WO2020025971A1 - Circuit alteration detection in integrated circuits - Google Patents
Circuit alteration detection in integrated circuits Download PDFInfo
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- WO2020025971A1 WO2020025971A1 PCT/GB2019/052173 GB2019052173W WO2020025971A1 WO 2020025971 A1 WO2020025971 A1 WO 2020025971A1 GB 2019052173 W GB2019052173 W GB 2019052173W WO 2020025971 A1 WO2020025971 A1 WO 2020025971A1
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- shield
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- voltage
- impedance signal
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- G—PHYSICS
- G01—MEASURING; TESTING
- G01R—MEASURING ELECTRIC VARIABLES; MEASURING MAGNETIC VARIABLES
- G01R31/00—Arrangements for testing electric properties; Arrangements for locating electric faults; Arrangements for electrical testing characterised by what is being tested not provided for elsewhere
- G01R31/28—Testing of electronic circuits, e.g. by signal tracer
- G01R31/317—Testing of digital circuits
- G01R31/31719—Security aspects, e.g. preventing unauthorised access during test
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H10—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES; ELECTRIC SOLID-STATE DEVICES NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- H10W—GENERIC PACKAGES, INTERCONNECTIONS, CONNECTORS OR OTHER CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAILS OF DEVICES COVERED BY CLASS H10
- H10W20/00—Interconnections in chips, wafers or substrates
- H10W20/40—Interconnections external to wafers or substrates, e.g. back-end-of-line [BEOL] metallisations or vias connecting to gate electrodes
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H10—SEMICONDUCTOR DEVICES; ELECTRIC SOLID-STATE DEVICES NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- H10W—GENERIC PACKAGES, INTERCONNECTIONS, CONNECTORS OR OTHER CONSTRUCTIONAL DETAILS OF DEVICES COVERED BY CLASS H10
- H10W42/00—Arrangements for protection of devices
- H10W42/40—Arrangements for protection of devices protecting against tampering, e.g. unauthorised inspection or reverse engineering
- H10W42/405—Arrangements for protection of devices protecting against tampering, e.g. unauthorised inspection or reverse engineering using active circuits
Definitions
- Integrated circuits may include designs that contain sensitive information.
- sensitive information is the secret key information used in crypto engine implementations (such as AES).
- security countermeasures are often implemented to provide safety of the sensitive information against side channel attacks.
- Some side channel attack techniques include physical attacks that require actual physical access to the inner layers of the integrated circuit.
- Passive or active shields can be added to ICs as countermeasures to protect sensitive information on ICs from unauthorized or unintended access methods for the circuit.
- an IC isP covered with metal lines that are disposed on top of the IC, for example in the top metal layer to hide the circuit beneath.
- these metal lines are connected to a voltage supply (power and ground) or supplied with a predefined or random test data from a transmitter, and observed with a number of receivers located at certain points of the integrated circuit.
- the receivers are also coupled to power or ground to compare whether there is a change.
- the receivers may also be supplied with the same test data internally in order to compare the data on the shielding metals and the actual test data. The receivers verify the integrity of the metal lines based on the output of the comparison.
- detection of a breach may be avoided with attack techniques where a portion of the shield is cut and reconstructed with a technique such as a focused ion beam to create a potential attack zone.
- Circuit alteration detection in integrated circuits is described herein.
- the described circuit alteration detection and corresponding circuitry can identify a change in impedance characteristics on a protection shield to detect a circuit alteration.
- An implementation of a system incorporating circuit alteration detection can include a shield in at least one metal layer over an integrated circuit; and a detector coupled to the shield to detect a change in impedance characteristics of one or more shield lines of the shield due to physical alteration of the shield.
- the shield lines can be arranged in one or more metal layers and cover an area with shape arrangements such as parallel lines and serpentines.
- the detector can include one or more comparators to detect a difference in impedance of more than a tolerance value. An appropriate countermeasure response can be initiated upon detection of the difference in impedance.
- Figures 1A and IB illustrate a physical alteration of a shield used as a countermeasure against a physical attack of an IC.
- Figure 2 shows an example arrangement of shield lines in a single metal layer.
- Figure 3 shows another example arrangement of shield lines in a single metal layer.
- Figure 4 shows an example arrangement of shield lines connected in different levels of metal layers.
- Figures 5A-5C illustrate cross-sectional views of the layers of an IC incorporating a shield for circuit alteration detection.
- Figures 6A-6C show example representations of detection circuits.
- Figures 7A and 7B show example arrangements of shield with a plurality of groupings of shield lines.
- Circuit alteration detection in integrated circuits is described herein.
- the described circuit alteration detection and corresponding circuitry can protect secure or sensitive information that might be contained on an IC by identifying a change in impedance on one or more metal lines of a protection shield.
- shields can be added to ICs to protect sensitive information on ICs from unauthorized or unintended access methods.
- a countermeasure provided herein can be used alone or in conjunction with an active shielding technique to still detect alteration of a shield even when an attacker attempts to circumvent detection by reconstructing connections to the metal lines.
- An implementation of a system incorporating a countermeasure with circuit alteration detection can include a shield in at least one metal layer over an integrated circuit; and a detector coupled to the shield to detect a change in impedance characteristics of one or more shield lines of the shield due to physical alteration of the shield.
- the detector can include one or more comparators to detect a difference in impedance of more than a tolerance value.
- An appropriate countermeasure response can be initiated upon detection of the difference in impedance.
- Figures 1A and 1B illustrate a physical alteration of a shield used as a countermeasure against a physical attack of an IC.
- Figure 1A shows an example representation of a shield that may be used to protect a circuit from tampering.
- the shield 100 can include shield lines 110 in a metal layer over an integrated circuit.
- the shield 100 can be formed of any metal or conductive material as suitable for back-end-of line processing of the integrated circuit.
- the shield lines 110 of the shield 100 can be formed of copper.
- FIG. 1B shows an example of how a shield may be altered by tampering.
- two of the shield lines 110-1, 110-2 of the shield 100 may be cut by an attacker to reach circuitry below the shield.
- active shielding may be circumvented by an attacker by applying a conductive material to maintain the signal path.
- bypass lines 120 may be applied to reconstruct the cut metal line while creating a potential attack zone 130.
- the potential attack zone 130 is created to gain access to secure or sensitive information below metal lines.
- material such as Tungsten is used to create bypass lines 120. Although such materials may avoid disruption to an active shield, these materials have different resistivity than the original material for the shield lines 110.
- the subject countermeasure with circuit alteration detection can detect when such a physical attack is occurring an initiate an appropriate countermeasure response.
- shield lines may be used for circuit alteration detection.
- the shield lines can be arranged in one or more metal layers and cover an area with shape arrangements such as parallel lines and serpentines.
- FIG. 2 shows an example arrangement of shield lines in a single metal layer.
- the shield arrangement 200 can include a multitude of shield lines 210 in the form of straight metal lines. Two or more tap nodes 215 can be provided in each shield line 210 from which to measure impedance between. In the illustrated example, resistance can be measured across A - A", B - B', C - C', D - D', and E - E'.
- Each shield line 210 can be designed to have about the same resistance by having a same length and width. When a portion of one or more of the shield lines 210 is removed, the resistance changes and can be detected by the measurement across the tap nodes 215 of that shield line 210.
- FIG. 3 shows another example arrangement of shield lines in a single metal layer.
- the shield arrangement 300 can include a multitude of shield lines 310 in the form of serpentine metal lines. Two or more tap nodes 315 can be provided in each shield line 310 to measure impedance, for example across A - A", B - B', and C - C'.
- the resistance value of a shield line 310 may be designed to have a higher resistance value by increasing the number of windings between two tap nodes 315.
- FIG. 4 shows an example arrangement of shield lines connected in different levels of metal layers.
- a multitude of shield lines 410 in the form of straight metal lines can be provided in parallel in one metal layer similar to the shield lines 210 of Figure 2.
- Two or more tap nodes 415 can be provided in each shield line 410 to measure impedance.
- two or more of the shield lines 410 can be coupled together using connector lines 420 and contact vias 430 such that resistance can be measured across, for example, A - A', B - B', C - C', and D - D'.
- the connector lines 420 can be provided in a different metal layer than the shield lines 410.
- the shield lines 410 can be formed at an N level metal layer and the connector lines 420 can be formed at an N-l level metal layer.
- a multi-level serpentine shape can be formed by at least two of the shield lines 410 and corresponding connector lines 420 that couple the at least two of the shield lines 410.
- FIGS 5A-5C illustrate cross-sectional views of the layers of an IC incorporating a shield for circuit alteration detection.
- shield lines such as described with respect to shield lines 210 and 310 of Figures 2 and 3, may be formed in a top metal layer 510 over a device layer 530 with intermediate layers 540 in between. Both the IC circuitry and the Detector circuitry can be fabricated in the device layer 530. The shield lines can be coupled to the detector circuitry through the intermediate layers 540.
- multiple groups of shield lines can be formed in the same metal layer (see e.g., Figure 7A). In some cases, multiple shields may be provided in different levels of metal layers or a single shield may be formed using multiple levels metal layers.
- shield lines such as described with respect to shield lines 410 of Figure 4 can be formed in a top metal layer 510 with connector lines such as described with respect to connector lines 420 of Figure 4 formed in a lower metal layer 520. In some cases, shield lines such as described with respect to shield lines 210 and 310 of Figures 2 and 3 may be formed in both top metal layer 510 and lower metal layer 520.
- Shield line arrangements in the metal layers 510 and 520 can be provided over the device layer 530 with intermediate layers 545 in between.
- the shield lines can be coupled to the detector circuitry through the intermediate layers 545.
- the top metal layer 510 may be a top most metal level or a level below the top most metal level.
- the lower metal layer 520 may be the metal level immediately below the top metal layer 510 or other metal levels may be between the two metal layers.
- shield lines can be provided in a back-side metal layer 550 and coupled to detector circuitry in the device layer 530 to detect tampering to the back-side of an IC.
- Shield lines can also be provided in a top metal layer 510 and/or in a lower metal layer, such as lower metal layer 520 of Figure 5B.
- a method can include receiving a first impedance signal from a first shield line of a plurality of shield lines disposed over an integrated circuit in one or more metal lines; receiving a second impedance signal from a second shield line of the plurality of shield lines; comparing the first impedance signal to the second impedance signal; and generating a signal to initiate a countermeasure response when the first impedance signal is different from the second impedance signal by greater than a tolerance value.
- the impedance signal may be read using current or voltage (e.g., determining whether there has been an increase in current due to decrease of impedance or whether there has been a change in voltage using read using a voltage divider configuration).
- Figures 6A-6C show example representations of detection circuits.
- a shield can be provided in at least one metal layer over an integrated circuit and a detector can be coupled to the shield to detect a change in impedance characteristics of one or more shield lines of the shield due to physical alteration of the shield.
- the change in impedance characteristics may be detected by comparing the shield lines of a shield two-by-two, such as shown in Figure 6A.
- two shield lines (e.g., from A- A’ and B-B’ of any of the configurations shown in Figures 2-4) can be compared using a corresponding comparator 610.
- the resistance R AA’ across A-A’ can be compared to the resistance R BB’ across B-B’ using a voltage divider configuration such that the comparator 610 outputs an error signal (ERR) when the difference between V AA’ and V BB’ is greater than a tolerance value.
- ERP error signal
- a comparison resistor of a set value R Known can be coupled to tap node A or A’ of the first shield line with the other tap node A’ or A coupled to a voltage line (e.g., VDD).
- the other end of the comparison resistor can be coupled to ground or another voltage line.
- the same comparison resistor or another comparison resistor of the same value R Known can be coupled to tap node B or B’ or the second shield line with the other tap node B’ or B coupled to a voltage line (e.g., VDD).
- a switch may be included to couple the resistor to one node and then the other (and back and forth).
- the comparison resistors are formed in a lower layer of the circuit (e.g., in a lower metal layer, a polysilicon layer, or device layer) and can be designed to have a same shape and material (but are not required to have same shape or material as the shield lines).
- the intermediate voltages V AA’ and V BB’ read by the comparator 610 can be stored in the comparator and compared.
- the two resistances are expected to have the same value (within a tolerance amount) because each shield pattern is identical. If there is a change of one or more of the resistances, for example, due to tampering, the comparator detects a difference in the voltage and outputs the error signal ERR, which can be used to initiate a countermeasure response.
- the change in impedance characteristics may be detected by comparing each shield line of a group of shield lines to each other such as possible by the configurations illustrated in Figures 6B and 6C.
- FIG. 6B shows an example circuit configuration using a resistor bridge between the shield lines for circuit alteration detection.
- each shield line can have one tap node be selectively coupled to a voltage supply line (e.g., VDD) and a first voltage line (e.g., VSS) and the other tap node be selectively coupled to a comparator 620, which will output an error signal (ERR) when a voltage difference between its two inputs is greater than a tolerance value (e.g., absolute difference(VMID- VREF) > VTolerance).
- a tolerance value e.g., absolute difference(VMID- VREF) > VTolerance
- the resistance R AA’ represents the measured resistance across a shield line A-A’
- the resistance R BB’ represents the measured resistance across a shield line B-B’
- the resistance Rcc represents the measured resistance across a shield line C-C’
- the resistance R DD’ represents the measured resistance across a shield line D-D’.
- Any suitable numbers of shield lines of the same (within tolerance) resistance may be coupled to comparator 620 and may be in any suitable arrangement including, but not limited to, the arrangements illustrated in Figures 2-4.
- Switches denoted as S PA connect (in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line A-A’ to a voltage line V DD and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620; and switches denoted as S NA connect (in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line A-A’ to a first voltage line (Vss) and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620.
- switches denoted as S PB connect(in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line B-B’ to the voltage line VDD and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620; and switches denoted as SNB connect (in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line B-B’ to the first voltage line (Vss) and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620; switches denoted as Spc connect(in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line C-C’ to the voltage line VDD and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620; and switches denoted as SNC connect (in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line C-C’ to the first voltage line (Vss) and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620; and switches denoted as S PD connect(in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line D- D’ to the voltage line VDD and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620; and switches denoted as
- three switches may be used for each shield line: one to couple one end of the shield line to the voltage supply line, one to couple the one end of the shield line to the first voltage line, and one to couple the other end of the shield line to an intermediate node coupled to the positive input of the comparator.
- two switches may be used for each shield line: one to couple one end of the shield line to the voltage supply line or to the first voltage line, and one to couple the other end of the shield line to the intermediate node coupled to the positive input of the comparator.
- only a single switch is provided for each shield line.
- the single switch may be used to couple an end of the shield line to the voltage supply line or to the first voltage line (and in some cases only to one or the other, with the group of shield lines having some coupled to the voltage supply line and some coupled to the first voltage line).
- the other end of the shield line may be coupled to the positive input of the comparator.
- a sequence of switching can be carried out to provide a middle voltage VMID and compare VMID to the reference voltage VREF applied to the negative (-) input of the comparator 620 .
- a sequence for comparisons can be, while the other switches are open, close SNA and SPB to output VMID emerging from the connection between resistance R A A’ across A-A’ and resistance R B B’ across B-B’; close SNA and Spc to output VMID emerging from the connection between resistance RAA’ across A-A’ and resistance Rcc across C-C’; close SNA and SPD to output VMID emerging from the connection between resistance RAA’ across A-A’ and resistance RDD’ across D-D’; close SNB and Spc to output VMID emerging from the connection between resistance R B B’ across B-B’ and resistance R C c across C-C’; close SNB and SPD to output VMID emerging from the connection between resistance R BB’ across B-B’ and resistance R DD’ across D-D’; and close S NC and Spo to
- the measured voltages for RAA ⁇ RBB ⁇ RCC , and R DD are expected to be identical (within tolerances) if the resistors are made with the same material and the implemented circuit is not altered.
- VMID is not equal to VDD/2
- the comparator indicates that the resistances tied to VDD are different from the resistances tied to Y ss . So, it can be inferred that a shield line has been altered.
- Figure 6C shows another example circuit configuration using a resistor bridge between the shield lines for circuit alteration detection.
- a resistor bridge can be formed using the resistances R AA’ R BB’ R CC and R DD’ across the respective tap lines of the shield lines AA’, BB’, CC’, and DD’ and a reference resistor R REF selectively coupled to the shield lines.
- the resistance bridge of Figure 6C uses a reference resistor in the resistor bridge and compares voltages output from two of such resistor bridges 630 and 640 using comparator 650.
- a reference voltage of bridge 630 is coupled to the positive(+) input of the comparator 650 and selectively coupled to the shield lines as those shield lines are selectively coupled to the positive (+) input of the comparator 650.
- Switches denoted as SPAI connect the shield line A-A’ to a voltage line V DD and the positive (+) input of the comparator 650; switches denoted as SPBI connect the shield line B-B’ to the voltage line VDD and the positive (+) input of the comparator 650; switches denoted as Spci connect the shield line C-C’ to the voltage line VDD and the positive (+) input of the comparator 650; and switches denoted as SPDI connect the shield line D-D’ to the voltage line V D D and the positive (+) input of the comparator 650.
- a similar reference voltage is included in bridge 640 and coupled to the negative (-) input of the comparator 650 and selectively coupled to the shield lines as those shield lines are selectively coupled to the negative (-) input of the comparator 650.
- Switches denoted as S PA2 connect the shield line A-A’ to a first voltage line V S s and the negative (-) input of the comparator 650; switches denoted as SPB2 connect the shield line B-B’ to the first voltage line Vss and the negative (-) input of the comparator 650; switches denoted as Spc 2 connect the shield line C-C’ to the first voltage line Vss and the negative (-) input of the comparator 650; and switches denoted as S PD 2 connect the shield line D-D’ to the voltage first voltage line Vss and the negative (-) input of the comparator 650.
- three switches may be used for each shield line: one to couple one end of the shield line to a voltage supply line, one to couple another end of the shield line to the first input node of the comparator and an end of the first reference resistor; and one to couple the another end of the shield line to the second input node of the comparator and an end of the second reference resistor.
- two switches may be used for each shield line.
- one switch is provided to couple one end of the shield line to the voltage supply line
- a second switch is provided to couple the other end of the shield line to a first intermediate node coupled both the first reference resistor and to the positive input of the comparator while for another shield line that second switch is provided to couple the other end of that shield line to a second intermediate node coupled both the second reference resistor and to the negative input of the comparator.
- one end of a shield line is coupled to the voltage supply line (without a switch), one switch is provided to couple another end of the shield line to the first intermediate node coupled to the first input node of the comparator and the end of the first reference resistor; and one switch is provided to couple the another end of the shield line to the second intermediate node coupled to the second input node of the comparator and the end of the second reference resistor.
- the resistances may be compared to themselves (e.g., close both SPAI and SPA2 during a comparison operation - where the switches in bridges 630 and 640 are not simultaneously closed) or each line to all the other lines, or some combination of comparisons.
- the ERR output of any of the comparators can initiate a countermeasure response.
- the particular countermeasure response can be to reset, halt, or disable the system, obfuscate data operations, or perform another appropriate countermeasure response.
- a countermeasure response that obfuscates or alters the data in some manner can be determined by the IC designer.
- One such approach can be to switch from performing a proper response to performing an improper response.
- An improper response refers to the responses intended to create power signatures which are indicative of a different key or a random key.
- Figures 7A and 7B show example arrangements of shields with a plurality of groupings of shield lines.
- a plurality of groupings of shield lines may be provided, each grouping having its corresponding detection circuitry.
- the separate groups can be disposed over different regions of the chip, different metal layers of the chip, or both different metal layers and different regions of the chip, and may have corresponding different countermeasure responses applied in response to an error signal.
- four groups 701, 702, 703, and 704 of shield lines can be coupled to corresponding detectors 711,
- Each group can have shield lines arranged in accordance with any suitable arrangement of shield lines, for example, as illustrated in Figures 2-4. Different groups may have different arrangements and/or resistances.
- detector circuitry and connections such as described with respect to Figures 6A-6C are used for the corresponding detectors 711, 712,
- the resistances within a group are made to be the same (even though the other groups may have different resistances).
- the error signal output by each detector 711, 712, 713, and 714 can initiate a countermeasure response.
- the countermeasure responses may be different depending on the implementation.
- an error signal from one detector may initiate a different response than an error signal from another detector.
- an error signal from detector 711 or 712 can initiate a Response A.
- an error signal from detector 713 initiates a Response B and an error signal from detector 714 initiates a Response C, where Response A, Response B, and Response C, are different types of countermeasure responses (e.g., one may reset the circuit, one may shut down the circuit, one may cause improper responses to be output) or have different thresholds before implementing a countermeasure response (e.g., Response A may not initiate a particular response until three error signals are received while Response B initiates that particular response upon the first error signal being received).
- a plurality of groupings of shield lines may be provided.
- the separate groups can be disposed over different regions of the chip, different metal layers of the chip, or both different metal layers and different regions of the chip, and may have the same or different countermeasure responses applied in response to an error signal.
- a single detection circuit may be coupled to multiple shields.
- two groups of shield lines 751 and 754 may be coupled to a same detector 761.
- other groups of shield lines 752, 753 may be coupled to the same or different detectors (e.g., detector 762 for group 752 and detector 763 for group 753).
- Each group can have shield lines arranged in accordance with any suitable arrangement of shield lines, for example, as illustrated in Figures 2-4. Different groups may have different arrangements and/or resistances. When detector circuitry and connections such as described with respect to Figures 6A-6C are used for the corresponding detectors 761, 762, and 763, the resistances within a group (e.g., 751, 752, 753, or 754) are made to be the same (even though the other groups may have different resistances).
- any reference in this specification to“one embodiment,”“an embodiment,” “example embodiment,” “an example”, “some examples”, etc., means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment of the invention.
- the appearances of such phrases in various places in the specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment.
- any elements or limitations of any invention or embodiment thereof disclosed herein can be combined with any and/or all other elements or limitations (individually or in any combination) or any other invention or embodiment thereof disclosed herein, and all such combinations are contemplated with the scope of the invention without limitation thereto.
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Abstract
A system with circuit alteration detection can include a shield in at least one metal layer over an integrated circuit, and a detector coupled to the shield to detect a change in impedance characteristics of one or more shield lines of the shield due to physical alteration of the shield. The shield lines can be arranged in one or more metal layers and cover an area with shape arrangements such as parallel lines and serpentines. The detector can include one or more comparators to detect a difference in impedance of more than a tolerance value. An appropriate countermeasure response can be initiated upon detection of the difference in impedance.
Description
CIRCUIT ALTERATION DETECTION IN INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
BACKGROUND
[0001] Integrated circuits (ICs) may include designs that contain sensitive information. An example of such sensitive information is the secret key information used in crypto engine implementations (such as AES). In security critical integrated circuits, security countermeasures are often implemented to provide safety of the sensitive information against side channel attacks. Some side channel attack techniques include physical attacks that require actual physical access to the inner layers of the integrated circuit. Passive or active shields can be added to ICs as countermeasures to protect sensitive information on ICs from unauthorized or unintended access methods for the circuit.
[0002] For both passive shielding and active shielding, an IC isP covered with metal lines that are disposed on top of the IC, for example in the top metal layer to hide the circuit beneath. For active shielding, these metal lines are connected to a voltage supply (power and ground) or supplied with a predefined or random test data from a transmitter, and observed with a number of receivers located at certain points of the integrated circuit. For a case where the active shield uses a voltage supply, the receivers are also coupled to power or ground to compare whether there is a change. For a case using test data, the receivers may also be supplied with the same test data internally in order to compare the data on the shielding metals and the actual test data. The receivers verify the integrity of the metal lines based on the output of the comparison. However, detection of a breach may be avoided with attack techniques where a portion of the shield is cut and reconstructed with a technique such as a focused ion beam to create a potential attack zone.
BRIEF SUMMARY
[0003] Circuit alteration detection in integrated circuits is described herein. The described circuit alteration detection and corresponding circuitry can identify a change in impedance characteristics on a protection shield to detect a circuit alteration.
[0004] An implementation of a system incorporating circuit alteration detection can include a shield in at least one metal layer over an integrated circuit; and a detector coupled to the shield to detect a change in impedance characteristics of one or more shield lines of the shield due to physical alteration of the shield.
[0005] The shield lines can be arranged in one or more metal layers and cover an area with shape arrangements such as parallel lines and serpentines. The detector can include one
or more comparators to detect a difference in impedance of more than a tolerance value. An appropriate countermeasure response can be initiated upon detection of the difference in impedance.
[0006] This Summary is provided to introduce a selection of concepts in a simplified form that are further described below in the Detailed Description. This Summary is not intended to identify key features or essential features of the claimed subject matter, nor is it intended to be used to limit the scope of the claimed subject matter.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
[0007] Figures 1A and IB illustrate a physical alteration of a shield used as a countermeasure against a physical attack of an IC.
[0008] Figure 2 shows an example arrangement of shield lines in a single metal layer.
[0009] Figure 3 shows another example arrangement of shield lines in a single metal layer.
[0010] Figure 4 shows an example arrangement of shield lines connected in different levels of metal layers.
[0011] Figures 5A-5C illustrate cross-sectional views of the layers of an IC incorporating a shield for circuit alteration detection.
[0012] Figures 6A-6C show example representations of detection circuits.
[0013] Figures 7A and 7B show example arrangements of shield with a plurality of groupings of shield lines.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION
[0014] Circuit alteration detection in integrated circuits is described herein. The described circuit alteration detection and corresponding circuitry can protect secure or sensitive information that might be contained on an IC by identifying a change in impedance on one or more metal lines of a protection shield.
[0015] As mentioned above, shields can be added to ICs to protect sensitive information on ICs from unauthorized or unintended access methods. . A countermeasure provided herein can be used alone or in conjunction with an active shielding technique to still detect alteration of a shield even when an attacker attempts to circumvent detection by reconstructing connections to the metal lines.
[0016] An implementation of a system incorporating a countermeasure with circuit alteration detection can include a shield in at least one metal layer over an integrated circuit;
and a detector coupled to the shield to detect a change in impedance characteristics of one or more shield lines of the shield due to physical alteration of the shield. The detector can include one or more comparators to detect a difference in impedance of more than a tolerance value. An appropriate countermeasure response can be initiated upon detection of the difference in impedance.
[0017] Figures 1A and 1B illustrate a physical alteration of a shield used as a countermeasure against a physical attack of an IC. Figure 1A shows an example representation of a shield that may be used to protect a circuit from tampering. Referring to Figure 1A, the shield 100 can include shield lines 110 in a metal layer over an integrated circuit. The shield 100 can be formed of any metal or conductive material as suitable for back-end-of line processing of the integrated circuit. For example, in some implementations, the shield lines 110 of the shield 100 can be formed of copper.
[0018] Figure 1B shows an example of how a shield may be altered by tampering. Referring to Figure 1B, two of the shield lines 110-1, 110-2 of the shield 100 may be cut by an attacker to reach circuitry below the shield. As mentioned above, active shielding may be circumvented by an attacker by applying a conductive material to maintain the signal path. For example, bypass lines 120 may be applied to reconstruct the cut metal line while creating a potential attack zone 130. The potential attack zone 130 is created to gain access to secure or sensitive information below metal lines. Often, material such as Tungsten is used to create bypass lines 120. Although such materials may avoid disruption to an active shield, these materials have different resistivity than the original material for the shield lines 110. As discussed in more detail with respect to Figures 6A-6C, the subject countermeasure with circuit alteration detection can detect when such a physical attack is occurring an initiate an appropriate countermeasure response.
[0019] Although a set of parallel metal lines are shown in the illustrative example of Figures 1A and 1B, a variety of arrangements of shield lines may be used for circuit alteration detection. For example, the shield lines can be arranged in one or more metal layers and cover an area with shape arrangements such as parallel lines and serpentines.
[0020] Figure 2 shows an example arrangement of shield lines in a single metal layer. Referring to Figure 2, the shield arrangement 200 can include a multitude of shield lines 210 in the form of straight metal lines. Two or more tap nodes 215 can be provided in each shield line 210 from which to measure impedance between. In the illustrated example, resistance can be measured across A - A", B - B', C - C', D - D', and E - E'. Each shield line 210 can be designed to have about the same resistance by having a same length and width. When a
portion of one or more of the shield lines 210 is removed, the resistance changes and can be detected by the measurement across the tap nodes 215 of that shield line 210.
[0021] Figure 3 shows another example arrangement of shield lines in a single metal layer. Referring to Figure 3, the shield arrangement 300 can include a multitude of shield lines 310 in the form of serpentine metal lines. Two or more tap nodes 315 can be provided in each shield line 310 to measure impedance, for example across A - A", B - B', and C - C'. In the illustrated example, the resistance value of a shield line 310 may be designed to have a higher resistance value by increasing the number of windings between two tap nodes 315.
[0022] Figure 4 shows an example arrangement of shield lines connected in different levels of metal layers. Referring to the shield arrangement 400 of Figure 4, a multitude of shield lines 410 in the form of straight metal lines can be provided in parallel in one metal layer similar to the shield lines 210 of Figure 2. Two or more tap nodes 415 can be provided in each shield line 410 to measure impedance. To enable higher resistance values between two tap nodes 415, two or more of the shield lines 410 can be coupled together using connector lines 420 and contact vias 430 such that resistance can be measured across, for example, A - A', B - B', C - C', and D - D'. The connector lines 420 can be provided in a different metal layer than the shield lines 410. For example, the shield lines 410 can be formed at an N level metal layer and the connector lines 420 can be formed at an N-l level metal layer. A multi-level serpentine shape can be formed by at least two of the shield lines 410 and corresponding connector lines 420 that couple the at least two of the shield lines 410.
[0023] Figures 5A-5C illustrate cross-sectional views of the layers of an IC incorporating a shield for circuit alteration detection. Referring to Figure 5A, shield lines, such as described with respect to shield lines 210 and 310 of Figures 2 and 3, may be formed in a top metal layer 510 over a device layer 530 with intermediate layers 540 in between. Both the IC circuitry and the Detector circuitry can be fabricated in the device layer 530. The shield lines can be coupled to the detector circuitry through the intermediate layers 540.
[0024] In some cases, multiple groups of shield lines can be formed in the same metal layer (see e.g., Figure 7A). In some cases, multiple shields may be provided in different levels of metal layers or a single shield may be formed using multiple levels metal layers. Referring to Figure 5B, shield lines such as described with respect to shield lines 410 of Figure 4 can be formed in a top metal layer 510 with connector lines such as described with respect to connector lines 420 of Figure 4 formed in a lower metal layer 520. In some cases, shield lines such as described with respect to shield lines 210 and 310 of Figures 2 and 3 may be formed in both top metal layer 510 and lower metal layer 520. Shield line arrangements in
the metal layers 510 and 520 can be provided over the device layer 530 with intermediate layers 545 in between. The shield lines can be coupled to the detector circuitry through the intermediate layers 545. The top metal layer 510 may be a top most metal level or a level below the top most metal level. The lower metal layer 520 may be the metal level immediately below the top metal layer 510 or other metal levels may be between the two metal layers.
[0025] In some cases, as illustrated in Figure 5C, shield lines can be provided in a back-side metal layer 550 and coupled to detector circuitry in the device layer 530 to detect tampering to the back-side of an IC. Shield lines can also be provided in a top metal layer 510 and/or in a lower metal layer, such as lower metal layer 520 of Figure 5B.
[0026] Various detection methods are possible. A method can include receiving a first impedance signal from a first shield line of a plurality of shield lines disposed over an integrated circuit in one or more metal lines; receiving a second impedance signal from a second shield line of the plurality of shield lines; comparing the first impedance signal to the second impedance signal; and generating a signal to initiate a countermeasure response when the first impedance signal is different from the second impedance signal by greater than a tolerance value. The impedance signal may be read using current or voltage (e.g., determining whether there has been an increase in current due to decrease of impedance or whether there has been a change in voltage using read using a voltage divider configuration).
[0027] Figures 6A-6C show example representations of detection circuits. As mentioned above, a shield can be provided in at least one metal layer over an integrated circuit and a detector can be coupled to the shield to detect a change in impedance characteristics of one or more shield lines of the shield due to physical alteration of the shield. In some cases, the change in impedance characteristics may be detected by comparing the shield lines of a shield two-by-two, such as shown in Figure 6A.
[0028] Referring to Figure 6A, two shield lines (e.g., from A- A’ and B-B’ of any of the configurations shown in Figures 2-4) can be compared using a corresponding comparator 610. The resistance RAA’ across A-A’ can be compared to the resistance RBB’ across B-B’ using a voltage divider configuration such that the comparator 610 outputs an error signal (ERR) when the difference between VAA’ and VBB’ is greater than a tolerance value.
[0029] A comparison resistor of a set value RKnown can be coupled to tap node A or A’ of the first shield line with the other tap node A’ or A coupled to a voltage line (e.g., VDD). The other end of the comparison resistor can be coupled to ground or another voltage line. The same comparison resistor or another comparison resistor of the same value RKnown can be
coupled to tap node B or B’ or the second shield line with the other tap node B’ or B coupled to a voltage line (e.g., VDD). When the same comparison resistor is used, a switch may be included to couple the resistor to one node and then the other (and back and forth). In some cases the comparison resistors are formed in a lower layer of the circuit (e.g., in a lower metal layer, a polysilicon layer, or device layer) and can be designed to have a same shape and material (but are not required to have same shape or material as the shield lines). The intermediate voltages VAA’ and VBB’ read by the comparator 610 can be stored in the comparator and compared. The two resistances are expected to have the same value (within a tolerance amount) because each shield pattern is identical. If there is a change of one or more of the resistances, for example, due to tampering, the comparator detects a difference in the voltage and outputs the error signal ERR, which can be used to initiate a countermeasure response.
[0030] In some cases, the change in impedance characteristics may be detected by comparing each shield line of a group of shield lines to each other such as possible by the configurations illustrated in Figures 6B and 6C.
[0031] Figure 6B shows an example circuit configuration using a resistor bridge between the shield lines for circuit alteration detection. Referring to Figure 6B, it can be seen that each shield line can have one tap node be selectively coupled to a voltage supply line (e.g., VDD) and a first voltage line (e.g., VSS) and the other tap node be selectively coupled to a comparator 620, which will output an error signal (ERR) when a voltage difference between its two inputs is greater than a tolerance value (e.g., absolute difference(VMID- VREF) > VTolerance). If the reference voltage is VDD/2, the comparator can show a difference between the resistance tied to VDD and the resistance tied to VSS. In the illustrated example, the resistance RAA’ represents the measured resistance across a shield line A-A’, the resistance RBB’ represents the measured resistance across a shield line B-B’, the resistance Rcc represents the measured resistance across a shield line C-C’, and the resistance RDD’ represents the measured resistance across a shield line D-D’. Any suitable numbers of shield lines of the same (within tolerance) resistance may be coupled to comparator 620 and may be in any suitable arrangement including, but not limited to, the arrangements illustrated in Figures 2-4.
[0032] Switches denoted as SPA connect (in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line A-A’ to a voltage line VDD and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620; and switches denoted as SNA connect (in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line A-A’ to a first voltage line (Vss) and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator
620. Similarly, switches denoted as SPB connect(in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line B-B’ to the voltage line VDD and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620; and switches denoted as SNB connect (in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line B-B’ to the first voltage line (Vss) and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620; switches denoted as Spc connect(in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line C-C’ to the voltage line VDD and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620; and switches denoted as SNC connect (in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line C-C’ to the first voltage line (Vss) and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620; and switches denoted as SPD connect(in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line D- D’ to the voltage line VDD and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620; and switches denoted as SND connect (in some cases using a same control signal) the shield line D-D’ to the first voltage line (Vss) and the positive (+) input 625 of the comparator 620.
[0033] In some cases, three switches (instead of four switches) may be used for each shield line: one to couple one end of the shield line to the voltage supply line, one to couple the one end of the shield line to the first voltage line, and one to couple the other end of the shield line to an intermediate node coupled to the positive input of the comparator. In some cases, two switches may be used for each shield line: one to couple one end of the shield line to the voltage supply line or to the first voltage line, and one to couple the other end of the shield line to the intermediate node coupled to the positive input of the comparator. In some cases, only a single switch is provided for each shield line. The single switch may be used to couple an end of the shield line to the voltage supply line or to the first voltage line (and in some cases only to one or the other, with the group of shield lines having some coupled to the voltage supply line and some coupled to the first voltage line). The other end of the shield line may be coupled to the positive input of the comparator.
[0034] In operation, a sequence of switching can be carried out to provide a middle voltage VMID and compare VMID to the reference voltage VREF applied to the negative (-) input of the comparator 620. For example, a sequence for comparisons can be, while the other switches are open, close SNA and SPB to output VMID emerging from the connection between resistance RAA’ across A-A’ and resistance RBB’ across B-B’; close SNA and Spc to output VMID emerging from the connection between resistance RAA’ across A-A’ and resistance Rcc across C-C’; close SNA and SPD to output VMID emerging from the connection between resistance RAA’ across A-A’ and resistance RDD’ across D-D’; close SNB and Spc to output VMID emerging from the connection between resistance RBB’ across B-B’ and resistance RCc across C-C’; close SNB and SPD to output VMID emerging from the connection between
resistance RBB’ across B-B’ and resistance RDD’ across D-D’; and close SNC and Spo to output VMID emerging from the connection between resistance Rcc across C-C’ and resistance RDD’ across D-D’.
[0035] The measured voltages for RAA\ RBB\ RCC, and RDD (and any others in coupled to the comparator 620) are expected to be identical (within tolerances) if the resistors are made with the same material and the implemented circuit is not altered. When VMID is not equal to VDD/2, the comparator indicates that the resistances tied to VDD are different from the resistances tied to Yss. So, it can be inferred that a shield line has been altered.
[0036] Figure 6C shows another example circuit configuration using a resistor bridge between the shield lines for circuit alteration detection. Referring to Figure 6C, a resistor bridge can be formed using the resistances RAA’ RBB’ RCC and RDD’ across the respective tap lines of the shield lines AA’, BB’, CC’, and DD’ and a reference resistor RREF selectively coupled to the shield lines. Instead of using other ones of the shield lines in the voltage divider for outputting VMID which is then compared to a reference voltage as shown in Figure 6B, the resistance bridge of Figure 6C, uses a reference resistor in the resistor bridge and compares voltages output from two of such resistor bridges 630 and 640 using comparator 650.
[0037] A reference voltage of bridge 630 is coupled to the positive(+) input of the comparator 650 and selectively coupled to the shield lines as those shield lines are selectively coupled to the positive (+) input of the comparator 650. Switches denoted as SPAI connect the shield line A-A’ to a voltage line VDD and the positive (+) input of the comparator 650; switches denoted as SPBI connect the shield line B-B’ to the voltage line VDD and the positive (+) input of the comparator 650; switches denoted as Spci connect the shield line C-C’ to the voltage line VDD and the positive (+) input of the comparator 650; and switches denoted as SPDI connect the shield line D-D’ to the voltage line VDD and the positive (+) input of the comparator 650. A similar reference voltage is included in bridge 640 and coupled to the negative (-) input of the comparator 650 and selectively coupled to the shield lines as those shield lines are selectively coupled to the negative (-) input of the comparator 650. Switches denoted as SPA2 connect the shield line A-A’ to a first voltage line VSs and the negative (-) input of the comparator 650; switches denoted as SPB2 connect the shield line B-B’ to the first voltage line Vss and the negative (-) input of the comparator 650; switches denoted as Spc2 connect the shield line C-C’ to the first voltage line Vss and the negative (-) input of the comparator 650; and switches denoted as SPD2 connect the shield line D-D’ to the voltage first voltage line Vss and the negative (-) input of the comparator 650.
[0038] In some cases, three switches (instead of four switches) may be used for each shield line: one to couple one end of the shield line to a voltage supply line, one to couple another end of the shield line to the first input node of the comparator and an end of the first reference resistor; and one to couple the another end of the shield line to the second input node of the comparator and an end of the second reference resistor. In some cases, two switches may be used for each shield line. In one of such cases, one switch is provided to couple one end of the shield line to the voltage supply line, and a second switch is provided to couple the other end of the shield line to a first intermediate node coupled both the first reference resistor and to the positive input of the comparator while for another shield line that second switch is provided to couple the other end of that shield line to a second intermediate node coupled both the second reference resistor and to the negative input of the comparator. In another of such cases (of the two switch implementation for the configuration described with respect to Figure 6C), one end of a shield line is coupled to the voltage supply line (without a switch), one switch is provided to couple another end of the shield line to the first intermediate node coupled to the first input node of the comparator and the end of the first reference resistor; and one switch is provided to couple the another end of the shield line to the second intermediate node coupled to the second input node of the comparator and the end of the second reference resistor.
[0039] The resistances may be compared to themselves (e.g., close both SPAI and SPA2 during a comparison operation - where the switches in bridges 630 and 640 are not simultaneously closed) or each line to all the other lines, or some combination of comparisons. For example, if the switches SPAI are closed for the positive (+) input of the comparator and for the switches SPB2 are closed for the negative (-) input of the comparator, then the voltage drop across RAA’ can be compared to the voltage drop across RBB\ Similarly, if the switches SPAI are closed for the positive (+) input of the comparator and for the switches Spc2 are closed for the negative (-) input of the comparator, then the voltage drop across RAA’ can be compared to the voltage drop across Rcc’·
[0040] The ERR output of any of the comparators (e.g., 610, 620, 650) can initiate a countermeasure response. The particular countermeasure response can be to reset, halt, or disable the system, obfuscate data operations, or perform another appropriate countermeasure response. For example, a countermeasure response that obfuscates or alters the data in some manner can be determined by the IC designer. One such approach can be to switch from performing a proper response to performing an improper response. An improper response
refers to the responses intended to create power signatures which are indicative of a different key or a random key.
[0041] Figures 7A and 7B show example arrangements of shields with a plurality of groupings of shield lines. As illustrated in Figure 7A, a plurality of groupings of shield lines may be provided, each grouping having its corresponding detection circuitry. The separate groups can be disposed over different regions of the chip, different metal layers of the chip, or both different metal layers and different regions of the chip, and may have corresponding different countermeasure responses applied in response to an error signal. For example, four groups 701, 702, 703, and 704 of shield lines can be coupled to corresponding detectors 711,
712, 713, and 714. Each group can have shield lines arranged in accordance with any suitable arrangement of shield lines, for example, as illustrated in Figures 2-4. Different groups may have different arrangements and/or resistances. When detector circuitry and connections such as described with respect to Figures 6A-6C are used for the corresponding detectors 711, 712,
713, and 714, the resistances within a group (e.g., 701, 702, 703, or 704) are made to be the same (even though the other groups may have different resistances).
[0042] The error signal output by each detector 711, 712, 713, and 714 can initiate a countermeasure response. The countermeasure responses may be different depending on the implementation. In addition, an error signal from one detector may initiate a different response than an error signal from another detector. In the illustrated example, an error signal from detector 711 or 712 can initiate a Response A. However, an error signal from detector 713 initiates a Response B and an error signal from detector 714 initiates a Response C, where Response A, Response B, and Response C, are different types of countermeasure responses (e.g., one may reset the circuit, one may shut down the circuit, one may cause improper responses to be output) or have different thresholds before implementing a countermeasure response (e.g., Response A may not initiate a particular response until three error signals are received while Response B initiates that particular response upon the first error signal being received).
[0043] As illustrated in Figure 7B, a plurality of groupings of shield lines may be provided. The separate groups can be disposed over different regions of the chip, different metal layers of the chip, or both different metal layers and different regions of the chip, and may have the same or different countermeasure responses applied in response to an error signal. In the example shown in Figure 7B, a single detection circuit may be coupled to multiple shields. For example, two groups of shield lines 751 and 754 may be coupled to a same detector 761. In some cases, other groups of shield lines 752, 753 may be coupled to the
same or different detectors (e.g., detector 762 for group 752 and detector 763 for group 753). Each group can have shield lines arranged in accordance with any suitable arrangement of shield lines, for example, as illustrated in Figures 2-4. Different groups may have different arrangements and/or resistances. When detector circuitry and connections such as described with respect to Figures 6A-6C are used for the corresponding detectors 761, 762, and 763, the resistances within a group (e.g., 751, 752, 753, or 754) are made to be the same (even though the other groups may have different resistances).
[0044] Any reference in this specification to“one embodiment,”“an embodiment,” “example embodiment,” “an example”, “some examples”, etc., means that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment of the invention. The appearances of such phrases in various places in the specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment. In addition, any elements or limitations of any invention or embodiment thereof disclosed herein can be combined with any and/or all other elements or limitations (individually or in any combination) or any other invention or embodiment thereof disclosed herein, and all such combinations are contemplated with the scope of the invention without limitation thereto.
[0045] Although the subject matter has been described in language specific to structural features and/or acts, it is to be understood that the subject matter defined in the appended claims is not necessarily limited to the specific features or acts described above. Rather, the specific features and acts described above are disclosed as examples of implementing the claims and other equivalent features and acts are intended to be within the scope of the claims.
Claims
1. A system, comprising:
a shield in at least one metal layer over an integrated circuit and comprising a plurality of shield lines; and
a detector coupled to the shield to detect a change in impedance characteristics of one or more of the plurality of shield lines of the shield due to physical alteration of the shield.
2. The system of claim 1, wherein the plurality of shield lines is disposed in a single metal layer.
3. The system of claim 1, wherein the plurality of shield lines is disposed in two or more metal layers.
4. The system of any preceding claim, wherein the plurality of shield lines comprises an arrangement of parallel lines.
5. The system of any preceding claim, wherein the plurality of shield lines comprises an arrangement of serpentines.
6. The system of claim 3, wherein each shield line of the plurality of shield lines has at least one line in a first of the two or more metal layers and a line in a second of the two or more metal layers.
7. The system of claim 6, wherein the at least one line in a first of the two or more metal layers comprises two lines in the first of the two or more metal layers, wherein the line in the second of the two or more metal layers is a connector line that couples the two lines together into a multi-level serpentine shape.
8. The system of any one of claims 1-7, further comprising a second shield in the at least one metal layer over the integrated circuit and comprising a second plurality of shield lines; and a second detector coupled to the second shield.
9. The system of any one of claims 1-7, further comprising a second shield in a different at least one metal layer over the integrated circuit and comprising a second plurality of shield lines; and a second detector coupled to the second shield.
10. The system of any preceding claim, wherein the detector is coupled to tap points of each shield line.
11. The system of any preceding claim, wherein the detector comprises a comparator.
12. The system of claim 11, wherein the comparator comprises a first input node selectively coupled to the shield and a second input node coupled to receive a reference voltage.
13. The system of claim 12, further comprising three switches for each shield line, including a first switch that selectively couples one end of a shield line to a voltage supply line; a second switch that selectively couples the one end of the shield line to a first voltage line; and a third switch that selectively couples another end of the shield line to the first input node of the comparator;
wherein the comparator reads a middle voltage VMID at the first input node when one of the plurality of shield lines is coupled to the voltage supply line and the first input node and another of the plurality of shield lines is coupled to the first voltage line and the first input node; and outputs an error signal when a voltage difference between VMID and the reference voltage is greater than a tolerance value.
14. The system of claim 11, wherein the comparator comprises a first input node selectively coupled to the shield and a second input node coupled to the shield.
15. The system of claim 14, further comprising:
a first reference resistor coupled at one end to a first voltage line;
a second reference resistor coupled at one end to the first voltage line; and
three switches for each shield line, including a first switch that selectively couples one end of a shield line to a voltage supply line; a second switch that selectively couples another end of the shield line to the first input node of the comparator and another end of the first
reference resistor; and a third switch that selectively couples the another end of the shield line to the second input node of the comparator and another end of the second reference resistor.
16. A method comprising:
receiving a first impedance signal from a first shield line of a plurality of shield lines disposed over an integrated circuit in one or more metal lines;
receiving a second impedance signal from a second shield line of the plurality of shield lines;
comparing the first impedance signal to the second impedance signal; and
generating a signal to initiate a countermeasure response when the first impedance signal is different from the second impedance signal by greater than a tolerance value.
17. The method of claim 16, wherein receiving the first impedance signal and receiving the second impedance signal comprises receiving a middle voltage of a node coupling the first shield line to the second shield line; and
wherein comparing the first impedance signal to the second impedance signal comprises comparing the middle voltage to a reference voltage.
18. The method of claim 16, wherein receiving the first impedance signal comprises receiving a first intermediate voltage of a node coupling the first shield line to a reference resistor;
wherein receiving the second impedance signal comprises receiving a second intermediate voltage of a node coupling the second shield line to the reference resistor or a second reference resistor; and
wherein comparing the first impedance signal to the second impedance signal comprises comparing the first intermediate voltage to the second intermediate voltage.
19. The method of any one of claims 16-18, further comprising:
receiving a third impedance signal from a third shield line of the plurality of shield lines;
comparing the first impedance signal to the third impedance signal; and
generating the signal to initiate the countermeasure response when the first impedance signal is different from the third impedance signal by greater than the tolerance value.
20. The method of any one of claims 16-19, further comprising:
receiving at least two impedance signals from a second set of shield lines disposed over the integrated circuit in one or more metal lines;
comparing the at least two impedance signals; and
generating a second signal to initiate a second countermeasure response different than the countermeasure response when the at least two impedance signals have a difference greater than the tolerance value.
Priority Applications (1)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201980051286.7A CN112513654B (en) | 2018-08-03 | 2019-08-02 | Circuit change detection in integrated circuits |
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|---|---|---|---|
| US16/054,123 | 2018-08-03 | ||
| US16/054,123 US10770410B2 (en) | 2018-08-03 | 2018-08-03 | Circuit alteration detection in integrated circuits |
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| KR102245773B1 (en) * | 2019-06-11 | 2021-04-27 | 연세대학교 산학협력단 | On-Chip Security Circuit for Detecting and Protecting against Invasive Attacks |
| US11893146B2 (en) * | 2020-03-04 | 2024-02-06 | Arm Limited | Tamper detection techniques |
| US12114471B2 (en) * | 2020-07-20 | 2024-10-08 | Arm Limited | Active shield structure |
| GB2617785A (en) * | 2021-07-26 | 2023-10-18 | Boe Technology Group Co Ltd | Display device and touch panel |
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| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
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| US20130104252A1 (en) * | 2011-10-24 | 2013-04-25 | Subbayya Chowdary Yanamadala | Tamper detection countermeasures to deter physical attack on a security asic |
| US20180061196A1 (en) * | 2016-02-25 | 2018-03-01 | International Business Machines Corporation | Multi-layer stack with embedded tamper-detect protection |
| US20180061780A1 (en) * | 2016-08-29 | 2018-03-01 | Freescale Semiconductor, Inc. | Active tamper detection circuit with bypass detection and method therefor |
| US20180107845A1 (en) * | 2016-10-14 | 2018-04-19 | Google Inc. | Active asic intrusion shield |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN112513654A (en) | 2021-03-16 |
| CN112513654B (en) | 2024-08-30 |
| US10770410B2 (en) | 2020-09-08 |
| US20200043870A1 (en) | 2020-02-06 |
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