WO2019206315A1 - 一种包括tee的系统及其电子签名系统 - Google Patents

一种包括tee的系统及其电子签名系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019206315A1
WO2019206315A1 PCT/CN2019/084703 CN2019084703W WO2019206315A1 WO 2019206315 A1 WO2019206315 A1 WO 2019206315A1 CN 2019084703 W CN2019084703 W CN 2019084703W WO 2019206315 A1 WO2019206315 A1 WO 2019206315A1
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Prior art keywords
tee
module
electronic signature
verification
party
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PCT/CN2019/084703
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English (en)
French (fr)
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李京海
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Li Jinghai
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Publication of WO2019206315A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019206315A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the technical field of TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) and electronic signature systems, and more particularly to a "system including TEE” and its electronic signature system.
  • TEE Trusted Execution Environment
  • the idea of the present invention stems from the analysis of "integrating an electronic signature system and its application in a mobile phone” and is applicable to all “systems including TEE and its electronic signature system”.
  • TEE is the abbreviation of Trusted Execution Environment, Chinese meaning: Trusted execution environment, also known as “safe execution environment”;
  • TEE is a secure execution environment based on ARM TrustZone technology
  • ARM TrustZone is ARM's underlying hardware isolation technology used to build TEE
  • REE is the abbreviation of Rich Execution Environment, Chinese meaning: rich execution environment, also known as “normal execution environment”;
  • TEE and REE are two independent system execution environments that are relatively isolated in the same system, are isolated by hardware technology, have independent software systems, are closely related and can communicate with each other; TEE system can be configured through software. Access to all areas and resources of the REE system, while the REE system cannot access the security areas and resources set by the TEE system; for example, the current mobile phone system basically includes the REE system (ie: Android system execution environment) and the TEE system (ie: A secure execution environment based on ARM TrustZone technology, running software applications with high security requirements, such as: fingerprint, password input, payment, etc.)
  • REE system ie: Android system execution environment
  • TEE system ie: A secure execution environment based on ARM TrustZone technology, running software applications with high security requirements, such as: fingerprint, password input, payment, etc.
  • TEE itself is also a computer system, which is a system consisting of TEE hardware system and TEE software system; different TEE software systems run on TEE hardware systems to form different TEE systems; therefore, TEE system can be said to be colorful Infinite variety;
  • the initial TEE system refers to the TEE system automatically established after the TEE system is reset.
  • Systems including TEE means “systems containing the TEE”; “systems including TEE” must also include REE; for example: “Mobile phone systems containing TEE”.
  • the existing TEE system is the TEE system in the existing "system including TEE (such as mobile phone system)", which is a secure execution environment based on ARM TrustZone technology, which is used to run "software applications with high security requirements";
  • TEE such as mobile phone system
  • the existing TEE system is initiated and established in the form of chain check; the existing TEE system trusts the software program in the root and the "validation data used for the verification operation (eg, the public key and hash value used for the verification) ") is stored in the system ROM memory and cannot be modified; wherein the first stage check operation in the startup establishment process is completed by the "firmware in the ROM memory", and the "checking" used by the verification operation is performed.
  • the public key or hash value used is also written to the OTP/efuse memory before the product leaves the factory;
  • the meaning of "checking” is: "According to the agreement, apply 'contracted verification data (such as: public key or hash value for verification) to 'check the loaded program module'; it includes: Convention, apply 'contracted verification data (such as: public key for verification) 'verify 'the electronic signature of the loaded program module'", or "by convention, apply the 'conventional verification data (such as: Hash value)' to verify 'Hash value of the loaded program module'";
  • the meaning of “chain inspection” is: continuous verification of one stage and one stage according to the pre-designed stage and process; for example: “Firmware program in ROM memory” running in the first stage, applied according to the agreement "Contracted verification data (such as: Hash value)” verifies the "Hash value of the loaded program module". If the verification passes, the execution of the "loaded program module” is started, and the second stage is entered; The program running in the phase, according to the agreement, continues to apply the "contracted verification data (such as: public key for verification)” to verify the "electronic signature of the loaded program module", if the verification is passed, then start the implementation of the " The loaded program module” enters the third stage; ... so continuously, completes the "pre-designed inspection process at each stage” to establish a TEE system;
  • Contracted verification data such as: Hash value
  • the trust root of the TEE system is the basic trust resource that is used in the process of establishing the TEE system and determines the trustworthiness of the built TEE system. It is part of the system; it includes firmware in the hardware and ROM memory. And “verification data for the verification operation (eg, public key and hash value for verification)";
  • ROM is the abbreviation of Read Only Memory, Chinese meaning: read-only memory; OTP is the abbreviation of One Time Programable; eFuse memory is a new type of one-time programmable memory; OTP memory, eFuse memory Belonging to ROM memory;
  • TEE TEE
  • manufacturer e.g., mobile phone manufacturer
  • TEE white paper of the International Organization for Standardization (Global Platform Organization) clearly states that the security level of the TEE system is lower than the security level of the SE system; therefore, in practice, it is generally not established, stored and applied in the TEE system. "Private Key for Electronic Signatures".
  • the electronic signature system is a computer system that can establish, store and apply "private keys for electronic signatures" and can implement electronic signatures; it is generally established by applying "SE security chip or SE security chip module with high security features”. .
  • a reliable electronic signature system refers to an electronic signature system that is certified by a “third-party certification body established according to law” and can implement “reliable electronic signature”. According to the electronic signature law, "reliable electronic signature” has legal effect.
  • the ordinary electronic signature system refers to an electronic signature system that has not been certified by a “third-party certification body established according to law”, for example, an electronic signature system that the enterprise itself authenticates.
  • SE and SE system SE electronic signature module, SIM card electronic signature module
  • SE is the abbreviation of Secure Element, meaning Chinese: security chip or security chip module; it refers to: in the field of electronic signature, with security protection design, "integration includes CPU, memory and encryption and decryption module a SOC chip or an integrated circuit module of a functional unit;
  • SOC is the abbreviation of SYSTEM ON CHIP, Chinese meaning is: system on chip.
  • the SE system is a system that includes "the SE security chip module and its software system";
  • SE electronic signature module in this paper refers to the SE system that can establish, store and apply the 'private key for electronic signature' and can implement electronic signature";
  • the SE electronic signature module generally cooperates with the "other host computer system" to jointly complete the task involving the electronic signature, so the SE electronic signature module is also referred to as the SE electronic signature module subsystem relative to the host computer system;
  • the SE electronic signature module after being registered for use, except for periodically updating the signature key according to the strict authentication process, the other parts generally do not change, and is a secure computer system with relatively fixed functions;
  • SIM card electronic signature module is an SE electronic signature module with SIM card function and SIM card appearance structure.
  • the electronic signature system is established by applying the "SE security chip with high security features"; the feature is that the SE security chip system has a liquid crystal display and a key input; the sensitive information to be signed is provided in the USBKey.
  • the display on the LCD screen achieves the effect of what you see and sign, and eliminates the security loophole caused by the hacker tampering with the information.
  • the transaction signature must be confirmed by the user on the USBKey's own button to enable the user. The process of controlling the signature of a transaction.
  • SE security chip with high security features This type of electronic signature system is also established by the application of "SE security chip with high security features"; its feature is that its SE security chip system does not have its own liquid crystal display and key input, which is easy to integrate into the mobile phone; its sensitive information to be signed It is displayed and confirmed on the mobile phone REE system (ie, mobile phone Android system) that is connected to the electronic signature system; its "customer confirmation of transaction signature” is also in “communication with the electronic signature system.” Enter the confirmation on the mobile phone REE system (ie: mobile phone Andriod system);
  • the disadvantage of this type of electronic signature system is that the mobile phone REE system (ie, the mobile phone Android system) is an open system that may not be strictly authenticated and has a loophole, and there is a risk that the hacker tampers with the information and controls the transaction signature beyond the authority.
  • Electronic signature system technology is also not widely used in existing mobile phones.
  • the electronic signature system represented by "SE electronic signature module integrated in Huawei Kirin 980 chip”.
  • the electronic signature system is established by applying the "SE security chip module integrated in the Kirin 980 chip”; its feature is that its SE security chip module system does not have its own liquid crystal display and key input, which is easy to integrate into the mobile phone;
  • the sensitive information is displayed and confirmed on the "mobile phone TEE system connected to the electronic signature system”; the "user confirmation of the transaction signature” is also in the “mobile phone TEE system connected to the electronic signature system” Enter the confirmation on;
  • the existing TEE system is started up in a chain check mode; in which the "public key for verification" is either directly written into the OTP/efuse (ROM memory), it cannot be modified, or is written to The hash value in OTP/efuse (ROM memory) is indirectly restricted and cannot be modified;
  • the version of the "TEE system download module” is upgraded, it is impossible to upgrade the Hash verification value of the "TEE system download module” in the system ROM module.
  • the new version of the TEE system download module can only be verified by verifying the electronic signature. "; but this can only verify the electronic signature, but can not identify the old and new versions, because the trust signature of the old and new versions of the "TEE system download module” will be verified, so the hacker can be replaced by "old version and its signature” "New version and its signature", while still using the old version of the vulnerability attack system;
  • the existing TEE system is initiated and established in the form of chain inspection; among them, the "signature private key corresponding to the 'public key for verification'" is controlled by the mobile phone manufacturer itself; therefore, The security of the mobile phone TEE system is verified by the mobile phone manufacturer itself, and has not been authenticated and controlled by an authoritative third party;
  • the electronic signature system established by the "SE security chip module integrated with the Kirin 980 chip in Huawei mobile phone” is a system that is certified and controlled by an authoritative third party and conforms to the security specification;
  • the existing mobile phone TEE system has insufficient credibility and insufficient security level.
  • the present invention provides a new technical solution that can solve the above problems.
  • the present invention is an improvement over the prior art based on the prior art.
  • Hash which is generally translated as “hash”, can also be transliterated directly into “hash”. This article uses its English directly.
  • Hash algorithm is an algorithm that maps binary values of arbitrary length into shorter fixed-length binary values, including CRC32, MD5, SHA1 algorithms, and so on.
  • Hash digest using the hash algorithm to map binary values of arbitrary length to shorter fixed-length binary values. This small binary value is called a Hash digest or hash value or Hash validation data; it is a unique and extremely compact numerical representation of a piece of data. Finding two different inputs for the Hash digest to the same value is basically computationally impossible, so the Hash digest of the data can verify the integrity of the data.
  • a symmetric encryption algorithm refers to an encryption algorithm in which the encryption key and the decryption key are the same or can be derived from each other.
  • the key used by the symmetric encryption algorithm is called a symmetric key.
  • the encryption key of the symmetric encryption algorithm can be derived from the decryption key, and the decryption key can also be derived from the encryption key. In most symmetric algorithms, the encryption key and the decryption key are the same.
  • An asymmetric encryption algorithm refers to an encryption algorithm in which the encryption key and the decryption key are different; for example, the RSA algorithm.
  • the two keys used by the asymmetric encryption algorithm are a public key (public key) and a private key (private key). They are a pair, but it is basically impossible to calculate each other. It is calculated from each other and is called an asymmetric key pair.
  • the data is encrypted with the public key and the algorithm, only the corresponding private key and the algorithm can be used for decryption; if the data is encrypted with the private key and the algorithm, only the corresponding public key and the algorithm can be used for decryption.
  • a digital certificate that is, an electronic signature authentication certificate, refers to a data message or other electronic record that can confirm that an electronic signer is associated with electronic signature production data;
  • a digital certificate is generally a file that is electronically signed by a digital certificate authority (CA) and contains public key and public key owner information.
  • CA digital certificate authority
  • the digital certificate application refers to "application related to digital certificate”, which may be “key pair for generating a digital certificate”, may be “downloading a digital certificate”, or “updating a digital certificate”, and the like.
  • Electronic signature also known as digital signature, refers to the data contained in the electronic message in the data message, attached to identify the identity of the signer and indicate that the signatory recognizes the content. For example, the sender first calculates a message digest (also called HASH digest) according to the agreed HASH algorithm; and then encrypts the message digest with the sender's private key and asymmetric encryption algorithm. The text is called "the sender's electronic signature of the message.” The electronic signature needs to be bound to the original message and sent to the recipient.
  • a message digest also called HASH digest
  • Electronic signature production data refers to data such as characters and codes used in the electronic signature process to reliably associate electronic signatures with electronic signers.
  • Electronic signature verification data refers to data used to verify electronic signatures, including codes, passwords, algorithms or public keys.
  • CA is the abbreviation of Certification Authority, Chinese meaning: certification body; it is the use of public key infrastructure technology, specifically to provide network identity authentication services, responsible for certification, issuance and management of digital certificates, and authoritative and impartial Tripartite trust institutions. Often referred to as a digital certificate authority.
  • Download establishment means downloading and storing in the memory of the computer.
  • ID data is the abbreviation of identification
  • ID data refers to: identification data.
  • the basic idea of the present invention is to improve the existing TEE system and improve the security level of the TEE system; so that "the improved TEE system can be matched with the SE electronic signature module and cooperate to form a new electronic signature system"; including: 1) Improve the trust root of the TEE system; "Require the updated verification data (such as the public key and Hsah value for the verification) in the existing TEE system trust root for verifying the TEE module to be loaded.
  • the present invention provides a "system including TEE” and its electronic signature system, which can have a variety of different solutions under the general concept; for a complete description of various different solutions under the general concept of the present invention, Various different aspects of the invention are described in a hierarchical modular structure.
  • a "system including TEE” provided by the present invention, comprising a REE (Enriched Execution Environment) system and a TEE (Trusted Execution Environment) system; characterized in that: the TEE system trust root included therein includes: TEE hardware The system, the system ROM memory firmware program, and the "SE electronic signature module for communication with the TEE system", and the "for verifying the TEE module to be loaded” stored in the SE electronic signature module need to be updated or New verification data (eg public key and hash value for verification)";
  • the TEE system is a TEE system established based on the trust root of the TEE system, starting from a system ROM memory firmware program, and being established in a "chain check mode";
  • TEE load creation management module for performing management verification and establishment of "the TEE module to be loaded and established"; the feature includes the following steps:
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” obtains the electronic signature of the "to be loaded TEE software module” and its authenticator according to the process;
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” communicates and cooperates with the "SE electronic signature module” according to the protocol and the flow, and applies “in the SE electronic signature module, for verification” to be loaded and established.
  • the verification data of the TEE module eg, the public key for the verification
  • the trust root of the TEE system comprises: a TEE hardware system, a system ROM memory firmware program, and an "SE electronic signature module for communicating with the TEE system", and "Authentication data (eg, public key for verification) used by the authoritative third party (eg, CA) for verifying the TEE module to be loaded in the SE electronic signature module” and the system vendor (eg, mobile phone manufacturer) verification data (eg, public key for verification) '";
  • TEE load creation management module for performing management verification and establishment of "the TEE module to be loaded and established"; the feature includes the following steps:
  • the "TEE load creation management module” obtains the "TEE software module to be loaded and established” and its "authoritative third party (such as CA) electronic signature and system manufacturer (such as: mobile phone manufacturer) Electronic signature";
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” communicates and cooperates with the "SE electronic signature module” according to the protocol and the flow, and applies "in the SE electronic signature module, for verification” to be loaded and established.
  • the TEE module's 'authoritative third party (eg CA) verification data eg: public key for verification
  • 'and 'system vendors (eg mobile phone manufacturers) verification data eg: public key for verification
  • the “TEE load creation management module” refuses to start. Execute the "to load the established TEE software module”;
  • the “TEE load creation management module” continues according to the process. Perform the next step.
  • the TEE system is an initial TEE system automatically established after the system reset according to the "predetermined verification type"; and at the same time, it is characterized in that it includes "TEE loading".
  • the "predetermined verification type” includes two categories, namely: “the type of verification verified by an authoritative third party (such as CA)” and “the type of verification verified by the "authenticator of a non-authoritative third party”);
  • the TEE system of the 'predetermined verification type' also includes two categories, namely: “the TEE system (referred to as STEE) for electronic signature application verified by an authoritative third party (such as CA)” and " Other TEE systems verified by 'non-authoritative third party certifiers (eg mobile phone manufacturers)';
  • the TEE system (referred to as STEE) for electronic signature application verified by an authoritative third party refers to: the "TEE loading establishment management module", in an authoritative third party (such as : CA)
  • the application includes the "authoritative third party (such as CA) in the SE electronic signature module for verifying the TEE module to be loaded.”
  • Verify the data (such as the public key and hash value used for the verification) '', verify the "to be loaded TEE module", and start the implementation of the established TEE system after the verification is passed;
  • predetermined verification type is "authentication type verified by an authoritative third party (such as a CA)"
  • it includes the following steps:
  • the "TEE load creation management module” obtains the “loading module of the predetermined verification type” according to the agreement and the process;
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” communicates and cooperates with the "SE electronic signature module” according to a protocol and a flow, and applies "in the SE electronic signature module, for verification” of the reservation.
  • Verification type of the loading module ''authoritative third party such as CA
  • verification data such as: public key and hash value for verification
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” refuses to start executing the "loading module of the predetermined verification type"
  • the "predetermined verification type” is "the type of verification verified by the Authenticator of a non-authoritative third party (eg, a mobile phone manufacturer)"
  • it includes the following steps:
  • the "TEE load creation management module” obtains the “loading module of the predetermined verification type” according to the agreement and the process;
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” communicates and cooperates with the "SE electronic signature module” according to a protocol and a flow, and applies "in the SE electronic signature module, for verification” of the reservation.
  • Verification type of the load module 'of the non-authoritative third party's authenticator eg: mobile phone manufacturer
  • verification data eg: public key and Hsah value for the verification
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” refuses to start executing the "loading module of the predetermined verification type"
  • TEE system is an initial TEE system automatically established after the system is reset; and the initial TEE system is "authenticated by an authoritative third party (eg, CA), TEE system (referred to as STEE) for electronic signature applications";
  • CA authoritative third party
  • STEE TEE system
  • the root of trust of the TEE system includes: a TEE hardware system, a system ROM memory firmware program, and an "SE electronic signature module for communication with the TEE system", and "stored in the SE electronic signature module” Validation data (eg, public key and Hsah value for verification) for verifying 'to load the established TEE module', an authoritative third party (eg, CA)';
  • SE electronic signature module for communication with the TEE system
  • Validation data eg, public key and Hsah value for verification
  • CA authoritative third party
  • TEE load creation management module for performing management verification and establishment of "the TEE module to be loaded and established"; the feature includes the following steps:
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” obtains "software modules to be loaded and created” according to the process
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” communicates and cooperates with the "SE electronic signature module” according to the protocol and the flow, and applies “in the SE electronic signature module, for verification” to be loaded and established.
  • the "TEE load establishment management module” is further used to manage and verify “the load module selected by the user after the establishment of the TEE system (ie, STEE)", so that "the TEE system (ie, STEE)"
  • the user can continue to load and execute the "Load module verified by other non-authoritative third party's other authenticators (such as mobile phone manufacturers)" to become the new "other TEE system”; it is characterized by the following steps:
  • the "TEE load creation management module” receives a request of "a user-selected load module that performs execution of a verification by another non-authoritative third party (eg, a mobile phone manufacturer)";
  • the "TEE load creation management module” obtains "loading module to be loaded and established” according to the convention and the process;
  • the “TEE load creation management module” communicates and cooperates with the “SE electronic signature module” according to the protocol and the process, and applies “in the SE electronic signature module for verification” to be loaded and established.
  • the verification data of the other certifiers (mobile phone manufacturers) of the non-authoritative third party of the TEE module's (for example, the public key and hash value for the verification)' verify the "the TEE software module to be loaded";
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” refuses to start executing the "TEE software module to be loaded and established"
  • the present invention provides an electronic signature system, which is "an electronic signature system applied to the system of 'including TEE”, characterized in that it comprises: “for electronic signature application of the system” “TEE system”, and "SE electronic signature module” that communicates with the TEE system”;
  • the "TEE system for electronic signature application” is characterized in that: the root of trust includes: a TEE hardware system, a system ROM memory firmware program, and an "SE electronic signature module” that is connected to the TEE system for communication. And the verification data (such as the public key and hash value used for the verification) required to be verified or newly created in the SE electronic signature module for verifying the TEE module to be loaded.
  • the verification data such as the public key and hash value used for the verification
  • TEE system for electronic signature application the TEE system established from the system ROM memory firmware program, and established in a “chain-checking manner"; the TEE system and " The SE electronic signature module connected to and communicate with each other cooperates to complete the task of the electronic signature application;
  • TEE load creation management module for performing management verification on "the TEE module to be loaded and established"; the feature includes the following steps:
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” obtains the electronic signature of the "to be loaded TEE software module” and its authenticator according to the process;
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” communicates and cooperates with the "SE electronic signature module” according to the protocol and the flow, and applies “in the SE electronic signature module, for verification” to be loaded and established.
  • the verification data of the TEE module eg, the public key for the verification
  • the “SE electronic signature module” is characterized in that: “the verification data required to be updated or newly created in the trust root of the TEE system for verifying the TEE module to be loaded” is updated (such as: the public key and hash value used for the verification));
  • the SE electronic signature module further includes an “Assisting TEE Establishment Management Module” for applying the verification data used in the SE electronic signature module for verifying the TEE module to be loaded (eg, the verification)
  • the public key)'' is used to assist the "TEE load creation management module of the TEE system" to perform management verification on "the TEE module to be loaded”; the feature includes the following steps:
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” obtains the electronic signature of the "to be loaded TEE software module” and its authenticator according to the process;
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” communicates and cooperates with “the SE electronic signature module and its 'assisted TEE establishment management module'” according to the protocol and the flow, and applies "the SE electronic signature module” Verification data for verifying 'to load the established TEE module' (eg, public key for verification)" to verify the electronic signature of the "TEE software module to be loaded”;
  • the electronic signature system according to 5 above characterized in that it is "an electronic signature system applied to the 'system including TEE' and verified by an authoritative third party (such as CA)"; It includes: the TEE system (referred to as STEE) for electronic signature application verified by an authoritative third party (such as CA) of the system, and the “authorized third party connected with the TEE system” (such as CA) verified 'SE electronic signature module'";
  • the TEE system (referred to as STEE) for electronic signature application verified by an authoritative third party (such as CA) is characterized in that: the trust root includes: a TEE hardware system, a system ROM memory firmware program, And an "SE electronic signature module for communicating with the TEE system", and an "authoritative third party (such as CA) for "validating the TEE software module to be loaded” stored in the SE electronic signature module.
  • Verification data eg public key for verification
  • TEE load establishment management module for performing management verification on "the TEE module to be loaded”; the TEE system is only passed the "authoritative third party (such as: CA)" Verification can be established; it is characterized by the following steps:
  • the "TEE load creation management module” obtains the electronic signature of "the TEE software module to be loaded and established” and its “authoritative third party (such as CA) according to the process;
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” communicates and cooperates with the "SE electronic signature module” according to the protocol and the flow, and applies "in the SE electronic signature module, for verification” to be loaded and established.
  • the "SE electronic signature module” verified by an authoritative third party is characterized in that it includes "the” TEE system for the electronic signature application, and the "trust root” To verify the 'authentication data of the authoritative third party (eg CA) to load the established TEE module (eg public key for verification)'";
  • the SE electronic signature module further includes an “Assisting TEE Establishment Management Module” for applying “the authoritative third party in the SE electronic signature module for verifying the TEE module to be loaded” (eg: CA) verification data (eg, public key for verification) '', assists the 'TEE load creation management module of the TEE system' to perform management verification on the TEE module to be loaded; the feature is The following steps:
  • the "TEE load creation management module” obtains the “TEE software module to be loaded and created” and the "electronic signature of an authoritative third party (such as CA)" according to the process;
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” communicates and cooperates with "the SE electronic signature module and its 'assisted TEE establishment management module'” according to the protocol and the flow, and applies "the SE electronic signature module”
  • the verification data of the 'authoritative third party eg CA
  • CA 'authoritative third party
  • Authorized third party such as: CA
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” continues the execution of the next step according to the flow.
  • an authoritative third party such as CA
  • the TEE system (referred to as STEE) for electronic signature application verified by an authoritative third party (such as CA) is characterized in that: the trust root includes: a TEE hardware system, a system ROM memory firmware program, And "SE electronic signature module for communication with the TEE system", and "authentication of an authoritative third party (such as CA) for "authentication of the TEE module to be loaded” stored in the SE electronic signature module Data (eg, public key for verification) 'and 'system manufacturer (eg, mobile phone manufacturer) verification data (eg, public key for verification) '";
  • SE electronic signature module Data eg, public key for verification
  • 'and 'system manufacturer eg, mobile phone manufacturer
  • TEE load establishment management module for performing management verification on "the TEE module to be loaded”; the TEE system is only passed through “authoritative third parties (such as CA) and systems)
  • parties such as CA
  • Two-factor verification by a vendor eg, a mobile phone manufacturer
  • a vendor eg, a mobile phone manufacturer
  • the "TEE load creation management module” obtains the "TEE software module to be loaded and established” and the electronic signature of the "authoritative third party (such as CA) and the electronics of the system manufacturer (such as the mobile phone manufacturer). signature";
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” communicates and cooperates with the "SE electronic signature module” according to the protocol and the flow, and applies “in the SE electronic signature module, for verification” to be loaded and established.
  • the TEE module's 'authoritative third party (eg CA) verification data eg: public key for verification
  • 'and 'system vendors (eg mobile phone manufacturers) verification data eg: public key for verification
  • the “TEE load creation management module” refuses to start. Execute the "to load the established TEE software module”;
  • the “TEE load creation management module” continues according to the process. Carry out the next step;
  • the "SE electronic signature module” verified by an authoritative third party is characterized in that it includes "the" TEE system for the electronic signature application, and the "trust root” Verification data for verifying 'to load the established TEE module', 'authoritative third party (eg CA) verification data (eg public key for verification)' and 'system vendor (eg mobile phone manufacturer) (eg : the public key for the verification))";
  • the SE electronic signature module further includes an “Assisting TEE Establishment Management Module” for applying “the authoritative third party in the SE electronic signature module for verifying the TEE module to be loaded” (eg: CA) verification data (eg, public key for verification) 'and 'system manufacturer (eg, mobile phone manufacturer) verification data (eg, public key for verification)'", assisting "the TEE system'
  • the TEE load creation management module ' performs management verification on "to load the established TEE module”; it is characterized by the following steps:
  • the “TEE load creation management module” obtains the electronic signature of the “software module to be loaded” and the electronic signature of the “authoritative third party (eg CA) and the electronic signature of the system manufacturer (eg mobile phone manufacturer) according to the process. ";
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” communicates and cooperates with “the SE electronic signature module and its 'assisted TEE establishment management module'” according to the protocol and the flow, and applies “the SE electronic signature module” Verification data for the verification of the 'authorized third party (eg CA) to be loaded with the established TEE module (eg public key for verification) and the verification data of the system vendor (eg mobile phone manufacturer) (eg: public key for verification) "" the electronic signature of the "authoritative third party (such as CA) of the "software module to be loaded” and the electronic signature of the system manufacturer (such as: mobile phone manufacturer)” verification;
  • the SE electronic signature module Verification data for the verification of the 'authorized third party (eg CA) to be loaded with the established TEE module (eg public key for verification) and the verification data of the system vendor (eg mobile phone manufacturer) (eg: public key for verification)
  • the “TEE load creation management module” refuses to start. Execute the "software module to be loaded”;
  • the “TEE load creation management module” continues according to the process. Perform the next step.
  • a signature system includes: a TEE system (referred to as STEE) for electronic signature application verified by an authoritative third party (such as a CA) of the system, and "connected with the TEE system, 'SE Electronic Signature Module' verified by an authoritative third party (such as CA);
  • the "SE electronic signature module” verified by an authoritative third party is further characterized in that it includes verification data of "SE system management module” and "authoritative third party (such as CA). (eg: public key for verification)", used to manage the establishment of "digital certificate application that may be established by an authoritative third party (such as CA) verification” in the "SE electronic signature module”;
  • the "SE electronic signature module” receives the "Request to establish a digital certificate application in the SE electronic signature module", the "information data to be authenticated by the protocol” and the electronic signature of an authoritative third party (eg CA) ";
  • the "SE system management module” of the “SE electronic signature module” applies the method of verifying the electronic signature according to the protocol and the digital certificate, and applies the "authoritative third party” stored in the "SE electronic signature module” (eg: CA) verification data (eg, public key for verification) "verification of the electronic signature of an authoritative third party (eg CA)";
  • CA is the third-party authority responsible for the certification, issuance and management of digital certificates
  • CA is the management of the issuance of user digital certificates through the CA computer certification management system
  • the “digital certificate application” refers to an application related to a digital certificate, which may be “a key pair for generating a digital certificate”, may be “downloading a digital certificate”, or “updating a digital certificate”, and the like.
  • the electronic signature system according to the above 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 further characterized in that it is "a one applied to the 'system including TEE' and verified by an authoritative third party (such as CA)
  • An electronic signature system includes: a TEE system (referred to as STEE) for electronic signature application verified by an authoritative third party (such as CA) of the system, and "connected communication with the TEE system” 'SE electronic signature module' verified by an authoritative third party (such as CA);
  • the "SE electronic signature module” verified by an authoritative third party is further characterized in that it includes: "SE system management module” and “authoritative third party (such as: CA) verification) Data (eg, public key for verification) and “validation data of system vendors (eg, mobile phone manufacturers) (eg, public key for verification)” are used to manage the establishment of the "SE electronic signature module” “A digital certificate application that can be established by an authoritative third party (such as CA) and a system vendor (such as a mobile phone manufacturer)”; it is characterized by the following steps:
  • the "SE electronic signature module” receives the "Request to establish a digital certificate application in the SE electronic signature module", the "information data to be authenticated by the protocol” and the electronic signature of an authoritative third party (eg CA) And the electronic signature of the system manufacturer (eg mobile phone manufacturer);
  • the "SE system management module" of the "SE electronic signature module” applies the method of verifying the electronic signature according to the protocol and the digital certificate, and applies the 'authoritative third party' stored in the "SE electronic signature module subsystem” (such as: CA) verification data (such as: public key for verification) 'and 'system manufacturers (such as: mobile phone manufacturers) verification data (such as: public key for verification) '" to the authoritative third party ( Such as: CA) electronic signature and system manufacturers (such as: mobile phone manufacturers) electronic signatures are verified separately;
  • the “SE system management module” continues to execute according to the process. step.
  • the electronic signature system according to the above 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 further characterized in that it is "applied to the 'system including TEE' and verified by an authoritative third party (such as CA)
  • An electronic signature system comprising: a TEE system (referred to as STEE) for electronic signature applications verified by an authoritative third party (such as a CA) of the system, and "with the TEE system” 'SE electronic signature module' that is connected to the communication and verified by an authoritative third party (such as CA);
  • the "SE electronic signature module” verified by an authoritative third party is further characterized in that it includes: "SE system management module” and "root CA verification data (eg, verification) The public key) and the system manufacturer (such as the mobile phone manufacturer) verification data (such as: the public key for the verification), used to manage the establishment of the "SE electronic signature module” in the "SE root certificate and A digital certificate application that can be established by a system vendor (such as a mobile phone manufacturer) for dual authentication; it is characterized by the following steps:
  • the "SE electronic signature module” receives the "Request to establish a digital certificate application in the SE electronic signature module", the "information data to be authenticated by the protocol” and the electronic signature of the root CA, and the system manufacturer (eg : Mobile phone manufacturer) electronic signature";
  • the "SE system management module" of the "SE electronic signature module” applies the verification data of the 'root CA' stored in the "SE electronic signature module” according to the protocol and the method of verifying the electronic signature in the digital certificate (such as: the public key used for the verification) 'and the system manufacturer (such as: mobile phone manufacturer) verification data (such as: the public key for the verification) '" the root CA's electronic signature and system manufacturers (such as: mobile phones) The electronic signature of the manufacturer is verified separately;
  • the root CA is an authoritative certification body that issues digital certificates to the operating CA;
  • the national root CA is the national authoritative certification body that issues digital certificates to the operating CA;
  • the digital certificate of the national root CA is the root digital certificate, which is the national root.
  • the digital certificate of the national root CA and the national root CA is the starting point of the national trust chain based on the digital certificate;
  • the operating CA is a third-party authoritative certification body that is certified by the root CA (such as the national root CA) and can issue and manage digital certificates to specific individuals and legal persons outside the CA.
  • the invention solves the problem that the existing TEE system trust root storage cannot be updated in the system ROM memory, makes the trust root of the TEE system and its TEE system more reliable and safer, and solves the problem that the existing TEE system is always the system manufacturer.
  • mobile phone manufacturers specialize in special control, no third-party certification supervision, so that "TEE system for electronic signature applications” can be "authoritative third-party (such as CA) and system vendors (such as: mobile phone manufacturers)” Co-verification and control improves the reliability of the "TEE system for electronic signature applications”; at the same time, the present invention provides a "TEE system for electronic signature applications" by "the system of the TEE” A new electronic signature system formed by a combination of 'SE electronic signature module' communicating with the TEE system; the new electronic signature system is complete and reliable, and is easy to integrate into the "system including TEE” (eg: In the mobile phone system, it is a more cost-effective and more reliable and practical electronic signature system.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a TEE system trust root of a conventional "system including TEE"; wherein, the "authentication data for verifying the TEE software module to be loaded" of the TEE system trust root is stored in the system ROM module. in;
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of an existing electronic signature system used in the "system including TEE”; wherein "the verification data of the system vendor for verifying the TEE software module to be loaded” is stored in In the system ROM module; its TEE system is controlled by the system manufacturer;
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a TEE system trust root of a system including a TEE according to the present invention; wherein, the TEE system trusts the root of the "authentication of the TEE software module to be loaded” to be updated or newly created. "Storing the SE electronic signature module;
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of an electronic signature system for the "system including TEE" of the present invention; wherein, the TEE system trusts the root of the "authorized third party for verifying the TEE software module to be loaded"
  • the verification data and the verification data of the system manufacturer are stored in the SE electronic signature module; the TEE system is jointly controlled by the authoritative third party and the system manufacturer.
  • Embodiment 1 A mobile phone system and its electronic signature system
  • a mobile phone system provided by Embodiment 1 of the present invention has a SOC main chip which is a Huawei Kirin 980 chip, and the chip integrates a SE security chip module dedicated to the TEE system;
  • the mobile phone system includes a REE system, a TEE system, and SE electronic signature module of SE security chip module";
  • the feature root of the TEE system of the mobile phone system comprises: a TEE hardware system, a “ROM module for starting the TEE system”, and an “SE electronic signature module for connecting and communicating with the TEE system”, and “stored in the An updateable in the SE electronic signature module for verifying 'to be loaded with the established TEE software module', 'authentication data of the authoritative third party CA electronic signature' and 'authentication data of the mobile phone manufacturer's electronic signature'";
  • the initial TEE system automatically established after the TEE system is reset is "the TEE system (referred to as STEE) for electronic signature application certified by an authoritative third party CA”; and is characterized in that it includes "TEE load establishment management module” for performing management verification on “the TEE module to be loaded and established”; the TEE system may be established only by the dual verification of "authoritative third party CA and the mobile phone manufacturer”;
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” obtains "the TEE software module to be loaded and established” and its “electronic signature of the authoritative third party CA and the electronic signature of the mobile phone manufacturer” according to the procedure;
  • the "TEE load creation management module” calculates the hash value of the "the TEE software module to be loaded” according to the process; and communicates with the "SE electronic signature module” according to the protocol, "the hash value of the 'to-be-built TEE software module', and the electronic signature of the authoritative third-party CA and the electronic signature of the mobile phone manufacturer" are sent to the SE electronic signature module and its 'assisted TEE establishment management Module '";
  • the SE electronic signature module and its 'assisted TEE establishment management module' apply the verification data in the SE electronic signature module for verifying the TEE software module to be loaded (for example, the public key for the verification check), decrypt the received "electronic signature of the TEE software module to be loaded”, and get the correct hash of the "the TEE software module to be loaded” Value (abbreviated as B)";
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” receives the "the verification result” according to the protocol
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” refuses to start the execution of the TEE software to be loaded and established. Module
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” starts the execution of the TEE software to be loaded and executed according to the process. Module.
  • An electronic signature system provided in the first embodiment is characterized in that it is an electronic signature system that is applied to the mobile phone system and verified by an authoritative third party CA.
  • the method includes: the mobile phone system "TEE System for Electronic Signature Application (STEE) verified by an authoritative third party CA", and "SE Electronic Signature Module verified by an authoritative third party CA” in connection with the TEE system” ;
  • the “TEE System for Electronic Signature Application (STEE) verified by an authoritative third-party CA” is characterized in that: the root of the trust includes: a TEE hardware system, a system ROM memory firmware program, and “and The SE electronic signature module of the TEE system is connected to communicate, and the verification data of the 'authoritative third party CA for verifying the TEE software module to be loaded in the SE electronic signature module (eg: verification The public key used) 'and' the verification data of the mobile phone manufacturer (eg, the public key for the verification) '";
  • TEE load establishment management module for performing management verification on "the TEE module to be loaded and established"; the TEE system is only passed the "authoritative third party CA and the mobile phone manufacturer" Dual verification is possible; it is characterized by the following steps:
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” obtains "the TEE software module to be loaded and established” and its “electronic signature of the authoritative third party CA and the electronic signature of the mobile phone manufacturer” according to the procedure;
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” communicates and cooperates with the "SE electronic signature module” according to the protocol and the flow, and applies "in the SE electronic signature module, for verification” to be loaded and established.
  • the TEE software module's 'authoritative third-party CA's verification data eg: public key for verification
  • 'the mobile phone manufacturer's verification data eg: public key for verification
  • the established TEE software module "verifies the electronic signature of the authoritative third-party CA and the electronic signature of the mobile phone manufacturer" respectively;
  • the “TEE load creation management module” refuses to start. Execute the "to load the established TEE software module”;
  • the "TEE loading establishment management module” starts the execution of the TEE software to be loaded and executed according to the process. Module.
  • the "SE electronic signature module” verified by an authoritative third party is characterized in that it includes "the" TEE system for the electronic signature application, and the "trust root” In the verification of 'to be loaded with the established TEE module', 'authoritative third-party CA's verification data (eg, public key for verification)' and 'the mobile phone manufacturer's verification data (eg, public key for verification)' ";
  • the SE electronic signature module further includes an “Assisting TEE Establishment Management Module” for applying the verification of the “authoritative third party CA for verifying the TEE module to be loaded in the SE electronic signature module”.
  • Data eg, public key for verification
  • the mobile phone manufacturer's verification data eg, public key for verification
  • assisting the "TEE system's 'TEE load creation management module'" To load the established TEE module" for management verification;
  • the SE electronic signature module further includes: an “SE system management module” and an “authoritative third party CA verification data (eg, a public key for verification)”, for managing the “SE electronic signature module”.
  • an “SE system management module” and an “authoritative third party CA verification data eg, a public key for verification”
  • the "SE electronic signature module” receives "a request to establish a digital certificate application in the SE electronic signature module", "information data to be authenticated by agreement” and an electronic signature of an authoritative third party CA";
  • the "SE system management module" of the “SE electronic signature module” applies the verification method of the authoritative third party CA stored in the “SE electronic signature module” according to the protocol and the method of verifying the electronic signature in the digital certificate.
  • the data eg, the public key for the verification
  • the "SE system management module” establishes "the requested digital certificate application” in the "SE electronic signature module”.

Abstract

一种包括TEE的系统，其特征是：其包含的TEE系统的信任根包括：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的用于验证要加载建立的TEE软件模块的、需要更新或新建的验证数据；一种应用于所述包括TEE的系统中的电子签名系统，其包括有：所述系统的用于电子签名应用的TEE系统、及与所述TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块；其中，SE电子签名模块中包括有所述TEE信任根中的、用于验证要加载建立的TEE软件模块的、需要更新或新建的验证数据。

Description

一种包括TEE的系统及其电子签名系统 技术领域
本发明涉及TEE(可信执行环境)和电子签名系统的技术领域，更具体地，涉及一种“包括TEE的系统”及其电子签名系统。
背景技术
本发明的构思源于对“在手机中集成电子签名系统及其应用”的分析，并适用于所有“包括TEE的系统及其电子签名系统”。
在互联通讯时代，数字证书及其电子签名系统(如USBKey数字证书)被广泛应用。同时，移动通讯技术、智能手机技术也蓬勃发展，基于智能手机的数字证书应用潜力巨大。
但研究发现，现有数字证书技术及其电子签名系统却并没有在手机中广泛充分应用。分析其原因，主要是“现有电子签名系统的技术”还存在缺陷。
为进一步分析，下面先介绍现有技术的相关概念和原理：
1、TEE和REE
1)TEE是Trusted Execution Environment的缩写，中文含义：可信执行环境，也称为“安全执行环境”；
TEE是基于ARM TrustZone技术的安全执行环境；ARM TrustZone是ARM公司的用来构建TEE的底层硬件隔离的技术；
2)REE是Rich Execution Environment的缩写，中文含义：富执行环境，也称为“普通执行环境”；
3)TEE和REE是相对存在于同一个系统中的、通过硬件技术隔离的、有各自独立软件系统的、密切关联并可相互通信的、两个独立的系统执行环境；TEE系统通过软件配置可访问REE系统的所有区域及资源，而REE系统则不能访问TEE系统设置的安全区域及资源；例如：目前的手机系统基本都包括有REE系统(即：Android系统执行环境)和TEE系统(即：基于ARM TrustZone技术的安全执行环境，运行安全要求高的软件应用，如：指纹、密码输入、支付等)；
4)TEE本身也是一个计算机系统，其是由TEE硬件系统和TEE软件系统组成的系统； 不同的TEE软件系统在TEE硬件系统上运行，构成不同的TEE系统；因此，TEE系统可以说是丰富多彩、种类无限；
5)初始TEE系统，是指TEE系统复位后自动建立的TEE系统。
2、包括TEE的系统
“包括TEE的系统”，是指“包含有所述TEE的系统”；“包括TEE的系统”肯定也包括REE；如：“包含有TEE的手机系统”。
3、现有TEE系统的安全性说明
1)现有TEE系统是现有“包括TEE的系统(如：手机系统)”中的TEE系统，其是基于ARM TrustZone技术的安全执行环境，用于运行“安全要求高的软件应用”；
2)现有TEE系统是以链式验签的方式启动建立的；现有TEE系统信任根中的软件程序和“用于验签操作的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)”是存储在系统ROM存储器中不可修改的；其中，其启动建立过程中的第一阶段验签操作是由“ROM存储器中的固件”来完成的，而其验签操作使用的“验签用的公钥或Hash值”也是在产品出厂前被写入到OTP/efuse存储器中的；
其中，“验签”的含义是：“按约定，应用‘约定的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥或Hash值)’对‘被加载的程序模块’进行验证；其包括：“按约定，应用‘约定的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’验证‘被加载程序模块的电子签名’”，或“按约定，应用‘约定的验证数据(如：Hash值)’验证‘被加载程序模块的Hash值’”；
其中，“链式验签”的含义是：按预先设计的阶段和流程，一个阶段接一个阶段地连续验签；例如：第一个阶段运行的“ROM存储器中的固件程序”，按约定应用“约定的验证数据(如：Hash值)”对“被加载的程序模块的Hash值”进行验证，若验证通过，则启动执行该“被加载的程序模块”，进入第二个阶段；第二个阶段运行的程序，按约定，继续应用“约定的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”对“被加载的程序模块的电子签名”进行验证，若验证通过，则启动执行该“被加载的程序模块”，进入第三个阶段；……如此连续，完成“预先设计的各个阶段的验签流程”，建立TEE系统；
[根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]　
其中，TEE系统的信任根，是“在建立TEE系统的过程中要使用的、决定所建TEE系统可信任程度”的基础信任资源，是系统的一部分；其包括硬件、ROM存储器中的固件程序及“用于验签操作的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)”；
其中，ROM是Read Only Memory的缩写，中文含义：只读存储器；OTP是One Time  Programable(一次性可编程)的缩写；eFuse存储器是一种新型的一次性可编程存储器；OTP存储器、eFuse存储器都属于ROM存储器；
3)现有TEE系统都是由“‘包括TEE的系统’的厂商(如：手机厂商)”专管专控的，不对外开放；
4)国际标准化组织Global Platform(全球平台组织)的TEE白皮书中明确指出，TEE系统的安全等级低于SE系统的安全等级；因此，在实际中，一般不会在TEE系统中建立、存储及应用“电子签名用的私钥”。
4、电子签名系统
电子签名系统是可建立、存储及应用“电子签名用的私钥”，并可实施电子签名的计算机系统；其一般都是应用“具有高安全特性的SE安全芯片或SE安全芯片模块”建立的。
可靠的电子签名系统，是指经“依法设立的第三方认证机构”认证，可实施“可靠的电子签名”的电子签名系统。依据电子签名法，“可靠的电子签名”才具有法律效力。
普通的电子签名系统，是指未经“依法设立的第三方认证机构”认证的电子签名系统，例如：企业自己认证自己使用的电子签名系统。
5、SE和SE系统、SE电子签名模块、SIM卡电子签名模块
1)SE是Secure Element的缩写，中文含义：安全芯片或安全芯片模块；其在本文中是指：用于电子签名领域的、具有安全防护设计的、“集成包括有CPU、存储器及加解密模块等功能单元”的SOC芯片或集成电路模块；
其中，SOC是SYSTEM ON CHIP的缩写，中文含义是：片上系统。
2)SE系统，是“包括有SE安全芯片模块及其软件系统”的系统；
3)SE电子签名模块，在本文中是指“可建立、存储及应用‘电子签名用的私钥’的、并能实施电子签名”的SE系统；
在应用中，SE电子签名模块一般是与“其它主计算机系统”协作匹配、共同完成涉及电子签名的任务，所以，相对于主计算机系统，SE电子签名模块又称为SE电子签名模块子系统；
SE电子签名模块，在注册使用后，除定期按严格认证流程更新签名密钥外，其它部分一般不会再变化，是一个功能相对固定的安全的计算机系统；
4)SIM卡电子签名模块，是一种具有SIM卡功能和SIM卡外观结构的SE电子签名模块。
参考上述概念，下面分析“现有电子签名系统的技术”未在手机中广泛充分应用的原因；现有电子签名系统按其应用架构可分为下面三类，下面分别分析说明：
1、以现有“银行USBKey”为代表的电子签名系统。
该类电子签名系统，其是应用“具有高安全特性的SE安全芯片”建立的；其特征是：其SE安全芯片系统自带液晶显示和按键输入；其待签名的敏感信息在USBKey自带的液晶显示屏上进行显示，达到所见即所签的效果，杜绝了黑客篡改信息所带来的安全漏洞；同时，其交易签名必须由用户在USBKey自带按键上进行输入确认才能实现，使用户可控制交易签名的过程。
该类电子签名系统，其缺点是：“SE安全芯片系统自带液晶显示和按键输入”会占用手机较大空间，对手机整体结构布局影响较大，且增加成本，对手机整体销售不利；同时，“SE安全芯片系统自带液晶显示屏”的显示容量小，功能有限，只适用于银行类“少量敏感信息的电子签名应用”，使应用扩展受限；因此，该类电子签名系统技术并没有在现有手机中集成应用。
2、以“SIM卡电子签名模块”为代表的电子签名系统。
该类电子签名系统也是应用“具有高安全特性的SE安全芯片”建立的；其特征是：其SE安全芯片系统没有自带液晶显示和按键输入，便于集成于手机中；其待签名的敏感信息是在“与该电子签名系统相连接通信的手机REE系统(即：手机Android系统)”上进行显示及确认的；其“交易签名的用户确认”也是在“与该电子签名系统相连接通信的手机REE系统(即：手机Andriod系统)”上输入确认的；
该类电子签名系统，其缺点是：手机REE系统(即：手机Android系统)是未经严格认证的可能有漏洞的开放系统，其存在黑客篡改信息、越权控制交易签名的风险，因此，该类电子签名系统技术也没有在现有手机中广泛应用。
3、以“华为手机中麒麟980芯片集成的SE电子签名模块”为代表的电子签名系统。
该类电子签名系统是应用“麒麟980芯片中集成的SE安全芯片模块”建立的；其特征是：其SE安全芯片模块系统没有自带液晶显示和按键输入，便于集成于手机中；其待签名的敏感信息是在“与该电子签名系统相连接通信的手机TEE系统”上进行显示及确认的；其“交易签名的用户确认”也是在“与该电子签名系统相连接通信的手机TEE系统”上输入确认的；
参考前述的“现有TEE系统的安全性说明”可知，现有手机TEE系统的安全等级是比较高的，因此，该类电子签名系统在现有手机中具有一定的应用；
但仔细分析发现，该类电子签名系统还是具有严重缺陷，使其无法在手机中广泛充分应用；具体原因分析如下：
(1)现有TEE系统信任根中“验签用的公钥”的安全等级不够。
现有TEE系统是以链式验签的方式启动建立的；其中，其“验签用的公钥”或是被直接写入OTP/efuse(ROM存储器)中不可修改，或是被写入到OTP/efuse(ROM存储器)中的Hash值间接限制而不可修改；
因现有“验签用的公钥”不可修改、无法更新，使对应的用于信任签名的私钥也无法更新，致使从长期看，其用于信任签名的私钥可被破解，使黑客可假冒签名骗取信任而存在风险；
同时，当“TEE系统下载模块”版本升级时，系统ROM模块中不可能升级更新“TEE系统下载模块”的Hash验证值，只能通过验证电子签名的方法来验证“TEE系统下载模块的新版本”；但如此只能验证电子签名，却无法识别新旧版本，因为“TEE系统下载模块”新旧版本的信任签名都是会被验证通过的，因此，黑客也就可用“旧版本及其签名”替换“新版本及其签名”，而依然可利用旧版本的漏洞攻击系统；
(2)现有手机TEE系统都是由手机厂商专管专控的，可信度不够，安全等级不够。
现有TEE系统是以链式验签的方式启动建立的；其中，其“‘验签用的公钥’所对应的签名私钥”都是由手机厂商自己专管专控的；因此，现有手机TEE系统的安全性都是由手机厂商自己认证自己管控，而没有经过权威第三方的认证和管控；
而由“华为手机中麒麟980芯片集成的SE安全芯片模块”建立的电子签名系统，其是经过权威第三方认证和管控的、符合安全规范的系统；
因此，相对于该类“经过权威第三方认证和管控的SE电子签名系统”，现有手机TEE系统的可信度不够，安全等级不够。
正是因为现有手机TEE系统存在上述两类缺陷，使“依赖现有手机TEE系统的该类电子签名系统”也存在缺陷；并使该类电子签名系统无法在手机中广泛充分应用。
综上分析可知，“现有各类电子签名系统的技术”在手机中集成应用时都存在缺陷，使其不能在手机中广泛充分应用。
基于上面的分析，本发明提供一种能解决上述问题缺陷的新的技术方案。
本发明是在现有技术基础上，对现有技术的改进创新。下面再介绍下现有技术的相关内容：
1、Hash算法及Hash摘要
1)Hash，一般翻译为“散列”，也可直接音译为“哈希”。本文直接使用其英文。
2)Hash算法，是将任意长度的二进制值映射为较短的固定长度的二进制值的算法，包括CRC32、MD5、SHA1算法，等。
3)Hash摘要，用Hash算法将任意长度的二进制值映射为较短的固定长度的二进制值。这个小的二进制值称为Hash摘要或Hash值或Hash验证数据；其是一段数据唯一且极其紧凑的数值表示形式。要找到Hash摘要为同一个值的两个不同的输入，在计算上基本是不可能的，所以，数据的Hash摘要可以检验数据的完整性。
2、对称加密算法及其对称密钥
对称加密算法，是指加密密钥和解密密钥相同或可相互推算出来的加密算法。对称加密算法使用的密钥，称为对称密钥。
对称加密算法的加密密钥能够从解密密钥中推算出来，同时解密密钥也可以从加密密钥中推算出来。在大多数的对称算法中，加密密钥和解密密钥是相同的。
3、非对称加密算法及其非对称密钥对
非对称加密算法，是指加密密钥和解密密钥不相同的加密算法；如RSA算法。
非对称加密算法使用的这两个密钥，是公开密钥(public key，简称公钥)和私有密钥(private key，简称私钥)，它们是一对，但彼此在计算上基本不可能相互推算出来，称为非对称密钥对。
如果用公钥和该算法对数据进行加密，只有用对应的私钥和该算法才能解密；如果用私钥和该算法对数据进行加密，那么只有用对应的公钥和该算法才能解密。
4、数字证书
数字证书，就是电子签名认证证书，是指可证实电子签名人与电子签名制作数据有联系的数据电文或者其他电子记录；
数字证书一般是由数字证书认证机构(CA)电子签名的包含公开密钥以及公开密钥拥有者信息的文件。
5、数字证书应用
数字证书应用，是指“与数字证书相关的应用”，其可以是“生成数字证书用的密钥对”、可以是“下载建立数字证书”、也可以是“更新数字证书”，等。
6、电子签名
1)电子签名，也称数字签名，是指数据电文中以电子形式所含、所附用于识别签名人身份并表明签名人认可其中内容的数据。例如：发送者先将报文按约定的HASH算法计算得到一个报文摘要(又称：HASH摘要)；再将该报文摘要用发送者的私有密钥和非对称加密算法加密，得到的密文，就叫“该发送者对该报文的电子签名”。电子签名需与原报文绑定使用，一起发送给接收者。
2)电子签名制作数据，是指在电子签名过程中使用的，将电子签名与电子签名人可靠地联系起来的字符、编码等数据。
3)电子签名验证数据，是指用于验证电子签名的数据，包括代码、口令、算法或者公钥等。
4)电子签名的验证方法，是在数字证书中记载并说明的。
7、CA，是Certification Authority的缩写，中文含义：认证机构；其是采用公开密钥基础技术，专门提供网络身份认证服务，负责认证、签发和管理数字证书，且具有权威性和公正性的第三方信任机构。通常又叫做数字证书认证中心。
8、下载建立，是指在计算机的存储器中下载存储并应用。
9、ID数据，ID是identification的缩写,ID数据是指:识别数据。
发明内容
本发明的基本构思是：改进现有TEE系统，提高TEE系统的安全等级；使“改进的TEE系统可与SE电子签名模块相匹配，并协同构成一种新型的电子签名系统”；包括：(1)改进TEE系统信任根；将“现有TEE系统信任根中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、需要更新的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hsah值)”从系统ROM存储器中移出、存储到“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块中，并按安全规范的要求定期更新(如：更新验签用的公钥)；(2)改进TEE系统的验签流程；通过应用SE电子签名模块及SE电子签名模块中的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的、需要更新的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hsah值)”进行验签，提高以“链式验签方式”建立的TEE系统的可靠性；(3)改进“现有TEE系统始终是由系统厂商(如：手机厂商)专管专控、无第三方认证监督”的问题；使“用于电子签名应用的TEE系统”可由“权威第三方(如CA)”验证和管控，提高“用于电子签名应用的TEE系统”的可靠性；(4)同时，“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”也做相应的改进。
本发明提供的一种“包括TEE的系统”及其电子签名系统，其在总的构思下可有多种不 同的方案；为完整描述在本发明总的构思下的各种不同的方案，下面按层次化模块化结构，描述本发明的各种不同方案。
[根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]　
1、本发明提供的一种“包括TEE的系统”，其包括REE(富执行环境)系统和TEE(可信执行环境)系统；其特征在于：其包含的TEE系统信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、需要更新或新建的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)”；
其特征还在于：其TEE系统是基于所述TEE系统信任根、从系统ROM存储器固件程序开始、以“链式验签方式”建立的TEE系统；
其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证和建立；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其认证方的电子签名；
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”的电子签名进行验证；
(3)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的软件模块”；
(4)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
2、如上述1所述的系统，其特征还在于：其TEE系统的信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”；
其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证和建立；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”；
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进 行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“要加载建立的TEE模块”的“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”分别进行验证；
(3)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证有一个不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”；
(4)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证都通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
[根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]　
3、如上述1或2所述的系统，其特征还在于：其TEE系统是系统复位后按“预定验证类型”自动建立的初始TEE系统；同时，其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于按“预定验证类型”加载“预定验证类型的加载模块”，并根据“加载模块的验证类型”与SE电子签名模块通信协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证所述‘预定验证类型的加载模块’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)”对所述“预定验证类型的加载模块”进行验证；建立“‘预定验证类型’的所述TEE系统”；
其中，“预定验证类型”包括两大类，即：“由权威第三方(如CA)验证的验证类型”和“由‘非权威第三方的认证方’验证的验证类型”；
其中，“‘预定验证类型’的所述TEE系统”也包括两大类，即：“经权威第三方(如:CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”和“经‘非权威第三方的认证方(如：手机厂商)’验证的其它TEE系统”；
[根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]　
其中，所述“经权威第三方(如:CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”，是指：所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，在权威第三方(如:CA)认证的TEE信任根基础上，按协议和流程，应用包括“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)’”在内的验证数据，对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行验证，并在验证通过后启动执行建立的TEE系统；
其特征还在于：当所述“预定验证类型”是“由权威第三方(如CA)验证的验证类型”时，其包括下面步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按约定和流程获得“所述预定验证类型的加载模块”；
[根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]　
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘所述预定验证类型的加载模块’的‘权威第三方(如CA)’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)’”对“所述预定验证类型的加载模块”进行验证；
(3)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行“所述预定验证类型的加载模块”；
(4)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步；
其特征还在于：当所述“预定验证类型”是“由‘非权威第三方的认证方(如：手机厂商)’验证的验证类型”时，其包括下面步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按约定和流程获得“所述预定验证类型的加载模块”；
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘所述预定验证类型的加载模块’的‘非权威第三方的认证方(如：手机厂商)’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hsah值)’”对“所述预定验证类型的加载模块”进行验证；
(3)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行“所述预定验证类型的加载模块”；
(4)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
4、如上述1或2所述的系统，其特征还在于：其TEE系统是系统复位后自动建立的初始TEE系统；并且该初始TEE系统是“经权威第三方(如:CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”；
其特征还在于：其TEE系统的信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hsah值)’”；
其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证和建立；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程获得“要加载建立的软件模块”；
[根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]　
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)’”对该“要加载建立的软件模块”进行验证；
(3)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的软件模块”；
(4)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步；
其特征还在于：所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，还用于管理验证“在该TEE系统(即STEE)建立后，用户后续选择的加载模块”，使“该TEE系统(即STEE)”可按用户选择继续加载执行“‘非权威第三方的其它认证方(如：手机厂商)’验证的加载模块”，成为新的“其它TEE系统”；其特征是包括下面步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，接收到“用户选择的加载执行‘非权威第三方的其它认证方(如：手机厂商)’验证的加载模块”的请求；
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按约定和流程获得“要加载建立的加载模块”；
[根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]　
(3)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘非权威第三方的其它认证方(手机厂商)’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)’”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”进行验证；
(4)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”；
(5)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
5、本发明提供一种电子签名系统，是“应用于所述‘包括TEE的系统’中的一种电子签名系统”，其特征在于：其包括有：所述系统的“用于电子签名应用的TEE系统”、及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的‘SE电子签名模块’”；
[根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]　
其中，所述“用于电子签名应用的TEE系统”，其特征在于：其信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、需要更新或新建的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)”；
其特征还在于：其是基于所述“用于电子签名应用的TEE系统”的信任根、从系统ROM存储器固件程序开始、以“链式验签方式”建立的TEE系统；该TEE系统与“与其相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”相互协作，共同完成电子签名应用的任务；
其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其认证方的电子签名；
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”的电子签名进行验证；
(3)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的软件模块”；
(4)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
[根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]　
其中，所述“SE电子签名模块”，其特征在于：其包括有：“所述TEE系统信任根中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、需要更新或新建的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)”；
其特征还在于：该SE电子签名模块包括有“协助TEE建立管理模块”，用于应用“所述SE电子签名模块中用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”，协助“所述TEE系统的‘TEE加载建立管理模块’”对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其认证方的电子签名；
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块及其‘协助TEE建立管理模块’”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”的电子签名进行验证；
(3)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的软件模块”；
(4)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
6、如上述5所述的电子签名系统，其特征还在于：其是“应用于所述‘包括TEE的系统’中的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的一种电子签名系统”；其包括有：所述系统的“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”、及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”；
其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”，其特征在于：其信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”；
其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；使所述TEE系统只有在通过“权威第三方(如:CA)”的验证才可能被建立；其特征是包括下面步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名；
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”的“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”进行验证；
(3)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”的验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”；
(4)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”的验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步；
其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”，其特征在于：其包括有“所述‘用于电子签名应用的TEE系统’信任根中的、“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”；
其特征还在于：该SE电子签名模块包括有“协助TEE建立管理模块”，用于应用“所述SE电子签名模块中用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”，协助“所述TEE系统的‘TEE加载建立管理模块’”对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其 “权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”；
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块及其‘协助TEE建立管理模块’”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”的“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”进行验证；
(3)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”的验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”；
(4)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”的验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
7、如上述5或6所述的电子签名系统，其特征还在于：其是“应用于所述‘包括TEE的系统’中的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的一种电子签名系统”；其包括有：所述系统的“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”、及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”；
其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”，其特征在于：其信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”；
其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；使所述TEE系统只有在通过“权威第三方(如:CA)和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)”的双重验证才可能被建立；其特征是包括下面步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”；
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”的“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”分别进行验证；
(3)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名” 的验证有一个不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”；
(4)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证都通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步；
其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”，其特征在于：其包括有“所述‘用于电子签名应用的TEE系统’信任根中的、“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”；
其特征还在于：该SE电子签名模块包括有“协助TEE建立管理模块”，用于应用“所述SE电子签名模块中用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”，协助“所述TEE系统的‘TEE加载建立管理模块’”对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程获得“要加载建立的软件模块”及其“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”；
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块及其‘协助TEE建立管理模块’”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“要加载建立的软件模块”的“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”分别进行验证；
(3)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证有一个不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的软件模块”；
(4)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证都通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
8、如上述5或6或7所述的电子签名系统，其特征还在于：其是“应用于所述‘包括TEE的系统’中的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的一种电子签名系统”；其包括有：所述系统的“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”、 及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”；
其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”，其特征还在于：其包括有“SE系统管理模块”和“权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”，用于管理在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“需有权威第三方(如:CA)验证才可能建立的数字证书应用”；其特征是包括下面步骤：
(1)该“SE电子签名模块”接收到“‘在该SE电子签名模块中建立数字证书应用的请求’、‘按协议要认证的信息数据’及权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”；
(2)该“SE电子签名模块”的“SE系统管理模块”，按协议、按数字证书中验证电子签名的方法，应用存储在该“SE电子签名模块”中的“权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”进行验证；
(3)若验证不通过，则该“SE系统管理模块”，不允许在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“该请求的数字证书应用”；
其中,CA是负责认证、签发和管理数字证书的第三方权威机构；CA是通过CA计算机认证管理系统管理签发用户数字证书；
其中，“数字证书应用”是指与数字证书相关的应用，其可以是“生成数字证书用的密钥对”，可以是“下载建立数字证书”，也可以是“更新数字证书”，等。
9、如上述5或6或7或8所述的电子签名系统，其特征还在于：其是“应用于所述‘包括TEE的系统’中的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的一种电子签名系统”；其包括有：所述系统的“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”、及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”；
其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”，其特征还在于：：其包括有“SE系统管理模块”、“权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”和“系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”，用于管理在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“需有权威第三方(如:CA)和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)双重认证才可能建立的数字证书应用”；其特征是包括下面步骤：
(1)该“SE电子签名模块”接收到“‘在该SE电子签名模块中建立数字证书应用的请求’、‘按协议要认证的信息数据’及权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名、及系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”；
(2)该“SE电子签名模块”的“SE系统管理模块”，按协议、按数字证书中验证电子 签名的方法，应用存储在该“SE电子签名模块子系统”中的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”分别进行验证；
[根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]　
(3)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证有一个不通过，则该“SE系统管理模块”，不允许在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“该请求的数字证书应用”；
(4)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证都通过，则该“SE系统管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
10、如上述5或6或7或8或9所述的电子签名系统，其特征还在于：其是“应用于所述‘包括TEE的系统’中的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的一种电子签名系统”；其包括有：所述系统的“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”、及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”；
其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”，其特征还在于：：其包括有“SE系统管理模块”、“根CA的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”和“系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”，用于管理在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“需有根CA和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)双重认证才可能建立的数字证书应用”；其特征是包括下面步骤：
(1)该“SE电子签名模块”接收到“‘在该SE电子签名模块中建立数字证书应用的请求’、‘按协议要认证的信息数据’及根CA的电子签名、及系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”；
(2)该“SE电子签名模块”的“SE系统管理模块”，按协议、按数字证书中验证电子签名的方法，应用存储在该“SE电子签名模块”中的‘根CA的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“根CA的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”分别进行验证；
[根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]　
(3)若对“根CA的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证有一个不通过，则该“SE系统管理模块”，不允许在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“该请求的数字证书应用”；
[根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]　
(4)若对“根CA的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证都通过， 则该“SE系统管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
其中，根CA，是向运营CA签发数字证书的权威认证机构；例如：国家根CA，是向运营CA签发数字证书的国家权威认证机构；国家根CA的数字证书是根数字证书，是国家根CA给自己颁发的数字证书；国家根CA和国家根CA的数字证书，是以数字证书为基础的国家级信任链的起始点；
其中，运营CA，是由根CA(如：国家根CA)认证、可向CA外的具体个人及法人签发并管理数字证书的第三方权威认证机构。
有益效果：
本发明解决了现有TEE系统信任根存储在系统ROM存储器中无法更新的问题，使TEE系统的信任根及其TEE系统更可靠更安全；同时，解决了“现有TEE系统始终是由系统厂商(如：手机厂商)专管专控、无第三方认证监督”的问题，使“用于电子签名应用的TEE系统”可由“权威第三方(如CA)和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)”共同验证和管控，提高了“用于电子签名应用的TEE系统”的可靠性；同时，本发明提供了一种由“所述‘包括TEE的系统’的‘用于电子签名应用的TEE系统’和‘与所述TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块’”共同构成的新型的电子签名系统；该新型的电子签名系统完整可靠、并便于集成于所述“包括TEE的系统”(如：手机系统)中，是一种性价比更好和更可靠更实用的电子签名系统。
附图说明
图1是现有“包括TEE的系统”的TEE系统信任根的结构示意图；其中，TEE系统信任根的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的验证数据”都存储在系统ROM模块中；
图2是现有用于所述“包括TEE的系统”中的电子签名系统的结构示意图；其中，“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的‘系统厂商的验证数据’”都存储在系统ROM模块中；其TEE系统由系统厂商专管专控；
图3是本发明的“包括TEE的系统”的TEE系统信任根的结构示意图；其中，TEE系统信任根的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的、需要更新或新建的验证数据”存储SE电子签名模块中；
图4是本发明的用于所述“包括TEE的系统”中的电子签名系统的结构示意图；其中，TEE系统信任根的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的、权威第三方的验证数据和系统厂商的验证数据”存储SE电子签名模块中；其TEE系统由权威第三方和系统厂商共同管控。
具体实施方式
下面结合附图给出具体实施例，对本发明的总体构思和具体技术方案作进一步的详细描述：
实施例1:一种手机系统及其电子签名系统
本发明实施例1提供的一种手机系统，其SOC主芯片是华为的麒麟980芯片，该芯片集成有TEE系统专用的SE安全芯片模块；该手机系统包括有REE系统、TEE系统和“基于该SE安全芯片模块的SE电子签名模块”；
其特征在于：该手机系统的TEE系统的信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、“启动建立TEE系统的ROM模块”、及“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及“存储在该SE电子签名模块中的、可更新的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的、‘权威第三方CA电子签名的验证数据’和‘该手机厂商电子签名的验证数据’”；
其特征还在于：其“TEE系统复位后自动建立的初始TEE系统”是“经权威第三方CA认证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”；其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；使所述TEE系统只有在通过“权威第三方CA和该手机厂商”的双重验证才可能被建立；其特征是包括下面步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其“权威第三方CA的电子签名和该手机厂商的电子签名”；
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程计算出“所述‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’”的Hash值；并按协议与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信，将“所述‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的Hash值、及所述权威第三方CA的电子签名和该手机厂商的电子签名”发给“所述SE电子签名模块及其‘协助TEE建立管理模块’”；
(3)“所述SE电子签名模块及其‘协助TEE建立管理模块’”，按协议，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的权威第三方CA电子签名的验证数据和该手机厂商电子签名的验证数据”，对“所述‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的权威第三方CA的电子签名和该手机厂商的电子签名”分别进行验证；
其验证电子签名方法是：
1)“所述SE电子签名模块及其‘协助TEE建立管理模块’”，按协议，接收到“所述‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’Hash值(简记为A)和所述‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的电子签名”；
2)“所述SE电子签名模块及其‘协助TEE建立管理模块’”，按协议，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”，对接收到的“所述‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的电子签名”进行解密，得到“所述‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的正确Hash值(简记为B)”；
3)“所述SE电子签名模块及其‘协助TEE建立管理模块’”，将数据B与数据A进行比较；
4)若数据A与数据B一致，则验证通过；若数据A与数据B不一致，则验证不通过；
(4)“所述SE电子签名模块及其‘协助TEE建立管理模块’”，按协议，将“对‘权威第三方CA的电子签名和该手机厂商的电子签名’的验证结果”反馈给所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”；
(5)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议，接收到“所述的验证结果”；
(6)若对“权威第三方CA的电子签名和该手机厂商的电子签名”的验证有一个不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”；
(7)若对“权威第三方CA的电子签名和该手机系统的电子签名”的验证都通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，启动执行该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”。
本实施例1提供的一种电子签名系统，其特征在于：其是“应用于所述手机系统中的、经过权威第三方CA验证的一种电子签名系统”；其包括有：所述手机系统的“经过权威第三方CA验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”、及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的、经过权威第三方CA验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”；
其中，所述“经过权威第三方CA验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”，其特征在于：其信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的、‘权威第三方CA的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘该手机厂商的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”；
其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；使所述TEE系统只有在通过“权威第三方CA和该手机厂商”的双重验证才可能被建立；其特征是包括下面步骤：
(1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其“权威第三方CA的电子签名和该手机厂商的电子签名”；
(2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的‘权威第三方CA的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘该手机厂商的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”的“权威第三方CA的电子签名和该手机厂商的电子签名”分别进行验证；
(3)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证有一个不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”；
(4)若对“权威第三方CA的电子签名和该手机厂商的电子签名”的验证都通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，启动执行该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”。
其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”，其特征在于：其包括有“所述‘用于电子签名应用的TEE系统’信任根中的、“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、‘权威第三方CA的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘该手机厂商的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”；
其特征还在于：该SE电子签名模块包括有“协助TEE建立管理模块”，用于应用“所述SE电子签名模块中用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方CA的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘该手机厂商的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”，协助“所述TEE系统的‘TEE加载建立管理模块’”对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；
其特征还在于：该SE电子签名模块，包括有“SE系统管理模块”和“权威第三方CA的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”，用于管理在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“需有权威第三方CA验证才可能建立的数字证书应用”；其特征是包括下面步骤：
(1)该“SE电子签名模块”接收到“‘在该SE电子签名模块中建立数字证书应用的请求’、‘按协议要认证的信息数据’及权威第三方CA的电子签名”；
(2)该“SE电子签名模块”的“SE系统管理模块”，按协议、按数字证书中验证电子签名的方法，应用存储在该“SE电子签名模块”中的“权威第三方CA的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”对“权威第三方CA的电子签名”进行验证；
(3)若验证不通过，则该“SE系统管理模块”，不允许在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“该请求的数字证书应用”；
(4)若验证通过，则该“SE系统管理模块”，在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“该请求 的数字证书应用”。
以上所述仅为本申请的一个较佳实施例，并不用以限制本申请；凡在本申请的精神和原则之内所做的任何修改、等同替换、改进等，均应包含在本申请保护的范围之内。

Claims (10)

  1. [根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]
    本发明提供的一种“包括TEE的系统”，其包括REE(富执行环境)系统和TEE(可信执行环境)系统；其特征在于：其包含的TEE系统信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、需要更新或新建的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)”；
    其特征还在于：其TEE系统是基于所述TEE系统信任根、从系统ROM存储器固件程序开始、以“链式验签方式”建立的TEE系统；
    其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证和建立；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
    (1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其认证方的电子签名；
    (2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”的电子签名进行验证；
    (3)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的软件模块”；
    (4)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
  2. 如权利要求1所述的系统，其特征还在于：其TEE系统的信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”；
    其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证和建立；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
    (1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”；
    (2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证 数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“要加载建立的TEE模块”的“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”分别进行验证；
    (3)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证有一个不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”；
    (4)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证都通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
  3. [根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]
    如权利要求1或2所述的系统，其特征还在于：其TEE系统是系统复位后按“预定验证类型”自动建立的初始TEE系统；同时，其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于按“预定验证类型”加载“预定验证类型的加载模块”，并根据“加载模块的验证类型”与SE电子签名模块通信协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证所述‘预定验证类型的加载模块’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hsah值)”对所述“预定验证类型的加载模块”进行验证；建立“‘预定验证类型’的所述TEE系统”；
    其中，“预定验证类型”包括两大类，即：“由权威第三方(如CA)验证的验证类型”和“由‘非权威第三方的认证方’验证的验证类型”；
    其中，“‘预定验证类型’的所述TEE系统”也包括两大类，即：“经权威第三方(如:CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”和“经‘非权威第三方的认证方(如：手机厂商)’验证的其它TEE系统”；
    其中，所述“经权威第三方(如:CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”，是指：所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，在权威第三方(如:CA)认证的TEE信任根基础上，按协议和流程，应用包括“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)’”在内的验证数据，对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行验证，并在验证通过后启动执行建立的TEE系统；
    其特征还在于：当所述“预定验证类型”是“由权威第三方(如CA)验证的验证类型”时，其包括下面步骤：
    (1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按约定和流程获得“所述预定验证类型的加载模块”；
    (2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘所述预定验证类型的加载模块’ 的‘权威第三方(如CA)’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)’”对“所述预定验证类型的加载模块”进行验证；
    (3)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行“所述预定验证类型的加载模块”；
    (4)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步；
    其特征还在于：当所述“预定验证类型”是“由‘非权威第三方的认证方(如：手机厂商)’验证的验证类型”时，其包括下面步骤：
    (1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按约定和流程获得“所述预定验证类型的加载模块”；
    (2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘所述预定验证类型的加载模块’的‘非权威第三方的认证方(如：手机厂商)’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)’”对“所述预定验证类型的加载模块”进行验证；
    (3)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行“所述预定验证类型的加载模块”；
    (4)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
  4. [根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]
    如权利要求1或2所述的系统，其特征还在于：其TEE系统是系统复位后自动建立的初始TEE系统；并且该初始TEE系统是“经权威第三方(如:CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”；
    其特征还在于：其TEE系统的信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)’”；
    其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证和建立；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
    (1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程获得“要加载建立的软件模块”；
    (2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hsah值)’”对该“要加载建立的 软件模块”进行验证；
    (3)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的软件模块”；
    (4)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步；
    其特征还在于：所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，还用于管理验证“在该TEE系统(即STEE)建立后，用户后续选择的加载模块”，使“该TEE系统(即STEE)”可按用户选择继续加载执行“‘非权威第三方的其它认证方(如：手机厂商)’验证的加载模块”，成为新的“其它TEE系统”；其特征是包括下面步骤：
    (1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，接收到“用户选择的加载执行‘非权威第三方的其它认证方(如：手机厂商)’验证的加载模块”的请求；
    (2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按约定和流程获得“要加载建立的加载模块”；
    (3)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘非权威第三方的其它认证方(手机厂商)’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hsah值)’”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”进行验证；
    (4)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”；
    (5)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
  5. [根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]
    本发明提供一种电子签名系统，是“应用于所述‘包括TEE的系统’中的一种电子签名系统”，其特征在于：其包括有：所述系统的“用于电子签名应用的TEE系统”、及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的‘SE电子签名模块’”；
    其中，所述“用于电子签名应用的TEE系统”，其特征在于：其信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、需要更新或新建的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hsah值)”；
    其特征还在于：其是基于所述“用于电子签名应用的TEE系统”的信任根、从系统ROM存储器固件程序开始、以“链式验签方式”建立的TEE系统；该TEE系统与“与其相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”相互协作，共同完成电子签名应用的任务；
    其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
    (1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其认证方的电子签名；
    (2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”的电子签名进行验证；
    (3)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的软件模块”；
    (4)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
    其中，所述“SE电子签名模块”，其特征在于：其包括有：“所述TEE系统信任根中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、需要更新或新建的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥和Hash值)”；
    其特征还在于：该SE电子签名模块包括有“协助TEE建立管理模块”，用于应用“所述SE电子签名模块中用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”，协助“所述TEE系统的‘TEE加载建立管理模块’”对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
    (1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其认证方的电子签名；
    (2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块及其‘协助TEE建立管理模块’”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”的电子签名进行验证；
    (3)若验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的软件模块”；
    (4)若验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
  6. 如权利要求5所述的电子签名系统，其特征还在于：其是“应用于所述‘包括TEE的系统’中的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的一种电子签名系统”；其包括有：所述系统的“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”、及“与 所述TEE系统相连接通信的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”；
    其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”，其特征在于：其信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”；
    其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；使所述TEE系统只有在通过“权威第三方(如:CA)”的验证才可能被建立；其特征是包括下面步骤：
    (1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名；
    (2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE软件模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”的“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”进行验证；
    (3)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”的验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”；
    (4)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”的验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步；
    其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”，其特征在于：其包括有“所述‘用于电子签名应用的TEE系统’信任根中的、“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”；
    其特征还在于：该SE电子签名模块包括有“协助TEE建立管理模块”，用于应用“所述SE电子签名模块中用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”，协助“所述TEE系统的‘TEE加载建立管理模块’”对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
    (1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程获得“要加载建立的软件模块”及其“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”；
    (2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块及其‘协助TEE建立管理模块’”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证 ‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“要加载建立的软件模块”的“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”进行验证；
    (3)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”的验证不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的软件模块”；
    (4)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”的验证通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
  7. 如权利要求5或6所述的电子签名系统，其特征还在于：其是“应用于所述‘包括TEE的系统’中的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的一种电子签名系统”；其包括有：所述系统的“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”、及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”；
    其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”，其特征在于：其信任根包括有：TEE硬件系统、系统ROM存储器固件程序、及“与TEE系统相连接通信的SE电子签名模块”、及在该SE电子签名模块中存储的“要加载建立的TEE模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”；
    其特征还在于：其包括有“TEE加载建立管理模块”，用于对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；使所述TEE系统只有在通过“权威第三方(如:CA)和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)”的双重验证才可能被建立；其特征是包括下面步骤：
    (1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程获得“要加载建立的软件模块”及其“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”；
    (2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“要加载建立的软件模块”的“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”分别进行验证；
    (3)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证有一个不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的软件模块”；
    (4)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名” 的验证都通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步；
    其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”，其特征在于：其包括有“所述‘用于电子签名应用的TEE系统’信任根中的、“用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的、‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”；
    其特征还在于：该SE电子签名模块包括有“协助TEE建立管理模块”，用于应用“所述SE电子签名模块中用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”，协助“所述TEE系统的‘TEE加载建立管理模块’”对“要加载建立的TEE模块”进行管理验证；其特征是包括下面的步骤：
    (1)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程获得“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”及其“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”；
    (2)所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按协议和流程，与“所述SE电子签名模块及其‘协助TEE建立管理模块’”进行通信并协作，应用“所述SE电子签名模块中的、用于验证‘要加载建立的TEE模块’的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”的“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”分别进行验证；
    (3)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证有一个不通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，拒绝启动执行该“要加载建立的TEE软件模块”；
    (4)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证都通过，则所述“TEE加载建立管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
  8. 如权利要求5或6或7所述的电子签名系统，其特征还在于：其是“应用于所述‘包括TEE的系统’中的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的一种电子签名系统”；其包括有：所述系统的“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”、及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”；
    其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”，其特征还在于：其包括有“SE系统管理模块”和“权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”，用于管理在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“需有权威第三方(如:CA)验证才可能建立的数字 证书应用”；其特征是包括下面步骤：
    (1)该“SE电子签名模块”接收到“‘在该SE电子签名模块中建立数字证书应用的请求’、‘按协议要认证的信息数据’及权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”；
    (2)该“SE电子签名模块”的“SE系统管理模块”，按协议、按数字证书中验证电子签名的方法，应用存储在该“SE电子签名模块”中的“权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名”进行验证；
    (3)若验证不通过，则该“SE系统管理模块”，不允许在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“该请求的数字证书应用”；
    其中,CA是负责认证、签发和管理数字证书的第三方权威机构；CA是通过CA计算机认证管理系统管理签发用户数字证书；
    其中，“数字证书应用”是指与数字证书相关的应用，其可以是“生成数字证书用的密钥对”，可以是“下载建立数字证书”，也可以是“更新数字证书”，等。
  9. [根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]
    如权利要求5或6或7或8所述的电子签名系统，其特征还在于：其是“应用于所述‘包括TEE的系统’中的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的一种电子签名系统”；其包括有：所述系统的“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”、及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”；
    其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”，其特征还在于：：其包括有“SE系统管理模块”、“权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”和“系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”，用于管理在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“需有权威第三方(如:CA)和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)双重认证才可能建立的数字证书应用”；其特征是包括下面步骤：
    (1)该“SE电子签名模块”接收到“‘在该SE电子签名模块中建立数字证书应用的请求’、‘按协议要认证的信息数据’及权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名、及系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”；
    (2)该“SE电子签名模块”的“SE系统管理模块”，按协议、按数字证书中验证电子签名的方法，应用存储在该“SE电子签名模块子系统”中的‘权威第三方(如:CA)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”分别进行验证；
    (3)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证有一个不通过，则该“SE系统管理模块”，不允许在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“该请求的数字证书应用”；
    (4)若对“权威第三方(如:CA)的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证都通过，则该“SE系统管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
  10. [根据细则91更正 17.05.2019]
    如权利要求5或6或7或8或9所述的电子签名系统，其特征还在于：其是“应用于所述‘包括TEE的系统’中的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的一种电子签名系统”；其包括有：所述系统的“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的、用于电子签名应用的TEE系统(简称STEE)”、及“与所述TEE系统相连接通信的、经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”；
    其中，所述“经过权威第三方(如CA)验证的‘SE电子签名模块’”，其特征还在于：：其包括有“SE系统管理模块”、“根CA的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”和“系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)”，用于管理在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“需有根CA和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)双重认证才可能建立的数字证书应用”；其特征是包括下面步骤：
    (1)该“SE电子签名模块”接收到“‘在该SE电子签名模块中建立数字证书应用的请求’、‘按协议要认证的信息数据’及根CA的电子签名、及系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”；
    (2)该“SE电子签名模块”的“SE系统管理模块”，按协议、按数字证书中验证电子签名的方法，应用存储在该“SE电子签名模块”中的‘根CA的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’和‘系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的验证数据(如：验签用的公钥)’”对该“根CA的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”分别进行验证；
    (3)若对“根CA的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证有一个不通过，则该“SE系统管理模块”，不允许在该“SE电子签名模块”中建立“该请求的数字证书应用”；
    (4)若对“根CA的电子签名和系统厂商(如：手机厂商)的电子签名”的验证都通过，则该“SE系统管理模块”，按流程，继续执行下一步。
    其中，根CA，是向运营CA签发数字证书的权威认证机构；例如：国家根CA，是向运营CA签发数字证书的国家权威认证机构；国家根CA的数字证书是根数字证书，是国家根CA给自己颁发的数字证书；国家根CA和国家根CA的数字证书，是以数字证书为基础的国家级信 任链的起始点；
    其中，运营CA，是由根CA(如：国家根CA)认证、可向CA外的具体个人及法人签发并管理数字证书的第三方权威认证机构。
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