WO2020124843A1 - 基于区块链的可追踪的匿名电子投票方法 - Google Patents
基于区块链的可追踪的匿名电子投票方法 Download PDFInfo
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
- G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
- G06F21/6254—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes by anonymising data, e.g. decorrelating personal data from the owner's identification
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/30—Authentication, i.e. establishing the identity or authorisation of security principals
- G06F21/31—User authentication
- G06F21/33—User authentication using certificates
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
- G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
- G06F21/56—Computer malware detection or handling, e.g. anti-virus arrangements
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
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- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
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- G—PHYSICS
- G07—CHECKING-DEVICES
- G07C—TIME OR ATTENDANCE REGISTERS; REGISTERING OR INDICATING THE WORKING OF MACHINES; GENERATING RANDOM NUMBERS; VOTING OR LOTTERY APPARATUS; ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS OR APPARATUS FOR CHECKING NOT PROVIDED FOR ELSEWHERE
- G07C13/00—Voting apparatus
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3218—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
- H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/42—Anonymization, e.g. involving pseudonyms
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
- H04L2209/46—Secure multiparty computation, e.g. millionaire problem
- H04L2209/463—Electronic voting
Definitions
- the invention relates to the field of cryptography and information security, in particular to a traceable anonymous electronic voting method based on blockchain.
- Blockchain technology is derived from the distributed ledger of Bitcoin, and has the characteristics of decentralization, non-tampering and verifiability. Recording the ballot data in the blockchain can ensure the authenticity of the data without being tampered, and can largely guarantee the authenticity of the election results.
- Anonymous authentication is an authentication technology for messages, which does not reveal the authenticator's identity through authentication; and linkability is an effective means of linking to participating activities and can be used to effectively detect user misconduct.
- the blockchain provides users with an anonymous address similar to a pseudonym, which can hide the user's true identity. The user can use his public key to generate an anonymous blockchain address as his account address. Voters encrypt the votes and store them on the blockchain in the form of transactions, so that the users are anonymous and the votes are authentic and not forgery during the voting process, ensuring that the election results are true and effective.
- the purpose of the present invention is to solve the above-mentioned defects in the prior art and provide an anonymous electronic voting method based on blockchain.
- a blockchain-based traceable anonymous electronic voting method includes:
- Public parameter generation step through the parameter generation algorithm Setup(1 ⁇ ), input the security parameter 1 ⁇ , and output the system's public parameter PP and the master public private key pair (MPK, MSK), where MPK is the main public key and MSK is Master private key, ⁇ is an ordinary positive integer;
- User registration step user V i submits personal information to the certification center, through the certificate generation algorithm CertGen (MSK, pk i ), enters the master private key MSK and user V i public key pk i , and outputs the certificate cert i , where, i is an ordinary positive integer;
- Anonymous ballot authentication step through the authentication algorithm Auth(Num
- Step of counting the votes through the decryption algorithm Dec(C i ,esk), input the encrypted ballot C i and the decrypted private key esk, output the plain text m i , summarize the valid ballots, and count the voting results.
- the algorithm Setup(1 ⁇ ) is a common algorithm for generating public parameters in cryptography.
- the security parameter 1 ⁇ is input, and the public parameter PP of the system and the master public private key pair (MPK, MSK).
- MPK, MSK the public parameter PP of the system
- ⁇ is an ordinary positive integer.
- the specific algorithm implementation can refer to the relevant content in "Modern Cryptography-Principles and Protocols".
- the step S2 the algorithm CertGen (MSK, pk i) cryptography is a common digital signature algorithm, the public key pk i and the input of the main user private key MSK V i, the output signature of the cert i, That is the certificate.
- the specific algorithm implementation can refer to the relevant content in "Modern Cryptography-Principles and Protocols".
- the algorithm Enc(m i ,epk) is a common encryption algorithm in cryptography, where the input message mi and the encrypted public key epk output the ciphertext C i .
- the specific algorithm implementation can refer to the relevant content in "Modern Cryptography-Principles and Protocols".
- C i ,pk i ,sk i ,cert i ,MPK,PP) is an authentication algorithm for the message C i , input the election identification number Num, and encrypt the vote C i , public-private key pair pk i and sk i , certificate cert i , master public key MPK and public parameter PP, output certificate ⁇ i , where the symbol “
- the algorithm Auth uses the proof algorithm Prover to disclose knowledge And private evidence Give the proof result ⁇ , where the algorithm It is a proof algorithm in the zk-SNARK zero-knowledge proof scheme, which inputs public knowledge Private evidence And public parameter PP, output proof result ⁇ . Specific references "How to Vote Privately Using Bitcoin";
- the user combines the encrypted ballot C i and its corresponding proof ⁇ i and sends (C i , ⁇ i ) to the blockchain network in the form of a transaction through the blockchain address in.
- the algorithm Link(C 1 , C 2 , ⁇ 1 , ⁇ 2 ) is a link algorithm for checking whether the user double-casts, and input two encrypted votes C whose verification result is 1 in S6 1 and C 2 , and the corresponding two proofs ⁇ 1 and ⁇ 2 , output the link result 0 or 1; the algorithm checks whether the values of two t 1 in ⁇ 1 and ⁇ 2 are the same, if they are the same, output 1 to indicate that the user If the vote is cast twice, it is a double vote; otherwise, 0 is output, indicating that the user voted once.
- the algorithm Trace( ⁇ 1 , ⁇ 2 ) is a tracking algorithm for inferring the user's identity.
- the two proofs whose input result is 1 in S7 are ⁇ 1 and ⁇ 2.
- the output is solved to The user's public key pk i ;
- the algorithm infers the public key pk i of the double-throwing user through the two t 2 contained in ⁇ 1 and ⁇ 2 , Expressed as follows:
- step S9 is specifically as follows:
- step S91 Collect the valid encrypted ballots whose output result is 0 in step S7, and decrypt them through the algorithm Dec(C i ,esk); where, the algorithm Dec(C i ,esk) is a common decryption algorithm in cryptography. input ciphertext and decrypt the private key ESK C i, the output of the plaintext m i.
- the present invention has the following advantages and effects:
- the present invention improves an anonymous authentication method based on prefixes. On the premise of protecting user privacy, it reduces the amount of calculation when linking votes and tracking users, and improves the calculation efficiency.
- the present invention ensures that when a malicious user double-throws, the user can be tracked according to the public information, thereby limiting the user's malicious behavior to a certain extent.
- the present invention can ensure the characteristics of transparent election process, unforgeable votes, verifiable election results and other characteristics.
- the present invention supports voters to participate in other election tasks once without being tracked, and two or more votes in the same election task will be tracked, thereby expanding the applicability of the solution.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of an anonymous electronic voting method based on blockchain disclosed in the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a system structure diagram of an anonymous electronic voting method based on a blockchain disclosed in the present invention.
- this embodiment proposes an anonymous electronic voting method based on blockchain, which has the characteristics of simple process, easy implementation, small amount of calculation, linkable and verifiable, under the premise of ensuring the protection of user privacy , To achieve the purpose of reducing computing costs and publicly verifiable.
- the voting scheme supports voters to participate in other election tasks for a single time without being linked to, and multiple votes in the same election task will be linked to, thereby expanding the applicability of the program.
- An anonymous electronic voting method based on blockchain (the system structure is shown in Figure 2), which mainly includes three roles: the election committee EC, the voter V i , and the certification center CA.
- the steps include: generating system parameters and registering , Publish tasks, vote, track, count and publish results.
- a key pair (epk, esk) for encrypting and decrypting votes has been generated, and public parameters such as epk and election identification number Num are disclosed; the default smart contract S is compiled normally, the contract address ⁇ S has been generated, and the election committee
- the EC and the voter V i have their own public and private key pairs (pk EC , sk EC ), (pk i , sk i ) and corresponding block chain one-time addresses ⁇ EC , ⁇ i .
- the voting plan is mainly composed of the following steps:
- Step 1 Generate system parameters.
- the public parameter PP of the system and the master public and private key pair (MPK, MSK) of the authentication center are generated by the Setup(1 ⁇ ) algorithm.
- the second step user registration.
- the EC and the voter V i submit personal information to the certification center, and the CA generates the certificates cert EC and cert i for the EC and V i through the certificate generation algorithm CertGen (MSK, pk i ).
- the third step voting.
- Voting process voter V i by anonymous authentication algorithm Auth Auth for authentication and encryption Num electoral identification number of votes C i (Num
- the fourth step check the ticket.
- Intelligent contract be validated for each voter V i ⁇ i generated by an authentication algorithm Verify, that is, run Verify (Num
- the smart contract further links the ⁇ i verified in the previous step through the link algorithm Link to check whether there is a double throw, that is, to run Link(C 1 , C 2 , ⁇ 1 , ⁇ 2 ).
- the sixth step tracking.
- Step 7 Count the votes.
- the smart contract counts the votes corresponding to the Link result of 0 in the fifth step, that is, the valid votes.
- the election committee decrypts the clear text of the ballot by running Dec(C i ,esk), calculates the election results and publishes, and gives the corresponding calculation of the election results. Zero knowledge proof.
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Abstract
Description
Claims (7)
- 一种基于区块链的可追踪的匿名电子投票方法,其特征在于,所述的匿名电子投票方法包括:S1、公共参数生成步骤,通过参数生成算法Setup(1 λ),输入安全参数1 λ,输出系统的公共参数PP和主公私钥对(MPK,MSK),其中,MPK为主公钥,MSK为主私钥,λ是正整数;S2、用户注册步骤,用户V i向认证中心提交个人信息,通过证书生成算法CertGen(MSK,pk i),输入主私钥MSK和用户V i的公钥pk i,输出证书cert i,其中,i是正整数;S3、加密选票步骤,通过加密算法Enc(m i,epk),输入消息m i和加密公钥epk,输出密文C i,其中,m i表示选票内容,C i表示加密选票;S4、选票匿名认证步骤,通过认证算法Auth(Num||C i,pk i,sk i,cert i,MPK,PP),输入选举标识号Num、加密选票C i、公私钥对pk i和sk i、证书cert i、主公钥MPK以及公共参数PP,输出证明π i,其中,符号“||”表示将两个消息串联;S5、投票步骤,将加密选票C i和其对应的证明π i组合在一起,并投出(C i,π i);S6、验票步骤,通过验证算法Verify(Num||C i,π i,MPK,PP),输入选举标识号Num、加密选票C i、证明π i、主公钥MPK以及公共参数PP,输出验证结果0或1;S7、链接步骤,通过链接算法Link(C 1,C 2,π 1,π 2),输入两个加密选票C 1和C 2以及对应的两个证明π 1和π 2,输出链接结果0或1;S8、追踪步骤,通过追踪算法Trace(π 1,π 2),输入两个证明π 1和π 2,输出求解到的公钥pk i;S9、计票步骤,通过解密算法Dec(C i,esk),输入加密选票C i和解密私钥esk,输出明文m i,将有效选票汇总,统计投票结果。
- 根据权利要求1所述的基于区块链的可追踪的匿名电子投票方法,其特征在于,所述的步骤S4中算法Auth(Num||C i,pk i,sk i,cert i,MPK,PP)具体如下:S41、算法Auth首先计算两个标签t 1和t 2,即t 1=H(Num,sk i),t 2=H(Num,pk i)+C i·pk i,其中,Num是选举标识号,pk i和sk i分别是选民的公钥和私钥,C i是加密选票,H是密码学中Hash算法;S42、算法Auth要求用户提供私有证据 以证明公开知识 是正确生成的,对于 存在 使得{CertVrfy(Cert i,pk i,MPK)=1^pair(pk i,sk i)=1^t 1=H(Num,sk i)^t 2=H(Num,pk i)+C i·pk i}恒成立;其中,算法CertVrfy(cert i,pk i,MPK)是密码学中签名验证算法,输入证书cert i、公钥pk i和主公钥MPK,输出验证结果0或1;算法pair(pk i,sk i)是密码学中密钥验证算法,输入公钥pk i和私钥sk i,输出配对结果0或1;S44、算法Auth最后输出证明π i=(t 1,t 2,η)。
- 根据权利要求1所述的基于区块链的可追踪的匿名电子投票方法,其特征在于,所述的步骤S5中将加密选票C i和其对应的证明π i组合在一起,并通过区块链地址以交易的形式将(C i,π i)发送到区块链网络中。
- 根据权利要求1所述的基于区块链的可追踪的匿名电子投票方法,其特征在于,所述的步骤S7中算法Link(C 1,C 2,π 1,π 2)检查π 1和π 2中两个t 1的值是否相同,若相同则输出1,表明用户投票两次,即双投;否则,输出0,表明用户投票一次。
- 根据权利要求1所述的基于区块链的可追踪的匿名电子投票方法,其特征在于,所述的步骤S9具体如下:S91、将步骤S7中输出结果为0的有效加密选票汇总,通过算法Dec(C i,esk)对其进行解密,其中,C i为密文,esk为解密私钥;S92、统计解密结果,得到选举结果,同时给出计算选举结果的相应零知识证明。
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