WO2019178755A1 - 一种完整性验证方法、网络设备、ue及计算机存储介质 - Google Patents

一种完整性验证方法、网络设备、ue及计算机存储介质 Download PDF

Info

Publication number
WO2019178755A1
WO2019178755A1 PCT/CN2018/079684 CN2018079684W WO2019178755A1 WO 2019178755 A1 WO2019178755 A1 WO 2019178755A1 CN 2018079684 W CN2018079684 W CN 2018079684W WO 2019178755 A1 WO2019178755 A1 WO 2019178755A1
Authority
WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
integrity protection
network device
configuration information
ssb
protection verification
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/CN2018/079684
Other languages
English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
杨宁
Original Assignee
Oppo广东移动通信有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Oppo广东移动通信有限公司 filed Critical Oppo广东移动通信有限公司
Priority to PCT/CN2018/079684 priority Critical patent/WO2019178755A1/zh
Priority to CN201880002951.9A priority patent/CN109644354B/zh
Publication of WO2019178755A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019178755A1/zh

Links

Images

Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W24/00—Supervisory, monitoring or testing arrangements
    • H04W24/02—Arrangements for optimising operational condition
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/10—Connection setup
    • H04W76/19—Connection re-establishment
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/20—Manipulation of established connections
    • H04W76/27—Transitions between radio resource control [RRC] states

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of information processing technologies, and in particular, to an integrity verification method, a network device, a user equipment (UE), and a computer storage medium.
  • UE user equipment
  • the network side configures the paging area of the RAN for the UE.
  • the UE moves within the paging area, the UE does not need to notify the network side, and follows the mobility behavior under the idle, that is, the cell selection reselection principle.
  • the UE moves out of the paging area configured by the RAN, the UE is triggered to resume the RRC connection and re-acquire the paging area configured by the RAN.
  • the integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request recovery request message is performed at the original base station, such as shown in FIG. 1, that is, the ShortMAC-I and the UE in the RRC Resume request message that the serving base station will receive.
  • the context identification information is sent to the base station, and the original base station performs integrity protection verification. If the integrity protection verification is passed, the original base station forwards the AS context of the UE to the serving base station, so that the serving base station can restore the context of the UE and restore the RRC connection.
  • the integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message fails, the original base station does not send the security context, but the signaling of the Xn interface still exists.
  • the base station will continuously try to obtain the security context of the fake UE, so that the network consumes too much resources to deal with meaningless processing, and even causes Network ⁇ .
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides an integrity verification method, a network device, a user equipment (UE), and a computer storage medium.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides an integrity verification method, which is applied to a first network device, where the method includes:
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides an integrity verification method, which is applied to a second network device, where the method includes:
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides an integrity verification method, which is applied to a UE, where the method includes:
  • the embodiment of the invention provides a first network device, including:
  • a first communication unit configured to verify integrity protection verification configuration information of the RRC recovery request message initiated by the user equipment UE;
  • the first processing unit performs integrity protection verification on the RRC recovery request message sent by the UE, based on the configuration information of the integrity protection verification.
  • the embodiment of the invention provides a second network device, including:
  • a second processing unit when serving as the original serving base station of the UE and saving the context of the UE, sending, by the second communication unit, the RRC initiated by the UE to verify the UE, before releasing the UE to enter the inactive state Restore the integrity information of the request message to verify the configuration information;
  • the second communication unit sends the integrity protection verification configuration information to the first network device.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a UE, including:
  • the third communication unit sends an RRC recovery request message to the first network device.
  • a network device provided by an embodiment of the present invention includes: a processor and a memory for storing a computer program capable of running on a processor,
  • processor is configured to perform the steps of the foregoing method when the computer program is run.
  • a UE provided by an embodiment of the present invention includes: a processor and a memory for storing a computer program capable of running on the processor,
  • processor is configured to perform the steps of the foregoing method when the computer program is run.
  • a computer storage medium is provided by the embodiment of the present invention.
  • the computer storage medium stores computer executable instructions, and the foregoing method steps are implemented when the computer executable instructions are executed.
  • the technical solution of the embodiment of the present invention can enable the first network device to perform integrity protection verification by pre-configuring the configuration information of the RRC connection recovery request message integrity protection verification; thus, the first network device, especially the service, can be reduced.
  • the data transmission caused by the signaling interaction between the base station and the anchor base station in particular, can avoid the scenario where the fake UE attacks the network in the system.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a processing flow of an RRC recovery connection
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a network structure
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic flowchart 1 of an integrity verification method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart 2 of an integrity verification method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic flowchart 3 of an integrity verification method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic flowchart 4 of an integrity verification method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic structural diagram of a first network device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of a second network device according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic structural diagram of a UE according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of a hardware architecture according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • a communication system in which a UE according to the present invention communicates with a network device is described with reference to FIG.
  • Such communication systems may use different air interfaces and/or physical layers.
  • air interfaces used by communication systems include, for example, Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA), Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) (in particular, Long Term Evolution (LTE)). ), Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), etc.
  • FDMA Frequency Division Multiple Access
  • TDMA Time Division Multiple Access
  • CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
  • UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • GSM Global System for Mobile Communications
  • the following description relates to a CDMA communication system, but such teachings are equally applicable to other types of systems.
  • the CDMA wireless communication system may include a plurality of UEs 100, a plurality of network devices such as a base station (BS) 270, a base station controller (BSC) 275, and a mobile switching center (MSC) 280, and the like in the figure.
  • the MSC 280 is configured to interface with a public switched telephone network (PSTN) 290.
  • PSTN public switched telephone network
  • the MSC 280 is also configured to interface with a BSC 275 that can be coupled to the base station 270 via a backhaul line.
  • the backhaul line can be constructed in accordance with any of a number of well known interfaces including, for example, E1/T1, ATM, IP, PPP, Frame Relay, HDSL, ADSL, or xDSL. It will be appreciated that the system as shown in FIG. 2 may include multiple BSC 2750s.
  • BS 270 receives reverse link signals from various UEs 100.
  • UE 100 typically participates in calls, messaging, and other types of communications.
  • Each reverse link signal received by a particular base station 270 is processed within a particular BS 270.
  • the obtained data is forwarded to the relevant BSC 275.
  • the BSC provides call resource allocation and coordinated mobility management functions including a soft handoff procedure between the BSs 270.
  • the BSC 275 also routes the received data to the MSC 280, which provides additional routing services for interfacing with the PSTN 290.
  • PSTN 290 interfaces with MSC 280, which forms an interface with BSC 275, and BSC 275 controls BS 270 accordingly to transmit forward link signals to UE 100.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides an integrity verification method, which is applied to a first network device, as shown in FIG. 3, and includes:
  • Step 301 Configure integrity protection verification configuration information for verifying an RRC recovery request message initiated by a user equipment (UE).
  • UE user equipment
  • Step 302 Perform integrity protection verification on the RRC recovery request message sent by the UE, based on the configuration information of the integrity protection verification.
  • the first network device in this embodiment may be a base station that currently provides services for the UE.
  • the first network device may also obtain the integrity protection verification configuration information sent by a serving base station (second network device) before the UE, which includes:
  • the second network device Receiving, by the second network device, integrity protection verification configuration information about verifying the UE initiated RRC recovery request message; wherein the second network device is an original serving base station serving the UE, and when the second network Before releasing the UE to enter the inactive state, the device sends, to the first network device, integrity protection verification configuration information for verifying the RRC recovery request message initiated by the UE.
  • the following processing is also performed on the second network device side: before transmitting the configuration information (that is, before transmitting the integrity protection verification configuration information about verifying the RRC Resume request message initiated by the UE to the neighbor base station), the second network The device calculates a corresponding KgNB* (key) and a corresponding shortMAC-I according to the frequency domain SSB configuration information of the neighboring cell.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes at least one of the following: at least one short MAC-I, and a UE context identifier I-RNTI.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes ShortMAC-I corresponding to each SSB and corresponding SSB identification information.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information further includes: identifier information of the SSB corresponding to the at least one SSB included in the frequency domain range of the target cell managed by the first network device; And, the at least one short MAC-I corresponds to the identification information of the at least one SSB.
  • the foregoing network side completes the configuration process, and then the UE performs an RRC recovery request.
  • the UE updates the key according to the ARFCN and PCI information of the current SSB and calculates ShortMAC-I.
  • the first network device side performs integrity protection verification on the RRC recovery request message sent by the UE, according to the configuration information of the integrity protection verification, and further includes:
  • the anchor base station corresponding to the UE When the integrity protection verification configuration information corresponding to the UE does not exist, the anchor base station corresponding to the UE is addressed, so that the anchor base station performs integrity protection verification on the RRC recovery request message.
  • the UE initiates an RRC Resume request message to a certain base station. If the base station has the integrity protection verification configuration information corresponding to the UE, the integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message is performed. Otherwise, the anchor gNB is addressed, and the anchor gNB performs the integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message.
  • the current base station can perform integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message, if the verification is successful, the target base station is addressed, and the UE context is requested, otherwise the UE is directly rejected.
  • FIG. 4 illustrates that the anchor base station may be the source base station to which the UE is connected, and the T-gNB may be understood as the current serving base station of the UE; the anchor base station and the serving base station may obtain through the Xn interface.
  • the integrity protection verifies the configuration information; then, the anchor base station sends an RRC Connection Release message to the UE, or an RRC Suspend message; the UE camps on the target gNB, retaining the RRC connection.
  • the UE calculates a short MAC-I based on at least information such as a C-RNTI, a source PCI, and a target cell identifier; the UE sends an RRC connection recovery request message to the target base station, where at least includes (ShortMAC-I and I-RNTI); the target base station is based on the RRC connection.
  • the I-RNTI in the recovery request message finds a short MAC-I, and then the target base station performs integrity check protection according to the short MAC-I; if the current base station, that is, the target base station, can perform integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message, if If the verification succeeds, the target base station is addressed, and the UE context is requested, otherwise the UE is directly rejected.
  • the anchor base station (that is, the second network device in this embodiment) first calculates a key, and each SSB corresponds to a key, and then determines ARFCN and PCI; based on each SSB corresponding KRRCint, and the old security algorithm calculate the ShortMAC-I corresponding to each SSB, that is, ShortMAC-I-1, ShortMAC-I-2, ShortMAC-I-3 shown in the figure;
  • the anchor base station sends a key corresponding to each SSB, ShortMAC-I and I-RNTI to the target base station (that is, the first network device in this embodiment);
  • the UE may determine that the camped cell is SSB2; and calculate the key KgNB*, extract the ARFCN and the PCI from the SSB2, and then acquire the KRRCint, based on the obtained information and the old security algorithm. Calculated ShortMAC-I;
  • the target base station finds the corresponding ShortMAC-I based on the I-RNTI in the RRC recovery request, and then performs security check.
  • the first network device may also obtain the integrity protection verification configuration information sent by a serving base station (second network device) before the UE, which includes:
  • the second network device Receiving, by the second network device, integrity protection verification configuration information about verifying the UE initiated RRC recovery request message; wherein the second network device is an original serving base station serving the UE, and when the second network Before releasing the UE to enter the inactive state, the device sends, to the first network device, integrity protection verification configuration information for verifying the RRC recovery request message initiated by the UE.
  • the following processing is also performed on the second network device side: before transmitting the configuration information (that is, before transmitting the integrity protection verification configuration information about verifying the RRC Resume request message initiated by the UE to the neighbor base station), the second network The device calculates the corresponding KgNB* according to the frequency domain SSB configuration information of the neighboring cell.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes at least one of: at least one key, a UE context identifier I-RNTI, a security algorithm, a PCI of the original serving base station, and a C-RNTI of the original serving base station.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes KgNB*, UE context identifier I-RNTI, stored security algorithm, primary side PCI and C-RNTI. If the target cell is a wideband carrier with multiple SSBs in the frequency domain.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes KgNB* corresponding to each SSB and corresponding SSB identification information.
  • the foregoing network side completes the configuration process, and then the UE performs an RRC recovery request.
  • the UE updates the key according to the ARFCN and PCI information of the current SSB and calculates ShortMAC-I.
  • the first network device side performs integrity protection verification on the RRC recovery request message sent by the UE, according to the configuration information of the integrity protection verification, and further includes:
  • the anchor base station corresponding to the UE When the integrity protection verification configuration information corresponding to the UE does not exist, the anchor base station corresponding to the UE is addressed, so that the anchor base station performs integrity protection verification on the RRC recovery request message.
  • the UE initiates an RRC Resume request message to a certain base station. If the base station has the integrity protection verification configuration information corresponding to the UE, the integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message is performed. Otherwise, the anchor gNB is addressed, and the anchor gNB performs the integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message.
  • the target base station searches for the stored KgNB* according to the information carried in the RRC resume request message, and then calculates the shortMAC-I. If the current base station can perform integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message, if the verification is successful, the target base station is addressed to perform UE context request, otherwise the UE is directly rejected.
  • the anchor base station may be a source base station to which the UE is connected
  • the T-gNB may be understood as the current serving base station of the UE
  • the anchor base station and the serving base station may be obtained through the Xn interface.
  • the integrity protection verifies the configuration information; then, the anchor base station sends an RRC Connection Release message to the UE, or an RRC Suspend message; the UE camps on the target gNB, retaining the RRC connection.
  • the UE calculates a short MAC-I based on at least information such as a C-RNTI, a source PCI, and a target cell identifier; the UE sends an RRC connection recovery request message to the target base station, where at least includes (ShortMAC-I and I-RNTI); the target base station is based on the RRC connection.
  • the I-RNTI in the recovery request message finds a short MAC-I, and then the target base station performs integrity check protection according to the short MAC-I; if the current base station, that is, the target base station, can perform integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message, if If the verification succeeds, the target base station is addressed, and the UE context is requested, otherwise the UE is directly rejected.
  • the anchor base station (that is, the second network device in this embodiment) first calculates a key, and each SSB corresponds to a key, ARFCN, and PCI;
  • the anchor base station sends a key corresponding to each SSB, an I-RNTI, a source PCI, a source C-RNTI, and a security algorithm to the target base station (that is, the first network device in this embodiment);
  • the UE may determine that the camped cell is SSB2; and calculate the key KgNB*, extract the ARFCN and the PCI from the SSB2, and then acquire the KRRCint, based on the obtained information and the old security algorithm. Calculated ShortMAC-I;
  • the target base station When receiving the RRC recovery request sent by the UE, the target base station first calculates ShortMAC-I, and then performs security check.
  • the configuration information of the RRC connection recovery request message integrity protection verification can be configured in advance, so that the first network device can perform integrity protection verification; thus, the first network device, especially the serving base station, can be reduced.
  • the data transmission caused by the signaling interaction between the anchor base station and the anchor base station in particular, can avoid the scenario where the fake UE attacks the network in the system.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides an integrity verification method, which is applied to a second network device, including: when the original serving base station of the UE is used, and the context of the UE is saved, before releasing the UE to the inactive state, The integrity protection verification configuration information regarding the verification of the UE-initiated RRC recovery request message is sent to the first network device.
  • the second network device in this embodiment may be the original serving base station that is currently the UE.
  • the first network device and the cell are all base stations in the RAN notification area and at least part of the base stations and the base stations and cells in the cell. Or, it can be understood that the first network device is the current serving base station of the UE; and one of the cells managed by the first network device is the target cell of the UE.
  • the second network device Before transmitting the configuration information (that is, before transmitting the integrity protection verification configuration information about verifying the RRC Resume request message initiated by the UE to the neighboring base station), the second network device calculates the correspondence according to the frequency domain SSB configuration information of the neighboring cell. KgNB* (key), and the corresponding shortMAC-I.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes at least one of the following: at least one short MAC-I, and a UE context identifier I-RNTI.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes ShortMAC-I corresponding to each SSB and corresponding SSB identification information.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information further includes: identification information of the SSB corresponding to the at least one SSB included in the frequency domain range of the target cell; and the at least one short MAC -I, corresponding to the identification information of the at least one SSB.
  • the foregoing network side completes the configuration process, and then the UE performs an RRC recovery request.
  • the UE updates the key according to the ARFCN and PCI information of the current SSB and calculates ShortMAC-I.
  • the following processing is also performed on the second network device side: before transmitting the configuration information (that is, before transmitting the integrity protection verification configuration information about verifying the RRC Resume request message initiated by the UE to the neighbor base station), the second network The device calculates a key corresponding to the at least one SSB according to the frequency domain SSB configuration information of the neighboring cell.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes at least one of: at least one key, a UE context identifier I-RNTI, a security algorithm, a PCI of the original serving base station, and a C-RNTI of the original serving base station.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes KgNB*, UE context identifier I-RNTI, stored security algorithm, primary side PCI and C-RNTI. If the target cell is a wideband carrier with multiple SSBs in the frequency domain.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes KgNB* corresponding to each SSB and corresponding SSB identification information.
  • the foregoing network side completes the configuration process, and then the UE performs an RRC recovery request.
  • the UE updates the key according to the ARFCN and PCI information of the current SSB and calculates ShortMAC-I.
  • the configuration information of the RRC connection recovery request message integrity protection verification can be configured in advance, so that the first network device can perform integrity protection verification; thus, the first network device, especially the serving base station, can be reduced.
  • the data transmission caused by the signaling interaction between the anchor base station and the anchor base station in particular, can avoid the scenario where the fake UE attacks the network in the system.
  • the embodiment of the invention provides an integrity verification method, which is applied to a UE, and the method includes:
  • the first network device in this embodiment may be a base station that currently provides services for the UE.
  • the UE performs an RRC recovery request. Before initiating the RRC Resume request message to the target, the UE updates the key according to the ARFCN and the PCI information of the current SSB and calculates the short MAC-I.
  • the first network device side performs integrity protection verification on the RRC recovery request message sent by the UE, according to the configuration information of the integrity protection verification.
  • the configuration information of the RRC connection recovery request message integrity protection verification can be configured in advance, so that the first network device can perform integrity protection verification; thus, the first network device, especially the serving base station, can be reduced.
  • the data transmission caused by the signaling interaction between the anchor base station and the anchor base station in particular, can avoid the scenario where the fake UE attacks the network in the system.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a first network device, as shown in FIG. 7, including:
  • the first communication unit 71 is configured to verify integrity protection verification configuration information of the RRC recovery request message initiated by the user equipment UE;
  • the first processing unit 72 performs integrity protection verification on the RRC recovery request message sent by the UE, based on the configuration information of the integrity protection verification.
  • the first network device in this embodiment may be a base station that currently provides services for the UE.
  • the first communication unit 71 receives integrity protection verification configuration information about the RRC recovery request message initiated by the second network device, where the second network device is the original serving base station serving the UE. And when the second network device sends the integrity protection verification configuration information for verifying the UE initiated RRC recovery request message to the first network device before releasing the UE to enter an inactive state.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes at least one of the following: at least one short MAC-I, and a UE context identifier I-RNTI.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes ShortMAC-I corresponding to each SSB and corresponding SSB identification information.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information further includes: identifier information of the SSB corresponding to the at least one SSB included in the frequency domain range of the target cell managed by the first network device; And, the at least one short MAC-I corresponds to the identification information of the at least one SSB.
  • the foregoing network side completes the configuration process, and then the UE performs an RRC recovery request.
  • the UE updates the key according to the ARFCN and PCI information of the current SSB and calculates ShortMAC-I.
  • the first communication unit 71 receives an RRC recovery request message sent by the UE;
  • the first processing unit 72 when the integrity protection verification configuration information corresponding to the UE is present, performs integrity protection verification on the RRC recovery request message sent by the UE, based on the configuration information of the integrity protection verification; When there is no integrity protection verification configuration information corresponding to the UE, the anchor base station corresponding to the UE is addressed, so that the anchor base station performs integrity protection verification on the RRC recovery request message.
  • the UE initiates an RRC Resume request message to a certain base station. If the base station has the integrity protection verification configuration information corresponding to the UE, the integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message is performed. Otherwise, the anchor gNB is addressed, and the anchor gNB performs the integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message.
  • the first processing unit 72 searches for the stored short MAC-I according to the UE identity information carried in the RRC restoration request message, performs integrity protection verification based on the short MAC-I, and performs the verification when the verification is successful.
  • the UE addresses the target network device to perform the UE context acquisition; when the verification fails, the UE is rejected.
  • the current base station can perform integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message, if the verification is successful, the target base station is addressed, and the UE context is requested, otherwise the UE is directly rejected.
  • the first communication unit 71 receives integrity protection verification configuration information about the RRC recovery request message initiated by the second network device, where the second network device is the original serving base station serving the UE. And when the second network device sends the integrity protection verification configuration information for verifying the UE initiated RRC recovery request message to the first network device before releasing the UE to enter an inactive state.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes at least one of: at least one key, a UE context identifier I-RNTI, a security algorithm, a PCI of the original serving base station, and a C-RNTI of the original serving base station.
  • the identifier information of the SSB corresponding to the at least one SSB included in the frequency domain range of the target cell managed by the first network device may be further included; and the at least one key and the location The identification information of the at least one SSB corresponds to.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes KgNB*, UE context identifier I-RNTI, stored security algorithm, primary side PCI and C-RNTI. If the target cell is a wideband carrier with multiple SSBs in the frequency domain.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes KgNB* corresponding to each SSB and corresponding SSB identification information.
  • the foregoing network side completes the configuration process, and then the UE performs an RRC recovery request.
  • the UE updates the key according to the ARFCN and PCI information of the current SSB and calculates ShortMAC-I.
  • the first communication unit 71 receives an RRC recovery request message sent by the UE;
  • the first processing unit 72 when the integrity protection verification configuration information corresponding to the UE is present, performs integrity protection verification on the RRC recovery request message sent by the UE, based on the configuration information of the integrity protection verification; When there is no integrity protection verification configuration information corresponding to the UE, the anchor base station corresponding to the UE is addressed, so that the anchor base station performs integrity protection verification on the RRC recovery request message.
  • the UE initiates an RRC Resume request message to a certain base station. If the base station has the integrity protection verification configuration information corresponding to the UE, the integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message is performed. Otherwise, the anchor gNB is addressed, and the anchor gNB performs the integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message.
  • the first processing unit 72 searches for the stored key according to the identifier information carried in the RRC restoration request message; calculates a short MAC-I based on the key and the security algorithm; The short MAC-I performs integrity protection verification; when the verification is successful, the target network device is addressed to the UE, and the UE context acquisition is performed; when the verification fails, the UE is rejected.
  • the target base station searches for the stored KgNB* according to the information carried in the RRC resume request message, and then calculates the shortMAC-I. If the current base station can perform integrity protection verification of the RRC Resume request message, if the verification is successful, the target base station is addressed to perform UE context request, otherwise the UE is directly rejected.
  • the configuration information of the RRC connection recovery request message integrity protection verification can be configured in advance, so that the first network device can perform integrity protection verification; thus, the first network device, especially the serving base station, can be reduced.
  • the data transmission caused by the signaling interaction between the anchor base station and the anchor base station in particular, can avoid the scenario where the fake UE attacks the network in the system.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a second network device, as shown in FIG. 8, including: a second processing unit 81, when serving as the original serving base station of the UE and saving the context of the UE, releasing the UE to enter Before the inactive state, the integrity protection verification configuration information about verifying the UE initiated RRC recovery request message is sent to the first network device by the second communication unit;
  • the second communication unit 82 sends the integrity protection verification configuration information to the first network device.
  • the second network device in this embodiment may be the original serving base station that is currently the UE.
  • the first network device and the cell are all base stations in the RAN notification area and at least part of the base stations and the base stations and cells in the cell. Or, it can be understood that the first network device is the current serving base station of the UE; and one of the cells managed by the first network device is the target cell of the UE.
  • the second processing unit calculates the corresponding according to the frequency domain SSB configuration information of the neighboring cell. KgNB* (key), and the corresponding shortMAC-I.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes at least one of the following: at least one short MAC-I, and a UE context identifier I-RNTI.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes ShortMAC-I corresponding to each SSB and corresponding SSB identification information.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information further includes: identification information of the SSB corresponding to the at least one SSB included in the frequency domain range of the target cell; and the at least one short MAC -I, corresponding to the identification information of the at least one SSB.
  • the foregoing network side completes the configuration process, and then the UE performs an RRC recovery request.
  • the UE updates the key according to the ARFCN and PCI information of the current SSB and calculates ShortMAC-I.
  • the following processing is also performed on the second network device side: before the configuration information is sent (that is, before the integrity protection verification configuration information for verifying the UE initiated RRC Resume request message is sent to the neighbor base station), the second processing The unit calculates a key corresponding to the at least one SSB according to the frequency domain SSB configuration information of the neighboring cell.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes at least one of: at least one key, a UE context identifier I-RNTI, a security algorithm, a PCI of the original serving base station, and a C-RNTI of the original serving base station.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes KgNB*, UE context identifier I-RNTI, stored security algorithm, primary side PCI and C-RNTI. If the target cell is a wideband carrier with multiple SSBs in the frequency domain.
  • the integrity protection verification configuration information includes KgNB* corresponding to each SSB and corresponding SSB identification information.
  • the foregoing network side completes the configuration process, and then the UE performs an RRC recovery request.
  • the UE updates the key according to the ARFCN and PCI information of the current SSB and calculates ShortMAC-I.
  • the configuration information of the RRC connection recovery request message integrity protection verification can be configured in advance, so that the first network device can perform integrity protection verification; thus, the first network device, especially the serving base station, can be reduced.
  • the data transmission caused by the signaling interaction between the anchor base station and the anchor base station in particular, can avoid the scenario where the fake UE attacks the network in the system.
  • An embodiment of the present invention provides a UE, as shown in FIG.
  • the third communication unit 91 sends an RRC recovery request message to the first network device.
  • the third processing unit 92 updates the key and calculates the short MAC-I according to the ARFCN and PCI information of the current SSB.
  • the first network device side performs integrity protection verification on the RRC recovery request message sent by the UE, according to the configuration information of the integrity protection verification.
  • the configuration information of the RRC connection recovery request message integrity protection verification can be configured in advance, so that the first network device can perform integrity protection verification; thus, the first network device, especially the serving base station, can be reduced.
  • the data transmission caused by the signaling interaction between the anchor base station and the anchor base station in particular, can avoid the scenario where the fake UE attacks the network in the system.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a network device, or a hardware component architecture of the UE.
  • the method includes: at least one processor 1001, a memory 1002, and at least one network interface 1003.
  • the various components are coupled together by a bus system 1004.
  • the bus system 1004 is used to implement connection communication between these components.
  • the bus system 1004 includes a power bus, a control bus, and a status signal bus in addition to the data bus.
  • various buses are labeled as bus system 1004 in FIG.
  • the memory 1002 in the embodiments of the present invention may be a volatile memory or a non-volatile memory, or may include both volatile and non-volatile memory.
  • the memory 1002 stores elements, executable modules or data structures, or a subset thereof, or their extension set:
  • the processor 1001 is configured to be able to process the method steps of any one of the foregoing embodiments 1 to 3, and details are not described herein.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a computer storage medium, where the computer storage medium stores computer executable instructions, and when the computer executable instructions are executed, the method steps of any one of the foregoing embodiments 1 to 3 are implemented.
  • Embodiments of the Invention may be stored in a computer readable storage medium if it is implemented in the form of a software function module and sold or used as a standalone product. Based on such understanding, the technical solution of the embodiments of the present invention may be embodied in the form of a software product in essence or in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium, including a plurality of instructions.
  • a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) is caused to perform all or part of the methods described in various embodiments of the present invention.
  • the foregoing storage medium includes various media that can store program codes, such as a USB flash drive, a mobile hard disk, a read only memory (ROM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk.
  • embodiments of the invention are not limited to any specific combination of hardware and software.
  • an embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer storage medium, wherein a computer program is configured, and the computer program is configured to execute a data scheduling method according to an embodiment of the present invention.

Landscapes

  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
  • Signal Processing (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)

Abstract

本发明公开了一种完整性验证方法、网络设备、用户设备(UE)及计算机存储介质，其中方法包括：配置用于验证用户设备UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。

Description

一种完整性验证方法、网络设备、UE及计算机存储介质 技术领域
本发明涉及信息处理技术领域，尤其涉及一种完整性验证方法、网络设备、用户设备(UE)及计算机存储介质。
背景技术
当UE处于RRC_INACTIVE状态，网络侧会给UE配置RAN的寻呼区域，当UE在该寻呼区域内移动时不用通知网络侧，遵循idle下移动性行为，即小区选择重选原则。当UE移动出RAN配置的寻呼区域时，会触发UE恢复RRC连接并重新获取RAN配置的寻呼区域。
现有技术中，RRC Resume request恢复请求消息(MSG3)的完整性保护验证是在原基站来执行的，比如图1所示，即服务基站将收到的RRC Resume request消息中的ShortMAC-I和UE上下文标识信息发给愿基站，原基站进行完整性保护验证，如果完整性保护验证通过，则原基站转发该UE的AS上下文给服务基站，使得服务基站可以恢复UE的上下文进而恢复RRC连接。但是如果RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证失败，则原基站不发送安全上下文，但是Xn接口的信令还是要存在的。对于如果存在假UE尝试破坏网络侧，不停的发送RRC Resume request消息给基站，则基站会不停的尝试获取该假UE的安全上下文，使得网络消耗过多资源处理无意义的处理，甚至导致网络瘫痪。
发明内容
为解决上述技术问题，本发明实施例提供了一种完整性验证方法、网络设备、用户设备(UE)及计算机存储介质。
本发明实施例提供了一种完整性验证方法，应用于第一网络设备，所述方法包括：
配置用于验证用户设备UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；
基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
本发明实施例提供一种完整性验证方法，应用于第二网络设备，所述方法包括：
当作为UE的原服务基站、且保存所述UE的上下文时，在释放所述UE进入非激活状态之前，向第一网络设备发送关于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息。
本发明实施例提供一种完整性验证方法，应用于UE，所述方法包括：
向第一网络设备发送RRC恢复请求消息。
本发明实施例提供了一种第一网络设备，包括：
第一通信单元，配置用于验证用户设备UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；
第一处理单元，基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
本发明实施例提供一种第二网络设备，包括：
第二处理单元，当作为UE的原服务基站、且保存所述UE的上下文时，在释放所述UE进入非激活状态之前，通过第二通信单元向第一网络设备发送关于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；
第二通信单元，向第一网络设备发送所述完整性保护验证配置信息。
本发明实施例提供一种UE，包括：
第三通信单元，向第一网络设备发送RRC恢复请求消息。
本发明实施例提供的一种网络设备，包括：处理器和用于存储能够在处理器上运行的计算机程序的存储器，
其中，所述处理器用于运行所述计算机程序时，执行前述方法的步骤。
本发明实施例提供的一种UE，包括：处理器和用于存储能够在处理器上运行的计算机程序的存储器，
其中，所述处理器用于运行所述计算机程序时，执行前述方法的步骤。
本发明实施例提供的一种计算机存储介质，所述计算机存储介质存储有计算机可执行指令，所述计算机可执行指令被执行时实现前述方法步骤。
本发明实施例的技术方案，就能够通过预先配置RRC连接恢复请求消息完整性保护验证的配置信息，使得第一网络设备可以进行完整性保护验证；如此，就能够降低第一网络设备尤其是服务基站和锚基站之间进行信令交互所带来的数据传输，特别是能够避免系统中存在假UE攻击网络的场景。
附图说明
图1为RRC恢复连接的处理流程示意图；
图2为一种网络结构示意图；
图3为本发明实施例完整性验证方法流程示意图1；
图4为本发明实施例完整性验证方法流程示意图2；
图5为本发明实施例完整性验证方法流程示意图3；
图6为本发明实施例完整性验证方法流程示意图4；
图7为本发明实施例第一网络设备组成结构示意图；
图8为本发明实施例第二网络设备组成结构示意图；
图9为本发明实施例UE组成结构示意图；
图10为本发明实施例的一种硬件架构示意图。
具体实施方式
为了能够更加详尽地了解本发明实施例的特点与技术内容，下面结合附图对本发明实施例的实现进行详细阐述，所附附图仅供参考说明之用，并非用来限定本发明实施例。
参考图2描述其中根据本发明的UE与网络设备进行通信的通信系统。
这样的通信系统可以使用不同的空中接口和/或物理层。例如，由通信系统使用的空中接口包括例如频分多址(FDMA)、时分多址(TDMA)、码分多址(CDMA)和通用移动通信系统(UMTS)(特别地，长期演进(LTE))、全球移动通信系统(GSM)等等。作为非限制性示例，下面的描述涉及CDMA通信系统，但是这样的教导同样适用于其它类型的系统。
参考图2，CDMA无线通信系统可以包括多个UE100、多个网络设备，比如图中的基站(BS)270、基站控制器(BSC)275和移动交换中心(MSC)280等。MSC280被构造为与公共电话交换网络(PSTN)290形成接口。MSC280还被构造为与可以经由回程线路耦接到基站270的BSC275形成接口。回程线路可以根据若干己知的接口中的任一种来构造，所述接口包括例如E1/T1、ATM，IP、PPP、帧中继、HDSL、ADSL或xDSL。将理解的是，如图2中所示的系统可以包括多个BSC2750。
在图2中，还描绘了多个卫星300，但是理解的是，可以利用任何数目的卫星获得有用的定位信息。作为无线通信系统的一个典型操作，BS270接收来自各种UE100的反向链路信号。UE100通常参与通话、消息收发和其它类型的通信。特定基站270接收的每个反向链路信号被在特定BS270内进行处理。获得的数据被转发给相关的BSC275。BSC提供通话资源分配 和包括BS270之间的软切换过程的协调的移动管理功能。BSC275还将接收到的数据路由到MSC280，其提供用于与PSTN290形成接口的额外的路由服务。类似地，PSTN290与MSC280形成接口，MSC与BSC275形成接口，并且BSC275相应地控制BS270以将正向链路信号发送到UE100。
实施例一、
本发明实施例提供了一种完整性验证方法，应用于第一网络设备，如图3所示，包括：
步骤301：配置用于验证用户设备(UE)发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；
步骤302：基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
本实施例中所述第一网络设备，可以为当前为UE提供服务的基站。
本实施例可以存在以下两种处理场景，分别说明如下：
场景1、
所述第一网络设备还会预先获取到UE之前的一个服务基站(第二网络设备)发来的完整性保护验证配置信息，具体包括：
接收第二网络设备发来的关于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；其中，所述第二网络设备为服务所述UE的原服务基站，且当所述第二网络设备在释放所述UE进入非激活态前，向所述第一网络设备发送用于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息。
在第二网络设备侧还会进行以下处理：在发送配置信息之前(也就是说，向邻基站发送关于验证UE发起的RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证配置信息之前)，所述第二网络设备根据邻区的频域SSB配置信息计算对应的KgNB*(密钥)，以及对应的shortMAC-I。
所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个短MAC-I、UE上下文标识I-RNTI。
如果目标小区是一个频域范围包含多个SSBs的wideband carrier。则所述完整性保护验证配置信息包括每个SSB对应的ShortMAC-I以及对应的SSB标识信息。
也就是说，当存在多个SSB的时候，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，还包括：所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；并且，所述至少一个短MAC-I，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
前述网络侧完成配置处理，然后所述UE会进行RRC恢复请求，在向 目标发起RRC Resume request消息之前，UE根据当前SSB的ARFCN和PCI信息更新密钥并计算ShortMAC-I。
相应的，所述第一网络设备侧基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证，还包括：
接收所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息；
当存在所述UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息时，基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证；
或者，
当不存在所述UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息时，寻址所述UE对应的锚基站，使得所述锚基站执行对RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
也就是说，UE向某个基站发起RRC Resume request消息，如果该基站存在该UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息，则执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证。否则寻址anchor gNB，让anchor gNB执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证。
根据所述RRC恢复请求消息中所携带的UE标识信息，寻找存储的短MAC-I；基于所述短MAC-I进行完整性保护验证；当验证成功时，为所述UE寻址目标网络设备，进行所述UE上下文获取；当验证失败时，拒绝所述UE。
也就是说，如果当前基站可以执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证，如果验证成功则寻址目标基站，进行UE上下文索取，否则直接拒绝UE。
本场景可以进一步参见图4、5，其中图4中示意出，锚基站可以为UE连接的源基站，T-gNB可以理解为UE当前的服务基站；锚基站与服务基站之间通过Xn接口获取完整性保护验证配置信息；然后，锚基站向UE发送RRC连接释放消息，或者RRC暂停消息；UE驻留在目标gNB，保留RRC连接。UE至少基于C-RNTI、源PCI以及目标小区标识等信息计算短MAC-I；UE向目标基站发送RRC连接恢复请求消息，其中至少包括(ShortMAC-I and I-RNTI)；目标基站基于RRC连接恢复请求消息中的I-RNTI查找到短MAC-I，然后目标基站根据短MAC-I进行完整性校验保护；如果当前基站也就是目标基站可以执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证，如果验证成功则寻址目标基站，进行UE上下文索取，否则直接拒绝UE。
图5中示意出，1、锚基站(也就是本实施例中的第二网络设备)首先计算得到密钥，并且每一个SSB对应一个密钥，然后确定ARFCN以及PCI； 基于每一个SSB对应的KRRCint，以及旧安全算法计算得到每一个SSB对应的ShortMAC-I，也就是图中所示的ShortMAC-I-1、ShortMAC-I-2、ShortMAC-I-3；
2、锚基站向目标基站(也就是本实施例中的第一网络设备)，发送每一个SSB对应的密钥、ShortMAC-I以及I-RNTI；
3、在UE发送RRC恢复请求之前，UE可以确定其驻留小区为SSB2；并且计算得到密钥KgNB*，并从SSB2中提取ARFCN以及PCI，然后获取KRRCint，基于获取到的信息以及旧安全算法计算得到ShortMAC-I；
4、目标基站在收到UE发来的RRC恢复请求的时候，基于RRC恢复请求中的I-RNTI找到对应的ShortMAC-I，然后进行安全性校验。
场景2、
所述第一网络设备还会预先获取到UE之前的一个服务基站(第二网络设备)发来的完整性保护验证配置信息，具体包括：
接收第二网络设备发来的关于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；其中，所述第二网络设备为服务所述UE的原服务基站，且当所述第二网络设备在释放所述UE进入非激活态前，向所述第一网络设备发送用于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息。
在第二网络设备侧还会进行以下处理：在发送配置信息之前(也就是说，向邻基站发送关于验证UE发起的RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证配置信息之前)，所述第二网络设备根据邻区的频域SSB配置信息计算对应的KgNB*。
所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个密钥、UE上下文标识I-RNTI、安全算法、原服务基站的PCI、原服务基站的C-RNTI。
如果包括有多个SSB的时候，还可以包括：
所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；并且，所述至少一个密钥，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
所述完整性保护验证配置信息包括KgNB*,UE上下文标识I-RNTI，存储的安全算法，原侧的PCI和C-RNTI。如果目标小区是一个频域范围包含多个SSBs的wideband carrier。则所述完整性保护验证配置信息包括每个SSB对应的KgNB*以及对应的SSB标识信息。
前述网络侧完成配置处理，然后所述UE会进行RRC恢复请求，在向目标发起RRC Resume request消息之前，UE根据当前SSB的ARFCN和 PCI信息更新密钥并计算ShortMAC-I。
相应的，所述第一网络设备侧基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证，还包括：
接收所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息；
当存在所述UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息时，基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证；
或者，
当不存在所述UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息时，寻址所述UE对应的锚基站，使得所述锚基站执行对RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
也就是说，UE向某个基站发起RRC Resume request消息，如果该基站存在该UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息，则执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证。否则寻址anchor gNB，让anchor gNB执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证。
根据所述RRC恢复请求消息中所携带的标识信息，寻找存储的密钥；至少基于所述密钥和所述安全算法计算得到短MAC-I；基于计算得到的所述短MAC-I进行完整性保护验证；当验证成功时，为所述UE寻址目标网络设备，进行所述UE上下文获取；当验证失败时，拒绝所述UE。
也就是说，目标基站根据RRC resume request消息所携带的信息，寻找存储的KgNB*，然后计算shortMAC-I。如果当前基站可以执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证，如果验证成功则寻址目标基站，进行UE上下文索取，否则直接拒绝UE。
本场景可以进一步参见图4、6，其中图4中示意出，锚基站可以为UE连接的源基站，T-gNB可以理解为UE当前的服务基站；锚基站与服务基站之间通过Xn接口获取完整性保护验证配置信息；然后，锚基站向UE发送RRC连接释放消息，或者RRC暂停消息；UE驻留在目标gNB，保留RRC连接。UE至少基于C-RNTI、源PCI以及目标小区标识等信息计算短MAC-I；UE向目标基站发送RRC连接恢复请求消息，其中至少包括(ShortMAC-I and I-RNTI)；目标基站基于RRC连接恢复请求消息中的I-RNTI查找到短MAC-I，然后目标基站根据短MAC-I进行完整性校验保护；如果当前基站也就是目标基站可以执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证，如果验证成功则寻址目标基站，进行UE上下文索取，否则直接拒绝UE。
图6中示意出，1、锚基站(也就是本实施例中的第二网络设备)首先计算得到密钥，并且每一个SSB对应一个密钥、ARFCN以及PCI；
2、锚基站向目标基站(也就是本实施例中的第一网络设备)，发送每一个SSB对应的密钥、I-RNTI、源PCI和源C-RNTI、以及安全算法；
3、在UE发送RRC恢复请求之前，UE可以确定其驻留小区为SSB2；并且计算得到密钥KgNB*，并从SSB2中提取ARFCN以及PCI，然后获取KRRCint，基于获取到的信息以及旧安全算法计算得到ShortMAC-I；
4、目标基站在收到UE发来的RRC恢复请求的时候，先计算得到ShortMAC-I，然后进行安全性校验。
可见，通过采用上述方案，就能够通过预先配置RRC连接恢复请求消息完整性保护验证的配置信息，使得第一网络设备可以进行完整性保护验证；如此，就能够降低第一网络设备尤其是服务基站和锚基站之间进行信令交互所带来的数据传输，特别是能够避免系统中存在假UE攻击网络的场景。
实施例二、
本发明实施例提供了一种完整性验证方法，应用于第二网络设备，包括：当作为UE的原服务基站、且保存所述UE的上下文时，在释放所述UE进入非激活状态之前，向第一网络设备发送关于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息。
本实施例中所述第二网络设备，可以为当前为UE对应的原服务基站。其中，所述第一网络设备及小区，为RAN通知区域内的全部基站及其小区中的至少部分基站及小区中之一的基站及小区。或者可以理解为第一网络设备为UE的当前服务基站；该第一网络设备管理的某一个小区为UE的目标小区。
本实施例也可以存在以下两种处理场景，分别说明如下：
场景1、
在发送配置信息之前(也就是说，向邻基站发送关于验证UE发起的RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证配置信息之前)，所述第二网络设备根据邻区的频域SSB配置信息计算对应的KgNB*(密钥)，以及对应的shortMAC-I。
所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个短MAC-I、UE上下文标识I-RNTI。
如果目标小区是一个频域范围包含多个SSBs的wideband carrier。则所述完整性保护验证配置信息包括每个SSB对应的ShortMAC-I以及对应的SSB标识信息。
也就是说，当存在多个SSB的时候，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，还包括：目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信 息；并且，所述至少一个短MAC-I，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
前述网络侧完成配置处理，然后所述UE会进行RRC恢复请求，在向目标发起RRC Resume request消息之前，UE根据当前SSB的ARFCN和PCI信息更新密钥并计算ShortMAC-I。
场景2、
在第二网络设备侧还会进行以下处理：在发送配置信息之前(也就是说，向邻基站发送关于验证UE发起的RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证配置信息之前)，所述第二网络设备根据邻区的频域SSB配置信息计算至少一个SSB对应的密钥。
所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个密钥、UE上下文标识I-RNTI、安全算法、原服务基站的PCI、原服务基站的C-RNTI。
如果包括有多个SSB的时候，还可以包括：
所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；并且，所述至少一个密钥，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
所述完整性保护验证配置信息包括KgNB*,UE上下文标识I-RNTI，存储的安全算法，原侧的PCI和C-RNTI。如果目标小区是一个频域范围包含多个SSBs的wideband carrier。则所述完整性保护验证配置信息包括每个SSB对应的KgNB*以及对应的SSB标识信息。
前述网络侧完成配置处理，然后所述UE会进行RRC恢复请求，在向目标发起RRC Resume request消息之前，UE根据当前SSB的ARFCN和PCI信息更新密钥并计算ShortMAC-I。
可见，通过采用上述方案，就能够通过预先配置RRC连接恢复请求消息完整性保护验证的配置信息，使得第一网络设备可以进行完整性保护验证；如此，就能够降低第一网络设备尤其是服务基站和锚基站之间进行信令交互所带来的数据传输，特别是能够避免系统中存在假UE攻击网络的场景。
实施例三、
本发明实施例提供了一种完整性验证方法，应用于UE，所述方法包括：
向第一网络设备发送RRC恢复请求消息。
本实施例中所述第一网络设备，可以为当前为UE提供服务的基站。
所述UE会进行RRC恢复请求，在向目标发起RRC Resume request消息之前，UE根据当前SSB的ARFCN以及PCI信息，更新密钥并计算得到 短MAC-I。
相应的，所述第一网络设备侧基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
需要理解的是，本实施例提供的方案同样可以参见前述图4、5、6描述的场景，以及前述实施例描述的方案进行相应的处理，只是这里不再进行赘述。
可见，通过采用上述方案，就能够通过预先配置RRC连接恢复请求消息完整性保护验证的配置信息，使得第一网络设备可以进行完整性保护验证；如此，就能够降低第一网络设备尤其是服务基站和锚基站之间进行信令交互所带来的数据传输，特别是能够避免系统中存在假UE攻击网络的场景。
实施例四、
本发明实施例提供了一种第一网络设备，如图7所示，包括：
第一通信单元71，配置用于验证用户设备UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；
第一处理单元72，基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
本实施例中所述第一网络设备，可以为当前为UE提供服务的基站。
本实施例可以存在以下两种处理场景，分别说明如下：
场景1、
所述第一通信单元71，接收第二网络设备发来的关于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；其中，所述第二网络设备为服务所述UE的原服务基站，且当所述第二网络设备在释放所述UE进入非激活态前，向所述第一网络设备发送用于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息。
所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个短MAC-I、UE上下文标识I-RNTI。
如果目标小区是一个频域范围包含多个SSBs的wideband carrier。则所述完整性保护验证配置信息包括每个SSB对应的ShortMAC-I以及对应的SSB标识信息。
也就是说，当存在多个SSB的时候，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，还包括：所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；并且，所述至少一个短MAC-I，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
前述网络侧完成配置处理，然后所述UE会进行RRC恢复请求，在向目标发起RRC Resume request消息之前，UE根据当前SSB的ARFCN和PCI信息更新密钥并计算ShortMAC-I。
相应的，所述第一通信单元71，接收所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息；
第一处理单元72，当存在所述UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息时，基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证；当不存在所述UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息时，寻址所述UE对应的锚基站，使得所述锚基站执行对RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
也就是说，UE向某个基站发起RRC Resume request消息，如果该基站存在该UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息，则执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证。否则寻址anchor gNB，让anchor gNB执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证。
第一处理单元72，根据所述RRC恢复请求消息中所携带的UE标识信息，寻找存储的短MAC-I；基于所述短MAC-I进行完整性保护验证；当验证成功时，为所述UE寻址目标网络设备，进行所述UE上下文获取；当验证失败时，拒绝所述UE。
也就是说，如果当前基站可以执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证，如果验证成功则寻址目标基站，进行UE上下文索取，否则直接拒绝UE。
场景2、
所述第一通信单元71，接收第二网络设备发来的关于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；其中，所述第二网络设备为服务所述UE的原服务基站，且当所述第二网络设备在释放所述UE进入非激活态前，向所述第一网络设备发送用于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息。
所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个密钥、UE上下文标识I-RNTI、安全算法、原服务基站的PCI、原服务基站的C-RNTI。
如果包括有多个SSB的时候，还可以包括：所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；并且，所述至少一个密钥，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
所述完整性保护验证配置信息包括KgNB*,UE上下文标识I-RNTI，存储的安全算法，原侧的PCI和C-RNTI。如果目标小区是一个频域范围包含 多个SSBs的wideband carrier。则所述完整性保护验证配置信息包括每个SSB对应的KgNB*以及对应的SSB标识信息。
前述网络侧完成配置处理，然后所述UE会进行RRC恢复请求，在向目标发起RRC Resume request消息之前，UE根据当前SSB的ARFCN和PCI信息更新密钥并计算ShortMAC-I。
相应的，所述第一通信单元71，接收所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息；
第一处理单元72，当存在所述UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息时，基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证；当不存在所述UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息时，寻址所述UE对应的锚基站，使得所述锚基站执行对RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
也就是说，UE向某个基站发起RRC Resume request消息，如果该基站存在该UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息，则执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证。否则寻址anchor gNB，让anchor gNB执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证。
第一处理单元72，根据所述RRC恢复请求消息中所携带的标识信息，寻找存储的密钥；至少基于所述密钥和所述安全算法计算得到短MAC-I；基于计算得到的所述短MAC-I进行完整性保护验证；当验证成功时，为所述UE寻址目标网络设备，进行所述UE上下文获取；当验证失败时，拒绝所述UE。
也就是说，目标基站根据RRC resume request消息所携带的信息，寻找存储的KgNB*，然后计算shortMAC-I。如果当前基站可以执行RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证，如果验证成功则寻址目标基站，进行UE上下文索取，否则直接拒绝UE。
可见，通过采用上述方案，就能够通过预先配置RRC连接恢复请求消息完整性保护验证的配置信息，使得第一网络设备可以进行完整性保护验证；如此，就能够降低第一网络设备尤其是服务基站和锚基站之间进行信令交互所带来的数据传输，特别是能够避免系统中存在假UE攻击网络的场景。
实施例五、
本发明实施例提供了一种第二网络设备，如图8所示，包括：第二处理单元81，当作为UE的原服务基站、且保存所述UE的上下文时，在释放所述UE进入非激活状态之前，通过第二通信单元向第一网络设备发送关于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；
第二通信单元82，向第一网络设备发送所述完整性保护验证配置信息。
本实施例中所述第二网络设备，可以为当前为UE对应的原服务基站。其中，所述第一网络设备及小区，为RAN通知区域内的全部基站及其小区中的至少部分基站及小区中之一的基站及小区。或者可以理解为第一网络设备为UE的当前服务基站；该第一网络设备管理的某一个小区为UE的目标小区。
本实施例也可以存在以下两种处理场景，分别说明如下：
场景1、
在发送配置信息之前(也就是说，向邻基站发送关于验证UE发起的RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证配置信息之前)，第二处理单元，根据邻区的频域SSB配置信息计算对应的KgNB*(密钥)，以及对应的shortMAC-I。
所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个短MAC-I、UE上下文标识I-RNTI。
如果目标小区是一个频域范围包含多个SSBs的wideband carrier。则所述完整性保护验证配置信息包括每个SSB对应的ShortMAC-I以及对应的SSB标识信息。
也就是说，当存在多个SSB的时候，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，还包括：目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；并且，所述至少一个短MAC-I，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
前述网络侧完成配置处理，然后所述UE会进行RRC恢复请求，在向目标发起RRC Resume request消息之前，UE根据当前SSB的ARFCN和PCI信息更新密钥并计算ShortMAC-I。
场景2、
在第二网络设备侧还会进行以下处理：在发送配置信息之前(也就是说，向邻基站发送关于验证UE发起的RRC Resume request消息的完整性保护验证配置信息之前)，所述第二处理单元，根据邻区的频域SSB配置信息计算至少一个SSB对应的密钥。
所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个密钥、UE上下文标识I-RNTI、安全算法、原服务基站的PCI、原服务基站的C-RNTI。
如果包括有多个SSB的时候，还可以包括：
所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；并且，所述至少一个密钥，与所述至少一个SSB 的标识信息相对应。
所述完整性保护验证配置信息包括KgNB*,UE上下文标识I-RNTI，存储的安全算法，原侧的PCI和C-RNTI。如果目标小区是一个频域范围包含多个SSBs的wideband carrier。则所述完整性保护验证配置信息包括每个SSB对应的KgNB*以及对应的SSB标识信息。
前述网络侧完成配置处理，然后所述UE会进行RRC恢复请求，在向目标发起RRC Resume request消息之前，UE根据当前SSB的ARFCN和PCI信息更新密钥并计算ShortMAC-I。
可见，通过采用上述方案，就能够通过预先配置RRC连接恢复请求消息完整性保护验证的配置信息，使得第一网络设备可以进行完整性保护验证；如此，就能够降低第一网络设备尤其是服务基站和锚基站之间进行信令交互所带来的数据传输，特别是能够避免系统中存在假UE攻击网络的场景。
实施例六、
本发明实施例提供了一种UE，如图9所示包括：
第三通信单元91，向第一网络设备发送RRC恢复请求消息。
第三处理单元92，根据当前SSB的ARFCN以及PCI信息，更新密钥并计算得到短MAC-I。
相应的，所述第一网络设备侧基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
需要理解的是，本实施例提供的方案同样可以参见前述图4、5、6描述的场景，以及前述实施例描述的方案进行相应的处理，只是这里不再进行赘述。
可见，通过采用上述方案，就能够通过预先配置RRC连接恢复请求消息完整性保护验证的配置信息，使得第一网络设备可以进行完整性保护验证；如此，就能够降低第一网络设备尤其是服务基站和锚基站之间进行信令交互所带来的数据传输，特别是能够避免系统中存在假UE攻击网络的场景。
本发明实施例还提供了一种网络设备、或者UE的硬件组成架构，如图10所示，包括：至少一个处理器1001、存储器1002、至少一个网络接口1003。各个组件通过总线系统1004耦合在一起。可理解，总线系统1004用于实现这些组件之间的连接通信。总线系统1004除包括数据总线之外，还包括电源总线、控制总线和状态信号总线。但是为了清楚说明起见，在图100中将各种总线都标为总线系统1004。
可以理解，本发明实施例中的存储器1002可以是易失性存储器或非易失性存储器，或可包括易失性和非易失性存储器两者。
在一些实施方式中，存储器1002存储了如下的元素，可执行模块或者数据结构，或者他们的子集，或者他们的扩展集：
操作系统10021和应用程序10022。
其中，所述处理器1001配置为：能够处理前述实施例一至三任一实施例的方法步骤，这里不再进行赘述。
本发明实施例提供的一种计算机存储介质，所述计算机存储介质存储有计算机可执行指令，所述计算机可执行指令被执行时实施前述实施例一至三任一实施例的方法步骤。
本发明实施例上述装置如果以软件功能模块的形式实现并作为独立的产品销售或使用时，也可以存储在一个计算机可读取存储介质中。基于这样的理解，本发明实施例的技术方案本质上或者说对现有技术做出贡献的部分可以以软件产品的形式体现出来，该计算机软件产品存储在一个存储介质中，包括若干指令用以使得一台计算机设备(可以是个人计算机、服务器、或者网络设备等)执行本发明各个实施例所述方法的全部或部分。而前述的存储介质包括：U盘、移动硬盘、只读存储器(ROM，Read Only Memory)、磁碟或者光盘等各种可以存储程序代码的介质。这样，本发明实施例不限制于任何特定的硬件和软件结合。
相应地，本发明实施例还提供一种计算机存储介质，其中存储有计算机程序，该计算机程序配置为执行本发明实施例的数据调度方法。
尽管为示例目的，已经公开了本发明的优选实施例，本领域的技术人员将意识到各种改进、增加和取代也是可能的，因此，本发明的范围应当不限于上述实施例。

Claims (39)

  1. 一种完整性验证方法，应用于第一网络设备，所述方法包括：
    配置用于验证用户设备UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；
    基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个短MAC-I、UE上下文标识I-RNTI。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，还包括：所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；
    并且，所述至少一个短MAC-I，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
  4. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个密钥、UE上下文标识I-RNTI、安全算法、原服务基站的PCI、原服务基站的C-RNTI。
  5. 根据权利要求4所述的方法，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，还包括：
    所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；
    并且，所述至少一个密钥，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
  6. 根据权利要求1-5任一项所述的方法，其中，所述配置用于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息，包括：
    接收第二网络设备发来的关于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；其中，所述第二网络设备为服务所述UE的原服务基站，且当所述第二网络设备在释放所述UE进入非激活态前，向所述第一网络设备发送用于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息。
  7. 根据权利要求1-5任一项所述的方法，其中，基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证，还包括：
    接收所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息；
    当存在所述UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息时，基于所述完整性保 护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证；
    当不存在所述UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息时，寻址所述UE对应的锚基站，使得所述锚基站执行对RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
  8. 根据权利要求1-3任一项所述的方法，其中，所述对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证，还包括：
    根据所述RRC恢复请求消息中所携带的UE标识信息，寻找存储的短MAC-I；
    基于所述短MAC-I进行完整性保护验证；
    当验证成功时，为所述UE寻址目标网络设备，进行所述UE上下文获取；
    当验证失败时，拒绝所述UE。
  9. 根据权利要求1、4或5任一项所述的方法，其中，所述对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证，还包括：
    根据所述RRC恢复请求消息中所携带的标识信息，寻找存储的密钥；
    至少基于所述密钥和所述安全算法计算得到短MAC-I；
    基于计算得到的所述短MAC-I进行完整性保护验证；
    当验证成功时，为所述UE寻址目标网络设备，进行所述UE上下文获取；
    当验证失败时，拒绝所述UE。
  10. 一种完整性验证方法，应用于第二网络设备，所述方法包括：
    当作为UE的原服务基站、且保存所述UE的上下文时，在释放所述UE进入非激活状态之前，向第一网络设备发送关于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的方法，其中，所述第一网络设备及小区，为RAN通知区域内的全部基站及其小区中的至少部分基站及小区中之一的基站及小区。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个短MAC-I、UE上下文标识I-RNTI。
  13. 根据权利要求12所述的方法，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，还包括：所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；
    并且，所述至少一个短MAC-I，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
  14. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个密钥、UE上下文标识I-RNTI、安全算法、原服务基站的PCI、原服务基站的C-RNTI。
  15. 根据权利要求14所述的方法，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，还包括：
    所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；
    并且，所述至少一个密钥，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
  16. 根据权利要求10-15任一项所述的方法，向第一网络设备发送关于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息之前，所述方法还包括：
    根据邻区的频域SSB配置信息计算至少一个SSB对应的密钥，以及对应的短MAC-I；
    或者
    根据邻区的频域SSB配置信息计算至少一个SSB对应的密钥。
  17. 一种完整性验证方法，应用于UE，所述方法包括：
    向第一网络设备发送RRC恢复请求消息。
  18. 根据权利要求17所述的方法，其中，所述向第一网络设备发送RRC恢复请求消息之前，所述方法还包括：
    根据当前SSB的ARFCN以及PCI信息，更新密钥并计算得到短MAC-I。
  19. 一种第一网络设备，包括：
    第一通信单元，配置用于验证用户设备UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；
    第一处理单元，基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
  20. 根据权利要求19所述的第一网络设备，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个短MAC-I、UE上下文标识I-RNTI。
  21. 根据权利要求20所述的第一网络设备，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，还包括：所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；
    并且，所述至少一个短MAC-I，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
  22. 根据权利要求19所述的第一网络设备，其中，所述完整性保护验 证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个密钥、UE上下文标识I-RNTI、安全算法、原服务基站的PCI、原服务基站的C-RNTI。
  23. 根据权利要求22所述的第一网络设备，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，还包括：
    所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；
    并且，所述至少一个密钥，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
  24. 根据权利要求19-23任一项所述的第一网络设备，其中，所述第一通信单元，接收第二网络设备发来的关于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；其中，所述第二网络设备为服务所述UE的原服务基站，且当所述第二网络设备在释放所述UE进入非激活态前，向所述第一网络设备发送用于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息。
  25. 根据权利要求19-23任一项所述的第一网络设备，其中，所述第一通信单元，接收所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息；
    第一处理单元，当存在所述UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息时，基于所述完整性保护验证的配置信息，对所述UE发来的RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证；
    当不存在所述UE对应的完整性保护验证配置信息时，寻址所述UE对应的锚基站，使得所述锚基站执行对RRC恢复请求消息进行完整性保护验证。
  26. 根据权利要求19-21任一项所述的第一网络设备，其中，所述第一处理单元，根据所述RRC恢复请求消息中所携带的UE标识信息，寻找存储的短MAC-I；基于所述短MAC-I进行完整性保护验证；当验证成功时，为所述UE寻址目标网络设备，进行所述UE上下文获取；当验证失败时，拒绝所述UE。
  27. 根据权利要求19、22或23任一项所述的第一网络设备，其中，所述第一处理单元，根据所述RRC恢复请求消息中所携带的标识信息，寻找存储的密钥；至少基于所述密钥和所述安全算法计算得到短MAC-I；基于计算得到的所述短MAC-I进行完整性保护验证；当验证成功时，为所述UE寻址目标网络设备，进行所述UE上下文获取；当验证失败时，拒绝所述UE。
  28. 一种第二网络设备，包括：
    第二处理单元，当作为UE的原服务基站、且保存所述UE的上下文时，在释放所述UE进入非激活状态之前，通过第二通信单元向第一网络设备发 送关于验证UE发起的RRC恢复请求消息的完整性保护验证配置信息；
    第二通信单元，向第一网络设备发送所述完整性保护验证配置信息。
  29. 根据权利要求28所述的第二网络设备，其中，所述第一网络设备及小区，为RAN通知区域内的全部基站及其小区中的至少部分基站及小区中之一的基站及小区。
  30. 根据权利要求29所述的第二网络设备，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个短MAC-I、UE上下文标识I-RNTI。
  31. 根据权利要求30所述的第二网络设备，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，还包括：所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；
    并且，所述至少一个短MAC-I，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
  32. 根据权利要求29所述的第二网络设备，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，包括以下至少之一：至少一个密钥、UE上下文标识I-RNTI、安全算法、原服务基站的PCI、原服务基站的C-RNTI。
  33. 根据权利要求32所述的第二网络设备，其中，所述完整性保护验证配置信息，还包括：
    所述第一网络设备管理的目标小区中频域范围包含的至少一个SSB所对应的SSB的标识信息；
    并且，所述至少一个密钥，与所述至少一个SSB的标识信息相对应。
  34. 根据权利要求28-33任一项所述的第二网络设备，第二处理单元，根据邻区的频域SSB配置信息计算至少一个SSB对应的密钥，以及对应的短MAC-I；
    或者
    根据邻区的频域SSB配置信息计算至少一个SSB对应的密钥。
  35. 一种UE，包括：
    第三通信单元，向第一网络设备发送RRC恢复请求消息。
  36. 根据权利要求35所述的UE，其中，所述UE还包括：
    第三处理单元，根据当前SSB的ARFCN以及PCI信息，更新密钥并计算得到短MAC-I。
  37. 一种网络设备，包括：处理器和用于存储能够在处理器上运行的计算机程序的存储器，
    其中，所述处理器用于运行所述计算机程序时，执行权利要求1-16任一项所述方法的步骤。
  38. 一种UE，包括：处理器和用于存储能够在处理器上运行的计算机程序的存储器，
    其中，所述处理器用于运行所述计算机程序时，执行权利要求17或18所述方法的步骤。
  39. 一种计算机存储介质，所述计算机存储介质存储有计算机可执行指令，所述计算机可执行指令被执行时实现权利要求1-18任一项所述的方法步骤。
PCT/CN2018/079684 2018-03-20 2018-03-20 一种完整性验证方法、网络设备、ue及计算机存储介质 WO2019178755A1 (zh)

Priority Applications (2)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/CN2018/079684 WO2019178755A1 (zh) 2018-03-20 2018-03-20 一种完整性验证方法、网络设备、ue及计算机存储介质
CN201880002951.9A CN109644354B (zh) 2018-03-20 2018-03-20 一种完整性验证方法、网络设备、ue及计算机存储介质

Applications Claiming Priority (1)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
PCT/CN2018/079684 WO2019178755A1 (zh) 2018-03-20 2018-03-20 一种完整性验证方法、网络设备、ue及计算机存储介质

Publications (1)

Publication Number Publication Date
WO2019178755A1 true WO2019178755A1 (zh) 2019-09-26

Family

ID=66060201

Family Applications (1)

Application Number Title Priority Date Filing Date
PCT/CN2018/079684 WO2019178755A1 (zh) 2018-03-20 2018-03-20 一种完整性验证方法、网络设备、ue及计算机存储介质

Country Status (2)

Country Link
CN (1) CN109644354B (zh)
WO (1) WO2019178755A1 (zh)

Cited By (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN112788795A (zh) * 2019-11-08 2021-05-11 华为技术有限公司 连接恢复方法及装置
WO2023071712A1 (zh) * 2021-10-29 2023-05-04 华为技术有限公司 一种安全通信方法和相关设备
WO2023083691A1 (en) * 2021-11-10 2023-05-19 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Generating an authentication token

Families Citing this family (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN111510924B (zh) * 2018-02-23 2021-10-01 Oppo广东移动通信有限公司 一种安全算法的确定方法及装置、计算机存储介质
CN115175181A (zh) * 2021-04-02 2022-10-11 华为技术有限公司 一种通信的方法及装置

Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102487507A (zh) * 2010-12-01 2012-06-06 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种实现完整性保护的方法及系统
WO2015018074A1 (en) * 2013-08-09 2015-02-12 Nokia Solutions And Networks Oy Methods and apparatus
WO2017123048A1 (en) * 2016-01-14 2017-07-20 Lg Electronics Inc. Method for connecting with network at ue in wireless communication system and apparatus therefor
CN107294723A (zh) * 2016-03-31 2017-10-24 中兴通讯股份有限公司 消息完整性认证信息的生成和验证方法、装置及验证系统

Family Cites Families (3)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102036243B (zh) * 2009-09-29 2015-07-15 北京三星通信技术研究有限公司 处理无线链路失败报告的方法
CN102238542A (zh) * 2010-04-20 2011-11-09 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种中继节点下用户设备的rrc重建方法和系统
CN101848536B (zh) * 2010-04-28 2012-09-05 新邮通信设备有限公司 一种无线资源控制连接重建立方法和一种基站

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN102487507A (zh) * 2010-12-01 2012-06-06 中兴通讯股份有限公司 一种实现完整性保护的方法及系统
WO2015018074A1 (en) * 2013-08-09 2015-02-12 Nokia Solutions And Networks Oy Methods and apparatus
WO2017123048A1 (en) * 2016-01-14 2017-07-20 Lg Electronics Inc. Method for connecting with network at ue in wireless communication system and apparatus therefor
CN107294723A (zh) * 2016-03-31 2017-10-24 中兴通讯股份有限公司 消息完整性认证信息的生成和验证方法、装置及验证系统

Non-Patent Citations (1)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
ERICSSON: "Security for RRC Connection Suspend and Resume Procedure in Solution 18 for Narrow Band CloT", 3GPP TSG-SA WG3 MEETING #82 , S 3-160157, 25 January 2016 (2016-01-25), XP051073117 *

Cited By (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
CN112788795A (zh) * 2019-11-08 2021-05-11 华为技术有限公司 连接恢复方法及装置
CN112788795B (zh) * 2019-11-08 2023-04-07 华为技术有限公司 连接恢复方法及装置
WO2023071712A1 (zh) * 2021-10-29 2023-05-04 华为技术有限公司 一种安全通信方法和相关设备
WO2023083691A1 (en) * 2021-11-10 2023-05-19 Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (Publ) Generating an authentication token

Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
CN109644354B (zh) 2021-10-26
CN109644354A (zh) 2019-04-16

Similar Documents

Publication Publication Date Title
WO2019178755A1 (zh) 一种完整性验证方法、网络设备、ue及计算机存储介质
RU2630175C2 (ru) Передача обслуживания вызовов между узлами системы сотовой связи, поддерживающими различные контексты безопасности
US20100002883A1 (en) Security procedure and apparatus for handover in a 3gpp long term evolution system
US8750515B2 (en) Method and system for generating an identifier of a key
EP3596985B1 (en) Method and apparatus for protection of privacy in paging of user equipment
WO2018126961A1 (zh) 通信的方法、接入网设备和终端
EP2293610A1 (en) Method and device for preventing loss of network security synchronization
US10917789B2 (en) Radio link recovery for user equipment
WO2019233444A1 (zh) 一种提高ue标识安全性的方法及装置、计算机存储介质
CN111385832A (zh) 用于从连接性问题恢复的方法和用户设备
CN108064459B (zh) 一种csfb的回落结果检测方法及装置、存储介质
US8995959B2 (en) Prevention of mismatch of authentication parameter in hybrid communication system
CN108064454B (zh) 一种csfb的回落结果检测方法及装置、存储介质
CN109792661B (zh) 一种csfb的回落结果检测方法及装置、计算机存储介质
JP6994040B2 (ja) 接続解放方法及び装置
WO2019061440A1 (zh) 一种csfb的回落结果检测方法及装置、存储介质
US11012870B2 (en) Technique for triggering mobility management specific procedure to avoid registration state mismatch between user equipment and network
CN112166645B (zh) 一种提高寻呼可靠性的方法及装置、计算机存储介质
CN105828399B (zh) 一种跟踪区更新方法及装置
CN108064461B (zh) 一种csfb的回落结果检测方法及装置、计算机存储介质
CN108235826B (zh) 一种csfb的回落结果检测方法及装置、计算机存储介质
WO2022067815A1 (zh) 一种通信方法、装置及设备
EP3174331B1 (en) Method and device for initiating mobility management process
CN108064455B (zh) 一种csfb的回落结果检测方法及装置、存储介质
KR102442520B1 (ko) RRC 연결에서 DoS 공격 대응 방법 및 서버

Legal Events

Date Code Title Description
121 Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application

Ref document number: 18910691

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1

NENP Non-entry into the national phase

Ref country code: DE

122 Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase

Ref document number: 18910691

Country of ref document: EP

Kind code of ref document: A1