WO2020042176A1 - 一种伪基站识别方法及装置 - Google Patents

一种伪基站识别方法及装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2020042176A1
WO2020042176A1 PCT/CN2018/103658 CN2018103658W WO2020042176A1 WO 2020042176 A1 WO2020042176 A1 WO 2020042176A1 CN 2018103658 W CN2018103658 W CN 2018103658W WO 2020042176 A1 WO2020042176 A1 WO 2020042176A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
cell
base station
user equipment
list
pseudo base
Prior art date
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PCT/CN2018/103658
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
卓超
刘涛
Original Assignee
华为技术有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Publication date
Application filed by 华为技术有限公司 filed Critical 华为技术有限公司
Priority to CN201880096749.7A priority Critical patent/CN112640512A/zh
Priority to PCT/CN2018/103658 priority patent/WO2020042176A1/zh
Publication of WO2020042176A1 publication Critical patent/WO2020042176A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/06—Authentication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the field of communication technologies, and in particular, to a method and a device for identifying a pseudo base station.
  • the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) protocol introduced a two-way authentication operation.
  • the base station Before the user equipment completes the two-way authentication with the base station and enters the connected state, the base station can only provide the user with the user.
  • the device sends messages such as system messages and paging messages, and cannot obtain related information about the user device. Since the pseudo base station cannot obtain the authentication information on the network side, the pseudo base station cannot complete two-way authentication with the user equipment.
  • pseudo base stations in order to obtain information about user equipment, pseudo base stations usually induce user equipment under 3G, long term evolution (LTE), 5G and other systems to perform cell reselection or redirection, so that user equipment Residing in a pseudo base station cell (hereinafter referred to as a GSM pseudo base station cell) under the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) system, so as to obtain relevant information of the user equipment, and then perform hacking related operations, such as sending spam information, etc. .
  • GSM Global System for Mobile Communication
  • a user equipment After a user equipment is switched from a cell in a 3G or higher standard (for example, 3G, LTE, 5G, etc.) to a GSM pseudo base station cell, the user equipment recognizes that the GSM pseudo base station cell is currently camped on. , It will judge that the cell reselection or redirection fails, and then fall back to the cell in the 3G and above system where it resides. Take the user equipment fallback to the LTE cell as an example. After the user equipment rolls back to the LTE cell, it does not know the situation where the GSM pseudo base station cell was parked before, but continues the subsequent process. For example, the user equipment will be induced to stay in the LTE cell again. Leaving it to the GSM pseudo base station cell, so reciprocating, causes the user equipment to avoid the risk of pseudo base station attacks without regulation, affecting the user experience.
  • 3G or higher standard for example, 3G, LTE, 5G, etc.
  • the embodiments of the present application provide a method and a device for identifying a pseudo base station, which are used for user equipment to perform corresponding processing when a cell in a 3G and above standard system is camped on a GSM pseudo base station cell, thereby reducing user equipment being a pseudo base station.
  • the risk of attacks to improve the user experience are not limited to a 3G and above standard system.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a method for identifying a pseudo base station.
  • the method includes the following steps: a user equipment camps on a second cell from a first cell currently camping on.
  • the first cell is a cell under the first network system
  • the second cell is a cell under the second network system.
  • the user equipment determines that the second base station used to manage the second cell is a pseudo base station, it records the second cell.
  • the cell is a pseudo base station cell, and the cell information of the second cell is added to the prohibited camping list.
  • the prohibited camping list is used to instruct the user equipment to prohibit camping on the cell corresponding to the cell information recorded in the prohibited camping list.
  • the user equipment returns Return to the first network standard and camp on the first cell again; the user equipment determines whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is a pseudo base station.
  • the first network standard may be the Global System for Mobile Communications GSM;
  • the second network standard may be any of the following: long-term evolution LTE; 5G; code division multiple access to CDMA; bandwidth code division multiple access to WCDMA; time division synchronization code Multi-access TD-SCDMA.
  • the cell information of the second cell may include at least one of the following: a cell frequency point of the second cell; a cell frequency band of the second cell; and a physical cell identification PCI of the second cell.
  • the user equipment After the user equipment changes from the first cell in the first network system to camping on the second cell in the second network system, the user equipment records the second cell when it determines that the second cell is a pseudo base station cell In the case of a pseudo base station cell, the second cell is added to the forbidden camping list, thereby preventing the user equipment from staying in the pseudo base station cell of the second cell again, reducing the risk of the user equipment being attacked by the pseudo base station, and improving the user experience.
  • the user equipment rolls back to the first network standard, the user equipment can further determine whether the first base station is a pseudo base station according to the previously recorded situation that the second cell is a pseudo base station cell, thereby further reducing the user equipment being attacked by the pseudo base station. risks of.
  • the pseudo base station identification method provided in the first aspect, there are multiple methods for the user equipment to determine whether the first base station is a pseudo base station. Here are three of them.
  • the user equipment determines whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is a pseudo base station, which may be specifically implemented by the following methods: the user equipment triggers the establishment of a chain; the user equipment determines that the first base station is a pseudo base station if the establishment of the chain fails.
  • 3GPP introduced a two-way authentication operation: it is difficult for a pseudo base station to obtain authentication information on the network side, so it is difficult for the pseudo base station to perform two-way authentication with the user equipment. In other words, under 3G and above standards, it is difficult for pseudo base stations to establish a chain with user equipment. Then, in the first method, if the user equipment actively triggers a link establishment failure, it indicates that the first base station is a pseudo base station.
  • the user equipment determines that the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal and saves a pseudo base station configuration identifier; then, the user equipment determines Whether the first base station is a pseudo base station may be specifically implemented by the following method: the user equipment determines that the first base station is a pseudo base station while storing a pseudo-base station-like configuration identifier.
  • the user equipment determines that the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal when at least one of the following information is satisfied: the user equipment determines that the first base station is configured in a shared public land mobile network (PLMN) list.
  • PLMN identities are PLMN identities prohibited from being configured in the same shared PLMN list; the user equipment determines that the resident threshold of the first base station is lower than the resident threshold configured by the user equipment; the user equipment determines that the first base station is not configured with an inter-frequency neighbor cell and Inter-system neighboring cells; the user equipment determines that the priority of the first base station to configure the GSM neighboring cell is a high reselection priority.
  • PLMN public land mobile network
  • whether the first base station is a pseudo base station can be determined by identifying whether the system message configuration of the first base station reflects the characteristics of the existing system message configuration of the pseudo base station. That is, whether the first base station is a pseudo base station can be determined based on the system message configuration of the first base station.
  • the user equipment determines whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is a pseudo base station, which may be specifically implemented by the following methods: the user equipment determines that the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal; and the user equipment determines that the first base station is a pseudo base station.
  • the method for determining that the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal is similar to the second method, and details are not described herein again.
  • the third method differs from the second method in that in the third method, when the user equipment camps on the first cell for the first time, the system message configuration of the first base station is not determined, but the user equipment After the device camps on the first cell again, it determines whether the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal.
  • the user equipment may add the cell information of the first cell to the forbidden camp list.
  • the cell information of the first cell includes at least one of the following: the cell frequency of the first cell; the cell frequency band of the first cell; the PCI of the first cell and the E-UTRA absolute radio frequency channel number of the first cell EARFCN.
  • the user equipment after the cell information of the first cell is added to the forbidden camping list, the user equipment will no longer reside in the first cell, so the user equipment can be prevented from staying in the pseudo base station cell for a long time, and the user equipment can be prevented from being pseudo base station. Risk of attack.
  • the user equipment may perform a cell search in the first network system; if the user equipment searches for an available cell in the first network system, the user equipment camping to the third cell according to the search result, and the cell information of the third cell is not recorded in the prohibited camping list.
  • the user equipment can perform network search again in the first network system, so that the user equipment can camp on a legal base station cell in the first network system for normal communication.
  • the user equipment may determine that the first base station is a valid base station if the chain establishment is successful.
  • the user equipment After the two-way authentication operation between the user equipment and the base station is completed, the user equipment can enter the connected state, and the base station can obtain relevant information of the user equipment and communicate with the user equipment normally.
  • a legitimate base station can obtain the authentication information on the network side, and then complete the two-way authentication with the user equipment. Therefore, after the user equipment triggers the chain establishment, if the chain establishment is successful, the first base station may be determined to be a legitimate base station.
  • the user equipment may add the cell information of the first cell to the forbidden camp list; then, the user equipment performs a cell search in the first network system; if the user equipment is in the first network system If an available cell is searched, the user equipment camps on the fourth cell according to the search result, and the cell information of the fourth cell is not recorded in the prohibited camping list; if the user equipment does not search for an available cell under the first network standard, then The user equipment deletes the cell information of the first cell from the camping list and camps on the first cell again.
  • the user equipment when there are available cells in the current system, the user equipment camps on the fourth cell according to the search result, which enables the user equipment to camp on a legal base station cell under the first network system for normal communication. Residing the first cell when there are no available cells in the standard can prevent the user equipment from having no available cells in the current standard.
  • the user equipment camping from the first cell currently camping to the second cell may be specifically implemented in the following two ways.
  • the user equipment is camped from the first cell in which it currently resides to the second cell, which may be specifically implemented as follows: After the user equipment successfully accesses randomly, the user equipment receives an instruction message sent by the first base station, and the instruction message is used to indicate the user equipment. Performing redirection, the indication message includes one or more redirection frequency points; the user equipment camps from the first cell to the second cell according to the indication message, and the cell frequency point of the second cell is in one or more redirection frequency points one of.
  • the user equipment camps from the first cell currently camping to the second cell, which can be specifically implemented as follows: When the user equipment is in an idle state, the user equipment is based on the neighbor cell list configured by the first base station and under the second network standard. Perform cell reselection.
  • the neighbor cell list is used to instruct the user equipment to select one or more candidate cells for the cell reselection.
  • the user equipment camps from the first cell to the second cell, and the second cell is the candidate cell indicated in the neighbor cell list. .
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a pseudo base station identification apparatus, which is applied to user equipment and includes a resident module, a judgment processing module, and a fallback module.
  • the resident module is configured to camp from a first cell currently camping to a second cell, where the first cell is a cell in a first network system and the second cell is a cell in a second network system.
  • a judging processing module configured to record the second cell as a pseudo base station when determining that the second base station used to manage the second cell is a pseudo base station, and add the cell information of the second cell to the forbidden camp list to prohibit the
  • the camping list is used to indicate that the user equipment is prohibited from camping on a cell corresponding to the cell information recorded in the camping list.
  • a fallback module is used for the user equipment to fall back to the first network standard and residing in the first cell.
  • the determination processing module is further configured to determine whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is a pseudo base station.
  • the first network system may be the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM); the second network system may be any of the following: LTE; 5G; CDMA; WCDMA; TD-SCDMA.
  • GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
  • the cell information of the second cell may include at least one of the following: a cell frequency of the second cell; a cell frequency band of the second cell; and a PCI of the second cell.
  • the determination processing module determines whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is a pseudo base station, which can be implemented by the following three optional designs.
  • the judgment processing module when determining whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is a pseudo base station, is specifically used to: trigger a chain establishment; and determine that the first base station is pseudo if the chain establishment fails. Base station.
  • the judgment processing module is further configured to determine that the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal before the camping module is camped from the currently camped first cell to the second cell; and save the pseudo base station configuration Identification; when determining whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is a pseudo base station, the determination processing module is specifically configured to determine that the first base station is a pseudo base station in a case where the pseudo base station configuration identifier is stored.
  • the judgment processing module when determining whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is a pseudo base station, is specifically configured to: determine that the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal; and determine that the first base station is a pseudo base station .
  • the judgment processing module determines that the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal when at least one of the following information is satisfied: it is determined that multiple PLMN identifiers configured by the first base station in the PLMN list are prohibited from being configured in the same shared PLMN list. PLMN identification; determining that the resident threshold of the first base station is lower than the resident threshold configured by the user equipment; determining that the first base station is not configured with an inter-frequency neighboring cell and an inter-system neighboring cell; determining that the priority of the first base station configuring the GSM neighboring cell is High reselection priority.
  • the judgment processing module is further configured to: after determining that the first base station is a pseudo base station, add the cell information of the first cell to the forbidden camping list.
  • the judgment processing module is further configured to: after adding the cell information of the first cell to the prohibited camping list, perform a cell search in the first network system; the camping module is further configured to: if the judgment processing module is on the first network If an available cell is found under the standard, the third cell is camped on according to the search result, and the cell information of the third cell is not recorded in the prohibited camping list.
  • the judgment processing module is further configured to: after triggering the chain establishment, determine that the first base station is a valid base station if the chain establishment is successful.
  • the judgment processing module is further configured to: after determining that the first base station is a valid base station, add the cell information of the first cell to the forbidden camp list; perform a cell search under the first network standard; the camp module It is also used: if the judgment processing module searches for an available cell under the first network system, it camps on the fourth cell according to the search result, and the cell information of the fourth cell is not recorded in the prohibited camping list; the judgment processing module also uses Yu: If no available cell is found in the first network system, the cell information of the first cell is deleted from the forbidden camping list, and the first cell is camped again.
  • the camping module is camped from the first cell currently camping to the second cell, which can be implemented by the following two optional designs.
  • the camping module when the camping module camps from the first cell currently camping to the second cell, the camping module is specifically configured to: after the user equipment successfully accesses randomly, receiving an instruction message sent by the first base station, The indication message is used to instruct the user equipment to perform a redirection, and the indication message includes one or more redirection frequency points; according to the indication message, the first cell camps on the second cell, and the second cell has one or more cell frequency points. One of the redirection points.
  • the camping module when the camping module camps on the second cell from the first cell currently camping, it is specifically configured to: when the user equipment is in an idle state, based on the second network configured by the first base station, The neighbor cell list under the system performs cell reselection.
  • the neighbor cell list is used to instruct the user equipment to select one or more candidate cells; the first cell camps on the second cell, and the second cell is in the neighbor cell list. Indicated candidate cells.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a pseudo base station identification device.
  • the device includes a processor, the processor is coupled to a memory, and reads an instruction in the memory, for executing the first aspect or the first aspect. Any of the aspects design the method described.
  • the pseudo base station identification device may be a user equipment or a chip in the user equipment.
  • the user equipment includes, but is not limited to, a smart phone, a smart watch, a tablet computer, a virtual reality (VR) device, an augmented reality (AR) device, a personal computer, a handheld computer, and a personal digital assistant.
  • a smart phone a smart watch, a tablet computer
  • a virtual reality (VR) device a virtual reality (VR) device
  • AR augmented reality
  • personal computer a handheld computer
  • personal digital assistant a personal digital assistant
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a computer-readable storage medium for storing a program used to execute the functions of the first aspect or any one of the first aspects.
  • a program used to execute the functions of the first aspect or any one of the first aspects.
  • the program is executed by a processor, For implementing the method described in the first aspect or any one of the first aspects.
  • an embodiment of the present application provides a computer program product containing a program code, and when the program code contained in the computer program product runs on a computer, the computer executes the first aspect or any one of the first aspect.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of an application scenario according to an embodiment of the present application
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart of a first pseudo base station identification method according to an embodiment of the present application
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart of a second pseudo base station identification method according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of a third pseudo base station identification method according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of a first pseudo base station identification device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic structural diagram of a second pseudo base station identification device according to an embodiment of the present application.
  • 3GPP introduced a two-way authentication operation: Before the user equipment completes two-way authentication with the base station and enters the connected state, the base station can only send system messages and paging to the user equipment. Messages such as messages cannot obtain user equipment related information; only after the two-way authentication operation between the user equipment and the base station is completed, the user equipment can enter the connected state, and the base station can obtain the relevant information of the user equipment and conduct the same with the user equipment. Normal communication. Since it is difficult for the pseudo base station to obtain the authentication information on the network side, it is difficult for the pseudo base station to perform two-way authentication with the user equipment.
  • the pseudo base station cannot obtain related information of the user equipment because it is difficult to complete two-way authentication. Because, in order to obtain the related information of the user equipment, the pseudo base station usually induces the user equipment under 3G and above to perform cell reselection or redirection, so that the user equipment camps on the GSM pseudo base station cell, thereby obtaining the relevant information of the user equipment. Then perform hacking related operations, such as sending spam.
  • the user equipment recognizes that the GSM pseudo base station cell is currently camped, and judges that the cell reselection or redirection fails, and Fall back to the cell where the 3G and above standards reside. Take the user equipment fallback to the LTE cell as an example. After the user equipment rolls back to the LTE cell, it does not know the situation where the GSM pseudo base station cell was parked before, but continues the subsequent process. For example, the user equipment is induced to stay in the LTE cell again. Leaving it to the GSM pseudo base station cell, so reciprocating, causes the user equipment to avoid the risk of pseudo base station attacks without regulation, affecting the user experience.
  • the embodiments of the present application provide a method and a device for identifying a pseudo base station, which are used for user equipment to perform corresponding processing when a cell in a 3G and above system is switched to a GSM pseudo base station cell, thereby reducing users.
  • the risk of devices being attacked by pseudo base stations improves the user experience.
  • the user equipment when the user equipment camps on a legal base station cell in the 3G and above system, it may happen that the user equipment changes from a cell in the 3G and above system to a GSM pseudo base station cell.
  • a legitimate base station sends a system message (for example, a system message carrying a paging channel configuration) to the user equipment in clear text
  • a hacker can obtain the paging channel configuration of the legitimate base station, and then The paging channel interferes; when the legitimate base station cell where the user equipment resides is interfered by a hacker, the hacker will induce the user equipment to reside in a pseudo base station cell under the GSM system, thereby obtaining relevant information of the user equipment, and then performing hacking operations.
  • the embodiment of the present application can be applied to the communication system shown in FIG. 1.
  • the communication system includes a first base station, a second base station, and user equipment.
  • the user equipment may be a device that provides users with voice and / or data connectivity, a handheld device corresponding to a wireless connection function, or other processing equipment connected to a wireless modem.
  • the user equipment can communicate with one or more core networks via a radio access network (RAN).
  • RAN radio access network
  • the user equipment can be a mobile terminal, such as a mobile phone (or a "cellular" phone) and a computer corresponding to the mobile terminal.
  • a mobile terminal such as a mobile phone (or a "cellular" phone) and a computer corresponding to the mobile terminal.
  • it can be a portable, compact, handheld, computer-built or vehicle-mounted mobile device that exchanges language and / or data with a wireless access network.
  • PCS personal communication service
  • SIP session initiated protocol
  • WLL wireless local loop
  • PDA personal digital assistants
  • the terminal device can also be called a system, a subscriber unit, a subscriber station, a mobile station, a mobile station, a remote station, an access point,
  • the remote terminal, the access terminal, the user terminal, the user agent, or the user equipment are not limited in the embodiments of the present application.
  • the first base station is a base station in a first network system
  • the second base station is a base station in a second network system.
  • the second network standard may be GSM
  • the first network standard may be 3G and above, including but not limited to code division multiple access (CDMA), and bandwidth code division multiple access (wide -band code division multiple access (WCDMA), time division synchronization-synchronous code division multiple access (TD-SCDMA), long term evolution (LTE), 5th generation (5th generation, 5G) communication system.
  • CDMA code division multiple access
  • WCDMA wide -band code division multiple access
  • TD-SCDMA time division synchronization-synchronous code division multiple access
  • LTE long term evolution
  • 5th generation, 5G 5th generation
  • the second base station can be a network device (BTS) in GSM;
  • the first base station can be a BTS in CDMA, or a network device (NodeB) in WCDMA or TD-SCDMA, or
  • the evolved network equipment evolutionary node B, eNB or e-NodeB
  • the 5G base station in the 5G network architecture, or the home evolved node B (HeNB), etc.
  • the types of the one base station and the second base station are not specifically limited.
  • the second base station is a pseudo base station
  • the first base station may be a pseudo base station or a legal base station.
  • the user equipment resides on the first cell managed by the first base station; then, the user equipment is switched by the first cell under the first network system through operations such as cell reselection or redirection. And camped on the second cell in the second network system. After the user equipment camps in the second cell, the solution provided in the embodiment of the present application can be used for corresponding judgment and processing, thereby reducing the risk of the user equipment being attacked by the pseudo base station and improving the user experience.
  • FIG. 2 it is a schematic flowchart of a pseudo base station identification method according to an embodiment of the present application. The method includes the following steps.
  • S201 The user equipment camps from the first cell currently camped to the second cell.
  • the first cell is a cell in a first network system
  • the second cell is a cell in a second network system.
  • the first network standard may be GSM
  • the second network standard may be any of the following: LTE; 5G; CDMA; WCDMA; TD-SCDMA.
  • the process of changing the user equipment from the first cell to camping on the second cell may be implemented through the foregoing cell reselection or redirection operation.
  • the two operations are described below.
  • the user equipment camping from the first cell currently camping to the second cell can be implemented in the following manner: When the user equipment is in an idle state, the user equipment is configured based on the neighbors configured by the first base station under the second network standard.
  • the cell list is used for cell reselection.
  • the neighbor cell list is used to instruct the user equipment to perform cell reselection on one or more candidate cells.
  • the user equipment camps from the first cell to the second cell, and the second cell is the one indicated in the neighbor cell list.
  • Candidate cell Candidate cell.
  • the user equipment may trigger a cell reselection operation.
  • cell reselection is an autonomous behavior of the user equipment
  • the user equipment performs cell reselection based on the neighbor list configured by the first base station, that is, the first time the user equipment resides after performing the cell reselection.
  • the second cell is a candidate cell indicated in the neighbor cell list configured by the first base station.
  • the first cell in the first network system changes to the second cell in the second network system, so the cell reselection in the embodiment of the application It can be understood as reselection of cells in different systems.
  • the user equipment camping from the currently camped first cell to the second cell may be implemented in the following manner: After the user equipment successfully random accesses, the user equipment receives an instruction message sent by the first base station, where the instruction message is used for Instruct the user equipment to perform redirection, and the instruction message includes one or more redirection frequency points; the user equipment camps from the first cell to the second cell according to the instruction message, and the cell frequency points of the second cell are one or more One of the redirection points.
  • the first base station may trigger the user equipment to perform redirection.
  • the user equipment may select a frequency point that can be camped from one or more redirection frequency points delivered by the first base station, and then camp on a second cell corresponding to the frequency point.
  • a frequency point may be randomly selected from one or more redirection frequency points, a frequency point may be selected based on the priority of one or more redirection frequency points, and the first base station may be selected.
  • the selection of the frequency point may also be performed by other methods. The embodiment of the present application does not specifically limit this, as long as the cell corresponding to the frequency point is an available cell under the second network standard.
  • the user equipment when the user equipment performs the redirection, if one or more redirection frequency points issued by the first base station through the indication message are not available, the user equipment may initiate a frequency sweep under the second network standard and search for the second network standard. The next available cell resides on the searched second cell. Of course, if an available cell has not been searched through the frequency sweep, it can be determined that the redirection fails, and the user equipment falls back to the first network standard as in S203, and continues to perform subsequent operations such as S204.
  • the user equipment after the user equipment performs cell reselection or redirection, the user equipment is switched from the first cell in the first network system to the second cell in the second network system.
  • the second cell is a pseudo base station cell
  • the solutions provided in the embodiments of the present application may be used to make corresponding judgments and processing on the first cell and the second cell. The specific manner will be described in detail later.
  • the prohibited camping list is used to indicate that the user equipment is prohibited from camping on a cell corresponding to the cell information recorded in the prohibited camping list.
  • the banned list is only an expression provided in the embodiments of the present application, and it may also be replaced with other expressions, such as a restricted list, a cell restricted list, or a bar list, as long as the expression is available Just indicate the cell information of the cell where the user equipment is prohibited from camping.
  • the cell information of the second cell includes at least one of the following: a cell frequency point of the second cell; a cell frequency band of the second cell; and a physical cell ID (PCI) of the second cell.
  • PCI physical cell ID
  • the user equipment when performing user cell reselection evaluation, measurement evaluation, and replying to the measurement results of other standards, the user equipment can remove the pseudo base station cells in the forbidden list to avoid frequent initiation of inter-cell communication with the pseudo base stations. Interoperability.
  • the user equipment determines that the second base station is a pseudo base station (that is, the second cell is a pseudo base station cell)
  • it does not directly determine that reselection or redirection fails as in the prior art, and then rolls back to
  • the first cell records the situation where the second cell is a pseudo base station cell first, and adds the second cell to the forbidden camping list, thereby preventing the user equipment from staying in the pseudo base station cell under the second network standard (that is, the second cell Cell) to reduce the risk of user equipment being attacked by a pseudo base station.
  • the user equipment searches for redirected frequency points issued by the first base station and finds that a cell corresponding to one of the frequency points is a cell in the forbidden camping list, the user equipment may directly record that the cell is false. In the case of the base station cell, the subsequent steps S203 to S204 are performed.
  • the user equipment may choose to remove the second cell from the forbidden camp list. In this case, the user equipment can camp on the second cell again, thereby avoiding the problem that the user equipment has no available cell under the second network standard.
  • the main reason for doing this is as follows: As described in the previous introduction, when the legal base station cell where the user equipment resides is interfered, it may happen that the user equipment changes from a 3G and above cell to a GSM pseudo base station cell. Case. In actual implementation, the GSM pseudo base station has strong mobility.
  • the second cell may be no longer covered by the GSM pseudo base station as the GSM pseudo base station moves, then disabling the second cell may cause the user equipment to be in the second network.
  • the second cell may be deleted from the forbidden camping list at this time, and the user equipment may still camp on the second cell again.
  • the user equipment may add all GSM cells configured by the first base station to the forbidden list.
  • the GSM The pseudo base station may no longer cover any one of the GSM cells.
  • the user equipment cannot camp on any GSM cells.
  • the user equipment may also choose not to delete the second cell from the prohibited camping list, which is not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • S203 The user equipment falls back to the first network standard and camps on the first cell again.
  • the user equipment determines that the second base station is a pseudo base station, it determines that the redirection fails or the reselection fails. Therefore, the user equipment can fall back to the first network standard and camp on the first cell again.
  • the user equipment determines whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is a pseudo base station.
  • the judgment of whether the first cell is a pseudo base station cell may be triggered based on the recorded situation that the second cell is a pseudo base station cell.
  • the process in which the user equipment transitions from the first cell to camping on the second cell in S201 may be: the neighboring cell configured by the first base station (pseudo base station) for the user equipment is a pseudo base station Cell, the user equipment camps on the second cell (pseudo base station cell) after performing cell reselection based on the neighbor cell list configured by the first base station; or the redirection frequency point issued by the first base station (pseudo base station) is the pseudo base station cell Frequency, the user equipment camps on the second cell (pseudo base station cell) after redirection.
  • the neighboring cell configured by the first base station (pseudo base station) for the user equipment is a pseudo base station Cell
  • the user equipment camps on the second cell (pseudo base station cell) after performing cell reselection based on the neighbor cell list configured by the first base station
  • the redirection frequency point issued by the first base station (pseudo base station)
  • the process of the user equipment switching from the first cell to camping to the second cell in S201 may be: because the legal base station sends a system message to the user equipment (for example, carries a paging channel configuration) The system message) is sent in clear text, so the hacker can obtain the paging channel configuration of the legitimate base station, thereby interfering with the paging channel of the legitimate base station, and then induce the user equipment to reside in the second cell (pseudo base station). Cell).
  • the user equipment determines whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is a pseudo base station, which may be specifically implemented as follows: the user equipment triggers a chain establishment; the user equipment determines that the first base station is a pseudo base station if the chain establishment fails.
  • 3GPP introduced a two-way authentication operation: Only after the two-way authentication operation between the user equipment and the base station is completed, the user equipment can enter the connected state and the base station can obtain Relevant information about the user equipment and communicate with the user equipment normally. However, it is difficult for the pseudo base station to obtain the authentication information on the network side, so it is difficult for the pseudo base station to perform two-way authentication with the user equipment. In other words, under 3G and above standards, it is difficult for pseudo base stations to establish a chain with user equipment. Then, in the first method, if the user equipment actively triggers a link establishment failure, it indicates that the first base station is a pseudo base station.
  • the user equipment may add the cell information of the first cell to the forbidden camping list.
  • the cell information of the first cell includes at least one of the following: the cell frequency of the first cell; the cell frequency band of the first cell; the PCI of the first cell, and the E-UTRA absolute radio frequency channel number of the first cell (E- UTRA (absolute radio frequency channel number, EARFCN).
  • E- UTRA absolute radio frequency channel number, EARFCN
  • the user equipment After the cell information of the first cell is added to the forbidden camping list, the user equipment will no longer reside in the first cell, so the user equipment can be prevented from staying in the pseudo base station cell for a long time, and the risk of the user equipment being attacked by the pseudo base station is reduced.
  • the user equipment may perform a cell search again in the first network system. If the user equipment searches for an available cell in the first network system, then camping to the third cell according to the cell search result, and the cell information of the third cell is not recorded in the prohibited camping list.
  • the user equipment needs to delete the cells in the forbidden camp list (that is, the first cell) when performing the cell search again, only in the first network mode. Only when an available cell (ie, the third cell) outside the forbidden camping list is searched, the cell is selected to camp on the cell.
  • the user equipment can perform network search again in the first network system, so that the user equipment can camp on a legal base station cell in the first network system for normal communication.
  • the user equipment may switch to a system other than the first network system for the cell search.
  • the user equipment may disable LIE and trigger a search to the 3G or 5G standard.
  • the user equipment may determine that the first base station is a valid base station if the chain establishment is successful.
  • the user equipment can enter the connected state, and the base station can obtain the related information of the user equipment and communicate with the user equipment normally.
  • a legitimate base station can obtain the authentication information on the network side, and then complete the two-way authentication with the user equipment. Therefore, after the user equipment triggers the chain establishment, if the chain establishment is successful, the first base station may be determined to be a legitimate base station.
  • the user equipment may add the cell information of the first cell to the forbidden camp list; then, the user equipment performs a cell search in the first network system; if the user equipment is in the first network system If an available cell is searched, the user equipment camps on the fourth cell according to the search result, and the cell information of the fourth cell is not recorded in the prohibited camping list; if the user equipment does not search for an available cell under the first network standard, then The user equipment deletes the cell information of the first cell from the camping list and camps on the first cell again.
  • the user equipment when there are available cells in the current system, the user equipment camps on the fourth cell according to the search result, which enables the user equipment to camp on a legal base station cell under the first network system for normal communication. Residing the first cell when there are no available cells in the standard can prevent the user equipment from having no available cells in the current standard.
  • the user equipment may determine that the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal, and save a pseudo base station configuration identifier; then, the user equipment determines to manage the first base station.
  • Whether the first base station of the cell is a pseudo base station may be specifically implemented by the following scheme: the user equipment determines that the first base station is a pseudo base station in a case where the pseudo base station configuration identifier is stored.
  • the user equipment determines that the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal when at least one of the following information is satisfied: the user equipment determines that the first base station is configured in a shared public land mobile network (PLMN) list.
  • PLMN identities are PLMN identities prohibited from being configured in the same shared PLMN list; the user equipment determines that the resident threshold of the first base station is lower than the resident threshold configured by the user equipment; the user equipment determines that the first base station is not configured with an inter-frequency neighbor cell and Inter-system neighboring cells; the user equipment determines that the priority of the first base station to configure the GSM neighboring cell is a high reselection priority.
  • PLMN public land mobile network
  • the base station when the base station configures system messages, it sends a shared PLMN list to the user equipment to indicate that the PLMN identity of the user equipment is any of the list, and the user equipment can establish a connection with the base station.
  • the user equipment also maintains a PLMN list, which indicates which PLMNs cannot be shared by one base station, for example, PLMN1 of a mobile operator and PLMN2 of a telecommunications operator cannot be shared by one base station.
  • the user equipment After receiving the shared PLMN list issued by the base station, the user equipment can compare the shared PLMN list with the PLMN list maintained by itself.
  • the user equipment considers that The base station may be a pseudo base station, thereby saving a pseudo base station configuration identifier. This is because: the pseudo base station usually configures PLMN identities of multiple operators in a shared PLMN list to induce more user equipment to establish a connection with itself.
  • legitimate base stations will be configured with inter-frequency neighboring cells and / or inter-system neighboring cells
  • pseudo base stations will generally not be configured with inter-frequency neighboring cells and inter-system neighboring cells.
  • the dwell threshold configured by the pseudo base station is usually low, so that when the base station's transmit power is low, the user equipment can also determine that the dwell condition is satisfied when judging based on the dwell threshold of the pseudo base station to induce the user equipment to stay, and
  • the dwell threshold configured by a legitimate base station is usually higher than the dwell threshold configured by a fake base station.
  • a pseudo base station usually configures a GSM neighbor cell as a high reselection priority. This is because: GSM does not have two-way authentication, and it is more harmful for the user equipment to reside on the GSM pseudo base station cell (user privacy is leaked and spam messages are sent).
  • the pseudo base station usually configures the GSM neighbor cell as a high reselection priority, which makes it easier for the user equipment to reselect to the GSM pseudo base station cell.
  • legal base stations in the existing network usually configure the GSM neighbors with low reselection priority to avoid reselection to GSM cells with lower rates.
  • the pseudo base station configuration identifier is stored. Subsequently, after the user equipment rolls back from the second cell to the first cell, the user equipment may determine that the first base station is a pseudo base station in combination with the pseudo base station configuration identifier and the case where the recorded second cell is a pseudo base station cell.
  • whether the first base station is a pseudo base station may be determined by identifying whether the system message configuration of the first base station is similar to the characteristics of the existing system message configuration of the pseudo base station. That is, it can be determined whether the first base station is a pseudo base station through the system message configuration of the first base station.
  • the system information configuration of the first base station may not be determined, but after the user equipment camps on the first cell again in S203, Determine whether the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal. That is, in the second method, the user equipment determines whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is a pseudo base station in S204, which may also be implemented as follows: the user equipment determines that the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal; the user The device determines that the first base station is a pseudo base station.
  • the user equipment does not need to save the pseudo base station-like configuration identifier in advance, but judges the system message configuration of the first base station after the user equipment changes from the first cell to the second cell, and combines When the recorded second cell is a pseudo base station cell, it is determined whether the first base station is a pseudo base station.
  • the user equipment may add the cell information of the first cell to the forbidden camp list.
  • the cell information of the first cell includes at least one of the following: a cell frequency point of the first cell; a cell frequency band of the first cell; a PCI of the first cell; and an EARFCN of the first cell.
  • the user equipment After the cell information of the first cell is added to the forbidden camping list, the user equipment will no longer reside in the first cell, so the user equipment can be prevented from staying in the pseudo base station cell for a long time, and the risk of the user equipment being attacked by the pseudo base station is reduced.
  • the user equipment may perform a cell search again in the first network system. If the user equipment searches for an available cell in the first network system, then camping to the third cell according to the cell search result, and the cell information of the third cell is not recorded in the prohibited camping list.
  • the user equipment needs to delete the cells in the forbidden camp list (that is, the first cell) when performing the cell search again, only in the first network mode. Only when an available cell (ie, the third cell) outside the forbidden camping list is searched, the cell is selected to camp on the cell.
  • the user equipment can perform network search again in the first network system, so that the user equipment can camp on a legal base station cell in the first network system for normal communication.
  • the user equipment may switch to a system other than the first network system for the cell search.
  • the user equipment may disable LIE and trigger a search to the 3G standard.
  • the pseudo base station can also simulate a legal base station for system message configuration, if the pseudo base station-like configuration identifier of the first base station is not stored in the user equipment or the user equipment determines the system of the first base station The message configuration is not abnormal, which does not indicate that the first base station is a legitimate base station.
  • the user equipment determines that the second cell is a pseudo base station In the case of a cell, record that the second cell is a pseudo base station cell, and add the second cell to the banned camping list, thereby preventing the user equipment from staying in the pseudo base station cell of the second cell again, and reducing the user equipment from being attacked by the pseudo base station. Risk to enhance user experience.
  • the user equipment can take corresponding measures, for example, adding the cell information of the first cell to the forbidden camping list, thereby preventing the user equipment from staying in the pseudo base station cell of the first cell again, reducing the number of users. Risk of equipment being attacked by pseudo base stations.
  • the embodiments of the present application further provide the following two pseudo base station identification methods, both of which can be regarded as a specific example of the method shown in FIG. 2.
  • the user equipment is a UE
  • the first network system is LTE
  • the second network system is GSM.
  • the UE includes two modules, a GSM module and an LTE module.
  • the GSM module is responsible for the communication of the user equipment under the GSM network system
  • the LTE module is responsible for the communication of the user equipment under the LTE network system.
  • the GSM module and the LTE module may be different hardware processors or different software processing units, which are not specifically limited in this embodiment of the present application.
  • the method includes the following steps:
  • the UE resides on the LTE cell, and after measurement and evaluation, it determines to initiate L2G reselection.
  • the LTE base station may configure the GSM neighbor list of the UE through a system message, and the UE initiates L2G reselection after measuring and evaluating the candidate cells in the GSM neighbor list.
  • L2G cell reselection means cell reselection from LTE to GSM.
  • the UE initiates a reselection to GSM.
  • the GSM module indicates to the LTE module that the LTE reselection failed, and also indicates that the reselected GSM cell is a pseudo base station cell.
  • the GSM module can also save the judgment result that the GSM cell is a pseudo base station cell. After the UE falls back to LTE, the LTE module can perform corresponding processing according to the judgment result saved by the GSM module when performing subsequent operations.
  • the LTE radio resource control (LRRC) in the UE notifies the LTE non-access stratum (LNAS) to actively trigger the establishment of a chain to confirm whether the network Able to complete the two-way authentication process.
  • LNAS LTE non-access stratum
  • the UE when the UE actively triggers the establishment of a chain, it can be performed by tracking area update (TAU) and initiating a service request (Service).
  • TAU tracking area update
  • Service service request
  • the UE can identify the LTE cell as a legitimate base station cell, but the system information of the LTE base station was obtained by a hacker and interfered with the GSM provision area configured by the LTE base station; LNAS notified the LRRC to add the LTE cell to the banned camp In the list, the restricted type is that the network solution cannot be found, wait for the network to send an RRC connection release message (RRC_CONN_RELEASE), and search the network again; if other available cells are found, the cell is parked; if no other available cells are found, then The LTE cell is deleted from the barring list.
  • RRC_CONN_RELEASE RRC connection release message
  • the UE uses cell reselection to camp from the LTE cell to the GSM cell as an example.
  • the UE switches from the LTE cell to the GSM cell.
  • the process of the cell can also be implemented by the redirection of the UE.
  • the LRRC can remove the pseudo base station cells in the forbidden list when performing reselection evaluation, measurement reporting, and replying to the measurement results of other systems, so as to avoid frequent initiation of interoperation with the pseudo base station cells.
  • the UE resides on the LTE cell, the LRRC recognizes that the LTE base station system message configuration is abnormal, and the UE saves the pseudo base station configuration identifier; the UE determines to initiate L2G reselection after measurement and evaluation.
  • the LTE base station may configure the GSM neighbor list of the UE through a system message, and the UE initiates L2G reselection after measuring and evaluating the candidate cells in the GSM neighbor list.
  • L2G cell reselection means cell reselection from LTE to GSM.
  • the LRRC judges that the LTE base station meets any of the following conditions, it considers that the LTE base station is configured as a pseudo pseudo base station, and the LRRC stores a base station pseudo pseudo base station configuration identifier;
  • the dwell threshold of the system message block 1 (system information block 1 (SIB1)) of the LTE base station is abnormally low.
  • SIB1 system information block 1
  • the UE can also determine that the dwell condition is met. Among them, judging that the dwell threshold is abnormally low may be compared with the dwell threshold detection value configured by the UE;
  • LTE base stations are not configured with inter-frequency neighboring cells or inter-system neighboring cells, which induces UEs to stay in pseudo base stations for a long time;
  • the LTE base station configures the GSM neighbor cell as a high reselection priority.
  • the user equipment initiates a reselection to GSM.
  • the UE camps on the GSM cell after reselection.
  • the GSM module indicates to the LTE module that the LTE reselection failed, and also indicates that the reselected GSM cell is a pseudo base station cell.
  • the GSM module can also save the judgment result that the GSM cell is a pseudo base station cell. After the UE falls back to LTE, the LTE module can perform corresponding processing according to the judgment result saved by the GSM module when performing subsequent operations.
  • the LTE module adds the GSM pseudo base station cell to the forbidden camping list, thereby reducing the reselection and measurement priority of the GSM cell, and removing the restriction when there are no other GSM neighboring cells available.
  • removing the restriction of the GSM cell will delete the GSM cell from the prohibited camping list.
  • the LRRC determines whether the pseudo base station configuration identifier is true. If it is true, it identifies the LTE base station as a pseudo base station, adds the LTE cell to the forbidden camp list, and searches for other available cells again.
  • the LRRC when performing reselection evaluation, measurement reporting, and replying to the measurement results of other systems, the LRRC can remove the pseudo base station cells from the forbidden list to avoid frequent interoperation with the pseudo base station cells.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a pseudo base station identification device, which can be used to execute the method shown in FIG. 2.
  • the apparatus 500 includes a resident module 501, a determination processing module 502, and a rollback module 503.
  • a camping module 501 is configured to camp from a first cell currently camped to a second cell, where the first cell is a cell under the first network standard, The second cell is a cell under the second network standard.
  • a judgment processing module 502 is configured to record a second cell as a pseudo base station when determining that the second base station used to manage the second cell is a pseudo base station, and add the cell information of the second cell to a prohibited camping list to prohibit The camping list is used to indicate that the user equipment is prohibited from camping on a cell corresponding to the cell information recorded in the forbidden camping list.
  • a fallback module 503 is configured to fall back to the first network standard and residing in the first cell.
  • the determination processing module 502 is further configured to determine whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is a pseudo base station.
  • the first network standard may be GSM; the second network standard may be any of the following: LTE; 5G; CDMA; WCDMA; TD-SCDMA.
  • the cell information of the second cell may include at least one of the following: a cell frequency of the second cell; a cell frequency band of the second cell; and a PCI of the second cell.
  • the judgment processing module 502 is specifically configured to: trigger the establishment of a chain; and determine that the first base station is a pseudo base station if the establishment of the chain fails.
  • the judgment processing module 502 is further configured to determine that the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal before the camping module 501 camps from the currently camped first cell to the second cell; save the pseudo base station configuration identifier; the judgment processing module 502 When judging whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is a pseudo base station, it is specifically used to determine that the first base station is a pseudo base station under the condition that the pseudo base station configuration identifier is stored.
  • the determination processing module 502 determines that the system message configuration of the first base station is abnormal when at least one of the following information is satisfied: determining multiple PLMN identifiers configured by the first base station in the PLMN list To prevent the PLMN identifier configured in the same shared PLMN list; determine that the resident threshold of the first base station is lower than the resident threshold configured by the user equipment; determine that the first base station is not configured with an inter-frequency neighbor cell and an inter-system neighbor cell; determine the first A base station configures the priority of the GSM neighbor cell as a high reselection priority.
  • the judgment processing module 502 is further configured to: after determining that the first base station is a pseudo base station, add the cell information of the first cell to the forbidden camping list.
  • the judgment processing module 502 is further configured to: after adding the cell information of the first cell to the prohibited camping list, perform a cell search under the first network standard; the camping module 501 is further configured to: if the judgment processing module 502 is If an available cell is found in the first network system, the cell is camped to the third cell according to the search result, and the cell information of the third cell is not recorded in the prohibited camping list.
  • judgment processing module 502 is further configured to: after triggering the chain establishment, determine that the first base station is a valid base station if the chain establishment is successful.
  • the judgment processing module 502 is further configured to: after determining that the first base station is a valid base station, add the cell information of the first cell to the forbidden camping list; perform a cell search under the first network standard; the camping module 501 is further configured to: : If the judgment processing module 502 searches for an available cell under the first network system, it camps on the fourth cell according to the search result, and the cell information of the fourth cell is not recorded in the prohibited camping list; the judgment processing module 502 is further configured to: : If no available cell is found in the first network system, the cell information of the first cell is deleted from the forbidden camping list, and the first cell is camped again.
  • the camping module 501 camps from the first cell currently camping to the second cell, which can be implemented in the following two optional ways.
  • the camping module 501 is specifically configured to receive an instruction message sent by the first base station after the user equipment has successfully accessed the second cell, and the instruction message is used to indicate the user equipment.
  • the indication message includes one or more redirection frequency points; the first cell camps on the second cell according to the indication message, and the cell frequency point of the second cell is one of the one or more redirection frequency points .
  • the integrated module is implemented in the form of a software functional module and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium.
  • the technical solution of the present application is essentially a part that contributes to the existing technology or all or part of the technical solution can be embodied in the form of a software product, which is stored in a storage medium.
  • a computer device which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network device
  • the aforementioned storage media include: U disks, mobile hard disks, read-only memories (ROMs), random access memories (RAMs), magnetic disks or compact discs and other media that can store program codes .
  • pseudo base station identification device 500 can be used to execute the method provided by the embodiment corresponding to FIG. 2, so the implementation and technical effects not described in detail in the pseudo base station identification device 500 shown in FIG. 5 can be seen in FIG. 2. Related description.
  • an embodiment of the present application further provides a pseudo base station identification device, which is applied to user equipment.
  • the pseudo base station identification device is used to perform the pseudo base station identification method shown in FIG. 2, which may be the same as that shown in FIG. 5.
  • the pseudo base station identification device 500 is the same device.
  • the processor can read the software program in the memory, interpret and execute the instructions of the software program, and process the data of the software program.
  • the processor performs baseband processing on the data to be sent, and then outputs the baseband signal to the radio frequency circuit.
  • the radio frequency circuit processes the baseband signal, the radio frequency signal is sent out through the antenna in the form of electromagnetic waves.
  • the RF circuit receives the RF signal through the antenna, converts the RF signal into a baseband signal, and outputs the baseband signal to the processor.
  • the processor converts the baseband signal into data and processes the data. For processing.
  • FIG. 6 shows only one memory and a processor.
  • the memory may also be referred to as a storage medium or a storage device, which is not limited in this application.
  • the processor may include a baseband processor and a central processor.
  • the baseband processor is mainly used to process communication protocols and communication data
  • the central processor is mainly used to perform the entire pseudo base station identification device 600. Control, execute software programs, and process software program data.
  • the processor in FIG. 6 integrates the functions of the baseband processor and the central processing unit.
  • the baseband processor and the central processing unit may also be independent processors, which are interconnected through technologies such as a bus.
  • the pseudo base station identification device 600 may include multiple baseband processors to adapt to different network standards.
  • the pseudo base station identification device 600 may include multiple central processors to enhance its processing capabilities.
  • the various components can be connected via various buses.
  • a downlink signal (including data and / or control information) sent by a network device (such as a base station) is received through an antenna, and on the uplink, an uplink is sent to a network device (such as a base station) through an antenna
  • Signals (including data and / or control information) are processed in the processor by service data and signaling messages. These units are based on the radio access technology (e.g., LTE, NR, and other evolved systems) used by the radio access network. Access technology).
  • the processor is also used to control and manage the actions of the pseudo base station identification device 600, and to execute the processing performed by the pseudo base station identification device 600 in the foregoing embodiment.
  • the processor is further configured to support the pseudo base station identification apparatus 600 to execute the execution method of the user equipment in FIG. 2.
  • FIG. 6 only shows a simplified design of the pseudo base station identification device 600.
  • the pseudo base station identification device 600 may include any number of antennas, memories, processors, and the like, and all pseudo base station identification devices 600 that can implement the present application are within the protection scope of the present application.
  • the processor is configured to pass the transceiver and the The first base station interacts, and then camps from the currently camped first cell to the second cell, where the first cell is a cell in a first network system, and the second cell is a cell in a second network system;
  • the no-parking list is used to indicate that the user equipment is prohibited from camping on the cell corresponding to the cell information recorded in the no-parking list; interacts with the first base station and the second base station through the transceiver, and falls back to the A first network standard and camping on the first cell again; determining whether the first base station used to manage the first cell is
  • the processor may also implement any detailed functions of the user equipment in the method embodiment shown in FIG. 2, which is not described in detail here, and may refer to the processing steps performed by the user equipment in the method embodiment shown in FIG. 2.
  • pseudo base station identification device shown in FIG. 5 to FIG. 6 may be regarded as an integrated chip in user equipment, and may also be regarded as user equipment.
  • These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable memory capable of directing a computer or other programmable data processing device to work in a particular manner such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable memory produce a manufactured article including an instruction device, the instructions
  • the device implements the functions specified in one or more flowcharts and / or one or more blocks of the block diagram.
  • These computer program instructions can also be loaded on a computer or other programmable data processing device, so that a series of steps can be performed on the computer or other programmable device to produce a computer-implemented process, which can be executed on the computer or other programmable device.
  • the instructions provide steps for implementing the functions specified in one or more flowcharts and / or one or more blocks of the block diagrams.

Abstract

一种伪基站识别方法及装置，用于用户设备在由3G及以上制式下的小区转而驻留至GSM伪基站小区的情况下进行相应处理，从而降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险，提升用户体验。方法包括：用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，第一小区为第一网络制式下的小区，第二小区为第二网络制式下的小区；用户设备在判断用于管理第二小区的第二基站为伪基站的情况下，记录第二小区为伪基站小区，并将第二小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表，该禁止驻留列表用于指示用户设备禁止驻留在禁止驻留列表中记录的小区信息所对应的小区；用户设备回退到第一网络制式并重新驻留第一小区；用户设备判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站。

Description

一种伪基站识别方法及装置 技术领域
本申请涉及通信技术领域，尤其涉及一种伪基站识别方法及装置。
背景技术
从3G制式开始，第三代合作伙伴计划(3rd generation partnership project，3GPP)协议中引入了双向鉴权操作，在用户设备完成与基站间的双向鉴权并进入连接态之前，基站仅能向用户设备发送系统消息、寻呼消息等消息，无法获取到用户设备的相关信息。由于伪基站无法获取网络侧的鉴权信息，因而伪基站无法完成与用户设备间的双向鉴权。因此，在现网中，为了获取用户设备的相关信息，伪基站通常会诱导3G、长期演进(long term evolution，LTE)、5G等制式下的用户设备进行小区重选或重定向，使得用户设备驻留到全球移动通信系统(global system for mobile communication，GSM)制式下的伪基站小区(以下简称GSM伪基站小区)，从而获取用户设备的相关信息，进而进行黑客相关操作，例如发送垃圾信息等。
现有技术中，在用户设备由3G及以上制式(例如3G制式、LTE制式、5G制式等)下的小区转而驻留GSM伪基站小区后，用户设备识别出当前驻留在GSM伪基站小区，会判断小区重选或重定向失败，进而回退到之前驻留的3G及以上制式下的小区。以用户设备回退到LTE小区为例，用户设备回退到LTE小区后并不知悉之前曾驻留GSM伪基站小区的情况，而是继续后续流程，例如用户设备会由LTE小区再次被诱导驻留至GSM伪基站小区，如此往复，导致用户设备无法规避伪基站攻击的风险，影响用户体验。
因此，用户设备由3G及以上制式下的小区转而驻留GSM伪基站小区后，用户设备如何进行相应处理，从而降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险，提升用户体验。
发明内容
本申请实施例提供一种伪基站识别方法及装置，用于用户设备在由3G及以上制式下的小区转而驻留至GSM伪基站小区的情况下进行相应处理，从而降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险，提升用户体验。
第一方面，本申请实施例提供一种伪基站识别方法，该方法包括如下步骤：用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区。其中，第一小区为第一网络制式下的小区，第二小区为第二网络制式下的小区；用户设备在判断用于管理第二小区的第二基站为伪基站的情况下，记录第二小区为伪基站小区，并将第二小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表，禁止驻留列表用于指示用户设备禁止驻留在禁止驻留列表中记录的小区信息所对应的小区；用户设备回退到第一网络制式，并重新驻留第一小区；用户设备判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站。
其中，第一网络制式可以为全球移动通信系统GSM；第二网络制式为以下任一种：长期演进LTE；5G；码分多址接入CDMA；带宽码分多址接入WCDMA；时分同步码分多址接入TD-SCDMA。
其中，第二小区的小区信息可以包括以下至少一种：第二小区的小区频点；第二小区 的小区频段；第二小区的物理小区标识PCI。
采用上述方案，在用户设备由第一网络制式下的第一小区转而驻留第二网络制式下的第二小区后，用户设备在判断第二小区为伪基站小区的情况下记录第二小区为伪基站小区的情况，并将第二小区加入禁止驻留列表，从而避免用户设备再次驻留在第二小区这一伪基站小区，降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险，提升用户体验。同时，在用户设备回退到第一网络制式后，用户设备可根据之前记录的第二小区为伪基站小区的情况，进一步确定第一基站是否为伪基站，从而进一步降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险。
具体地，在第一方面提供的伪基站识别方法中，用户设备判断第一基站是否为伪基站的方法有多种。下面介绍其中三种。
第一种
用户设备判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站，具体可通过如下方法实现：用户设备触发建链；用户设备在建链失败的情况下确定第一基站为伪基站。
从3G制式开始，3GPP中引入了双向鉴权操作：而伪基站难以获取到网络侧的鉴权信息，因而伪基站难以完成与用户设备间的双向鉴权。也就是说，在3G及以上制式下，伪基站难以与用户设备建链。那么，在第一种方法中，若用户设备主动触发建链失败，则说明第一基站为伪基站。
第二种
在用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区之前，用户设备确定第一基站的系统消息配置异常并保存类伪基站配置标识；那么，用户设备判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站，具体可通过如下方法实现：用户设备在保存有类伪基站配置标识的情况下确定第一基站为伪基站。
其中，用户设备在以下信息中的至少一种满足时，确定第一基站的系统消息配置异常：用户设备确定第一基站配置在共享公共陆地移动网络(public land mobile network，PLMN)列表中的多个PLMN标识为禁止配置在同一共享PLMN列表中的PLMN标识；用户设备确定第一基站的驻留门限低于用户设备配置的驻留门限阈值；用户设备确定第一基站未配置异频邻区和异系统邻区；用户设备确定第一基站配置GSM邻区的优先级为高重选优先级。
采用第二种方法，可以通过识别第一基站的系统消息配置是否体现有伪基站的系统消息配置的特点，来判断第一基站是否为伪基站。即，可通过第一基站的系统消息配置情况判断第一基站是否为伪基站。
第三种
用户设备判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站，具体可通过如下方法实现：用户设备确定第一基站的系统消息配置异常；用户设备确定第一基站为伪基站。
其中，确定第一基站的系统消息配置异常的方式与第二种方法类似，此处不再赘述。
第三种方法与第二种方法的不同之处在于，在第三种方法中，用户设备在第一次驻留第一小区时不对第一基站的系统消息配置情况进行判断，而是在用户设备重新驻留第一小区后，再判断第一基站的系统消息配置是否异常。
无论采用上述三种方法中的哪一种，在用户设备确定第一基站为伪基站之后，用户设备可将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表。
其中，第一小区的小区信息包括以下至少一种：第一小区的小区频点；第一小区的小 区频段；第一小区的PCI、第一小区的E-UTRA绝对无线频率信道号EARFCN。
采用上述方案，将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表后，用户设备则不会再驻留在第一小区，因而可以避免用户设备长期驻留在伪基站小区，降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险。
进一步地，在用户设备将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表之后，用户设备可在第一网络制式下进行小区搜索；若用户设备在第一网络制式下搜索到可用小区，则用户设备根据搜索结果驻留到第三小区，第三小区的小区信息未记录在禁止驻留列表中。
采用上述方案，用户设备可在第一网络制式下重新进行搜网，从而使得用户设备可以驻留到第一网络制式下的合法基站小区，进行正常通信。
此外，在前述第一种方法中，在用户设备触发建链之后，用户设备可在建链成功的情况下确定第一基站为合法基站。
在用户设备和基站之间的双向鉴权操作完成之后，用户设备可进入连接态、基站才可获取到用户设备的相关信息并与用户设备进行正常通信。合法基站可以获取到网络侧的鉴权信息，进而完成与用户设备间的双向鉴权。因此，在用户设备触发建链后，若建链成功则可以确定第一基站为合法基站。
在用户设备确定第一基站为合法基站之后，用户设备可将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表；然后，用户设备在第一网络制式下进行小区搜索；若用户设备在第一网络制式下搜索到可用小区，则用户设备根据搜索结果驻留到第四小区，第四小区的小区信息未记录在禁止驻留列表中；若用户设备在第一网络制式下未搜索到可用小区，则用户设备将第一小区的小区信息从禁止驻留列表中删除，并重新驻留第一小区。
采用上述方案，在当前制式下有可用小区的情况下，用户设备根据搜索结果驻留到第四小区，可以使得用户设备驻留到第一网络制式下的合法基站小区，进行正常通信；在当前制式下没有可用小区的情况下重新驻留第一小区，可以避免用户设备在当前制式下无可用小区。
此外，在第一方面提供的伪基站识别方法中，用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区具体可通过如下两种方式实现。
方式一
用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，具体可通过如下方式实现：用户设备随机接入成功后，用户设备接收第一基站发送的指示消息，指示消息用于指示用户设备进行重定向，指示消息中包含一个或多个重定向频点；用户设备根据指示消息由第一小区驻留至第二小区，第二小区的小区频点为一个或多个重定向频点中的一个。
方式二
用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，具体可通过如下方式实现：当用户设备处于空闲态时，用户设备基于第一基站配置的、第二网络制式下的邻区列表进行小区重选，邻区列表用于指示用户设备进行小区重选的一个或多个候选小区；用户设备由第一小区驻留至第二小区，第二小区为邻区列表中指示的候选小区。
第二方面，本申请实施例提供一种伪基站识别装置，该装置应用于用户设备中，包括驻留模块，判断处理模块和回退模块。
驻留模块，用于由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，第一小区为第一网络制式下的小区，第二小区为第二网络制式下的小区。
判断处理模块，用于在判断用于管理第二小区的第二基站为伪基站的情况下，记录第二小区为伪基站小区，并将第二小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表，禁止驻留列表用于指示用户设备禁止驻留在禁止驻留列表中记录的小区信息所对应的小区。
回退模块，用于用户设备回退到第一网络制式，并重新驻留第一小区。
判断处理模块，还用于判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站。
其中，第一网络制式可以为全球移动通信系统GSM；第二网络制式可以为以下任一种：LTE；5G；CDMA；WCDMA；TD-SCDMA。
其中，第二小区的小区信息可以包括以下至少一种：第二小区的小区频点；第二小区的小区频段；第二小区的PCI。
判断处理模块判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站，可通过如下三种可选的设计来实现。
在一种可能的设计中，判断处理模块在判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站时，具体用于：触发建链；在建链失败的情况下确定第一基站为伪基站。
在一种可能的设计中，判断处理模块还用于：在驻留模块由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区之前，确定第一基站的系统消息配置异常；保存类伪基站配置标识；判断处理模块在判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站时，具体用于：在保存有类伪基站配置标识的情况下确定第一基站为伪基站。
在一种可能的设计中，判断处理模块在判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站时，具体用于：确定第一基站的系统消息配置异常；确定第一基站为伪基站。
其中，判断处理模块在以下信息中的至少一种满足时，确定第一基站的系统消息配置异常：确定第一基站配置在PLMN列表中的多个PLMN标识为禁止配置在同一共享PLMN列表中的PLMN标识；确定第一基站的驻留门限低于用户设备配置的驻留门限阈值；确定第一基站未配置异频邻区和异系统邻区；确定第一基站配置GSM邻区的优先级为高重选优先级。
此外，判断处理模块还用于:在确定第一基站为伪基站之后，将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表。
进一步地，判断处理模块还用于:在将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表之后，在第一网络制式下进行小区搜索；驻留模块还用于：若判断处理模块在第一网络制式下搜索到可用小区，则根据搜索结果驻留到第三小区，第三小区的小区信息未记录在禁止驻留列表中。
在一种可能的设计中，判断处理模块还用于:在触发建链之后，在建链成功的情况下确定第一基站为合法基站。
在一种可能的设计中，判断处理模块还用于:在确定第一基站为合法基站之后将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表；在第一网络制式下进行小区搜索；驻留模块还用于：若判断处理模块在第一网络制式下搜索到可用小区，则根据搜索结果驻留到第四小区，第四小区的小区信息未记录在禁止驻留列表中；判断处理模块还用于：若在第一网络制式下未搜索到可用小区，则将第一小区的小区信息从禁止驻留列表中删除，并重新驻留第一小区。
驻留模块由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，可通过如下两种可选的设计来实现。
在一种可能的设计中，驻留模块在由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区时，具体用 于：在用户设备随机接入成功后，接收第一基站发送的指示消息，指示消息用于指示用户设备进行重定向，指示消息中包含一个或多个重定向频点；根据指示消息由第一小区驻留至第二小区，第二小区的小区频点为一个或多个重定向频点中的一个。
在一种可能的设计中，驻留模块在由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区时，具体用于：当用户设备处于空闲态时，基于第一基站配置的、第二网络制式下的邻区列表进行小区重选，邻区列表用于指示用户设备进行小区重选的一个或多个候选小区；由第一小区驻留至第二小区，第二小区为邻区列表中指示的候选小区。
第三方面，本申请实施例提供一种伪基站识别装置，该装置包括处理器，所述处理器与存储器耦合，并读取所述存储器中的指令，用于执行上述第一方面或第一方面的任意一种设计所述的方法。
其中，该伪基站识别装置可以是用户设备，也可以是用户设备中的芯片。
具体地，该用户设备包括但不限于智能手机、智能手表、平板电脑、虚拟现实(virtual reality，VR)设备、增强现实(augmented reality，AR)设备、个人计算机、手持式计算机、个人数字助理。
第四方面，本申请实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，用于存储为执行上述第一方面或第一方面的任意一种设计的功能所用的程序，该程序被处理器执行时，用于实现上述第一方面或第一方面的任意一种设计所述的方法。
第五方面，本申请实施例提供了一种包含程序代码的计算机程序产品，当其包含的程序代码在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行上述第一方面或第一方面的任意一种设计所述的方法。
另外，第二方面至第五方面中任一种可能设计方式所带来的技术效果可参见第一方面中不同设计方式所带来的技术效果，此处不再赘述。
附图说明
图1为本申请实施例提供的一种本申请实施例的应用场景的示意图；
图2为本申请实施例提供的第一种伪基站识别方法的流程示意图；
图3为本申请实施例提供的第二种伪基站识别方法的流程示意图；
图4为本申请实施例提供的第三种伪基站识别方法的流程示意图；
图5为本申请实施例提供的第一种伪基站识别装置的结构示意图；
图6为本申请实施例提供的第二种伪基站识别装置的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
如背景技术中所述，从3G制式开始，3GPP中引入了双向鉴权操作：在用户设备完成与基站间的双向鉴权并进入连接态之前，基站仅能向用户设备发送系统消息、寻呼消息等消息，无法获取到用户设备的相关信息；只有在用户设备和基站之间的双向鉴权操作完成之后，用户设备可进入连接态、基站可获取到用户设备的相关信息并与用户设备进行正常通信。由于伪基站难以获取到网络侧的鉴权信息，因而伪基站难以完成与用户设备间的双向鉴权。也就是说，当用户设备驻留在3G及以上制式下的小区时，伪基站由于难以完成双向鉴权而难以获取到用户设备的相关信息。因为，为了获取用户设备的相关信息，伪基 站通常会诱导3G及以上制式下的用户设备进行小区重选或重定向，使得用户设备驻留到GSM伪基站小区，从而获取用户设备的相关信息，进而进行黑客相关操作，例如发送垃圾信息等。
现有技术中，在用户设备由3G及以上制式下的小区转而驻留GSM伪基站小区后，用户设备识别出当前驻留在GSM伪基站小区，会判断小区重选或重定向失败，进而回退到之前驻留的3G及以上制式下的小区。以用户设备回退到LTE小区为例，用户设备回退到LTE小区后并不知悉之前曾驻留GSM伪基站小区的情况，而是继续后续流程，例如用户设备会由LTE小区再次被诱导驻留至GSM伪基站小区，如此往复，导致用户设备无法规避伪基站攻击的风险，影响用户体验。
基于上述问题，本申请实施例提供一种伪基站识别方法及装置，用于用户设备在由3G及以上制式下的小区转而驻留至GSM伪基站小区的情况下进行相应处理，从而降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险，提升用户体验。
此外，当用户设备驻留3G及以上制式下的合法基站小区时，也可能发生用户设备由3G及以上制式的小区转而驻留GSM伪基站小区的情况。例如，由于合法基站向用户设备发送系统消息(例如，携带寻呼信道配置的系统消息)时是以明文方式发送的，因而黑客可获取到该合法基站的寻呼信道配置，进而对合法基站的寻呼信道进行干扰；当用户设备驻留的合法基站小区被黑客干扰时，黑客会诱导用户设备驻留到GSM制式下的伪基站小区，从而获取用户设备的相关信息，进而进行黑客操作。
采用本申请实施例提供的方案，还可以在用户设备由3G及以上制式下的小区转而驻留至GSM伪基站小区后，对之前驻留的3G及以上制式的基站是否为伪基站进行判断，从而进一步降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险，提升用户体验。
下面，对本申请实施例的应用场景加以介绍。
本申请实施例可应用于图1所示的通信系统中。该通信系统中包含第一基站、第二基站以及用户设备。
其中，用户设备可以是向用户提供语音和/或数据连通性的设备，对应无线连接功能的手持式设备、或连接到无线调制解调器的其他处理设备。用户设备可以经无线接入网(radio access network，RAN)与一个或多个核心网进行通信，用户设备可以是移动终端，如移动电话(或称为“蜂窝”电话)和对应移动终端的计算机，例如，可以是便携式、袖珍式、手持式、计算机内置的或者车载的移动装置，它们与无线接入网交换语言和/或数据。例如，个人通信业务(personal communication service，PCS)电话、无绳电话、会话发起协议(session initiated protocol，SIP)话机、无线本地环路(wireless local loop，WLL)站、个人数字助理(personal digital assistant，PDA)等设备。终端设备也可以称为系统、订户单元(subscriber unit)、订户站(subscriber station)，移动站(mobile station)、移动台(mobile)、远程站(remote station)、接入点(access point)、远程终端(remote terminal)、接入终端(access terminal)、用户终端(user terminal)、用户代理(user agent)或用户装备(user equipment)，本申请实施例中并不限定。
其中，第一基站为第一网络制式下的基站，第二基站为第二网络制式下的基站。
具体地，第二网络制式可以是GSM，第一网络制式可以是3G及以上制式，包括但不限于码分多址接入(code division multiple access，CDMA)、带宽码分多址接入(wide-band  code division multiple access，WCDMA)、时分同步码分多址接入(time division-synchronous code division multiple access，TD-SCDMA)、长期演进(long term evolution，LTE)、第五代(5th generation，5G)通信系统。
也就是说，第二基站可以是GSM中的网络设备(base transceiver station，BTS)；第一基站可以是CDMA中的BTS，也可以WCDMA或TD-SCDMA中的网络设备(NodeB)，还可以是LTE系统中的演进型网络设备(evolutional node B，eNB或e-NodeB)、5G网络架构中的5G基站，也可是家庭演进基站(home evolved node B，HeNB)等，本申请实施例中对第一基站和第二基站的类型不做具体限定。
本申请实施例中，第二基站是伪基站，第一基站可以是伪基站，也可以是合法基站。在本申请实施例的应用场景中，用户设备驻留在第一基站管理的第一小区上；然后，用户设备通过小区重选或者重定向等操作，由第一网络制式下的第一小区转而驻留至第二网络制式下的第二小区。用户设备在驻留至第二小区后，可采用本申请实施例提供的方案进行相应的判断和处理，从而降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险，提升用户体验。
下面将结合附图对本申请实施例作进一步地详细描述。
参见图2，为本申请实施例提供的一种伪基站识别方法的流程示意图。该方法包括如下步骤。
S201：用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区。
其中，第一小区为第一网络制式下的小区，第二小区为第二网络制式下的小区。示例性地，第一网络制式可以为GSM；第二网络制式可以为以下任一种：LTE；5G；CDMA；WCDMA；TD-SCDMA。第一网络制式和第二网络制式的相关描述可参见本申请实施例的应用场景中的相关介绍，此处不再赘述。
具体地，S201中，用户设备由第一小区转而驻留第二小区的过程，可以通过前述小区重选或重定向操作实现。下面分别对这两种操作进行介绍。
一、小区重选
具体地，用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，可通过如下方式实现：当用户设备处于空闲态时，用户设备基于第一基站配置的、第二网络制式下的邻区列表进行小区重选，邻区列表用于指示用户设备进行小区重选的一个或多个候选小区；用户设备由第一小区驻留至第二小区，第二小区为邻区列表中指示的候选小区。
当用户设备处于空闲态时，用户设备可触发小区重选的操作。需要说明的是，虽然小区重选是用户设备的自主行为，但是用户设备是基于第一基站配置的邻区列表进行小区重选的，也就是说，用户设备进行小区重选后驻留的第二小区是第一基站配置的邻区列表中指示的候选小区。
应理解，本申请实施例中，用户设备进行小区重选后由第一网络制式下的第一小区转而驻留第二网络制式下的第二小区，因此本申请实施例中的小区重选可以理解为异系统小区重选。
二、重定向
具体地，用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，可通过如下方式实现：用户设备随机接入成功后，用户设备接收第一基站发送的指示消息，该指示消息用于指示用户设备进行重定向，该指示消息中包含一个或多个重定向频点；用户设备根据该指示消息 由第一小区驻留至第二小区，第二小区的小区频点为一个或多个重定向频点中的一个。
用户设备随机接入成功后，第一基站可触发用户设备进行重定向。用户设备可以从第一基站下发的一个或多个重定向频点中选择一个可以驻留的频点，进而驻留在该频点对应的第二小区上。
应理解，用户设备在进行重定向时，可以从一个或多个重定向频点中随机选择一个频点，可以基于一个或多个重定向频点的优先级选择频点，可以基于第一基站的指示选择频点，也可以采用其他方式选择频点，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定，只要该频点对应的小区为第二网络制式下的可用小区即可。
此外，在用户设备进行重定向时，若第一基站通过指示消息下发的一个或多个重定向频点均不可用，用户设备可在第二网络制式下发起扫频，搜索第二网络制式下的可用小区，进而驻留到搜索到的第二小区上。当然，若通过扫频仍未搜索到可用小区，则可确定重定向失败，则用户设备像S203中那样回退到第一网络制式，并继续执行S204等后续操作。
由此可以看出，本申请实施例中，用户设备进行小区重选或重定向后，使得用户设备由第一网络制式下的第一小区转而驻留至第二网络制式下的第二小区。若第二小区为伪基站小区，则可采用本申请实施例提供的方案对第一小区和第二小区进行相应判断和处理。具体方式将在后面进行详细描述。
S202：用户设备在判断用于管理第二小区的第二基站为伪基站的情况下，记录第二小区为伪基站小区，并将第二小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表。
其中，禁止驻留列表用于指示用户设备禁止驻留在禁止驻留列表中记录的小区信息所对应的小区。需要说明的是，禁止驻留列表仅为本申请实施例中提供的一种表达方式，其也可以用其他表达方式替代，例如受限列表、小区受限列表或者bar列表，只要该表达方式可用于指示禁止用户设备驻留小区的小区信息即可。
其中，第二小区的小区信息包括以下至少一种：第二小区的小区频点；第二小区的小区频段；第二小区的物理小区标识(physical cell ID，PCI)。
此外，本申请实施例中，用户设备在进行小区重选评估、测量评估、回复其他制式测量结果时，都可以将禁止驻留列表中的伪基站小区剔除，避免频繁发起与伪基站小区间的互操作。
本申请实施例中，用户设备在判断第二基站为伪基站(即第二小区为伪基站小区)的情况下，并不像现有技术那样直接判定重选或重定向失败，进而回退到第一小区，而是先记录第二小区为伪基站小区的情况，并将第二小区加入禁止驻留列表，从而避免用户设备再次驻留在第二网络制式下的伪基站小区(即第二小区)，降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险。
此外，若用户设备在对第一基站下发的重定向频点进行搜索的过程中发现其中某个频点对应的小区为禁止驻留列表中的小区，则用户设备可直接记录该小区为伪基站小区的情况，并执行后续S203～S204。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中，将第二小区加入禁止驻留列表后，若用户设备在第二网络制式下没有其他可用小区，则用户设备可选择将第二小区从禁止驻留列表中删除，这样的话，用户设备可再次驻留第二小区，从而避免用户设备在第二网络制式下无可用小区的问题。这样做主要是出于如下考虑：如前面的介绍中所述，当用户设备驻留的合法基站小区被干扰时，也可能发生用户设备由3G及以上制式的小区转而驻留GSM伪基站小区 的情况。而实际实现时，GSM伪基站的移动性较强，若随着GSM伪基站的移动第二小区已不在GSM伪基站的覆盖范围内，那么一直禁用第二小区可能会导致用户设备在第二网络制式下无可用小区的情况，此时可将第二小区从禁止驻留列表中删除，用户设备仍可再次驻留在第二小区。
试想一下，在极端情况下，由于GSM伪基站的干扰，用户设备可能将第一基站配置的所有GSM小区均加入禁止驻留列表中，而实际上，随着GSM伪基站的移动，此时GSM伪基站可能已不再覆盖其中任何一个GSM小区，此时若这些GSM小区均不从禁止驻留列表中删除，那么用户设备则不能再驻留任何GSM小区。
当然，用户设备在第二网络制式下无可用小区的情况下，也可以选择不将第二小区从禁止驻留列表中删除，本申请实施例中对此不做具体限定。
S203：用户设备回退到第一网络制式，并重新驻留第一小区。
在用户设备判断第二基站为伪基站的情况下，会判定重定向失败或重选失败，因而用户设备可回退到第一网络制式，并重新驻留第一小区。
S204：用户设备判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站。
用户设备重新驻留第一小区后，可基于记录的第二小区为伪基站小区的情况，触发对第一小区是否为伪基站小区的判断。
在第一基站为伪基站的情况下，用户设备在S201中由第一小区转而驻留至第二小区的过程可以是：第一基站(伪基站)为用户设备配置的邻区为伪基站小区，用户设备基于第一基站配置的邻区列表进行小区重选后驻留到第二小区(伪基站小区)；或者，第一基站(伪基站)下发的重定向频点为伪基站小区的频点，用户设备进行重定向后驻留到第二小区(伪基站小区)。
在第一基站为合法基站的情况下，用户设备在S201中由第一小区转而驻留至第二小区的过程可以是：由于合法基站向用户设备发送系统消息(例如，携带寻呼信道配置的系统消息)时是以明文方式发送的，因而黑客可获取到该合法基站的寻呼信道配置，从而对合法基站的寻呼信道进行干扰，进而诱导用户设备驻留在第二小区(伪基站小区)。
具体的，本申请实施例中对第二基站是否为伪基站进行判断时可采用的方式有多种，下面列举其中的两种。
方式一
用户设备判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站，具体可通过如下方式实现：用户设备触发建链；用户设备在建链失败的情况下确定第一基站为伪基站。
如前面的介绍中所述，从3G制式开始，3GPP中引入了双向鉴权操作：只有在用户设备和基站之间的双向鉴权操作完成之后，用户设备可进入连接态、基站才可获取到用户设备的相关信息并与用户设备进行正常通信。而伪基站难以获取到网络侧的鉴权信息，因而伪基站难以完成与用户设备间的双向鉴权。也就是说，在3G及以上制式下，伪基站难以与用户设备建链。那么，在方式一中，若用户设备主动触发建链失败，则说明第一基站为伪基站。
在用户设备确定第一基站为伪基站之后，用户设备可将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表。
其中，第一小区的小区信息包括以下至少一种：第一小区的小区频点；第一小区的小区频段；第一小区的PCI、第一小区的E-UTRA绝对无线频率信道号(E-UTRA absolute radio  frequency channel number，EARFCN)。
将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表后，用户设备则不会再驻留在第一小区，因而可以避免用户设备长期驻留在伪基站小区，降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险。
进一步地，在用户设备将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表之后，用户设备还可在第一网络制式下重新进行小区搜索，若用户设备在第一网络制式下搜索到可用小区，则根据小区搜索结果驻留到第三小区，该第三小区的小区信息未记录在禁止驻留列表中。
也就是说，将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表之后，用户设备在重新进行小区搜索时，需要将禁止驻留列表中的小区(即第一小区)剔除，只有在第一网络制式下搜索到禁止驻留列表之外的可用小区(即第三小区)时，才选择驻留到该小区。
采用上述方案，用户设备可在第一网络制式下重新进行搜网，从而使得用户设备可以驻留到第一网络制式下的合法基站小区，进行正常通信。
此外，在用户设备在第一网络制式下进行小区搜索之后，若用户设备在第一网络制式下未搜索到可用小区，则用户设备可切换到第一网络制式之外的其他制式进行小区搜索。例如，当第一网络制式为LTE时，用户设备可禁用(disable)LIE，并触发去3G或5G制式搜网。
采用上述方案，在第一网络制式下没有可用小区的情况下切换到其他制式进行小区搜索，可以避免用户设备驻留在伪基站小区。
当然，在方式一中，用户设备触发建链之后，用户设备可在建链成功的情况下确定第一基站为合法基站。
如前所述，在用户设备和基站之间的双向鉴权操作完成之后，用户设备可进入连接态、基站才可获取到用户设备的相关信息并与用户设备进行正常通信。合法基站可以获取到网络侧的鉴权信息，进而完成与用户设备间的双向鉴权。因此，在用户设备触发建链后，若建链成功则可以确定第一基站为合法基站。
在用户设备确定第一基站为合法基站之后，用户设备可将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表；然后，用户设备在第一网络制式下进行小区搜索；若用户设备在第一网络制式下搜索到可用小区，则用户设备根据搜索结果驻留到第四小区，第四小区的小区信息未记录在禁止驻留列表中；若用户设备在第一网络制式下未搜索到可用小区，则用户设备将第一小区的小区信息从禁止驻留列表中删除，并重新驻留第一小区。
采用上述方案，在当前制式下有可用小区的情况下，用户设备根据搜索结果驻留到第四小区，可以使得用户设备驻留到第一网络制式下的合法基站小区，进行正常通信；在当前制式下没有可用小区的情况下重新驻留第一小区，可以避免用户设备在当前制式下无可用小区。
方式二
在用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区之前，用户设备可确定第一基站的系统消息配置异常，并保存类伪基站配置标识；那么，用户设备判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站，具体可通过如下方案实现：用户设备在保存有类伪基站配置标识的情况下确定第一基站为伪基站。
其中，用户设备在以下信息中的至少一种满足时，确定第一基站的系统消息配置异常：用户设备确定第一基站配置在共享公共陆地移动网络(public land mobile network，PLMN)列表中的多个PLMN标识为禁止配置在同一共享PLMN列表中的PLMN标识；用户设备 确定第一基站的驻留门限低于用户设备配置的驻留门限阈值；用户设备确定第一基站未配置异频邻区和异系统邻区；用户设备确定第一基站配置GSM邻区的优先级为高重选优先级。
在进行系统消息配置时，合法基站和伪基站的配置会有所不同。
比如，基站在进行系统消息配置时，会向用户设备下发共享PLMN列表，以指示用户设备的PLMN标识为该列表中的任一个时，用户设备均可与基站建立连接。而用户设备中也维护有一个PLMN列表，该列表指示哪些PLMN不可由一个基站共享，例如移动运营商的PLMN1和电信运营商的PLMN2不可被一个基站共享。用户设备在收到基站下发的共享PLMN列表后，可以将该共享PLMN列表与自身维护的PLMN列表比照，若该共享PLMN列表中包含至少两个不可被一个基站共享的PLMN，则用户设备认为该基站可能为伪基站，从而保存类伪基站配置标识。这是因为：伪基站通常会将多个运营商的PLMN标识配置在一个共享PLMN列表中，以诱导更多的用户设备与自身建立连接。
比如，合法基站会配置异频邻区和/或异系统邻区，而伪基站通常不会配置异频邻区和异系统邻区。
比如，伪基站配置的驻留门限通常较低，使得基的发射功率较低时，用户设备根据该伪基站的驻留门限判断时也能判断满足驻留条件，以诱导用户设备驻留，而合法基站配置的驻留门限通常高于伪基站配置的驻留门限。
再比如，伪基站通常会将GSM邻区配置为高重选优先级。这是因为：GSM没有双向鉴权，用户设备驻留在GSM伪基站小区上的危害更大(用户隐私泄露、发送垃圾短信)。伪基站通常将GSM邻区配置为高重选优先级，可以让用户设备更易重选到GSM伪基站小区。且现网中合法基站通常将GSM邻区配置为低重选优先级，避免重选到速率较低的GSM小区。
因此，在方式二中，用户设备驻留在第一小区时，若用户设备发现第一基站的系统消息配置异常则保存类伪基站配置标识。后续，用户设备由第二小区回退到第一小区后，用户设备可结合该类伪基站配置标识以及记录的第二小区为伪基站小区的情况，确定第一基站为伪基站。
在上述实现方式中，可以通过识别第一基站的系统消息配置是否体现有伪基站的系统消息配置的特点，来判断第一基站是否为伪基站。即，通过第一基站的系统消息配置情况可判断第一基站是否为伪基站。
当然，在方式二中，用户设备在第一次驻留第一小区时也可不对第一基站的系统消息配置情况进行判断，而是在用户设备在S203中重新驻留第一小区后，再判断第一基站的系统消息配置是否异常。也就是说，在方式二中，用户设备在S204中判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站，也可通过如下方式实现：用户设备确定第一基站的系统消息配置异常；用户设备确定第一基站为伪基站。在这种实现方式中，用户设备不必事先保存类伪基站配置标识，而是在用户设备由第一小区转而驻留第二小区后再对第一基站的系统消息配置情况进行判断，并结合记录的第二小区为伪基站小区的情况，对第一基站是否为伪基站进行判断。
无论在何种时机对第一基站的系统消息配置情况进行判断，在方式二中，在用户设备确定第一基站为伪基站之后，用户设备可将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表。
其中，第一小区的小区信息包括以下至少一种：第一小区的小区频点；第一小区的小 区频段；第一小区的PCI、第一小区的EARFCN。
将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表后，用户设备则不会再驻留在第一小区，因而可以避免用户设备长期驻留在伪基站小区，降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险。
进一步地，在用户设备将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表之后，用户设备还可在第一网络制式下重新进行小区搜索，若用户设备在第一网络制式下搜索到可用小区，则根据小区搜索结果驻留到第三小区，该第三小区的小区信息未记录在禁止驻留列表中。
也就是说，将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表之后，用户设备在重新进行小区搜索时，需要将禁止驻留列表中的小区(即第一小区)剔除，只有在第一网络制式下搜索到禁止驻留列表之外的可用小区(即第三小区)时，才选择驻留到该小区。
采用上述方案，用户设备可在第一网络制式下重新进行搜网，从而使得用户设备可以驻留到第一网络制式下的合法基站小区，进行正常通信。
此外，在用户设备在第一网络制式下进行小区搜索之后，若用户设备在第一网络制式下未搜索到可用小区，则用户设备可切换到第一网络制式之外的其他制式进行小区搜索。例如，当第一网络制式为LTE时，用户设备可禁用(disable)LIE，并触发去3G制式搜网。
采用上述方案，在第一网络制式下没有可用小区的情况下切换到其他制式进行小区搜索，可以避免用户设备驻留在伪基站小区。
另外，需要说明的是，在方式二中，由于伪基站也可模拟合法基站进行系统消息配置，因此若用户设备中未保存第一基站的类伪基站配置标识或者用户设备判断第一基站的系统消息配置不异常，并不能说明第一基站为合法基站。
采用本申请实施例提供的伪基站识别方法，在用户设备由第一网络制式下的第一小区转而驻留第二网络制式下的第二小区后，用户设备在判断第二小区为伪基站小区的情况下记录第二小区为伪基站小区的情况，并将第二小区加入禁止驻留列表，从而避免用户设备再次驻留在第二小区这一伪基站小区，降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险，提升用户体验。同时，在用户设备回退到第一网络制式后，用户设备可根据之前记录的第二小区为伪基站小区的情况，进一步确定第一基站是否为伪基站，从而进一步降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险。
在确定第一基站为伪基站后，用户设备可采取相应措施，例如将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表，从而避免用户设备再次驻留在第一小区这一伪基站小区，降低用户设备被伪基站攻击的风险。
基于同一发明构思，本申请实施例还提供如下两种伪基站识别方法，这两种方法均可视为图2所示方法的一个具体示例。
在这两种方法中，以用户设备为UE、第一网络制式为LTE、第二网络制式为GSM为例。UE中包括两个模块，GSM模块和LTE模块。其中，GSM模块负责用户设备在GSM网络制式下的通信；LTE模块负责用户设备在LTE网络制式下的通信。具体实现时，GSM模块和LTE模块可以是不同的硬件处理器，也可以是不同的软件处理单元，本申请实施例对此不做具体限定。
下面结合附图对两种伪基站识别方法分别进行介绍。
方法一
参见图3，该方法包括如下步骤：
【1】UE驻留在LTE小区上，进行测量评估后确定发起L2G重选。
其中，LTE基站可通过系统消息配置UE的GSM邻区列表，UE在对GSM邻区列表中的候选小区进行测量评估后发起L2G重选。L2G小区重选即LTE制式到GSM制式的小区重选。
【2】UE发起到GSM的重选。
【3】UE在重选后驻留GSM小区。
【4】GSM模块向LTE模块指示LTE重选失败，同时指示重选的GSM小区为伪基站小区。
此外，步骤【4】中，GSM模块也可保存GSM小区为伪基站小区的判断结果，UE回退到LTE后，LTE模块在执行后续操作时可根据GSM模块保存的判断结果进行相应处理。
【5】LTE模块将GSM伪基站小区加入到禁止驻留列表中，从而降低该GSM小区的重选和测量优先级，待没有其他可用GSM邻区后解除受限。
其中，将该GSM小区解除受限即将该GSM小区从禁止驻留列表中删除。
【6】重选失败回退，UE重新驻留LTE小区。
【7】UE回退到LTE小区后，UE中的LTE无线资源控制(LTE radio resource control，LRRC)通知LTE非接入层(LTE non-access stratum，LNAS)主动触发建链，以确认网络是否能够完成双向鉴权流程。
其中，UE主动触发建链时可以通过跟踪区更新(tracking area updata，TAU)以及发起服务请求(Service)等方式进行。
UE主动触发建链后，对于建链失败和建链成功有不同的处理方式。
对于建链失败的处理：
【8】如果UE收到RRC连接释放消息(RRC_CONN_RELEASE)，则说明鉴权流程失败，UE底层上报无线链路失败(radio link failure，RLF)，NAS协议流程定时器超时，然后UE可识别LTE小区为伪基站小区，LNAS通知LRRC将LTE小区加入禁止驻留列表中，重新搜索其他可用小区。
对于建链成功的处理：
【8】如果LTE建链成功，UE可以识别LTE小区为合法基站小区，但是LTE基站的系统消息被黑客获取，并干扰了LTE基站配置的GSM临区；LNAS通知LRRC将LTE小区加入禁止驻留列表中，受限类型为搜不到网解受限，等待网络发送RRC连接释放消息(RRC_CONN_RELEASE)后重新搜网；若搜到其他可用小区则驻留该小区，若搜不到其他可以小区则将该LTE小区从禁止驻留列表中删除。
其中，搜不到网解受限的含义是：若未搜索到其他可用小区，则将该LTE小区从禁止驻留列表中删除。
需要说明的是，方法一中以UE通过小区重选由LTE小区驻留到GSM小区为例进行介绍，实际实现时，步骤【1】～步骤【3】中UE由LTE小区转而驻留GSM小区的过程也可通过UE的重定向实现，重定向过程可参见图2所示方法中的相关描述，此处不再赘述。此外，在方法一中，LRRC在进行重选评估、测量上报、回复其他制式测量结果时，都可以将禁止驻留列表中的伪基站小区剔除，避免频繁发起到伪基站小区的互操作。
方法二
参见图4，该方法包括如下步骤：
【1】UE驻留在LTE小区上，LRRC识别LTE基站系统消息配置异常，UE保存类伪基站配置标识；UE进行测量评估后确定发起L2G重选。
其中，LTE基站可通过系统消息配置UE的GSM邻区列表，UE在对GSM邻区列表中的候选小区进行测量评估后发起L2G重选。L2G小区重选即LTE制式到GSM制式的小区重选。
其中，当LRRC判断LTE基站满足以下任一个条件时，认为LTE基站为类伪基站配置，LRRC保存基站类伪基站配置标识；
1)LTE基站配置不可能配置在同一基站上的共享PLMN，例如：将移动、联通、电信的PLMN配置在LTE基站的共享PLMNLIST中；
2)LTE基站的系统消息块1(system information block 1，SIB1)中配置驻留门限异常偏低，LTE基站能量较差时UE也能判断满足驻留条件。其中，判断驻留门限异常偏低可以与UE配置的驻留门限检测值进行比较判断；
3)LTE基站不配置异频邻区或异系统邻区，诱导UE长时间在伪基站驻留；
4)LTE基站配置GSM邻区为高重选优先级。
【2】用户设备发起到GSM的重选。
【3】UE在重选后驻留GSM小区。
【4】GSM模块向LTE模块指示LTE重选失败，同时指示重选的GSM小区为伪基站小区。
此外，步骤【4】中，GSM模块也可保存GSM小区为伪基站小区的判断结果，UE回退到LTE后，LTE模块在执行后续操作时可根据GSM模块保存的判断结果进行相应处理。
【5】LTE模块将GSM伪基站小区加入到禁止驻留列表中，从而降低该GSM小区的重选和测量优先级，待没有其他可用GSM邻区后解除受限。
其中，将该GSM小区解除受限即将该GSM小区从禁止驻留列表中删除。
【6】重选失败回退，UE重新驻留LTE小区。
【7】LRRC判断类伪基站配置标识是否为真，如果为真，则识别LTE基站为伪基站，将LTE小区加入禁止驻留列表，并重新搜索其他可用小区。
需要说明的是，方法二中以UE通过小区重选由LTE小区驻留到GSM小区为例进行介绍，实际实现时，步骤【1】～步骤【3】中UE由LTE小区转而驻留GSM小区的过程也可通过UE的重定向实现，重定向过程可参见图2所示方法中的相关描述，此处不再赘述。
此外，在方法二中，LRRC在进行重选评估、测量上报、回复其他制式测量结果时，都可以将禁止驻留列表中的伪基站小区剔除，避免频繁发起到伪基站小区的互操作。
需要说明的是，图3或图4所示方法可视为图2所示方法的一个具体示例。图3或图4所示方法中未详尽描述的实现方式及技术效果可参见图2所示方法中的相关描述。
基于同一发明构思，本申请实施例还提供一种伪基站识别装置，该装置可用于执行图2所示方法。参见图5，该装置500包括驻留模块501，判断处理模块502以及回退模块503。
具体地，该装置500用于执行图2所示方法时，驻留模块501，用于由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，第一小区为第一网络制式下的小区，第二小区为第二网络制式下的小区。判断处理模块502，用于在判断用于管理第二小区的第二基站为伪基站的情况下， 记录第二小区为伪基站小区，并将第二小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表，禁止驻留列表用于指示用户设备禁止驻留在禁止驻留列表中记录的小区信息所对应的小区。回退模块503，用于回退到第一网络制式，并重新驻留第一小区。判断处理模块502，还用于判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站。
其中，第一网络制式可以为GSM；第二网络制式可以为以下任一种：LTE；5G；CDMA；WCDMA；TD-SCDMA。
其中，第二小区的小区信息可以包括以下至少一种：第二小区的小区频点；第二小区的小区频段；第二小区的PCI。
判断处理模块判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站，可通过如下三种可选的方式来实现。
第一种
判断处理模块502在判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站时，具体用于：触发建链；在建链失败的情况下确定第一基站为伪基站。
第二种
判断处理模块502还用于：在驻留模块501由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区之前，确定第一基站的系统消息配置异常；保存类伪基站配置标识；判断处理模块502在判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站时，具体用于：在保存有类伪基站配置标识的情况下确定第一基站为伪基站。
第三种
判断处理模块502在判断用于管理第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站时，具体用于：确定第一基站的系统消息配置异常；确定第一基站为伪基站。
在第二种和第三种方式中，判断处理模块502在以下信息中的至少一种满足时，确定第一基站的系统消息配置异常：确定第一基站配置在PLMN列表中的多个PLMN标识为禁止配置在同一共享PLMN列表中的PLMN标识；确定第一基站的驻留门限低于用户设备配置的驻留门限阈值；确定第一基站未配置异频邻区和异系统邻区；确定第一基站配置GSM邻区的优先级为高重选优先级。
此外，判断处理模块502还用于：在确定第一基站为伪基站之后，将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表。
进一步地，判断处理模块502还用于：在将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表之后，在第一网络制式下进行小区搜索；驻留模块501还用于：若判断处理模块502在第一网络制式下搜索到可用小区，则根据搜索结果驻留到第三小区，第三小区的小区信息未记录在禁止驻留列表中。
此外，判断处理模块502还用于:在触发建链之后，在建链成功的情况下确定第一基站为合法基站。
进一步地，判断处理模块502还用于：在确定第一基站为合法基站之后将第一小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表；在第一网络制式下进行小区搜索；驻留模块501还用于：若判断处理模块502在第一网络制式下搜索到可用小区，则根据搜索结果驻留到第四小区，第四小区的小区信息未记录在禁止驻留列表中；判断处理模块502还用于：若在第一网络制式下未搜索到可用小区，则将第一小区的小区信息从禁止驻留列表中删除，并重新驻留第一小区。
驻留模块501由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，可通过如下两种可选的方式来实现。
第一种
驻留模块501在由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区时，具体用于：在用户设备随机接入成功后，接收第一基站发送的指示消息，指示消息用于指示用户设备进行重定向，指示消息中包含一个或多个重定向频点；根据指示消息由第一小区驻留至第二小区，第二小区的小区频点为一个或多个重定向频点中的一个。
第二种
驻留模块501在由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区时，具体用于：当用户设备处于空闲态时，基于第一基站配置的、第二网络制式下的邻区列表进行小区重选，邻区列表用于指示用户设备进行小区重选的一个或多个候选小区；由第一小区驻留至第二小区，第二小区为邻区列表中指示的候选小区。
需要说明的是，本申请实施例中对模块的划分是示意性的，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式。在本申请的实施例中的各功能模块可以集成在一个处理模块中，也可以是各个模块单独物理存在，也可以两个或两个以上模块集成在一个模块中。上述集成的模块既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用软件功能模块的形式实现。
集成的模块如果以软件功能模块的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本申请的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分或者该技术方案的全部或部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机，服务器，或者网络设备等)或处理器(processor)执行本申请各个实施例方法的全部或部分步骤。而前述的存储介质包括：U盘、移动硬盘、只读存储器(read-only memory，ROM)、随机存取存储器(random access memory，RAM)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。
同样需要说明的是，伪基站识别装置500可用于执行图2对应的实施例提供的方法，因此图5所示的伪基站识别装置500中未详尽描述的实现方式及技术效果可参见图2中的相关描述。
基于相同构思，本申请实施例还提供一种伪基站识别装置，该装置应用于用户设备，该伪基站识别装置用于执行图2所示的伪基站识别方法，可以是与图5所示的伪基站识别装置500相同的装置。
图6示例性示出了本申请提供的一种伪基站识别装置的结构示意图，如图6所示，伪基站识别装置600包括处理器、存储器、控制电路以及天线。处理器主要用于对通信协议以及通信数据进行处理，以及对整个伪基站识别装置600进行控制，执行软件程序，处理软件程序的数据，例如用于支持伪基站识别装置600执行图2所示的伪基站识别方法。存储器主要用于存储软件程序和数据。控制电路主要用于基带信号与射频信号的转换以及对射频信号的处理。控制电路和天线一起也可以叫做收发器，主要用于收发电磁波形式的射频信号。
当用户设备开机后，处理器可以读取存储器中的软件程序，解释并执行软件程序的指令，处理软件程序的数据。当需要通过无线发送数据时，处理器对待发送的数据进行基带 处理后，输出基带信号至射频电路，射频电路将基带信号进行射频处理后将射频信号通过天线以电磁波的形式向外发送。当有数据发送到伪基站识别装置600时，射频电路通过天线接收到射频信号，将射频信号转换为基带信号，并将基带信号输出至处理器，处理器将基带信号转换为数据并对该数据进行处理。
本领域技术人员可以理解，为了便于说明，图6仅示出了一个存储器和处理器。在实际的伪基站识别装置600中，可以存在多个处理器和存储器。存储器也可以称为存储介质或者存储设备等，本申请对此不做限制。
作为一种可选的实现方式，处理器可以包括基带处理器和中央处理器，基带处理器主要用于对通信协议以及通信数据进行处理，中央处理器主要用于对整个伪基站识别装置600进行控制，执行软件程序，处理软件程序的数据。图6中的处理器集成了基带处理器和中央处理器的功能，本领域技术人员可以理解，基带处理器和中央处理器也可以是各自独立的处理器，通过总线等技术互联。本领域技术人员可以理解，伪基站识别装置600可以包括多个基带处理器以适应不同的网络制式，伪基站识别装置600可以包括多个中央处理器以增强其处理能力，伪基站识别装置600的各个部件可以通过各种总线连接。所述基带处理器也可以表述为基带处理电路或者基带处理芯片。所述中央处理器也可以表述为中央处理电路或者中央处理芯片。对通信协议以及通信数据进行处理的功能可以内置在处理器中，也可以以软件程序的形式存储在存储单元中，由处理器执行软件程序以实现基带处理功能。
在本申请实施例中，可以将具有收发功能的天线和控制电路视为伪基站识别装置600的收发单元，将具有处理功能的处理器视为伪基站识别装置600的处理单元。收发单元也可以称为收发器、收发机、收发装置等。可选地，可以将收发单元中用于实现接收功能的器件视为接收单元，将收发单元中用于实现发送功能的器件视为发送单元，即收发单元包括接收单元和发送单元。示例性的，接收单元也可以称为接收机、接收器、接收电路等，发送单元可以称为发射机、发射器或者发射电路等。
在下行链路上，通过天线接收网络设备(例如基站)发送的下行链路信号(包括数据和/或控制信息)，在上行链路上，通过天线向网络设备(例如基站)发送上行链路信号(包括数据和/或控制信息)，在处理器中，对业务数据和信令消息进行处理，这些单元根据无线接入网采用的无线接入技术(例如，LTE、NR及其他演进系统的接入技术)来进行处理。所述处理器还用于对伪基站识别装置600的动作进行控制管理，用于执行上述实施例中由伪基站识别装置600进行的处理。处理器还用于支持伪基站识别装置600执行图2中用户设备的执行方法。
可以理解的是，图6仅仅示出了伪基站识别装置600的简化设计。在实际应用中，伪基站识别装置600可以包含任意数量的天线，存储器，处理器等，而所有可以实现本申请的伪基站识别装置600都在本申请的保护范围之内。
具体地，本申请中，以收发单元称为收发器，处理单元称为处理器为例，则伪基站识别装置600在执行图2所示的伪基站识别方法时，处理器用于通过收发器与第一基站进行交互，进而由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，所述第一小区为第一网络制式下的小区，所述第二小区为第二网络制式下的小区；在判断用于管理所述第二小区的第二基站为伪基站的情况下，记录所述第二小区为伪基站小区，并将所述第二小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表，所述禁止驻留列表用于指示所述用户设备禁止驻留在所述禁止驻留列表中记 录的小区信息所对应的小区；通过收发器与第一基站和第二基站进行交互，回退到所述第一网络制式并重新驻留所述第一小区；判断用于管理所述第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站。
处理器还可以实现上述图2所示的方法实施例中用户设备的任意详细功能，在此不再详尽赘述，可以参照上述图2所示的方法实施例中用户设备执行的处理步骤。
需要说明的是，图5～图6中所示的伪基站识别装置可视为用户设备中的集成芯片，也可以也视为用户设备。
具体地，该用户设备包括但不限于智能手机、智能手表、平板电脑、VR设备、AR设备、个人计算机、手持式计算机、个人数字助理。
本领域内的技术人员应明白，本申请的实施例可提供为方法、系统、或计算机程序产品。因此，本申请可采用完全硬件实施例、完全软件实施例、或结合软件和硬件方面的实施例的形式。而且，本申请可采用在一个或多个其中包含有计算机可用程序代码的计算机可用存储介质(包括但不限于磁盘存储器、CD-ROM、光学存储器等)上实施的计算机程序产品的形式。
本申请是参照根据本申请实施例的方法、设备(系统)、和计算机程序产品的流程图和/或方框图来描述的。应理解可由计算机程序指令实现流程图和/或方框图中的每一流程和/或方框、以及流程图和/或方框图中的流程和/或方框的结合。可提供这些计算机程序指令到通用计算机、专用计算机、嵌入式处理机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器以产生一个机器，使得通过计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备的处理器执行的指令产生用于实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的装置。
这些计算机程序指令也可存储在能引导计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备以特定方式工作的计算机可读存储器中，使得存储在该计算机可读存储器中的指令产生包括指令装置的制造品，该指令装置实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能。
这些计算机程序指令也可装载到计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备上，使得在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行一系列操作步骤以产生计算机实现的处理，从而在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行的指令提供用于实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的步骤。
显然，本领域的技术人员可以对本申请实施例进行各种改动和变型而不脱离本申请实施例的精神和范围。这样，倘若本申请实施例的这些修改和变型属于本申请权利要求及其等同技术的范围之内，则本申请也意图包含这些改动和变型在内。

Claims (30)

  1. 一种伪基站识别方法，其特征在于，包括：
    用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，所述第一小区为第一网络制式下的小区，所述第二小区为第二网络制式下的小区；
    所述用户设备在判断用于管理所述第二小区的第二基站为伪基站的情况下，记录所述第二小区为伪基站小区，并将所述第二小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表，所述禁止驻留列表用于指示所述用户设备禁止驻留在所述禁止驻留列表中记录的小区信息所对应的小区；
    所述用户设备回退到所述第一网络制式，并重新驻留所述第一小区；
    所述用户设备判断用于管理所述第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站。
  2. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述用户设备判断用于管理所述第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站，包括：
    所述用户设备触发建链；
    所述用户设备在建链失败的情况下确定所述第一基站为伪基站。
  3. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，在用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区之前，还包括：
    所述用户设备确定所述第一基站的系统消息配置异常；
    所述用户设备保存类伪基站配置标识；
    所述用户设备判断用于管理所述第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站，包括：
    所述用户设备在保存有所述类伪基站配置标识的情况下确定所述第一基站为伪基站。
  4. 如权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述用户设备判断用于管理所述第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站，包括：
    所述用户设备确定所述第一基站的系统消息配置异常；
    所述用户设备确定所述第一基站为伪基站。
  5. 如权利要求3或4所述的方法，其特征在于，所述用户设备在以下信息中的至少一种满足时，确定所述第一基站的系统消息配置异常：
    所述用户设备确定所述第一基站配置在共享公共陆地移动网络PLMN列表中的多个PLMN标识为禁止配置在同一共享PLMN列表中的PLMN标识；
    所述用户设备确定所述第一基站的驻留门限低于所述用户设备配置的驻留门限阈值；
    所述用户设备确定所述第一基站未配置异频邻区和异系统邻区；
    所述用户设备确定所述第一基站配置全球移动通信GSM邻区的优先级为高重选优先级。
  6. 如权利要求2～5任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述用户设备确定所述第一基站为伪基站之后，还包括：
    所述用户设备将所述第一小区的小区信息加入所述禁止驻留列表。
  7. 如权利要求6所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述用户设备将所述第一小区的小区信息加入所述禁止驻留列表之后，还包括：
    所述用户设备在所述第一网络制式下进行小区搜索；
    若所述用户设备在所述第一网络制式下搜索到可用小区，则所述用户设备根据搜索结 果驻留到第三小区，所述第三小区的小区信息未记录在所述禁止驻留列表中。
  8. 如权利要求2～7任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述用户设备触发建链之后，还包括：
    所述用户设备在建链成功的情况下确定所述第一基站为合法基站。
  9. 如权利要求8所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述用户设备确定所述第一基站为合法基站之后，还包括：
    所述用户设备将所述第一小区的小区信息加入所述禁止驻留列表；
    所述用户设备在所述第一网络制式下进行小区搜索；
    若所述用户设备在所述第一网络制式下搜索到可用小区，则所述用户设备根据搜索结果驻留到第四小区，所述第四小区的小区信息未记录在所述禁止驻留列表中；若所述用户设备在所述第一网络制式下未搜索到可用小区，则所述用户设备将所述第一小区的小区信息从所述禁止驻留列表中删除，并重新驻留所述第一小区。
  10. 如权利要求1～9任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，包括：
    所述用户设备随机接入成功后，所述用户设备接收所述第一基站发送的指示消息，所述指示消息用于指示所述用户设备进行重定向，所述指示消息中包含一个或多个重定向频点；
    所述用户设备根据所述指示消息由所述第一小区驻留至所述第二小区，所述第二小区的小区频点为所述一个或多个重定向频点中的一个。
  11. 如权利要求1～9任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，用户设备由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，包括：
    当所述用户设备处于空闲态时，所述用户设备基于所述第一基站配置的、所述第二网络制式下的邻区列表进行小区重选，所述邻区列表用于指示所述用户设备进行小区重选的一个或多个候选小区；
    所述用户设备由所述第一小区驻留至所述第二小区，所述第二小区为所述邻区列表中指示的候选小区。
  12. 如权利要求1～11任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一网络制式为全球移动通信系统GSM；所述第二网络制式为以下任一种：长期演进LTE；5G；码分多址接入CDMA；带宽码分多址接入WCDMA；时分同步码分多址接入TD-SCDMA。
  13. 如权利要求1～12任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第二小区的小区信息包括以下至少一种：
    所述第二小区的小区频点；
    所述第二小区的小区频段；
    所述第二小区的物理小区标识PCI。
  14. 一种伪基站识别装置，其特征在于，应用于用户设备中，包括：
    驻留模块，用于由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区，所述第一小区为第一网络制式下的小区，所述第二小区为第二网络制式下的小区；
    判断处理模块，用于在判断用于管理所述第二小区的第二基站为伪基站的情况下，记录所述第二小区为伪基站小区，并将所述第二小区的小区信息加入禁止驻留列表，所述禁止驻留列表用于指示所述用户设备禁止驻留在所述禁止驻留列表中记录的小区信息所对 应的小区；
    回退模块，用于回退到所述第一网络制式，并重新驻留所述第一小区；
    所述判断处理模块，还用于判断用于管理所述第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站。
  15. 如权利要求14所述的装置，其特征在于，所述判断处理模块在判断用于管理所述第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站时，具体用于：
    触发建链；
    在建链失败的情况下确定所述第一基站为伪基站。
  16. 如权利要求14所述的装置，其特征在于，所述判断处理模块还用于：
    在所述驻留模块由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区之前，确定所述第一基站的系统消息配置异常；
    保存类伪基站配置标识；
    所述判断处理模块在判断用于管理所述第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站时，具体用于：
    在保存有所述类伪基站配置标识的情况下确定所述第一基站为伪基站。
  17. 如权利要求14所述的装置，其特征在于，所述判断处理模块在判断用于管理所述第一小区的第一基站是否为伪基站时，具体用于：
    确定所述第一基站的系统消息配置异常；
    确定所述第一基站为伪基站。
  18. 如权利要求16或17所述的装置，其特征在于，所述判断处理模块在以下信息中的至少一种满足时，确定所述第一基站的系统消息配置异常：
    确定所述第一基站配置在PLMN列表中的多个PLMN标识为禁止配置在同一共享PLMN列表中的PLMN标识；
    确定所述第一基站的驻留门限低于所述用户设备配置的驻留门限阈值；
    确定所述第一基站未配置异频邻区和异系统邻区；
    确定所述第一基站配置GSM邻区的优先级为高重选优先级。
  19. 如权利要求15～18任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述判断处理模块还用于:
    在确定所述第一基站为伪基站之后，将所述第一小区的小区信息加入所述禁止驻留列表。
  20. 如权利要求19所述的装置，其特征在于，所述判断处理模块还用于:
    在将所述第一小区的小区信息加入所述禁止驻留列表之后，在所述第一网络制式下进行小区搜索；
    所述驻留模块还用于：
    若所述判断处理模块在所述第一网络制式下搜索到可用小区，则根据搜索结果驻留到第三小区，所述第三小区的小区信息未记录在所述禁止驻留列表中。
  21. 如权利要求15～20任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述判断处理模块还用于:
    在触发建链之后，在建链成功的情况下确定所述第一基站为合法基站。
  22. 如权利要求21所述的装置，其特征在于，所述判断处理模块还用于:
    在确定所述第一基站为合法基站之后将所述第一小区的小区信息加入所述禁止驻留列表；
    在所述第一网络制式下进行小区搜索；
    所述驻留模块还用于：
    若所述判断处理模块在所述第一网络制式下搜索到可用小区，则根据搜索结果驻留到第四小区，所述第四小区的小区信息未记录在所述禁止驻留列表中；
    所述判断处理模块还用于：
    若在所述第一网络制式下未搜索到可用小区，则将所述第一小区的小区信息从所述禁止驻留列表中删除，并重新驻留所述第一小区。
  23. 如权利要求14～22任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述驻留模块在由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区时，具体用于：
    在所述用户设备随机接入成功后，接收所述第一基站发送的指示消息，所述指示消息用于指示所述用户设备进行重定向，所述指示消息中包含一个或多个重定向频点；
    根据所述指示消息由所述第一小区驻留至所述第二小区，所述第二小区的小区频点为所述一个或多个重定向频点中的一个。
  24. 如权利要求14～22任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述驻留模块在由当前驻留的第一小区驻留至第二小区时，具体用于：
    当所述用户设备处于空闲态时，基于所述第一基站配置的、所述第二网络制式下的邻区列表进行小区重选，所述邻区列表用于指示所述用户设备进行小区重选的一个或多个候选小区；
    由所述第一小区驻留至所述第二小区，所述第二小区为所述邻区列表中指示的候选小区。
  25. 如权利要求14～24任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一网络制式为全球移动通信系统GSM；所述第二网络制式为以下任一种：LTE；5G；CDMA；WCDMA；TD-SCDMA。
  26. 如权利要求14～25任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第二小区的小区信息包括以下至少一种：
    所述第二小区的小区频点；
    所述第二小区的小区频段；
    所述第二小区的PCI。
  27. 一种伪基站识别装置，其特征在于，包括处理器，所述处理器与存储器耦合，并读取所述存储器中的指令，用于执行如权利要求1～13任一项所述的方法。
  28. 如权利要求27所述的装置，其特征在于，所述装置为用户设备或者所述装置为芯片。
  29. 一种计算机存储介质，其特征在于，所述计算机存储介质上存储有程序，所述程序被处理器执行时，用于实现如权利要求1～13任一项所述的方法。
  30. 一种计算机程序产品，其特征在于，所述计算机程序产品包含的程序代码在计算机上运行时，使得所述计算机执行如权利要求1～13任一项所述的方法。
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