WO2020192285A1 - 一种密钥管理方法、安全芯片、业务服务器及信息系统 - Google Patents

一种密钥管理方法、安全芯片、业务服务器及信息系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2020192285A1
WO2020192285A1 PCT/CN2020/074893 CN2020074893W WO2020192285A1 WO 2020192285 A1 WO2020192285 A1 WO 2020192285A1 CN 2020074893 W CN2020074893 W CN 2020074893W WO 2020192285 A1 WO2020192285 A1 WO 2020192285A1
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Prior art keywords
key
security chip
service
management center
key management
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PCT/CN2020/074893
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
潘无穷
Original Assignee
阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Publication date
Application filed by 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 filed Critical 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司
Priority to EP20778745.8A priority Critical patent/EP3860036B1/en
Priority to SG11202104530YA priority patent/SG11202104530YA/en
Publication of WO2020192285A1 publication Critical patent/WO2020192285A1/zh
Priority to US17/246,212 priority patent/US11240008B2/en

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage
    • H04L9/0897—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage involving additional devices, e.g. trusted platform module [TPM], smartcard or USB
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/068—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network using time-dependent keys, e.g. periodically changing keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/085—Secret sharing or secret splitting, e.g. threshold schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3234—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving additional secure or trusted devices, e.g. TPM, smartcard, USB or software token
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2463/00—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00
    • H04L2463/062—Additional details relating to network architectures or network communication protocols for network security covered by H04L63/00 applying encryption of the keys
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/08—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities
    • H04L63/0823—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for authentication of entities using certificates

Definitions

  • the embodiments of this specification relate to the field of Internet technology, and in particular to a key management method, a security chip, a service server, and an information system.
  • HSM Hardware Security Module
  • KMS Key Management Service, Key Management Center
  • KMS Key Management
  • the embodiment of this specification solves the technical problem that the KMS pressure is high or the service key is easily stolen by hackers in the information system in the prior art by providing a key management method, a security chip, a service server, and an information system. This not only reduces the pressure of KMS, but also effectively prevents the business key from being easily stolen by hackers.
  • a key management method is applied to a security chip, the security chip is set in a service server in an information system, the information system further includes a key management center, and the method includes:
  • the security chip sends a request to the key management center, and the request is used to obtain a service key from the key management center;
  • the security chip receives the service key ciphertext sent by the key management center, where the service key ciphertext is obtained after the key management center encrypts the service key based on the migration key;
  • the security chip decrypts the ciphertext of the service key based on the migration key to obtain the service key;
  • the security chip stores the service key in the security chip
  • the security chip When the application on the service server needs to encrypt the service data based on the service key, the security chip provides the service key to the application.
  • the method further includes:
  • the security chip sends a migration certificate to the key management center for verification by the key management center, wherein the migration certificate is stored in the security chip and is used to identify the security chip verification;
  • the security chip After the migration certificate is verified, the security chip sends a request to the key management center.
  • the security chip storing the service key in the security chip includes:
  • the security chip encrypts the service key based on a storage key, and stores the encrypted service key in the security chip, and the storage key corresponding to each security chip is different; or
  • the secure chip stores the service key in a specific secure space, and the specific secure space is located in the secure chip.
  • the security chip providing the service key to the application program includes:
  • the security chip receives the business data to be encrypted sent by the application program
  • the security chip encrypts the service data to be encrypted based on the service key, and sends the encrypted service data to the application program.
  • the security chip providing the service key to the application program includes:
  • the security chip sends the service key to the application program, so that the application program encrypts the service data to be encrypted based on the service key.
  • the method further includes:
  • the security chip After a preset period of time, the security chip invalidates the service key
  • the security chip sends a request to the key management center again to obtain a new service key from the key management center.
  • a security chip is used in a business server in an information system, the information system further includes a key management center, and the security chip includes:
  • the first sending unit is configured to send a request to the key management center, where the request is used to obtain a service key from the key management center;
  • the first receiving unit is configured to receive the service key ciphertext sent by the key management center, where the service key ciphertext is after the key management center encrypts the service key based on the migration key acquired;
  • the decryption unit is configured to decrypt the ciphertext of the service key based on the migration key to obtain the service key, and the second migration key is stored in the security chip and is connected to the first Migration key correspondence;
  • a storage unit configured to store the service key in the security chip
  • the providing unit is configured to provide the service key to the application when the application on the service server needs to encrypt the service data based on the service key.
  • the security chip further includes:
  • the second sending unit is configured to send a migration certificate to the key management center for verification by the key management center before the request is sent to the key management center, wherein the migration certificate Stored in the security chip and used to perform identity verification on the security chip;
  • the storage unit is specifically used for:
  • the service key is stored in a specific secure space, and the specific secure space is located in the secure chip.
  • the providing unit is specifically used for:
  • the providing unit is specifically used for:
  • the service key is sent to an application program, so that the application program encrypts service data to be encrypted based on the service key, and the application program is installed on a service server corresponding to the security chip.
  • the security chip further includes:
  • the invalidation unit is used to invalidate the service key after a preset period of time has passed;
  • the update unit is configured to send a request to the key management center again after the invalidation process is performed on the service key, so as to obtain a new service key from the key management center.
  • a business server in which a security chip is set.
  • An information system including:
  • a plurality of business servers each of the plurality of business servers is provided with a security chip.
  • a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, when the program is executed by a processor, it can implement any one of the above-mentioned embodiments of the first aspect.
  • a key management method is disclosed, which is applied to a security chip, the security chip is set in a service server in an information system, the information system further includes a key management center, and the method Including: the security chip sends a request to the key management center, the request is used to obtain the service key from the key management center; the security chip receives the service key sent by the key management center The ciphertext of the service key is obtained after the key management center encrypts the service key based on the migration key; the security chip encrypts the service key based on the migration key The document is decrypted to obtain the service key; the security chip stores the service key in the security chip; wherein, the application on the service server needs to pair service data based on the service key During encryption, the security chip provides the service key to the application program.
  • the key Since a security chip is set in each service server, and ciphertext transmission is used in the key transmission process, the key is stored in the security chip when the key is stored, which can effectively prevent customers from attacking memory and stealing business secrets. The key improves the security of the key.
  • the service key can be temporarily stored in the security chip. If the service key needs to be used during this period, there is no need to initiate a request to the key management center. It can be obtained directly from the security chip inside the business server, which reduces the pressure on the key management center, avoids downtime of the key management center, and improves the reliability of the information system.
  • the embodiments of this specification are dedicated to achieving a balance between the security of the key and the pressure of the key management center, and achieve the technical effect of not only reducing the pressure of the key management center, but also avoiding the theft of business keys by hackers.
  • Fig. 1 is an architecture diagram of an information system in an embodiment of this specification
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of a key management method in an embodiment of this specification
  • Fig. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a security chip in an embodiment of the specification.
  • the first method is: the service key is stored in KMS (Key Management Center), and the service key is always used under the protection of KMS. That is, every time the business server uses the key, it needs to request KMS.
  • KMS Key Management Center
  • This method is not a problem for small information systems, but for large information systems (which have a large number of business servers), all cryptographic operations require KMS, which will cause serious single-point dependence, which may cause KMS downtime and affect System stability.
  • the amount of data involved in operations such as database encryption and communication encryption is very large, and some high-security information systems will use the entire network encryption method, and the data is even larger. It is unrealistic for all data to be sent to KMS.
  • the second method is: the business key is stored in the KMS, the business server retrieves the key when it wants to use the key, and subsequent operations using the key are performed in the business server.
  • KMS is only relied on for key acquisition, and the key use process involving a large amount of data does not rely on KMS, which avoids the stability and performance problems of the first method.
  • this approach causes the key to appear in the business server. If the business server is compromised by hackers (for example, the memory of the business server is attacked), the hacker can obtain the business key. This problem does not exist in the first method. of. Because the first method will affect the stability and performance of the system, most large-scale information systems now adopt the second method.
  • the embodiment of this specification solves the technical problem that the existing information system has high pressure on KMS or the service key is easily stolen by hackers. It not only reduces the pressure of KMS, but also effectively prevents the technical effect of business keys being easily stolen by hackers.
  • a key management method is applied to a security chip, the security chip is set in a service server in an information system, the information system further includes a key management center, and the method includes: The key management center sends a request, the request is used to obtain the service key from the key management center; the security chip receives the service key cipher text sent by the key management center, and the service key is encrypted The text is obtained after the key management center encrypts the service key based on the migration key; the security chip decrypts the cipher text of the service key based on the migration key to obtain the service key The security chip stores the service key in the security chip; when the application on the service server needs to encrypt service data based on the service key, the security chip sends The application program provides the service key.
  • This embodiment provides a key management method, which is applied to an information system (especially a large-scale information system, which has a large number of service servers, for example, tens of thousands of service servers), as shown in Figure 1, so
  • the information system at least includes a key management center and multiple service servers (for example: service server 1, service server 2, service server 3, ).
  • the Key Management Service refers to a system that can provide complete key management and cryptographic calculations, usually composed of multiple HSMs, and provide high availability, key backup and other functions.
  • the key management center in this article is used to provide each business server with a business key, which is used by the business server to encrypt business data to ensure data security.
  • HSM hardware security module
  • hardware cryptographic module is usually a collection of software and hardware with a clear physical boundary (sturdy shell), which can ensure the security of the key life cycle, and provide external key management and cryptographic calculation functions .
  • Typical hardware cryptographic modules include cryptographic cards and cryptographic machines.
  • each business server is provided with a security chip (for example, a security chip 1 is provided in the business server 1, and a security chip 2 is provided in the business server 2.
  • the business server 3 is provided with security chips 3,...), and each security chip is used to manage the business key of the business server where it is located.
  • This method is applied to the security chip (ie: applied to the security chip in each business server in the information system), as shown in Figure 2, the method includes:
  • Step S101 The security chip sends a request to the key management center, and the request is used to obtain the service key from the key management center.
  • the method further includes:
  • the security chip sends the migration certificate to the key management center for verification by the key management center, and the migration certificate is stored in the security chip; after the migration certificate is verified, step S101 is executed.
  • the migration certificate is stored in the security chip and is used to prove that the security chip has a legal identity.
  • the security chip needs to be initialized before step S101 is executed.
  • the security chip needs to send its migration certificate to the key management center, and the key management center will verify the migration certificate.
  • a migration certificate is stored in each security chip.
  • the migration certificate can be swiped into the security chip by the chip manufacturer before the security chip leaves the factory, or after the operator corresponding to the information system purchases the security chip from the manufacturer. , The operator swiped into the security chip.
  • the migration certificate is used to prove the legitimacy of the identity of the security chip.
  • step S101 can be executed, that is, the security chip sends a request to the key management center to obtain the service key.
  • Step S102 The security chip receives the service key ciphertext sent by the key management center, and the service key ciphertext is obtained by the key management center after encrypting the service key based on the migration key.
  • the key management center after the key management center receives the request from the security chip, it extracts a business key (for example, randomly extracts a business key from the business key library, or extracts a business key based on preset rules). Extract a business key from the key store, or use HSM to generate a business key, etc.).
  • the first migration key is stored in the migration certificate sent before the security chip, and the first migration key may be a public key in an asymmetric encryption mode.
  • the key management center may be based on the first migration key pair
  • the business key extracted just now is encrypted, a business key ciphertext is generated, and the business key ciphertext is sent to the security chip.
  • the security chip receives the cipher text of the business key sent by the key management center.
  • Step S103 the security chip decrypts the ciphertext of the service key based on the migration key to obtain the service key.
  • a second migration key corresponding to the first migration key is also stored in the security chip.
  • the second migration key is a private key corresponding to the public key.
  • the security chip can be based on the second migration key.
  • the key decrypts the cipher text of the service key to obtain the service key (ie, the plain text of the service key).
  • the migration key corresponding to each security chip (that is, the first migration key and the second migration key) are different, thereby improving the security of the service key during the transmission process and avoiding
  • the encrypted service key is intercepted and decrypted by other security chips.
  • Step S104 the security chip stores the service key in the security chip.
  • step S104 includes the following two implementation manners:
  • Method 1 The security chip encrypts the service key based on the storage key, and stores the encrypted service key locally in the security chip.
  • the storage key on each security chip is different. Wherein, the storage key is different from the migration key, and is used for encrypted storage use of the service key.
  • a storage key is also stored inside the security chip.
  • the security chip can encrypt (the plaintext of) the service key based on the storage key, and store the encrypted service key locally in the security chip.
  • the storage key on each security chip is different, thereby improving the security of data storage and preventing the encrypted service key from being decrypted by other security chips.
  • Method 2 Store the service key in a specific secure space, and the specific secure space is located in the secure chip.
  • Step S105 When the application on the service server needs to encrypt the service data based on the service key, the security chip provides the service key to the application.
  • the encryption process of the business data can be completed locally by the security chip.
  • the security chip can receive the business data to be encrypted sent by the application program, and the application program is installed on the business server corresponding to the security chip (that is, the application program and The security chip is located on the same business server, and each security chip only provides services for the application on the business server where it is located); the security chip encrypts the business data to be encrypted based on the business key, and sends the encrypted business data To the application.
  • the application 1 can send the service data to be encrypted to the security chip 1. After the security chip 1 encrypts the service data based on the service key , And return it to application 1.
  • the encryption process of the business data can be completed by the application itself.
  • the security chip can send the business key to the application, so that the application encrypts the business data to be encrypted based on the business key, and the application is installed in the security
  • the chip corresponds to the service server (that is, the application and the security chip are located on the same service server, and each security chip only provides services for the application on the service server where it is located).
  • the security chip 2 may send the service key to the application program 2, and the application program 2 encrypts the service data to be encrypted.
  • the application program will completely delete the business key every time it is used up, and obtain it from the security chip again when it needs to be used next time.
  • the purpose is to prevent the business key from staying in a non-secure environment for a long time (ie: outside the security chip) Under the environment), the risk of being stolen by hackers is reduced.
  • step S104 the method further includes:
  • the security chip After a preset period of time, the security chip invalidates the service key; the security chip sends a request to the key management center again to obtain a new service key from the key management center.
  • the preset time period can be flexibly set according to actual needs (for example: 10 minutes, or half an hour, or 1 hour, or 12 hours, or 24 hours, etc.), how long is the preset time period specifically , This embodiment does not make specific limitations.
  • This expiration time can be set when the chip is produced or initialized, or remotely set by the key management center.
  • the security chip also has the function of periodic invalidation, which is used to periodically invalidate the service key.
  • each service key is only temporarily stored in the security chip.
  • An expiration time ie: preset time period
  • the timing function can be implemented inside the security chip.
  • the stored service key is invalidated (for example, deleted).
  • the traditional security chip does not have this function, and the business key can only be stored in the security chip for a long time.
  • the attacker may not be able to steal the service key after compromising the upper-layer software (such as the OS), the attacker can maliciously call the service key in the security chip to perform cryptographic operations.
  • the key management center has a very strong ability to control the business keys. If the key management center does not want the business server to have the ability to perform cryptographic operations locally (return to the traditional key management center model) ), only need to no longer support the key migration operation, after an expiration period (for example: 10 minutes), all the service keys in the security chip are all invalid. The service server can only use the service key in a traditional way.
  • the application on the business server does not have the authority to set this expiration time.
  • This expiration time can only be set by the security chip. This is because the environment of the application on the business server is more complicated and the application is vulnerable to viruses Infection, there are unsafe factors.
  • the service key after requesting a service key from the key management center once, the service key can be temporarily stored in the security chip before the service key becomes invalid.
  • you need to use the business key you do not need to initiate a request to the key management center, and you can obtain it directly from the security chip inside the business server, which reduces the pressure on the key management center, avoids downtime in the key management center, and improves information The reliability of the system.
  • the security chip is performing invalidation processing on the service key, and the security chip may repeat the above steps S101 to S104 to obtain a new service key from the key management center. In this way, the service key can be updated periodically.
  • a key management method is disclosed, which is applied to a security chip, the security chip is set in a service server in an information system, the information system further includes a key management center, and the method Including: the security chip sends a request to the key management center, the request is used to obtain the service key from the key management center; the security chip receives the service key sent by the key management center The ciphertext of the service key is obtained after the key management center encrypts the service key based on the migration key; the security chip encrypts the service key based on the migration key The document is decrypted to obtain the service key; the security chip stores the service key in the security chip; when the application on the service server needs to encrypt the service data based on the service key When the security chip provides the service key to the application program.
  • the key Since a security chip is set in each service server, and ciphertext transmission is used in the key transmission process, the key is stored in the security chip when the key is stored, which can effectively prevent customers from attacking memory and stealing business secrets. The key improves the security of the key.
  • the service key can be temporarily stored in the security chip. If the service key needs to be used during this period, there is no need to initiate a request to the key management center. It can be obtained directly from the security chip inside the business server, which reduces the pressure on the key management center, avoids downtime of the key management center, and improves the reliability of the information system.
  • the embodiments of this specification are dedicated to achieving a balance between the security of the key and the pressure of the key management center, and realize the technical effect of not only reducing the pressure of the key management center, but also preventing the business key from being stolen by hackers.
  • this embodiment provides a security chip for use in a service server in an information system, the information system includes a key management center, as shown in FIG. 4, the security chip includes:
  • the first sending unit 201 is configured to send a request to the key management center, where the request is used to obtain a service key from the key management center;
  • the first receiving unit 202 is configured to receive the service key ciphertext sent by the key management center, where the service key ciphertext is the key management center encrypting the service key based on the migration key Acquired later
  • the decryption unit 203 is configured to decrypt the ciphertext of the service key based on the migration key to obtain the service key;
  • the storage unit 204 is configured to store the service key in the security chip
  • the providing unit 205 is configured to provide the service key to the application when the application on the service server needs to encrypt service data based on the service key.
  • the security chip further includes:
  • the second sending unit is configured to send a migration certificate to the key management center for verification by the key management center before the request is sent to the key management center, and the migration certificate is stored in
  • the security chip is used to perform identity verification on the security chip
  • the storage unit 204 is specifically configured to:
  • the service key is stored in a specific secure space, and the specific secure space is located in the secure chip.
  • the providing unit 205 is specifically configured to:
  • Receive the to-be-encrypted service data sent by the application the application is installed on the service server corresponding to the security chip; encrypt the to-be-encrypted service data based on the service key; The service data is sent to the application program.
  • the providing unit 205 is specifically configured to:
  • the service key is sent to an application program, so that the application program encrypts service data to be encrypted based on the service key, and the application program is installed on a service server corresponding to the security chip.
  • the security chip further includes:
  • the invalidation unit is used to invalidate the service key after a preset period of time has passed;
  • the update unit is configured to send a request to the key management center again after the invalidation process is performed on the service key, so as to obtain a new service key from the key management center.
  • this embodiment provides a service server in which the above-mentioned security chip (ie, the security chip in any of the embodiments in Embodiment 2) is provided.
  • this embodiment provides an information system, as shown in FIG. 1, including:
  • Each of these business servers is provided with a security chip (that is, any of the business servers in the second embodiment) Security chip in one embodiment).
  • this embodiment provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored.
  • the program is executed by a processor, the following method steps can be implemented:
  • the second migration key is stored in the security chip and corresponds to the first migration key; the service key is securely stored; after a preset period of time, the service key is performed Failure handling.
  • the embodiments of the embodiments of the present specification can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the embodiments of this specification may adopt the form of a complete hardware embodiment, a complete software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware. Moreover, the embodiments of this specification may adopt the form of a computer program product implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program codes.
  • computer-usable storage media including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.
  • These computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer-readable memory that can guide a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to work in a specific manner, so that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture including the instruction device.
  • the device implements the functions specified in one process or multiple processes in the flowchart and/or one block or multiple blocks in the block diagram.
  • These computer program instructions can also be loaded on a computer or other programmable data processing equipment, so that a series of operation steps are executed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce computer-implemented processing, thereby executing
  • the instructions provide steps for implementing functions specified in a flow or multiple flows in the flowchart and/or a block or multiple blocks in the block diagram.

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Abstract

本说明书实施例公开了一种密钥管理方法，应用于安全芯片中，安全芯片设置在信息系统内的业务服务器中，信息系统还包括密钥管理中心，该方法包括：安全芯片向所述密钥管理中心发送请求；安全芯片接收密钥管理中心发来的业务密钥密文，业务密钥密文是密钥管理中心基于迁移密钥对业务密钥进行加密后获得的；安全芯片基于迁移密钥对业务密钥密文进行解密，获得业务密钥；安全芯片将业务密钥存储在安全芯片内；当业务服务器上的应用程序需要基于业务密钥对业务数据进行加密时，安全芯片向应用程序提供业务密钥。同时，本说明书实施例还公开了一种安全芯片、业务服务器、信息系统、及计算机可读存储介质。

Description

一种密钥管理方法、安全芯片、业务服务器及信息系统 技术领域
本说明书实施例涉及互联网技术领域，尤其涉及一种密钥管理方法、安全芯片、业务服务器及信息系统。
背景技术
信息系统大多使用密码技术来保障数据安全(例如：数据库加密、通信加密、身份认证等等)。为了保护密钥的安全，信息系统通常使用HSM(Hardware Security Module，硬件密码模块)或KMS(Key Management Service，密钥管理中心)来保护密钥。
而对于大型信息系统，其往往拥有数以万计的业务服务器，在进行密钥管理时，存在的问题较多。例如，KMS压力巨大，容易出现宕机，导致整个密钥管理瘫痪，或者，密钥容易被黑客盗取，严重影响到信息安全。
发明内容
本说明书实施例通过提供一种密钥管理方法、安全芯片、业务服务器及信息系统，解决了现有技术中的信息系统，存在KMS压力大或业务密钥容易被黑客盗取的技术问题，实现了不仅降低KMS的压力，而且可以有效防止业务密钥容易被黑客盗取的技术效果。
第一方面，本说明书通过本说明书的一实施例提供如下技术方案：
一种密钥管理方法，应用于安全芯片中，所述安全芯片设置在信息系统内的业务服务器中，所述信息系统还包括密钥管理中心，所述方法包括：
所述安全芯片向所述密钥管理中心发送请求，所述请求用于向所述密钥管理中心获取业务密钥；
所述安全芯片接收所述密钥管理中心发来的业务密钥密文，所述业务密钥密文是所述密钥管理中心基于迁移密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密后获得的；
所述安全芯片基于所述迁移密钥对所述业务密钥密文进行解密，获得所述业务密钥；
所述安全芯片将所述业务密钥存储在所述安全芯片内；
当所述业务服务器上的应用程序需要基于所述业务密钥对业务数据进行加密时，所述安全芯片向所述应用程序提供所述业务密钥。
优选地，在所述安全芯片向所述密钥管理中心发送请求之前，还包括：
所述安全芯片将迁移证书发送给所述密钥管理中心，以供所述密钥管理中心进行验证，其中，所述迁移证书存储在所述安全芯片内，用于对所述安全芯片进行身份验证；
待所述迁移证书验证通过后，所述安全芯片向所述密钥管理中心发送请求。
优选地，所述安全芯片将所述业务密钥存储在所述安全芯片内，包括：
所述安全芯片基于存储密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密，并将加密后的业务密钥存储在所述安全芯片内，每个安全芯片对应的存储密钥各不相同；或
所述安全芯片将所述业务密钥存储在特定安全空间内，所述特定安全空间位于所述安全芯片内。
优选地，所述安全芯片向所述应用程序提供所述业务密钥，包括：
所述安全芯片接收所述应用程序发来的待加密的业务数据；
所述安全芯片基于所述业务密钥对所述待加密的业务数据进行加密，并将加密后的业务数据发送给所述应用程序。
优选地，所述安全芯片向所述应用程序提供所述业务密钥，包括：
所述安全芯片将所述业务密钥发送给所述应用程序，以使得所述应用程序基于所述业务密钥对待加密的业务数据进行加密。
优选地，在所述安全芯片对所述业务密钥进行安全存储之后，还包括：
在经过预设时间段后，所述安全芯片对所述业务密钥进行失效处理；
所述安全芯片重新向所述密钥管理中心发送请求，以向所述密钥管理中心获取新的业务密钥。
第二方面，本说明书通过本说明书的一实施例提供如下技术方案：
一种安全芯片，应用于在信息系统内的业务服务器中，所述信息系统还包括密钥管理中心，所述安全芯片包括：
第一发送单元，用于向所述密钥管理中心发送请求，所述请求用于向所述密钥管理中心获取业务密钥；
第一接收单元，用于接收所述密钥管理中心发来的业务密钥密文，所述业务密钥密文是所述密钥管理中心基于迁移密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密后获得的；
解密单元，用于基于所述迁移密钥对所述业务密钥密文进行解密，获得所述业务密钥，所述第二迁移密钥存储在所述安全芯片内，且与所述第一迁移密钥对应；
存储单元，用于将所述业务密钥存储在所述安全芯片内；
提供单元，用于当所述业务服务器上的应用程序需要基于所述业务密钥对业务数据进行加密时，向所述应用程序提供所述业务密钥。
优选地，所述安全芯片，还包括：
第二发送单元，用于在所述向所述密钥管理中心发送请求之前，将迁移证书发送给所述密钥管理中心，以供所述密钥管理中心进行验证，其中，所述迁移证书存储在所述安全芯片内，用于对所述安全芯片进行身份验证；
待所述迁移证书验证通过后，通过所述第一发送单元向所述密钥管理中心发送请求。
优选地，所述存储单元，具体用于：
基于存储密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密，并将加密后的业务密钥进行存储，每个安全芯片对应的存储密钥各不相同；或
将所述业务密钥存储在特定安全空间内，所述特定安全空间位于所述安全芯片内。
优选地，所述提供单元，具体用于：
接收所述应用程序发来的待加密的业务数据；基于所述业务密钥对所述待加密的业务数据进行加密；将加密后的业务数据发送给所述应用程序。
优选地，所述提供单元，具体用于：
将所述业务密钥发送给应用程序，以使得所述应用程序基于所述业务密钥对待加密的业务数据进行加密，所述应用程序安装在与所述安全芯片对应的业务服务器上。
优选地，所述安全芯片还包括：
失效单元，用于在经过预设时间段后，对所述业务密钥进行失效处理；
更新单元，用于在所述对所述业务密钥进行失效处理之后，重新向密钥管理中心发送请求，以向所述密钥管理中心获取新的业务密钥。
第三方面，本说明书通过本说明书的一实施例提供如下技术方案：
一种业务服务器，在所述业务服务器中设置有安全芯片。
第四方面，本说明书通过本说明书的一实施例提供如下技术方案：
一种信息系统，包括：
密钥管理中心；
多台业务服务器，在所述多台业务服务器中的每台业务服务器中都设置有安全芯片。
第五方面，本说明书通过本说明书的一实施例提供如下技术方案：
一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，其特征在于，该程序被处理器执行时可以实现上述第一方面任一实施方式。
本说明书实施例中提供的一个或多个技术方案，至少具有如下技术效果或优点：
在本说明书实施例中，公开了一种密钥管理方法，应用于安全芯片中，所述安全芯片设置在信息系统内的业务服务器中，所述信息系统还包括密钥管理中心，所述方法包括：所述安全芯片向所述密钥管理中心发送请求，所述请求用于向所述密钥管理中心获取业务密钥；所述安全芯片接收所述密钥管理中心发来的业务密钥密文，所述业务密钥密文是所述密钥管理中心基于迁移密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密后获得的；所述安全芯片基于所述迁移密钥对所述业务密钥密文进行解密，获得所述业务密钥；所述安全芯片将所述业务密钥存储在所述安全芯片中；其中，在所述业务服务器上的应用程序需要基于所述业务密钥对业务数据进行加密时，由所述安全芯片向所述应用程序提供所述业务密钥。由于在每台业务服务器中都设置了安全芯片，且密钥传输过程中采用密文传输，在密钥存储时将密钥存储在安全芯片中，这样可以有效地避免客户攻击内存盗取业务密钥，提高了密钥的安全性。同时，在向密钥管理中心请求一次业务密钥后，可以将业务密钥临时存储在安全芯片内，在这段时间内若需要使用业务密钥时，无需再向密钥管理中心发起请求，直接从业务服务器内部的安全芯片获取即可，降低了密钥管理中心的压力，避免密钥管理中心出现宕机，提高了信息系统的可靠性。本说明书实施例致力于在密钥安全性和密钥管理中心压力之间实现平衡，实现了不仅降低密钥管理中心的压力， 而且避免业务密钥被黑客盗取的技术效果。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本说明书实施例中的技术方案，下面将对实施例描述中所需要使用的附图作一简单地介绍，显而易见地，下面描述中的附图是本说明书实施例的一些实施例，对于本领域普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1为本说明书实施例中一种信息系统的架构图；
图2为本说明书实施例中一种密钥管理方法的流程图；
图3为本说明书实施例中一种安全芯片的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
在正式介绍本方法之前，先对现有技术中进行如下介绍。
在现有技术中，在对密钥进行管理时，主要有以下两种方法：
第一种方法是：业务密钥存储在KMS(密钥管理中心)，并且业务密钥始终在KMS的保护下使用。即业务服务器每次使用密钥时，都需要请求KMS。这种方法对于小型信息系统是没有问题的，但对于大型信息系统(其拥有大量的业务服务器)来说，所有密码运算都请求KMS，会造成严重的单点依赖，可能导致KMS宕机，影响系统稳定性。特别是，数据库加密、通信加密等操作涉及的数据量非常大，而某些高安全的信息系统会采用全网加密的方式，数据更是巨大，所有的数据都发往KMS是不现实的。
第二种方法是：业务密钥存储在KMS，业务服务器要使用密钥时将密钥取回，使用密钥的后续操作都在业务服务器中进行。使用这种方法，仅在密钥获取时依赖KMS，而涉及大量数据的密钥使用过程则不依赖KMS，避免了第一种方法的稳定性和性能问题。但这种做法导致密钥出现在业务服务器中，如果业务服务器被黑客攻破(例如：业务服务器的内存被攻击)，黑客就可以获取业务密钥，这种问题在第一种方式中是不存在的。因为第一种方式会影响系统的稳定性和性能，所以现在大部分大型信息系统都采用的是第二种做法。
由此可见，现有技术中的密钥管理方法，普遍存在KMS压力大或业务密钥容易被黑客盗取的技术问题。
本说明书实施例通过提供一种密钥管理方法、安全芯片、业务服务器及信息系统，解决了现有技术中的信息系统存在KMS压力大或业务密钥容易被黑客盗取的技术问题，实现了不仅降低KMS的压力，而且可以有效防止业务密钥容易被黑客盗取的技术效果。
本说明书实施例的技术方案为解决上述技术问题，总体思路如下：
一种密钥管理方法，应用于安全芯片中，所述安全芯片设置在信息系统内的业务服务器中，所述信息系统还包括密钥管理中心，所述方法包括：所述安全芯片向所述密钥管理中心发送请求，所述请求用于向所述密钥管理中心获取业务密钥；所述安全芯片接收所述密钥管理中心发来的业务密钥密文，所述业务密钥密文是所述密钥管理中心基于迁移密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密后获得的；所述安全芯片基于所述迁移密钥对所述业务密钥密文进行解密，获得所述业务密钥；所述安全芯片将所述业务密钥存储在所述安全芯片内；当所述业务服务器上的应用程序需要基于所述业务密钥对业务数据进行加密时，所述安全芯片向所述应用程序提供所述业务密钥。
为了更好的理解上述技术方案，下面将结合说明书附图以及具体的实施方式对上述技术方案进行详细的说明。
首先说明，本文中出现的术语“多个”，一般指“两个以上”，包含“两个”的情况。
实施例一
本实施例提供了一种密钥管理方法，应用于信息系统中(尤其是指大型信息系统，其拥有大量的业务服务器，例如，有数以万计的业务服务器)，如图1所示，所述信息系统至少包括密钥管理中心和多台业务服务器(例如：业务服务器1、业务服务器2、业务服务器3、……)。
其中，密钥管理中心(KMS，Key Management Service)是指能够提供完善的密钥管理和密码计算的系统，通常由多个HSM组成，提供高可用性、密钥备份等功能。本文中的密钥管理中心用于向每台业务服务器提供业务密钥，该业务密钥用于业务服务器对业务数据进行加密，从而保障数据安全。
HSM(hardware security module，硬件密码模块)，硬件密码模块通常是明确物理边界(坚固的外壳)的软硬件的集合，能够确保密钥全生命周期的安全，并对外提供密钥管理和密码计算功能。典型的硬件密码模块包括密码卡、密码机等。
本实施例与现有技术区别之处在于，在每台业务服务器中都设置有一个安全芯片 (例如：在业务服务器1中设置有安全芯片1，在业务服务器2中设置有安全芯片2，在业务服务器3中设置有安全芯片3，……)，每个安全芯片用于对其所在的业务服务器进行业务密钥的管理。
本方法即应用于安全芯片中(即：应用于信息系统内每台业务服务器内的安全芯片中)，如图2所示，所述方法包括：
步骤S101：安全芯片向密钥管理中心发送请求，该请求用于向密钥管理中心获取业务密钥。
作为一种可选的实施例，在步骤S101之前，还包括：
安全芯片将迁移证书发送给密钥管理中心，以供密钥管理中心进行验证，迁移证书存储在安全芯片内；待迁移证书验证通过后，再执行步骤S101。其中所述迁移证书存储在安全芯片内，用于证明安全芯片具有合法身份。
在具体实施过程中，执行步骤S101之前，安全芯片需要初始化。在初始化过程中，安全芯片需要将其迁移证书发给密钥管理中心，密钥管理中心会对迁移证书进行验证。其中，在每个安全芯片内存储有一个迁移证书，该迁移证书可以是在安全芯片出厂前，由芯片厂商刷到安全芯片内部，或者，在信息系统对应的运营商向厂家购买到安全芯片后，由该运营商刷到安全芯片内部。该迁移证书用于证明安全芯片的身份的合法性。
若对迁移证书验证通过，密钥管理中心则向安全芯片反馈一验证通过的信息。进一步，即可执行步骤S101，即：安全芯片向密钥管理中心发送请求，以获取业务密钥。
步骤S102：安全芯片接收密钥管理中心发来的业务密钥密文，业务密钥密文是密钥管理中心基于迁移密钥对业务密钥进行加密后获得的。
在具体实施过程中，在密钥管理中心接收到安全芯片发来的请求后，则提取一个业务密钥(例如：从业务密钥库中随机提取一个业务密钥，或基于预设规则从业务密钥库中提取一个业务密钥，或利用HSM生成一个业务密钥，等等)。并且，在安全芯片之前发来的迁移证书中存储有第一迁移密钥，该第一迁移密钥可以是非对称加密方式中的公钥，进一步，密钥管理中心可以基于第一迁移密钥对刚才提取到的业务密钥进行加密，生成一业务密钥密文，并将该业务密钥密文发送给安全芯片。对应地，安全芯片则接收密钥管理中心发来的业务密钥密文。
步骤S103：安全芯片基于迁移密钥对业务密钥密文进行解密，获得业务密钥。
在具体实施过程中，在安全芯片中还存储有与第一迁移密钥对应的第二迁移密钥，第二迁移密钥是与公钥对应的私钥，安全芯片即可基于第二迁移密钥对业务密钥密文进行解密，从而获得业务密钥(即：业务密钥的明文)。
在具体实施过程中，每个安全芯片对应的迁移密钥(即：第一迁移密钥和第二迁移密钥)各不相同，从而提高了业务密钥在传出过程中的安全性，避免加密后的业务密钥被其它安全芯片截获并解密。
步骤S104：安全芯片将业务密钥存储在安全芯片内。
作为一种可选的实施例，步骤S104，包括以下两种实施方式：
方式一：安全芯片基于存储密钥对业务密钥进行加密，并将加密后的业务密钥存储在安全芯片本地，每个安全芯片上的存储密钥各不相同。其中，所述存储密钥与迁移密钥不同，其用于对业务密钥进行加密存储使用。
在具体实施过程中，在安全芯片内部还存储有一存储密钥，安全芯片可以基于该存储密钥对业务密钥(的明文)进行加密，并将加密后的业务密钥存储到安全芯片本地。
在具体实施过程中，每个安全芯片上的存储密钥各不相同，从而提高了数据存储的安全性，避免加密后的业务密钥被其它安全芯片解密。
方式二：将业务密钥存储在特定安全空间内，该特定安全空间位于安全芯片内。
在具体实施过程中，还可以在安全芯片内部设置一个特定安全空间，该特定安全空间采用软件或硬件加密方式，使得其中存储的数据绝对安全。
针对每个安全芯片，可以采用上述两种方式中的任意一种，来对业务密钥进行安全存储。
相较于现有技术，在本实施例中，由于在每台业务服务器中都设置了安全芯片，且业务密钥传输过程中采用密文传输，在业务密钥存储时是将业务密钥存储在安全芯片中(不是存储在业务服务器的硬盘或内存中)，这样可以有效地降低黑客攻击内存盗取业务密钥的风险，提高了密钥的安全性。
步骤S105：当业务服务器上的应用程序需要基于业务密钥对业务数据进行加密时，安全芯片向应用程序提供业务密钥。
在具体实施过程中，若安全芯片的性能比较强，则可以将业务数据的加密过程由安全芯片本地完成。
具体来讲，在应用程序需要使用业务密钥时，安全芯片可以接收应用程序发来的待加密的业务数据，该应用程序安装在与该安全芯片对应的业务服务器上(即：该应用程序与该安全芯片位于同一个业务服务器上，每个安全芯片只为其所在业务服务器上的应用程序提供服务)；安全芯片基于业务密钥对待加密的业务数据进行加密，并将加密后的业务数据发送给应用程序。
举例来讲，在业务服务器1上的应用程序1需要使用业务密钥时，应用程序1可以将待加密的业务数据发送给安全芯片1，由安全芯片1基于业务密钥对业务数据进行加密后，并返还给应用程序1。
在具体实施过程中，若安全芯片的性能比较弱，则可以将业务数据的加密过程由应用程序自己完成。
具体来讲，在应用程序需要使用业务密钥时，安全芯片可以将业务密钥发送给应用程序，以使得应用程序基于业务密钥对待加密的业务数据进行加密，该应用程序安装在与该安全芯片对应的业务服务器上(即：该应用程序与该安全芯片位于同一个业务服务器上，每个安全芯片只为其所在业务服务器上的应用程序提供服务)。
举例来讲，在业务服务器2上的应用程序2需要使用业务密钥时，安全芯片2可以将业务密钥发送给应用程序2，由应用程序2对待加密的业务数据进行加密。
其中，应用程序每次使用完业务密钥后就将其彻底删除，下次需要使用时再重新向安全芯片获取，目的是避免业务密钥长时间滞留在非安全环境下(即：安全芯片以外的环境下)，降低了被黑客窃取的风险。
作为一种可选的实施例，在步骤S104之后，还包括：
在经过预设时间段后，安全芯片对业务密钥进行失效处理；安全芯片重新向密钥管理中心发送请求，以向密钥管理中心获取新的业务密钥。其中，所述预设时间段可以根据实际需要灵活设置(例如：10分钟、或半小时、或1小时、或12小时、或24小时、等等)，对于所述预设时间段具体是多久，本实施例不做具体限定。这个失效时间可以是芯片在生产或初始化时设置好，或者密钥管理中心远程设置的。
也就是说，安全芯片还具有定期失效的功能，用于定期对业务密钥进行失效处理。
在具体实施过程中，每个业务密钥在安全芯片内只是临时存储，针对业务密钥可以设置一个失效时间(即：预设时间段)，在安全芯片可以内部实现定时功能，在该失效时间到达后，则将其存储的业务密钥进行失效(例如：删除)处理。
而传统的安全芯片是没有这个功能的，业务密钥只能长期存储在安全芯片中。虽然攻击者在攻陷上层软件(例如OS)后，可能无法窃取到业务密钥，但是攻击者能够恶意调用安全芯片中的业务密钥去执行密码运算。
另外，如果没有定期失效这个功能，在云环境下，由于应用有可能会在不同服务器之间迁移，则每个服务器上的安全芯片都会留存这个应用的业务密钥，这使得这个应用的业务密钥被恶意调用的可能性增大。云环境实际上放大了业务密钥留存的范围。使得上面这个攻击隐患更严重了。通过设置失效时间，使得攻击时间窗口由长期变为一个失效周期(比如：10分钟)，安全隐患减少明显。
同时，通过失效时间的管理，使得密钥管理中心对业务密钥有非常强的控制能力，如果密钥管理中心不想让业务服务器拥有本地进行密码运算的能力(回归到传统的密钥管理中心模式)，只需要不再支持密钥迁移操作，在一个失效周期(比如：10分钟)后，所有安全芯片中的业务密钥就全部失效了。业务服务器只能按照传统的方式使用业务密钥。
此处需要说明：业务服务器上的应用是没有权限设置这个失效时间的，这个失效时间只能由安全芯片来设置，这是考虑到业务服务器上的应用所处的环境比较复杂，应用容易被病毒感染，存在不安全的因素。
相较于现有技术，在本实施例中，在向密钥管理中心请求一次业务密钥后，在业务密钥失效前，业务密钥可以临时存储在安全芯片内，在这段时间内若需要使用业务密钥时，无需再向密钥管理中心发起请求，直接从业务服务器内部的安全芯片获取即可，降低了密钥管理中心的压力，避免密钥管理中心出现宕机，提高了信息系统的可靠性。
在具体实施过程中，安全芯片在对业务密钥进行失效处理，安全芯片可以重复上述步骤S101～步骤S104，从而向密钥管理中心获取新的业务密钥。这样，就可以是实现周期性地对业务密钥进行更新。
上述本说明书实施例中的技术方案，至少具有如下的技术效果或优点：
在本说明书实施例中，公开了一种密钥管理方法，应用于安全芯片中，所述安全芯片设置在信息系统内的业务服务器中，所述信息系统还包括密钥管理中心，所述方法包括：所述安全芯片向所述密钥管理中心发送请求，所述请求用于向所述密钥管理中心获取业务密钥；所述安全芯片接收所述密钥管理中心发来的业务密钥密文，所述业务密钥密文是所述密钥管理中心基于迁移密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密后获得的；所述安全 芯片基于所述迁移密钥对所述业务密钥密文进行解密，获得所述业务密钥；所述安全芯片将所述业务密钥存储在所述安全芯片内；当所述业务服务器上的应用程序需要基于所述业务密钥对业务数据进行加密时，所述安全芯片向所述应用程序提供所述业务密钥。由于在每台业务服务器中都设置了安全芯片，且密钥传输过程中采用密文传输，在密钥存储时将密钥存储在安全芯片中，这样可以有效地避免客户攻击内存盗取业务密钥，提高了密钥的安全性。同时，在向密钥管理中心请求一次业务密钥后，可以将业务密钥临时存储在安全芯片内，在这段时间内若需要使用业务密钥时，无需再向密钥管理中心发起请求，直接从业务服务器内部的安全芯片获取即可，降低了密钥管理中心的压力，避免密钥管理中心出现宕机，提高了信息系统的可靠性。本说明书实施例致力于在密钥安全性和密钥管理中心压力之间实现平衡，实现了不仅降低密钥管理中心的压力，而且避免业务密钥被黑客盗取的技术效果。
实施例二
基于同一发明构思，本实施例提供了一种安全芯片，用于在信息系统内的业务服务器中，所述信息系统包括还密钥管理中心，如图4所示，所述安全芯片包括：
第一发送单元201，用于向所述密钥管理中心发送请求，所述请求用于向所述密钥管理中心获取业务密钥；
第一接收单元202，用于接收所述密钥管理中心发来的业务密钥密文，所述业务密钥密文是所述密钥管理中心基于迁移密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密后获得的；
解密单元203，用于基于迁移密钥对所述业务密钥密文进行解密，获得所述业务密钥；
存储单元204，用于将所述业务密钥存储在所述安全芯片内；
提供单元205，用于当所述业务服务器上的应用程序需要基于所述业务密钥对业务数据进行加密时，向所述应用程序提供所述业务密钥。
作为一种可选的实施例，所述安全芯片，还包括：
第二发送单元，用于在所述向所述密钥管理中心发送请求之前，将迁移证书发送给所述密钥管理中心，以供所述密钥管理中心进行验证，所述迁移证书存储在所述安全芯片内，用于对所述安全芯片进行身份验证；
待所述迁移证书验证通过后，通过所述第一发送单元向所述密钥管理中心发送请 求。
作为一种可选的实施例，存储单元204，具体用于：
基于存储密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密，并将加密后的业务密钥进行存储，每个安全芯片对应的存储密钥各不相同；或
将所述业务密钥存储在特定安全空间内，所述特定安全空间位于所述安全芯片内。
作为一种可选的实施例，提供单元205，具体用于：
接收应用程序发来的待加密的业务数据，所述应用程序安装在与所述安全芯片对应的业务服务器上；基于所述业务密钥对所述待加密的业务数据进行加密；将加密后的业务数据发送给所述应用程序。
作为一种可选的实施例，提供单元205，具体用于：
将所述业务密钥发送给应用程序，以使得所述应用程序基于所述业务密钥对待加密的业务数据进行加密，所述应用程序安装在与所述安全芯片对应的业务服务器上。
作为一种可选的实施例，所述安全芯片还包括：
失效单元，用于在经过预设时间段后，对所述业务密钥进行失效处理；
更新单元，用于在所述对所述业务密钥进行失效处理之后，重新向密钥管理中心发送请求，以向所述密钥管理中心获取新的业务密钥。
实施例三
基于同一发明构思，本实施例提供了一种业务服务器，在该业务服务器中设置有上述安全芯片(即：实施例二中的任一实施方式中的安全芯片)。
实施例四
基于同一发明构思，本实施例提供了一种信息系统，如图1所示，包括：
密钥管理中心；
多台业务服务器(例如：业务服务器1、业务服务器2、业务服务器3、……)，并且，在这些业务服务器中的每台业务服务器中都设置有一安全芯片(即：实施例二中的任一实施方式中的安全芯片)。
实施例五
基于同一发明构思，本实施例提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，该程序被处理器执行时可以实现如下方法步骤：
向所述密钥管理中心发送请求，所述请求用于向所述密钥管理中心获取业务密钥；接收所述密钥管理中心发来的业务密钥密文，所述业务密钥密文是所述密钥管理中心基于第一迁移密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密后获得的；基于第二迁移密钥对所述业务密钥密文进行解密，获得所述业务密钥，所述第二迁移密钥存储在所述安全芯片内，且与所述第一迁移密钥对应；对所述业务密钥进行安全存储；在经过预设时间段后，对所述业务密钥进行失效处理。
在具体实施过程中，该程序被处理器执行时可以实现上述实施例一中任一实施方式中的方法步骤。
本领域内的技术人员应明白，本说明书实施例的实施例可提供为方法、系统、或计算机程序产品。因此，本说明书实施例可采用完全硬件实施例、完全软件实施例、或结合软件和硬件方面的实施例的形式。而且，本说明书实施例可采用在一个或多个其中包含有计算机可用程序代码的计算机可用存储介质(包括但不限于磁盘存储器、CD-ROM、光学存储器等)上实施的计算机程序产品的形式。
本说明书实施例是参照根据本说明书实施例的方法、设备(系统)、和计算机程序产品的流程图和/或方框图来描述的。应理解可由计算机程序指令实现流程图和/或方框图中的每一流程和/或方框、以及流程图和/或方框图中的流程和/或方框的结合。可提供这些计算机程序指令到通用计算机、专用计算机、嵌入式处理机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器以产生一个机器，使得通过计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器执行的指令产生用于实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的装置。
这些计算机程序指令也可存储在能引导计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备以特定方式工作的计算机可读存储器中，使得存储在该计算机可读存储器中的指令产生包括指令装置的制造品，该指令装置实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能。
这些计算机程序指令也可装载到计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备上，使得在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行一系列操作步骤以产生计算机实现的处理，从而在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行的指令提供用于实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方 框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的步骤。
尽管已描述了本说明书实施例的优选实施例，但本领域内的技术人员一旦得知了基本创造性概念，则可对这些实施例作出另外的变更和修改。所以，所附权利要求意欲解释为包括优选实施例以及落入本说明书实施例范围的所有变更和修改。
显然，本领域的技术人员可以对本说明书实施例进行各种改动和变型而不脱离本说明书实施例的精神和范围。这样，倘若本说明书实施例的这些修改和变型属于本说明书实施例权利要求及其等同技术的范围之内，则本说明书实施例也意图包含这些改动和变型在内。

Claims (15)

  1. 一种密钥管理方法，应用于安全芯片中，所述安全芯片设置在信息系统内的业务服务器中，所述信息系统还包括密钥管理中心，所述方法包括：
    所述安全芯片向所述密钥管理中心发送请求，所述请求用于向所述密钥管理中心获取业务密钥；
    所述安全芯片接收所述密钥管理中心发来的业务密钥密文，所述业务密钥密文是所述密钥管理中心基于迁移密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密后获得的；
    所述安全芯片基于所述迁移密钥对所述业务密钥密文进行解密，获得所述业务密钥；
    所述安全芯片将所述业务密钥存储在所述安全芯片内；
    当所述业务服务器上的应用程序需要基于所述业务密钥对业务数据进行加密时，所述安全芯片向所述应用程序提供所述业务密钥。
  2. 如权利要求1所述的方法，在所述安全芯片向所述密钥管理中心发送请求之前，还包括：
    所述安全芯片将迁移证书发送给所述密钥管理中心，以供所述密钥管理中心进行验证，其中，所述迁移证书存储在所述安全芯片内，用于对所述安全芯片进行身份验证；
    待所述迁移证书验证通过后，所述安全芯片向所述密钥管理中心发送请求。
  3. 如权利要求2所述的方法，所述安全芯片将所述业务密钥存储在所述安全芯片内，包括：
    所述安全芯片基于存储密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密，并将加密后的业务密钥存储在所述安全芯片内，每个安全芯片对应的存储密钥各不相同；或
    所述安全芯片将所述业务密钥存储在特定安全空间内，所述特定安全空间位于所述安全芯片内。
  4. 如权利要求1所述的方法，所述安全芯片向所述应用程序提供所述业务密钥，包括：
    所述安全芯片接收所述应用程序发来的待加密的业务数据；
    所述安全芯片基于所述业务密钥对所述待加密的业务数据进行加密，并将加密后的业务数据发送给所述应用程序。
  5. 如权利要求1所述的方法，所述安全芯片向所述应用程序提供所述业务密钥，包括：
    所述安全芯片将所述业务密钥发送给所述应用程序，以使得所述应用程序基于所述业务密钥对待加密的业务数据进行加密。
  6. 如权利要求1～5任一所述的方法，在所述安全芯片对所述业务密钥进行安全存储之后，还包括：
    在经过预设时间段后，所述安全芯片对所述业务密钥进行失效处理；
    所述安全芯片重新向所述密钥管理中心发送请求，以向所述密钥管理中心获取新的业务密钥。
  7. 一种安全芯片，应用于在信息系统内的业务服务器中，所述信息系统还包括密钥管理中心，所述安全芯片包括：
    第一发送单元，用于向所述密钥管理中心发送请求，所述请求用于向所述密钥管理中心获取业务密钥；
    第一接收单元，用于接收所述密钥管理中心发来的业务密钥密文，所述业务密钥密文是所述密钥管理中心基于迁移密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密后获得的；
    解密单元，用于基于所述迁移密钥对所述业务密钥密文进行解密，获得所述业务密钥，所述第二迁移密钥存储在所述安全芯片内，且与所述第一迁移密钥对应；
    存储单元，用于将所述业务密钥存储在所述安全芯片内；
    提供单元，用于当所述业务服务器上的应用程序需要基于所述业务密钥对业务数据进行加密时，向所述应用程序提供所述业务密钥。
  8. 如权利要求7所述的安全芯片，所述安全芯片，还包括：
    第二发送单元，用于在所述向所述密钥管理中心发送请求之前，将迁移证书发送给所述密钥管理中心，以供所述密钥管理中心进行验证，其中，所述迁移证书存储在所述安全芯片内，用于对所述安全芯片进行身份验证；
    待所述迁移证书验证通过后，通过所述第一发送单元向所述密钥管理中心发送请求。
  9. 如权利要求7所述的安全芯片，所述存储单元，具体用于：
    基于存储密钥对所述业务密钥进行加密，并将加密后的业务密钥进行存储，每个安全芯片对应的存储密钥各不相同；或
    将所述业务密钥存储在特定安全空间内，所述特定安全空间位于所述安全芯片内。
  10. 如权利要求8所述的安全芯片，所述提供单元，具体用于：
    接收所述应用程序发来的待加密的业务数据；基于所述业务密钥对所述待加密的业务数据进行加密；将加密后的业务数据发送给所述应用程序。
  11. 如权利要求8所述的安全芯片，所述提供单元，具体用于：
    将所述业务密钥发送给应用程序，以使得所述应用程序基于所述业务密钥对待加密的业务数据进行加密，所述应用程序安装在与所述安全芯片对应的业务服务器上。
  12. 如权利要求7～11任一所述的安全芯片，所述安全芯片还包括：
    失效单元，用于在经过预设时间段后，对所述业务密钥进行失效处理；
    更新单元，用于在所述对所述业务密钥进行失效处理之后，重新向密钥管理中心发送请求，以向所述密钥管理中心获取新的业务密钥。
  13. 一种业务服务器，在所述业务服务器中设置有如权利要求7～12任一权项所述的安全芯片。
  14. 一种信息系统，包括：
    密钥管理中心；
    业务服务器，在所述业务服务器中设置有如权利要求7～12任一权项所述的安全芯片。
  15. 一种计算机可读存储介质，其上存储有计算机程序，其特征在于，该程序被处理器执行时可以实现如权利要求1～6任一权项所述的方法步骤。
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