WO2019223310A1 - Système de modèle fiable d'enregistrement d'enquête de scène de crime numérique - Google Patents

Système de modèle fiable d'enregistrement d'enquête de scène de crime numérique Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019223310A1
WO2019223310A1 PCT/CN2018/123778 CN2018123778W WO2019223310A1 WO 2019223310 A1 WO2019223310 A1 WO 2019223310A1 CN 2018123778 W CN2018123778 W CN 2018123778W WO 2019223310 A1 WO2019223310 A1 WO 2019223310A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
digital
trusted
survey
sign
server
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2018/123778
Other languages
English (en)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
杨一涛
李云
王新猛
吴育宝
Original Assignee
南京森林警察学院
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Publication date
Application filed by 南京森林警察学院 filed Critical 南京森林警察学院
Priority to JP2020520020A priority Critical patent/JP7026971B2/ja
Publication of WO2019223310A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019223310A1/fr

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/06—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols the encryption apparatus using shift registers or memories for block-wise or stream coding, e.g. DES systems or RC4; Hash functions; Pseudorandom sequence generators
    • H04L9/0618—Block ciphers, i.e. encrypting groups of characters of a plain text message using fixed encryption transformation
    • H04L9/0631—Substitution permutation network [SPN], i.e. cipher composed of a number of stages or rounds each involving linear and nonlinear transformations, e.g. AES algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
    • H04L9/3006—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters
    • H04L9/302—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy underlying computational problems or public-key parameters involving the integer factorization problem, e.g. RSA or quadratic sieve [QS] schemes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures

Definitions

  • the invention belongs to the technical field of protecting data integrity in digital data processing, and particularly relates to a trusted model system for digital field survey records.
  • the current survey record is a collection of documents and attachments formed after the site survey is completed. It mainly includes: field transcripts, photos, videos, audio, traces, various physical evidence, electronic data evidence, and drawings. Among these current survey records, photos, videos, and audio have been digitally collected.
  • the current survey records in the form of transcripts, drawings, etc. are manually entered into the on-site survey information system by the surveyors to realize digitization.
  • the invention with the application number CN201710140360.5 and the name "a method and system for fixing electronic evidence on the spot” discloses a method and system for fixing electronic evidence on the spot.
  • the method includes obtaining user login information, selecting user rights, and starting recording user operations; collecting on-site electronic evidence; stopping recording of user operations, and generating a recording result of a user operation log; performing integrity verification on the obtained electronic evidence; Generate electronic reports of electronic evidence, and add the integrity verification results of electronic evidence to electronic reports; upload electronic files, the above through the user login module, evidence collection module, integrity verification result module, report generation module and upload module All modules are implemented together.
  • the present invention proposes a digital reconnaissance record trusted model system.
  • the digital reconnaissance records can be trusted Operation to ensure that all digital survey information from the beginning of the record to the submission of the court, the recorded content, the person who recorded, the location, the recording time and other digital information is complete and has not been tampered with.
  • DR ⁇ dr i
  • Ci The information of DR is stored in Ci
  • TR is a set of trusted digital reconnaissance records
  • TR ⁇ tr i
  • tr i dr i + Sign (dr i ) ⁇
  • Sign is a credible operation
  • the date and time DT are input to the server S, GPS coordinate information of the current location C i input to C i.
  • the above-mentioned on-site survey terminal equipment C i is bound to the identity of the investigator using the equipment, and is dedicated to a specific person.
  • the above-mentioned survey terminal device C i is equipped with a high-definition camera, a GPS sensor, Wi-fi and 4G signal access capabilities.
  • the aforementioned cryptographic algorithm set includes an asymmetric key pair generation algorithm, a symmetric key algorithm, a signature algorithm, and a hash algorithm.
  • the invention further proposes a method for performing credible operation by using the above-mentioned digital reconnaissance record trusted model system, which specifically includes the following steps:
  • PK s is stored in the digital certificate, recorded as Cert s .
  • SK s applies the AES algorithm (AES, Advanced Encryption Standard) and strong encryption. The key is stored locally on server S;
  • the server issues a certificate for the surveying terminal equipment and sends the private key to the terminal in an encrypted manner. All the surveying terminal equipment and the public key of the server are stored on the server and Publicly accessible
  • Site survey terminal equipment C i collects site survey data dr n through the equipment
  • the survey terminal device C i obtains the geographic location coordinates of the survey data collected through its own GPS sensor, and records it as G n ;
  • the server returns the current time dt n to the current survey terminal device, and adds a digital signature to ensure the credibility of the time.
  • the field survey terminal equipment C i verifies the credibility of the time, and performs credible processing on the field survey data dr n as follows to obtain the credible field survey data tr n :
  • the above-described registration process comprises: i inspect the site terminal device C transmits a registration request to the server S i and Key, which is the password holder is provided its own terminal i, the server generates the key pair S i is C E and D are the encryption and decryption functions of the symmetric encryption algorithm AES, Sign uses the asymmetric cryptographic algorithm DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) for signing, and H is the hash function of the SHA1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) algorithm.
  • DSA Digital Signature Algorithm
  • H is the hash function of the SHA1 (Secure Hash Algorithm) algorithm.
  • the survey data described in step 3 of the signature process may be text, pictures, audio, and video.
  • the process of verifying the trusted spot survey data tr n is as follows:
  • dt n Validate (PK s , Sign (SK s , dt n ))
  • the present invention has the following beneficial technical effects:
  • a digital record generated during a crime scene investigation is credibly processed to generate a credible current investigation digital record.
  • the record contains the current investigation data, the collection place, the collection time, and the person's information. information.
  • the trusted record uses the terminal's private key to sign the record, and the person who collected the record saves the record.
  • the credibility of the record is reflected in tamper resistance and non-repudiation, because the terminal is dedicated and the digital signature ensures that the data is collected
  • the terminal owner cannot deny which terminal.
  • Figure 1 is a structural diagram of a trusted model of digital survey records.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of terminal registration.
  • Figure 3 is a flow chart of the credibility verification of the survey data.
  • FIG. 1 depicts the structure of a trusted model.
  • DR ⁇ dr i
  • PK s is stored in the digital certificate, recorded as Cert s .
  • SKs uses the AES algorithm and a strong key stored locally on the server.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart of terminal registration.
  • the terminal equipment C i is the hand-held device of the reconnaissance personnel.
  • the equipment is equipped with high-definition cameras, GPS sensors, Wi-fi and 4G signal access capabilities, and input functions.
  • the identities of one investigator are bound one by one, and they are used exclusively by one person. This registration process needs to be completed before using the terminal device for the first time.
  • Key i is a password set by the holder of terminal i.
  • the purpose is to protect the security of the private key.
  • E and D are the encryption and decryption functions of the symmetric encryption algorithm AES in cryptography, Sign uses the asymmetric cryptography algorithm DSA for signature, and H is the hash function of the SHA1 algorithm.
  • the purpose of this step is to let the server issue a certificate for the terminal and send the private key to the terminal in an encrypted manner. All public keys of the terminal and server are kept on the server and can be accessed publicly.
  • the terminal C i collects the current survey data dr n through the equipment, and the data can be text, pictures, audio, and video;
  • the terminal C i obtains the geographic location coordinates of the collected survey data through its own GPS sensor, and records it as G n ;
  • Timestamp n dt n + Sign (SK s , dt n )
  • the terminal Ci verifies the credibility of the time and performs credible processing on the survey data drn as follows to obtain the trusted survey data tr n :
  • Figure 3 is a flowchart of the credibility verification of the survey data, which describes the whole process of trn verification of a trusted survey record. If the recorded data is tampered, the verification will fail.
  • the terminal device uses the public key of the server certificate to decrypt Sign (PK s , dt) to verify the credibility of dt. If it is true and valid, it generates the trusted spot survey data tr by the following steps:
  • Step 2 The obtained hash value is 1 and G Timestatmp combined, and the terminal using a private key SK S arithmetic sign: Sign (SK s, H ( DC0017.JPG), G, Timestamp);
  • a digital record generated during the investigation of a crime scene is credibly processed to generate a credible digital record of the current investigation.
  • the record contains information of the current investigation data, the collection location, the collection time, and the collection person. And guarantee that this information cannot be tampered with, and at the same time non-repudiation.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computing Systems (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
  • Management, Administration, Business Operations System, And Electronic Commerce (AREA)

Abstract

La présente invention concerne un système de modèle fiable d'enregistrement d'enquête de scène de crime numérique et un procédé pour effectuer une opération fiable à l'aide du système. Le système enregistre un modèle fiable d'enregistrement d'enquête de scène de crime numérique en tant que T, où T=(E,A,DR,TR,Sign), TR est un ensemble fiable d'enregistrements d'enquête de scène de crime numérique, TR={tr i|tr i = dr i+Sign(dr i)}, et Sign est une opération fiable. Si les données enregistrées ci-dessus sont falsifiées, une défaillance de vérification serait provoquée, et des données fiables d'enquête de scène de crime tr n peuvent être vérifiées. L'invention cible les enregistrements numériques générés dans une enquête de scène de crime, et peut effectuer une opération fiable sur les enregistrements numériques pour générer des enregistrements numériques fiables d'enquête de scène de crime. La crédibilité des enregistrements est reflétée par la non falsifiabilité et la non répudiation. Du fait qu'un terminal est spécialement utilisé par une personne spéciale, la signature numérique révèle clairement le terminal dont proviennent les données. Ainsi, le détenteur du terminal ne peut pas nier le fait. La présente invention résout efficacement le problème technique existant de manipulation facile de photos et de vidéos capturées par des terminaux mobiles, et résout le problème de l'ajout ultérieur d'une signature et d'un signet au nom d'un tiers.
PCT/CN2018/123778 2018-05-21 2018-12-26 Système de modèle fiable d'enregistrement d'enquête de scène de crime numérique WO2019223310A1 (fr)

Priority Applications (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
JP2020520020A JP7026971B2 (ja) 2018-05-21 2018-12-26 デジタル現場調査記録信頼モデルシステム及び方法

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

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CN201810494011.8 2018-05-21
CN201810494011.8A CN108737095B (zh) 2018-05-21 2018-05-21 一种利用数字现勘记录可信模型系统进行可信化操作的方法

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN108737095B (zh) * 2018-05-21 2021-03-05 南京森林警察学院 一种利用数字现勘记录可信模型系统进行可信化操作的方法

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CN103593618A (zh) * 2013-10-28 2014-02-19 北京实数科技有限公司 电子数据证据的可采用性验证方法及系统
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CN108737095A (zh) 2018-11-02
CN108737095B (zh) 2021-03-05
JP2020537411A (ja) 2020-12-17
JP7026971B2 (ja) 2022-03-01

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