WO2020114240A1 - Procédé et système de protection de confidentialité de données d'authentification de contrat intelligent à base de preuve de connaissance nulle - Google Patents

Procédé et système de protection de confidentialité de données d'authentification de contrat intelligent à base de preuve de connaissance nulle Download PDF

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WO2020114240A1
WO2020114240A1 PCT/CN2019/119520 CN2019119520W WO2020114240A1 WO 2020114240 A1 WO2020114240 A1 WO 2020114240A1 CN 2019119520 W CN2019119520 W CN 2019119520W WO 2020114240 A1 WO2020114240 A1 WO 2020114240A1
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verification
key
data
zero
generate
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PCT/CN2019/119520
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English (en)
Chinese (zh)
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万志国
管章双
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山东大学
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Priority to US17/057,758 priority Critical patent/US11411737B2/en
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
    • G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
    • G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3218—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using proof of knowledge, e.g. Fiat-Shamir, GQ, Schnorr, ornon-interactive zero-knowledge proofs
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/602—Providing cryptographic facilities or services
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
    • H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
    • H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/061—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key exchange, e.g. in peer-to-peer networks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
    • H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/12—Applying verification of the received information
    • H04L63/126—Applying verification of the received information the source of the received data
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to the field of blockchain technology, and in particular to a method and system for privacy protection of smart contract authentication data based on zero-knowledge proofs.
  • Smart contracts are programs that run on the blockchain, and their execution must be confirmed by consensus.
  • the existence of smart contracts enables the blockchain to handle more complex logic than fund transfer.
  • the combination of blockchain technology and smart contracts has been applied in many fields: finance, insurance, notarization, real estate, lottery, voting, supply chain, smart grid, medical insurance, Internet of Things, and cloud computing.
  • Zero-knowledge proof refers to a method in which the prover knows or possesses a certain message, and can make the verifier believe that a certain conclusion is correct without providing any useful information to the verifier.
  • a large number of facts prove that if zero-knowledge proof can be used for data authentication, it will effectively solve many problems.
  • the latest technologies for zero-knowledge proofs are zk-SNARKs (zero-knowledge, Succinct, Non-interactive, ARgument, Knowledge), zk-STARKs (zero-knowledge, Scalable, ARguments, Knowledge), Bulletproofs, etc.
  • zk-SNARK has been successfully applied to the anonymous digital currency ZeroCash.
  • Digital signature is a combination of public key encryption technology and digital digest technology. Digital signatures are equivalent to traditional handwritten signatures in many ways, and have legal significance in some countries. Properly implemented digital signatures are more difficult to forge than handwriting types. In addition, some undeniable digital signature schemes can provide time stamps, even if the private key is leaked, the validity of the signature can be guaranteed.
  • the present disclosure provides a smart contract authentication data privacy protection method based on zero-knowledge proofs, which has the guarantee of the privacy and authenticity of the input data, and without the leakage of sensitive information, everyone can Verify the authenticity of the data;
  • the first aspect of the present disclosure provides a smart contract authentication data privacy protection method based on zero knowledge proof
  • the privacy protection method of smart contract authentication data based on zero-knowledge proof includes:
  • Initialization steps Initialize, enter security parameters, and obtain public parameters; the trusted data certification agency DA generates public and private key pairs;
  • the key pair generation step taking the common parameters and the verification circuit as input, to generate a key pair, the key pair including a certification key and a verification key;
  • Data authentication step use the private key of the trusted data authentication agency DA to sign and authenticate the private data of the user DU of the decentralized application and generate a signature;
  • the user DU prover terminal of the decentralized application uses the personal private data as the input value of the verification circuit, and the calculation result and hash value are input into the verification circuit as the output value of the verification circuit;
  • the user DU uses the certification key to generate a zero-knowledge certificate;
  • Verification steps the verifier uses the verification key to verify whether the zero-knowledge proof is correct; the verification passes to prove that the calculation result is correct, otherwise the calculation result is proved to be wrong; the verifier executes the smart contract based on the verification result.
  • the input of the security parameters obtains the public parameters; specifically, it refers to: input the security parameters and obtain the public parameters using the zero-knowledge system ZKP;
  • the security parameter refers to the security parameter ⁇ ;
  • the use of the zero-knowledge system ZKP to obtain the common parameters refers to: the use of the ZKP.Setup(1 ⁇ ) of the zero-knowledge proof system ZKP to obtain the common parameters pp.
  • the generation of the public key and the private key pair by the trusted data certification authority DA means that the trusted data certification authority DA selects a digital signature mechanism to generate the public/private key pair.
  • the trusted data certification agency DA publishes the public key.
  • the DA trusted certificate authority public key data announced means: the trusted certification authority data DA to (pp, pk a) announced.
  • DA trusted data authentication agencies
  • the public parameter and the verification circuit are used as input to generate a key pair; where the verification circuit specifically refers to:
  • the user's private data needs to meet the conditions, such as the user's health status, income and other private information must meet the given insurance conditions.
  • the public parameter and verification circuit are used as input to generate a key pair; specifically, it refers to:
  • the zero-knowledge proof system ZKP is run to generate a key pair.
  • the public parameter and verification circuit are used as input to generate a key pair; it is completed by a trusted third-party organization or through a trusted process.
  • the trusted third-party organization includes but is not limited to digital certificate authentication Centers, national institutions, etc.
  • the zero-knowledge proof system ZKP is run to generate a key pair, which is allowed to be generated by multiple trusted agencies or generated by a trusted process.
  • the public parameter and verification circuit are used as input to generate a key pair; specifically, it refers to:
  • the use of the private key of the trusted data authentication agency DA to sign and authenticate the personal private data of the user DU of the decentralized application and generate a signature; means:
  • Trusted data certification agency DA will keep personal private data And the signed private key sk a as input, run DataAuth(sk a , ) Algorithm to sign and authenticate the data and generate a signature ⁇ a .
  • the user DU prover terminal of the decentralized application uses the private data as the input value of the verification circuit, and the calculation result and the hash value as the output value of the verification circuit are input into the verification circuit; means:
  • Decentralized application user DU prover terminal will private data As the input value of the verification circuit C, the calculation result R and the hash value h are input to the verification circuit C as the output value of the verification circuit C.
  • the user DU of the decentralized application generates a certificate; it means that the user DU of the decentralized application executes the zero-knowledge proof system ZKP to generate the certificate.
  • the user DU of the decentralized application generates a certificate; it means that the user DU of the decentralized application executes ZKP.Prove(pk, ZKP. R,h) The algorithm generates proof ⁇ .
  • the verifier verifies whether the proof is correct; if the verification is passed, it proves that the calculation result is correct; otherwise, it proves that the calculation result is wrong; it means:
  • the verifier V runs the Verify(vk,pk a , ⁇ ,R,h, ⁇ a ) algorithm to verify that ⁇ is correct; if it passes, it proves that the calculation result R is correct, otherwise it proves that the calculation result R is wrong.
  • the second aspect of the present disclosure provides a smart contract authentication data privacy protection system based on zero knowledge proof
  • Smart contract authentication data privacy protection system based on zero-knowledge proof including:
  • the initialization module is configured to: input security parameters, perform initialization and obtain public parameters; the trusted data certification authority DA generates public and private key pairs;
  • a key pair generation module which is configured to: take a common parameter and a verification circuit as input to generate a key pair, the key pair including a certification key and a verification key;
  • the data authentication module is configured to: use the private key of the trusted data authentication agency DA to perform signature authentication and generate a signature on the personal private data of the user DU of the decentralized application;
  • Generate a certification module which is configured to: the user DU certifier terminal of the decentralized application uses personal private data as the input value of the verification circuit, and the calculation result and hash value as the output value of the verification circuit are input into the verification circuit; The user DU of the decentralized application uses the proof key to generate a zero-knowledge proof;
  • the verification certification module is configured to: the verifier uses the verification key to verify whether the zero-knowledge proof is correct; the verification passes to prove that the calculation result is correct, otherwise the calculation result is proved to be wrong; the verifier executes the smart contract based on the verification result.
  • the initialization module of the system further includes:
  • the trusted data authentication agency DA constructs a verification circuit according to the calculation tasks required by the decentralized application DApp based on the smart contract.
  • the present disclosure also provides an electronic device, including a memory and a processor, and computer instructions stored on the memory and running on the processor.
  • the computer instructions are executed by the processor, the first aspect is completed Method steps.
  • the present disclosure also provides a computer-readable storage medium for storing computer instructions, which when executed by a processor, completes the steps of the method of the first aspect.
  • the technology proposed in this disclosure guarantees the authenticity and privacy of the data of the smart contract, and will not disclose the input data to others, ensuring the authenticity of the input data.
  • the present disclosure can be used in various blockchain systems to ensure the authenticity and privacy of data.
  • the proof generated by the end user is provided through the blockchain recording service, and any verifier can perform access verification to truly achieve decentralization.
  • FIG. 1 is a flow chart of the method of the first embodiment
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a basic verification circuit for authentication data privacy protection according to the first embodiment.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a system framework of a smart contract authentication data privacy protection method based on zero-knowledge proof in Embodiment 1.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a system framework of a smart contract authentication data privacy protection method based on zero-knowledge proof in Embodiment 1.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a verification circuit for protecting authentication data privacy protection for outputting plain text in Embodiment 1.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a verification circuit for protecting authentication data privacy protection for outputting plain text in Embodiment 1.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a verification circuit for protecting privacy of authentication data to prevent fraud by malicious users according to the first embodiment.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a system framework implemented by using Ethereum and zk-SNARKs as an example in Embodiment 1.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of a system framework implemented by using Ethereum and zk-SNARKs as an example in Embodiment 1.
  • Zero Knowledge Proof System Zero Knowledge Proof, ZKP
  • Transaction Similar to the transfer transaction of digital currency in Bitcoin, called transaction in this application; a block contains multiple transactions, and the miner runs a consensus algorithm to add the block to the block On the chain.
  • Embodiment 1 this embodiment provides a privacy protection method for smart contract authentication data based on zero-knowledge proof
  • the privacy protection method of smart contract authentication data based on zero-knowledge proof includes:
  • Initialization steps input security parameters, perform initialization and obtain public parameters; trusted data certification authority DA generates public and private key pairs;
  • the key pair generation step taking the common parameters and the verification circuit as input, to generate a key pair, the key pair including a certification key and a verification key;
  • Data authentication step use the private key of the trusted data authentication agency DA to sign and authenticate the private data of the user DU of the decentralized application and generate a signature;
  • the user DU prover terminal of the decentralized application uses the personal private data as the input value of the verification circuit, and the calculation result and hash value are input into the verification circuit as the output value of the verification circuit;
  • the user DU uses the certification key to generate a zero-knowledge certificate;
  • Verification steps the verifier uses the verification key to verify whether the zero-knowledge proof is correct; the verification passes to prove that the calculation result is correct, otherwise the calculation result is proved to be wrong; the verifier executes the smart contract based on the verification result.
  • the privacy protection method of smart contract authentication data based on zero-knowledge proof includes:
  • Trusted data certification agency DA Data Authenticator
  • decentralized application user DU DApp
  • validator V Validator
  • smart contract-based decentralized application DApp Decentralized App
  • Step (1) Initialization: Enter the safety parameter ⁇ , perform initialization, and use the ZKP.Setup(1 ⁇ ) of the zero-knowledge proof system ZKP to obtain the public parameter pp;
  • Step (2) Generate a key pair: take the common parameter pp and the verification circuit C as inputs, run the ZKP.KeyGen(pp,C) algorithm of the zero-knowledge proof system ZKP, and generate a key pair (pk, vk), where the proof The key pk is used to generate the certificate, and the verification key vk is used to verify the certificate;
  • the zero-knowledge proof system of step (1) includes:
  • the zero-knowledge proof system ZKP (Setup, KeyGen, Prove, Verify) is, but not limited to, zk-SNARKs, zk-STARKs and Bulletproofs;
  • ZKP.Setup(1 ⁇ ) is used to initialize the common parameter pp of the zero-knowledge proof system
  • ZKP.KeyGen (pp, C) is used to generate the proof key pair (pk, vk), where the proof key pk is used to generate the proof, and the verification key vk is used to verify the proof;
  • the common parameter pp is initialized only once, and the common parameter pp is used for ZKP.KeyGen (pp, C) to generate a key pair, and calculation of proof generation and verification.
  • ⁇ .KeyGen(1 ⁇ ) is used to initialize the signature algorithm and generate the signature key pair (pk a ,sk a );
  • ⁇ .Sign (sk a , data) is used to sign the data data and generate a signature ⁇ a ;
  • ⁇ .Verify(pk a ,data, ⁇ a ) is used to verify the signature ⁇ a .
  • the calculation task in step (1) includes:
  • the decentralized application DApp based on the smart contract constructs an arithmetic equation according to calculation requirements; the user DU of the decentralized application proves to the DApp that the data provided by it meets the equation relationship.
  • the decentralized application User DU proves to the decentralized application DApp based on smart contract that he knows that the hash primitive corresponding to h is x 1 ,x 2 ,...,x n ,r,ID,T, but does not report to the smart based
  • the decentralized application DApp of the contract leaks x 1 , x 2 ,..., x n and r;
  • the same calculation task uses the same verification circuit, and the circuit is repeatable.
  • the verification circuit C in step (1) is constructed:
  • the calculation result R and the hash value h required by the decentralized application DApp are used as the output of the verification circuit C to prove that the calculation result R required by the decentralized application DApp is indeed Data certified by the trusted data certification agency DA Calculated as input;
  • the verification circuit C includes a combination of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, comparison, or hash calculation, and the form of the combination is determined according to the requirements for verifying the user's private data required by the decentralized application DApp based on the smart contract.
  • the key pair (pk, vk) is initialized only once.
  • the step (2) taking the public parameter pp and the verification circuit C as input refers to being completed by a trusted third-party organization or a trusted process.
  • the DataAuth(sk a of step (3) The specific steps of the algorithm are:
  • the trusted data authentication agency DA uses the identity ID of the user DU of the decentralized application and the current time T to input the private of the DU Expand, after expansion, it becomes ( ID,T);
  • the trusted data certification authority DA is based on the private key sk a and runs the ⁇ .Sign(sk a ,h) algorithm for extended private input
  • the hash value of the generated signature ⁇ a ⁇ .Sign(sk a ,Hash( ⁇ x 1 ,x 2 ,...,x n ,r>
  • Hash() includes but is not limited to SHA256 and SHA3 hash functions.
  • the calculation result R of the step (4) is a calculation result required by the decentralized application DApp, and this value is input by the private user DU of the decentralized application Calculated in combination with the public correlation coefficient published by the decentralized application DApp.
  • Verify the step (5) of the concrete steps (vk, pk a, ⁇ , R, h, ⁇ a) of the algorithm is:
  • the verifier V will verify the signed public key pk a , the hash value h and the signature ⁇ a , and enter it into the signature verification algorithm ⁇ .Verify(pk a ,h, ⁇ a ) to verify whether the signature ⁇ a of the hash value h Valid; if invalid, output 0;
  • the privacy protection method of smart contract authentication data based on zero-knowledge proof includes:
  • Trusted data certification agency DA DataAuthenticator
  • smart contract-based decentralized application user DU DApp
  • validator V Validator
  • smart contract-based decentralized application DApp DecentralizedApp
  • the data certification authority is an independent and trusted data source.
  • the DA will generate reliable data and use its private key sk a to sign the data of the DApp user DU.
  • DA knows when the data is generated and the data owner, but it will never disclose this data to other DApp users DU.
  • Each DU DApp user can use the public key pk a corresponding signature verification data.
  • the DU needs to take its own private real data as input to obtain the decentralized service provided by the DApp. Due to privacy issues, the DU hopes to protect privacy while enjoying the service.
  • the validator V is a blockchain maintainer (miner), used to verify transactions submitted to the blockchain system.
  • the verifiers run consensus algorithms to generate new blocks containing verified transactions.
  • smart contracts can be executed on the blockchain.
  • the decentralized application provides services in the form of smart contracts on the blockchain.
  • a decentralized medical insurance plan provides individuals with insurance services in the form of decentralized smart contracts.
  • the DApp user DU sends a service request to the DApp (smart contract), which includes the calculation result required by the DApp, the hash value, proof, and signature of the DU private input.
  • the verifier V verifies the service request, the DApp provides services for its users.
  • the DU takes three vectors as input: the first vector is the private data vector of the DU
  • the second vector is the common parameter vector Used to calculate the calculation result R required by the DApp
  • the third vector is auxiliary data Among them, ID, T and r are the identity of the DU, time information and random number, and the random number r is used to obfuscate the input of the DU of the DApp user.
  • the DU converts three vectors As the input of the verification circuit for authentication data privacy protection, the calculation result R and the hash value h are used as the output of the verification circuit for authentication data privacy protection.
  • the calculation result R is necessary for the DApp to perform certain operations, and the hash value h is used for verification Authenticity.
  • the zero-knowledge proof system generates a zero-knowledge proof ⁇ for a verification circuit that authenticates data privacy protection.
  • the DU sends the following variables to the DApp to verify the correctness of the calculation result: prove ⁇ , vector with Calculation result R, hash value h and digital signature ⁇ a on h.
  • the DApp verifies that R is indeed with The result of the calculation, and the hash value h is indeed passed with Calculated to ensure that the same To generate R and h.
  • the DApp checks the validity of the signature ⁇ a to ensure that Authenticity.
  • the privacy protection method of smart contract authentication data based on zero-knowledge proof is composed of 5 steps, which are described in detail below.
  • ZKP.Setup(1 ⁇ ) is used to initialize the common parameter pp of the zero-knowledge proof system;
  • ZKP.KeyGen(pp,C) is used to generate the proof key pair (pk,vk), where the proof key pk is used to generate the proof, The verification key vk is used to verify the proof;
  • ZKP.Prove(pk, R,h) is used to generate proof ⁇ , prove that the calculation result R is made of real and valid data Calculated;
  • ZKP.Verify(vk, ⁇ , R,h) is used to verify the proof ⁇ to judge the data The true validity of the calculation and the correctness of the calculation result R; when the same verification circuit is used in the zero-knowledge proof system, the common parameter pp is initialized only once, and the common parameter pp is used for
  • ⁇ .KeyGen(1 ⁇ ) is used to initialize the signature algorithm and generate the signature key pair (pk a ,sk a );
  • ⁇ .Sign(sk a ,data) is used to sign the data data and generate the signature ⁇ a ;
  • ⁇ .Verify(pk a ,data, ⁇ a ) is used to verify the signature ⁇ a .
  • the DApp constructs a circuit according to the requirements of private data verification; the user DU of the decentralized application proves to the decentralized application DApp based on the smart contract that the private data provided by it meets the verification circuit relationship.
  • the decentralized application User DU proves to the decentralized application DApp based on smart contract that he knows that the hash primitive corresponding to h is x 1 ,x 2 ,...,x n ,r,ID,T, but does not report to the smart based
  • the decentralized application DApp of the contract leaks x 1 , x 2 ,..., x n and r; the same calculation task uses the same verification circuit, and the verification circuit is repeatable.
  • the verification circuit C inputs the secret of the DU Common parameter vector And auxiliary data As the input of the verification circuit, the calculation result R and hash value h required by the decentralized application DApp based on the smart contract are output as the verification circuit to prove the calculation required by the decentralized application DApp based on the smart contract
  • the result R is indeed the data certified by the trusted data certification agency DA And common parameter vectors It is calculated as input, as shown in FIG. 2; the verification circuit C can perform a combination of addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, comparison, and hash circuits to implement a more complicated verification circuit.
  • the trusted third party takes the public parameter pp and the verification circuit C as inputs, runs the ZKP.KeyGen (pp, C) algorithm of the zero-knowledge proof system ZKP, and generates a key pair (pk, vk), which proves The key pk is used to generate the certificate, and the verification key vk is used to verify the certificate.
  • the zero-knowledge proof system may be, but not limited to, zk-SNARKs, zk-STARKs, and Bulletproofs; when the same verification circuit is used in the zero-knowledge proof system, the common parameter pp and key pair (pk, vk) Only initialize once.
  • the DU requests the DA to obtain its personal data Trusted data certification agency DA will keep personal private data And the signed private key sk a as input, run DataAuth(sk a , ) Algorithm to sign and authenticate the data and generate a signature ⁇ a .
  • the DA will verify Authenticity, and will Associated with the ID identification of the DU.
  • T); the DA is based on the private key sk a and runs the ⁇ .Sign(sk a ,h) algorithm as Extended private input Generates a signature ⁇ a ⁇ .Sign(sk a ,Hash( ⁇ x 1 ,x 2 ,...,x n ,r>
  • D. DApp service request the DU checks DApp rules and obtains public input from the DApp
  • the DU gets its private data (Extended with r) and auxiliary input And the calculation result R and hash value h required by the DApp.
  • the DU performs ZKP. Prove (pk, ZKP. R,h) algorithm to obtain proof ⁇ .
  • the DU sends a service request including ( ⁇ , R, h, ⁇ a ) to the DApp.
  • the request will be sent to the blockchain in the form of a transaction (Tx) at the DApp address.
  • calculation result R is a calculation result required by the DApp, and the value is entered through the private input of the DU Combined with the public correlation coefficient published by the DApp Calculated.
  • each of the validators V runs the corresponding function of the DApp smart contract, which calls Verify(vk,pk a , ⁇ , R,h, ⁇ a ) algorithm. If the output of the verification function is 0, the verifier V will discard the transaction; the output of the verification function is 1, the verifier V executes the DApp with the calculation result R.
  • the implementation of DApp depends on the consensus of the verifiers, so only when most of the verifiers accept the certificate can the proof of DApp verification be valid.
  • the Verify (vk, pk a, ⁇ , R,h, ⁇ a )
  • the specific steps of the algorithm are as follows: the verifier V will input the signature public key pk a , hash value h and signature ⁇ a into the signature verification algorithm ⁇ .Verify(pk a ,h, ⁇ a ), verify whether the signature ⁇ a of the hash value h is valid; if it is invalid, output 0; if valid, continue to use the ZKP.Verify(vk, ⁇ , R,h) Verify that ⁇ is correct. If both verifications are passed, then prove that the calculation result R is correct, otherwise prove that the calculation result R is wrong.
  • any DApp with a fixed verification circuit can be executed using the above process based on the zero-knowledge proof technology to protect the privacy of the DU.
  • a DApp with a limited cycle can also be realized.
  • the complicated calculation verification circuit will cause the cost of the prover (ie DU) to increase.
  • the zero-knowledge proof technology no matter how complicated the DApp calculation function is, the calculation cost of the verifier is fixed.
  • the verification circuit takes the calculation result R as an output, and it is open to every user.
  • a similar zero-knowledge proof algorithm can be used to generate proofs for R without revealing R.
  • DU can also pay R amount as a premium to protect output and payment privacy.
  • the DA can be constructed to correspond to the verification circuit shown in FIG. 4; the DU uses the ZKP.Prove() algorithm to generate a corresponding verification circuit certificate. Note that the output of the calculation circuit will be used as the input of the payment circuit, so the output of the calculation circuit is hidden from other outputs.
  • a security credential scheme should be used to generate the ID of the DU to distinguish the DU.
  • the ID identification of the DU can be used as a private input of two SHA256 circuits, as shown in the circuit of FIG. 5.
  • the first SHA256 circuit outputs h, which matches the proof of previous insurance payment.
  • the second SHA256 circuit outputs h', which must be signed by the DA of the insurance claim.
  • the system framework of the smart contract authentication data privacy protection method based on zero-knowledge proofs can be implemented by a combination of three major modules, including a decentralized application DApp based on smart contracts, a zero-knowledge proof module, and a blockchain system.
  • the zero-knowledge proof modules may be, but not limited to, zk-SNARKs, zk-STARKs and Bulletproofs.
  • the DApp is a smart contract running on the blockchain.
  • the blockchain may be but not limited to Ethereum.
  • a specific example is the medical insurance plan, which requires a medical report certified by the hospital to register.
  • the decentralized application DApp user DU based on smart contract is the person who wants to sign the plan, the data certification agency DA is a trusted hospital, the verifier V is the blockchain maintainer, and the DApp is a decentralized medical insurance smart contract ,As shown in Figure 3.
  • the authentication data privacy protection scheme of the medical insurance smart contract is shown in Figure 6. This specific example is used to illustrate the following:
  • A. System settings: Enter the safety parameter ⁇ 80, run zk-SNARKs.Setup(1 ⁇ ) to obtain the public parameter pp. Select ECDSA as the selected secure digital signature mechanism.
  • a verification circuit C is constructed, as shown in FIG. 2, FIG. 4 or FIG. 5.
  • DA runs DataAuth(sk a , )
  • DA will verify Authenticity, and will Associated with the ID identification of the DU.
  • the DU sends a service request containing ( ⁇ , R, h, ⁇ a ) to the DApp.
  • the request will be sent to the blockchain in the form of a transaction (Tx) at the DApp address.
  • the compensation amount R will be output through the claim calculation circuit, and the amount will be paid to the DU through the payment circuit, as shown in FIG. 5.
  • Embodiment 2 provides a smart contract authentication data privacy protection system based on zero-knowledge proof
  • Smart contract authentication data privacy protection system based on zero-knowledge proof including:
  • An initialization module which is configured to: initialize, enter security parameters, and obtain public parameters; the trusted data certification authority DA generates public and private key pairs;
  • a key pair generation module which is configured to: take a common parameter and a verification circuit as input to generate a key pair, the key pair including a certification key and a verification key;
  • the data authentication module is configured to: use the private key of the trusted data authentication agency DA to perform signature authentication and generate a signature on the personal private data of the user DU of the decentralized application;
  • Generate a certification module which is configured to: the user DU certifier terminal of the decentralized application uses personal private data as the input value of the verification circuit, and the calculation result and hash value as the output value of the verification circuit are input into the verification circuit; The user DU of the decentralized application uses the proof key to generate a zero-knowledge proof;
  • the verification certification module is configured to: the verifier uses the verification key to verify whether the zero-knowledge proof is correct; the verification passes to prove that the calculation result is correct, otherwise the calculation result is proved to be wrong; the verifier executes the smart contract based on the verification result.
  • Embodiment 3 also provides an electronic device, including a memory and a processor, and computer instructions stored on the memory and running on the processor. When the computer instructions are executed by the processor, the first embodiment is completed. Describe the steps of the method.
  • Embodiment 4 This embodiment also provides a computer-readable storage medium for storing computer instructions. When the computer instructions are executed by a processor, the steps of the method in Embodiment 1 are completed.

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Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé et un système de protection de confidentialité de données d'authentification de contrat intelligent à preuve de connaissance nulle, comprenant les étapes consistant à : initialiser et fournir en entrée un paramètre de sécurité pour obtenir un paramètre public ; une autorité de certification de données de confiance DA générant des paires de clés publiques et privées ; générer une paire de clés à l'aide du paramètre public et d'un circuit de vérification en tant qu'entrées, la paire de clés comprenant une clé de certification et une clé de vérification ; vérifier, à l'aide d'une paire de clés privées de l'autorité de certification de données de confiance DA, la signature de données privées personnelles d'un utilisateur DU d'une application décentralisée et générer une signature ; le terminal de certification d'utilisateur DU fournit en entrée , à l'aide des données privées personnelles en tant que valeur d'entrée du circuit de vérification, un résultat de calcul et une valeur de hachage qui sert de valeur de sortie du circuit de vérification dans le circuit de vérification ; l'utilisateur DU utilisant une clé de certification pour générer une preuve de connaissance nulle ; un vérificateur utilisant la clé de vérification pour vérifier si la preuve de connaissance nulle est correcte ; le passage de la vérification certifie que le résultat de calcul est correct, sinon il est certifié que le résultat de calcul est erroné ; et le vérificateur exécute un contrat intelligent sur la base du résultat de vérification.
PCT/CN2019/119520 2018-12-06 2019-11-19 Procédé et système de protection de confidentialité de données d'authentification de contrat intelligent à base de preuve de connaissance nulle WO2020114240A1 (fr)

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CN109614820A (zh) * 2018-12-06 2019-04-12 山东大学 基于零知识证明的智能合约认证数据隐私保护方法

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WO2022234324A1 (fr) * 2021-05-04 2022-11-10 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Preuve à divulgation nulle de connaissance de calcul de contrat intelligent à l'aide d'une entrée privée
CN113469827A (zh) * 2021-07-23 2021-10-01 电子科技大学 一种基于混合智能合约的保险理赔装置及方法
CN113469827B (zh) * 2021-07-23 2023-04-18 电子科技大学 一种基于混合智能合约的保险理赔装置及方法
CN113794567A (zh) * 2021-09-13 2021-12-14 上海致居信息科技有限公司 一种sha256哈希算法零知识证明电路的合成加速方法及装置
CN113794567B (zh) * 2021-09-13 2024-04-05 上海致居信息科技有限公司 一种sha256哈希算法零知识证明电路的合成加速方法及装置
CN114793228A (zh) * 2022-03-29 2022-07-26 上海万向区块链股份公司 基于零知识证明防止商户作恶的数据源筛选方法和系统

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