WO2020088515A1

WO2020088515A1 - Security authentication method and apparatus for pos user public key, and terminal device

Info

Publication number: WO2020088515A1
Application number: PCT/CN2019/114320
Authority: WO
Inventors: 刘绍海; 李坚强
Original assignee: 百富计算机技术（深圳）有限公司
Priority date: 2018-10-30
Filing date: 2019-10-30
Publication date: 2020-05-07
Also published as: CN109523258A

Abstract

A security authentication method and apparatus for a POS user public key, and a terminal device. The method comprises: upon running firmware for the first time, randomly generating a first key (S101); downloading a user public key, and generating a first ciphertext on the basis of the first key and the user public key (S102); and upon downloading an application, verifying whether the user public key is correct on the basis of the first key and the first ciphertext (S103). The present method employs a key generated by the terminal itself to encrypt the user public key, so as to effectively prevent a man-in-the-middle event caused by an unauthorized user of the terminal altering the user public key, thereby preventing the terminal from running unauthorized payment applications and improving security of the terminal.

Description

POS user public key security authentication method, device and terminal equipment

Technical field

The invention belongs to the technical field of terminal processing, and particularly relates to a POS user public key security authentication method, device and terminal equipment.

Background technique

POS (Point Of Sale, sales terminal) is generally purchased by the payment company, and leased or provided to the merchant for free, the payment company charges a payment processing fee. Due to the rapid development of domestic third-party payment and increasingly fierce competition, many third-party payment companies will guide merchants to illegally run their own payment applications on POS by providing preferential handling fees, profiting from them, and destroying customers themselves. Interests. In the prior art, POS still has a problem of cutting machine loopholes and low security.

technical problem

In view of this, the embodiments of the present invention provide a POS user public key security authentication method, device, and terminal device to solve the problem that the POS still has a machine-cutting loophole in the prior art and the security is not high.

Technical solution

The first aspect of the embodiments of the present invention provides a POS user public key security authentication method, including:

The first key is randomly generated when the firmware is run for the first time;

Download the user public key, and generate a first ciphertext according to the first key and the user public key;

When downloading the application program, verify whether the user public key is correct according to the first key and the first ciphertext.

Optionally, the randomly generating the first key includes:

Access the fuse area of the central processor and determine whether data exists in the fuse area;

When data exists in the fuse area, set the data of the fuse area as the first key;

When there is no data in the fuse area, a first key is randomly generated and written into the fuse area.

Optionally, the generating the first ciphertext according to the first key and the user public key includes:

Store the user public key in the Flash area of the central processor;

Obtain the first key of the fuse area, and encrypt the user public key of the flash area according to the first key to generate a first ciphertext;

Store the first ciphertext in the Flash area.

Optionally, when downloading the application, verifying whether the user public key is correct according to the first key and the first ciphertext includes:

When downloading the application program, read the first key of the fuse area and the first ciphertext of the Flash area;

Decrypt the first ciphertext according to the first key to obtain a first HASH value;

Calculate the HASH value of the user public key in the Flash area to obtain a second HASH value;

Judging whether the first HASH value and the second HASH value satisfy the preset condition, and verifying whether the user public key is correct according to the judgment result.

A second aspect of an embodiment of the present invention provides a user public key security authentication device, including:

The key generation module is used to randomly generate the first key when the firmware runs for the first time;

A ciphertext generation module, used to download the user's public key, and generate a first ciphertext according to the first key and the user's public key;

The public key verification module is used to verify whether the downloaded user public key is correct according to the first key and the first ciphertext when downloading the application program.

Optionally, the key generation module is specifically used for:

Optionally, the ciphertext generation module is specifically used to:

Store the user public key in the Flash area of the central processor;

Obtaining a first key of the fuse area, and encrypting the user public key of the flash area according to the first key to generate a first ciphertext;

Store the first ciphertext in the Flash area.

Optionally, the public key verification module is specifically used to:

Decrypt the first ciphertext according to the first key to obtain a first hash HASH value;

A third aspect of the embodiments of the present invention provides a terminal device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, when the processor executes the computer program The steps of implementing the POS user public key security authentication method as described in any one of the above.

A fourth aspect of the embodiments of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium that stores a computer program, and when the computer program is executed by a processor, implements the POS user public key as described in any one of the above The steps of the safety certification method.

Beneficial effect

Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the embodiments of the present invention are: when the firmware is first run, the first key is randomly generated, that is, the terminal generates the key itself, which reduces the complicated operation of external key injection, and at the same time The randomness of the generated key can prevent the illegal person from looking for the rule of generating the first key, and then avoid the terminal from being cut off by the illegal person to modify the user's public key; download the user's public key, according to the first key and the The user public key generates a first ciphertext, and when downloading the application, verify whether the user public key is correct according to the first key and the first ciphertext, that is, encrypt the user public key, effectively avoiding the terminal A machine cut-off event caused by an illegal person modifying or replacing a user's public key, thereby preventing the terminal from running other illegal application programs and improving the security of terminal payment.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION

In order to more clearly explain the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention, the following will briefly introduce the drawings required in the embodiments or the description of the prior art. Obviously, the drawings in the following description are only for the invention. In some embodiments, for those of ordinary skill in the art, without paying creative labor, other drawings may be obtained based on these drawings.

1 is a schematic diagram of an implementation process of a POS user public key security authentication method provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

2 is a schematic diagram of a specific implementation process of step S101 in FIG. 1;

FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a specific implementation of step S102 in FIG. 1;

4 is a schematic flowchart of a specific implementation of step S103 in FIG. 1;

5 is a schematic structural diagram of a user public key security authentication device provided by an embodiment of the present invention;

6 is a schematic diagram of a terminal device provided by an embodiment of the present invention.

Embodiments of the invention

In the following description, for the purpose of illustration rather than limitation, specific details such as a specific system structure and technology are proposed to thoroughly understand the embodiments of the present invention. However, those skilled in the art should understand that the present invention can also be implemented in other embodiments without these specific details. In other cases, detailed descriptions of well-known systems, devices, circuits, and methods are omitted so as not to obscure the description of the present invention with unnecessary details.

In order to explain the technical solutions of the present invention, the following will be described with specific embodiments.

Example one

Referring to FIG. 1, a schematic flowchart of an embodiment of a POS user public key security authentication method is provided, which is applicable to a POS, and the POS may include firmware and a central processing unit (Central Processing Unit, central processor).

An implementation process of the POS user public key security authentication method is detailed as follows:

In step S101, when the firmware runs for the first time, a first key is randomly generated.

For POS security, before downloading an application, you need to verify the legitimacy of the application to be downloaded, and only download authorized application files for installation. Application file refers to the file that needs to be downloaded to install the application. In order to mark application files authorized by users, users need to use encryption algorithms to encrypt application files authorized by themselves. The encryption algorithm generally used is an asymmetric encryption algorithm. The asymmetric encryption algorithm includes a public key (PUK, Public key) and a private key (PVK, Private key). Among them, the public key and the private key are paired. The content encrypted with the key can only be decrypted with the corresponding public key. Similarly, if the content encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key.

That is, when downloading the application, you need to sign with the private key first. After the signature verification is passed, the user's public key is downloaded to the POS, and then the user's public key is encrypted. When downloading the application, first verify the security of the user's public key , After the user's public key is verified, the user's public key is used to verify and sign the application. Only the application with a successful verification signature can be downloaded to the POS to run, that is, while ensuring the safety of the user's public key, the application is secured .

Specifically, the firmware randomly generates the first key when it runs for the first time. Exemplarily, when the firmware runs for the first time, the hardware random number module in the POS may be used to generate a 16-byte random number, and the 16-byte random number may be a 3DES key. The 3DES key is used as the encryption key of the user's public key, and the encryption key is randomly generated by the POS itself, which can reduce the complicated operation of external injection of the key, at the same time prevent illegal people from looking for the law of generating the key, and further increase the security of public key verification Sex.

In one embodiment, referring to FIG. 2, the specific implementation process of randomly generating the first key in step S101 includes:

Step S201, access the fuse area of the central processor, and determine whether data exists in the fuse area.

Among them, the central processing unit (CPU) may include a fuse area and a flash area. Among them, the fuse (fuse) area is a one-time program writing area, and subsequent modification is not allowed.

When the firmware runs for the first time, it accesses the fuse area of the central processor and judges whether data exists in the fuse area, that is, checks whether the first key exists in the fuse area.

Step S202: When data exists in the fuse area, set the data of the fuse area as the first key.

Step S203, when there is no data in the fuse area, a first key is randomly generated and written into the fuse area.

Exemplarily, when there is no data in the fuse area, a hardware random number module in the POS can be used to generate a 16-byte random number and write it into the fuse area. The 16-byte random number is used as a 3DES key for public The key is encrypted, and the 16-byte random number is directly read from the fuse area every time the firmware runs, and the public key is encrypted or decrypted. Among them, 3DES is a general term for the triple data encryption algorithm block password, which is equivalent to applying the DES encryption algorithm three times to the user public key to ensure the security of the user public key.

Step S102: Download the user public key, and generate a first ciphertext according to the first key and the user public key.

In actual applications, as long as the user's public key is modified or replaced, the illegal application program can be downloaded, so that the POS runs the illegal application program, thereby profiting from it, so protecting the user public key is very important. Specifically, in this embodiment, after the signature verification of the user public key is passed, the user public key is encrypted according to the first key to obtain the first ciphertext, that is, the user public key ciphertext, to prevent illegal persons from modifying the user public key . When verifying the user's public key, it is also necessary to decrypt the user's public key ciphertext through the decryption algorithm according to the first key to obtain the decrypted user public key HASH value (first HASH value), and then calculate the user saved on the Flash area Public key HASH value (second HASH value), if the two user public key HASH values are the same, the user public key verification is passed, the user public key is correct, and then use the user public key to verify the application, that is, complete the application download.

Exemplarily, the 3DES key is used to encrypt the user public key to obtain the first ciphertext.

In an embodiment, referring to FIG. 3, the specific implementation process of downloading the user public key in step S102 and generating the first ciphertext according to the first key and the user public key includes:

Step S301: Store the user public key in the Flash area of the central processor.

Among them, data in the Flash area will not be lost when the central processor is powered off or the terminal is powered off, so the user public key is stored in the Flash area to prevent data loss after restarting the terminal.

Step S302: Obtain a first key of the fuse area, and encrypt the user public key of the flash area according to the first key to generate a first ciphertext.

Step S303: Store the first ciphertext in the Flash area.

Step S103: When downloading the application program, verify whether the user public key is correct according to the first key and the first ciphertext.

Exemplarily, after customer A purchases the POS from the merchant, the private key of the merchant is first used to sign the public key of customer A, and then the public key of customer A is downloaded into the POS. At this time, the valid public key in the POS terminal The key is switched from the merchant's public key to the customer A's public key. The reason to use the private key of the merchant to sign the public key of customer A first is to prevent customers who are not authorized by the merchant from downloading their public keys to the POS machine.

Among them, the public key of the merchant is pre-stored in the POS machine. When the public key of the customer A is downloaded, the public key of the merchant is used to sign and verify the public key of the customer A. The verification is passed, and the public key of the customer A is downloaded. When the download is successful Then, encrypt the public key of customer A according to the randomly generated first key in the POS to obtain the first ciphertext. When downloading the application program to the POS, decrypt the first ciphertext according to the first key. The decrypted user public key verifies that the downloaded user public key is correct, for example, to verify whether the user public key (the public key of customer A stored in the FLASH area) when downloading the application matches the public key of the decrypted customer A, If they do not match, it means that the public key of customer A when downloading the application is illegal and has been tampered with. At this time, the application is refused to be downloaded, or customer A can be notified to return the POS to the factory for repair. The public key is correct, allowing the application to be downloaded.

When customer A wants to develop his next-level proxy customer B, he uses the private key of customer A to sign the public key of the next-level proxy customer B, and then downloads the public key of customer B to the POS. Similarly, After the download is successful, the public key of customer B is encrypted according to the first key randomly generated in the POS to obtain the first ciphertext, and when the application is downloaded to the POS, the download is verified according to the first ciphertext and the first key Is the public key of customer B correct, that is, only when the public key of customer B is correct, the authorized application is downloaded to the POS.

In one embodiment, when the application program is downloaded, when the user public key cannot be obtained, it means that the application program has not been encrypted correspondingly and belongs to an illegal application program, and directly refuses to download the application program file.

In an embodiment, referring to FIG. 4, the specific implementation process of verifying whether the user public key is correct according to the first key and the first ciphertext when downloading the application program in step S103 includes:

Step S401: When downloading the application program, read the first key of the fuse area and the first ciphertext of the Flash area.

Step S402: Decrypt the first ciphertext according to the first key to obtain a first HASH value.

The hash algorithm is to map a binary value of any length into a short fixed-length binary value. This short binary value is called a HASH value. HASH value is the only and extremely compact numerical representation of a piece of data. For a string, even if only one character in the string is changed, then the hash will produce different HASH values.

Specifically, the first ciphertext is decrypted according to the first key to obtain the decrypted user public key HASH value, that is, the first HASH value is obtained.

Step S403: Calculate the HASH value of the user public key in the Flash area to obtain a second HASH value.

Step S404, judging whether the first HASH value and the second HASH value satisfy the preset condition, and verifying whether the user public key is correct according to the judgment result.

Specifically, comparing the first HASH value with the second HASH value, if they do not match, it means that the first HASH value and the second HASH value do not satisfy the preset condition, and it is verified that the user public key is not correct.

Exemplarily, determine whether the first HASH value and the second HASH value are compared, and verify whether the first HASH value and the second HASH value match, if the first HASH value and the second HASH value match If the HASH value matches, verify that the user's public key is correct, then use the user's public key to verify the application, and download the application after verification; if the first HASH value and the second HASH value do not match, then It is verified that the user public key is incorrect, that is, the user public key when downloading the application is illegal, and the POS is directly returned to the factory for repair.

In an embodiment, a common POS attack method may include: an attacker cracks a first key, such as a 3DES key, to regenerate a user public key ciphertext (first ciphertext) and write it to the Flash area, so that the system can PUK verification process ". In this embodiment, since the first key is generated by the random number generation module provided by the CPU, the true randomness of the first key is guaranteed, so that the attacker cannot find the rule through big data analysis, so the first key It is very safe to produce. In addition, in terms of key storage, the first key is stored in the fuse area inside the CPU, and the system does not provide any API (Application Programming Interface (application programming interface), the application layer of the system does not have permission to operate to the fuse area, so the storage of the first key is very safe. In addition, in terms of algorithm, the 16-byte value can be used as the first key to encrypt the user's public key, and the encryption strength is high. Therefore, from the first key to the first key encryption algorithm, an attacker cannot crack it.

In an embodiment, a common POS attack method may further include: an attacker may attempt to modify the user public key saved in the Flash area so that the illegal application program passes verification. In this embodiment, the randomly generated first key is used to encrypt the user's public key to obtain the first ciphertext. Since the attacker does not know the first key, he cannot forge and generate the first ciphertext corresponding to the user's public key. , So in the end, because the user public key and the user public key ciphertext decrypted user public key (the first ciphertext) do not match, the user public key verification fails.

In an embodiment, common POS attack methods may further include: an attacker may try to copy data in the Flash area of a normal POS to a POS that needs to be cracked, or directly replace the Flash in the POS that needs to be cracked, In this embodiment, since the first keys of the two POS are randomly generated, the possibility of the same is very small, the first ciphertext generated will be different, so even if the normal public POS user key Put into the POS that needs to be cracked, the public key of the illegal user still cannot pass the verification.

In an embodiment, common POS attack methods may further include: an attacker may try to re-sold a new CPU and Flash to the machine that needs to be cracked to restore the machine to production state, and then re-download a new user public key to generate New user public key ciphertext, and save the user public key and user public key ciphertext to the Flash area at the same time. However, the POS in the production state cannot run ordinary application programs, and must be switched to the factory state to run the application programs. Therefore, although the purpose of modifying the user's public key is achieved in this way, the application cannot be run, and this POS attack method is invalid.

In this embodiment, the PUK is encrypted and stored in a one-machine-one-secure manner, which reduces the complicated operation of external key injection, which can effectively prevent the PUK in the POS machine from being tampered with and achieve the purpose of cutting the machine, which improves the POS machine The safety of the customer's interests is guaranteed. In addition, one machine has one key, even if this machine is cracked, other machines are safe.

The above POS user public key security authentication method randomly generates the first key when the firmware is run for the first time, that is, the terminal generates the key itself, which reduces the complicated operation of external key injection and generates the randomness of the key at the same time. It can prevent the illegal person from looking for the rule of generating the first key, and then avoid the terminal from being cut off by the illegal person to modify the user's public key; download the user's public key, and generate the first according to the first key and the user's public key Cipher text, when downloading an application, verify whether the user public key is correct according to the first key and the first cipher text, that is, encrypt the user public key, effectively avoiding the terminal from being modified or replaced by illegal persons The machine cut-off event caused by the public key prevents the terminal from running other illegal applications and improves the security of the terminal payment.

Those skilled in the art may understand that the size of the sequence numbers of the steps in the above embodiments does not mean that the execution order is sequential, and the execution order of each process should be determined by its function and inherent logic, and should not correspond to the implementation process of the embodiments of the present invention Constitute any limitation.

Example 2

Corresponding to the POS user public key security authentication method described in the first embodiment above, FIG. 5 shows a structural block diagram of the user public key security authentication device in the second embodiment of the present invention. For ease of explanation, only parts related to this embodiment are shown.

The device includes: a key generation module 110, a ciphertext generation module 120, and a public key verification module 130.

The key generation module 110 is used to randomly generate the first key when the firmware is run for the first time.

The ciphertext generation module 120 is used to download the user public key, and generate a first ciphertext according to the first key and the user public key.

The public key verification module 130 is used to verify whether the downloaded user public key is correct according to the first key and the first ciphertext when downloading the application program.

In one embodiment, the key generation module 110 is specifically used to: access the fuse area of the central processor and determine whether data exists in the fuse area; when there is data in the fuse area, change the fuse area Is set as the first key; when there is no data in the fuse area, the first key is randomly generated and written to the fuse area.

In one embodiment, the ciphertext generation module 120 is specifically configured to: store the user public key in the flash area of the central processor; obtain the first key of the fuse area, and according to the first secret The key encrypts the user public key in the Flash area to generate a first ciphertext; and stores the first ciphertext in the Flash area.

In one embodiment, the public key verification module 130 is specifically configured to: read the first key of the fuse area and the first ciphertext of the flash area when downloading an application program; according to the The first key decrypts the first ciphertext to obtain a first hash HASH value; calculates the HASH value of the user public key in the Flash area to obtain a second HASH value; and determines the first HASH value And whether the second HASH value meets a preset condition, and verify whether the user public key is correct according to the judgment result.

In the above user public key security authentication device, the key generation module 110 randomly generates the first key when the firmware is run for the first time, that is, the terminal generates the key itself, which reduces the complicated operation of external key injection and generates the key The randomness of can prevent the illegal person from looking for the rule of generating the first key, and then avoid the terminal from being cut off by the illegal person to modify the user's public key; the ciphertext generation module 120 downloads the user's public key, based on the first key Generate a first ciphertext with the user's public key, and then the public key verification module 130 verifies whether the user's public key is correct according to the first key and the first ciphertext when downloading the application, that is, the user The public key is encrypted to effectively prevent the terminal from being cut by an illegal person to modify or replace the user's public key, thereby preventing the terminal from running other illegal applications and improving the security of terminal payment.

Example Three

6 is a schematic diagram of a terminal device 100 provided in Embodiment 3 of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 6, the terminal device 100 described in this embodiment includes: a processor 140, a memory 150, and a computer program 151 stored in the memory 150 and executable on the processor 140, for example, a POS user company Procedures for key security authentication methods. When the computer 140 executes the computer program 151, the processor 140 implements the steps in the above embodiments of each POS user public key security authentication method, such as steps S101 to S103 shown in FIG. Alternatively, when the processor 140 executes the computer program 151, the functions of each module / unit in the foregoing device embodiments are realized, for example, the functions of the modules 110 to 130 shown in FIG. 5.

Exemplarily, the computer program 151 may be divided into one or more modules / units, and the one or more modules / units are stored in the memory 150 and executed by the processor 140 to complete this invention. The one or more modules / units may be a series of computer program instruction segments capable of performing specific functions, and the instruction segments are used to describe the execution process of the computer program 151 in the terminal device 100. For example, the computer program 151 can be divided into a key generation module, a ciphertext generation module, and a public key verification module. The specific functions of each module are as follows:

The key generation module is used to randomly generate the first key when the firmware runs for the first time.

The ciphertext generation module is used to download the user public key, and generate a first ciphertext according to the first key and the user public key.

In one embodiment, the key generation module is specifically used to: access the fuse area of the central processor and determine whether data exists in the fuse area; when data exists in the fuse area, connect the fuse The data of the area is set as the first key; when there is no data in the fuse area, the first key is randomly generated and written into the fuse area.

In one embodiment, the ciphertext generation module is specifically used to: store the user public key in the Flash area of the central processor; obtain the first key of the fuse area, and according to the first The key encrypts the user public key of the Flash area to generate a first ciphertext; the first ciphertext is stored in the Flash area.

In one embodiment, the public key verification module is specifically used to: read the first key of the fuse area and the first ciphertext of the flash area when downloading an application program; according to the first A key decrypts the first ciphertext to obtain a first hash HASH value; calculates the HASH value of the user public key in the Flash area to obtain a second HASH value; judges the first HASH value and Whether the second HASH value meets a preset condition, and according to the judgment result, it is verified whether the user public key is correct.

The terminal device 100 may be a computing device such as a desktop computer, a notebook, a palmtop computer, and a cloud server. The terminal device 100 may include, but is not limited to, the processor 140 and the memory 150. Those skilled in the art may understand that FIG. 6 is only an example of the terminal device 100, and does not constitute a limitation on the terminal device 100, and may include more or fewer components than those illustrated, or a combination of certain components, or different components. For example, the terminal device 100 may further include input and output devices, network access devices, buses, and the like.

The so-called processor 140 may be a central processing unit (Central Processing Unit (CPU), can also be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSP), application-specific integrated circuits (Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), ready-made programmable gate array (Field-Programmable Gate Array, FPGA) or other programmable logic devices, discrete gates or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. The general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor or the processor may be any conventional processor or the like.

The storage 150 may be an internal storage unit of the terminal device 100, such as a hard disk or a memory of the terminal device 100. The memory 150 may also be an external storage device of the terminal device 100, such as a plug-in hard disk equipped on the terminal device 100, a smart memory card (Smart Media Card, SMC), a secure digital (SD) card, or a flash memory card (Flash Card) etc. Further, the memory 150 may also include both an internal storage unit of the terminal device 100 and an external storage device. The memory 150 is used to store the computer program and other programs and data required by the terminal device 100. The memory 150 can also be used to temporarily store data that has been or will be output.

In the above embodiments, the description of each embodiment has its own emphasis. For a part that is not detailed or recorded in an embodiment, you can refer to the related descriptions of other embodiments.

Those of ordinary skill in the art may realize that the units and algorithm steps of the examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented by electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are executed in hardware or software depends on the specific application of the technical solution and design constraints. Professional technicians can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of the present invention.

In the embodiments provided by the present invention, it should be understood that the disclosed device / terminal device and method may be implemented in other ways. For example, the device / terminal device embodiments described above are only schematic. For example, the division of the module or unit is only a logical function division, and in actual implementation, there may be another division manner, such as multiple units Or components can be combined or integrated into another system, or some features can be ignored or not implemented. In addition, the displayed or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be indirect coupling or communication connection through some interfaces, devices or units, and may be in electrical, mechanical or other forms.

The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separated, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place, or may be distributed on multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of this embodiment.

In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present invention may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist alone physically, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit. The above integrated unit may be implemented in the form of hardware or software functional unit.

If the integrated module / unit is implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it may be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the present invention can implement all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments, and can also be completed by a computer program instructing relevant hardware. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. When the program is executed by the processor, the steps of the foregoing method embodiments may be implemented. Wherein, the computer program includes computer program code, and the computer program code may be in the form of source code, object code, executable file, or some intermediate form. The computer-readable medium may include: any entity or system capable of carrying the computer program code, a recording medium, a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a computer memory, a read-only memory (ROM, Read-Only Memory), random access memory (RAM, Random Access Memory), electrical carrier signals, telecommunication signals, and software distribution media. It should be noted that the content included in the computer-readable medium can be appropriately increased or decreased according to the requirements of legislation and patent practice in jurisdictions. Does not include electrical carrier signals and telecommunications signals.

The above-mentioned embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, not to limit them; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those of ordinary skill in the art should understand that they can still implement the foregoing The technical solutions described in the examples are modified, or some of the technical features are equivalently replaced; and these modifications or replacements do not deviate from the essence and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, and should be included in Within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

A POS user public key security authentication method is characterized by including:

The first key is randomly generated when the firmware is run for the first time;

Download the user public key, and generate a first ciphertext according to the first key and the user public key;

When downloading the application program, verify whether the user public key is correct according to the first key and the first ciphertext.
The POS user public key security authentication method according to claim 1, wherein the randomly generating the first key includes:

Access the fuse area of the central processor and determine whether data exists in the fuse area;

When data exists in the fuse area, set the data of the fuse area as the first key;

When there is no data in the fuse area, a first key is randomly generated and written into the fuse area.
The POS user public key security authentication method according to claim 2, wherein the generating the first ciphertext according to the first key and the user public key includes:

Store the user public key in the Flash area of the central processor;

Obtain the first key of the fuse area, and encrypt the user public key of the flash area according to the first key to generate a first ciphertext;

Store the first ciphertext in the Flash area.
The POS user public key security authentication method according to claim 3, characterized in that, when downloading an application program, it is verified whether the user public key is correct based on the first key and the first ciphertext, include:

When downloading the application program, read the first key of the fuse area and the first ciphertext of the Flash area;

Decrypt the first ciphertext according to the first key to obtain a first hash HASH value;

Calculate the HASH value of the user public key in the Flash area to obtain a second HASH value;

Judging whether the first HASH value and the second HASH value satisfy the preset condition, and verifying whether the user public key is correct according to the judgment result.
A user public key security authentication device, characterized in that it includes:

The key generation module is used to randomly generate the first key when the firmware runs for the first time;

A ciphertext generation module, used to download the user's public key, and generate a first ciphertext according to the first key and the user's public key;

The public key verification module is used to verify whether the downloaded user public key is correct according to the first key and the first ciphertext when downloading the application program.
The user public key security authentication device according to claim 5, wherein the key generation module is specifically used for:

Access the fuse area of the central processor and determine whether data exists in the fuse area;

When data exists in the fuse area, set the data of the fuse area as the first key;

When there is no data in the fuse area, a first key is randomly generated and written into the fuse area.
The user public key security authentication device according to claim 6, wherein the ciphertext generation module is specifically used for:

Store the user public key in the Flash area of the central processor;

Obtaining a first key of the fuse area, and encrypting the user public key of the flash area according to the first key to generate a first ciphertext;

Store the first ciphertext in the Flash area.
The user public key security authentication device according to claim 7, wherein the public key verification module is specifically used for:

When downloading the application program, read the first key of the fuse area and the first ciphertext of the Flash area;

Decrypt the first ciphertext according to the first key to obtain a first hash HASH value;

Calculate the HASH value of the user public key in the Flash area to obtain a second HASH value;

Judging whether the first HASH value and the second HASH value satisfy the preset condition, and verifying whether the user public key is correct according to the judgment result.
A terminal device, including a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, characterized in that, when the processor executes the computer program, it is implemented as claimed in claims 1 to 4. The steps of any of the methods.
A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, characterized in that, when the computer program is executed by a processor, the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1 to 4 are implemented.