，所述处理器可以调用并执行所述存储器中存储的程序指令，用于实现上述第一方面至第四方面描述的方法中的功能。所述通信装置还可以包括通信接口，所述通信接口用于该通信装置与其它设备进行通信。示例性地，若所述通信装置为第一网元，该其它设备为第二网元或第三网元。若所述通信装置为第二网元，该其它设备为终端。
在一种可能的设备中，该通信装置包括：通信接口，所述通信接口用于所述通信装置和其它装置进行通信。示例性地，该通信接口可以是收发器，收发器用于收发第一指示。存储器，用于存储程序指令。处理器，用于根据第一指示确定第三密钥，以及根据第三密钥推衍第一密钥，根据第一密钥推衍第二密钥。
可选地，具体推衍密钥的方法可以参考第一方面至第四方面中相应的描述，这里不再赘述。
第十方面，本申请还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，包括：计算机软件指令；当计算机软件指令在通信装置或内置在通信装置的芯片中运行时，使得通信装置执行 上述第一方面至第四方面中任一方面所述的密钥协商方法。
第十一方面，本申请还提供了一种包含指令的计算机程序产品，当计算机程序产品在通信装置或内置在通信装置的芯片中运行时，使得通信装置执行上述第一方面至第四方面中任一方面所述的密钥协商方法。
第十二方面，本申请提供了一种芯片系统，该芯片系统包括处理器，还可以包括存储器，用于实现上述方法中第一网元、第二网元、第三网元或终端的功能。该芯片系统可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其他分立器件。
第十三方面，本申请还提供了一种通信系统，所述通信系统包括第五方面描述的第一网元或支持第一网元实现该第一方面描述的方法的通信装置，以及第六方面描述的第二网元或支持第二网元实现该第二方面描述的方法的通信装置，第七方面描述的第三网元或支持第三网元实现该第三方面描述的方法的通信装置，第八方面描述的终端或支持终端实现该第四方面描述的方法的通信装置；
或所述通信系统包括第九方面描述的第一网元或支持第一网元实现该第一方面描述的方法的通信装置，以及第九方面描述的第二网元或支持第二网元实现该第二方面描述的方法的通信装置，第九方面描述的第三网元或支持第三网元实现该第三方面描述的方法的通信装置，第九方面描述的终端或支持终端实现该第四方面描述的方法的通信装置。
另外，上述任意方面的设计方式所带来的技术效果可参见第一方面至第四方面中不同设计方式所带来的技术效果，此处不再赘述。
本申请中，第一网元、第二网元、第三网元、终端和通信装置的名字对设备本身不构成限定，在实际实现中，这些设备可以以其他名称出现。只要各个设备的功能和本申请类似，属于本申请权利要求及其等同技术的范围之内。
上述各个方面中，第二网元向第一网元发送的第一请求消息包含了终端的标识，该终端的标识通常是5G的核心网络中使用的终端的第二标识。在这种情况下，终端的第二标识存在泄漏的风险，导致用户数据泄漏，降低了用户数据的安全性。为了解决该问题，本申请实施例提供了以下确定终端的标识的方法。
第十四方面，本申请还提供了一种确定终端的标识的方法，该方法可应用于第一网络功能(Network Function，NF)，或者该方法可应用于可以支持第一NF实现该方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统，方法包括：在第一NF接收到第一网元发送的包括终端的第一标识的第一请求消息后，第一NF向第四网元发送终端的第一标识，接收第四网元发送的终端的第二标识；第一NF向第二NF发送终端的第二标识。
本申请提供的确定终端的标识的方法，在5G网络中，可以使应用服务器使用终端的第一标识进行用户数据传输，5G的核心网络中的设备可以根据终端的第一标识获取终端的第二标识，在5G的核心网络内使用终端的第二标识进行数据传输。从而，能够避免泄漏终端的第二标识，有效地提高用户数据的安全性。
在一种可能的设计中，方法还包括：第一NF接收第四网元发送的第二NF的地址信息；若第一NF的地址信息与第二NF的地址信息不同，第一NF向第一网元发送第二NF的地址信息。
第十五方面，本申请还提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第十四方面描述的方法。通信装置为第一NF或支持第一NF实现该第一方面描述的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统。例如，该通信装置包括：接收单元和发送单元。所述接收单元，用于接收第一网元发送的第一请求消息，第一请求消息包括终端的第一标识；所述发送单元，用于向第四网元发送终端的第一标识；所述接收单元，还用于接收第四网元发送的终端的第二标识；所述发送单元，还用于向第二NF发送终端的第二标识。
在一种可能的设计中，所述接收单元，还用于接收第四网元发送的第二NF的地址信息；若第一NF的地址信息与第二NF的地址信息不同，所述发送单元，还用于向第一网元发送第二NF的地址信息。
需要说明的是，上述第十五方面的功能模块可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块。例如，收发器，用于完成接收单元和发送单元的功能，处理器，用于完成处理单元的功能，存储器，用于处理器处理本申请的方法的程序指令。处理器、收发器和存储器通过总线连接并完成相互间的通信。具体的，可以参考第十四方面所述的方法中的第一NF的行为的功能。
第十六方面，本申请还提供了一种通信装置，用于实现上述第十四方面描述的方法。通信装置为第一NF或支持第一NF实现该第十四方面描述的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置包括芯片系统。例如所述通信装置包括处理器，用于实现上述第十四方面描述的方法的功能。所述通信装置还可以包括存储器，用于存储程序指令和数据。所述存储器与所述处理器耦合，所述处理器可以调用并执行所述存储器中存储的程序指令，用于实现上述第十四方面描述的方法中的功能。所述通信装置还可以包括通信接口，所述通信接口用于该通信装置与其它设备进行通信。示例性地，若所述通信装置为第一NF，该其它设备为第一网元。
在一种可能的设备中，该通信装置包括：通信接口，所述通信接口用于所述通信装置和其它装置进行通信。示例性地，该通信接口可以是收发器，收发器用于收发第一请求消息。存储器，用于存储程序指令。
可选地，具体确定终端的标识的方法可以参考第十四方面中相应的描述，这里不再赘述。
第十七方面，本申请还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，包括：计算机软件指令；当计算机软件指令在通信装置或内置在通信装置的芯片中运行时，使得通信装置执行上述第十四方面所述的确定终端的标识的方法。
第十八方面，本申请还提供了一种包含指令的计算机程序产品，当计算机程序产品在通信装置或内置在通信装置的芯片中运行时，使得通信装置执行上述第十四方面所述的确定终端的标识的方法。
第十九方面，本申请提供了一种芯片系统，该芯片系统包括处理器，还可以包括存储器，用于实现上述方法中第一NF的功能。该芯片系统可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其他分立器件。
另外，上述任意方面的设计方式所带来的技术效果可参见第十四方面中不同设计 方式所带来的技术效果，此处不再赘述。
本申请中，第一网元、第一NF和通信装置的名字对设备本身不构成限定，在实际实现中，这些设备可以以其他名称出现。只要各个设备的功能和本申请类似，属于本申请权利要求及其等同技术的范围之内。
附图说明
图1为本申请提供的一种通信网络的架构示例图一；
图2a为本申请提供的一种通信网络的架构示例图二；
图2b为本申请提供的一种通信网络的架构示例图三；
图2c为本申请提供的一种通信网络的架构示例图四；
图3为本申请提供的一种密钥协商方法的流程图一；
图3a为本申请提供的一种密钥协商方法的流程图二；
图3b为本申请提供的一种密钥协商方法的流程图三；
图4为本申请提供的一种密钥协商方法的流程图四；
图5为本申请提供的一种密钥协商方法的流程图五；
图6为本申请提供的一种密钥协商方法的流程图六；
图7为本申请提供的一种通信装置的组成示例图一；
图8为本申请提供的一种通信装置的组成示例图二；
图9a为本申请提供的一种通信网络的架构示例图五；
图9b为本申请提供的一种通信网络的架构示例图六；
图9c为本申请提供的一种通信网络的架构示例图七；
图10为本申请提供的一种确定终端的标识的方法的流程图一；
图11为本申请提供的一种确定终端的标识的方法的流程图二；
图12为本申请提供的一种确定终端的标识的方法的流程图三；
图13为本申请提供的一种通信装置的组成示例图三；
图14为本申请提供的一种通信装置的组成示例图四。
具体实施方式
本申请说明书和权利要求书及上述附图中的术语“第一”、“第二”和“第三”等是用于区别不同对象，而不是用于限定特定顺序。
在本申请实施例中，“示例性的”或者“例如”等词用于表示作例子、例证或说明。本申请实施例中被描述为“示例性的”或者“例如”的任何实施例或设计方案不应被解释为比其它实施例或设计方案更优选或更具优势。确切而言，使用“示例性的”或者“例如”等词旨在以具体方式呈现相关概念。
多个”是指两个或两个以上，其它量词与之类似。“和/或”描述关联对象的关联关系，表示可以存在三种关系，例如，A和/或B，可以表示：单独存在A，同时存在A和B，单独存在B这三种情况。此外，对于单数形式“a”，“an”和“the”出现的元素(element)，除非上下文另有明确规定，否则其不意味着“一个或仅一个”，而是意味着“一个或多于一个”。例如，“a device”意味着对一个或多个这样的device。再者，至少一个(at least one of).......”意味着后续关联对象中的一个或任意组合，例如“A、B和C中的至少一个”包括A，B，C，AB，AC，BC，或ABC。
移动通信技术已经深刻地改变了人们的生活，但人们对更高性能的移动通信技术的追求从未停止。为了应对未来爆炸性的移动数据流量增长、海量移动通信的设备连接、不断涌现的各类新业务和应用场景，5G移动通信系统应运而生。
本申请提供的技术方案可以应用于图1所示通信网络，该网络可以为5G网络。如图1所示，该网络可以包括：至少一个终端101、网络设备102、接入和移动性管理网元103、认证和密钥协商网元104、数据管理网元105和应用服务器106。其中，接入和移动性管理网元103、认证和密钥协商网元104、数据管理网元105可以是位于核心网中的设备。终端可以通过无线的方式与网络设备和应用服务器相连，网络设备可以通过无线或有线方式与核心网中的设备连接。核心网中的设备与网络设备可以是独立的不同的物理设备，也可以是将核心网设备的功能与网络设备的逻辑功能集成在同一个物理设备上，还可以是一个物理设备上集成了部分核心网设备的功能和部分的网络设备的功能。终端可以是固定位置的，也可以是可移动的。需要说明的是，图1所示网络架构仅为示例性架构图，虽然未示出，但除图1所示网络功能外，图1所示网络还可以包括其他功能，如：计费网元(如：计费控制功能(Charge Function，CHF))、无线中继设备和无线回传设备等。本申请的实施例对该通信系统中包括的终端、网络设备和应用服务器的数量不做限定。
其中，终端101可以为用户设备(User Equipment，UE)，还可以为各种具有无线或者有线通信功能的手持设备、车载设备、可穿戴设备、计算设备或连接到无线调制解调器的其它处理设备；还可以包括用户单元(subscriber unit)、蜂窝电话(cellular phone)、智能电话(smart phone)、无线数据卡、个人数字助理(Personal Digital Assistant，PDA)电脑、平板型电脑、无线调制解调器(modem)、手持设备(handheld)、膝上型电脑(laptop computer)、无绳电话(cordless phone)或者无线本地环路(Wireless Local Loop，WLL)台、机器类型通信(Machine Type Communication，MTC)终端、移动台(Mobile Station，MS)等，不予限制。
网络设备102可以是无线通信的基站(base station，BS)、基站控制器或演进型基站(eNodeB)等。也可以称为无线接入点，收发站，中继站，小区，发送接收点(transmit and receive port，TRP)等等。具体的，网络设备是一种部署在无线接入网中用以为终端设备提供无线通信功能的装置，其主要功能包括如下一个或多个功能：进行无线资源的管理、互联网协议(internet protocol，IP)头的压缩及用户数据流的加密、用户设备附着时进行移动管理实体(mobility management entity，MME)的选择、路由用户面数据至服务网关(service gateway，SGW)、寻呼消息的组织和发送、广播消息的组织和发送、以移动性或调度为目的的测量及测量报告的配置等等。网络设备可以包括各种形式的蜂窝基站、家庭基站、小区、无线传输点、宏基站、微基站、中继站、无线接入点等等。在采用不同的无线接入技术的系统中，具备网络设备功能的设备的名称可能会有所不同。例如，在5G NR系统中，称为5G基站(generation Node B，gNB)等等。随着通信技术的演进，网络设备的名称可能会变化。此外，在其它可能的情况下，网络设备可以是其它为终端设备提供无线通信功能的装置。网络设备102也可能为其他具体有线网络功能的接入网设备。本申请的实施例对网络设备所采用的具体技术和具体设备形态不做限定。为方便描述，本申请实施例中，为终端提供无线 通信功能的装置或有线通信功能的装置称为网络设备。
网络设备和终端设备可以部署在陆地上，包括室内或室外、手持或车载；也可以部署在水面上；还可以部署在空中的飞机、气球和卫星上。本申请的实施例对网络设备和终端设备的应用场景不做限定。
网络设备和终端设备之间以及终端设备和终端设备之间可以通过授权频谱(licensed spectrum)进行通信，也可以通过免授权频谱(unlicensed spectrum)进行通信，也可以同时通过授权频谱和免授权频谱进行通信。本申请的实施例对网络设备和终端设备之间所使用的频谱资源不做限定。
接入和移动性管理网元103主要实现对终端的接入控制和移动性管理功能，还可以用于对终端进行认证和密钥推衍，保护终端的身份信息(如终端的用户永久标识(Subscription Permanent Identifier，SUPI)等)。具体的，该接入和移动性管理网元可以为接入和移动管理功能(Access and Mobility Management Function，AMF)和安全锚点功能(Security Anchor Functionality，SEAF)。这里AMF与SEAF也可以独立部署，在认证的流程中，AMF通过SEAF与AUSF进行通信。
认证和密钥协商网元104主要用于对终端进行认证和密钥推衍。具体的，该认证和密钥协商网元可以包括针对应用的认证和密钥管理认证功能(Authentication and Key Management for Applications Authentication Function，AAuF)和认证服务器功能(Authentication Server Function，AUSF)。需要说明的是，AAuF和AUSF可以是独立的不同的物理设备，也可以是将AAuF与AUSF的逻辑功能集成在同一个物理设备上，还可以是一个物理设备上集成了部分AUSF的功能和部分的AUSF的功能，本申请对此不作限定。
数据管理网元105主要用于保存终端签约的数据、安全参数(或者称为认证向量)、注册信息、订阅信息、群组信息等相关信息。具体的，该数据管理网元可以为统一数据管理(unified data management，UDM)。在本申请中，安全参数也可以称为认证向量(authentication vector，AV)。
应用服务器106主要用于为终端提供应用服务。具体的，该应用服务器可以为AKMA应用功能(AKMA Application Function，AApF)。每个应用都可以有一个AApF，因此AAuF和终端可能与多个AApF进行连接交互。
需要说明的是，上述各架构中的网元名字只是一个示例，具体实现中网元名字可能为其他名字，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。下面以图1为5G网络，图1中的接入和移动性管理网元103为AMF/SEAF，认证和密钥协商网元104为AAuF和AUSF，数据管理网元105为UDM，应用服务器106为AApF为例，对本申请提供的密钥协商方法进行介绍。
AAuF可能与UDM、AUSF和AMF/SEAF都有接口。示例的，在第一种可能的连接方式中，如图2a所示，AAuF分别与AUSF和AApF连接，AUSF分别与UDM与AMF/SEAF连接。
在第二种可能的连接方式中，如图2b所示，AAuF分别与UDM和AApF连接，AUSF分别与UDM与AMF/SEAF连接。
在第三种可能的连接方式中，如图2c所示，AAuF分别与AMF/SEAF和AApF连 接，AUSF分别与UDM与AMF/SEAF连接。
需要说明的是，若AMF和SEAF部署在一个物理设备上，AUSF与AMF/SEAF连接可以理解为AUSF与一个物理设备相连。若AMF和SEAF部署在两个物理设备上，AUSF与AMF/SEAF连接可以理解为AUSF分别与AMF和SEAF相连。
同理，若AMF和SEAF部署在一个物理设备上，AAuF与AMF/SEAF连接可以理解为AAuF与一个物理设备相连。若AMF和SEAF部署在两个物理设备上，AAuF与AMF/SEAF连接可以理解为AAuF分别与AMF和SEAF相连。
AAuF可以从UDM、AUSF或AMF/SEAF获得对终端进行认证的相关的参数或者认证后的密钥，通过与UDM、AUSF或AMF/SEAF交互完成对于终端的认证和密钥协商。另外，终端还可以通过AAuF与AApF进行密钥协商。
目前，终端与核心网中的设备可以采用AKMA方法进行认证和密钥协商。具体的，终端需要先通过AMF/SEAF向UDM或AUSF发送认证请求，UDM或AUSF获得安全参数，终端与AAuF执行认证过程。认证成功后，AAuF向终端发送认证成功消息，认证成功消息可以包括密钥有效期(key lifetime，LT)和临时(temporary)标识(Identifier，ID)等。
但是，在AApF需要主动向终端发送消息时，如果AApF仍然采用AKMA方法先与AAuF、AUSF、AMF/SEAF和UDM等核心网中的设备和终端进行认证，然后，AApF与终端和AAuF进行密钥协商，AApF再根据协商后的密钥对需要发送的信息进行加密发送。在这种情况下，由于认证和密钥协商的时长较长，导致AApF向终端发送消息的时延也较长。因此，如何向终端直接推送密钥是一个亟待解决的问题。
本申请实施例提供一种密钥协商方法，所述方法包括：AAPF向AAuF发送第一请求消息，AAuF接收到AAPF发送的第一请求消息之后，发送第二请求消息。其中，第一请求消息包括终端的标识和AAPF的标识，终端的标识用于确定第一安全参数对应的认证方式和/或终端的标识对应的安全上下文；第二请求消息包括终端的标识。AUSF接收到AAuF发送的第二请求消息之后，根据终端的标识确定AAuF的密钥(Kaauf)，并向AAuF发送第一安全参数和第一指示。其中，第一安全参数包括AAuF的密钥，第一指示用于指示第一安全参数对应的认证方式和/或终端的标识对应的安全上下文。AAuF接收到第一安全参数和第一指示之后，根据AAPF密钥参数确定AAPF的密钥，以及根据第一安全参数确定推送信息，并向AAPF发送推送信息和AAPF的密钥。其中，AAPF密钥参数包括AAuF的密钥和AAPF的标识，推送信息包括第一指示。AAPF接收到AAuF发送的推送信息之后，向终端发送推送信息。终端接收到AAPF发送的推送信息之后，根据第一指示确定AAuF密钥参数，以及根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥，根据AAPF密钥参数确定AAPF的密钥。其中，AAuF密钥参数包括AUSF的密钥，或者，AAuF密钥参数包括加密密钥和完整性保护密钥，或者，AAuF密钥参数包括安全上下文；AAPF密钥参数包括AAuF的密钥。本申请提供的密钥协商方法，在5G网络中，应用服务器可以先与认证和密钥协商网元进行密钥协商，然后，向终端发送推送信息，终端根据推送信息确定密钥。实现了应用服务器与终端之间无需进行认证，便可以进行密钥协商，得到对消息进行加密的密钥，从而，有效地减少了认证和密钥协商的时长，也降低了AApF向终端发送消息的时延也 较长。
下面结合附图对本申请提供的密钥协商方法进行具体阐述。需要说明的是，本申请下述实施例中各个网元之间的消息名字或消息中各参数的名字等只是一个示例，具体实现中也可以是其他的名字，本申请对此不作具体限定。
在第一种可能的设计中，由于5G网络包括两种认证方式，即5G认证与密钥协商(Authentication and Key Agreement，AKA)和可扩展的身份验证协议(Extensible Authentication Protocol，EAP)AKA’，因此，对于两种不同的认证方式，AKMA的认证过程也可能不同。在应用服务器向终端发送推送信息时也需要告知终端具体采用了哪种认证方式，以便于终端确定密钥。对于图2a所示的网络架构，AAuF与AUSF之间存在直接的逻辑接口。在本申请提供的密钥协商方法应用于图2a所示的网络架构的场景下时，AAuF可以通过AUSF与UDM交互，确定认证方式。如图3所示，为本申请实施例提供的一种密钥协商方法的流程图，该方法可以包括以下步骤：
S301、AAPF向AAuF发送第一请求消息。
通常，AAPF与终端之间进行消息交互时，AAPF和终端需要利用密钥对发送的消息进行加密处理。因此，在AAPF向终端发送消息之前，AAPF需要与终端进行密钥协商。具体的，AAPF可以向AAuF发送第一请求消息，第一请求消息包括终端的标识和AAPF的标识。另外，对AAPF获取终端的标识的方法不作限定，可以是预先配置的，也可以是AAPF从应用层获取的，不予限定。AAPF的标识是可选发送的。
在本申请中，终端的标识可以是终端的用户永久标识(Subscription Permanent Identifier，SUPI)，或者终端的国际移动用户识别码(International Mobile Subscriber Identity，IMSI)，或者终端的IP多媒体私有标识(IP Multimedia Private Identity，IMPI)，或者终端的全球唯一临时标识(Globally Unique Temporary Identifier，GUTI)，或者终端的IP多媒体共有标识(IP Multimedia Public Identity，IMPU)，或者终端的临时移动用户标识符(Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity，TMSI)(如：系统架构演进临时移动用户标识符(S-TMSI)或者移动管理功能临时移动用户标识符(M-TMSI)或者分组域用户临时标识符(P-TMSI))，或者终端的国际移动台设备标识(International Mobile Station Equipment Identity，IMEI)，或者终端的用户密封标识(Subscription Concealed Identifier，SUCI)，或者广义的公共订阅ID(Generic Public Subscription Identifier，GPSI)等，不予限制。SUCI可以是对SUPI的加密封装。
第一请求消息还可以包括其他信息，如：AAPF的标识、密钥有效期、推送临时标识(Push Temporary Identifier，P-TID)。
S302、AAuF向AUSF发送第二请求消息。
AAuF接收到AAPF发送的第一请求消息之后，保存AAPF的标识、密钥有效期和P-TID，并且向AUSF发送终端的标识。例如，AAuF可以向AUSF发送第二请求消息，第二请求消息包括终端的标识。第二请求消息还可以包括其他信息，如：AAuF服务器名称(AAuF server name)。若第一请求消息未携带AApF的标识，AAuF也可以通过AAuF与AAPF的接口等信息确定AAPF的标识。
S303、AUSF根据终端的标识获取AAuF的密钥。
AUSF接收到AAuF发送的第二请求消息之后，可以根据终端的标识获取AAuF 的密钥。
在一种可能的实现方式中，AUSF可以根据终端的标识从UDM获取安全参数，根据安全参数确定AAuF的密钥。如图3a所示，S303可以包括以下详细步骤。
S3031、AUSF向UDM发送第三请求消息。
第三请求消息包括终端的标识。第三请求消息还可以包括其他信息，如：AAuF服务器名称。终端的标识用于生成第二安全参数或第三安全参数。例如，可以根据终端的标识对应的订阅信息确定生成第二安全参数或第三安全参数。订阅信息可以包括终端的根密钥信息等。UDM可以根据终端的根密钥信息确定第二安全参数或第三安全参数。还可以根据第二安全参数或第三安全参数确定的第一安全参数。第一安全参数也可以称为AKMA AV。
S3032、UDM确定认证方式和认证方式对应的安全参数。
UDM可以根据本地策略确定对所述终端的标识指示的终端进行认证的认证方式，具体的策略可以参考现有技术的阐述，不予赘述。在本申请中，认证方式可以是5G AKA认证方式或EAP AKA’认证方式。
5G AKA认证方式对应的安全参数可以是第二安全参数。在本申请中，第二安全参数也可以称为5G AKA AV。5G AKA AV包括AUSF的密钥(Kausf)、随机数(random number，RAND)、认证令牌(Authentication token，AUTN)和期望的用户响应(expected user response，XRES)。
EAP AKA’认证方式对应的安全参数可以是第三安全参数。在本申请中，第三安全参数也可以称为EAP AKA’AV。EAP AKA’AV包括加密密钥(Cipher Key，CK’)、完整性保护密钥(Integrity key，IK’)、RAND、AUTN和XRES。
S3033、UDM向AUSF发送认证方式对应的安全参数和第一指示。
第一指示可以用于指示第一安全参数对应的认证方式。第一安全参数可以是根据上述S3032中所述的第二安全参数或第三安全参数确定的，具体的如S3034的阐述。
S3034、AUSF根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥。
针对不同的认证方式对应的安全参数，AUSF确定AAuF的密钥的方式也可以不同。
例如，若第一指示指示5G AKA认证方式，认证方式对应的安全参数为5G AKA AV，AUSF可以根据AUSF的密钥生成AAuF的密钥(或Kakma)，即AAuF密钥参数包括AUSF的密钥。AUSF保存AUSF的密钥。
又例如，若第一指示指示EAP AKA’认证方式，认证方式对应的安全参数为EAP AKA’AV，AUSF可以根据CK’和IK’生成AAuF的密钥(或Kakma)，即AAUF密钥参数包括CK’和IK’。也可能AUSF首先根据CK’和IK’生成AUSF的密钥，再基于AUSF的密钥生成AAuF的密钥。这里生成AUSF的密钥可以基于已有技术，不做限制。
可选的，用于生成AAuF的密钥的AAuF密钥参数还可以包括以下参数中的至少一个，如：AAuF服务器名称、第一新鲜参数、AKMA指示、终端的标识、第一指示、RAND、AUTN、XRES。需要说明的是，AAuF服务器名称可以是AAuF发送给AUSF的，也可以是AUSF根据AUSF与AAuF的接口连接确定AAuF服务器名称，不予限 定。第一新鲜参数可以包括生成AAUF密钥的计数器，或者AUSF随机选的随机参数(nonce)。AUSF可以将第一新鲜参数发送给AAuF，以使AAuF可以通过其他消息发送给终端；最终，终端可以采用相同的参数推衍得到AAUF密钥。AKMA指示用于限定密钥用于AKMA场景。终端的标识可以为AApF发送的终端的标识，也可以为UDM根据AUSF发送的终端的标识确定的终端的永久标识，并返回给AUSF。
进一步的，AUSF可以确定第一安全参数包括AAuF的密钥、RAND、AUTN和XRES，执行S304。
需要说明的是，若UDM未向AUSF发送第一指示，AUSF可以根据认证向量的格式确定认证方式。例如，若UDM向AUSF发送的认证方式对应的安全参数为5G AKA AV，AUSF可以根据5G AKA AV的格式确定认证方式为5G AKA认证方式，AUSF可以根据AUSF的密钥生成AAuF的密钥。又例如，若UDM向AUSF发送的认证方式对应的安全参数为EAP AKA’AV，AUSF可以根据EAP AKA’AV的格式确定认证方式为EAP AKA’AV认证方式，AUSF可以根据CK’和IK’生成AAuF的密钥。
在另一种可能的实现方式中，AUSF可以从UDM获取AAuF的密钥。如图3b所示，S303可以包括以下详细步骤。
S3035、AUSF向UDM发送第三请求消息。
第三请求消息包括终端的标识。第三请求消息还可以包括其他信息，如：AAuF服务器名称。
S3036、UDM确定认证方式和认证方式对应的安全参数。
在本申请中，认证方式可以是5G AKA认证方式或EAP AKA’认证方式。5G AKA认证方式对应的安全参数可以是第二安全参数。EAP AKA’认证方式对应的安全参数可以是第三安全参数。关于认证方式、第二安全参数和第三安全参数的具体解释可以参考S3012的解释，不予赘述。
S3037、UDM根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥。
针对不同的认证方式对应的安全参数，UDM确定AAuF的密钥的方式也可以不同。
例如，若UDM确定的认证方式为5G AKA认证方式，认证方式对应的安全参数为5G AKA AV，UDM可以根据AUSF的密钥生成AAuF的密钥(或Kakma)，即AAuF密钥参数包括AUSF的密钥。
又例如，若UDM确定的认证方式为EAP AKA’认证方式，认证方式对应的安全参数为EAP AKA’AV，UDM可以根据CK’和IK’生成AAuF的密钥(或Kakma)，即AAuF密钥参数包括CK’和IK’。
也可能UDM直接生成第一安全参数(如AKMA AV)，其中，AKMA AV包括AAuF的密钥、RAND、AUTN和XRES。此时AAuF的密钥参数可以包括CK，IK或者终端的根密钥。这里CK和IK的生成方式也可以基于已有技术，不做限制。
需要说明的是，如果UDM直接生成第一安全参数，而不是通过5G AKA或者EAP AKA’生成的，此时的认证方式可以唯一的。此时不需要第一指示。UDM发送给AUSF的流程不包括第一指示。另外，AUSF发送给AAuF的流程，AAuF发送给AApF，以及AApF发送给终端的流程也都可以不包括第一指示。
可选的，用于生成AAuF的密钥的AAuF密钥参数还可以包括以下参数中的至少 一个，如：AAUF服务器名称、第一新鲜参数、AKMA指示、终端的标识、第一指示、RAND、AUTN和XRES。具体解释可以参考S3034中的解释，不予赘述。
进一步的，UDM可以确定第一安全参数包括AAuF的密钥、RAND、AUTN和XRES，执行S3038。
S3038、UDM向AUSF发送第一安全参数和第一指示。执行S304。
S304、AUSF向AAuF发送第一安全参数和第一指示。
在AUSF获取到第一安全参数和第一指示之后，将第一安全参数和第一指示转发给AAuF。可选的，在AUSF生成AAuF的密钥时，若AAuF密钥参数还包括第一新鲜参数，AUSF还可以向AAuF发送第一新鲜参数。
S305、AAuF根据AAPF密钥参数确定AAPF的密钥，以及根据第一安全参数确定推送信息。
在AAuF接收到第一安全参数之后，AAuF可以根据AAuF的密钥确定AAPF的密钥(Kaapf)。其中，第一安全参数包括AAuF的密钥、RAND、AUTN和XRES。用于生成AAPF的密钥的AAPF密钥参数可以包括AAuF的密钥。另外，AAuF保存AAuF的密钥。
可选的，用于生成AAPF的密钥的AAPF密钥参数还可以包括以下参数中的至少一个，如：AAPF的标识、AAuF服务器名称、第二新鲜参数、AKMA指示、终端的标识、第一指示、RAND、AUTN和XRES。需要说明的是，AAPF的标识可以是AAPF发送给AAuF的。第二新鲜参数可以包括生成AAPF密钥的计数器，或者AAuF随机选的随机参数。AAPF可以将第二新鲜参数发送给终端；最终，终端可以采用相同的参数推衍得到AAPF密钥。终端的标识可以为AApF从终端处终端的标识，也可以为从AUSF处接受到的终端的永久标识，此终端的永久标识为UDM根据AUSF发送的终端的标识确定的，并返回给AUSF。
另外，AAuF还可以根据第一安全参数确定推送信息。推送信息可以包括RAND、AUTN和第一指示。
可选的，推送信息还可以包括以下参数中的至少一个，如：AAPF的标识、密钥有效期、第一新鲜参数和第二新鲜参数。
需要说明的是，若AUSF未向AAuF发送第一指示，AAuF可以根据第一安全参数的格式确定认证方式。例如，可以根据5G AKA AV和EAP AKA’AV确定的第一安全参数包括的参数个数或者长度不同确定认证方式。或者，也可以根据EAP AKA’AV包括的AT_MAC等参数确定认证方式，若第一安全参数包括AT_MAC等参数，可以表明第一安全参数是根据EAP AKA’AV确定的，认证方式为EAP AKA’认证方式。或者，EAP AKA’AV采用了EAP packet包的格式，可以表明第一安全参数是根据EAP AKA’AV确定的，认证方式为EAP AKA’认证方式。
S306、AAuF向AAPF发送推送信息和AAPF的密钥。
S307、AAPF向终端发送推送信息。
AAPF接收到AAuF发送的推送信息和AAPF的密钥之后，向终端发送推送信息，并保存AAPF的密钥。关于推送信息的解释可以参考S305，不予赘述。
S308、终端根据第一指示确定认证方式，再确定AAuF密钥参数，以及根据AAuF 密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥。
终端接收到AAPF发送的推送信息之后，终端可以根据第一指示确定认证方式，再采用对应认证方式的校验方法校验RAND和AUTN的正确性。若校验成功，则终端可以根据已有方法得到AUSF的密钥，或者CK’和IK’。之后终端根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥。其中，AAuF密钥参数包括AUSF的密钥，或者，AAuF密钥参数包括CK’和IK’。具体确定AAuF密钥的推衍方式可以参考S3034和S3037。
S309、终端根据AAPF密钥参数确定AAPF的密钥。
例如，终端根据AAuF的密钥确定AAPF的密钥。用于生成AAPF的密钥的AAPF密钥参数包括AAuF的密钥。具体的生成AAuF密钥的方式与AUSF生成AAuF密钥的方式或者UDM生成AAuF密钥的方式相同；生成AAPF密钥的方式与AAuF生成AAPF密钥的方式相同，可以参考上述步骤中的详述，不予赘述。
需要说明的是，在终端生成AAuF的密钥和AAPF的密钥时，所需要使用的其他参数，可以是其他网元通过推送信息等消息发送给终端的，也可以是终端自己存储的，不予限定。
本申请提供的密钥协商方法，可以针对不同的认证方式生成AKMA AV，在推送信息内新增第一指示，指示生成AKMA AV的认证方式，以使终端可以根据第一指示完成推送信息的校验，以及生成AAuF的密钥和AAPF的密钥。从而，应用服务器与终端之间无需进行认证，就可以实现密钥协商，所有网元可以得到对消息进行加密的密钥，有效地减少了认证和密钥协商的时长，降低了AApF向终端发送消息的时延也较长。
对于图2b所示的网络架构，AAuF与UDM之间存在直接的逻辑接口。与基于上述图2a所示的网络架构进行密钥协商的不同点在于，在AAuF接收到AAPF发送的第一请求消息之后，向UDM发送第二请求消息，第二请求消息包括终端的标识。UDM确定认证方式和认证方式对应的安全参数之后，根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥，并确定第一安全参数包括AAuF的密钥、RAND、AUTN和XRES。或者，UDM确定认证方式和认证方式对应的安全参数之后，向AAuF发送认证方式对应的安全参数和第一指示，AAuF根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥，并确定第一安全参数。这里UDM确认第一安全参数的方式可以参考步骤S3037。然后，UDM向AAuF发送第一安全参数和第一指示。AAuF接收到第一安全参数和第一指示之后，可以根据AAPF密钥参数确定AAPF的密钥，以及根据第一安全参数确定推送信息，并向AAPF发送推送信息和AAPF的密钥，AAPF向终端发送推送信息。其中，关于UDM的操作、AAuF的操作、AAPF的操作和终端的操作的具体解释可以参考上述基于图2a所示的网络架构进行密钥协商的相关阐述，不予赘述。
对于图2c所示的网络架构，AAuF与AMF/SEAF之间存在直接的逻辑接口。与基于上述图2a所示的网络架构进行密钥协商的不同点在于，在AAuF接收到AAPF发送的第一请求消息之后，向AMF/SEAF发送第二请求消息，第二请求消息包括终端的标识。AMF/SEAF向AUSF发送第二请求消息，AUSF确定认证方式和认证方式对应的安全参数之后，向AMF/SEAF发送认证方式对应的安全参数和第一指示，AMF/SEAF根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥，并确定第一安全参数。若第一指示指示5G  AKA认证方式，认证方式对应的安全参数为SEAF的密钥(Kseaf)，RAND，AUTN，XRES，AAuF密钥参数包括Kseaf。若第一指示指示EAP AKA’认证方式，认证方式对应的安全参数为Kseaf，RAND，AUTN，XRES，AAuF密钥参数包括Kseaf。这里Kseaf为AUSF根据5G AKA或者EAP AKA’中密钥参数确定的。虽然不同认证方式返回给SEAF的参数名称相同，但是根据不同的认证方式，对于RAND和AUTN的校验是不同的，所以5G AKA认证方式对应的Kseaf，RAND，AUTN，XRES，与EAP AKA’对应的Kseaf，RAND，AUTN，XRES是有本质的不同。或者，AUSF确定认证方式和认证方式对应的安全参数之后，AUSF根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥，并确定第一安全参数，向AMF/SEAF发送认证方式对应的安全参数和第一指示。或者，UDM确定认证方式和认证方式对应的安全参数之后，UDM根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥，并确定第一安全参数，通过AUSF向AMF/SEAF发送认证方式对应的安全参数和第一指示。然后，AMF/SEAF向AAuF发送第一安全参数和第一指示。AAuF接收到第一安全参数和第一指示之后，可以根据AAPF密钥参数确定AAPF的密钥，以及根据第一安全参数确定推送信息，并向AAPF发送推送信息和AAPF的密钥，AAPF向终端发送推送信息。其中，关于AMF/SEAF的操作、AUSF的操作、AAuF的操作、AAPF的操作和终端的操作的具体解释可以参考上述基于图2a所示的网络架构进行密钥协商的阐述，不予赘述。
在第二种可能的设计中，与上述各个实施例的不同点在于，AUSF或AMF/SEAF已经保存了终端的安全上下文。在应用服务器向终端发送推送信息时也需要告知终端保存了终端的安全上下文，以便于终端确定密钥。对于图2a所示的网络架构，AAuF与AUSF之间存在直接的逻辑接口。在本申请提供的密钥协商方法应用于图2a所示的网络架构的场景下时，AUSF可以根据安全上下文确定AAuF的密钥，向终端发送推送信息。如图4所示，为本申请实施例提供的一种密钥协商方法的流程图，该方法可以包括以下步骤：
S401、AAPF向AAuF发送第一请求消息。
第一请求消息包括终端的标识和AAPF的标识。终端的标识用于确定终端的标识对应的安全上下文。第一请求消息还可以包括其他信息，如：密钥有效期、P-TID。关于第一请求消息的其他详细解释可以参考S301的阐述，不予赘述。AAPF的标识可以可选发送。此时AAuF可以通过AAuF与AAPF的接口信息确定AAPF的标识。
还可能发送AUSF的密钥的标识；用于确定AUSF的密钥。
还可能发送AMF的密钥的标识；用于确定AMF的密钥。
还可能发送SEAF的密钥的标识；用于确定SEAF的密钥。
具体获取AUSF的密钥的标识，AMF的密钥的标识，SEAF的密钥的标识的方式不做限制，跟获取终端的标识的获取方式类似不在赘述。
S402、AAuF向AUSF发送第二请求消息。
AAuF接收到AAPF发送的第一请求消息之后，保存AAPF的标识、密钥有效期和P-TID，并且向AUSF发送终端的标识。例如，AAuF可以向AUSF发送第二请求消息，第二请求消息包括终端的标识。第二请求消息还可以包括其他信息的至少一项，如：AAuF服务器名称，AUSF的密钥的标识，AMF的密钥的标识，SEAF的密钥的标 识。
S403、AUSF根据终端的标识获取安全上下文。
在一种可能的设计中，所述安全上下文包括AUSF的密钥和/或AUSF的密钥的标识。在本申请中，AUSF根据终端的标识获取安全上下文的方式包括以下任意一种。例如，若终端的标识为永久标识(如SUPI、IMSI等)，AUSF可以根据终端的永久标识确定安全上下文。若终端的标识为临时标识(如GUTI、TMSI等)，AUSF可以发送终端的临时标识至AMF或者UDM，请求返回终端的永久标识，AUSF再根据终端的永久标识确定安全上下文。若终端的标识为封装后的标识(例如，SUCI)，则可以请求其他网络功能(Network Function，NF)(如UDM或者SIDF)解密SUCI得到永久标识，AUSF再根据终端的永久标识进行确定安全上下文。具体AUSF确定AMF或者UDM的位置等不做限制。若终端的标识为公开标识(如：GPSI、IMPU等)，AUSF可以根据后续本申请实施例提供的确定终端的标识的方式确定终端的网络标识(或称为临时标识)。
在另一种可能的设计中，所述安全上下文包括AMF的密钥和/或AMF的密钥的标识。
在又一种可能的设计中，所述安全上下文包括SEAF的密钥和/或SEAF的密钥的标识。
在本申请中，AUSF根据终端的标识获取安全上下文的方式包括以下任意一种。例如，若终端的标识为永久标识(如SUPI、IMSI等)，或者临时标识(如GUTI、TMSI等)，AUSF可以发送终端的永久标识或者临时标识至AMF(或SEAF)，请求返回终端的AMF的密钥和/或AMF的密钥的标识，或者，请求返回终端的SEAF的密钥和/或SEAF的密钥的标识。若终端的标识为封装后的标识(例如，SUCI)，则可以请求其他NF(如UDM或者SIDF)解密SUCI得到永久标识，AUSF再根据终端的永久标识请求AMF(或SEAF)进行确定安全上下文。
需要说明的是，若AUSF根据终端的标识未获取安全上下文，则触发对应终端的认证，可以为AKMA认证或者AKMA推送的认证方式，本申请不予限定。AKMA推送的方式可以参考图3，图3a，图3b所示的实施方式，不予赘述。
需要说明的是，如果AMF接收到AUSF的密钥的标识，则可以首先确定安全上下文，然后根据接收到的AUSF的密钥的标识确定AUSF的密钥。或者校验安全上下文中AUSF的密钥的标识是否与接收到的AUSF的密钥的标识是否一致。如果一致则最终确定AUSF的密钥的标识的AUSF的密钥。如果不一致，则确定终端与AUSF保存的AUSF的密钥不同，触发拒绝流程，可选的发送拒绝响应至AAuF；可选的触发对于终端的认证，可以为AKMA认证或者AKMA推送的认证方式，本申请不予限定。AKMA推送的方式可以参考图3，图3a，图3b所示的实施方式，不予赘述。
需要说明的是，如果AUSF接收到AMF的密钥的标识，则可以首先确定安全上下文，然后根据接收到的AMF的密钥的标识确定AMF的密钥。或者校验安全上下文中AMF的密钥的标识是否与接收到的AMF的密钥的标识是否一致。如果一致则最终确定AMF的密钥的标识对应的AMF的密钥。如果不一致，则确定终端与AMF保存的AMF的密钥不同，触发拒绝流程，可选的发送拒绝响应至AAuF；可选的触发对于 终端的认证，可以为AKMA认证或者AKMA推送的认证方式，本申请不予限定。AKMA推送的方式可以参考图3，图3a，图3b所示的实施方式，不予赘述。还可能，AUSF同时发送终端的标识(终端的临时标识或者终端的永久标识)和接收到的AMF的密钥的标识至对应的AMF，AMF首先根据终端的确定安全上下文，然后根据接收到的AMF的密钥的标识确定AMF的密钥。或者校验安全上下文中AMF的密钥的标识是否与接收到的AMF的密钥的标识是否一致。如果一致则最终确定AMF的密钥的标识对应的AMF的密钥，并发送AMF的密钥至AUSF。如果不一致，则确定终端与AMF保存的AMF的密钥不同，触发拒绝流程，发送拒绝消息至AUSF，后续AUSF触发拒绝流程，可选的发送拒绝响应至AAuF；可选的触发对于终端的认证，可以为AKMA认证或者AKMA推送的认证方式，本申请不予限定。
需要说明的是，如果AUSF接收到SEAF的密钥的标识，则可以首先确定安全上下文，然后根据接收到的SEAF的密钥的标识确定SEAF的密钥。或者校验安全上下文中SEAF的密钥的标识是否与接收到的SEAF的密钥的标识是否一致。如果一致则最终确定SEAF的密钥的标识对应的SEAF的密钥。如果不一致，则确定终端与SEAF保存的SEAF的密钥不同，触发拒绝流程，可选的发送拒绝响应至AAuF；可选的触发对于终端的认证，可以为AKMA认证或者AKMA推送的认证方式，本申请不予限定。AKMA推送的方式可以参考图3，图3a，图3b所示的实施方式，不予赘述。还可能，AUSF同时发送终端的标识(终端的临时标识或者终端的永久标识)和接收到的SEAF的密钥的标识至对应SEAF，SEAF首先根据终端的确定安全上下文，然后根据接收到的SEAF的密钥的标识确定SEAF的密钥。或者校验安全上下文中SEAF的密钥的标识是否与接收到的SEAF的密钥的标识是否一致。如果一致则最终确定SEAF的密钥的标识对应的SEAF的密钥，并发送SEAF的密钥至AUSF。如果不一致，则确定终端与SEAF保存的SEAF的密钥不同，触发拒绝流程，发送拒绝消息至AUSF，后续AUSF触发拒绝流程，可选的发送拒绝响应至AAuF；可选的触发对于终端的认证，可以为AKMA认证或者AKMA推送的认证方式，本申请不予限定。
在AUSF根据终端的标识获取安全上下文之后，执行S404。
S404、AUSF根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥。
AUSF可以根据安全上下文生成AAuF的密钥(或Kakma)，即AAuF密钥参数包括安全上下文。示例的，安全上下文包括AUSF的密钥、AMF的密钥或者SEAF的密钥，AUSF可以根据AUSF的密钥、AMF的密钥或者SEAF的密钥生成AAuF的密钥(或Kakma)。
可选的，用于生成AAuF的密钥的AAuF密钥参数还可以包括以下参数中的至少一个，如：AAUF服务器名称、AKMA指示、终端的标识、AMF的密钥的标识、AUSF的密钥的标识、SEAF的密钥的标识、第一新鲜参数、第一指示。需要说明的是，第一指示用于指示终端的标识对应的安全上下文。AAuF服务器名称、AKMA指示、第一新鲜参数的相关解释可以参考图3所述的实施例中S3034的阐述，不予赘述。
可选的，若安全上下文包括AMF的密钥的标识、AUSF的密钥的标识或SEAF的密钥的标识，AUSF可以基于AMF的密钥的标识对应的AMF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。或者，AUSF可以基于AUSF的密钥的标识对应的AUSF的密钥生成的AAUF 的密钥。或者，AUSF可以基于SEAF的密钥的标识对应的SEAF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。
进一步的，AUSF可以确定第一安全参数包括AAuF的密钥，执行S405。
可选的，第一安全参数还可以包括AMF的密钥的标识、AUSF的密钥的标识或SEAF的密钥的标识，执行S405。
S405、AUSF向AAuF发送第一安全参数。
在AUSF获取到第一安全参数之后，向AAuF发送第一安全参数。可选的，在AUSF生成AAuF的密钥时，若AAuF密钥参数还包括第一新鲜参数，AUSF还可以向AAuF发送第一新鲜参数。可选的，AUSF还可以向AAuF发送第一指示。
S406、AAuF根据AAPF密钥参数确定AAPF的密钥，以及根据第一安全参数确定推送信息。这里确定AAPF的密钥的具体方式可以参考上述实施例。
在AAuF接收到第一安全参数之后，AAuF可以根据AAuF的密钥确定AAPF的密钥。其中，第一安全参数包括AAuF的密钥。用于生成AAPF的密钥的AAPF密钥参数可以包括AAuF的密钥。另外，AAuF保存AAuF的密钥。
可选的，用于生成AAPF的密钥的AAPF密钥参数的其他解释可以参考图3对应的实施例。
可选的，若第一安全参数包括AMF的密钥的标识、AUSF的密钥的标识或SEAF的密钥的标识，在AAuF接收到第一安全参数之后，AAuF可以基于AMF的密钥的标识对应的AMF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。或者，AAuF可以基于AUSF的密钥的标识对应的AUSF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。或者，AAuF可以基于SEAF的密钥的标识对应的SEAF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。然后，AAuF再根据AAuF的密钥确定AAPF的密钥。
另外，AAuF还可以根据AAuF的密钥或第一指示确定推送信息。推送信息可以包括第一指示。
进一步可选的，AAuF还可以随机选择RAND、临时标识、AAPF的标识、密钥有效期和消息校验码(Message authentication code，MAC)。推送信息还可以包括以下参数中的至少一个，如：AMF的密钥的标识、AUSF的密钥的标识、SEAF的密钥的标识、RAND、临时标识、AAPF的标识、密钥有效期、MAC、第一新鲜参数、第二新鲜参数。
其中，MAC是对上述所有推送信息的完整性保护。完整性保护密钥可以为基于AAPF的密钥推衍的密钥。完整性保护算法可以预先协商好的算法，也可以为AAuF选择的算法。并且，推送信息还可以包括算法的标识，以便于将算法的标识通知给终端。另外，临时标识也可以为AApF发送给AAuF的，是对终端的标识，不予限定。
需要说明的是，若AUSF未向AAuF发送第一指示，AAuF可以根据第一安全参数的格式确定认证方式。例如，其中未包含RAND，AUTN，或者其中包含密钥的标识等不做限制。
S407、AAuF向AAPF发送推送信息和AAPF的密钥。
S408、AAPF向终端发送推送信息。
AAPF接收到AAuF发送的推送信息和AAPF的密钥之后，向终端发送推送信息， 并保存AAPF的密钥。关于推送信息的解释可以参考S405，不予赘述。
S409、终端根据第一指示确定AAuF密钥参数，以及根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥。
终端接收到AAPF发送的推送信息之后，终端根据第一指示确定需要采用已有安全上下文生成AAuF的密钥。例如，首先确定AUSF的密钥，以及根据AUSF的密钥确定AAuF的密钥。或者，确定AMF的密钥，以及根据AMF的密钥确定AAuF的密钥。或者，确定SEAF的密钥，以及根据SEAF的密钥确定AAuF的密钥。具体的生成AAuF的密钥的推衍方法与AUSF生成AAuF密钥的方式相同。
可选的，推送信息包括AMF的密钥的标识、AUSF的密钥的标识或SEAF的密钥的标识。在终端接收到推送信息之后，终端可以基于AMF的密钥的标识对应的AMF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。若终端保存的AMF的密钥的标识与接收到的AMF的密钥的标识不一致，则确定终端与AMF保存的AMF密钥不同，则拒绝流程，可选的发送拒绝指示或拒绝响应至AAPF。
或者，终端可以基于AUSF的密钥的标识对应的AUSF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。若终端保存的AUSF的密钥的标识与接收到的AUSF的密钥的标识不一致，则确定终端与AUSF保存的AMF密钥不同，则拒绝流程，可选的发送拒绝指示或拒绝响应至AAPF。
或者，终端可以基于SEAF的密钥的标识对应的SEAF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。若终端保存的SEAF的密钥的标识与接收到的SEAF的密钥的标识不一致，则确定终端与SEAF保存的SEAF密钥不同，则拒绝流程，可选的发送拒绝指示或拒绝响应至AAPF。
S410、终端根据AAPF密钥参数确定AAPF的密钥。
终端根据AAuF的密钥确定AAPF的密钥。用于生成AAPF的密钥的AAPF密钥参数包括AAuF的密钥。具体的生成AAPF密钥的方式与AAuF生成AAPF密钥的方式相同，可以参考上述步骤中的详述，不予赘述。
需要说明的是，在终端生成AAuF的密钥和AAPF的密钥时，所需要使用的其他参数，可以是其他网元通过推送信息等消息发送给终端的，也可以是终端自己存储的，不予限定。
本申请提供的密钥协商方法，可以基于5G网络已有的密钥架构，向终端发送推送信息，推送信息内新增第一指示，指示终端的安全上下文，以使终端可以根据第一指示完成推送信息的校验，以及生成AAuF的密钥和AAPF的密钥的密钥。从而，应用服务器与终端之间无需进行认证，就可以实现密钥协商，所有网元可以得到对消息进行加密的密钥，有效地减少了认证和密钥协商的时长，降低了AApF向终端发送消息的时延也较长。
对于图2b所示的网络架构，AAuF与UDM之间存在直接的逻辑接口。与基于上述图2a所示的网络架构利用安全上下文进行密钥协商的不同点在于，在AAuF接收到AAPF发送的第一请求消息之后，向UDM发送第二请求消息，第二请求消息包括终端的标识。UDM根据终端的标识获取安全上下文，安全上下文可以包括CK’、IK’、AUSF的密钥、Kamf和Kseaf中至少一个，UDM可以根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密 钥，AAuF密钥参数包括安全上下文。并UDM确定第一安全参数包括AAuF的密钥。然后，UDM向AAuF发送第一安全参数和第一指示。AAuF接收到第一安全参数和第一指示之后，可以根据AAPF密钥参数确定AAPF的密钥，以及根据第一安全参数确定推送信息，并向AAPF发送推送信息和AAPF的密钥，AAPF向终端发送推送信息。其中，关于UDM的操作、AAuF的操作、AAPF的操作和终端的操作的具体解释可以参考上述基于图2a所示的网络架构进行密钥协商的相关阐述，不予赘述。
对于图2c所示的网络架构，AAuF与SEAF之间存在直接的逻辑接口。与基于上述图2a所示的网络架构利用安全上下文进行密钥协商的不同点在于，在AAuF接收到AAPF发送的第一请求消息之后，向SEAF发送第二请求消息，第二请求消息包括终端的标识。SEAF根据终端的标识获取安全上下文，安全上下文可以包括Kamf和Kseaf中至少一个，SEAF可以根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥，AAuF密钥参数包括安全上下文。并SEAF确定第一安全参数包括AAuF的密钥。然后，SEAF向AAuF发送第一安全参数和第一指示。AAuF接收到第一安全参数和第一指示之后，可以根据AAPF密钥参数确定AAPF的密钥，以及根据第一安全参数确定推送信息，并向AAPF发送推送信息和AAPF的密钥，AAPF向终端发送推送信息。其中，关于SEAF的操作、AAuF的操作、AAPF的操作和终端的操作的具体解释可以参考上述基于图2a所示的网络架构进行密钥协商的相关阐述，不予赘述。上述SEAF也可以替换为AMF，由AMF来执行。另外，这里AMF或者SEAF还可以向AAuF发送AMF或者SEAF的密钥的标识。这里AAuF的操作与图4实施例描述相同。
在第三种可能的设计中，与上述各个实施例的不同点在于，若终端已接入5G网络。此时，可以通过非接入层(Non-access stratum，NAS)消息直接将推送信息发送给终端。对于图2a所示的网络架构，AAuF与AUSF之间存在直接的逻辑接口。在本申请提供的密钥协商方法应用于图2a所示的网络架构的场景下时，AUSF可以根据安全上下文确定AAuF的密钥，向终端发送推送信息。如图5所示，为本申请实施例提供的一种密钥协商方法的流程图，该方法可以包括以下步骤：
S501、AAPF向AAuF发送第一请求消息。
第一请求消息包括终端的标识和AAPF的标识。终端的标识用于确定终端的标识对应的安全上下文。第一请求消息还可以包括其他信息，如：密钥有效期、P-TID、临时标识和AAPF的地址。关于第一请求消息的其他详细解释可以参考S301的阐述，不予赘述。AAPF的标识可以可选发送。
S502、AAuF向AUSF发送第二请求消息。
AAuF接收到AAPF发送的第一请求消息之后，保存AAPF的标识。可选的保存密钥有效期、P-TID、临时标识和AAPF的地址的至少一项，并且向AUSF发送终端的标识。例如，AAuF可以向AUSF发送第二请求消息，第二请求消息包括终端的标识、AAPF的标识、密钥有效期和临时标识。第二请求消息还可以包括其他信息，如：AAuF服务器名称。
S503、AUSF根据终端的标识确定终端已注册到网络。
AUSF可以向UDM发送终端的标识，UDM向AUSF反馈终端是否已注册至网络的指示。若终端未注册至网络，则触发对应终端的认证，可以为AKMA认证或者AKMA 推送的方式，本申请不予限定。这里AKMA认证的方式可以参考图3对应的实施例。
若终端已注册至网络，执行S504。
S504、AUSF根据终端的标识获取安全上下文。
在一种可能的设计中，所述安全上下文包括AUSF的密钥和/或AUSF的密钥的标识。在另一种可能的设计中，所述安全上下文包括AMF的密钥和/或AMF的密钥的标识。在又一种可能的设计中，所述安全上下文包括SEAF的密钥和/或SEAF的密钥的标识。获取安全上下文具体解释可以参考S403的阐述，不予赘述。
在AUSF根据终端的标识获取安全上下文之后，执行S505。
S505、AUSF根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥。
AUSF可以根据安全上下文生成AAuF的密钥(或Kakma)，即AAuF密钥参数包括安全上下文。示例的，安全上下文包括AUSF的密钥、AMF的密钥或者SEAF的密钥，AUSF可以根据AUSF的密钥、AMF的密钥或者SEAF的密钥生成AAuF的密钥(或Kakma)。具体的生成方式可以参考图3对应实施例，不予赘述。
进一步的，AUSF可以确定第一安全参数包括AAuF的密钥，执行S506。
可选的，第一安全参数还可以包括AMF的密钥的标识、AUSF的密钥的标识或SEAF的密钥的标识，执行S506。
S506、AUSF向AAuF发送第一安全参数。
在AUSF获取到第一安全参数之后，向AAuF发送第一安全参数。可选的，若AAuF密钥参数包括第一新鲜参数，AUSF还可以向AAuF发送第一新鲜参数。AUSF还可以向AAuF发送终端的地址。终端的地址可以为AUSF从AMF、UDM或者SEAF获得的。具体的，AUSF可以发送请求消息至AMF、UDM或SMF，请求消息包括终端的标识，得到包含有终端的地址的响应消息。
S507、AAuF根据AAPF密钥参数确定AAPF的密钥。
在AAuF接收到第一安全参数之后，AAuF可以根据AAuF的密钥确定AAPF的密钥。其中，第一安全参数包括AAuF的密钥。AAuF保存AAuF的密钥，AAPF密钥参数包括AAuF的密钥。
可选的，用于生成AAPF的密钥的AAPF密钥参数还可以包括以下参数中的至少一个，如：AAPF的标识、第二新鲜参数。
S508、AAuF向AAPF发送AAPF的密钥。
可选的，AAuF还可以向AAPF发送终端的地址。AAPF接收到AAPF的密钥之后，保存AAPF的密钥。
S509、AUSF向AMF/SEAF发送推送信息。
推送信息可以包括第一指示、临时标识、AAPF的标识和密钥有效期。第一指示用于指示终端的标识对应的安全上下文。
进一步可选的，推送信息还可以包括以下参数中的至少一个，如：AAPF的地址。
S510、AMF/SEAF向终端发送推送信息。
AMF/SEAF接收到AUSF发送的推送信息之后，向终端发送推送信息。关于推送信息的解释可以参考S509，不予赘述。可选的，AMF/SEAF可以通过寻呼消息、下行NAS消息向终端发送推送信息。
S511、终端根据第一指示确定AAuF密钥参数，以及根据AAuF密钥参数确定AAuF的密钥。
终端接收到AAPF发送的推送信息之后，终端根据第一指示确定需要采用已有安全上下文生成AAuF的密钥。例如，首先确定AUSF的密钥，以及根据AUSF的密钥确定AAuF的密钥。或者，确定AMF的密钥，以及根据AMF的密钥确定AAuF的密钥。或者，确定SEAF的密钥，以及根据SEAF的密钥确定AAuF的密钥。具体的生成AAuF的密钥的推衍方法与AUSF生成AAuF密钥的方式相同。
可选的，若推送信息包括AMF的密钥的标识、AUSF的密钥的标识或SEAF的密钥的标识，在终端接收到推送信息之后，终端可以基于AMF的密钥的标识对应的AMF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。或者，终端可以基于AUSF的密钥的标识对应的AUSF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。或者，终端可以基于SEAF的密钥的标识对应的SEAF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。
可选的，推送信息包括AMF的密钥的标识、AUSF的密钥的标识或SEAF的密钥的标识。在终端接收到推送信息之后，终端可以基于AMF的密钥的标识对应的AMF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。若终端保存的AMF的密钥的标识与接收到的AMF的密钥的标识不一致，则确定终端与AMF保存的AMF密钥不同，则拒绝流程，可选的发送拒绝指示或拒绝响应至AMF/SEAF。
或者，终端可以基于AUSF的密钥的标识对应的AUSF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。若终端保存的AUSF的密钥的标识与接收到的AUSF的密钥的标识不一致，则确定终端与AUSF保存的AMF密钥不同，则拒绝流程，可选的发送拒绝指示或拒绝响应至AMF/SEAF。
或者，终端可以基于SEAF的密钥的标识对应的SEAF的密钥生成的AAUF的密钥。若终端保存的SEAF的密钥的标识与接收到的SEAF的密钥的标识不一致，则确定终端与SEAF保存的SEAF密钥不同，则拒绝流程，可选的发送拒绝指示或拒绝响应至AMF/SEAF。
S512、终端根据AAPF密钥参数确定AAPF的密钥。
终端根据AAuF的密钥确定AAPF的密钥。用于生成AAPF的密钥的AAPF密钥参数包括AAuF的密钥。具体的生成AAPF密钥的方式与AAuF生成AAPF密钥的方式相同，可以参考上述步骤中的详述，不予赘述。
需要说明的是，在终端生成AAuF的密钥和AAPF的密钥时，所需要使用的其他参数，可以是AAuF计算了AAPF的密钥之后，通过AUSF将推衍的其他参数发送给AMF/SEAF再发送给终端，也可以其他网元通过推送信息等消息发送给终端的，也可以是终端自己存储的，不予限定。
需要说明的是，也可能AUSF直接生成AAuF的密钥和AAPF的密钥，直接发送AAuF的密钥和AAPF的密钥至AAuF，以使AAuF发送AAPF的密钥至AAPF。
本申请提供的密钥协商方法，可以基于5G网络已有的密钥架构，通过NAS消息向终端发送推送信息，指示终端的安全上下文，以使终端可以根据第一指示完成推送信息的校验，以及生成AAuF的密钥和AAPF的密钥的密钥。从而，应用服务器与终端之间无需进行认证，就可以实现密钥协商，所有网元可以得到对消息进行加密的密 钥，有效地减少了认证和密钥协商的时长，降低了AApF向终端发送消息的时延也较长。
可选的，若AUSF根据终端的标识确定终端已注册到网络，与上述图3所示方法应用于图2a所示场景下时相同，AUSF根据终端的标识获取AAuF的密钥，AAuF根据AAPF密钥参数确定AAPF的密钥，以及根据第一安全参数确定推送信息。具体的可以参考上述实施例的阐述，不予赘述。AAuF直接发送推送信息给AMF或SEAF，由AMF或SEAF直接发送推送信息给终端。
对于图2c所示的网络架构，AAuF与AMF/SEAF之间存在直接的逻辑接口。与基于上述图2a所示的网络架构利用NAS消息向终端发送推送信息进行密钥协商的不同点在于，AAuF通过AMF/SEAF与AUSF进行交互。例如，在AAuF接收到AAPF发送的第一请求消息之后，向AMF/SEAF发送第二请求消息，第二请求消息包括终端的标识。AMF/SEAF再向AUSF发送第二请求消息。AUSF通过AMF/SEAF向AAuF发送第一安全参数和第一指示。其他动作步骤及解释可以参考上述基于图2a所示的网络架构进行密钥协商的相关阐述，不予赘述。
可选的，AMF/SEAF接收到终端的标识之后，AMF/SEAF根据终端的标识确定终端是否已注册到网络。例如，可以根据终端的标识本地检索，或者请求UDM获取终端的当前注册的状态。若终端已注册至网络，AMF/SEAF可以从先前(old)AMF/SEAF获得Kamf或者Kseaf，或者本地存储有Kamf或者Kseaf。这里old AMF是指之前服务过终端的AMF，可以通过终端的标识来确定，例如终端的临时标识可以包括old AMF的位置信息。AMF/SEAF基于Kamf或者Kseaf生成AAuF的密钥，生成方式与基于AUSF的密钥生成AAuF的密钥类似。然后，AMF/SEAF向终端发送推送信息，推送信息包括临时标识、AAPF的标识和密钥有效期。AMF/SEAF可以通过寻呼消息、下行NAS消息向终端发送推送信息。其他动作步骤及解释可以参考上述基于图2a所示的网络架构进行密钥协商的相关阐述，不予赘述。
针对上述所有实施例，也可能AAPF不发送P-TID至AAUF，由AAUF确定了P-TID之后再发送给AAPF。
针对上述所有实施例，也可能AAPF不发送临时标识至AAUF，由AAUF确定了临时标识之后再发送给AAPF。
针对上述所有实施例，也可能AAPF不发送密钥有效期至AAUF，由AAUF确定了密钥有效期之后再发送给AAPF。
针对上述所有实施例，也可能AAPF不发送AAPF的标识至AAUF，AAUF根据AAUF与AAPF之间的接口信息确定AAPF的标识。
针对上述所有实施例，终端与AAPF之间为逻辑接口，可能直接通信，也可能存在多种连接方式，例如通过AMF/SEAF与AAPF交互等不做限制。
上述各个实施例是针对不同的场景阐述了各功能实体与终端间如何进行密钥协商的。综上所述，是由各功能实体先进行密钥的推衍，各功能实体保存各自的密钥，然后向终端发送指示消息，指示推衍密钥的规则，使得终端可以根据指示消息推衍密钥，得到各功能实体的密钥，从而，使各功能实体与终端间完成密钥协商。
接下来，本申请实施例还提供的一种密钥协商方法的流程图，通过网元与终端的 交互过程阐述了指示消息转发过程与密钥协商过程。如图6所示，该方法可以包括以下步骤：
S601、第二网元向第一网元发送第一请求消息，第一请求消息包括终端的标识。
第一请求消息还可以包括其他信息，如：AAPF的标识、密钥有效期、P-TID。
S602、第一网元接收第二网元发送的第一请求消息。
第一网元接收到第二网元发送的第一请求消息之后，可以得到终端的标识。第一网络可以通过终端的标识来获取第一密钥，第一密钥可以是第一网元所持有的密钥。第一密钥可以是Kaauf。例如，可以从第三网元获取第一密钥，执行S603～S606。
S603、第一网元向第三网元发送第二请求消息，第二请求消息包括终端的标识。
第二请求消息还可以包括其他信息，如：AAuF服务器名称。
S604、第三网元接收第一网元发送的第二请求消息。
S605、第三网元根据终端的标识确定第一密钥。
第三网元接收到第一网元发送的第一请求消息之后，可以得到终端的标识，并根据终端的标识获取第三密钥，以及根据第三密钥推衍第一密钥。第三密钥可以是第三网元所持有的密钥。第三密钥可以是Kausf，或者，可以是CK’和IK’。推衍第一密钥的参数还可以包括AAuF服务器名称、第一新鲜参数、AKMA指示、终端的标识、第一指示、RAND、AUTN、XRES等。具体的，可以参考上述各个实施例的阐述。
S606、第三网元向第一网元发送第一密钥和第一指示。
第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或终端的标识对应的安全上下文。认证方式可以是5G AKA认证方式或EAP AKA’认证方式。
S607、第一网元接收第三网元发送的第一密钥和第一指示。
S608、第一网元根据第一密钥推衍第二密钥。
第一网元接收到第三网元发送的第一密钥之后，可以根据第一密钥推衍第二密钥。第二密钥可以是第二网元所持有的密钥。第二密钥可以是Kaapf。推衍第二密钥的参数还可以包括AAPF的标识、AAuF服务器名称、第二新鲜参数、AKMA指示、终端的标识、第一指示、RAND、AUTN和XRES等的至少一项。具体的，可以参考上述各个实施例的阐述。
S609、第一网元向第二网元发送第一指示和第二密钥。
S610、第二网元接收第一网元发送的第一指示和第二密钥。
S611、第二网元向终端发送第一指示。
S612、终端接收第二网元发送的第一指示。
S613、终端根据第一指示确定第三密钥。
终端接收到第一指示之后，可以根据第一指示确定认证方式，再采用对应认证方式的校验方法校验推送的RAND和AUTN的正确性。若校验成功，再确定第三密钥(如：Kausf，或者，CK’和IK’)。执行S614和S615。
S614、终端根据第三密钥推衍第一密钥。
S615、终端根据第一密钥推衍第二密钥。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中各个网元之间的消息名字或消息中各参数的名字等只是一个示例，具体实现中也可以是其他的名字，本申请对此不作具体限定。上述 第一网元可以是AAuF，第二网元可以是AAPF，第三网元可以是AUSF。第一网元、第二网元、第三网元和终端之间具体的指示消息转发过程、密钥推衍过程，以及密钥协商过程可以参考上述各个实施例是针对不同的场景阐述，本申请不予赘述。
上述本申请提供的实施例中，分别从网元、终端、以及网元和终端之间交互的角度对本申请实施例提供的方法进行了介绍。可以理解的是，各个网元，例如第一网元、第二网元、第三网元、终端为了实现上述本申请实施例提供的方法中的各功能，第一网元、第二网元、第三网元和终端包含了执行各个功能相应的硬件结构和/或软件模块。本领域技术人员应该很容易意识到，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的算法步骤，本申请能够以硬件或硬件和计算机软件的结合形式来实现。某个功能究竟以硬件还是计算机软件驱动硬件的方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
本申请实施例可以根据上述方法示例对第一网元、第二网元、第三网元和终端进行功能模块的划分，例如，可以对应各个功能划分各个功能模块，也可以将两个或两个以上的功能集成在一个处理模块中。上述集成的模块既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用软件功能模块的形式实现。需要说明的是，本申请实施例中对模块的划分是示意性的，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式。
在采用对应各个功能划分各个功能模块的情况下，图7示出了上述和实施例中涉及的通信装置的一种可能的组成示意图，该通信装置能执行本申请各方法实施例中任一方法实施例中第一网元、第二网元、第三网元或终端所执行的步骤。如图7所示，该通信装置可以包括：接收单元701、发送单元702和处理单元703。
当所述通信装置为第一网元或支持第一网元实现实施例中提供的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置可以是芯片系统。其中，接收单元701，用于支持通信装置执行本申请实施例中描述的方法。例如，接收单元701，用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图3、图3a、图3b、图4、图5、图6中所示的密钥协商方法中的接收终端的标识、第一指示和第一密钥的相关步骤。例如，图6所示的方法中的S602和S607。
发送单元702用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图3所示的方法中的S302和S306，图3a所示的方法中的S302和S306，图3b所示的方法中的S302和S306，图4所示的方法中的S402和S407，图5所示的方法中的S502和S508，图6所示的方法中的S603和S609。
处理单元703用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图3所示的方法中的S305，图3a所示的方法中的S305，图3b所示的方法中的S305，图4所示的方法中的S406，图5所示的方法中的S507，图6所示的方法中的S608。
当所述通信装置为第二网元或支持第二网元实现实施例中提供的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置可以是芯片系统。其中，接收单元701，用于支持通信装置执行本申请实施例中描述的方法。例如，接收单元701，用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图3、图3a、图3b、图4、图5、图6中所示的密钥协商方法中的接收第一指示和第二密钥的相关步骤。例如，图6所示的方法中的S610。
发送单元702用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图3所示的方法中的S301，图3a 所示的方法中的S301，图3b所示的方法中的S301，图4所示的方法中的S401，图5所示的方法中的S501，图6所示的方法中的S601。
当所述通信装置为第三网元或支持第三网元实现实施例中提供的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置可以是芯片系统。其中，接收单元701，用于支持通信装置执行本申请实施例中描述的方法。例如，接收单元701，用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图3、图3a、图3b、图4、图5、图6中所示的密钥协商方法中的接收第二请求消息的相关步骤。例如，图6所示的方法中的S604。
发送单元702用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图3所示的方法中的S304，图3a所示的方法中的S304，图3b所示的方法中的S304，图4所示的方法中的S405，图5所示的方法中的S506，图6所示的方法中的S606。
处理单元703用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图3所示的方法中的S303，图3a所示的方法中的S3034，图4所示的方法中的S403和S404，图5所示的方法中的S503～S505，图6所示的方法中的S605。
当所述通信装置为终端或支持终端实现实施例中提供的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置可以是芯片系统。其中，接收单元701，用于支持通信装置执行本申请实施例中描述的方法。例如，接收单元701，用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图3、图3a、图3b、图4、图5、图6中所示的密钥协商方法中的接收第一指示的相关步骤。例如，图6所示的方法中的S612。
处理单元703用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图3所示的方法中的S308和S309，图3a所示的方法中的S308和S309，图3b所示的方法中的S308和S309，图4所示的方法中的S409和S410，图5所示的方法中的S511～S512，图6所示的方法中的S613～S615。
需要说明的是，上述方法实施例涉及的各步骤的所有相关内容均可以援引到对应功能模块的功能描述，在此不再赘述。
本申请实施例提供的通信装置，用于执行上述任意实施例的方法，因此可以达到与上述实施例的方法相同的效果。
如图8所示为本申请实施例提供的通信装置800，用于实现上述方法中第一网元的功能。该通信装置800可以是第一网元，也可以是第一网元中的装置。其中，该通信装置800可以为芯片系统。本申请实施例中，芯片系统可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其他分立器件。或者，通信装置800用于实现上述方法中第二网元的功能。该通信装置800可以是第二网元，也可以是第二网元中的装置。其中，该通信装置800可以为芯片系统。本申请实施例中，芯片系统可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其他分立器件。或者，通信装置800用于实现上述方法中第三网元的功能。该通信装置800可以是第三网元，也可以是第三网元中的装置。其中，该通信装置800可以为芯片系统。本申请实施例中，芯片系统可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其他分立器件。或者，通信装置800用于实现上述方法中终端的功能。该通信装置800可以是终端，也可以是终端中的装置。其中，该通信装置800可以为芯片系统。本申请实施例中，芯片系统可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其他分立器件。
通信装置800包括至少一个处理器801，用于实现本申请实施例提供的方法中第 一网元、第二网元、第三网元或终端的功能。示例性地，处理器801可以用于第一指示确定第三密钥，根据第三密钥推衍第一密钥，以及据第一密钥推衍第二密钥等等，具体参见方法示例中的详细描述，此处不做赘述。
通信装置800还可以包括至少一个存储器802，用于存储程序指令和/或数据。存储器802和处理器801耦合。本申请实施例中的耦合是装置、单元或模块之间的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式，用于装置、单元或模块之间的信息交互。处理器801可能和存储器802协同操作。处理器801可能执行存储器802中存储的程序指令。所述至少一个存储器中的至少一个可以包括于处理器中。
通信装置800还可以包括通信接口803，用于通过传输介质和其它设备进行通信，从而用于通信装置800中的装置可以和其它设备进行通信。示例性地，若通信装置为AUSF，该其它设备为AMF/SEAF。若通信装置为终端，该其它设备为AAPF。处理器801利用通信接口803收发数据，并用于实现图3、图3a、图3b、图4、图5、图6对应的实施例中所述的第一网元、第二网元、第三网元或终端所执行的方法。
本申请实施例中不限定上述通信接口803、处理器801以及存储器802之间的具体连接介质。本申请实施例在图8中以通信接口803、处理器801以及存储器802之间通过总线804连接，总线在图8中以粗线表示，其它部件之间的连接方式，仅是进行示意性说明，并不引以为限。所述总线可以分为地址总线、数据总线、控制总线等。为便于表示，图8中仅用一条粗线表示，但并不表示仅有一根总线或一种类型的总线。
在本申请实施例中，处理器可以是通用处理器、数字信号处理器、专用集成电路、现场可编程门阵列或者其他可编程逻辑器件、分立门或者晶体管逻辑器件、分立硬件组件，可以实现或者执行本申请实施例中的公开的各方法、步骤及逻辑框图。通用处理器可以是微处理器或者任何常规的处理器等。结合本申请实施例所公开的方法的步骤可以直接体现为硬件处理器执行完成，或者用处理器中的硬件及软件模块组合执行完成。
在本申请实施例中，存储器可以是非易失性存储器，比如硬盘(hard disk drive，HDD)或固态硬盘(solid-state drive，SSD)等，还可以是易失性存储器(volatile memory)，例如随机存取存储器(random-access memory，RAM)。存储器是能够用于携带或存储具有指令或数据结构形式的期望的程序代码并能够由计算机存取的任何其他介质，但不限于此。本申请实施例中的存储器还可以是电路或者其它任意能够实现存储功能的装置，用于存储程序指令和/或数据。
本申请实施例还提供了一种确定终端的标识的方法，该方法包括：在5G网络中，可以使应用服务器使用终端的公开标识进行用户数据传输，5G的核心网络中的设备可以根据终端的公开标识获取终端的网络标识，在5G的核心网络内使用终端的网络标识进行数据传输。从而，能够避免泄漏终端的网络标识，有效地提高用户数据的安全性。另外可以理解的是，本发明除了可以应用于5G，还可以应用于6G，7G等未来的网络中。
下面结合附图对本申请提供的确定终端的标识的方法进行具体阐述。需要说明的是，本申请下述实施例中各个网元之间的消息名字或消息中各参数的名字等只是一个示例，具体实现中也可以是其他的名字，本申请对此不作具体限定。
基于图2a所示的网络架构，如图9a所示，AAUF与AUSF之间存在网络开放功能(Network exposure function，NEF)，NEF分别与AAUF、AUSF、UDM和统一的数据存储网元(Unified Data Repository，UDR)连接。AAUF与UDM/UDR之间存在直接的逻辑接口。AUSF与UDR之间存在直接的逻辑接口。NEF和UDM/UDR之间存在直接的逻辑接口。AAUF、AUSF、UDM、NEF和UDR之间可以进行相互通信。
基于图2b所示的网络架构，如图9b所示，AAUF与AUSF之间存在NEF，NEF分别与AAUF、UDM、AUSF和UDR连接。AAUF与UDM/UDR之间存在直接的逻辑接口。AUSF与UDM/UDR之间存在直接的逻辑接口。NEF和UDM/UDR之间存在直接的逻辑接口。AAUF、AUSF、NEF和UDM/UDR之间可以进行相互通信。
基于图2c所示的网络架构，如图9c所示，AAUF与AUSF之间存在AMF/SEAF，AMF/SEAF分别与AAUF、AUSF、UDM和UDR连接。AMF/SEAF、AAUF、AUSF和UDR之间可以进行相互通信。这里AMF/SEAF代表SEAF或AMF，SEAF也可以部署在AMF内部。
上述图9a、图9b和图9c中所示的各个网元间的连接关系只是示意性说明，在实际应用中，核心网中的网元是基于服务性架构组网的，各个网元间存在着部分直接或间接的逻辑节点，不排除各个网元间可以进行其他通信的情况，或者通过其他网元与目标NF进行通信的方式，例如AUSF通过UDM访问UDR，或者NEF通过UDM访问UDR等不做限制。另外，AAUF也可能部署在其他网元内部，例如AUSF，NEF，AMF/SEAF等不做限制。关于网络架构的其他解释可以参考上述实施例中对网络架构的阐述，不予赘述。
在第一种可能的设计中，在本申请提供的确定终端的标识的方法应用于图9a和图9b所示的任意一种网络架构的场景下时，可以由NEF根据终端的第一标识从UDM或UDR获取终端的第二标识。在这里终端的第一标识可以是指终端的公开标识(例如公开给外部第三方应用的标识)，终端的第二标识可以是指终端的网络标识。如图10所示，为本申请实施例提供的一种确定终端的标识的方法的流程图。这里以NEF根据终端的第一标识从UDR获取终端的第二标识为例进行说明。该方法可以包括以下步骤：
S1001、AAPF向AAUF发送第一请求消息。
S1002、AAUF向NEF发送第二请求消息。
S1003、NEF接收AAUF发送的第二请求消息。
在一些实施例中，AAUF可以接收AAPF发送的第一请求消息。第一请求消息和第二请求消息包括终端的第一标识。终端的第一标识可以是以下任意一种，例如：SUPI，或者IMSI，或者IMPI，或者GUTI，或者IMPU，或者TMSI(如：S-TMSI，或者M-TMSI，或者P-TMSI)，或者IMEI，GPSI，或者SUCI等，或者第一临时标识，或者外部标识，不予限制。SUCI可以是对SUPI的加密封装。关于第一请求消息和第二请求消息的其他解释可以参考上述各个实施例的阐述，不予赘述。
可选的，这里第一临时标识可以为AAPF获得的，用于标识终端的临时身份的。例如第一临时标识可以为之前终端与核心网中的设备进行网络认证过程中分发的，后续，终端发送给AAPF的；或者核心网中的设备发送给AAPF的。第一临时身份用来指示终端的身份，还包括指示以下信息的至少一项，随机参数，AAPF的标识，AAUF 的标识，AMF/SEAF的标识，AUSF的标识。这里随机参数用来定义临时身份的随机性。
需要注意的是，本申请中GUTI不限制具体的系统和场景，例如可以为4G的GUTI，也可以为5G的GUTI。
上述外部标识，可以为运营商网络专门为终端定义的一个身份，可以供外部应用(APP)使用，同时不泄露终端的身份隐私。
第一请求消息还可能包括AUSF的地址，这里AUSF的地址信息可以为之前终端与核心网中的设备进行网络认证过程中分发的，后续终端发送给AAPF的；或者核心网中的设备发送给AAPF的。这里AAPF如何获得AUSF的地址信息，不做限制。此时，AAuF向AUSF地址对应的AUSF地址发送第二请求消息。
第二请求消息中还可能包括AUSF的地址，这里AUSF的地址信息可以为之前终端与核心网中的设备进行网络认证过程中分发给AAuF；或者认证之后，终端发送给AAuF的；或者核心网中的设备发送给AAUF的。如何获得AUSF的地址信息，不做限制。可选的，AAuF从第一请求消息获得AUSF的地址，或者这里AAuF保存有AUSF的地址和终端的标识的对应关系，AAuF根据终端的标识确定AUSF的地址。
S1004、NEF向UDR发送终端的第一标识。
S1005、UDR接收NEF发送的终端的第一标识。
在一些实施例中，UDR接收到NEF发送的终端的第一标识后，可以查询终端标识对应关系，获取该终端的第一标识对应的终端的第二标识。示例的，终端标识对应关系可以以表格的形式呈现，即表1呈现了终端标识对应关系。
表1
对应关系 第一标识 第二标识
对应关系1 GPSI SUPI或者GUTI
对应关系2 GPSI IMPI或者IMPU
对应关系3 GUTI SUPI或者IMSI
对应关系4 IMPU IMPI
对应关系5 第一临时标识 SUPI或者GUTI
对应关系6 第一临时标识 IMPI或者IMPU
对应关系7 外部标识 SUPI或者GUTI
需要说明的是，表1只是以表格的形式示意终端标识对应关系在存储设备中的存储形式，并不是对终端标识对应关系在存储设备中的存储形式的限定，当然，终端标识对应关系在存储设备中的存储形式还可以以其他的形式存储，本申请实施例对此不做限定。
进一步的，在网元根据终端的第一标识获取对应的终端的第二标识之前，网元需要先获取终端标识对应关系。
在一种可能的设计中，终端标识对应关系是预先定义的。所谓预先定义可以理解为标准或者协议中预先定义的。网元需要预先存储该预先定义的终端标识对应关系。在网元获取到终端的第一标识后，可以从本地获取终端标识对应关系，确定终端的第二标识。
S1006、UDR向NEF发送终端的第二标识。
S1007、NEF接收UDR发送的终端的第二标识。
S1008、NEF向AUSF发送终端的第二标识。
在一些实施例中，第一请求消息和第二请求消息不包括AUSF的地址信息，UDR还可以向NEF反馈AUSF的地址信息。NEF向UDR反馈的AUSF的地址信息对应的AUSF发送终端的第二标识。还可能NEF执行校验，例如，NEF接收UDR发送的第一AUSF的地址信息，NEF可以先判定下第一AUSF的地址信息和第二AUSF的地址信息是否相同，若第一AUSF的地址信息与第二AUSF的地址信息不同，NEF向第一AUSF发送终端的第二标识。这里的第一AUSF可以是指与AAUF先前进行通信过的AUSF，或者，可以理解为先前服务过终端的AUSF。第二AUSF可以是AAUF搜索到的。
可选的，NEF还可以向第一AUSF发送数据。第一AUSF向AAUF传输数据，可以通过NEF传输。NEF还可以向AAUF发送第一AUSF的地址信息。
在另一些实施例中，NEF保存有终端标识对应关系，可以查询终端标识对应关系，获取该终端的第一标识对应的终端的第二标识。进一步的，NEF还可能保存有终端标识(第一标识或者第二标识)对应的AUSF地址信息，可以查询终端标识对应的AUSF地址信息。NEF还可以向UDR发送请求，获取AUSF的地址信息，以便于NEF向AUSF发送数据。具体的解释可以参考上述阐述，不予赘述。
可选的，NEF还可以部署在AAuF内部，此时的动作都是AAuF来执行。
之后密钥协商的过程，以及上述流程中其他参数的发送和处理，可以参考上述各个实施例的阐述，不予赘述。
本申请提供的确定终端的标识的方法，在5G网络中，可以使应用服务器使用终端的第一标识进行用户数据传输，5G的核心网络中的设备可以根据终端的第一标识获取终端的第二标识，在5G的核心网络内使用终端的第二标识进行数据传输。从而，能够避免泄漏终端的第二标识，有效地提高用户数据的安全性。
在第二种可能的设计中，在本申请提供的确定终端的标识的方法应用于图9a、图9b和图9c所示的任意一种网络架构的场景下时，可以由AMF/SEAF根据终端的第一标识从UDM或UDR获取终端的第二标识。如图11所示，为本申请实施例提供的一种确定终端的标识的方法的流程图。这里以AMF/SEAF根据终端的第一标识从UDR获取终端的第二标识为例进行说明。该方法可以包括以下步骤：
S1101、AAPF向AAUF发送第一请求消息。
S1102、AAUF向第一AMF/SEAF发送第二请求消息。
S1103、第一AMF/SEAF接收AAUF发送的第二请求消息。
在一些实施例中，AAUF可以接收AAPF发送的第一请求消息。第一请求消息和第二请求消息均包括终端的第一标识。终端的第一标识的描述参见上述一实施例。关于第一请求消息和第二请求消息的其他解释可以参考上述各个实施例的阐述，不予赘述。
第一请求消息还可能包括AMF/SEAF的地址，这里AMF/SEAF的地址信息可以 为之前终端与核心网中的设备进行网络认证过程中分发的，后续终端发送给AAPF的；或者核心网中的设备发送给AAPF的。这里AAPF如何获得AMF/SEAF的地址信息，不做限制。此时AApF向第一请求消息中携带AMF/SEAF的地址发送第二请求消息。
第二请求消息中还可能包括AMF/SEAF的地址，这里AMF/SEAF的地址信息可以为之前终端与核心网中的设备进行网络认证过程中分发给AAuF；或者认证之后，终端发送给AAuF的；或者核心网中的设备发送给AAUF的。如何获得AMF/SEAF的地址信息，不做限制。可选的，AAuF从第一请求消息获得AMF/SEAF的地址，或者这里AAuF保存有AMF/SEAFF的地址和终端的标识的对应关系，AAuF根据终端的标识确定AMF/SEAF的地址。
S1104、第一AMF/SEAF向UDR发送终端的第一标识。
在一些实施例中，第一AMF/SEAF可以通过AUSF或者NEF向UDR发送终端的第一标识。
在另一些实施例中，第一AMF/SEAF可以通过AUSF或者NEF向UDM发送终端的第一标识。
在另一些实施例中，第一AMF/SEAF可以通过UDM访问UDR，向UDR发送终端的第一标识。
S1105、UDR接收第一AMF/SEAF发送的终端的第一标识。
在一些实施例中，UDR接收到第一AMF/SEAF发送的终端的第一标识后，可以查询终端标识对应关系，获取该终端的第一标识对应的终端的第二标识。具体解释可以参考上述S1005的阐述，不予赘述。
S1106、UDR向第一AMF/SEAF发送终端的第二标识。
S1107、第一AMF/SEAF接收UDR发送的终端的第二标识。
S1108、第一AMF/SEAF向第二AMF/SEAF发送终端的第二标识。
在一些实施例中，UDR还可以向第一AMF/SEAF反馈具体的AMF/SEAF的地址信息或标识。例如，第一AMF/SEAF接收UDR发送的第二AMF/SEAF的地址信息，第一AMF/SEAF可以先判定下第一AMF/SEAF的地址信息和第二AMF/SEAF的地址信息是否相同，若第一AMF/SEAF的地址信息与第二AMF/SEAF的地址信息不同，则第一AMF/SEAF触发AMF重定向，即第一AMF/SEAF向AAUF发送第二AMF/SEAF的地址信息，AAUF向第二AMF/SEAF发送数据。这里的第二AMF/SEAF可以是与AAUF先前进行通信过的AMF/SEAF，或者，可以理解为先前服务过终端的AMF/SEAF。第一AMF/SEAF可以是AAUF搜索到的。
可选的，第一AMF/SEAF可以请求第二AMF/SEAF，使第二AMF/SEAF向AAUF发送第二AMF/SEAF的地址信息。
可选的，第一AMF/SEAF向第二AMF/SEAF发送终端的第二标识。
可选的，第一AMF/SEAF向第二AMF/SEAF发送AAuF的地址信息。
AUSF向AAUF传输数据时，通过第二AMF/SEAF传输。
在另一些实施例中，第一AMF/SEAF保存有终端标识对应关系，可以查询终端标识对应关系，获取该终端的第一标识对应的终端的第二标识。第一AMF/SEAF可以是与AAUF先前进行通信过的AMF/SEAF，或者，可以理解为先前服务过终端的 AMF/SEAF。进一步的，第一AMF/SEAF还可以向UDR发送请求，获取第二AMF/SEAF的地址信息。其他具体的解释可以参考上述阐述，不予赘述。第一AMF/SEAF向AUSF发送终端的第二标识。可选的，第一AMF/SEAF还保存有终端标识对应的AUSF地址信息。可选的，UDR返回AUSF的地址信息至第一AMF/SEAF。此时，第一AMF/SEAF可以确定AUSF。
之后密钥协商的过程，以及上述流程中其他参数的发送和处理，可以参考上述各个实施例的阐述，不予赘述。
本申请提供的确定终端的标识的方法，在5G网络中，可以使应用服务器使用终端的第一标识进行用户数据传输，5G的核心网络中的设备可以根据终端的第一标识获取终端的第二标识，在5G的核心网络内使用终端的第二标识进行数据传输。从而，能够避免泄漏终端的第二标识，有效地提高用户数据的安全性。
在第三种可能的设计中，与第二种可能的设计的不同点在于，执行主体不同，即将AMF/SEAF替换为AUSF即可。另外，第一AUSF可以请求第二AUSF，反馈AUSF的密钥。其他具体的具体解释可以参考上述第二种可能的设计的阐述，不予赘述。
需要说明的是，上述三种可能的设计中，描述了第一标识和第二标识的操作，以及地址信息的获取，同样适用于本发明中所有实施例，不予赘述。
上述各个实施例中所述的UDR也可以替换为UDM执行UDR的相关步骤。
上述各个实施例是针对具体的功能实体，对确定终端的标识的方法进行说明的。接下来，本申请实施例还提供的一种密钥协商方法的流程图，通过网元间的交互过程阐述了确定终端的标识的过程。如图12所示，该方法可以包括以下步骤：
S1201、第二网元向第一网元发送第一请求消息。
S1202、第一网元接收第二网元发送的第二请求消息。
S1203、第一网元向第一NF发送第二请求消息。
第一请求消息和第二请求消息均包括终端的第一标识。关于第一请求消息和第二请求消息的其他解释可以参考上述各个实施例的阐述，不予赘述。
S1204、第一NF向第四网元发送终端的第一标识。
S1205、第四网元接收第一NF发送的终端的第一标识。
在一些实施例中，第四网元接收到第一NF发送的终端的第一标识后，可以查询终端标识对应关系，获取该终端的第一标识对应的终端的第二标识。具体解释可以参考上述各个实施例的阐述，不予赘述。
S1206、第四网元向第一NF发送终端的第二标识。
S1207、第一NF接收第四网元发送的终端的第二标识。
S1208、第一NF向第二NF发送终端的第二标识。
第一NF接收第四网元发送的第二NF的地址信息。若第一NF的地址信息与第二NF的地址信息不同，第一NF向第一网元发送第二NF的地址信息。具体解释可以参考上述各个实施例的阐述，不予赘述。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中各个网元之间的消息名字或消息中各参数的名字等只是一个示例，具体实现中也可以是其他的名字，本申请对此不作具体限定。上述第一网元可以是AAUF，第二网元可以是AAPF，第四网元可以是UDR或UDM。第 一网元、第二网元、第四网元之间具体的指示消息转发过程和确定终端的标识过程可以参考上述各个实施例是针对不同的场景阐述，本申请不予赘述。
上述本申请提供的实施例中，分别从网元和网元之间交互的角度对本申请实施例提供的确定终端的标识的方法进行了介绍。可以理解的是，各个网元，例如第一NF和第四网元为了实现上述本申请实施例提供的方法中的各功能，第一NF和第四网元包含了执行各个功能相应的硬件结构和/或软件模块。本领域技术人员应该很容易意识到，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的算法步骤，本申请能够以硬件或硬件和计算机软件的结合形式来实现。某个功能究竟以硬件还是计算机软件驱动硬件的方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本申请的范围。
本申请实施例可以根据上述方法示例对第一NF和第四网元进行功能模块的划分，例如，可以对应各个功能划分各个功能模块，也可以将两个或两个以上的功能集成在一个处理模块中。上述集成的模块既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用软件功能模块的形式实现。需要说明的是，本申请实施例中对模块的划分是示意性的，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式。
在采用对应各个功能划分各个功能模块的情况下，图13示出了上述和实施例中涉及的通信装置的一种可能的组成示意图，该通信装置能执行本申请各方法实施例中任一方法实施例中第一NF和第四网元所执行的步骤。如图13所示，该通信装置可以包括：接收单元1301、发送单元1302和处理单元1303。
当所述通信装置为第一NF或支持第一NF实现实施例中提供的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置可以是芯片系统。其中，接收单元1301，用于支持通信装置执行本申请实施例中描述的方法。例如，接收单元1301，用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图10、图11、图12中所示的确定终端的标识的方法中的接收终端的第一标识和终端的第二标识的相关步骤。例如，图10所示的方法中的S1003和S1007，图11所示的方法中的S1103和S1107，图12所示的方法中的S1203和S1207。
发送单元1302用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图10所示的方法中的S1004和S1008，图11所示的方法中的S1104和S1108，图12所示的方法中的S1204和S1208。
当所述通信装置为第四网元或支持第四网元实现实施例中提供的方法的通信装置，例如该通信装置可以是芯片系统。其中，接收单元1301，用于支持通信装置执行本申请实施例中描述的方法。例如，接收单元1301，用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图10、图11、图12中所示的确定终端的标识的方法中的接收终端的第一标识和终端的第二标识的相关步骤。例如，图10所示的方法中的S1005，图11所示的方法中的S1105，图12所示的方法中的S1205。
发送单元1302用于执行或用于支持通信装置执行图10所示的方法中的S1006，图11所示的方法中的S1106，图12所示的方法中的S1206。
进一步的，通信装置还可以包括处理单元1303，处理单元1303用于根据终端的第一标识确定终端的第二标识。
需要说明的是，上述方法实施例涉及的各步骤的所有相关内容均可以援引到对应 功能模块的功能描述，在此不再赘述。
本申请实施例提供的通信装置，用于执行上述任意实施例的方法，因此可以达到与上述实施例的方法相同的效果。
如图14所示为本申请实施例提供的通信装置1400，用于实现上述方法中第一NF的功能。该通信装置1400可以是第一NF，也可以是第一NF中的装置。其中，该通信装置1400可以为芯片系统。本申请实施例中，芯片系统可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其他分立器件。或者，通信装置1400用于实现上述方法中第四网元的功能。该通信装置1400可以是第四网元，也可以是第四网元中的装置。其中，该通信装置1400可以为芯片系统。本申请实施例中，芯片系统可以由芯片构成，也可以包含芯片和其他分立器件。
通信装置1400包括至少一个处理器1401，用于实现本申请实施例提供的方法中第一NF或第四网元的功能。示例性地，处理器1401可以用于根据终端的第一标识确定终端的第二标识等等，具体参见方法示例中的详细描述，此处不做赘述。
通信装置1400还可以包括至少一个存储器1402，用于存储程序指令和/或数据。存储器1402和处理器1401耦合。本申请实施例中的耦合是装置、单元或模块之间的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式，用于装置、单元或模块之间的信息交互。处理器1401可能和存储器1402协同操作。处理器1401可能执行存储器1402中存储的程序指令。所述至少一个存储器中的至少一个可以包括于处理器中。
通信装置1400还可以包括通信接口1403，用于通过传输介质和其它设备进行通信，从而用于通信装置1400中的装置可以和其它设备进行通信。示例性地，若通信装置为AUSF或AMF/SEAF，该其它设备为AAUF。处理器1401利用通信接口1403收发数据，并用于实现图10、图11、图12中所示的确定终端的标识的方法中的接收终端的第一标识和终端的第二标识的相关步骤。
本申请实施例中不限定上述通信接口1403、处理器1401以及存储器1402之间的具体连接介质。本申请实施例在图14中以通信接口1403、处理器1401以及存储器1402之间通过总线1404连接，总线在图14中以粗线表示，其它部件之间的连接方式，仅是进行示意性说明，并不引以为限。所述总线可以分为地址总线、数据总线、控制总线等。为便于表示，图14中仅用一条粗线表示，但并不表示仅有一根总线或一种类型的总线。
在本申请实施例中，处理器可以是通用处理器、数字信号处理器、专用集成电路、现场可编程门阵列或者其他可编程逻辑器件、分立门或者晶体管逻辑器件、分立硬件组件，可以实现或者执行本申请实施例中的公开的各方法、步骤及逻辑框图。通用处理器可以是微处理器或者任何常规的处理器等。结合本申请实施例所公开的方法的步骤可以直接体现为硬件处理器执行完成，或者用处理器中的硬件及软件模块组合执行完成。
在本申请实施例中，存储器可以是非易失性存储器，比如硬盘(hard disk drive，HDD)或固态硬盘(solid-state drive，SSD)等，还可以是易失性存储器(volatile memory)，例如随机存取存储器(random-access memory，RAM)。存储器是能够用于携带或存储具有指令或数据结构形式的期望的程序代码并能够由计算机存取的任何其他介质， 但不限于此。本申请实施例中的存储器还可以是电路或者其它任意能够实现存储功能的装置，用于存储程序指令和/或数据。
通过以上的实施方式的描述，所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到，为描述的方便和简洁，仅以上述各功能模块的划分进行举例说明，实际应用中，可以根据需要而将上述功能分配由不同的功能模块完成，即将装置的内部结构划分成不同的功能模块，以完成以上描述的全部或者部分功能。
在本申请所提供的几个实施例中，应该理解到，所揭露的装置和方法，可以通过其它的方式实现。例如，以上所描述的装置实施例仅仅是示意性的，例如，所述模块或单元的划分，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式，例如多个单元或组件可以结合或者可以集成到另一个装置，或一些特征可以忽略，或不执行。另一点，所显示或讨论的相互之间的耦合或直接耦合或通信连接可以是通过一些接口，装置或单元的间接耦合或通信连接，可以是电性，机械或其它的形式。
所述作为分离部件说明的单元可以是或者也可以不是物理上分开的，作为单元显示的部件可以是一个物理单元或多个物理单元，即可以位于一个地方，或者也可以分布到多个不同地方。可以根据实际的需要选择其中的部分或者全部单元来实现本实施例方案的目的。
另外，在本申请各个实施例中的各功能单元可以集成在一个处理单元中，也可以是各个单元单独物理存在，也可以两个或两个以上单元集成在一个单元中。上述集成的单元既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用软件功能单元的形式实现。
本申请实施例提供的方法中，可以全部或部分地通过软件、硬件、固件或者其任意组合来实现。当使用软件实现时，可以全部或部分地以计算机程序产品的形式实现。所述计算机程序产品包括一个或多个计算机指令。在计算机上加载和执行所述计算机程序指令时，全部或部分地产生按照本发明实施例所述的流程或功能。所述计算机可以是通用计算机、专用计算机、计算机网络、网络设备、终端或者其他可编程装置。所述计算机指令可以存储在计算机可读存储介质中，或者从一个计算机可读存储介质向另一个计算机可读存储介质传输，例如，所述计算机指令可以从一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心通过有线(例如同轴电缆、光纤、数字用户线(digital subscriber line，DSL))或无线(例如红外、无线、微波等)方式向另一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心进行传输。所述计算机可读存储介质可以是计算机可以存取的任何可用介质或者是包含一个或多个可用介质集成的服务器、数据中心等数据存储设备。所述可用介质可以是磁性介质(例如，软盘、硬盘、磁带)、光介质(例如，数字视频光盘(digital video disc，DVD))、或者半导体介质(例如，SSD)等。
以上所述，仅为本申请的具体实施方式，但本申请的保护范围并不局限于此，任何在本申请揭露的技术范围内的变化或替换，都应涵盖在本申请的保护范围之内。因此，本申请的保护范围应以所述权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (44)

  1. 一种密钥协商方法，其特征在于，包括：
    第一网元接收第二网元发送的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的标识；
    所述第一网元发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息包括所述终端的标识；
    所述第一网元接收第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文；
    所述第一网元向所述第二网元发送所述第一指示。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一网元接收第一密钥，根据所述第一密钥推衍第二密钥；
    所述第一网元向所述第二网元发送所述第二密钥。
  3. 一种密钥协商方法，其特征在于，包括：
    第二网元向第一网元发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的标识；
    所述第二网元接收所述第一网元发送的第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文；
    所述第二网元向所述终端发送所述第一指示。
  4. 根据权利要求3所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第二网元接收所述第一网元发送的第二密钥，所述第二密钥是根据第一密钥推衍得到的。
  5. 一种密钥协商方法，其特征在于，包括：
    第三网元接收第一网元发送的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的标识；
    所述第三网元向所述第一网元发送第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第三网元根据所述终端的标识确定第一密钥；以及向所述第一网元发送所述第一密钥。
  7. 根据权利要求6所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第三网元根据所述终端的标识确定第一密钥，包括：
    所述第三网元根据所述终端的标识获取第三密钥；
    所述第三网元根据所述第三密钥推衍所述第一密钥。
  8. 一种密钥协商方法，其特征在于，包括：
    终端接收第二网元发送的第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文；
    所述终端根据所述第一指示确定第三密钥；
    所述终端根据所述第三密钥推衍第一密钥；
    所述终端根据所述第一密钥推衍第二密钥。
  9. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    接收单元，用于接收第二网元发送的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的标识；
    发送单元，用于发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息包括所述终端的标识；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述第二网元发送所述接收单元接收到的所述第一指示。
  10. 根据权利要求9所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述接收单元，还用于接收第一密钥；
    所述通信装置还包括处理单元，其中，
    所述处理单元，用于根据所述接收单元接收到的所述第一密钥推衍第二密钥；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述第二网元发送所述处理单元推衍得到的所述第二密钥。
  11. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    发送单元，用于向第一网元发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的标识；
    接收单元，用于接收所述第一网元发送的第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述终端发送所述接收单元接收到的所述第一指示。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第一网元发送的第二密钥，所述第二密钥是根据第一密钥推衍得到的。
  13. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    接收单元，用于接收第一网元发送的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的标识；
    发送单元，用于向所述第一网元发送第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文。
  14. 根据权利要求13所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述通信装置还包括处理单元，其中，
    所述处理单元，用于根据所述终端的标识确定第一密钥；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述第一网元发送所述处理单元推衍得到的所述第一密钥。
  15. 根据权利要求14所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述处理单元，具体用于：
    根据所述终端的标识获取第三密钥；以及根据所述第三密钥推衍所述第一密钥。
  16. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    接收单元，用于接收第二网元发送的第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或终端的标识对应的安全上下文；
    处理单元，用于根据所述接收单元接收到的所述第一指示确定第三密钥；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述处理单元推衍得到的所述第三密钥推衍第一密钥；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述处理单元推衍得到的所述第一密钥推衍第二密钥。
  17. 一种确定终端的标识的方法，其特征在于，包括：
    第一网络功能NF接收第一网元发送的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的第一标识；
    所述第一NF向第四网元发送所述终端的第一标识；
    所述第一NF接收所述第四网元发送的所述终端的第二标识；
    所述第一NF向第二NF发送所述终端的第二标识。
  18. 根据权利要求17所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一NF接收所述第四网元发送的第二NF的地址信息；
    若所述第一NF的地址信息与所述第二NF的地址信息不同，所述第一NF向所述第一网元发送所述第二NF的地址信息。
  19. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    接收单元，用于接收第一网元发送的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的第一标识；
    发送单元，用于向第四网元发送所述终端的第一标识；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第四网元发送的所述终端的第二标识；
    所述发送单元，还用于向第二网络功能NF发送所述终端的第二标识。
  20. 根据权利要求19所述的装置，其特征在于，
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第四网元发送的第二NF的地址信息；
    若第一NF的地址信息与所述第二NF的地址信息不同，所述发送单元，还用于向所述第一网元发送所述第二NF的地址信息。
  21. 一种密钥协商方法，其特征在于，包括：
    第一网元接收第二网元发送的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的标识；
    所述第一网元发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息包括所述终端的标识；
    所述第一网元接收第一密钥，并根据所述第一密钥推衍第二密钥；
    所述第一网元向所述第二网元发送所述第二密钥。
  22. 根据权利要求21所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一网元接收第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文；
    所述第一网元向所述第二网元发送所述第一指示。
  23. 根据权利要求21或22所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一网元发送第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息包括所述终端的标识；
    所述第一网元接收第三网元的标识；
    所述第一网元根据所述第三网元的标识确定所述第三网元；
    所述第一网元发送第二请求消息，包括：
    所述第一网元向所述第三网元发送所述第二请求消息。
  24. 根据权利要求21或22所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第一网元发送第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息包括所述终端的第一标识，所述终端的第一标识为所述第一请求消息包括的所述终端的标识；
    所述第一网元接收第三网元的标识和所述终端的第二标识，所述终端的第二标识为所述第二请求消息包括的所述终端的标识；
    所述第一网元根据所述第三网元的标识确定所述第三网元；
    所述第一网元发送第二请求消息，包括：
    所述第一网元向所述第三网元发送所述第二请求消息。
  25. 一种密钥协商方法，其特征在于，包括：
    第二网元向第一网元发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的标识；
    所述第二网元接收所述第一网元发送的第二密钥，所述第二密钥是根据第一密钥推衍得到的。
  26. 根据权利要求25所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第二网元接收所述第一网元发送的第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文；
    所述第二网元向所述终端发送所述第一指示。
  27. 一种密钥协商方法，其特征在于，包括：
    第三网元接收第一网元发送的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的标识；
    所述第三网元根据所述终端的标识对应的第三密钥确定第一密钥；
    所述第三网元向所述第一网元发送所述第一密钥。
  28. 根据权利要求27所述的方法，所述第三网元根据所述终端的标识对应的第三密钥确定第一密钥，包括：
    所述第三网元根据所述第三密钥，以及应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA指示和/或所述终端的标识生成所述第一密钥。
  29. 根据权利要求27或28所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述第三网元向所述第一网元发送第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文。
  30. 一种密钥协商方法，其特征在于，包括：
    终端确定第三密钥；
    所述终端根据所述第三密钥推衍第一密钥；
    所述终端根据所述第一密钥推衍第二密钥。
  31. 根据权利要求30所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端接收第二网元发送的第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文；
    所述终端确定第三密钥，包括：
    所述终端根据所述第一指示确定第三密钥。
  32. 根据权利要求31所述的方法，所述终端根据所述第三密钥推衍第一密钥，包括：
    所述终端根据所述第三密钥，以及应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA指示和/或终端的标识生成第一密钥。
  33. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    接收单元，用于接收第二网元发送的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的标识；
    发送单元，用于发送第二请求消息，所述第二请求消息包括所述终端的标识；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收第一密钥；
    处理单元，用于根据所述接收单元接收到的所述第一密钥推衍第二密钥；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述第二网元发送所述处理单元推衍得到的所述第二密钥。
  34. 根据权利要求33所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述接收单元，还用于接收第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述第二网元发送所述第一指示。
  35. 根据权利要求33或34所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送单元，还用于发送第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息包括所述终端的标识；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收第三网元的标识；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述接收单元接收到的所述第三网元的标识确定所述第三网元；
    所述发送单元，具体用于向所述第三网元发送所述第二请求消息。
  36. 根据权利要求33或34所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送单元，还用于发送第三请求消息，所述第三请求消息包括所述终端的第一标识，所述终端的第一标识为所述第一请求消息包括的所述终端的标识；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收第三网元的标识和所述终端的第二标识，所述终端的第二标识为所述第二请求消息包括的所述终端的标识；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述接收单元接收到的所述第三网元的标识确定所述第三网元；
    所述发送单元，具体用于向所述第三网元发送所述第二请求消息。
  37. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    发送单元，用于向第一网元发送第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的标识；
    接收单元，用于接收所述第一网元发送的第二密钥，所述第二密钥是根据第一密钥推衍得到的。
  38. 根据权利要求37所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述接收单元，还用于接收所述第一网元发送的第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述终端发送所述接收单元接收到的所述第一指示。
  39. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    接收单元，用于接收第一网元发送的第一请求消息，所述第一请求消息包括终端的标识；
    处理单元，用于根据所述终端的标识对应的第三密钥确定第一密钥；
    发送单元，用于向所述第一网元发送所述处理单元推衍得到的所述第一密钥。
  40. 根据权利要求39所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述处理单元，具体用于：
    根据所述第三密钥，以及应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA指示和/或所述终端的标识生成所述第一密钥。
  41. 根据权利要求39或40所述的通信装置，其特征在于，
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述第一网元发送第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或所述终端的标识对应的安全上下文。
  42. 一种通信装置，其特征在于，包括：
    处理单元，用于确定第三密钥；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述处理单元推衍得到的所述第三密钥推衍第一密钥；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述处理单元推衍得到的所述第一密钥推衍第二密钥。
  43. 根据权利要求42所述的通信装置，其特征在于，所述通信装置还包括接收单元，其中，
    所述接收单元，用于接收第二网元发送的第一指示，所述第一指示用于指示认证方式和/或终端的标识对应的安全上下文；
    所述处理单元，具体用于根据所述接收单元接收到的所述第一指示确定第三密钥。
  44. 根据权利要求43所述的通信装置，所述处理单元，具体用于：
    根据所述第三密钥，以及应用的认证和密钥管理AKMA指示和/或终端的标识生成第一密钥。
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