WO2019085908A1 - 一种rrc连接恢复方法及装置 - Google Patents

一种rrc连接恢复方法及装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019085908A1
WO2019085908A1 PCT/CN2018/112770 CN2018112770W WO2019085908A1 WO 2019085908 A1 WO2019085908 A1 WO 2019085908A1 CN 2018112770 W CN2018112770 W CN 2018112770W WO 2019085908 A1 WO2019085908 A1 WO 2019085908A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
integrity protection
algorithm
terminal
connection recovery
base station
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PCT/CN2018/112770
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
胡力
李秉肇
徐小英
陈璟
李�赫
Original Assignee
华为技术有限公司
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
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Publication date
Application filed by 华为技术有限公司 filed Critical 华为技术有限公司
Priority to EP18874270.4A priority Critical patent/EP3694244B1/en
Publication of WO2019085908A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019085908A1/zh
Priority to US16/859,699 priority patent/US11564099B2/en

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/10—Connection setup
    • H04W76/19—Connection re-establishment
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H04W12/106—Packet or message integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/14—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using a plurality of keys or algorithms
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/03—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption
    • H04W12/037—Protecting confidentiality, e.g. by encryption of the control plane, e.g. signalling traffic
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/04—Key management, e.g. using generic bootstrapping architecture [GBA]
    • H04W12/041—Key generation or derivation
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/10—Integrity
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W36/00—Hand-off or reselection arrangements
    • H04W36/08—Reselecting an access point
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W76/00—Connection management
    • H04W76/20—Manipulation of established connections
    • H04W76/27—Transitions between radio resource control [RRC] states
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/20—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general
    • H04L63/205—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for managing network security; network security policies in general involving negotiation or determination of the one or more network security mechanisms to be used, e.g. by negotiation between the client and the server or between peers or by selection according to the capabilities of the entities involved
    • Y—GENERAL TAGGING OF NEW TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS; GENERAL TAGGING OF CROSS-SECTIONAL TECHNOLOGIES SPANNING OVER SEVERAL SECTIONS OF THE IPC; TECHNICAL SUBJECTS COVERED BY FORMER USPC CROSS-REFERENCE ART COLLECTIONS [XRACs] AND DIGESTS
    • Y02—TECHNOLOGIES OR APPLICATIONS FOR MITIGATION OR ADAPTATION AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE
    • Y02D—CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION TECHNOLOGIES IN INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES [ICT], I.E. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AIMING AT THE REDUCTION OF THEIR OWN ENERGY USE
    • Y02D30/00—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks
    • Y02D30/70—Reducing energy consumption in communication networks in wireless communication networks

Definitions

  • the present application relates to the field of mobile communications technologies, and in particular, to an RRC connection recovery method and apparatus.
  • the suspend and resume process can be used for narrowband internet of things (NB-IoT) terminals, ie, IoT devices with low mobility or low power consumption.
  • NB-IoT narrowband internet of things
  • IoT devices with low mobility or low power consumption.
  • the terminal and the base station When the base station informs the terminal to release the current connection in a suspended manner, the terminal and the base station delete the context of the part of the access layer, and also retain the context of the part of the access layer, such as the access layer key, the security capability of the terminal, and the current Selected security algorithms, etc.
  • the terminal then enters an inactive state from the connected state. When the terminal wishes to resume the connection with the base station, it can quickly recover from the inactive state to the connected state.
  • the above service flow can be extended to apply the suspend and resume process to an enhanced mobile broadband (eMBB) terminal such as a smart phone.
  • eMBB enhanced mobile broadband
  • the present application provides an RRC connection recovery method and apparatus, in order to improve security and flexibility when a terminal recovers from an inactive state to a connected state.
  • the present application provides an RRC connection recovery method, including: a terminal sends a connection recovery request message to a target base station, where a connection recovery request message is used to request restoration of a radio resource control RRC connection; and the terminal acquires a first encryption algorithm from a target base station. And a first integrity protection algorithm, where the first encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station, and the first integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station; the terminal is based on the first encryption algorithm The first integrity protection algorithm and the connection recovery complete message obtain a protected connection recovery complete message, and the connection recovery complete message is used to indicate that the RRC connection recovery is complete; the terminal sends a protected connection recovery complete message to the target base station.
  • the terminal when the terminal moves to the target base station, the terminal sends a connection recovery request message to the target base station, and then the target base station reselects the first encryption algorithm used when communicating with the terminal according to the capabilities and requirements of the target base station itself. And a first integrity protection algorithm, and sending the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal.
  • the security algorithm used for flexible selection of communication between the terminal and the target base station is realized; on the other hand, since the base station to which the terminal is connected has changed, the communication algorithm can be improved by using a new encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm. Sex.
  • the terminal acquires the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station, including: the terminal receives a connection recovery response message from the target base station, and the connection recovery response message includes a first encryption algorithm and a An integrity protection algorithm, the connection recovery response message is used to instruct the terminal to restore the RRC connection, the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the second encryption key, the second encryption key is generated according to the second encryption algorithm, and the second encryption algorithm is the terminal and the And an encryption algorithm negotiated between the source base stations; the terminal generates a second encryption key according to the second encryption algorithm, and decrypts the connection recovery response message according to the second encryption key and the second encryption algorithm.
  • the terminal acquires the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the decrypted connection recovery response message.
  • connection recovery response message is integrity protected according to the second integrity protection key and the second integrity protection algorithm
  • second integrity protection key is according to the second integrity protection algorithm.
  • the second integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the source base station. The terminal generates a second integrity protection key according to the second integrity protection algorithm; the terminal performs integrity verification on the connection recovery response message according to the second integrity protection key and the second integrity protection algorithm.
  • the terminal acquires the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station, including: the terminal receives the connection recovery response message from the target base station, and the first encryption algorithm, where the connection recovery response message includes a first integrity protection algorithm, the connection recovery response message is used to instruct the terminal to restore the RRC connection, and the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the first encryption key and the first encryption algorithm, and the first encryption key is generated according to the first encryption algorithm; Obtaining a first encryption algorithm, and generating a first encryption key according to the first encryption algorithm; the terminal decrypting the connection recovery response message according to the first encryption key and the first encryption algorithm, and acquiring the first from the decrypted connection recovery response message Integrity protection algorithm.
  • the terminal acquires the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station, including: the terminal receives the connection recovery response message from the target base station, the first encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection.
  • the algorithm, the connection recovery response message is used to instruct the terminal to restore the RRC connection, and the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the first encryption key and the first encryption algorithm, and the first encryption key is generated according to the first encryption algorithm.
  • connection recovery response message is integrity protected according to the first integrity protection key and the first integrity protection algorithm, and the first integrity protection key is according to the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the terminal generates a first integrity protection key according to the first integrity protection algorithm; the terminal performs integrity verification on the connection recovery response message according to the first integrity protection key and the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the terminal acquires the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station, including: the terminal receives the first message from the target base station, where the first message includes the first encryption algorithm and the first Integrity protection algorithm.
  • the terminal after receiving the first message from the target base station, the terminal further includes: the terminal receiving a connection recovery response message from the target base station, where the connection recovery response message is used to indicate that the terminal resumes the RRC connection, and the connection is restored.
  • the response message is secured according to the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the first message is integrity protected according to the first integrity protection key and the first integrity protection algorithm, and the first integrity protection key is generated according to the first integrity protection algorithm. And further comprising: the terminal generating a first integrity protection key according to the first integrity protection algorithm; the terminal performing integrity verification on the first message according to the first integrity protection key and the first integrity protection algorithm .
  • the first message further includes first indication information, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the terminal does not update the access layer key; and the terminal generates the first according to the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the integrity protection key includes: the terminal generates a first integrity protection key according to the current access layer key and the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the terminal determines that the first message does not include the second indication information, where the second indication information is used to instruct the terminal to update the access layer key, and the terminal according to the first integrity protection algorithm, The first integrity protection key is generated, and the terminal generates the first integrity protection key according to the current access layer key and the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the method further includes: the terminal sending a second message to the target base station, where the second message is used to respond to the first message.
  • the first message is a security mode command message or an RRC reconfiguration message.
  • the above several possible designs provide several methods for implementing the base station to transmit the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection key to the terminal. In practical applications, it can be flexibly selected according to actual needs.
  • the present application provides an RRC connection recovery method, including: a terminal sends a connection recovery request message to a target base station, where the connection recovery request message is used to request restoration of a radio resource control RRC connection; if the terminal does not receive the first base station from the target base station An encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm obtain a protected connection recovery complete message according to the second encryption algorithm, the second integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery complete message; or, if the terminal receives the first from the target base station An encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm obtain a protected connection recovery completion message according to the first encryption algorithm, the first integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery completion message; the terminal sends the protected connection recovery completion to the target base station.
  • a terminal sends a connection recovery request message to a target base station, where the connection recovery request message is used to request restoration of a radio resource control RRC connection; if the terminal does not receive the first base station from the target base station An encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm obtain a protected connection recovery complete message according to the second encryption
  • the first encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station
  • the first integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station
  • the second encryption algorithm is a terminal and the The encryption algorithm negotiated between the source base stations
  • the second integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the source base station
  • the connection recovery complete message is used to indicate that the restoration of the RRC connection is completed.
  • the terminal when the terminal moves to the target base station, the terminal sends a connection recovery request message to the target base station, and then the target base station reselects the first encryption algorithm used when communicating with the terminal according to the capabilities and requirements of the target base station itself. And the first integrity protection algorithm. If the target base station determines that the first encryption algorithm is the same as the second encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection algorithm is the same as the second integrity protection algorithm, the selected first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are not sent to the middle. Correspondingly, if the terminal determines that the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are not received, the terminal uses the second encryption algorithm and the second integrity protection algorithm to generate a protected connection recovery complete message.
  • the target base station determines that the first encryption algorithm is different from the second encryption algorithm, or the first integrity protection algorithm is different from the second integrity protection algorithm, sending the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal, and correspondingly If the terminal determines that the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are received, the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are used to generate a protected connection recovery complete message.
  • the security algorithm used for flexible selection of communication between the terminal and the target base station is realized; on the other hand, since the base station to which the terminal is connected has changed, the communication algorithm can be improved by using a new encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm. Sex.
  • the target base station determines that the first encryption algorithm is the same as the second encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection algorithm is the same as the second integrity protection algorithm, the target base station does not send the first encryption algorithm and the first complete to the terminal.
  • Sexual protection algorithms can save money.
  • the present application provides an RRC connection recovery method, including: receiving, by a target base station, a connection recovery request message from a terminal, where the connection recovery request message is used to request restoration of a radio resource control RRC connection; and the target base station selects according to a security capability of the terminal.
  • the security capability of the terminal includes an encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm supported by the terminal; the target base station sends a first encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal; and the target base station receives the terminal from the terminal.
  • the protected connection recovery complete message and according to the protected connection recovery complete message, the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm, obtains a connection recovery complete message, and the connection recovery complete message is used to indicate that the restoration of the RRC connection is completed.
  • the target base station when the terminal moves to the target base station, the target base station receives the connection recovery request message sent by the terminal, and then the target base station reselects the first encryption used when communicating with the terminal according to the capability and requirements of the target base station itself.
  • the algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm and send the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal.
  • the security algorithm used for flexible selection of communication between the terminal and the target base station is realized; on the other hand, since the base station to which the terminal is connected has changed, the communication algorithm can be improved by using a new encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm. Sex.
  • the method further includes: the target base station receives a second encryption algorithm from the source base station, and the second encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the source base station.
  • the target base station sends the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal, including: the target base station generates a second encryption key according to the second encryption algorithm.
  • the target base station encrypts the connection recovery response message according to the second encryption key and the second encryption algorithm, where the connection recovery response message includes a first encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery response message is used to instruct the terminal to resume the RRC connection.
  • the target base station transmits an encrypted connection recovery response message to the terminal.
  • the method further includes: the target base station generates a second integrity protection key according to the second integrity protection algorithm, where the second integrity protection algorithm is a negotiated integrity between the terminal and the source base station.
  • the protection algorithm the target base station performs integrity protection on the connection recovery response message according to the second integrity protection key and the second integrity protection algorithm.
  • the target base station sends the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal, including: the target base station generates a first encryption key according to the first encryption algorithm; and the target base station according to the first encryption key And the first encryption algorithm encrypts the connection recovery response message, where the connection recovery response message includes a first integrity protection algorithm, the connection recovery response message is used to instruct the terminal to restore the RRC connection; and the target base station sends a connection recovery response message to the terminal.
  • An encryption algorithm is used to instruct the terminal to restore the RRC connection.
  • the target base station sends the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal, including: the target base station generates a first encryption key according to the first encryption algorithm.
  • the target base station encrypts the connection recovery response message according to the first encryption key and the first encryption algorithm, and the connection recovery response message is used to instruct the terminal to restore the RRC connection; the target base station sends the connection recovery response message, the first encryption algorithm, and the An integrity protection algorithm.
  • the method further includes: the target base station generates a first integrity protection key according to the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the target base station performs integrity protection on the connection recovery response message according to the first integrity protection key and the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the target base station sends the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal, including: the target base station sends a first message to the terminal, where the first message includes the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity. Protection algorithm.
  • the method further includes: the target base station performing security protection on the connection recovery response message according to the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm; The target base station sends a connection recovery response message to the terminal.
  • the target base station generates a first integrity protection key according to the first integrity protection algorithm; the target base station is configured according to the first integrity protection key and the first integrity protection algorithm, Complete protection of the first message.
  • the target base station generates a first integrity protection key according to the first integrity protection algorithm, including: the target base station according to the current access layer key and the first integrity protection algorithm , generating a first integrity protection key.
  • the first message further includes first indication information, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the terminal does not update the access layer key.
  • the target base station receives a second message from the terminal, and the second message is responsive to the first message.
  • the first message is a security mode command message or an RRC reconfiguration message.
  • the application provides an RRC connection recovery method, including: receiving, by a target base station, a connection recovery request message from a terminal, where the connection recovery request message is used to request restoration of a radio resource control RRC connection; and the target base station selects according to the security capability of the terminal.
  • the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm, the security capabilities of the terminal include an encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm supported by the terminal.
  • the target base station sends a connection recovery response message to the terminal, where the connection recovery response message is used to indicate that the terminal resumes the RRC connection. And receiving a protected connection recovery complete message from the terminal, and obtaining a connection recovery complete message according to the protected connection recovery complete message, the second encryption algorithm, and the second integrity protection algorithm; or
  • the target base station sends the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal;
  • the protected connection recovery completion message of the terminal and obtaining a connection recovery complete message according to the protected connection recovery complete message, the first encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection algorithm;
  • the first encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station
  • the first integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station
  • the second encryption algorithm is a terminal and the The encryption algorithm negotiated between the source base stations
  • the second integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the source base station
  • the connection recovery complete message is used to indicate that the restoration of the RRC connection is completed.
  • the target base station when the terminal moves to the target base station, the target base station receives the connection recovery request message sent by the terminal, and then the target base station reselects the first encryption used when communicating with the terminal according to the capability and requirements of the target base station itself. Algorithm and first integrity protection algorithm. If the target base station determines that the first encryption algorithm is the same as the second encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection algorithm is the same as the second integrity protection algorithm, the selected first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are not sent to the middle. Correspondingly, if the terminal determines that the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are not received, the terminal uses the second encryption algorithm and the second integrity protection algorithm to generate a protected connection recovery complete message.
  • the target base station determines that the first encryption algorithm is different from the second encryption algorithm, or the first integrity protection algorithm is different from the second integrity protection algorithm, sending the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal, and correspondingly If the terminal determines that the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are received, the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are used to generate a protected connection recovery complete message.
  • the security algorithm used for flexible selection of communication between the terminal and the target base station is realized; on the other hand, since the base station to which the terminal is connected has changed, the communication algorithm can be improved by using a new encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm. Sex.
  • the target base station determines that the first encryption algorithm is the same as the second encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection algorithm is the same as the second integrity protection algorithm, the target base station does not send the first encryption algorithm and the first complete to the terminal.
  • Sexual protection algorithms can save money.
  • the present application provides a device, which may be a terminal or a chip in a terminal.
  • the device has the functionality to implement the various embodiments of the first aspect described above. This function can be implemented in hardware or in hardware by executing the corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the functions described above.
  • the terminal when the device is a terminal, the terminal includes: a receiving unit, a transmitting unit, and a processing unit.
  • the processing unit may for example be a processor, which may for example be a receiver, a transmitting unit, for example a transmitter.
  • the receiver and transmitter include radio frequency circuits.
  • the terminal further comprises a storage unit, which may be, for example, a memory.
  • the storage unit stores a computer execution instruction
  • the processing unit is connected to the storage unit, and the processing unit executes a computer execution instruction stored by the storage unit, so that the terminal performs the RRC connection recovery of any one of the foregoing first aspects. method.
  • the chip when the device is a chip in the terminal, the chip includes: a receiving unit, a transmitting unit, and a processing unit.
  • the processing unit can be, for example, a processing circuit, which can be, for example, an input interface, a pin or a circuit, etc.
  • the transmitting unit can be, for example, an output interface, a pin or a circuit.
  • the processing unit may execute a computer-executed instruction stored by the storage unit to cause the RRC connection recovery method of any of the above aspects to be performed.
  • the storage unit may be a storage unit in the chip, such as a register, a cache, etc., and the storage unit may also be a storage unit located outside the chip in the terminal, such as a read-only memory (ROM), and may be stored.
  • ROM read-only memory
  • RAM random access memory
  • the processor mentioned in any of the above may be a general-purpose central processing unit (CPU), a microprocessor, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more An integrated circuit for controlling program execution of the RRC connection recovery method of any of the above first aspects.
  • CPU central processing unit
  • ASIC application-specific integrated circuit
  • the present application provides a device, which may be a terminal or a chip in a terminal.
  • the device has the functionality to implement the various embodiments of the second aspect described above. This function can be implemented in hardware or in hardware by executing the corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the functions described above.
  • the terminal when the device is a terminal, the terminal includes: a receiving unit, a transmitting unit, and a processing unit.
  • the processing unit may for example be a processor, which may for example be a receiver, a transmitting unit, for example a transmitter.
  • the receiver and transmitter include radio frequency circuits.
  • the terminal further comprises a storage unit, which may be, for example, a memory.
  • the storage unit stores a computer execution instruction
  • the processing unit is connected to the storage unit, and the processing unit executes a computer execution instruction stored by the storage unit, so that the terminal performs the RRC connection recovery method of the second aspect.
  • the chip when the device is a chip in the terminal, the chip includes: a receiving unit, a transmitting unit, and a processing unit.
  • the processing unit can be, for example, a processing circuit, which can be, for example, an input interface, a pin or a circuit, etc.
  • the transmitting unit can be, for example, an output interface, a pin or a circuit.
  • the processing unit may execute a computer-executed instruction stored by the storage unit such that the RRC connection recovery method of any of the above second aspects is performed.
  • the storage unit may be a storage unit in the chip, such as a register, a cache, etc., and the storage unit may also be a storage unit outside the chip, such as a ROM, and other types of statics that can store static information and instructions.
  • Storage device RAM, etc.
  • the processor mentioned in any of the above may be a general-purpose CPU, a microprocessor, an ASIC, or an integrated circuit of one or more programs for controlling the RRC connection recovery method of the second aspect described above.
  • the application provides a device, which may be a base station or a chip in a base station.
  • the device has the functionality to implement the various embodiments of the third aspect described above. This function can be implemented in hardware or in hardware by executing the corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the functions described above.
  • the base station when the device is a base station, the base station includes: a receiving unit, a sending unit, and a processing unit.
  • the processing unit may for example be a processor, which may for example be a receiver, a transmitting unit, for example a transmitter.
  • the receiver and transmitter include radio frequency circuits.
  • the base station further comprises a storage unit, which may be, for example, a memory.
  • the storage unit stores a computer execution instruction
  • the processing unit is connected to the storage unit, and the processing unit executes a computer execution instruction stored by the storage unit, so that the base station performs the RRC connection recovery of any one of the foregoing third aspects. method.
  • the chip when the device is a chip in a base station, the chip includes: a receiving unit, a transmitting unit, and a processing unit.
  • the processing unit can be, for example, a processing circuit, which can be, for example, an input interface, a pin or a circuit, etc.
  • the transmitting unit can be, for example, an output interface, a pin or a circuit.
  • the processing unit may execute computer execution instructions stored by the storage unit such that the RRC connection recovery method of any of the above third aspects is performed.
  • the storage unit may be a storage unit in the chip, such as a register, a cache, etc., and the storage unit may also be a storage unit located outside the chip in the terminal, such as a ROM only, other types of statics that can store static information and instructions.
  • Storage device RAM, etc.
  • the processor mentioned in any of the above may be a general-purpose CPU, a microprocessor, an ASIC, or one or more program execution integrations for controlling the RRC connection recovery method of any of the above third aspects. Circuit.
  • the application provides a device, which may be a base station or a chip in a base station.
  • the device has the functionality to implement the various embodiments of the fourth aspect described above. This function can be implemented in hardware or in hardware by executing the corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the functions described above.
  • the terminal when the device is a base station, the terminal includes: a receiving unit, a sending unit, and a processing unit.
  • the processing unit may for example be a processor, which may for example be a receiver, a transmitting unit, for example a transmitter.
  • the receiver and transmitter include radio frequency circuits.
  • the base station further comprises a storage unit, which may be, for example, a memory.
  • the storage unit stores a computer execution instruction
  • the processing unit is coupled to the storage unit, and the processing unit executes a computer execution instruction stored by the storage unit to cause the base station to perform the RRC connection recovery method of the fourth aspect.
  • the chip when the device is a chip in a base station, the chip includes: a receiving unit, a transmitting unit, and a processing unit.
  • the processing unit can be, for example, a processing circuit, which can be, for example, an input interface, a pin or a circuit, etc.
  • the transmitting unit can be, for example, an output interface, a pin or a circuit.
  • the processing unit may execute computer execution instructions stored by the storage unit to cause the RRC connection recovery method of the fourth aspect described above to be executed.
  • the storage unit may be a storage unit in the chip, such as a register, a cache, etc., and the storage unit may also be a storage unit outside the chip in the base station, such as a ROM, other types of static storage that can store static information and instructions. Equipment, RAM, etc.
  • the processor mentioned in any of the above may be a general-purpose CPU, a microprocessor, an ASIC, or an integrated circuit of one or more programs for controlling the RRC connection recovery method of the above fourth aspect.
  • the present application further provides a computer readable storage medium having instructions stored therein that, when executed on a computer, cause the computer to perform the methods described in the above aspects.
  • the present application also provides a computer program product comprising instructions which, when run on a computer, cause the computer to perform the methods described in the various aspects above.
  • the present application provides a communication system, the system comprising the apparatus of the fifth aspect and the apparatus of the seventh aspect, or the system comprising the apparatus of the sixth aspect and the eighth aspect Said device.
  • the terminal when the terminal moves to the target base station, the terminal sends a connection recovery request message to the target base station, and then the target base station reselects the first encryption algorithm used when communicating with the terminal according to the capabilities and requirements of the target base station itself. And a first integrity protection algorithm, and sending the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal.
  • the present application implements a security algorithm used for flexible selection of communication between a terminal and a target base station; on the other hand, since the base station to which the terminal is connected has changed, a new encryption algorithm and Integrity protection algorithms can improve the security of communication.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a possible network architecture provided by the present application
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a process for a terminal to enter an inactive state from a connected state according to the present application
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of an RRC connection recovery method provided by the present application.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of another RRC connection recovery method provided by the present application.
  • Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of a device provided by the present application.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of another apparatus provided by the present application.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of another apparatus provided by the present application.
  • the radio resource control (RRC) connection recovery method of the present application may be performed by a device.
  • the device may include a device on the network side and/or a device on the terminal side.
  • the device On the network side, the device may be a chip in a base station or a base station, that is, the RRC connection recovery method of the present application may be performed by a chip in the base station or the base station; on the terminal side, the device may be a chip in the terminal or the terminal, that is, The RRC connection recovery method of the present application is performed by a chip in a terminal or a terminal.
  • the present application uses a device as a base station or a terminal as an example to describe an RRC connection recovery method.
  • a device is a chip in a base station or a chip in a terminal
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a possible network architecture of the present application. It includes a terminal, a source base station, and a target base station.
  • the terminal communicates with the source base station and the target base station through a wireless interface.
  • the source base station and the target base station can communicate through a wired connection, such as through an X2 interface, an Xn interface, or can communicate through an air interface.
  • the terminal may move from the source base station to the target base station due to the movement of the terminal or the like.
  • the source base station is a base station that the terminal accesses first
  • the target base station is a base station that is accessed after the terminal moves.
  • the terminal is a device with wireless transceiver function, which can be deployed on land, indoors or outdoors, handheld or on-board; it can also be deployed on the water surface (such as ships); it can also be deployed in the air (such as airplanes, balloons). And satellites, etc.).
  • the terminal may be a mobile phone, a tablet, a computer with wireless transceiver function, a virtual reality (VR) terminal, an augmented reality (AR) terminal, industrial control (industrial control) Wireless terminal, wireless terminal in self driving, wireless terminal in remote medical, wireless terminal in smart grid, wireless terminal in transportation safety, A wireless terminal in a smart city, a wireless terminal in a smart home, and the like.
  • a base station is a device that provides wireless communication functions for a terminal, including but not limited to: a next-generation base station (g nodeB, gNB), an evolved node B (eNB), and a radio network controller (radio) in 5G.
  • Network controller g nodeB, gNB
  • eNB evolved node B
  • RNC Radio network controller
  • NB node B
  • BSC base station controller
  • BTS base transceiver station
  • home base station for example, home evolved node B, or home node B
  • HNB BaseBand Unit
  • TRP transmission and receiving point
  • TP transmitting point
  • mobile switching center etc.
  • the terminal generally has three states, that is, a connected state, an idle state, and an inactive state.
  • the terminal when the terminal is in the connected state, the terminal is in a normal working state.
  • User data can be sent and received between the network side and the terminal.
  • the terminal and the base station When the terminal enters the idle state from the connected state, the terminal and the base station generally delete all the access stratum (AS) contexts of the terminal.
  • AS access stratum
  • the terminal when the network side releases the connection of the terminal by the suspend reason, the terminal also enters the idle state from the connected state, but at this time, the terminal and the base station delete part of the AS context, and retain A partial AS context, for example, may retain an access layer key (which may be referred to as KeNB in 4G), a security capability of the terminal, and a security algorithm (including an integrity protection algorithm and an encryption algorithm) for communication between the terminal and the source base station to which the terminal accesses. .
  • the security capability of the terminal refers to the security algorithm supported by the terminal, including the supported encryption algorithm and the supported integrity protection algorithm.
  • an inactive state is introduced.
  • the base station suspends the terminal.
  • the terminal and the base station delete part of the AS context, and reserve part of the AS context, for example, the access layer may be reserved.
  • the key (which can be called KgNB in 5G), the security capability of the terminal, and the security algorithm (including integrity protection algorithm and encryption algorithm) for communication between the terminal and the source base station accessed by the terminal.
  • the security capability of the terminal refers to the security algorithm supported by the terminal, including the supported encryption algorithm and the supported integrity protection algorithm.
  • the terminal When the terminal is in an inactive state, since part of the AS context is reserved on the terminal, the terminal enters the connected state from the inactive state more quickly than when the terminal enters the connected state from the idle state.
  • the terminal when the terminal returns from the inactive state to the connected state, the terminal may need to replace the base station. That is, the terminal first establishes a connection with the source base station, and then, for some reason, such as network side notification, the terminal enters an inactive state at the source base station. When the terminal wishes to return to the connected state, if the terminal has moved to the coverage of the target base station, the terminal will resume from the inactive state to the connected state at the target base station.
  • the present application is also applicable to the scenario where the target base station and the source base station are the same when the terminal is restored from the inactive state to the connected state, that is, the base station accessed by the terminal may not change, and is still the same base station.
  • This application mainly discusses how to implement a flexible and secure connection when the terminal determines that it needs to enter the connected state from the inactive state, that is, restores the connection with the target base station.
  • a schematic diagram of a process for a terminal provided in the present application to enter an inactive state from a connected state includes the following steps:
  • Step 201 The base station determines to suspend the RRC connection of the terminal.
  • the base station when the base station does not receive the data sent by the terminal within a certain period of time, it decides to suspend the terminal.
  • Step 202 The base station sends a suspension message to the terminal.
  • the suspend message is used to notify the terminal to release the RRC connection and enter an inactive state.
  • the suspend message may be, for example, an RRC Connection Release message with a special indication.
  • the suspended message may carry the following parameters: a recovery identifier, a next hop chaining counter (NCC), and the like.
  • NCC next hop chaining counter
  • the recovery identifier is a parameter that is required when the terminal enters the connected state from the inactive state.
  • the recovery identifier may include information such as the identifier of the source base station and the identifier of the terminal.
  • the NCC is also a parameter required by the terminal to enter the connected state from the inactive state.
  • the NCC is a parameter required to generate a new access layer key, that is, the NCC can be used to generate a new access layer key (KgNB* used in this application) Indicates the new access layer key).
  • the suspend message may also carry a cause parameter releaseCause, and the releaseCause is used to notify the terminal to perform the suspend operation and enter the inactive state.
  • releaseCause can be set to "RRC Suspend” or "RRC Inactive”.
  • the terminal obtains the releaseCause parameter and determines that the releaseCause value is "RRC Suspend” or "RRC Inactive"
  • the terminal suspends the related operation.
  • the base station may further notify the control plane network element of the core network to release the bearer, for example, release a signaling radio bearer (SRB) or a data radio bearer (DRB).
  • SRB signaling radio bearer
  • DRB data radio bearer
  • Step 203 The terminal enters an inactive state.
  • the terminal saves the deleted part of the AS context and retains part of the AS context.
  • the reserved part of the AS context includes an access layer key, a security capability of the terminal, an integrity protection algorithm and an encryption algorithm for communication between the terminal and the source base station to which the terminal accesses.
  • the terminal also saves the recovery identifier, NCC and other parameters sent by the base station.
  • the terminal suspends the bearer, for example, suspending the signaling radio bearer, the data radio bearer, and then entering the inactive state.
  • the terminal From the process in which the terminal enters the inactive state from the connected state, it can be seen that after the terminal enters the inactive state, the terminal saves part of the AS context and parameters received from the base station, and thus, when the terminal wishes to recover from the inactive state to the connection. In the state, these parameters will help the terminal to quickly recover from the inactive state to the connected state.
  • the RRC connection recovery method of the present application is described below, that is, the terminal returns from the inactive state to the connected state. Moreover, the terminal is restored from the inactive state to the connected state under the target base station.
  • the target base station and the source base station may be different base stations, or may be the same base station.
  • the following takes the base station and the source base station which are different base stations as an example, and describes the RRC connection recovery method of the present application.
  • the target base station and the source base station are the same base station, only the interaction between the source base station and the target base station needs to be omitted.
  • the communication message needs to be encrypted and integrity protected.
  • the encryption algorithm is used to encrypt the message
  • the integrity protection algorithm is used to protect the integrity of the message.
  • the communication between the terminal and the target base station will be protected using the negotiated new encryption algorithm and the new integrity protection algorithm.
  • the target base station when the terminal moves to the target base station, the target base station can reselect the encryption algorithm and the integrity protection algorithm according to the capabilities and requirements of the target base station itself, and use the reselected encryption algorithm and the integrity protection algorithm. Communication with the terminal, rather than continuing to use the encryption algorithm and integrity protection algorithm that the terminal communicates with the source base station. Therefore, the method of the present application, on the one hand, the target base station can reselect the encryption algorithm and the integrity protection algorithm, and is flexible; on the other hand, the communication security can be improved by using a new encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm.
  • the security algorithm for communication negotiated between the terminal and the target base station is referred to as a first encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm, that is, the first encryption algorithm is between the terminal and the target base station.
  • the negotiated encryption algorithm for secure communication, the first integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm for secure communication negotiated between the terminal and the target base station.
  • the security algorithm used for communication between the terminal and the source base station is called a second encryption algorithm and a second integrity protection algorithm, that is, the second encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm used for secure communication negotiated between the terminal and the source base station.
  • the second integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the source base station for secure communication.
  • first encryption algorithm reselected by the target base station may be the same as or different from the second encryption algorithm.
  • first integrity protection algorithm reselected by the target base station may be the same as the second integrity protection algorithm. It may also be different.
  • an RRC connection recovery method provided by the present application includes the following steps:
  • Step 301 The terminal sends a connection recovery request message to the target base station.
  • the target base station receives a connection recovery request message from the terminal.
  • a connection recovery request message sent by the terminal used to request to resume the RRC connection. That is, the terminal requests to return from the inactive state to the connected state.
  • connection recovery request message carries a recovery identifier.
  • connection recovery request message may further carry a short message authentication code for integrity (short MAC-I).
  • shortMAC-I is used to authenticate the validity of the terminal.
  • Step 302 The target base station selects a first encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the target base station after receiving the connection recovery request message, the target base station obtains the recovery identifier, and determines that the terminal is connected to the source base station according to the identifier of the source base station in the recovery identifier, and sends a context request to the source base station.
  • the message, the context request message is used to request to acquire the context of the terminal, for example, carrying the recovery identifier in the context request message.
  • the connection recovery request message further carries the shortMAC-I
  • the short MAC-I is also carried in the context request message and sent to the source base station.
  • the source base station After receiving the context request message, the source base station obtains the recovery identifier, and obtains the access layer context of the terminal according to the identifier of the terminal in the recovery identifier, including the security capability of the terminal.
  • the obtained access layer context of the terminal further includes information about a second encryption algorithm, a second integrity protection algorithm, and the like negotiated between the terminal and the source base station.
  • the source base station carries the acquired security capability of the terminal in a context response message and sends the security capability to the target base station.
  • the context response message further includes a second encryption algorithm and a second integrity protection algorithm for communication between the terminal and the source base station.
  • the source base station further regenerates the access layer key, and carries the regenerated access layer key (KgNB*) in the context response message and sends the key to the target base station.
  • KgNB* regenerated access layer key
  • the source base station further checks the received shortMAC-I.
  • the obtained access layer context of the terminal is sent to the target base station only when the short MAC-I check is passed, that is, the terminal is determined to be a legal terminal.
  • Step 303 The target base station sends a first encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal.
  • the terminal receives the first encryption algorithm from the target base station and the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the terminal may acquire the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • Step 304 The terminal obtains a protected connection recovery complete message according to the first encryption algorithm, the first integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery complete message.
  • the terminal restores the RRC connection state
  • the terminal sends a connection recovery complete message to the target base station, where the connection recovery complete message is used to indicate that the RRC connection recovery is complete, that is, the terminal notifies the target base station that the terminal has entered the RRC connected state.
  • connection recovery completion message may be secured before the connection recovery complete message is sent. Specifically, the terminal obtains the protected connection recovery complete message according to the first encryption algorithm, the first integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery complete message.
  • the terminal may first encrypt the connection recovery complete message according to the first encryption algorithm and the first encryption key, to obtain an encrypted connection recovery complete message. Then, the encrypted connection recovery complete message is integrity-protected according to the first integrity protection algorithm and the first integrity protection key, thereby obtaining a protected connection recovery complete message.
  • the terminal may first perform integrity protection on the connection recovery complete message according to the first integrity protection algorithm and the first integrity protection key, and obtain an integrity-protected connection recovery complete message. Then, the integrity-protected connection recovery completion message is encrypted according to the first encryption algorithm and the first encryption key, to obtain a protected connection recovery completion message.
  • the first encryption key is generated by the terminal according to the first encryption algorithm.
  • the first encryption key may be the type of the access layer key, the identifier of the first encryption algorithm, and the type of the first encryption algorithm. Generated.
  • the first integrity protection key is generated by the terminal according to the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the first integrity protection key may be identified by the terminal according to the access layer key and the first integrity protection algorithm. The type of the first integrity protection algorithm is generated.
  • the method for obtaining a protected connection recovery completion message is not specifically limited, and the actual application can be flexibly selected according to requirements.
  • Step 305 The terminal sends a protected connection recovery complete message to the target base station.
  • the target base station receives a protected connection recovery complete message from the terminal.
  • the target base station After receiving the protected connection recovery complete message, the target base station obtains a connection recovery complete message according to the protected connection recovery complete message, the first encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection algorithm, and confirms that the terminal enters the RRC according to the connection recovery complete message. Connection Status.
  • the target base station obtains a connection recovery complete message according to the protected connection recovery complete message, the first encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection algorithm, and corresponds to the method for the terminal to protect the connection recovery complete message. of.
  • the method for the target base station to obtain the connection recovery complete message is: the target base station according to the first integrity protection algorithm and the first integrity protection key, Perform an integrity check on the protected connection recovery complete message.
  • the target base station decrypts the integrity verification completed connection recovery completion message according to the first encryption algorithm and the first encryption key to obtain a connection recovery completion message.
  • the target base station obtains the connection recovery complete message by: the target base station is protected according to the first encryption algorithm and the first encryption key.
  • the connection recovery completion message is decrypted to obtain a decrypted connection recovery completion message.
  • the target base station performs integrity verification on the decrypted connection recovery complete message according to the first integrity protection algorithm and the first integrity protection key. When the check is correct, a connection recovery complete message is obtained.
  • the target base station may reselect the first encryption algorithm and the first used when communicating with the terminal according to the capabilities and requirements of the target base station itself.
  • the integrity protection algorithm sends the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal.
  • the security algorithm used for flexible selection of communication between the terminal and the target base station is realized; on the other hand, since the base station to which the terminal is connected has changed, the communication algorithm can be improved by using a new encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm. Sex.
  • the terminal may generate the shortMAC-I according to the following steps:
  • Step A1 The terminal acquires the first NCC and the second NCC.
  • the first NCC refers to the NCC that is sent by the source base station to the terminal and saved by the terminal in the suspending process. For details, refer to step 202 above.
  • the second NCC refers to the NCC saved by the terminal before the first NCC is obtained.
  • Step A2 The terminal determines whether the first NCC is the same as the second NCC. If they are the same, step A3 is performed; if not, step A4 is performed.
  • Step A3 The terminal obtains KgNB* according to KgNB.
  • KgNB refers to the old access layer key (old KgNB), which may also be called the original access layer key (original KgNB), or may also be called the old access layer key (old KgNB). .
  • KgNB* refers to the new access layer key (new KgNB), which may also be referred to as the updated access layer key (updated KgNB).
  • KgNB, KgNB* is just a symbolic representation.
  • the access layer key can be represented by KeNB, KeNB*.
  • the different manifestations of the symbols themselves are not intended to limit the application.
  • the terminal may obtain the KgNB according to the KgNB, the physical cell identifier (PCI), and the absolute radio frequency channel number-down link (ARFCN-DL). *.
  • KgNB* for the prior art, reference may be made to relevant literature, for example, reference can be made to the 3rd generation partnership project (3GPP) technical specification (technical) Specification, TS) 33.401 or related description in 3GPP TS 33.501, which is not described here.
  • 3GPP 3rd generation partnership project
  • Step A5 is performed after step A3.
  • Step A4 The terminal obtains a next hop (NH) according to the first NCC and the second NCC, and obtains KgNB* according to the NH.
  • NH next hop
  • NH is associated with the first NCC and the second NCC.
  • the terminal can determine the number N of the derived NH according to the first NCC and the second NCC, and then derive the next NH according to the current NH, and obtain another NH by using the next NH, and repeat until the N is derived to obtain the final NH.
  • the terminal may obtain KgNB* according to NH, source PCI, and ARFCN-DL.
  • the specific implementation of the KgNB* is obtained according to the NH, the source PCI, and the ARFCN-DL.
  • Step A5 is performed after step A4.
  • Step A5 The terminal derives the second integrity protection key Krrc-int* according to the KgNB*, the identifier of the second integrity protection algorithm, and the type of the second integrity protection algorithm.
  • the type of the second integrity protection algorithm is a RRC integrity protection algorithm.
  • Step A6 According to Krrc-int*, the second integrity protection algorithm, shortMAC-I is obtained.
  • a second integrity protection algorithm a source cell radio network temporary identifier (C-RNTI), a source PCI, a target cell Identify and get shortMAC-I.
  • C-RNTI source cell radio network temporary identifier
  • the terminal can generate shortMAC-I.
  • the target base station if the short message-I is included in the connection recovery request message, the target base station also sends the short MAC-I in the context request message to the source base station, and the source base station performs verification with the terminal.
  • the access layer context of the terminal is sent to the target base station only if the check is correct.
  • the source base station may include the following steps according to the method for verifying the short MAC-I:
  • Step B1 The source base station determines whether the next hop NH has been used. If not, step B2 is performed. If it is already used, step B3 is performed.
  • Step B2 The source base station obtains KgNB* according to NH.
  • the step B2 is the same as the specific process of the step B4 in the method for generating the short MAC-I by the terminal, and the foregoing description may be referred to.
  • Step B4 is performed after step B2.
  • Step B3 The source base station terminal obtains KgNB* according to KgNB.
  • the step B3 is the same as the specific process of the step B3 in the method for generating the short MAC-I by the terminal, and the foregoing description may be referred to.
  • Step B4 is performed after step B3.
  • Step B4 The source base station derives the second integrity protection key Krrc-int* according to the KgNB*, the identifier of the second integrity protection algorithm, and the type of the second integrity protection algorithm.
  • the type of the second integrity protection algorithm is a RRC integrity protection algorithm.
  • Step B5 according to the Krrc-int*, the second integrity protection algorithm, verifying the received shortMAC-I from the terminal.
  • the received shortMAC-I from the terminal may be verified according to the Krrc-int*, the second integrity protection algorithm, the source C-RNTI, the source PCI, and the identifier of the target cell. .
  • the source base station can check the received short MAC-I from the terminal.
  • the target base station selects a specific method of the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the target base station may preferentially according to the encryption algorithm of the target base station itself.
  • the level list selects an encryption algorithm with the highest priority from the security capabilities of the terminal as the selected first encryption algorithm.
  • K is greater than 1, and then randomly select one encryption algorithm from the selected K encryption algorithms as the selected first encryption algorithm.
  • the first encryption algorithm may be selected in other ways.
  • the selected first encryption algorithm acts as an encryption algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station and used for communication.
  • the target base station can also select the first integrity protection algorithm from the security capabilities of the terminal in the same manner as the first encryption algorithm is selected.
  • the selected first integrity protection algorithm acts as an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station and used for communication.
  • the method for the terminal to receive and acquire the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station can be implemented by at least but not limited to the following methods.
  • Embodiment 1 The target base station sends a connection recovery response message to the terminal, where the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the second encryption algorithm and the second encryption key, where the connection recovery response message includes the first encryption algorithm and the first complete Sex protection algorithm.
  • connection recovery response message is a response message to the connection recovery request message sent by the terminal in the foregoing step 301, and the connection recovery response message is used to instruct the terminal to resume the RRC connection.
  • the terminal receives the connection recovery response message, it starts to resume the RRC connection.
  • the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm that are reselected by the target base station are carried as parameters in the connection recovery response message and sent to the terminal.
  • connection recovery response message sent to the terminal by the target base station needs to be secured. That is, the connection recovery response message can be encrypted by an encryption algorithm and integrity protected by an integrity protection algorithm.
  • connection recovery response message may be encrypted by: firstly, generating a second encryption key according to the second encryption algorithm introduced above, and then, according to the second encryption algorithm and the second encryption key The key encrypts the connection recovery response message to obtain an encrypted connection recovery response message.
  • the target base station may implement the second encryption key.
  • the target base station may derive the second encryption key Krrc-enc* according to the KgNB*, the identifier of the second encryption algorithm, and the type of the second encryption algorithm.
  • the KgNB*, the identifier of the second encryption algorithm, and the type of the second encryption algorithm are all sent by the source base station to the target base station.
  • the source base station sends the KgNB*, the identifier of the second encryption algorithm, and the type of the second encryption algorithm to the target base station by being carried in the context response message.
  • the encrypted connection recovery response message may be integrity protected by: firstly, generating a second integrity protection key according to the second integrity protection algorithm introduced above, and then, according to the second complete The sexual protection algorithm and the second integrity protection key perform integrity protection on the encrypted connection recovery response message to obtain a protected connection recovery response message.
  • the target base station generates the second integrity protection key, which may be derived by the target base station according to the KgNB*, the identifier of the second integrity protection algorithm, and the type of the second integrity protection algorithm. Protection key Krrc-int*.
  • the KgNB*, the identifier of the second integrity protection algorithm, and the type of the second integrity protection algorithm are all sent by the source base station to the target base station.
  • the source base station sends the KgNB*, the identifier of the second integrity protection algorithm, and the type of the second integrity protection algorithm to the target base station by being carried in the context response message.
  • the connection recovery response message sent by the target base station to the terminal is a connection recovery response message that is encrypted and integrity protected. Therefore, the target base station sends a connection recovery response message to the terminal, which may also be expressed as: the base station sends a protected connection recovery response message to the terminal.
  • the foregoing protected connection recovery response message may also be an integrity protection for the connection recovery response message, obtaining a connection recovery response message of integrity protection; and then performing integrity protection.
  • the connection recovery response message is encrypted to obtain a protected connection recovery response message.
  • the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are carried in the protected connection recovery response message, and the protected connection recovery response message is according to the first
  • the second encryption algorithm and the second encryption key are encrypted, and integrity protection is performed according to the second integrity protection algorithm and the second integrity protection key.
  • the protected connection recovery response message is decrypted and integrity checked, thereby obtaining a connection recovery response message.
  • connection recovery response message if the target base station encrypts the connection recovery response message first, and then performs integrity protection, the terminal first performs integrity verification on the protected connection recovery response message, and then performs integrity check.
  • the connection recovery response message is decrypted to obtain a connection recovery response message.
  • the terminal If the target base station first performs integrity protection on the connection recovery response message and then performs encryption, the terminal first decrypts the protected connection recovery response message, and then performs integrity check on the decrypted connection recovery response message. , thus getting a connection recovery response message.
  • the method for decrypting the protected connection recovery response message or the integrity verification connection recovery response message by the terminal, and the method for encrypting the connection recovery response message with the target base station, is a corresponding operation, that is, the terminal is configured according to The second encryption algorithm generates a second encryption key, and decrypts the protected connection recovery response message or decrypts the integrity verification connection recovery response message according to the second encryption key and the second encryption algorithm. Specific implementation details may be described in the foregoing encryption process, and are not described herein again.
  • the method for performing integrity check on the protected connection recovery response message or the decrypted connection recovery response message by the terminal, and the method for performing integrity protection on the connection recovery response message by the target base station is a corresponding operation, that is, the terminal Generating a second integrity protection key according to the second integrity protection algorithm, and performing a protected connection recovery response message or a decrypted connection recovery response message according to the second integrity protection key and the second integrity protection algorithm Integrity check.
  • Specific implementation details may be described in the foregoing encryption process, and are not described herein again.
  • the terminal may obtain the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm that are carried.
  • the second encryption key used by the terminal when decrypting the connection recovery response message, and the second integrity protection key used when the integrity check connection recovery response message is used can be generated temporarily or locally.
  • the terminal when generating the shortMAC-I, the terminal has generated the second encryption key Krrc-enc* and the second integrity protection key Krrc-int*, so that the terminal can directly use the decryption connection recovery response message before The second encryption key Krrc-enc* that has been generated; and the terminal can directly use the second integrity protection key KRrrc-int* that has been generated before the integrity check connection recovery response message.
  • This implementation can save the overhead of the terminal.
  • connection recovery response message is encrypted by using the second encryption algorithm and the second encryption key. Therefore, the first encryption algorithm can be carried in the protected connection recovery response message.
  • the first encryption algorithm may not be carried in the protected connection recovery response message. Because, in this case, the terminal needs to use the first encryption algorithm and the first encryption key to decrypt the protected connection recovery response message, and the first encryption algorithm is carried in the protected connection recovery response message.
  • the first encryption key is generated according to at least the first encryption algorithm.
  • the method 2 or the implementation method 3 may be implemented as follows.
  • the method 2 the target base station sends a connection recovery response message and a first encryption algorithm to the terminal, where the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the first encryption algorithm and the first encryption key, and the connection recovery response message includes the first complete Sex protection algorithm.
  • the main difference between the implementation method 2 and the implementation method 1 is that the implementation method 2 encrypts the connection recovery response message according to the first encryption algorithm and the first encryption key, and the connection recovery response message includes the first integrity protection.
  • the algorithm but does not include the first encryption algorithm, which is sent to the terminal together with the connection recovery response message, or the first encryption algorithm is separately sent to the terminal separately from the connection recovery response message.
  • the specific implementation process of encrypting the connection recovery response message according to the first encryption algorithm and the first encryption key may refer to the foregoing specific implementation process of encrypting the connection recovery response message according to the second encryption algorithm and the second encryption key. , no longer repeat them here.
  • connection integrity recovery message may be integrity-protected according to the first integrity protection algorithm and the first integrity protection key, and the specific implementation process may refer to the foregoing second integrity protection algorithm and the second integrity protection. A specific implementation process of encrypting a key pair connection recovery response message is not described here.
  • the terminal after receiving the connection recovery response message and the first encryption algorithm sent by the target base station, the terminal first generates a first encryption key according to the first encryption algorithm, and then decrypts the connection according to the first encryption key and the first encryption algorithm.
  • the recovery response message can also be expressed as: decrypting the protected connection recovery response message.
  • the specific implementation process is similar to the implementation method 1.
  • the process of decrypting the protected connection recovery response message of the terminal is similar, and reference may be made to the foregoing description.
  • the first integrity protection algorithm may be obtained therefrom, and then the first integrity protection key is generated according to the first integrity protection algorithm, and according to the first complete
  • the sexual protection algorithm and the first integrity protection key perform an integrity check on the decrypted connection recovery response message. When the check is correct, it can be determined that the RRC connection can be resumed.
  • the terminal since the terminal can only obtain the first encryption algorithm first, and then the first integrity protection algorithm can be obtained, the terminal can only decrypt the protected connection recovery response message first, and then the integrity check decryption. Connection recovery response message. Therefore, for the target base station, the connection recovery response message is first integrity protected, and then the connection recovery response message is encrypted.
  • the third method is: the target base station sends a connection recovery response message, a first encryption algorithm, and a first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal, where the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the first encryption algorithm and the first encryption key.
  • the main difference between the implementation method 3 and the foregoing implementation method 2 is: in the implementation method 3, the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are not carried in the connection recovery response message, but are sent together with the connection recovery response message.
  • the terminal or is, is separately sent to the terminal.
  • the parameters that need to be sent to the terminal that is, the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are sent to the terminal as a whole, but the first encryption algorithm cannot be carried in the connection recovery response.
  • the message therefore, neither the first encryption algorithm nor the first integrity protection algorithm is carried in the connection recovery response message.
  • the target base station encrypts the connection recovery response message, and implements integrity protection for the connection recovery response message, and encrypts the connection recovery response message in the first method, and restores the connection recovery response message.
  • integrity protection is similar, and the foregoing description may be referred to, and details are not described herein again.
  • the target base station may first encrypt the connection recovery response message, and then perform integrity protection on the encrypted connection recovery response message. It is also possible to perform integrity protection on the connection recovery response message first, and then encrypt the integrity-protected connection recovery response message.
  • the terminal first performs integrity check on the connection recovery response message, and then decrypts the integrity verification connection recovery response message.
  • the terminal decrypts the connection recovery response message first, and then performs integrity verification on the decrypted connection recovery response message.
  • implementation method 1 to implementation method 3 are only examples, and in actual applications, other implementation methods are also possible. For example, you can also have the following implementation methods.
  • Implementation method 4 The target base station sends a connection recovery response message, a first encryption algorithm, and a first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal, where the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the second encryption algorithm and the second encryption key.
  • connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the second encryption algorithm and the second encryption key, and the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are not carried in the connection recovery response message and are sent to the terminal, but are sent separately. To the terminal.
  • Embodiment 5 The target base station sends a connection recovery response message and a first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal, where the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the second encryption algorithm and the second encryption key, where the connection recovery response message includes the first Encryption Algorithm.
  • connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the second encryption algorithm and the second encryption key
  • first encryption algorithm is carried in the connection recovery response message and sent to the terminal
  • first integrity protection algorithm is separately sent to the terminal.
  • Embodiment 6 The target base station sends a connection recovery response message and a first encryption algorithm to the terminal, where the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the second encryption algorithm and the second encryption key, where the connection recovery response message includes the first integrity. Protection algorithm.
  • connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the second encryption algorithm and the second encryption key, and the first integrity protection algorithm is carried in the connection recovery response message and sent to the terminal, and the first encryption algorithm is separately sent to the terminal. of.
  • Implementation Method 7 The target base station sends a first message to the terminal, where the first message includes a first encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm. Accordingly, the terminal receives the first message from the target base station.
  • the method of the seventh method is that the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm that are reselected by the target base station are carried as parameters in the first message and sent to the terminal.
  • the first message may be a security mode command message.
  • the first message may also be an RRC reconfiguration message.
  • the foregoing first message sent to the terminal by the target base station needs to be secured.
  • the connection recovery response message can be integrity protected by an integrity protection algorithm.
  • the first message may be integrity protected by: firstly, generating a first integrity protection key according to the first integrity protection algorithm, and then, according to the first integrity protection algorithm The first message is integrity protected with the first integrity protection key to obtain the protected first message.
  • the target base station may generate a first integrity protection key according to the first integrity protection algorithm and the current access layer key.
  • the current access layer key ie, KgNB*
  • KgNB* is generated by the source base station after being generated by the foregoing step B2 or step B3, and then sent to the target base station.
  • the source base station sends the KgNB* in the context response message and sends the message to the target base station.
  • the target base station generates the first integrity protection key, which may be derived by the target base station according to the KgNB*, the identifier of the first integrity protection algorithm, and the type of the first integrity protection algorithm. Protection key Krrc-int*.
  • the first message sent by the target base station to the terminal may be the integrity-protected first message. Therefore, in the case that the first message is protected, the sending, by the target base station, the first message to the terminal may also be expressed as: the base station sends the protected first message to the terminal.
  • the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are carried in the first message and sent to the terminal, where the first message may be according to the first integrity protection algorithm and the first The integrity protection key is integrity protected.
  • the first integrity protection algorithm and the first encryption algorithm may be obtained from the first message. Further, an integrity check is also performed on the protected first message.
  • the method for performing integrity check on the protected first message by the terminal and the method for integrity protection of the first message by the target base station are corresponding operations, that is, the terminal generates the first according to the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • An integrity protection key, and performing integrity verification on the protected first message according to the first integrity protection key and the first integrity protection algorithm are corresponding operations, that is, the terminal generates the first according to the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the terminal may generate a first integrity protection key according to the first integrity protection algorithm and the current access layer key.
  • the current access layer key (ie, KgNB*) is generated by the terminal by using the foregoing step A3 or step A4.
  • the method for generating the first integrity protection key by the terminal may be implemented by the terminal according to the KgNB*, the identifier of the first integrity protection algorithm, corresponding to the method for generating the first integrity protection key by the target base station.
  • the terminal when the first message is a security mode command message or an RRC reconfiguration message, the terminal triggers the terminal to update the access layer key after receiving the security mode command message or the RRC reconfiguration message. Therefore, if the terminal has updated the access layer key before receiving the first message, the target base station also needs to notify the terminal that the access layer key does not need to be updated. For example, if the terminal further generates the short MAC-I before the step 301, the terminal has updated the access layer key from the KgNB to the KgNB* in the process of generating the shortMAC-I. Therefore, after receiving the first message, the terminal receives the first message. The access layer key should not be updated.
  • the terminal may be notified that the access layer key does not need to be updated by the following method, but not limited to the following method.
  • the first message carries a first encryption algorithm, a first integrity protection algorithm, and first indication information, where the first indication information is used to indicate that the terminal does not update the access layer key.
  • the terminal After receiving the first message, the terminal obtains the first encryption algorithm, the first integrity protection algorithm, and the first indication information.
  • the terminal may determine, according to the first indication information, that the access layer key does not need to be updated. Therefore, when the terminal generates the first integrity protection key according to the first integrity protection algorithm and the current access layer key, the current access layer key used is updated by the terminal in the process of generating the shortMAC-I. KgNB* (KgNB* is the current key) without further updates to KgNB*.
  • Method B The first message carries a first encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the terminal after receiving the first message, the terminal determines that the first message does not carry the second indication information, and determines that the access layer key does not need to be updated.
  • the second indication information is used to instruct the terminal to update the access layer key.
  • the terminal determines, according to the second indication information, that the access layer key needs to be updated, and thus needs to be further updated by KgNB*.
  • the terminal determines that the second message is not carried in the first message, and determines that the access layer key does not need to be updated.
  • the terminal may be instructed not to update the access layer key, so that the terminal generates the first integrity protection key by using the current access layer key.
  • the terminal After acquiring the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm, the terminal will use the two algorithms to communicate with the target base station.
  • connection recovery complete message sent by the terminal to the target base station in step 304 is protected according to the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm, and then sent to the target base station.
  • the terminal obtains a specific process of the protected connection recovery completion message according to the first encryption algorithm, the first integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery completion message.
  • the terminal may first encrypt the connection recovery completion message, and the specific process may be: obtaining a first encryption key according to the first encryption algorithm, and then encrypting the connection recovery completion message according to the first encryption algorithm and the first encryption key. , get the encrypted connection recovery complete message. Further, performing integrity protection on the encrypted connection recovery complete message, where the first integrity protection key is generated according to the first integrity protection algorithm, and then according to the first integrity protection algorithm and the first integrity The protection key is used to perform integrity protection on the encrypted connection recovery completion message to obtain a protected connection recovery completion message.
  • the terminal obtains a specific process of the protected connection recovery completion message according to the first encryption algorithm, the first integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery completion message.
  • the terminal may first perform integrity protection on the connection recovery complete message, where the specific process may be: generating a first integrity protection key according to the first integrity protection algorithm, and then according to the first integrity protection algorithm and the first The integrity protection key, integrity protection of the connection recovery completion message, and integrity recovery connection recovery completion message.
  • the integrity restoration connection recovery completion message is encrypted, and the specific process is: obtaining a first encryption key according to the first encryption algorithm, and then performing integrity protection according to the first encryption algorithm and the first encryption key.
  • the connection recovery complete message is encrypted to obtain a protected connection recovery complete message.
  • the first encryption key and the first integrity protection key may be directly used without re-generation. Save money.
  • the base station after receiving the protected connection recovery complete message, the base station performs decryption and integrity check on the protected connection recovery complete message, and the specific implementation process may refer to the foregoing terminal decryption and integrity check connection recovery response. The implementation process of the message will not be described here.
  • step 303 is implemented in the manner of the foregoing implementation method seven, further, between step 303 and step 304, the following steps may be further included:
  • step C1 the terminal sends a second message to the target base station, and accordingly, the target base station receives the second message.
  • the second message is for responding to the first message.
  • the second message may be a security command completion message or an RRC reconfiguration complete message.
  • step 303 is implemented in the manner of the foregoing implementation method seven, further, between step 303 and step 304, the following steps may be further included:
  • Step C2 The target base station performs integrity protection on the connection recovery response message according to the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm, where the connection recovery response message is used to instruct the terminal to resume the RRC connection.
  • Step C3 The target base station sends a connection recovery response message to the terminal, and correspondingly, the terminal receives the connection recovery response message.
  • step C1 it is also possible to perform both the above step C1 and the step C2 and the step C3. That is, after the above step 303, step C1 is performed first, then step C2 is performed, then step C3 is performed, and then step 304 is performed.
  • FIG. 4 another RRC connection recovery method provided by the present application is provided.
  • the main difference between the RRC connection recovery method shown in FIG. 4 and the RRC connection recovery method shown in FIG. 3 is that in the RRC connection recovery method shown in FIG. 4, the target base station generates the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm. Then, further, it is further determined whether the first encryption algorithm is the same as the second encryption algorithm, and whether the first integrity protection algorithm and the second integrity protection algorithm are the same. Based on the result of the judgment, it is decided which method is used to notify the terminal.
  • the terminal after receiving the notification from the target base station, the terminal needs to first determine whether the encryption algorithm and the integrity protection algorithm sent by the target base station are received, and according to the result of the determination, determine which manner to use to generate the protected connection recovery completion. Message.
  • Steps 401 to 402 are the same as the foregoing steps 301 to 302. Reference may be made to the foregoing description, and details are not described herein again.
  • Step 403 The target base station determines whether the first encryption algorithm is the same as the second encryption algorithm, and determines whether the first integrity protection algorithm and the second integrity protection algorithm are the same. If the first encryption algorithm is the same as the second encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection algorithm is the same as the second integrity protection algorithm, step 404a is performed; if the first encryption algorithm is different from the second encryption algorithm or the first integrity protection The algorithm is different from the second integrity protection algorithm, and step 404b is performed.
  • Step 404a The target base station sends a connection recovery response message to the terminal, and the terminal receives a connection recovery response message from the target base station.
  • connection recovery response message is used to instruct the terminal to resume the RRC connection.
  • the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the second encryption algorithm and the second key, and integrity protected using the second integrity protection algorithm and the second integrity protection key.
  • the target base station since the first encryption algorithm selected by the target base station is the same as the second encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection algorithm is the same as the second integrity protection algorithm, the target base station does not send the selected first encryption to the terminal. Algorithm and second encryption algorithm.
  • step 404a go to step 405.
  • Step 404b The target base station sends a first encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal, where the terminal receives the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station.
  • the target base station sends the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal.
  • the target base station sends the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal.
  • step 404b go to step 405.
  • Step 405 The terminal determines whether the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station are received. As a result of the judgment, the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station are received, and the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station are not received.
  • Step 406 The terminal determines a protected connection recovery complete message.
  • step 406 when the terminal determines the protected connection recovery complete message, the judgment result of the above step 405 is referred to.
  • step 405 If the terminal determines in step 405 that the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station are received, the protected connection is restored according to the first encryption algorithm, the first integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery completion message. Message.
  • the terminal determines in step 405 that the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station are received.
  • the terminal determines in step 405 that the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station are not received, the protected connection recovery is obtained according to the second encryption algorithm, the second integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery complete message. Complete the message.
  • the specific implementation process is similar to the foregoing step 304. For reference, refer to the foregoing related description, and details are not described herein.
  • Step 407 The terminal sends a protected connection recovery complete message to the target base station, and the target base station receives the protected connection recovery complete message from the terminal.
  • the target base station After receiving the protected connection recovery complete message, the target base station decrypts and integrity checks the protected connection recovery complete message according to the judgment result of the target base station in step 403.
  • the completed connection recovery completion message, the second encryption algorithm, and the second integrity protection are performed according to the protected connection.
  • the algorithm gets the connection recovery complete message.
  • the target base station recovers the completion message, the first encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection according to the protected connection.
  • the algorithm gets the connection recovery complete message.
  • the target base station when the terminal moves to the target base station, the target base station can reselect the first encryption algorithm and the first used when communicating with the terminal according to the capabilities and requirements of the target base station itself.
  • An integrity protection algorithm If the target base station determines that the first encryption algorithm is the same as the second encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection algorithm is the same as the second integrity protection algorithm, the selected first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are not sent to the middle. Correspondingly, if the terminal determines that the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are not received, the terminal uses the second encryption algorithm and the second integrity protection algorithm to generate a protected connection recovery complete message.
  • the target base station determines that the first encryption algorithm is different from the second encryption algorithm, or the first integrity protection algorithm is different from the second integrity protection algorithm, sending the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal, and correspondingly If the terminal determines that the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are received, the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are used to generate a protected connection recovery complete message.
  • the security algorithm used for flexible selection of communication between the terminal and the target base station is realized; on the other hand, since the base station to which the terminal is connected has changed, the communication algorithm can be improved by using a new encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm. Sex.
  • the target base station determines that the first encryption algorithm is the same as the second encryption algorithm, and When the integrity protection algorithm is the same as the second integrity protection algorithm, the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm are not sent to the terminal, which can save overhead.
  • connection recovery request message, the connection recovery response message, the connection recovery completion message, the context request message, the context response message, and the like in the foregoing embodiment are only one name, and the name does not limit the message itself.
  • the connection recovery request message, the connection recovery response message, the connection recovery completion message, the context request message, and the context response message may be other names, which are not specifically limited in the embodiment of the present application.
  • the connection recovery request message may also be replaced with a request message, a recovery request message, a connection request message, etc.
  • the connection recovery response message may be replaced with a response message, a recovery response message, a connection response message, etc., and the connection is restored.
  • the completion message may also be replaced with a completion message, a recovery completion message, a connection completion message, etc.
  • the context request message may also be replaced with a request message or the like
  • the context response message may also be replaced with a response message or the like.
  • each of the foregoing network elements includes a hardware structure and/or a software module corresponding to each function.
  • the present invention can be implemented in a combination of hardware or hardware and computer software in combination with the elements and algorithm steps of the various examples described in the embodiments disclosed herein. Whether a function is implemented in hardware or computer software to drive hardware depends on the specific application and design constraints of the solution. A person skilled in the art can use different methods for implementing the described functions for each particular application, but such implementation should not be considered to be beyond the scope of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 a schematic diagram of a device provided by the present application, which may be a terminal or a base station, may perform the method performed by the terminal or the target base station in any of the foregoing embodiments.
  • the apparatus 500 includes at least one processor 501, a transmitter 502, a receiver 503, and optionally a memory 504.
  • the processor 501, the transmitter 502, the receiver 503, and the memory 504 are connected by a communication line.
  • Processor 501 can be a general purpose central processing unit (CPU), a microprocessor, an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), or one or more integrated circuits for controlling the execution of the program of the present invention.
  • CPU central processing unit
  • ASIC application-specific integrated circuit
  • the communication line can include a path for communicating information between the units.
  • the transmitter 502 and the receiver 503 are configured to communicate with other devices or communication networks.
  • the transmitter and receiver include radio frequency circuits.
  • the memory 504 can be a read-only memory (ROM) or other type of static storage device that can store static information and instructions, a random access memory (RAM) or other type that can store information and instructions.
  • the dynamic storage device may also be an electrically erasable programmabler-only memory (EEPROM), a compact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM) or other optical disc storage, or a disc storage ( Including compressed optical discs, laser discs, optical discs, digital versatile discs, Blu-ray discs, etc.), magnetic disk storage media or other magnetic storage devices, or can be used to carry or store desired program code in the form of instructions or data structures and can be stored by a computer Any other media taken, but not limited to this.
  • EEPROM electrically erasable programmabler-only memory
  • CD-ROM compact disc read-only memory
  • CD-ROM compact disc read-only memory
  • disc storage Including compressed optical discs, laser discs, optical discs, digital versatile discs, Blu-ray discs, etc.
  • the memory 504 may be independent and connected to the processor 501 via a communication line. Memory 504 can also be integrated with the processor.
  • the memory 504 is used to store application code for executing the solution of the present invention, and is controlled by the processor 501 for execution.
  • the processor 501 is configured to execute application code stored in the memory 504.
  • the processor 501 may include one or more CPUs, such as CPU0 and CPU1 in FIG.
  • apparatus 500 can include multiple processors, such as processor 501 and processor 508 in FIG. Each of these processors may be a single-CPU processor or a multi-core processor, where the processor may refer to one or more devices, circuits, and/or A processing core for processing data, such as computer program instructions.
  • processors such as processor 501 and processor 508 in FIG.
  • processors may be a single-CPU processor or a multi-core processor, where the processor may refer to one or more devices, circuits, and/or A processing core for processing data, such as computer program instructions.
  • the device 500 when the device 500 is a terminal, the device 500 can be used to implement the steps performed by the terminal in the method of the embodiment of the present invention.
  • the device 500 can perform step 301, step 304 and step 305 in FIG. 3, Step 401, step 405-step 407 in FIG. 4 can also be performed, and related features can be referred to above, and details are not described herein again.
  • the device 500 when the device 500 is a base station, the device 500 can be used to implement the steps performed by the target base station in the method of the embodiment of the present invention.
  • the device 500 can perform step 302 and step 303 in FIG. 3, and can also perform FIG. 4 Step 402, step 403, step 404a and step 404b, related features may be referred to above, and are not described herein again.
  • the actions of the terminal in FIG. 2 to FIG. 4 may be performed by the processor 501 (and/or the processor 508) in the device 500 calling the application code stored in the memory 504, which is not used in this embodiment of the present application. Any restrictions.
  • the application may divide the function module into the terminal according to the above method example.
  • each function module may be divided according to each function, or two or more functions may be integrated into one processing module.
  • the above integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional modules. It should be noted that the division of modules in the present application is schematic, and is only a logical function division, and may be further divided in actual implementation.
  • FIG. 6 shows a schematic diagram of a device, which may be the terminal involved in the above embodiment, and the device 600 includes a processing unit 601 and a receiving unit 602. And transmitting unit 603.
  • the sending unit 603 is configured to send a connection recovery request message to the target base station, where the connection recovery request message is used to request to resume the radio resource control RRC connection.
  • the processing unit 601 is configured to obtain, by the receiving unit 602, a first encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station, where the first encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station, where the first integrity protection algorithm is An integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station. And, configured to obtain a protected connection recovery complete message according to the first encryption algorithm, the first integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery complete message, where the connection recovery complete message is used to indicate that the RRC connection recovery is complete.
  • the sending unit 603 is further configured to send a protected connection recovery complete message to the target base station.
  • the receiving unit 602 is specifically configured to receive a connection recovery response message from the target base station, where the connection recovery response message includes a first encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm, where the connection recovery response message is used to indicate the terminal.
  • the RRC connection is restored, the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the second encryption key, the second encryption key is generated according to the second encryption algorithm, and the second encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the source base station.
  • the processing unit 601 is specifically configured to generate a second encryption key according to the second encryption algorithm, and decrypt the connection recovery response message according to the second encryption key and the second encryption algorithm. And acquiring the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the decrypted connection recovery response message.
  • connection recovery response message is integrity protected according to a second integrity protection key and a second integrity protection algorithm
  • the second integrity protection key is generated according to a second integrity protection algorithm
  • second The integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the source base station.
  • the processing unit 601 is further configured to: generate a second integrity protection key according to the second integrity protection algorithm. And performing integrity verification on the connection recovery response message according to the second integrity protection key and the second integrity protection algorithm.
  • the receiving unit 602 is specifically configured to receive a connection recovery response message from the target base station and a first encryption algorithm, where the connection recovery response message includes a first integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery response message is used to indicate the terminal.
  • the RRC connection is restored, and the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the first encryption key and the first encryption algorithm, and the first encryption key is generated according to the first encryption algorithm.
  • the processing unit 601 is specifically configured to decrypt the connection recovery response message according to the first encryption key and the first encryption algorithm, and obtain the first integrity protection algorithm from the decrypted connection recovery response message.
  • the receiving unit 602 is specifically configured to receive a connection recovery response message from the target base station, a first encryption algorithm, and a first integrity protection algorithm, where the connection recovery response message is used to indicate that the terminal resumes the RRC connection, and the connection is The recovery response message is encrypted according to the first encryption key and the first encryption algorithm, and the first encryption key is generated according to the first encryption algorithm.
  • connection recovery response message is integrity protected according to a first integrity protection key and a first integrity protection algorithm, the first integrity protection key being generated according to a first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the processing unit 601 is further configured to: generate a first integrity protection key according to the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the integrity check is performed on the connection recovery response message according to the first integrity protection key and the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the sending unit 603 is configured to send a connection recovery request message to the target base station, where the connection recovery request message is used to request to resume the radio resource control RRC connection.
  • the processing unit 601 is specifically configured to: if the receiving unit 602 does not receive the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station, according to the second encryption algorithm, the second integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery completion message, Get a protected connection recovery complete message. Alternatively, if the receiving unit 602 receives the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm from the target base station, the protected connection recovery is completed according to the first encryption algorithm, the first integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery complete message. Message.
  • the sending unit 603 is further configured to send a protected connection recovery complete message to the target base station.
  • the first encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station
  • the first integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station
  • the second encryption algorithm is a terminal and the The encryption algorithm negotiated between the source base stations
  • the second integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the source base station
  • the connection recovery complete message is used to indicate that the restoration of the RRC connection is completed.
  • the terminal may be used to implement the steps performed by the terminal in the method of the embodiment of the present invention.
  • the terminal may be used to implement the steps performed by the terminal in the method of the embodiment of the present invention.
  • the application may perform the division of the function modules on the target base station according to the foregoing method example.
  • each function module may be divided according to each function, or two or more functions may be integrated into one processing module.
  • the above integrated modules can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of software functional modules.
  • the division of modules in the present application is schematic, and is only a logical function division, and may be further divided in actual implementation.
  • FIG. 7 shows a schematic diagram of a device, which may be the target base station involved in the above embodiment, and the device 700 includes a processing unit 701 and a receiving unit. 702 and transmitting unit 703.
  • the receiving unit 702 is configured to receive a connection recovery request message from the terminal, where the connection recovery request message is used to request to resume the radio resource control RRC connection.
  • the processing unit 701 is configured to select the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm according to the security capability of the terminal, where the security capability of the terminal includes an encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm supported by the terminal.
  • the sending unit 703 is configured to send the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal.
  • the receiving unit 702 is further configured to receive a protected connection recovery complete message of the terminal, where the connection recovery complete message is used to indicate that the RRC connection is completed.
  • the processing unit 701 is further configured to obtain a connection recovery complete message according to the protected connection recovery complete message, the first encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the receiving unit 702 is further configured to receive a second encryption algorithm from the source base station, where the second encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the source base station.
  • the processing unit 701 is further configured to generate a second encryption key according to the second encryption algorithm. And, according to the second encryption key and the second encryption algorithm, encrypting the connection recovery response message, where the connection recovery response message includes a first encryption algorithm and a first integrity protection algorithm, where the connection recovery response message is used to instruct the terminal to resume the RRC connection. .
  • the sending unit 703 is specifically configured to send an encrypted connection recovery response message to the terminal.
  • the processing unit 701 is further configured to generate a second integrity protection key according to the second integrity protection algorithm, where the second integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the source base station. . And performing integrity protection on the connection recovery response message according to the second integrity protection key and the second integrity protection algorithm.
  • the processing unit 701 is further configured to generate a first encryption key according to the first encryption algorithm. And, the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the first encryption key and the first encryption algorithm, where the connection recovery response message includes a first integrity protection algorithm, and the connection recovery response message is used to instruct the terminal to resume the RRC connection.
  • the sending unit 703 is specifically configured to send a connection recovery response message and a first encryption algorithm to the terminal.
  • the processing unit 701 is further configured to generate a first encryption key according to the first encryption algorithm. And, the connection recovery response message is encrypted according to the first encryption key and the first encryption algorithm, and the connection recovery response message is used to instruct the terminal to resume the RRC connection.
  • the sending unit 703 is specifically configured to send, by the sending unit 703, a connection recovery response message, a first encryption algorithm, and a first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal.
  • the processing unit 701 is further configured to generate a first integrity protection key according to the first integrity protection algorithm. And performing integrity protection on the connection recovery response message according to the first integrity protection key and the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the receiving unit 702 is configured to receive a connection recovery request message from the terminal, where the connection recovery request message is used to request to resume the radio resource control RRC connection.
  • the processing unit 701 is configured to select the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm according to the security capability of the terminal, where the security capability of the terminal includes an encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm supported by the terminal.
  • the sending unit 703 is configured to: if the first encryption algorithm is the same as the second encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection algorithm is the same as the second integrity protection algorithm, send a connection recovery response message to the terminal.
  • the receiving unit 702 is configured to receive a protected connection recovery complete message from the terminal, and obtain a connection recovery complete message according to the protected connection recovery complete message, the second encryption algorithm, and the second integrity protection algorithm. or,
  • the sending unit 703 is configured to send the first encryption algorithm and the first integrity protection algorithm to the terminal if the first encryption algorithm is different from the second encryption algorithm, or the first integrity protection algorithm is different from the second integrity protection algorithm.
  • the receiving unit 702 is configured to receive the protected connection recovery complete message from the terminal, and obtain a connection recovery complete message according to the protected connection recovery complete message, the first encryption algorithm, and the first integrity protection algorithm.
  • the first encryption algorithm is an encryption algorithm and an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station
  • the first integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the target base station
  • the second encryption algorithm is a terminal and the The encryption algorithm negotiated between the source base stations
  • the second integrity protection algorithm is an integrity protection algorithm negotiated between the terminal and the source base station
  • the connection recovery response message is used to indicate that the terminal resumes the RRC connection
  • the connection recovery complete message is used to indicate that the RRC is restored.
  • the connection is complete.
  • the base station may be used to implement the steps performed by the target base station in the method of the embodiment of the present invention.
  • the base station may be used to implement the steps performed by the target base station in the method of the embodiment of the present invention.
  • reference may be made to the above, and details are not described herein again.
  • the above embodiments it may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof.
  • software it may be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product.
  • the computer program product includes one or more computer instructions.
  • the computer program instructions When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the processes or functions described in accordance with embodiments of the present invention are generated in whole or in part.
  • the computer can be a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device.
  • the computer instructions can be stored in a computer readable storage medium or transferred from one computer readable storage medium to another computer readable storage medium, for example, the computer instructions can be from a website site, computer, server or data center Transfer to another website site, computer, server, or data center by wire (eg, coaxial cable, fiber optic, digital subscriber line (DSL), or wireless (eg, infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.).
  • the computer readable storage medium can be any available media that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server, data center, or the like that includes one or more available media.
  • the usable medium may be a magnetic medium (eg, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape), an optical medium (eg, a DVD), or a semiconductor medium (such as a Solid State Disk (SSD)) or the like.
  • a magnetic medium eg, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape
  • an optical medium eg, a DVD
  • a semiconductor medium such as a Solid State Disk (SSD)
  • embodiments of the present application can be provided as a method, apparatus (device), computer readable storage medium, or computer program product.
  • the present application may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or a combination of software and hardware aspects, which are collectively referred to herein as "module” or "system.”
  • a general purpose processor may be a microprocessor.
  • the general purpose processor may be any conventional processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine.
  • the processor may also be implemented by a combination of computing devices, such as a digital signal processor and a microprocessor, a plurality of microprocessors, one or more microprocessors in conjunction with a digital signal processor core, or any other similar configuration. achieve.
  • the steps of the method or algorithm described in the embodiments of the present application may be directly embedded in hardware, a software unit executed by a processor, or a combination of the two.
  • the software unit can be stored in RAM memory, flash memory, ROM memory, EPROM memory, EEPROM memory, registers, hard disk, removable disk, CD-ROM, or any other form of storage medium in the art.
  • the storage medium can be coupled to the processor such that the processor can read information from the storage medium and can write information to the storage medium.
  • the storage medium can also be integrated into the processor.
  • the processor and the storage medium may be disposed in the ASIC, and the ASIC may be disposed in the terminal device. Alternatively, the processor and the storage medium may also be disposed in different components in the terminal device.
  • These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device such that a series of operational steps are performed on a computer or other programmable device to produce computer-implemented processing for execution on a computer or other programmable device.
  • the instructions provide steps for implementing the functions specified in one or more of the flow or in a block or blocks of a flow diagram.

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Abstract

本申请提供一种RRC连接恢复方法及装置。该方法中：当终端移动到目标基站时，目标基站可以根据目标基站自身的能力和要求，重新选择与终端之间进行通信时所使用的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，并将第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法发送给终端。一方面，实现了灵活选择终端与目标基站之间通信所使用的安全算法；另一方面，由于终端连接的基站发生了改变，因而使用新的加密算法和完整性保护算法，可以提高通信的安全性。

Description

一种RRC连接恢复方法及装置
本申请要求在2017年10月31日提交中华人民共和国知识产权局、申请号为201711050848.5、发明名称为“一种RRC连接恢复方法及装置”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中，以及，要求在2018年4月3日提交中华人民共和国知识产权局、申请号为201810289244.4、发明名称为“一种RRC连接恢复方法及装置”的中国专利申请的优先权，其全部内容通过引用结合在本申请中。
技术领域
本申请涉及移动通信技术领域，尤其涉及一种RRC连接恢复方法及装置。
背景技术
在长期演进(long term evolution，LTE)中，挂起和恢复流程可用于窄带-物联网(narrowband internet of things,NB-IoT)的终端，即移动性较低或耗电低的物联网设备，如智能水表。
当基站以挂起的方式通知终端释放当前连接时，终端和基站会删除部分接入层的上下文，以及还会保留部分接入层的上下文，如接入层密钥，终端的安全能力，当前选择的安全算法等。然后终端从连接态进入不活跃态。当终端希望恢复与基站的连接时，可以快速地从不活跃态恢复到连接态。
第五代(5th generation，5G)系统及未来的通信系统中，可以扩展上述服务流程，将挂起和恢复流程应用到增强移动带宽(enhanced mobile broadband,eMBB)的终端，如智能手机。
由于终端的移动性较高，因而终端改变接入的基站的频率较高。在这种情形下，如何提高终端在从不活跃态恢复到连接态时的安全性和灵活性，则是有待解决的问题。
发明内容
本申请提供一种RRC连接恢复方法及装置，以期提高终端从不活跃态恢复到连接态时的安全性和灵活性。
为达到上述目的，本申请提供如下技术方案：
第一方面，本申请提供一种RRC连接恢复方法，包括：终端向目标基站发送连接恢复请求消息，连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接；终端获取来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，第一加密算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的加密算法，第一完整性保护算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的完整性保护算法；终端根据第一加密算法、第一完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息，连接恢复完成消息用于指示RRC连接恢复完成；终端向目标基站发送受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
上述方法，当终端移动到目标基站时，终端向目标基站发送连接恢复请求消息，然后由目标基站根据目标基站自身的能力和要求，重新选择与终端之间进行通信时所使用的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，并将第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法发送给终端。一方面，实现了灵活选择终端与目标基站之间通信所使用的安全算法；另一方面，由于终端连接的基站发生了改变，因而使用新的加密算法和完整性保护算法，可以提高通信的安全性。
在一种可能的设计中，终端获取来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，包括：终端接收来自目标基站的连接恢复响应消息，连接恢复响应消息包括第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接，连接恢复响应消息根据第二加密密钥进行加密，第二加密密钥根据第二加密算法生成，第二加密算法为终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法；终端根据第二加密算法生成第二加密密钥，并根据第二加密密钥和第二加密算法，解密连接恢复响应消息。终端从解密的连接恢复响应消息中获取第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。
在本设计的一种可能的实施方式中，连接恢复响应消息根据第二完整性保护密钥和第二完整性保护算法进行完整性保护，第二完整性保护密钥根据第二完整性保护算法生成，第二完整性保护算法为终端与源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法。终端根据第二完整性保护算法,生成第二完整性保护密钥；终端根据第二完整性保护密钥和第二完整性保护算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验。
在另一种可能的设计中，终端获取来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，包括：终端接收来自目标基站的连接恢复响应消息及第一加密算法，连接恢复响应消息包括第一完整性保护算法，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接，连接恢复响应消息根据第一加密密钥和第一加密算法进行加密，第一加密密钥根据第一加密算法生成；终端获取第一加密算法，并根据第一加密算法生成第一加密密钥；终端根据第一加密密钥和第一加密算法，解密连接恢复响应消息，并从解密的连接恢复响应消息中获取第一完整性保护算法。
在又一种可能的设计中，终端获取来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，包括：终端接收来自目标基站的连接恢复响应消息、第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接，连接恢复响应消息根据第一加密密钥和第一加密算法进行加密，第一加密密钥根据第一加密算法生成。
在本设计的一种可能的实施方式中，连接恢复响应消息根据第一完整性保护密钥和第一完整性保护算法进行完整性保护，第一完整性保护密钥根据第一完整性保护算法生成。终端根据第一完整性保护算法生成第一完整性保护密钥；终端根据第一完整性保护密钥和第一完整性保护算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验。
在又一种可能的设计中，终端获取来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，包括：终端接收来自目标基站的第一消息，第一消息包括第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。
在本设计的一种可能的实施方式中，终端接收来自目标基站的第一消息之后还包括：终端接收来自目标基站的连接恢复响应消息，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接，连接恢复响应消息是根据第一加密算法、第一完整性保护算法进行安全性保护的。
在本设计的一种可能的实施方式中，第一消息根据第一完整性保护密钥和第一完整性保护算法进行完整性保护，第一完整性保护密钥根据第一完整性保护算法生成；则进一步还包括：终端根据第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥；终端根据第一完整性保护密钥和第一完整性保护算法，对第一消息进行完整性校验。
在本设计的一种可能的实施方式中，第一消息还包括第一指示信息，第一指示信息用于指示终端不更新接入层密钥；终端根据第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性 保护密钥，包括：终端根据当前接入层密钥和第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥。
在本设计的又一种可能的实施方式中，终端确定第一消息中不包括第二指示信息，第二指示信息用于指示终端更新接入层密钥；终端根据第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥，包括：终端根据当前接入层密钥和第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥。
在本设计的一种可能的实施方式中，还包括：终端向目标基站发送第二消息，第二消息用于响应所述第一消息。
在本设计的一种可能的实施方式中，第一消息为安全模式命令消息或RRC重配置消息。
上述几种可能的设计，给出了几种实现基站将第一加密算法和第一完整性保护密钥发送给终端的方法。在实际应用中，可根据实际需要灵活选择。
第二方面，本申请提供一种RRC连接恢复方法，包括：终端向目标基站发送连接恢复请求消息，连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接；若终端未接收到来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则根据第二加密算法、第二完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息；或者，若终端接收到来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则根据第一加密算法、第一完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息；终端向目标基站发送受保护的连接恢复完成消息；
其中，第一加密算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的加密算法和完整性保护算法，第一完整性保护算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，第二加密算法为终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法，第二完整性保护算法为终端与源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，连接恢复完成消息用于指示恢复RRC连接完成。
上述方法，当终端移动到目标基站时，终端向目标基站发送连接恢复请求消息，然后由目标基站根据目标基站自身的能力和要求，重新选择与终端之间进行通信时所使用的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。目标基站若确定第一加密算法与第二加密算法相同，且第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法相同，则不将选择的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法发送给中，相应地，终端若确定未接收到第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则使用第二加密算法和第二完整性保护算法，生成受保护的连接恢复完成消息。目标基站若确定第一加密算法与第二加密算法不同，或第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法不同，则将第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法发送给终端，相应地，终端若确定接收到第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则使用第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，生成受保护的连接恢复完成消息。一方面，实现了灵活选择终端与目标基站之间通信所使用的安全算法；另一方面，由于终端连接的基站发生了改变，因而使用新的加密算法和完整性保护算法，可以提高通信的安全性。
并且，由于当目标基站确定第一加密算法与第二加密算法相同，且第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法相同时，则目标基站不向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，因而可节约开销。
第三方面，本申请提供一种RRC连接恢复方法，包括：目标基站接收来自终端的 连接恢复请求消息，连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接；目标基站根据终端的安全能力，选择第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，终端的安全能力包括终端支持的加密算法和完整性保护算法；目标基站向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法；目标基站接收来自终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息，并根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，得到连接恢复完成消息，连接恢复完成消息用于指示恢复RRC连接完成。
上述方法，当终端移动到目标基站时，目标基站接收终端发送的连接恢复请求消息，然后由目标基站根据目标基站自身的能力和要求，重新选择与终端之间进行通信时所使用的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，并将第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法发送给终端。一方面，实现了灵活选择终端与目标基站之间通信所使用的安全算法；另一方面，由于终端连接的基站发生了改变，因而使用新的加密算法和完整性保护算法，可以提高通信的安全性。
在一种可能的设计中，还包括：目标基站接收来自源基站的第二加密算法，第二加密算法为终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法。目标基站向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，包括：目标基站根据第二加密算法，生成第二加密密钥。目标基站根据第二加密密钥和第二加密算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，连接恢复响应消息包括第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接；目标基站向终端发送加密的连接恢复响应消息。
在本设计的一种可能的实施方式中，还包括：目标基站根据第二完整性保护算法生成第二完整性保护密钥，第二完整性保护算法为终端与源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法；目标基站根据第二完整性保护密钥和第二完整性保护算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护。
在另一种可能的设计中，目标基站向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，包括：目标基站根据第一加密算法，生成第一加密密钥；目标基站根据第一加密密钥和第一加密算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，连接恢复响应消息包括第一完整性保护算法，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接；目标基站向终端发送连接恢复响应消息和第一加密算法。
在又一种可能的设计中，目标基站向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，包括：目标基站根据第一加密算法，生成第一加密密钥。目标基站根据第一加密密钥和第一加密算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接；目标基站向终端发送连接恢复响应消息、第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。
在一种可能的设计中，还包括：目标基站根据第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥。目标基站根据第一完整性保护密钥和第一完整性保护算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护。
在又一种可能的设计中，目标基站向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，包括：目标基站向终端发送第一消息，第一消息包括第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。
在本设计的又一种可能的实施方式中，目标基站向终端发送第一消息之后还包括：目标基站根据第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行安全性 保护；目标基站向终端发送连接恢复响应消息。
在本设计的又一种可能的实施方式中，目标基站根据第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥；目标基站根据第一完整性保护密钥和第一完整性保护算法，对第一消息进行完整性保护。
在本设计的又一种可能的实施方式中，目标基站根据第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥，包括：目标基站根据当前接入层密钥和第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥。
在本设计的又一种可能的实施方式中，第一消息还包括第一指示信息，第一指示信息用于指示终端不更新接入层密钥。
在本设计的又一种可能的实施方式中，目标基站接收来自终端的第二消息，第二消息用于响应所述第一消息。
在本设计的又一种可能的实施方式中，第一消息为安全模式命令消息或RRC重配置消息。
第四方面，本申请提供一种RRC连接恢复方法，包括：目标基站接收来自终端的连接恢复请求消息，连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接；目标基站根据终端的安全能力，选择第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，终端的安全能力包括终端支持的加密算法和完整性保护算法。
若第一加密算法与第二加密算法相同，且第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法相同，则目标基站向终端发送连接恢复响应消息，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接；以及，接收来自终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息，并根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、第二加密算法和第二完整性保护算法，得到连接恢复完成消息；或者，
若第一加密算法与第二加密算法不同，或第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法不同，则目标基站向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法；以及，接收来自终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息，并根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，得到连接恢复完成消息；
其中，第一加密算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的加密算法和完整性保护算法，第一完整性保护算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，第二加密算法为终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法，第二完整性保护算法为终端与源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，连接恢复完成消息用于指示恢复RRC连接完成。
上述方法，当终端移动到目标基站时，目标基站接收终端发送的连接恢复请求消息，然后由目标基站根据目标基站自身的能力和要求，重新选择与终端之间进行通信时所使用的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。目标基站若确定第一加密算法与第二加密算法相同，且第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法相同，则不将选择的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法发送给中，相应地，终端若确定未接收到第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则使用第二加密算法和第二完整性保护算法，生成受保护的连接恢复完成消息。目标基站若确定第一加密算法与第二加密算法不同，或第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法不同，则将第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法发送给终端，相应地，终端若确定接收到第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则使用第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，生成受保护的连接恢复完成消息。一方 面，实现了灵活选择终端与目标基站之间通信所使用的安全算法；另一方面，由于终端连接的基站发生了改变，因而使用新的加密算法和完整性保护算法，可以提高通信的安全性。
并且，由于当目标基站确定第一加密算法与第二加密算法相同，且第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法相同时，则目标基站不向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，因而可节约开销。
第五方面，本申请提供一种装置，该装置可以是终端，也可以是终端内的芯片。该装置具有实现上述第一方面的各实施例的功能。该功能可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块。
在一种可能的设计中，当该装置为终端时，终端包括：接收单元、发送单元和处理单元。处理单元例如可以是处理器，接收单元例如可以是接收器，发送单元，例如可以是发送器。接收器和发送器包括射频电路。可选地，终端还包括存储单元，该存储单元例如可以是存储器。当终端包括存储单元时，该存储单元存储有计算机执行指令，处理单元与存储单元连接，处理单元执行存储单元存储的计算机执行指令，以使该终端执行上述第一方面任意一项的RRC连接恢复方法。
在另一种可能的设计中，当该装置为终端内的芯片时，芯片包括：接收单元、发送单元和处理单元。处理单元例如可以是处理电路，接收单元例如可以是输入接口、管脚或电路等，发送单元例如可以是输出接口、管脚或电路等。该处理单元可执行存储单元存储的计算机执行指令，以使上述第一方面任意一项的RRC连接恢复方法被执行。可选地，存储单元可以是芯片内的存储单元，如寄存器、缓存等，存储单元还可以是终端内的位于芯片外部的存储单元，如只读存储器(read-only memory，ROM)、可存储静态信息和指令的其他类型的静态存储设备、随机存取存储器(random access memory，RAM)等。
其中，上述任一处提到的处理器，可以是一个通用的中央处理器(Central Processing Unit，CPU)，微处理器，特定应用集成电路(application-specific integrated circuit，ASIC)，或一个或多个用于控制上述第一方面任意一项的RRC连接恢复方法的程序执行的集成电路。
第六方面，本申请提供一种装置，该装置可以是终端，也可以是终端内的芯片。该装置具有实现上述第二方面的各实施例的功能。该功能可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块。
在一种可能的设计中，当该装置为终端时，终端包括：接收单元、发送单元和处理单元。处理单元例如可以是处理器，接收单元例如可以是接收器，发送单元，例如可以是发送器。接收器和发送器包括射频电路。可选地，终端还包括存储单元，该存储单元例如可以是存储器。当终端包括存储单元时，该存储单元存储有计算机执行指令，处理单元与存储单元连接，处理单元执行存储单元存储的计算机执行指令，以使该终端执行上述第二方面的RRC连接恢复方法。
在另一种可能的设计中，当该装置为终端内的芯片时，芯片包括：接收单元、发送单元和处理单元。处理单元例如可以是处理电路，接收单元例如可以是输入接口、 管脚或电路等，发送单元例如可以是输出接口、管脚或电路等。该处理单元可执行存储单元存储的计算机执行指令，以使上述第二方面任意一项的RRC连接恢复方法被执行。可选地，存储单元可以是芯片内的存储单元，如寄存器、缓存等，存储单元还可以是终端内的位于芯片外部的存储单元，如ROM)、可存储静态信息和指令的其他类型的静态存储设备、RAM等。
其中，上述任一处提到的处理器，可以是一个通用的CPU，微处理器，ASIC，或一个或多个用于控制上述第二方面的RRC连接恢复方法的程序执行的集成电路。
第七方面，本申请提供一种装置，该装置可以是基站，也可以是基站内的芯片。该装置具有实现上述第三方面的各实施例的功能。该功能可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块。
在一种可能的设计中，当该装置为基站时，基站包括：接收单元、发送单元和处理单元。处理单元例如可以是处理器，接收单元例如可以是接收器，发送单元，例如可以是发送器。接收器和发送器包括射频电路。可选地，基站还包括存储单元，该存储单元例如可以是存储器。当基站包括存储单元时，该存储单元存储有计算机执行指令，处理单元与存储单元连接，处理单元执行存储单元存储的计算机执行指令，以使该基站执行上述第三方面任意一项的RRC连接恢复方法。
在另一种可能的设计中，当该装置为基站内的芯片时，芯片包括：接收单元、发送单元和处理单元。处理单元例如可以是处理电路，接收单元例如可以是输入接口、管脚或电路等，发送单元例如可以是输出接口、管脚或电路等。该处理单元可执行存储单元存储的计算机执行指令，以使上述第三方面任意一项的RRC连接恢复方法被执行。可选地，存储单元可以是芯片内的存储单元，如寄存器、缓存等，存储单元还可以是终端内的位于芯片外部的存储单元，如只ROM、可存储静态信息和指令的其他类型的静态存储设备、RAM等。
其中，上述任一处提到的处理器，可以是一个通用的CPU，微处理器，ASIC，或一个或多个用于控制上述第三方面任意一项的RRC连接恢复方法的程序执行的集成电路。
第八方面，本申请提供一种装置，该装置可以是基站，也可以是基站内的芯片。该装置具有实现上述第四方面的各实施例的功能。该功能可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块。
在一种可能的设计中，当该装置为基站时，终端包括：接收单元、发送单元和处理单元。处理单元例如可以是处理器，接收单元例如可以是接收器，发送单元，例如可以是发送器。接收器和发送器包括射频电路。可选地，基站还包括存储单元，该存储单元例如可以是存储器。当基站包括存储单元时，该存储单元存储有计算机执行指令，处理单元与存储单元连接，处理单元执行存储单元存储的计算机执行指令，以使该基站执行上述第四方面的RRC连接恢复方法。
在另一种可能的设计中，当该装置为基站内的芯片时，芯片包括：接收单元、发送单元和处理单元。处理单元例如可以是处理电路，接收单元例如可以是输入接口、管脚或电路等，发送单元例如可以是输出接口、管脚或电路等。该处理单元可执行存 储单元存储的计算机执行指令，以使上述第四方面的RRC连接恢复方法被执行。可选地，存储单元可以是芯片内的存储单元，如寄存器、缓存等，存储单元还可以是基站内的位于芯片外部的存储单元，如ROM、可存储静态信息和指令的其他类型的静态存储设备、RAM等。
其中，上述任一处提到的处理器，可以是一个通用的CPU，微处理器，ASIC，或一个或多个用于控制上述第四方面的RRC连接恢复方法的程序执行的集成电路。
第九方面，本申请还提供一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机可读存储介质中存储有指令，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行上述各方面所述的方法。
第十方面，本申请还提供一种包含指令的计算机程序产品，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行上述各方面所述的方法。
另外，第三方面至第十方面中任一种设计所带来的技术效果可参见第一方面或第二方面中不同设计所带来的技术效果，此处不再赘述。
第十一方面，本申请提供一种通信系统，所述系统包括第五方面所述的装置和第七方面所述的装置，或者，所述系统包括第六方面所述的装置和第八方面所述的装置。
本申请的这些方面或其他方面在以下实施例的描述中会更加简明易懂。
本申请，当终端移动到目标基站时，终端向目标基站发送连接恢复请求消息，然后由目标基站根据目标基站自身的能力和要求，重新选择与终端之间进行通信时所使用的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，并将第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法发送给终端。相较于现有技术，本申请，一方面，实现了灵活选择终端与目标基站之间通信所使用的安全算法；另一方面，由于终端连接的基站发生了改变，因而使用新的加密算法和完整性保护算法，可以提高通信的安全性。
附图说明
图1为本申请提供的一种可能的网络架构示意图；
图2为本申请提供的终端从连接态进入不活跃态的过程示意图；
图3为本申请提供的一种RRC连接恢复方法示意图；
图4为本申请提供的另一种RRC连接恢复方法示意图；
图5为本申请提供的一种装置示意图；
图6为本申请提供的另一种装置示意图；
图7为本申请提供的另一种装置示意图。
具体实施方式
下面将结合附图对本申请作进一步地详细描述。方法实施例中的具体操作方法也可以应用于装置实施例或系统实施例中。其中，在本申请的描述中，除非另有说明，“多个”的含义是两个或两个以上。
需要说明的的是，本申请的无线资源控制(radio resource control，RRC)连接恢复方法可由装置执行。其中，该装置可以包括网络侧的装置和/或终端侧的装置。在网络侧，该装置可以是基站或基站内的芯片，即可以由基站或基站内的芯片执行本申请的RRC连接恢复方法；在终端侧，该装置可以是终端或终端内的芯片，即可以由终端或终端内的芯片执行本申请的RRC连接恢复方法。
为方便说明，本申请，以装置为基站或终端为例，对RRC连接恢复方法进行说明， 对于装置为基站内的芯片或终端内的芯片的实现方法，可参考基站或终端的RRC连接恢复方法的具体说明，不再重复介绍。
如图1所示，为本申请的一种可能的网络架构示意图。包括终端、源基站和目标基站。终端通过无线接口与源基站、目标基站进行通信。源基站与目标基站之间可以通过有线连接进行通信，如通过X2接口,Xn接口进行通信，或者还可以通过空口的方式进行通信。
本申请中，由于终端的移动等原因，终端可能从源基站移动到目标基站。源基站是终端在先接入的基站，目标基站是终端移动后，在后接入的基站。
其中，终端是一种具有无线收发功能的设备，可以部署在陆地上，包括室内或室外、手持或车载；也可以部署在水面上(如轮船等)；还可以部署在空中(例如飞机、气球和卫星上等)。所述终端可以是手机(mobile phone)、平板电脑(pad)、带无线收发功能的电脑、虚拟现实(virtual reality，VR)终端、增强现实(augmented reality，AR)终端、工业控制(industrial control)中的无线终端、无人驾驶(self driving)中的无线终端、远程医疗(remote medical)中的无线终端、智能电网(smart grid)中的无线终端、运输安全(transportation safety)中的无线终端、智慧城市(smart city)中的无线终端、智慧家庭(smart home)中的无线终端等等。
基站，是一种为终端提供无线通信功能的设备，包括但不限于：5G中的下一代基站(g nodeB，gNB)、演进型节点B(evolved node B，eNB)、无线网络控制器(radio network controller，RNC)、节点B(node B，NB)、基站控制器(base station controller，BSC)、基站收发台(base transceiver station，BTS)、家庭基站(例如，home evolved nodeB，或home node B，HNB)、基带单元(BaseBand Unit，BBU)、传输点(transmitting and receiving point，TRP)、发射点(transmitting point，TP)、移动交换中心等。
本申请，终端一般情况下，具有三种状态，即连接(connected)态，空闲(idle)态和不活跃(inactive)态。
其中，当终端处于连接态时，终端处于正常工作的状态。网络侧与终端之间可以发送和接收用户数据。
当终端从连接态进入空闲态时，终端和基站一般会删除终端的全部的接入层(access stratum,AS)上下文。在一种特别的情况下，在4G中，当网络侧以挂起原因释放终端的连接时，终端也会从连接态进入空闲态，但此时，终端和基站会删除部分AS上下文，以及保留部分AS上下文，例如可以保留接入层密钥(4G中可以称为KeNB)，终端的安全能力，终端和终端接入的源基站之间通信的安全算法(包括完整性保护算法和加密算法)。其中，终端的安全能力指的是终端支持的安全算法，包括支持的加密算法和支持的完整性保护算法。
在5G中，引入了不活跃态，当终端从连接态进入不活跃态时，基站将挂起终端，此时，终端和基站删除部分AS上下文，以及保留部分AS上下文，例如可以保留接入层密钥(5G中可以称为KgNB)，终端的安全能力，终端和终端接入的源基站之间通信的安全算法(包括完整性保护算法和加密算法)。其中，终端的安全能力指的是终端支持的安全算法，包括支持的加密算法和支持的完整性保护算法。
当终端处于不活跃态时，由于终端上保留了部分AS上下文，因此相较于终端从空闲态进入连接态，终端从不活跃态进入连接态会更加快速。
另外，考虑到终端的移动性，当终端从不活跃态恢复到连接态时，终端可能需要更换基站。即，终端先与源基站建立连接，然后由于某些原因，例如网络侧通知，终端在源基站进入不活跃态。当终端希望恢复到连接态时，若终端已经移动至目标基站的覆盖范围，则终端将在目标基站从不活跃态恢复到连接态。
当然，本申请同样也适用终端从不活跃态恢复到连接态时，接入的目标基站与源基站相同的场景，即终端接入的基站也可以不发生改变，仍然是同一个基站。
本申请主要讨论，当终端确定需要从不活跃态进入连接态，即恢复与目标基站之间的连接时，如何实现可以适应目标基站的一些要求，从而达到灵活、安全连接的目的。
在介绍本申请具体的RRC连接恢复方法之前，先介绍终端从连接态进入不活跃态的过程。
如图2所示，为本申请提供的终端从连接态进入不活跃态的过程示意图，包括以下步骤：
步骤201、基站决定挂起终端的RRC连接。
例如，当基站一段时间内未接收到终端发送的数据时，则决定将终端挂起。
步骤202、基站向终端发送挂起消息。
挂起消息用于通知终端释放RRC连接，并进入不活跃态。挂起消息例如可以是具有特殊指示的RRC连接释放消息。
在具体实现中，挂起消息可以携带以下参数：恢复标识，下一跳链计数器(next hop chaining counter，NCC)等。
恢复标识是终端后续从不活跃态进入连接态时所需要的参数，恢复标识可以包括源基站的标识、终端的标识等信息。
NCC也是终端后续从不活跃态进入连接态时所需要的参数，NCC是生成新的接入层密钥所需要的参数，即NCC可用于生成新的接入层密钥(本申请用KgNB*表示新的接入层密钥)。
可选地，挂起消息还可以携带原因参数releaseCause，releaseCause用于通知终端执行挂起操作并进入不活跃态。例如可以将releaseCause置为“RRC Suspend”或“RRC Inactive”。当终端获取到releaseCause参数时，确定releaseCause的值为“RRC Suspend”或“RRC Inactive”时，则执行终端挂起的相关操作。
可选地，基站还可以通知核心网的控制面网元释放承载，例如释放信令无线承载(signaling radio bearer，SRB)、数据无线承载(data radio bearer，DRB)。
步骤203、终端进入不活跃态。
终端保存删除部分AS上下文，以及保留部分AS上下文。保留的部分AS上下文包括接入层密钥，终端的安全能力，终端和终端接入的源基站之间通信的完整性保护算法和加密算法等。
终端还保存基站发送的恢复标识，NCC等参数。
终端挂起承载，例如，挂起信令无线承载、数据无线承载，然后进入不活跃态。
从上述终端从连接态进入不活跃态的过程可看出，终端进入不活跃态之后，终端上保存有部分AS上下文和从基站接收的参数，因而，后续当终端希望从不活跃态恢复到连接态时，这些参数将有助于终端实现快速从不活跃态恢复到连接态。
下面介绍本申请的RRC连接恢复方法，即终端从不活跃态恢复到连接态。并且，终端是在目标基站下实现从不活跃态恢复到连接态。
其中，目标基站和源基站可以是不同的基站，也可以是相同的基站。下面以目标基站和源基站是不同的基站为例，对本申请的RRC连接恢复方法进行说明。针对目标基站和源基站是相同的基站的情形，只需要将源基站和目标基站之间的交互操作省略即可。
终端与基站之间通信时，需要对通信的消息进行加密和完整性保护，例如使用加密算法对消息进行加密，使用完整性保护算法对消息进行完整性保护。
本申请中，当终端通过目标基站恢复连接时，终端与目标基站之间将使用协商的新的加密算法和新的完整性保护算法对通信的消息进行保护。
换句话说，本申请中，当终端移动到目标基站时，目标基站可以根据目标基站自身的能力和要求，重新选择加密算法和完整性保护算法，并使用重新选择的加密算法和完整性保护算法与终端之间进行通信，而不是在继续使用终端与源基站通信的加密算法和完整性保护算法。因而，本申请方法，一方面，目标基站可以重新选择加密算法和完整性保护算法，较为灵活；另一方面，由于使用了新的加密算法和完整性保护算法，因而可以提高通信的安全性。
为方便说明，本申请中，终端与目标基站之间协商的用于通信的安全算法，称为第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法,即，第一加密算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的用于安全通信的加密算法，第一完整性保护算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的用于安全通信的完整性保护算法。终端与源基站之间通信所使用的安全算法，称为第二加密算法和第二完整性保护算法，即，第二加密算法为终端与源基站之间协商的用于安全通信的加密算法，第二完整性保护算法为终端与源基站之间协商的用于安全通信的完整性保护算法。
需要说明的是，目标基站重新选择的第一加密算法与第二加密算法可能相同，也可能不同；同样地，目标基站重新选择的第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法可能相同，也可能不同。
参考图3，为本申请提供的一种RRC连接恢复方法，包括以下步骤：
步骤301、终端向目标基站发送连接恢复请求消息。
相应地，目标基站接收来自终端的连接恢复请求消息。
终端发送的连接恢复请求消息，用于请求恢复RRC连接。即终端请求从不活跃态恢复到连接态。
作为一种实现方式，连接恢复请求消息中携带恢复标识。
进一步地，连接恢复请求消息中还可以携带用于完整性的短消息认证码(short message authentication code for integrity，shortMAC-I)。shortMAC-I用于认证终端的合法性。
步骤302、目标基站选择第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。
作为一种实现方式，当目标基站接收到连接恢复请求消息后，从中获取到恢复标识，根据恢复标识中的源基站的标识，确定终端之前是与源基站连接的，则向源基站发送上下文请求消息，上下文请求消息用于请求获取终端的上下文，例如，在上下文请求消息中携带恢复标识。可选地，若连接恢复请求消息还携带shortMAC-I，则还将 shortMAC-I携带于上下文请求消息中发送至源基站。
源基站接收到目标基站发送上下文请求消息后，从中获取恢复标识，根据恢复标识中的终端的标识，获取该终端的接入层上下文，包括终端的安全能力。可选地，获取的终端的接入层上下文还包括终端与源基站之间协商的第二加密算法、第二完整性保护算法等信息。
源基站将获取的终端的安全能力携带于上下文响应消息中发送给目标基站。可选地，上下文响应消息中还包括终端与源基站之间通信的第二加密算法、第二完整性保护算法。
可选地，源基站还重新生成接入层密钥，并将重新生成的接入层密钥(KgNB*)携带于上下文响应消息中发送给目标基站。
可选地，若源基站还接收到目标基站发送的shortMAC-I，则源基站还对接收到的shortMAC-I进行校验。只有对shortMAC-I校验通过，即确定该终端是合法终端时，才将获取的该终端的接入层上下文发送给目标基站。
步骤303、目标基站向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。
相应地，终端接收来自目标基站的第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法。
当终端接收到来自目标基站的第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法时，终端即可以获取到该第一加密算法和该第一完整性保护算法。
步骤304、终端根据第一加密算法、第一完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
具体地，当终端恢复RRC连接状态之后，终端向目标基站发送连接恢复完成消息，该连接恢复完成消息用于指示所述RRC连接恢复完成，即终端通知目标基站，终端已经进入RRC连接状态。
终端生成连接恢复完成消息之后，在发送该连接恢复完成消息之前，还可以对该连接恢复完成消息进行安全保护。具体地，终端根据第一加密算法、第一完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
在一种实现方式中，终端可以先根据第一加密算法和第一加密密钥，对连接恢复完成消息进行加密，得到加密后的连接恢复完成消息。然后根据第一完整性保护算法和第一完整性保护密钥，对加密后的连接恢复完成消息进行完整性保护，从而得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
在另一种实现方式中，终端可以先根据第一完整性保护算法和第一完整性保护密钥，对连接恢复完成消息进行完整性保护，得到完整性保护后的连接恢复完成消息。然后根据第一加密算法和第一加密密钥，对完整性保护后的连接恢复完成消息进行加密，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
其中，第一加密密钥是由终端根据第一加密算法生成，具体实现中，第一加密密钥可以是由终端根据接入层密钥、第一加密算法的标识、第一加密算法的类型生成的。第一完整性保护密钥是由终端根据第一完整性保护算法生成，具体实现中，第一完整性保护密钥可以是由终端根据接入层密钥、第一完整性保护算法的标识、第一完整性保护算法的类型生成的。
本申请对于如何得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息的方法不做具体限定，实际应用中可根据需要灵活选择。
步骤305、终端向目标基站发送受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
相应地，目标基站接收来自终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
目标基站接收到受保护的连接恢复完成消息之后，根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，得到连接恢复完成消息，并根据连接恢复完成消息确认终端进入RRC连接状态。
需要说明的是，目标基站根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，得到连接恢复完成消息的方法，与终端对连接恢复完成消息进行保护的方法是相对应的。
例如，若终端是对连接恢复完成消息先进行加密，后进行完整性保护，则目标基站得到连接恢复完成消息的方法为：目标基站根据第一完整性保护算法和第一完整性保护密钥，对受保护的连接恢复完成消息进行完整性校验。当校验正确时，进一步地，目标基站根据第一加密算法和第一加密密钥，对完整性校验后的连接恢复完成消息进行解密，得到连接恢复完成消息。
再比如，若终端是对连接恢复完成消息先进行完整性保护，后进行加密，则目标基站得到连接恢复完成消息的方法为：目标基站根据第一加密算法和第一加密密钥，对受保护的连接恢复完成消息进行解密，得到解密的连接恢复完成消息。进一步地，目标基站根据第一完整性保护算法和第一完整性保护密钥，对解密的连接恢复完成消息进行完整性校验。当校验正确时，则得到连接恢复完成消息。
本申请，通过上述步骤301-步骤305，当终端移动到目标基站时，目标基站可以根据目标基站自身的能力和要求，重新选择与终端之间进行通信时所使用的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，并将第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法发送给终端。一方面，实现了灵活选择终端与目标基站之间通信所使用的安全算法；另一方面，由于终端连接的基站发生了改变，因而使用新的加密算法和完整性保护算法，可以提高通信的安全性。
下面对上述步骤301-步骤305中所涉及到的一些实现过程的具体实现方法进行说明。
针对上述步骤301，当连接恢复请求消息中包括shortMAC-I时，作为一种实现方式，终端可以根据下列步骤生成该shortMAC-I：
步骤A1、终端获取第一NCC和第二NCC。
其中，第一NCC指的是终端是在挂起流程中由源基站发送至终端，并由终端保存的NCC，具体可参考上述步骤202。
第二NCC指的是终端获得第一NCC之前保存的NCC。
步骤A2、终端判断第一NCC与第二NCC是否相同。若相同，则执行步骤A3；若不同，则执行步骤A4。
步骤A3、终端根据KgNB，得到KgNB*。
其中，KgNB指的是老的接入层密钥(old KgNB)，也可以称为原始的接入层密钥(original KgNB)，或者还可以称为旧的接入层密钥(old KgNB)。
相应地，KgNB*指的是新的接入层密钥(new KgNB)，也可以称为更新的接入层密钥(updated KgNB)。
需要说明的是，KgNB，KgNB*仅仅是一种符号化的表示。例如，在4G应用中， 接入层密钥则可以使用KeNB，KeNB*表示。符号本身的不同表现形式，本不构成对本申请的限定。
可选地，作为一种实现方式，可以由终端根据KgNB，源物理小区标识(physical cell identifier,PCI)，下行绝对无线频点(absolute radio frequency channel number-down link，ARFCN-DL)，得到KgNB*。
针对根据KgNB，源PCI和ARFCN-DL，得到KgNB*的具体实现方式，为现有技术，可参考相关文献，例如可以参考第三代合作伙伴计划(3rd generation partnership project，3GPP)技术规范(technical specification，TS)33.401或3GPP TS 33.501中的相关说明，这里不再赘述。
步骤A3之后执行步骤A5。
步骤A4、终端根据第一NCC和第二NCC得到下一跳(next hop，NH)，以及，根据NH，得到KgNB*。
其中，NH是与第一NCC和第二NCC具有对应关系的。终端根据第一NCC和第二NCC可以确定衍生NH的次数N，再根据当前NH衍生得到下一个NH，使用下一个NH衍生得到再一个NH，如此反复，直到衍生N次，得到最终的NH。
可选地，作为一种实现方式，可以由终端根据NH，源PCI，ARFCN-DL，得到KgNB*。
根据NH，源PCI，ARFCN-DL，得到KgNB*的具体实现方式，为现有技术，可参考相关文献，例如可以参考3GPP TS 33.401或3GPP TS 33.501中的相关说明，这里不再赘述。
步骤A4之后执行步骤A5。
步骤A5、终端根据KgNB*，第二完整性保护算法的标识，第二完整性保护算法的类型，衍生得到第二完整性保护密钥Krrc-int*。
本申请中，第二完整性保护算法的类型为RRC完整性保护算法。
步骤A6、根据Krrc-int*，第二完整性保护算法，得到shortMAC-I。
可选地，在一种具体实现方式中，可以根据Krrc-int*，第二完整性保护算法，源小区无线网络临时标识(cell radio network temporary identifier，C-RNTI)，源PCI，目标小区的标识，得到shortMAC-I。
通过上述步骤A1-步骤A6，终端可以生成shortMAC-I。
相应地，若上述连接恢复请求消息中包括shortMAC-I，则目标基站也会将该shortMAC-I携带于上下文请求消息中发送至源基站，由源基站与该终端进行校验。只有检验正确时，才将终端的接入层上下文发送给目标基站。
相应地，源基站根据对shortMAC-I的校验方法，可以包括以下步骤：
步骤B1、源基站判断下一跳NH是否已经使用，若未使用，则执行步骤B2，若已经使用，则执行步骤B3。
步骤B2、源基站根据NH，得到KgNB*。
该步骤B2与上述终端生成shortMAC-I的方法中的步骤B4的具体过程相同，可参考前述描述。
步骤B2之后执行步骤B4。
步骤B3、源基站终端根据KgNB，得到KgNB*。
该步骤B3与上述终端生成shortMAC-I的方法中的步骤B3的具体过程相同，可参考前述描述。
步骤B3之后执行步骤B4。
步骤B4、源基站根据KgNB*，第二完整性保护算法的标识，第二完整性保护算法的类型，衍生得到第二完整性保护密钥Krrc-int*。
本申请中，第二完整性保护算法的类型为RRC完整性保护算法。
步骤B5、根据Krrc-int*，第二完整性保护算法，校验接收到的来自终端的shortMAC-I。
可选地，在一种具体实现方式中，可以根据Krrc-int*，第二完整性保护算法，源C-RNTI，源PCI，目标小区的标识，校验接收到的来自终端的shortMAC-I。
通过上述步骤B1-步骤B5，源基站可以对接收到的来自终端的shortMAC-I进行校验。
针对图3所示的流程中的步骤302，目标基站选择第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法的具体方法，例如，作为一种实现方式，可以是目标基站根据目标基站自身的加密算法优先级列表，从终端的安全能力中选择优先级最高的一个加密算法，作为选择的第一加密算法。或者，还可以是从终端的安全能力中选择优先级最高的K个加密算法，K大于1，然后从选择的K个加密算法中随机选择一个加密算法，作为选择的第一加密算法。或者，还可以是其它方式选择第一加密算法。选择的第一加密算法作为终端与目标基站之间协商的且用于通信的加密算法。
同样地，目标基站也可以使用与选择第一加密算法相同的方式，从终端的安全能力中选择第一完整性保护算法。选择的第一完整性保护算法作为终端与目标基站之间协商的且用于通信的完整性保护算法。
针对上述步骤303，终端接收并获取来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法的方法，至少可以通过但不限于以下几种方法实现。
实现方法一、目标基站向终端发送连接恢复响应消息，该连接恢复响应消息是根据第二加密算法和第二加密密钥进行加密的，该连接恢复响应消息中包括第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。
其中，该连接恢复响应消息是针对上述步骤301中终端发送的连接恢复请求消息的响应消息,连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接。当终端接收到连接恢复响应消息时，则开始恢复RRC连接。
因此，该实现方法一，是将目标基站重新选择的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，作为参数携带于连接恢复响应消息中发送至终端。
通常地，为了提升通信的安全性，针对目标基站发送给终端的上述连接恢复响应消息，是需要进行安全性保护的。即，该连接恢复响应消息可以通过加密算法进行加密，以及通过完整性保护算法进行完整性保护。
在该实现方法一中，可以通过以下方式对该连接恢复响应消息进行加密：首先，根据上述介绍的第二加密算法，生成第二加密密钥，然后，根据第二加密算法和第二加密密钥，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，得到加密的连接恢复响应消息。
作为示例，目标基站生成第二加密密钥的实现方式，可以是由目标基站根据KgNB*，第二加密算法的标识，第二加密算法的类型，衍生得到第二加密密钥Krrc-enc*。 其中，KgNB*，第二加密算法的标识，第二加密算法的类型，都是由源基站发送给目标基站的。可选地，源基站将KgNB*，第二加密算法的标识，第二加密算法的类型，携带于上下文响应消息中发送给目标基站。
进一步地，还可以对加密的连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护。具体实现过程中，可以通过以下方式对该加密的连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护：首先，根据上述介绍的第二完整性保护算法，生成第二完整性保护密钥，然后，根据第二完整性保护算法和第二完整性保护密钥，对加密的连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护，得到受保护的连接恢复响应消息。
作为示例，目标基站生成第二完整性保护密钥的实现方式，可以是由目标基站根据KgNB*，第二完整性保护算法的标识，第二完整性保护算法的类型，衍生得到第二完整性保护密钥Krrc-int*。其中，KgNB*，第二完整性保护算法的标识，第二完整性保护算法的类型，都是由源基站发送给目标基站的。可选地，源基站将KgNB*，第二完整性保护算法的标识，第二完整性保护算法的类型，携带于上下文响应消息中发送给目标基站。
即，在该实现方法一中，目标基站向终端发送的连接恢复响应消息，是经过加密和完整性保护的连接恢复响应消息。因此，目标基站向终端发送连接恢复响应消息，也可以表述为：基站向终端发送受保护的连接恢复响应消息。
需要说明的是，作为另一种实现方式，上述受保护的连接恢复响应消息，也可以是先对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护，获取完整性保护的连接恢复响应消息；然后对完整性保护的连接恢复响应消息进行加密，从而得到受保护的连接恢复响应消息。具体实现方式，可参考前述描述，不再赘述。
综上所述，在该实现方式一中，是将第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法携带于受保护的连接恢复响应消息中发送给终端，该受保护的连接恢复响应消息是根据第二加密算法和第二加密密钥进行加密的，以及根据第二完整性保护算法和第二完整性保护密钥进行完整性保护的。
从而，当终端接收到该受保护的连接恢复响应消息后，对该受保护的连接恢复响应消息进行解密和完整性校验，从而获取连接恢复响应消息。
具体地，若目标基站是先对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，然后进行完整性保护的，则终端相应地，先对保护的连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验，然后再对完整性校验后的连接恢复响应消息进行解密，从而得到连接恢复响应消息。
若目标基站是先对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护，然后进行加密的，则终端相应地，先对保护的连接恢复响应消息进行解密，然后再对解密的连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验，从而得到连接恢复响应消息。
其中，终端对受保护的连接恢复响应消息或完整性校验后的连接恢复响应消息进行解密的方法，与目标基站对连接恢复响应消息进行加密的方法，是相对应的操作，即，终端根据第二加密算法生成第二加密密钥，并根据第二加密密钥和第二加密算法，解密受保护的连接恢复响应消息，或解密完整性校验后的连接恢复响应消息。具体实现细节可参数前述加密过程的描述，这里不再赘述。
以及，终端对受保护的连接恢复响应消息或解密的连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验的方法，与目标基站对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护的方法，是相对应的操 作，即，终端根据第二完整性保护算法,生成第二完整性保护密钥，并根据第二完整性保护密钥和第二完整性保护算法，对受保护的连接恢复响应消息或解密的连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验。具体实现细节可参数前述加密过程的描述，这里不再赘述。
进一步地，终端在获取到连接恢复响应消息后，可从中获取到携带的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。
需要说明的是，在上述实现方法一中，终端在解密连接恢复响应消息时所使用的第二加密密钥，以及在完整性校验连接恢复响应消息时所使用的第二完整性保护密钥，可以是临时生成的，也可以是从本地获取的。例如，终端在生成shortMAC-I时，已经生成了第二加密密钥Krrc-enc*和第二完整性保护密钥Krrc-int*，因此，终端在解密连接恢复响应消息时，可以直接使用之前已经生成的第二加密密钥Krrc-enc*；以及，终端在完整性校验连接恢复响应消息时，可以直接使用之前已经生成的第二完整性保护密钥KRrrc-int*。该实现方式可节约终端的开销。
该实现方法一中，是通过第二加密算法和第二加密密钥，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密的。因此，可以将第一加密算法携带于受保护的连接恢复响应消息中。
如果是通过第一加密算法和第一加密密钥，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，则就不可以将第一加密算法携带于受保护的连接恢复响应消息中。因为，该情形下，终端需要使用第一加密算法和第一加密密钥，才能解密受保护的连接恢复响应消息，而第一加密算法却是携带于受保护的连接恢复响应消息中的。其中，第一加密密钥是至少根据第一加密算法生成的。
因此，如果采用根据第一加密算法和第一加密密钥对连接恢复响应消息进行加密的方法，则可以通过下述实现方法二或实现方法三来实现。
实现方法二、目标基站向终端发送连接恢复响应消息和第一加密算法，该连接恢复响应消息是根据第一加密算法和第一加密密钥进行加密的，该连接恢复响应消息中包括第一完整性保护算法。
该实现方法二与上述实现方法一的主要区别在于：该实现方法二是根据第一加密算法和第一加密密钥对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，以及，连接恢复响应消息包括第一完整性保护算法，但不包括第一加密算法，该第一加密算法是与连接恢复响应消息一起发送至终端的，或者该第一加密算法是与连接恢复响应消息分别单独发送至终端的。
其中，根据第一加密算法和第一加密密钥对连接恢复响应消息进行加密的具体实现过程，可参考前述根据第二加密算法和第二加密密钥对连接恢复响应消息进行加密的具体实现过程，这里不再赘述。
进一步地，还可以根据第一完整性保护算法和第一完整性保护密钥对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护，其具体实现过程可参考前述根据第二完整性保护算法和第二完整性保护密钥对连接恢复响应消息进行加密的具体实现过程，这里不再赘述。
相应地，终端在接收到目标基站发送的连接恢复响应消息和第一加密算法后，首先根据第一加密算法生成第一加密密钥，然后根据第一加密密钥和第一加密算法，解密连接恢复响应消息，也可以表述为：解密受保护的连接恢复响应消息。其具体实现过程同实现方法一中，终端的解密受保护的连接恢复响应消息过程类似，可参考前述描述。
进一步地，在对受保护的连接恢复响应消息解密后，可从中获取到第一完整性保护算法，进而，再根据第一完整性保护算法生成第一完整性保护密钥，并根据第一完整性保护算法和第一完整性保护密钥对解密的连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验。当校验正确时，即可确定可以开始恢复RRC连接。
上述实现方法二，由于终端只能先获取到第一加密算法，然后才可以获取到第一完整性保护算法，因此终端只能先解密受保护的连接恢复响应消息，然后再完整性校验解密的连接恢复响应消息。从而，针对目标基站，则是先对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护，再对连接恢复响应消息进行加密。
实现方法三、目标基站向终端发送连接恢复响应消息、第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，该连接恢复响应消息是根据第一加密算法和第一加密密钥进行加密的。
该实现方法三与上述实现方法二的主要区别在于：该实现方法三中，第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法均没有携带于连接恢复响应消息，而是和连接恢复响应消息一起发给终端，或者是，分别单独发给终端。
即，该实现方法三中，将需要发给终端的参数，即第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，作为一个整体发送给终端，但由于其中的第一加密算法不能携带于连接恢复响应消息，因此，第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法都不携带于连接恢复响应消息中。
该实现方法三中，目标基站对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，以及对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护的具体实现过程，与实现方法一中对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，以及对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护的实现过程类似，可参考前述描述，这里不再赘述。
需要说明的是，该实现方法三中，目标基站既可以先对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，然后对加密的连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护。也可以是先对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护，然后对完整性保护的连接恢复响应消息进行加密。
相应地，终端则是先对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验，然后对完整性校验的连接恢复响应消息进行解密。或者是，终端则是先对连接恢复响应消息进行解密，然后对解密的连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验。
需要说明的是，上述实现方法一至实现方法三，仅作为示例，在实际应用中，还可以有其它实现方法。例如，还可以有以下实现方法。
实现方法四、目标基站向终端发送连接恢复响应消息、第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，该连接恢复响应消息是根据第二加密算法和第二加密密钥进行加密的。
即，连接恢复响应消息是根据第二加密算法和第二加密密钥进行加密，并且，第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法均不是携带于连接恢复响应消息发送至终端，而是单独发送至终端的。
实现方法五、目标基站向终端发送连接恢复响应消息和第一完整性保护算法，该连接恢复响应消息是根据第二加密算法和第二加密密钥进行加密的，该连接恢复响应消息包括第一加密算法。
即，连接恢复响应消息是根据第二加密算法和第二加密密钥进行加密，并且，第一加密算法是携带于连接恢复响应消息发送至终端，而第一完整性保护算法是单独发送至终端的。
实现方法六、目标基站向终端发送连接恢复响应消息和第一加密算法，该连接恢复响应消息是根据第二加密算法和第二加密密钥进行加密的，该连接恢复响应消息包括第一完整性保护算法。
即，连接恢复响应消息是根据第二加密算法和第二加密密钥进行加密，并且，第一完整性保护算法是携带于连接恢复响应消息发送至终端，而第一加密算法是单独发送至终端的。
实现方法七、目标基站向终端发送第一消息，该第一消息包括第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。相应地，终端接收来自目标基站的第一消息。
该实现方法七，是将目标基站重新选择的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，作为参数携带于第一消息中发送至终端。作为一种实现方式，该第一消息可以是安全模式命令消息。作为又一种实现方式，该第一消息还可以是RRC重配置消息。
通常地，为了提升通信的安全性，针对目标基站发送给终端的上述第一消息，是需要进行安全性保护的。比如，该连接恢复响应消息可以通过完整性保护算法进行完整性保护。
在该实现方法七中，可以通过以下方式对该第一消息进行完整性保护：首先，根据上述第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥，然后，根据第一完整性保护算法和第一完整性保护密钥对第一消息进行完整性保护，得到受保护的第一消息。
作为一种实现方式，目标基站可以根据第一完整性保护算法和当前接入层密钥，生成第一完整性保护密钥。其中，当前接入层密钥(即KgNB*)是由源基站通过上述步骤B2或步骤B3生成后发送给目标基站的。可选地，源基站将KgNB*携带于上下文响应消息中发送给目标基站。
作为示例，目标基站生成第一完整性保护密钥的实现方式，可以是由目标基站根据KgNB*，第一完整性保护算法的标识，第一完整性保护算法的类型，衍生得到第一完整性保护密钥Krrc-int*。
即在该实现方法七中，目标基站向终端发送的第一消息可以是经过完整性保护的第一消息。因此，在第一消息受到保护的情形下，目标基站向终端发送第一消息也可以表述为：基站向终端发送受保护的第一消息。
综上所述，在该实现方式七中，是将第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法携带于第一消息中发送给终端，该第一消息可以根据第一完整性保护算法和第一完整性保护密钥进行完整性保护的。
从而，当终端接收到该受保护的第一消息后，可以从第一消息中获取到第一完整性保护算法和第一加密算法。进一步地，还对该受保护的第一消息进行完整性校验。
其中，终端对受保护的第一消息进行完整性校验的方法，与目标基站对第一消息进行完整性保护的方法，是相对应的操作，即，终端根据第一完整性保护算法生成第一完整性保护密钥，并根据第一完整性保护密钥和第一完整性保护算法，对受保护的第一消息进行完整性校验。
具体地，终端可以根据第一完整性保护算法和当前接入层密钥，生成第一完整性保护密钥。其中，当前接入层密钥(即KgNB*)是由终端通过上述步骤A3或步骤A4生成的。
作为示例，与目标基站生成第一完整性保护密钥的方法相应地，终端生成第一完 整性保护密钥的实现方式，可以是由终端根据KgNB*，第一完整性保护算法的标识，第一完整性保护算法的类型，衍生得到第一完整性保护密钥Krrc-int*。
需要说明的是，当第一消息是安全模式命令消息或RRC重配置消息时，由于终端在接收到安全模式命令消息或RRC重配置消息后，会触发终端更新接入层密钥。因此，若终端在接收到第一消息之前已经更新过接入层密钥，则目标基站还需要通知终端不需要更新接入层密钥。例如，若终端在上述步骤301之前还生成shortMAC-I，则终端在生成shortMAC-I的过程中已经将接入层密钥由KgNB更新为KgNB*，因此，终端在接收到第一消息后，应该不更新接入层密钥。
具体地，可以通过以下但不限于以下方法通知终端不需要更新接入层密钥。
方法A，第一消息中携带第一加密算法、第一完整性保护算法和第一指示信息，该第一指示信息用于指示终端不更新接入层密钥。
即，终端在接收到第一消息后，从中获取到第一加密算法、第一完整性保护算法和第一指示信息。
终端根据第一指示信息，可确定不需要更新接入层密钥。从而，当终端根据第一完整性保护算法和当前接入层密钥，生成第一完整性保护密钥时，使用的当前接入层密钥即为终端在生成shortMAC-I的过程中更新得到的KgNB*(KgNB*即为当前密钥)，而不需要对KgNB*做进一步更新。
方法B，第一消息中携带第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。
该方法，终端在接收到第一消息后，确定第一消息中不携带第二指示信息，则确定不需要更新接入层密钥。其中，该第二指示信息用于指示终端更新接入层密钥。
也可以理解为，当第一消息中携带第二指示信息时，终端根据第二指示信息，确定需要更新接入层密钥，因而需要KgNB*做进一步更新。反之，当第一消息中不携带第二指示信息时，终端确定第一消息中不携带第二指示信息，则确定不需要更新接入层密钥。
通过上述方法A或方法B，可以指示终端不需要更新接入层密钥，从而终端使用当前接入层密钥生成第一完整性保护密钥。
针对上述步骤304，终端在获取到第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法之后，后续将使用这两个算法与目标基站之间进行通信。
例如，终端在步骤304中向目标基站发送的连接恢复完成消息，就是根据第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法进行保护，然后发送给目标基站的。
终端根据第一加密算法、第一完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息的具体过程。例如可以是，终端先对连接恢复完成消息加密，具体过程可以是：根据第一加密算法得到第一加密密钥，然后根据第一加密算法和第一加密密钥，对连接恢复完成消息进行加密，得到加密的连接恢复完成消息。进一步地，对该加密的连接恢复完成消息进行完整性保护，具体过程为：根据第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥，然后根据第一完整性保护算法和第一完整性保护密钥，对加密的连接恢复完成消息进行完整性保护，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
终端根据第一加密算法、第一完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息的具体过程。例如还可以是，终端先对连接恢复完成消息进行完整性保护，具体过程可以是：据第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥，然 后根据第一完整性保护算法和第一完整性保护密钥，对连接恢复完成消息进行完整性保护，得到完整性保护的连接恢复完成消息。进一步地，对该完整性保护的连接恢复完成消息进行加密，具体过程为：根据第一加密算法得到第一加密密钥，然后根据第一加密算法和第一加密密钥，对完整性保护的连接恢复完成消息进行加密，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
需要说明的是，在上述生成受保护的连接恢复完成消息的过程中，若第一加密密钥、第一完整性保护密钥之前已经生成了，则可以直接使用，而无需重新生成，从而可节约开销。
相应地，基站在接收到受保护的连接恢复完成消息后，对该受保护的连接恢复完成消息进行解密和完整性校验，具体实现过程，可参考前述终端解密和完整性校验连接恢复响应消息的实现过程，这里不再赘述。
作为一种实现方式，若上述步骤303采用上述实现方法七的方式实现，则进一步地，在步骤303和步骤304之间，还可以包括以下步骤：
步骤C1，终端向目标基站发送第二消息，相应地，目标基站接收到第二消息。
该第二消息用于响应第一消息。可选地，第二消息可以是安全命令完成消息或RRC重配置完成消息。
作为一种实现方式，若上述步骤303采用上述实现方法七的方式实现，则进一步地，在步骤303和步骤304之间，还可以包括以下步骤：
步骤C2，目标基站根据第一加密算法、第一完整性保护算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护，该连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接。
步骤C3，目标基站向终端发送连接恢复响应消息，相应地，终端接收该连接恢复响应消息。
作为又一种实现方式，还可以既执行上述步骤C1，也执行步骤C2和步骤C3。即在上述步骤303之后，先执行步骤C1，再执行步骤C2，再执行步骤C3，然后执行步骤304。
如图4所示，为本申请提供的另一种RRC连接恢复方法。图4所示的RRC连接恢复方法与图3所示的RRC连接恢复方法的主要区别在于：图4所示的RRC连接恢复方法中，目标基站在生成第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法之后，进一步地，还判断第一加密算法与第二加密算法是否相同、第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法是否相同。并根据判断的结果，决定采用何种方式通知终端。
相对应地，终端在接收到目标基站的通知后，需要先判断是否接收到目标基站发送的加密算法和完整性保护算法，并根据判断的结果，决定采用何种方式生成受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
下面具体说明，如图4所示，包括以下步骤：
步骤401-步骤402，与上述步骤301-步骤302相同，可参考前述描述，这里不再赘述。
步骤403、目标基站判断第一加密算法与第二加密算法是否相同，以及判断第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法是否相同。若第一加密算法与第二加密算法相同，且第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法相同，则执行步骤404a；若第一加密算法与第二加密算法不同或第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法不同，则执 行步骤404b。
步骤404a、目标基站向终端发送连接恢复响应消息，终端接收来自目标基站的连接恢复响应消息。
该连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接。该连接恢复响应消息是根据第二加密算法和第二密钥进行加密，以及使用第二完整性保护算法和第二完整性保护密钥进行完整性保护的。
该步骤404a中，由于目标基站选择的第一加密算法与第二加密算法相同，且第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法相同，因此，目标基站不向终端发送选择的第一加密算法与第二加密算法。
步骤404a之后，转到步骤405。
步骤404b、目标基站向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，终端接收来自目标基站的第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法。
该步骤404b,目标基站向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法的具体实现过程，可参考前述步骤303的几种实现方法，这里不再赘述。
步骤404b之后，转到步骤405。
步骤405、终端判断是否接收到来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。判断的结果为：接收到了来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法、未接收到来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。
步骤406、终端确定受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
该步骤406中，终端确定受保护的连接恢复完成消息时，会参考上述步骤405的判断结果。
若步骤405中终端确定接收到了来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则根据第一加密算法、第一完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息。具体实现过程可参考前述步骤304的描述，这里不赘述。
若步骤405中终端确定未接收到来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则根据第二加密算法、第二完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息。具体实现过程与考前述步骤304类似，可参考前述相关描述，这里不赘述。
步骤407、终端向目标基站发送受保护的连接恢复完成消息，目标基站接收来自终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
目标基站在接收到受保护的连接恢复完成消息后，是根据步骤403中目标基站的判断结果解密以及完整性校验该受保护的连接恢复完成消息的。
其中，若第一加密算法与第二加密算法相同，且第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法相同，则根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、第二加密算法和第二完整性保护算法，得到连接恢复完成消息。
若第一加密算法与第二加密算法不同，或第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法不同，则目标基站根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，得到连接恢复完成消息。
本申请，通过上述图4所示的步骤，当终端移动到目标基站时，目标基站可以根据目标基站自身的能力和要求，重新选择与终端之间进行通信时所使用的第一加密算 法和第一完整性保护算法。目标基站若确定第一加密算法与第二加密算法相同，且第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法相同，则不将选择的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法发送给中，相应地，终端若确定未接收到第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则使用第二加密算法和第二完整性保护算法，生成受保护的连接恢复完成消息。目标基站若确定第一加密算法与第二加密算法不同，或第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法不同，则将第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法发送给终端，相应地，终端若确定接收到第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则使用第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，生成受保护的连接恢复完成消息。一方面，实现了灵活选择终端与目标基站之间通信所使用的安全算法；另一方面，由于终端连接的基站发生了改变，因而使用新的加密算法和完整性保护算法，可以提高通信的安全性。
并且，图4所示的实施例，相较于图3所示的实施例，由于分别增加了目标基站和终端的判断动作，当目标基站确定第一加密算法与第二加密算法相同，且第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法相同时，则不向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，可节约开销。
需要说明的是，上述实施例中的连接恢复请求消息、连接恢复响应消息、连接恢复完成消息、上下文请求消息、上下文响应消息等仅是一个名字，名字对消息本身不构成限定。在5G网络以及未来其它的网络中，连接恢复请求消息、连接恢复响应消息、连接恢复完成消息、上下文请求消息、上下文响应消息也可以是其他的名字，本申请实施例对此不作具体限定。例如，连接恢复请求消息还有可能被替换为请求消息、恢复请求消息、连接请求消息等，该连接恢复响应消息还有可能被替换为响应消息、恢复响应消息、连接响应消息等，该连接恢复完成消息还有可能被替换为完成消息、恢复完成消息、连接完成消息等，该上下文请求消息还有可能被替换为请求消息等，该上下文响应消息还有可能被替换为响应消息等。
上述主要从各个网元之间交互的角度对本申请提供的方案进行了介绍。可以理解的是，上述实现各网元为了实现上述功能，其包含了执行各个功能相应的硬件结构和/或软件模块。本领域技术人员应该很容易意识到，结合本文中所公开的实施例描述的各示例的单元及算法步骤，本发明能够以硬件或硬件和计算机软件的结合形式来实现。某个功能究竟以硬件还是计算机软件驱动硬件的方式来执行，取决于技术方案的特定应用和设计约束条件。专业技术人员可以对每个特定的应用来使用不同方法来实现所描述的功能，但是这种实现不应认为超出本发明的范围。
基于相同的发明构思，如图5所示，为本申请提供的一种装置示意图，该装置可以是终端或基站，可执行上述任一实施例中由终端或目标基站执行的方法。
该装置500包括至少一个处理器501，发送器502，接收器503，可选地，还包括存储器504。所述处理器501，发送器502，接收器503，存储器504通过通信线路连接。
处理器501可以是一个通用中央处理器(CPU)，微处理器，特定应用集成电路(application-specific integrated circuit，ASIC)，或一个或多个用于控制本发明方案程序执行的集成电路。
通信线路可包括一通路，在上述单元之间传送信息。
所述发送器502和接收器503，用于与其他设备或通信网络通信。发送器和接收 器包括射频电路。
存储器504可以是只读存储器(read-only memory，ROM)或可存储静态信息和指令的其他类型的静态存储设备，随机存取存储器(random access memory，RAM)或者可存储信息和指令的其他类型的动态存储设备，也可以是电可擦可编程只读存储器(Electrically erasable programmabler-only memory，EEPROM)、只读光盘(compact disc read-only memory，CD-ROM)或其他光盘存储、光碟存储(包括压缩光碟、激光碟、光碟、数字通用光碟、蓝光光碟等)、磁盘存储介质或者其他磁存储设备、或者能够用于携带或存储具有指令或数据结构形式的期望的程序代码并能够由计算机存取的任何其他介质，但不限于此。存储器504可以是独立存在，通过通信线路与处理器501相连接。存储器504也可以和处理器集成在一起。其中，所述存储器504用于存储执行本发明方案的应用程序代码，并由处理器501来控制执行。所述处理器501用于执行存储器504中存储的应用程序代码。
在具体实现中，作为一种实施例，处理器501可以包括一个或多个CPU，例如图5中的CPU0和CPU1。
在具体实现中，作为一种实施例，装置500可以包括多个处理器，例如图5中的处理器501和处理器508。这些处理器中的每一个可以是一个单核(single-CPU)处理器，也可以是一个多核(multi-CPU)处理器，这里的处理器可以指一个或多个设备、电路、和/或用于处理数据(例如计算机程序指令)的处理核。
应理解，当该装置500是终端时，该装置500可以用于实现本发明实施例的方法中由终端执行的步骤，例如，装置500可以执行图3中的步骤301，步骤304和步骤305，还可以执行图4中的步骤401，步骤405-步骤407，相关特征可以参照上文，此处不再赘述。当该装置500是基站时，该装置500可以用于实现本发明实施例的方法中由目标基站执行的步骤，例如，装置500可以执行图3中的步骤302和步骤303，还可以执行图4中的步骤402，步骤403，步骤404a和步骤404b，相关特征可以参照上文，此处不再赘述。
在具体实现中，图2-图4中终端的动作可以由装置500中的处理器501(和/或处理器508)调用存储器504中存储的应用程序代码来执行，本申请实施例对此不作任何限制。
本申请可以根据上述方法示例对终端进行功能模块的划分，例如，可以对应各个功能划分各个功能模块，也可以将两个或两个以上的功能集成在一个处理模块中。上述集成的模块既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用软件功能模块的形式实现。需要说明的是，本申请中对模块的划分是示意性的，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式。比如，在采用对应各个功能划分各个功能模块的情况下，图6示出了一种装置示意图，该装置600可以是上述实施例中所涉及的终端，该装置600包括处理单元601、接收单元602和发送单元603。
在一种RRC连接恢复方法的实现中：
发送单元603，用于向目标基站发送连接恢复请求消息，连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接。
处理单元601，用于通过接收单元602获取来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，第一加密算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的加密算法，第一完整性 保护算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的完整性保护算法。以及，用于根据第一加密算法、第一完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息，连接恢复完成消息用于指示RRC连接恢复完成。
发送单元603，还用于向目标基站发送受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
在一种可能的设计中，接收单元602，具体用于接收来自目标基站的连接恢复响应消息，连接恢复响应消息包括第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接，连接恢复响应消息根据第二加密密钥进行加密，第二加密密钥根据第二加密算法生成，第二加密算法为终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法。
处理单元601，具体用于根据第二加密算法生成第二加密密钥，并根据第二加密密钥和第二加密算法，解密连接恢复响应消息。以及，从解密的连接恢复响应消息中获取第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。
在一种可能的设计中，连接恢复响应消息根据第二完整性保护密钥和第二完整性保护算法进行完整性保护，第二完整性保护密钥根据第二完整性保护算法生成，第二完整性保护算法为终端与源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法。
处理单元601，还用于：根据第二完整性保护算法,生成第二完整性保护密钥。以及，根据第二完整性保护密钥和第二完整性保护算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验。
在一种可能的设计中，接收单元602，具体用于接收来自目标基站的连接恢复响应消息及第一加密算法，连接恢复响应消息包括第一完整性保护算法，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接，连接恢复响应消息根据第一加密密钥和第一加密算法进行加密，第一加密密钥根据第一加密算法生成。获取第一加密算法，并根据第一加密算法生成第一加密密钥。
处理单元601，具体用于根据第一加密密钥和第一加密算法，解密连接恢复响应消息，并从解密的连接恢复响应消息中获取第一完整性保护算法。
在一种可能的设计中，接收单元602，具体用于接收来自目标基站的连接恢复响应消息、第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接，连接恢复响应消息根据第一加密密钥和第一加密算法进行加密，第一加密密钥根据第一加密算法生成。
在一种可能的设计中，连接恢复响应消息根据第一完整性保护密钥和第一完整性保护算法进行完整性保护，第一完整性保护密钥根据第一完整性保护算法生成。
处理单元601，还用于：根据第一完整性保护算法生成第一完整性保护密钥。根据第一完整性保护密钥和第一完整性保护算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验。
在另一种RRC连接恢复方法的实现中：
发送单元603，用于向目标基站发送连接恢复请求消息，连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接。
处理单元601，具体用于：若接收单元602未接收到来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则根据第二加密算法、第二完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息。或者，若接收单元602接收到来自目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则根据第一加密算法、第一完整性保护算 法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
发送单元603，还用于向所述目标基站发送受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
其中，第一加密算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的加密算法和完整性保护算法，第一完整性保护算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，第二加密算法为终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法，第二完整性保护算法为终端与源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，连接恢复完成消息用于指示恢复RRC连接完成。
应理解，该终端可以用于实现本发明实施例的方法中由终端执行的步骤，相关特征可以参照上文，此处不再赘述。
本申请可以根据上述方法示例对目标基站进行功能模块的划分，例如，可以对应各个功能划分各个功能模块，也可以将两个或两个以上的功能集成在一个处理模块中。上述集成的模块既可以采用硬件的形式实现，也可以采用软件功能模块的形式实现。需要说明的是，本申请中对模块的划分是示意性的，仅仅为一种逻辑功能划分，实际实现时可以有另外的划分方式。比如，在采用对应各个功能划分各个功能模块的情况下，图7示出了一种装置示意图，该装置700可以是上述实施例中所涉及的目标基站，该装置700包括处理单元701、接收单元702和发送单元703。
在一种RRC连接恢复方法的实现中：
接收单元702，用于接收来自终端的连接恢复请求消息，连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接。
处理单元701，用于根据终端的安全能力，选择第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，终端的安全能力包括终端支持的加密算法和完整性保护算法。
发送单元703，用于向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。
接收单元702，还用于接收来述终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息，连接恢复完成消息用于指示恢复所述RRC连接完成。
处理单元701，还用于根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，得到连接恢复完成消息。
在一种可能的设计中，接收单元702，还用于接收来自源基站的第二加密算法，第二加密算法为终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法。
处理单元701，还用于根据第二加密算法，生成第二加密密钥。以及，根据第二加密密钥和第二加密算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，连接恢复响应消息包括第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接。
发送单元703，具体用于向终端发送加密的连接恢复响应消息。
在一种可能的设计中，处理单元701，还用于根据第二完整性保护算法生成第二完整性保护密钥，第二完整性保护算法为终端与源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法。以及，根据第二完整性保护密钥和第二完整性保护算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护。
在一种可能的设计中，处理单元701，还用于根据第一加密算法，生成第一加密密钥。以及，根据第一加密密钥和第一加密算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，连接恢复响应消息包括第一完整性保护算法，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接。
发送单元703，具体用于向终端发送连接恢复响应消息和第一加密算法。
在一种可能的设计中，处理单元701，还用于根据第一加密算法，生成第一加密密钥。以及，根据第一加密密钥和第一加密算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接。
发送单元703，具体用于发送单元703向终端发送连接恢复响应消息、第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。
在一种可能的设计中，处理单元701，还用于根据第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥。以及，根据第一完整性保护密钥和第一完整性保护算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护。
在另一种RRC连接恢复方法的实现中：
接收单元702，用于接收来自终端的连接恢复请求消息，连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接。
处理单元701，用于根据终端的安全能力，选择第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，终端的安全能力包括终端支持的加密算法和完整性保护算法。
发送单元703，用于若第一加密算法与第二加密算法相同，且第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法相同，则向终端发送连接恢复响应消息。接收单元702，用于接收来自终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息，并根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、第二加密算法和第二完整性保护算法，得到连接恢复完成消息。或者，
发送单元703，用于若第一加密算法与第二加密算法不同，或第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法不同，则向终端发送第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法。接收单元702，用于接收来自终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息，并根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，得到连接恢复完成消息。
其中，第一加密算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的加密算法和完整性保护算法，第一完整性保护算法为终端与目标基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，第二加密算法为终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法，第二完整性保护算法为终端与源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，连接恢复响应消息用于指示终端恢复RRC连接，连接恢复完成消息用于指示恢复RRC连接完成。
应理解，该基站可以用于实现本发明实施例的方法中由目标基站执行的步骤，相关特征可以参照上文，此处不再赘述。
在上述实施例中，可以全部或部分地通过软件、硬件、固件或者其任意组合来实现。当使用软件实现时，可以全部或部分地以计算机程序产品的形式实现。所述计算机程序产品包括一个或多个计算机指令。在计算机上加载和执行所述计算机程序指令时，全部或部分地产生按照本发明实施例所述的流程或功能。所述计算机可以是通用计算机、专用计算机、计算机网络、或者其他可编程装置。所述计算机指令可以存储在计算机可读存储介质中，或者从一个计算机可读存储介质向另一个计算机可读存储介质传输，例如，所述计算机指令可以从一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心通过有线(例如同轴电缆、光纤、数字用户线(DSL))或无线(例如红外、无线、微波等)方式向另一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心进行传输。所述计算机可读存储介质可以是计算机能够存取的任何可用介质或者是包含一个或多个可用介质集成的服务器、数据中心等数据存储设备。所述可用介质可以是磁性介质，(例如，软盘、硬盘、磁带)、光介质(例如，DVD)、或者半导体介质(例如固态硬盘(Solid State Disk，SSD))等。
尽管在此结合各实施例对本发明进行了描述，然而，在实施所要求保护的本发明过程中，本领域技术人员通过查看所述附图、公开内容、以及所附权利要求书，可理解并实现所述公开实施例的其他变化。在权利要求中，“包括”(comprising)一词不排除其他组成部分或步骤，“一”或“一个”不排除多个的情况。单个处理器或其他单元可以实现权利要求中列举的若干项功能。相互不同的从属权利要求中记载了某些措施，但这并不表示这些措施不能组合起来产生良好的效果。
本领域技术人员应明白，本申请的实施例可提供为方法、装置(设备)、计算机可读存储介质或计算机程序产品。因此，本申请可采用完全硬件实施例、完全软件实施例、或结合软件和硬件方面的实施例的形式，这里将它们都统称为“模块”或“系统”。
本领域技术人员还可以了解到本申请实施例列出的各种说明性逻辑块(illustrative logical block)和步骤(step)可以通过电子硬件、电脑软件，或两者的结合进行实现。这样的功能是通过硬件还是软件来实现取决于特定的应用和整个系统的设计要求。本领域技术人员可以对于每种特定的应用，可以使用各种方法实现所述的功能，但这种实现不应被理解为超出本申请实施例保护的范围。
本申请实施例中所描述的各种说明性的逻辑单元和电路可以通过通用处理器，数字信号处理器，专用集成电路(ASIC)，现场可编程门阵列(FPGA)或其它可编程逻辑装置，离散门或晶体管逻辑，离散硬件部件，或上述任何组合的设计来实现或操作所描述的功能。通用处理器可以为微处理器，可选地，该通用处理器也可以为任何传统的处理器、控制器、微控制器或状态机。处理器也可以通过计算装置的组合来实现，例如数字信号处理器和微处理器，多个微处理器，一个或多个微处理器联合一个数字信号处理器核，或任何其它类似的配置来实现。
本申请实施例中所描述的方法或算法的步骤可以直接嵌入硬件、处理器执行的软件单元、或者这两者的结合。软件单元可以存储于RAM存储器、闪存、ROM存储器、EPROM存储器、EEPROM存储器、寄存器、硬盘、可移动磁盘、CD-ROM或本领域中其它任意形式的存储媒介中。示例性地，存储媒介可以与处理器连接，以使得处理器可以从存储媒介中读取信息，并可以向存储媒介存写信息。可选地，存储媒介还可以集成到处理器中。处理器和存储媒介可以设置于ASIC中，ASIC可以设置于终端设备中。可选地，处理器和存储媒介也可以设置于终端设备中的不同的部件中。
这些计算机程序指令也可装载到计算机或其他可编程数据处理设备上，使得在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行一系列操作步骤以产生计算机实现的处理，从而在计算机或其他可编程设备上执行的指令提供用于实现在流程图一个流程或多个流程和/或方框图一个方框或多个方框中指定的功能的步骤。
尽管结合具体特征及其实施例对本发明进行了描述，显而易见的，在不脱离本发明的精神和范围的情况下，可对其进行各种修改和组合。相应地，本说明书和附图仅仅是所附权利要求所界定的本发明的示例性说明，且视为已覆盖本发明范围内的任意和所有修改、变化、组合或等同物。显然，本领域的技术人员可以对本发明进行各种改动和变型而不脱离本发明的精神和范围。这样，倘若本发明的这些修改和变型属于本发明权利要求及其等同技术的范围之内，则本发明也意图包含这些改动和变型在内。

Claims (50)

  1. 一种RRC连接恢复方法，其特征在于，包括：
    终端向目标基站发送连接恢复请求消息，所述连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接；
    所述终端获取来自所述目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，所述第一加密算法为所述终端与所述目标基站之间协商的加密算法，所述第一完整性保护算法为所述终端与所述目标基站之间协商的完整性保护算法；
    所述终端根据所述第一加密算法、所述第一完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息,所述连接恢复完成消息用于指示所述RRC连接恢复完成；
    所述终端向所述目标基站发送所述受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端获取来自所述目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，包括：
    所述终端接收来自所述目标基站的连接恢复响应消息，所述连接恢复响应消息包括所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接，所述连接恢复响应消息根据第二加密密钥进行加密，所述第二加密密钥根据第二加密算法生成，所述第二加密算法为所述终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法；
    所述终端根据所述第二加密算法生成所述第二加密密钥，并根据所述第二加密密钥和所述第二加密算法，解密所述连接恢复响应消息；
    所述终端从解密的所述连接恢复响应消息中获取所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其特征在于，所述连接恢复响应消息根据第二完整性保护密钥和所述第二完整性保护算法进行完整性保护，所述第二完整性保护密钥根据所述第二完整性保护算法生成，所述第二完整性保护算法为所述终端与所述源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述终端根据所述第二完整性保护算法,生成所述第二完整性保护密钥；
    所述终端根据所述第二完整性保护密钥和所述第二完整性保护算法，对所述连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验。
  4. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端获取来自所述目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，包括：
    所述终端接收来自所述目标基站的连接恢复响应消息及所述第一加密算法，所述连接恢复响应消息包括所述第一完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接，所述连接恢复响应消息根据第一加密密钥和所述第一加密算法进行加密，所述第一加密密钥根据所述第一加密算法生成；
    所述终端获取所述第一加密算法，并根据所述第一加密算法生成所述第一加密密钥；
    所述终端根据所述第一加密密钥和所述第一加密算法，解密所述连接恢复响应消 息，并从解密的所述连接恢复响应消息中获取所述第一完整性保护算法。
  5. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端获取来自所述目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，包括：
    所述终端接收来自所述目标基站的连接恢复响应消息、所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复RRC连接，所述连接恢复响应消息根据第一加密密钥和所述第一加密算法进行加密，所述第一加密密钥根据所述第一加密算法生成。
  6. 根据权利要求4或5所述的方法，其特征在于，所述连接恢复响应消息根据第一完整性保护密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法进行完整性保护，所述第一完整性保护密钥根据所述第一完整性保护算法生成；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述终端根据所述第一完整性保护算法生成所述第一完整性保护密钥；
    所述终端根据所述第一完整性保护密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，对所述连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验。
  7. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述终端获取来自所述目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，包括：
    所述终端接收来自所述目标基站的第一消息，所述第一消息包括所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法；
    所述方法还包括:
    所述终端在接收所述第一消息后，接收来自所述目标基站的连接恢复响应消息，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接，所述连接恢复响应消息是根据所述第一加密算法、所述第一完整性保护算法进行安全性保护的。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一消息根据第一完整性保护密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法进行完整性保护，所述第一完整性保护密钥根据所述第一完整性保护算法生成；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述终端根据所述第一完整性保护算法，生成所述第一完整性保护密钥；
    所述终端根据所述第一完整性保护密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，对所述第一消息进行完整性校验。
  9. 根据权利要求8所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一消息还包括第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述终端不更新接入层密钥；
    所述终端根据所述第一完整性保护算法，生成所述第一完整性保护密钥，包括：
    所述终端根据当前接入层密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，生成所述第一完整性保护密钥。
  10. 根据权利要求8所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端确定所述第一消息中不包括第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新接入层密钥；
    所述终端根据所述第一完整性保护算法，生成所述第一完整性保护密钥，包括：
    所述终端根据当前接入层密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，生成所述第一完整性保护密钥。
  11. 根据权利要求7至10中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述终端向所述目标基站发送第二消息，所述第二消息用于响应所述第一消息。
  12. 根据权利要求7至11中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一消息为安全模式命令消息或RRC重配置消息。
  13. 一种RRC连接恢复方法，其特征在于，包括：
    终端向目标基站发送连接恢复请求消息，所述连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接；
    若所述终端未接收到来自所述目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则根据第二加密算法、第二完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息；或者，若所述终端接收到来自所述目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则根据所述第一加密算法、所述第一完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息；
    所述终端向所述目标基站发送所述受保护的连接恢复完成消息；
    其中，所述第一加密算法为所述终端与所述目标基站之间协商的加密算法和完整性保护算法，所述第一完整性保护算法为所述终端与所述目标基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，所述第二加密算法为所述终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法，所述第二完整性保护算法为所述终端与所述源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复完成消息用于指示恢复所述RRC连接完成。
  14. 一种RRC连接恢复方法，其特征在于，包括：
    目标基站接收来自终端的连接恢复请求消息，所述连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接；
    所述目标基站根据所述终端的安全能力，选择第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，所述终端的安全能力包括所述终端支持的加密算法和完整性保护算法；
    所述目标基站向所述终端发送所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法；
    所述目标基站接收来自所述终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息，并根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，得到所述连接恢复完成消息，所述连接恢复完成消息用于指示恢复所述RRC连接完成。
  15. 根据权利要求14所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述目标基站接收来自所述源基站的第二加密算法，所述第二加密算法为所述终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法；
    所述目标基站向所述终端发送所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，包括：
    所述目标基站根据所述第二加密算法，生成第二加密密钥；
    所述目标基站根据所述第二加密密钥和所述第二加密算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，所述连接恢复响应消息包括所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接；
    所述目标基站向所述终端发送加密的所述连接恢复响应消息。
  16. 根据权利要求15所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述目标基站根据第二完整性保护算法生成第二完整性保护密钥，所述第二完整性保护算法为所述终端与所述源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法；
    所述目标基站根据所述第二完整性保护密钥和所述第二完整性保护算法，对所述连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护。
  17. 根据权利要求16所述的方法，其特征在于，所述目标基站向所述终端发送所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，包括：
    所述目标基站根据所述第一加密算法，生成第一加密密钥；
    所述目标基站根据所述第一加密密钥和所述第一加密算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，所述连接恢复响应消息包括所述第一完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接；
    所述目标基站向所述终端发送所述连接恢复响应消息和所述第一加密算法。
  18. 根据权利要求16所述的方法，其特征在于，所述目标基站向所述终端发送所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，包括：
    所述目标基站根据所述第一加密算法，生成第一加密密钥；
    所述目标基站根据所述第一加密密钥和所述第一加密算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接；
    所述目标基站向所述终端发送所述连接恢复响应消息、所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法。
  19. 根据权利要求17或18所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述目标基站根据所述第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥；
    所述目标基站根据所述第一完整性保护密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，对所述连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护。
  20. 根据权利要求16所述的方法，其特征在于，所述目标基站向所述终端发送所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，包括：
    所述目标基站向所述终端发送第一消息，所述第一消息包括所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法；
    所述方法还包括：
    所述目标基站在发送所述第一消息后，根据所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行安全性保护，并向所述终端发送所述连接恢复响应消息。
  21. 根据权利要求20所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述目标基站根据所述第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥；
    所述目标基站根据所述第一完整性保护密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，对所述第一消息进行完整性保护。
  22. 根据权利要求21所述的方法，其特征在于，所述目标基站根据所述第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥，包括：
    所述目标基站根据当前接入层密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，生成所述第一完整性保护密钥。
  23. 根据权利要求22所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一消息还包括第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述终端不更新接入层密钥。
  24. 根据权利要求20至23中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述目标基站接收来自所述终端的第二消息，所述第二消息用于响应所述第一消 息。
  25. 根据权利要求20至24中任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述第一消息为安全模式命令消息或RRC重配置消息。
  26. 一种RRC连接恢复方法，其特征在于，包括：
    目标基站接收来自终端的连接恢复请求消息，所述连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接；
    所述目标基站根据所述终端的安全能力，选择第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，所述终端的安全能力包括所述终端支持的加密算法和完整性保护算法；
    若所述第一加密算法与第二加密算法相同，且所述第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法相同，则所述目标基站向所述终端发送连接恢复响应消息，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接；以及，接收来自所述终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息，并根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、所述第二加密算法和所述第二完整性保护算法，得到所述连接恢复完成消息；或者，
    若所述第一加密算法与第二加密算法不同，或所述第一完整性保护算法与第二完整性保护算法不同，则所述目标基站向所述终端发送所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法；以及，接收来自所述终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息，并根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，得到所述连接恢复完成消息；
    其中，所述第一加密算法为所述终端与所述目标基站之间协商的加密算法和完整性保护算法，所述第一完整性保护算法为所述终端与所述目标基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，所述第二加密算法为所述终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法，所述第二完整性保护算法为所述终端与所述源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复完成消息用于指示恢复所述RRC连接完成。
  27. 一种装置，其特征在于，包括：处理单元、发送单元和接收单元；
    所述发送单元，用于向目标基站发送连接恢复请求消息，所述连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接；
    所述处理单元，用于通过所述接收单元获取来自所述目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，所述第一加密算法为所述终端与所述目标基站之间协商的加密算法，所述第一完整性保护算法为所述终端与所述目标基站之间协商的完整性保护算法；以及，用于根据所述第一加密算法、所述第一完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息,所述连接恢复完成消息用于指示所述RRC连接恢复完成；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述目标基站发送所述受保护的连接恢复完成消息。
  28. 根据权利要求27所述的装置，其特征在于，所述接收单元，具体用于接收来自所述目标基站的连接恢复响应消息，所述连接恢复响应消息包括所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接，所述连接恢复响应消息根据第二加密密钥进行加密，所述第二加密密钥根据第二加密算法生成，所述第二加密算法为所述终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法；所述处理单元，具体用于根据所述第二加密算法生成所述第二加密密钥，并根据所述第二加密密钥和所述第二加密算法，解密所述连接恢复响应消息；以及，从解密的所述连 接恢复响应消息中获取所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法。
  29. 根据权利要求28所述的装置，其特征在于，所述连接恢复响应消息根据第二完整性保护密钥和所述第二完整性保护算法进行完整性保护，所述第二完整性保护密钥根据所述第二完整性保护算法生成，所述第二完整性保护算法为所述终端与所述源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法；所述处理单元，还用于：根据所述第二完整性保护算法,生成所述第二完整性保护密钥；以及，根据所述第二完整性保护密钥和所述第二完整性保护算法，对所述连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验。
  30. 根据权利要求27所述的装置，其特征在于，所述接收单元，具体用于接收来自所述目标基站的连接恢复响应消息及所述第一加密算法，所述连接恢复响应消息包括所述第一完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接，所述连接恢复响应消息根据第一加密密钥和所述第一加密算法进行加密，所述第一加密密钥根据所述第一加密算法生成；所述处理单元，具体用于获取所述第一加密算法，并根据所述第一加密算法生成所述第一加密密钥；以及，根据所述第一加密密钥和所述第一加密算法，解密所述连接恢复响应消息，并从解密的所述连接恢复响应消息中获取所述第一完整性保护算法。
  31. 根据权利要求27所述的装置，其特征在于，所述接收单元，具体用于接收来自所述目标基站的连接恢复响应消息、所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复RRC连接，所述连接恢复响应消息根据第一加密密钥和所述第一加密算法进行加密，所述第一加密密钥根据所述第一加密算法生成。
  32. 根据权利要求30或31所述的装置，其特征在于，所述连接恢复响应消息根据第一完整性保护密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法进行完整性保护，所述第一完整性保护密钥根据所述第一完整性保护算法生成；所述处理单元，还用于：根据所述第一完整性保护算法生成所述第一完整性保护密钥；根据所述第一完整性保护密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，对所述连接恢复响应消息进行完整性校验。
  33. 根据权利要求27所述的装置，其特征在于，所述接收单元，还用于接收来自所述目标基站的第一消息，所述第一消息包括所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法；以及用于在接收所述第一消息后，接收来自所述目标基站的连接恢复响应消息，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接，所述连接恢复响应消息是根据所述第一加密算法、所述第一完整性保护算法进行安全性保护的。
  34. 根据权利要求33所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一消息根据第一完整性保护密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法进行完整性保护，所述第一完整性保护密钥根据所述第一完整性保护算法生成；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述第一完整性保护算法，生成所述第一完整性保护密钥；以及，根据所述第一完整性保护密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，对所述第一消息进行完整性校验。
  35. 根据权利要求34所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一消息还包括第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述终端不更新接入层密钥；
    所述处理单元，具体用于根据当前接入层密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，生成所述第一完整性保护密钥。
  36. 根据权利要求34所述的装置，其特征在于，所述处理单元，具体用于：
    确定所述第一消息中不包括第二指示信息，所述第二指示信息用于指示所述终端更新接入层密钥；
    根据当前接入层密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，生成所述第一完整性保护密钥。
  37. 根据权利要求33至36中任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述发送单元还用于向所述目标基站发送第二消息，所述第二消息用于响应所述第一消息。
  38. 一种装置，其特征在于，包括：处理单元、发送单元和接收单元；
    所述发送单元，用于向目标基站发送连接恢复请求消息，所述连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接；
    所述处理单元，具体用于：若所述接收单元未接收到来自所述目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则根据第二加密算法、第二完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息；或者，若所述接收单元接收到来自所述目标基站的第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，则根据所述第一加密算法、所述第一完整性保护算法及连接恢复完成消息，得到受保护的连接恢复完成消息；
    所述发送单元，还用于向所述目标基站发送所述受保护的连接恢复完成消息；
    其中，所述第一加密算法为所述终端与所述目标基站之间协商的加密算法和完整性保护算法，所述第一完整性保护算法为所述终端与所述目标基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，所述第二加密算法为所述终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法，所述第二完整性保护算法为所述终端与所述源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复完成消息用于指示恢复所述RRC连接完成。
  39. 一种装置，其特征在于，包括：处理单元、发送单元和接收单元；
    所述接收单元，用于接收来自终端的连接恢复请求消息，所述连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接；
    所述处理单元，用于根据所述终端的安全能力，选择第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，所述终端的安全能力包括所述终端支持的加密算法和完整性保护算法；
    所述发送单元，用于向所述终端发送所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法；
    所述接收单元，还用于接收来自所述终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息，所述连接恢复完成消息用于指示恢复所述RRC连接完成；
    所述处理单元，还用于根据所述受保护的连接恢复完成消息、所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，得到所述连接恢复完成消息。
  40. 根据权利要求39所述的装置，其特征在于，所述接收单元，还用于接收来自所述源基站的第二加密算法，所述第二加密算法为所述终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法；所述处理单元，还用于根据所述第二加密算法，生成第二加密密钥；以及，根据所述第二加密密钥和所述第二加密算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，所述连接恢复响应消息包括所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接；所述发送单元，具体用于向所述终端发送加密的所述连接恢复响应消息。
  41. 根据权利要求40所述的装置，其特征在于，所述处理单元，还用于根据第二完整性保护算法生成第二完整性保护密钥，所述第二完整性保护算法为所述终端与所 述源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法；以及，根据所述第二完整性保护密钥和所述第二完整性保护算法，对所述连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护。
  42. 根据权利要求39所述的装置，其特征在于，所述处理单元，还用于根据所述第一加密算法，生成第一加密密钥；以及，根据所述第一加密密钥和所述第一加密算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，所述连接恢复响应消息包括所述第一完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接；所述发送单元，具体用于向所述终端发送所述连接恢复响应消息和所述第一加密算法。
  43. 根据权利要求39所述的装置，其特征在于，所述处理单元，还用于根据所述第一加密算法，生成第一加密密钥；以及，根据所述第一加密密钥和所述第一加密算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行加密，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接；所述发送单元，具体用于向所述终端发送所述连接恢复响应消息、所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法。
  44. 根据权利要求42或43所述的装置，其特征在于，所述处理单元，还用于根据所述第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥；以及，根据所述第一完整性保护密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，对所述连接恢复响应消息进行完整性保护。
  45. 根据权利要求39所述的装置，其特征在于，所述发送单元具体用于向所述终端发送第一消息，所述第一消息包括所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法；
    所述处理单元还用于根据所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，对连接恢复响应消息进行安全性保护；
    所述发送单元还用于在发送所述第一消息后，向所述终端发送所述连接恢复响应消息。
  46. 根据权利要求45所述的装置，其特征在于，所述处理单元还用于根据所述第一完整性保护算法，生成第一完整性保护密钥；以及，根据所述第一完整性保护密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，对所述第一消息进行完整性保护。
  47. 根据权利要求45所述的装置，其特征在于，所述处理单元具体用于根据当前接入层密钥和所述第一完整性保护算法，生成所述第一完整性保护密钥。
  48. 根据权利要求47所述的装置，其特征在于，所述第一消息还包括第一指示信息，所述第一指示信息用于指示所述终端不更新接入层密钥。
  49. 根据权利要求45至48中任一项所述的装置，其特征在于，所述接收单元还用于接收来自所述终端的第二消息，所述第二消息用于响应所述第一消息。
  50. 一种装置，其特征在于，包括：处理单元、发送单元和接收单元；
    所述接收单元，用于接收来自终端的连接恢复请求消息，所述连接恢复请求消息用于请求恢复无线资源控制RRC连接；
    所述处理单元，用于根据所述终端的安全能力，选择第一加密算法和第一完整性保护算法，所述终端的安全能力包括所述终端支持的加密算法和完整性保护算法；
    所述发送单元，用于若所述第一加密算法与所述第二加密算法相同，且所述第一完整性保护算法与所述第二完整性保护算法相同，则向所述终端发送连接恢复响应消息；所述接收单元，用于接收来自所述终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息，并根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、所述第二加密算法和所述第二完整性保护算法，得到所述连接恢复完成消息；或者，
    所述发送单元，用于若所述第一加密算法与所述第二加密算法不同，或所述第一完整性保护算法与所述第二完整性保护算法不同，则向所述终端发送所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法；所述接收单元，用于接收来自所述终端的受保护的连接恢复完成消息，并根据受保护的连接恢复完成消息、所述第一加密算法和所述第一完整性保护算法，得到所述连接恢复完成消息；
    其中，所述第一加密算法为所述终端与所述目标基站之间协商的加密算法和完整性保护算法，所述第一完整性保护算法为所述终端与所述目标基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，所述第二加密算法为所述终端与源基站之间协商的加密算法，所述第二完整性保护算法为所述终端与所述源基站之间协商的完整性保护算法，所述连接恢复响应消息用于指示所述终端恢复所述RRC连接，所述连接恢复完成消息用于指示恢复所述RRC连接完成。
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EP3694244B1 (en) 2022-11-30
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US11564099B2 (en) 2023-01-24
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