WO2019148690A1 - 基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法 - Google Patents
基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法 Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- WO2019148690A1 WO2019148690A1 PCT/CN2018/086477 CN2018086477W WO2019148690A1 WO 2019148690 A1 WO2019148690 A1 WO 2019148690A1 CN 2018086477 W CN2018086477 W CN 2018086477W WO 2019148690 A1 WO2019148690 A1 WO 2019148690A1
- Authority
- WO
- WIPO (PCT)
- Prior art keywords
- channel
- information
- communication
- wireless channel
- private
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Ceased
Links
Images
Classifications
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0875—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords based on channel impulse response [CIR]
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/04—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks
- H04L63/0428—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload
- H04L63/0442—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for providing a confidential data exchange among entities communicating through data packet networks wherein the data content is protected, e.g. by encrypting or encapsulating the payload wherein the sending and receiving network entities apply asymmetric encryption, i.e. different keys for encryption and decryption
-
- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
- H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
- H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of information security transmission technologies, and in particular, to an information transmission method for quantizing a private asymmetric key based on wireless channel characteristics.
- the physical layer security technology Based on the characteristics of the wireless channel, the physical layer security technology mainly quantizes the characteristics of the wireless channel into a symmetric key of the communication, and then uses the key to encrypt the information transmitted by the upper layer.
- the obtained wireless channel characteristics are not the same. Therefore, in order to obtain a symmetric key, in the conventional physical layer security technology based on the wireless channel feature, an information reconciliation process needs to be introduced, and the information is mutually exchanged by the communication parties, thereby obtaining a key that is consistent between the two communication parties.
- the introduction of information reconciliation will inevitably leak the secret wireless channel characteristic information of both parties.
- channel error correction coding is mostly used for consideration in the process of information reconciliation for generating a symmetric key.
- channel error correction coding and security information transmission based on wireless channel feature key generation are not considered together.
- the present invention provides an information transmission method for quantifying a private asymmetric key based on wireless channel characteristics.
- the required information can be passed through the security based on the measured characteristics of the wireless channel.
- the method is passed to the other party, thereby avoiding the information reconciliation and privacy amplification process in the method of directly generating the key through the wireless channel feature in the past, and has better practicability.
- the present invention provides a method for quantifying the private based on the characteristics of the wireless channel.
- the asymmetric key information transmission method includes the following steps:
- step A the communication parties A and B measure the channel characteristics of each of the communication dual transmissions to the opposite channel through the pilot sequences transmitted by the two parties, and the communication parties quantize the measured wireless channel characteristics into a private key, the private key. Is an asymmetric key to both sides of the communication;
- Step B the communicating party A performs channel error correction coding by pre-processing the information to be transmitted, and generates a bit sequence after channel error correction coding;
- Step C The communicating party A performs the encoding operation of the channel error correction encoded bit sequence generated in step B and the private key obtained in step A to generate an encrypted data stream;
- Step D the communicating party A sends the encrypted data stream to the B through the public channel;
- step E the communicating party B performs a decoding operation on the data stream received from A using the private key obtained in step A;
- Step F The B party of the communication uses the channel coding and decoding algorithm to perform channel error correction coding and decoding on the data stream after the decoding operation in step E;
- step G the B party of the communication passes the bit sequence after the channel decoding and the processing reversed from the preprocessing process of step B to obtain the information transmitted by A to B.
- the pilot sequence in step A should be a frequency domain subcarrier pilot sequence in a multicarrier transmission system, or a time domain symbol sequence in a single carrier transmission system, and the channel characteristics in step A should be The measured frequency domain amplitude response characteristic of the channel or the measured time domain impulse response characteristic of the channel.
- the quantization process in step A is that when the channel characteristic is the channel frequency domain amplitude response characteristic, the frequency domain amplitude response of the channel should be The amplitude values of the different subcarriers are quantized into a bit sequence corresponding to the amplitude; when the channel characteristic is the channel time domain impulse response characteristic, the amplitude response amplitude value of the time domain impulse response of the channel at different time points should be quantized to the amplitude The corresponding bit sequence.
- the private key in step A should be quantized into a bit sequence by pre-processing the results of the corresponding channel measurements by the A and B parties of the communication.
- the step A preprocessing process comprises performing transform domain processing or principal component analysis processing on the result of the channel measurement, extracting a bit sequence with high consistency between A and B parties, and quantizing the measured channel characteristics into The bit sequence is extracted or arranged in a certain way.
- the pre-processing in step B includes the communication A party encrypting the information to be transmitted using the information already shared by the two communicating parties and the frame number of the transmission.
- the channel coding in step B includes a convolutional code, a turbo code, an RS code, an LDPC code, a Polar code, and converts the original transmission information into a code sequence longer than the original transmission information, and is used for A coding method that corrects bit errors during transmission.
- the encoding operation in step C includes performing a bit-by-bit XOR of the bit error-coded bit sequence generated by the communication A side in step B and the private key obtained by the communication A side in step A. operating.
- the decoding operation in step E includes performing a bit-by-bit XOR operation on the bit sequence transmitted by the communication A party in step D and the private key obtained by the communication B side in step A.
- the channel error correction coding and decoding in step F includes the communication B side correcting the bit decoded in step E using an error correction code to obtain a correct bit sequence before channel coding.
- the inverse operation in step G includes the communication B party decrypting the bit sequence decoded by the channel obtained in step F using the information already shared by the communicating parties and the frame number of the transmission.
- the invention provides an information transmission method for quantizing a private asymmetric key based on wireless channel characteristics.
- the present invention is different from the previous key generation method for the channel characteristics measured by the communication parties, and an information transmission method is designed. Since the information reconciliation process may reveal the secret shared channel information of both parties, adding the privacy amplification process will increase the overall complexity of the system.
- the method of the invention quantizes the measured channel characteristics into a private key, and directly performs an exclusive-OR operation with the channel-coded information to be transmitted, and then transmits the information to the other party.
- the other party performs an exclusive-OR operation on the private key obtained by quantizing the measured channel characteristics, and performs channel error correction encoding and decoding on the transmitted information to finally obtain the transmitted information.
- the communication parties can obtain secure information transmission through the wireless channel feature without using the information reconciliation process.
- Figure 1 is a flow chart of the system of the present invention
- FIG. 2 is a characteristic diagram of a frequency domain subcarrier amplitude channel obtained by using a wireless channel according to the present invention
- 3 is a diagram of channel quantization results obtained based on wireless channel characteristics of the present invention.
- Figure 5 is a diagram showing an example of the implementation of the system of the present invention.
- Figure 6 is a schematic diagram showing the safe transmission performance and eavesdropping results of the invention using the method of the invention in the presence of an eavesdropper.
- the present invention provides an information transmission method for quantifying a private asymmetric key based on a wireless channel feature.
- the required information can be transmitted to the other party in a secure manner based on the characteristics of the wireless channel measured by the communication parties, thereby avoiding
- the information reconciliation and privacy amplification process in the method of directly generating a key through the wireless channel feature has better practicability.
- the present invention provides a flowchart of a specific implementation system as shown in FIG.
- the communication parties Alice and Bob detect the pilot P through their respective channel characteristics, and measure the channel characteristics.
- the channel characteristic from Bob to Alice obtained by Alice is H BA
- the channel characteristic from Alice to Bob obtained by Bob is H AB .
- the frequency domain characteristics of the obtained wireless channel are as shown in FIG. 2. It can be seen from the figure that due to the difference of the wireless channels of the two communication parties and the difference of the respective devices of the communication parties, the frequency domain characteristics of the obtained wireless channels may be different.
- Alice and Bob respectively quantize the measured channel characteristics into the initially obtained private keys P A and P B .
- H BA ⁇ H AB due to the influence of the actual measurement, H BA ⁇ H AB , therefore, the actually obtained private key P A ⁇ P B .
- the process of obtaining a private key is shown in Figures 3 and 4. As can be seen in Figure 4, the 0/1 bit sequence in the private key finally obtained by Alice and Bob has some difference.
- Alice and Bob can obtain a highly random private key of length L by measuring the wireless channel multiple times.
- Alice selects the information M that needs to be sent to Bob, and Alice adds the transmitted frame number F after the message M, and combines it into the information MF.
- Alice encrypts the information MF by using the key K shared with Bob in advance to obtain information.
- Alice selects a channel error correction coding algorithm whose code rate is c, that is, the information length after channel error correction coding is 1/c of the original transmission information length.
- Alice will information Channel coding information obtained by channel coding among them, The length is L.
- a bit-by-bit XOR operation is performed to obtain the sequence S to be transmitted.
- Alice transmits sequence S to Bob over a common channel.
- Bob passes its private key XORing with the received sequence S to solve the information
- Bob uses channel error correction coding and decoding algorithm to obtain information Decoding to obtain information after error correction
- Bob will pass the information with the key K shared with Alice in advance.
- Decryption is performed to obtain the information MF, and finally the information M delivered by Alice is extracted.
- FIG. 6 An example of the overall system implementation of the method of the present invention described above is shown in FIG.
- the transmission performance of the secure information transmission using the inventive method and the performance of the eavesdropper attempting to decode the transmitted information through the eavesdropping channel are as shown in FIG. 6.
- the packet error rate of the secure information transmission using the inventive method is less than 10%, and information security can be achieved.
- the packet error rate of the information decoding after eavesdropping by the eavesdropper is 100%, and the transmitted information cannot be correctly decoded.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
- Signal Processing (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Computing Systems (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Mobile Radio Communication Systems (AREA)
Abstract
本发明介绍了一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法。由通信双方测量无线信道特征,提取出各自的私有密钥。通信的一方使用私有密钥对需要传输的信息先进行信道编码后再进行异或操作,实现对传输信息的加密。接收方使用其私有密钥对接收的信息进行异或操作,实现对传输信息的解密。由于无线信道和设备特征的影响,通信双方的私有密钥可能不对称,即有一定的差异。接收方解密的信息需要再使用信道纠错译码,解出正确的传输信息。使用该方法可以不需要通过额外的信息调和和隐私放大过程,实现共享无线信道特征的安全信息传输。
Description
本发明涉及信息安全传送技术领域,特别是涉及一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法。
基于无线信道特征物理层安全技术主要是基于测量无线信道的特征将其量化成通信双方对称的密钥,再使用其密钥加密上层传输的信息。然而,在实际的通信系统中,由于通信双方的通信链路可能存在着些许的差别,获得的无线信道特征不尽相同。因此,为了能够获得对称的密钥,在以往的基于无线信道特征物理层安全技术中需要引入信息调和过程,通过通信双方交互信息调和信息,从而获得通信双方一致的密钥。然而,引入信息调和将不可避免的泄漏通信双方秘密的无线信道特征信息。为了能够解决信息调和带来的双方秘密的无线信道特征信息的泄漏,通信双方还需要进一步通过隐私放大过程来保护最终获得密钥的安全性和随机性。因此,这些过程将增加最终获得密钥的复杂度。此外,在现有的基于无线信道特征的密钥生成技术体制中,信道纠错编码大多被用于考虑在信息调和的过程中使用,用于生成对称的密钥。在现有的研究中,并没有将将信道纠错编码和基于无线信道特征密钥生成的安全信息传输结合在一起考虑。
发明内容
为了解决上述存在的问题,本发明提供一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,通过本发明方法,可以基于通信双方测量得到的无线信道特征,将需要的信息通过安全的方式传递给对方,从而避免在以往通过无线信道特征直接生成密钥方法中的信息调和和隐私放大过程,具有更好的实用性,为达此目的,本发明提供一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,包括了以下步骤:
步骤A,通信双方A和B通过各自发射的导频序列,测量通信双发各自到对方信道的信道特征,通信双方将各自测量得到的无线信道特征量化成一种私有密钥,所述私有密钥是通信双方不对称的密钥;
步骤B,通信的A方将需要传输的信息通过预处理后进行信道纠错编码,生成信道纠错编码后的比特序列;
步骤C,通信的A方将步骤B中生成的信道纠错编码后的比特序列和步骤A中得到的私有密钥进行编码操作,生成加密后的数据流;
步骤D,通信的A方将加密后的数据流通过公开信道发送给B;
步骤E,通信的B方使用在步骤A获得的私有密钥对从A接收到的数据流进行解码 操作;
步骤F,通信的B方使用信道编码解码算法对步骤E进行解码操作后的数据流进行信道纠错编码解码;
步骤G,通信的B方将信道解码后的比特序列进过和步骤B预处理过程相逆的处理后得到A传输给B的信息。
本发明的进一步改进,步骤A中的导频序列应是多载波传输系统中的频域子载波导频序列,或者是单载波传输系统中的时域符号序列,步骤A中的信道特征应是测量得到的信道频域幅度响应特征,或者是测量得到的信道时域冲击响应特征,步骤A中的量化过程为,当信道特征为信道频域幅度响应特征时,应将信道的频域幅度响应特征在不同子载波的幅度值量化为与幅度对应的比特序列;当信道特征为信道时域冲击响应特征时,应将信道的时域冲击响应在不同时间点的冲击响应幅度值量化为与幅度对应的比特序列。
本发明的进一步改进,步骤A中的私有密钥,应由通信的A和B方将相应的信道测量的结果,通过预处理后量化成比特序列。
本发明的进一步改进,步骤A预处理过程包括了将信道测量的结果进行变换域处理或主成份分析处理,提取出A和B方一致性较高的比特序列并将测量的信道特征量化成的比特序列通过一定的方式进行抽取或排列组合变化。
本发明的进一步改进,步骤B中的预处理包括了通信A方使用通信双方已经共有的信息和传输的帧序号对需要传输的信息进行加密处理。
本发明的进一步改进,步骤B中的信道编码,包括了卷积码,Turbo码,RS码,LDPC码,Polar码,并将原传输信息转化为比原传输信息更长的码序列,用于纠正传输过程中比特错误的编码方法。
本发明的进一步改进,步骤C中的编码操作,包括了将步骤B中通信A方生成的信道纠错编码后的比特序列和步骤A中通信A方得到的私有密钥进行逐个比特的异或操作。
本发明的进一步改进,步骤E中的解码操作,包括了将步骤D中由通信A方传输来的比特序列和步骤A中通信B方得到的私有密钥进行逐个比特的异或操作。
本发明的进一步改进,步骤F中的信道纠错编码解码,包括了通信B方使用纠错码将步骤E解码后的比特进行纠正,获得正确的信道编码前的比特序列。
本发明的进一步改进,步骤G中的逆操作,包括了通信B方使用通信双方已经共有的信息和传输的帧序号对在步骤F中获得的信道解码的比特序列进行解密处理。
本发明提供一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,针对通信双方测量获得的信道特征,本发明不同于以往的密钥生成方法,设计了一种信息传输方法。由于信息调和过程有可能泄露双方秘密的共享信道信息,加入隐私放大过程后将增加系统整体的复杂度。本发明方法将测量得到的信道特征量化成私有密钥,直接和经过信道编码的需要传输的信息进行异或操作后传输给对方。对方通过将测量得到的信道特征量化成的私有密钥进行异或操作后对传输的信息进行信道纠错编码解码,最终获得传输的信息。通过该方法可以不借助于信息调和过程实现通信双方通过无线信道特征获得安全的信息传输。
图1为本发明系统流程图;
图2为本发明基于无线信道得到的频域子载波幅度信道特征图;
图3为本发明基于无线信道特征得到的信道量化结果图;
图4为本发明基于无线信道量化结果得到的密钥比特图;
图5为本发明系统实施的实例图;
图6为本发明使用该发明方法在有窃听者情况下的安全传输性能和窃听结果示意图。
下面结合附图与具体实施方式对本发明作进一步详细描述:
本发明提供一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,通过本发明方法,可以基于通信双方测量得到的无线信道特征,将需要的信息通过安全的方式传递给对方,从而避免在以往通过无线信道特征直接生成密钥方法中的信息调和和隐私放大过程,具有更好的实用性。
作为本发明一种实施例,本发明提供具体实施系统流程图如图1所示示意图。
首先通信双方Alice和Bob通过各自的信道特征探测导频P,测量信道特征。在本实施例中,考虑Alice和Bob基于无线信道在频域的幅度特征。通过信道探测导频P,Alice获得的从Bob至Alice的信道特征为H
BA,Bob获得的从Alice至Bob的信道特征为H
AB。其获得的无线信道频域特征如图2所示。从图中可以看出,由于通信双方无线信道的差异以及通信双方各自器件的差异,其获得的无线信道频域特征会有一定的差异。
Alice和Bob分别将测量得到的信道特征量化成初步获得的私有密钥P
A和P
B。其中,由于受到实际测量的影响,H
BA≈H
AB,因此,实际获得的私有密钥P
A≈P
B。其获得私有密钥的过程如图3和图4所示。在图4中可以看到,Alice和Bob最终获得的私有密钥中的0/1比特序列具有一定的差异。
因此,在本实施例中,我们允许P
A和P
B大部分的比特相同,但允许P
A和P
B有少量的比特不同。此外,Alice和Bob为了能够提高私有密钥的随机性,可以对初步获得私有密钥P
A和P
B进行抽取操作,即;
其中D为抽取深度。
Alice选择需要发送给Bob的信息M,Alice在信息M后加入传输的帧序号F,组合成信息MF。Alice通过和Bob事先共享的密钥K,将信息MF进行加密,获得信息
Alice选择一种信道纠错编码算法,该信道编码算法的码率为c,即信道纠错编码后的信息长度为原传输信息长度的1/c。Alice将信息
通过信道编码,获得信道编码后的信息
其中,
的长度为L。
上述的本发明方法整体系统实施实例图如图5所示。利用该发明方法进行安全信息传输的传输性能和窃听者通过窃听信道尝试解码传输信息的性能如图6所示。由图中所示,当以256比特为一组进行信息传输,传输环境的信噪比高于15dB时,使用该发明方法进行安全信息传输的分组错误率低于10%,可以实现信息的安全传输。而窃听者窃听后进行信息解码的分组错误率为100%,无法正确解出传输的信息。
以上所述,仅是本发明的较佳实施例而已,并非是对本发明作任何其他形式的限制,而依据本发明的技术实质所作的任何修改或等同变化,仍属于本发明所要求保护的范围。
Claims (10)
- 一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,包括了以下步骤,其特征在于:步骤A,通信双方A和B通过各自发射的导频序列,测量通信双发各自到对方信道的信道特征,通信双方将各自测量得到的无线信道特征量化成一种私有密钥,所述私有密钥是通信双方不对称的密钥;步骤B,通信的A方将需要传输的信息通过预处理后进行信道纠错编码,生成信道纠错编码后的比特序列;步骤C,通信的A方将步骤B中生成的信道纠错编码后的比特序列和步骤A中得到的私有密钥进行编码操作,生成加密后的数据流;步骤D,通信的A方将加密后的数据流通过公开信道发送给B;步骤E,通信的B方使用在步骤A获得的私有密钥对从A接收到的数据流进行解码操作;步骤F,通信的B方使用信道编码解码算法对步骤E进行解码操作后的数据流进行信道纠错编码解码;步骤G,通信的B方将信道解码后的比特序列进过和步骤B预处理过程相逆的处理后得到A传输给B的信息。
- 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,其特征在于:步骤A中的导频序列应是多载波传输系统中的频域子载波导频序列,或者是单载波传输系统中的时域符号序列,步骤A中的信道特征应是测量得到的信道频域幅度响应特征,或者是测量得到的信道时域冲击响应特征,步骤A中的量化过程为,当信道特征为信道频域幅度响应特征时,应将信道的频域幅度响应特征在不同子载波的幅度值量化为与幅度对应的比特序列;当信道特征为信道时域冲击响应特征时,应将信道的时域冲击响应在不同时间点的冲击响应幅度值量化为与幅度对应的比特序列。
- 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,其特征在于,步骤A中的私有密钥,应由通信的A和B方将相应的信道测量的结果,通过预处理后量化成比特序列。
- 根据权利要求3所述的一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,其特征在于,步骤A预处理过程包括了将信道测量的结果进行变换域处理或主成份分析处理,提取出A和B方一致性较高的比特序列并将测量的信道特征量化成的比特序列通过一定的方式进行抽取或排列组合变化。
- 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,其特征在于,步骤B中的预处理包括了通信A方使用通信双方已经共有的信息和传输的帧序号对需要传输的信息进行加密处理。
- 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,其特征在于,步骤B中的信道编码,包括了卷积码,Turbo码,RS码,LDPC码,Polar码,并将原传输信息转化为比原传输信息更长的码序列,用于纠正传输过程中比特错误的编码方法。
- 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,其特征在于,步骤C中的编码操作,包括了将步骤B中通信A方生成的信道纠错编码后的比特序列和步骤A中通信A方得到的私有密钥进行逐个比特的异或操作。
- 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,其特征在于,步骤E中的解码操作,包括了将步骤D中由通信A方传输来的比特序列和步骤A中通信B方得到的私有密钥进行逐个比特的异或操作。
- 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,其特征在于,步骤F中的信道纠错编码解码,包括了通信B方使用纠错码将步骤E解码后的比特进行纠正,获得正确的信道编码前的比特序列。
- 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法,其特征在于,步骤G中的逆操作,包括了通信B方使用通信双方已经共有的信息和传输的帧序号对在步骤F中获得的信道解码的比特序列进行解密处理。
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
| Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
|---|---|---|---|
| CN201810105180.8 | 2018-02-02 | ||
| CN201810105180.8A CN108366370B (zh) | 2018-02-02 | 2018-02-02 | 一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法 |
Publications (1)
| Publication Number | Publication Date |
|---|---|
| WO2019148690A1 true WO2019148690A1 (zh) | 2019-08-08 |
Family
ID=63004238
Family Applications (1)
| Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
|---|---|---|---|
| PCT/CN2018/086477 Ceased WO2019148690A1 (zh) | 2018-02-02 | 2018-05-11 | 基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法 |
Country Status (2)
| Country | Link |
|---|---|
| CN (1) | CN108366370B (zh) |
| WO (1) | WO2019148690A1 (zh) |
Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN115765994A (zh) * | 2022-11-07 | 2023-03-07 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | 基于静态信道的密钥提取方法 |
| EP4451760A4 (en) * | 2022-01-27 | 2025-03-26 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | METHOD AND DEVICE FOR PERFORMING DISTANCE MEASUREMENT IN UWB AND READABLE STORAGE MEDIUM |
| EP4617704A4 (en) * | 2022-12-09 | 2026-01-21 | Huawei Tech Co Ltd | METHOD FOR MEASURING DISTANCE AND ASSOCIATED APPARATUS |
Families Citing this family (11)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN110071801B (zh) * | 2019-04-24 | 2021-09-07 | 东南大学 | 一种结合bbbss协议与bch码的生成密钥部分调和方法 |
| CN110086616B (zh) * | 2019-05-10 | 2021-07-16 | 南京东科优信网络安全技术研究院有限公司 | 基于无线信道的前向一次一密保密通信方法 |
| CN110336657B (zh) * | 2019-07-03 | 2022-02-08 | 上海大学 | 一种基于信道特性的光ofdm动态密钥生成方法 |
| CN111404587B (zh) * | 2020-03-12 | 2022-04-01 | 东南大学 | 一种基于共轭预编码的多用户mimo对称信道特征获取方法 |
| CN112104459B (zh) * | 2020-09-10 | 2023-05-12 | 国网江苏省电力有限公司信息通信分公司 | 一种基于信道指纹与辅助数据的密钥生成方法 |
| CN112533199A (zh) * | 2020-11-25 | 2021-03-19 | 南京熊猫电子股份有限公司 | 基于usrp的ofdm信道物理密钥生成方法、装置和计算机设备 |
| CN112532328B (zh) * | 2021-02-07 | 2021-05-14 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | 一种信道特征量化方法、装置、电子设备及存储介质 |
| CN112906874B (zh) * | 2021-04-06 | 2024-08-23 | 南京大学 | 卷积神经网络特征图数据压缩方法及装置 |
| CN114040392A (zh) * | 2021-11-04 | 2022-02-11 | 东南大学 | 一种可应用于非协调无线信道密钥生成系统的基于中位数非均匀归一化的均匀量化方法 |
| CN116842096A (zh) * | 2022-03-25 | 2023-10-03 | 陕西天朗嘉业科技发展有限公司 | 基于区块链的静态数字映射识别服务方法及平台 |
| CN115883071B (zh) * | 2022-11-09 | 2026-04-14 | 中国人民解放军网络空间部队信息工程大学 | 一种加密通信及密钥纠错方法和装置 |
Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20140153723A1 (en) * | 2012-06-01 | 2014-06-05 | Georgia Tech Research Corporation | System for providing physical layer security |
| CN104219252A (zh) * | 2014-09-28 | 2014-12-17 | 东南大学 | 基于纠错编码的密钥前向一致性校验方法 |
| CN106878012A (zh) * | 2016-12-07 | 2017-06-20 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | 一种无线信道物理层密钥协商与不一致比特去除方法 |
Family Cites Families (4)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CN105024824B (zh) * | 2014-11-05 | 2018-12-21 | 浙江码博士防伪科技有限公司 | 基于非对称加密算法的可信标签的生成与验证方法及系统 |
| CN104717074B (zh) * | 2015-04-02 | 2019-06-25 | 东南大学 | 一种融合私有信息的共享密钥安全通信方法 |
| CN106102049B (zh) * | 2016-06-06 | 2019-02-05 | 东南大学 | 一种利用信道特性的安全传输消息方法 |
| CN106211149B (zh) * | 2016-07-08 | 2019-04-30 | 东南大学 | 基于主成分分析的信道互易性增强方法 |
-
2018
- 2018-02-02 CN CN201810105180.8A patent/CN108366370B/zh not_active Expired - Fee Related
- 2018-05-11 WO PCT/CN2018/086477 patent/WO2019148690A1/zh not_active Ceased
Patent Citations (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US20140153723A1 (en) * | 2012-06-01 | 2014-06-05 | Georgia Tech Research Corporation | System for providing physical layer security |
| CN104219252A (zh) * | 2014-09-28 | 2014-12-17 | 东南大学 | 基于纠错编码的密钥前向一致性校验方法 |
| CN106878012A (zh) * | 2016-12-07 | 2017-06-20 | 中国电子科技集团公司第三十研究所 | 一种无线信道物理层密钥协商与不一致比特去除方法 |
Cited By (3)
| Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| EP4451760A4 (en) * | 2022-01-27 | 2025-03-26 | Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. | METHOD AND DEVICE FOR PERFORMING DISTANCE MEASUREMENT IN UWB AND READABLE STORAGE MEDIUM |
| CN115765994A (zh) * | 2022-11-07 | 2023-03-07 | 中国人民解放军国防科技大学 | 基于静态信道的密钥提取方法 |
| EP4617704A4 (en) * | 2022-12-09 | 2026-01-21 | Huawei Tech Co Ltd | METHOD FOR MEASURING DISTANCE AND ASSOCIATED APPARATUS |
Also Published As
| Publication number | Publication date |
|---|---|
| CN108366370A (zh) | 2018-08-03 |
| CN108366370B (zh) | 2019-08-02 |
Similar Documents
| Publication | Publication Date | Title |
|---|---|---|
| CN108366370B (zh) | 一种基于无线信道特征量化私有不对称密钥的信息传输方法 | |
| CN1104119C (zh) | 基于信道特征的安全通信的装置与方法 | |
| Wu et al. | Channel-based dynamic key generation for physical layer security in OFDM-PON systems | |
| CN112533199A (zh) | 基于usrp的ofdm信道物理密钥生成方法、装置和计算机设备 | |
| CN111970693B (zh) | 一种低复杂度的LoRa物联网基于物理层波形的安全加密方法 | |
| CN105556880A (zh) | 用于安全通信的方法和装置 | |
| CN108696867B (zh) | 基于无线信道特征的轻量级组密钥分发方法 | |
| US9608802B2 (en) | Decoy bits method for direct encryption and key generation | |
| CN101507173A (zh) | 无线通信网络中产生完美秘钥 | |
| WO2008013008A1 (fr) | Procédé de communication secrète et dispositif de communication secrète de celui-ci | |
| CN110086616B (zh) | 基于无线信道的前向一次一密保密通信方法 | |
| CN118573372A (zh) | 基于量子技术的光纤安全通信方法及系统 | |
| CN111092733A (zh) | 一种抵抗集体噪声的量子盲双重签名的方法 | |
| CN106027231B (zh) | 一种在量子密钥分发后的处理中对误码进行级联纠错的方法 | |
| CN105846947A (zh) | 一种引入拉丁阵的物理层加密方法 | |
| CN115102819A (zh) | 基于酉矩阵变换的正交时频空安全传输方法、装置和设备 | |
| CN110971399A (zh) | 用于光网络物理层密钥分发的后处理方法和装置 | |
| CN110336657B (zh) | 一种基于信道特性的光ofdm动态密钥生成方法 | |
| Mihaljević et al. | An approach for stream ciphers design based on joint computing over random and secret data | |
| TWI487308B (zh) | 量子通訊方法 | |
| CN115396102B (zh) | 一种基于分块和循环码的物理层密钥生成方法 | |
| CN115834126B (zh) | 一种工程电子档案加密传输方法 | |
| CN108683500A (zh) | 一种基于信道特性的wban隐私保护方法 | |
| Ni et al. | PHY‐Aided Secure Communication via Weighted Fractional Fourier Transform | |
| CN117336715A (zh) | 一种基于无线信道直接加密的物理层安全通信方法 |
Legal Events
| Date | Code | Title | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| 121 | Ep: the epo has been informed by wipo that ep was designated in this application |
Ref document number: 18904222 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |
|
| NENP | Non-entry into the national phase |
Ref country code: DE |
|
| 122 | Ep: pct application non-entry in european phase |
Ref document number: 18904222 Country of ref document: EP Kind code of ref document: A1 |