WO2019056761A1 - 一种基于tpm的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法 - Google Patents

一种基于tpm的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法 Download PDF

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WO2019056761A1
WO2019056761A1 PCT/CN2018/085765 CN2018085765W WO2019056761A1 WO 2019056761 A1 WO2019056761 A1 WO 2019056761A1 CN 2018085765 W CN2018085765 W CN 2018085765W WO 2019056761 A1 WO2019056761 A1 WO 2019056761A1
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metric
tpm
trusted
embedded platform
bootloader
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PCT/CN2018/085765
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English (en)
French (fr)
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于海斌
曾鹏
尚文利
赵剑明
刘贤达
尹隆
陈春雨
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中国科学院沈阳自动化研究所
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Priority to US16/316,269 priority Critical patent/US20200042711A1/en
Publication of WO2019056761A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019056761A1/zh

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
    • G06F21/575—Secure boot
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
    • G06F21/572—Secure firmware programming, e.g. of basic input output system [BIOS]
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/64—Protecting data integrity, e.g. using checksums, certificates or signatures
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
    • G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
    • G06F9/44—Arrangements for executing specific programs
    • G06F9/4401—Bootstrapping
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F2221/03—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/50, monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms
    • G06F2221/034—Test or assess a computer or a system

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a startup method of a TPM-based industrial control trusted embedded platform, which can ensure the security and credibility of an industrial embedded platform, and belongs to the field of information security technology of an industrial system.
  • the security threats of industrial control system information mainly come from internal terminal security threats and external network security threats.
  • Internal endpoint security threats are primarily manifested in the vulnerability of the platform: the vulnerability of industrial control systems is often caused by system defects, misconfigurations, or misuse of equipment platforms (including hardware, operating systems, and industrial control system applications). Proper password management mechanisms, use of unreasonable access control mechanisms, etc.; external cybersecurity threats manifest as industrial control system network vulnerabilities: industrial control system networks and other network defects connected to them, misconfigurations or imperfections
  • the network management process can lead to the vulnerability of industrial control systems.
  • the process of starting the computer by the BIOS is divided into two stages: hardware startup and operating system startup.
  • BIOS booting and initializing the hardware is relatively closed and secure, while the stage of booting the operating system is relatively complex and diverse, and the user can choose to boot the operating system from a hard disk, a floppy disk or from another medium.
  • the diversity of operating system startups poses many risks to computer data security and access control, and the system is susceptible to unauthorized tampering or destruction.
  • Trusted computing has broad development prospects. Domestic and foreign authors have carried out a lot of research work in the field of trusted computing in the industrial field. However, for the special application requirements of industrial measurement and control systems, it is necessary to improve the trusted computing that meets the complex characteristics of industrial information. method. Therefore, to ensure the security of programmable embedded electronic devices, it is necessary to ensure the integrity of the embedded platform, that is, to ensure that information can not be intercepted by software externally and malicious code can not intercept control at a certain part of the startup sequence.
  • the purpose of trusted boot is to ensure the integrity of the operating system boot process. During the system startup process, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) measures the integrity of the bootloader, operating system kernel, system configuration files, etc., and establishes a chain of trust. Measure its integrity before loading the next step. When the integrity of a link is compromised, the system will not start.
  • TPM Trusted Platform Module
  • the object of the present invention is a TPM-based industrial control trusted embedded platform startup method and system.
  • the invention uses an integrated board of the XC7Z015 chip as an embedded platform, and focuses on how to implement trusted computing.
  • Technology is applied to industrial embedded systems to build a secure and trusted embedded development environment.
  • the technical solution adopted by the present invention to solve the technical problem thereof is: a startup method of a TPM-based industrial control trusted embedded platform, comprising the following steps:
  • the first step after the embedded platform is powered on, the trusted root CRTM is used as the source of the trust chain and executed;
  • Step 2 Perform a trusted metric of the BIOS, and start the BIOS after the metric is passed;
  • the third step the BIOS measures the bootloader, and extends the metric to the PCR corresponding to the TPM. After the metric is passed, the control execution right is handed over to the bootloader.
  • Step 4 The Bootloader measures the startup process of the Os kernel, records its metric value in the PCR of the TPM, and executes the Os startup process after the metric is passed.
  • BIOS Use the BIOS as a trusted root CRTM.
  • CRTM writes the configuration information of the bootloader bootloader to the metrics log.
  • the metric is implemented by the SHA-1 algorithm.
  • the metric value is a hash value obtained by the SHA-1 algorithm and stored in a platform status register in the TPM.
  • the metric value is a fixed length hash value.
  • the metric value is a 160 bit hash value.
  • the metric is consistent with the metric value reflected in the PCR by the specific metric value.
  • a startup system for a TPM-based industrial control trusted embedded platform comprising:
  • Trusted metric root module after the embedded platform is powered on, the trusted root CRTM is used as the source of the trust chain and executed;
  • the Trusted Platform Module is used to perform the trusted metric of the BIOS. After the metric is passed, the BIOS is started. The BIOS measures the Bootloader and extends the metric to the PCR corresponding to the TPM. After the metric is passed, the control execution is handed over to the Bootloader. The Bootloader measures the startup process of the Os kernel, records its metric value in the PCR of the TPM, and executes the Os startup process after the metric is passed.
  • TPM Trusted Platform Module
  • the present invention is measured before each part of the startup process is started, and the metric value is also stored in the PCR corresponding to the TPM.
  • the integrity measurement mechanism will terminate the execution of the program, thus ensuring the security of the embedded platform.
  • the invention realizes a set of secure startup mechanism of the embedded platform by using trusted computing technology without changing the existing hardware device architecture and combining the characteristics of the embedded device.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a TPM-based embedded platform motherboard according to the present invention.
  • FIG. 2 is a functional block diagram of a TPM-based trusted embedded platform of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a TPM-based embedded trusted platform trust chain delivery process according to the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a flow chart of the integrity verification process of the boot process of the TPM-based trusted embedded platform of the present invention.
  • the invention provides a design method of a TPM-based industrial control trusted embedded platform. Based on the trusted computing technology, the embedded trusted computing platform based on the trusted platform module TPM is designed, and the software structure is obtained from the software structure. And the hardware structure, analyzes the delivery mechanism of the trusted platform module and the trust chain.
  • the method implements a trusted mechanism mainly through three trusted roots: Root of Trust for Measurement, Root of Trust for Storage, Trusted Reporting Root RTR (Root of Trust for Reporting).
  • the method performs trusted verification on the ZYNQ hardware platform, and verifies the correctness of the design method through kernel forgery attack test, thus ensuring the security and credibility of the industrial embedded platform.
  • RTM is the starting point of the trusted metric
  • the trust chain is established during the measurement process.
  • RTS is an accurate summary value and sequential calculation engine that records complete metrics and is a storage unit that can reliably encrypt.
  • RTR is a computational engine that reliably reports RTS, reliably reporting information and identifying the credibility of the platform's identity.
  • the core of the TPM's evaluation of the startup sequence is the chain of trust mechanism. The specific implementation process is as follows:
  • the first step After the embedded platform is powered up, the trusted root CTRM is the source of the trust chain, and the system will first execute the code of the trusted root CTRM.
  • Step 2 The system starts from the trusted root. First, the trusted metric of the BIOS is performed. After the metric is passed, the BIOS is started.
  • Step 3 The BIOS measures the bootloader and extends the metric to the PCR corresponding to the TPM. After the BIOS completes the measurement of the Boot Loader and passes the measurement, the control execution right is handed over to the Bootloader.
  • Step 4 The Bootloader measures the startup process of the Os kernel, records its metric value in the PCR of the TPM, and executes the Os (Operating System) startup process after the metric is passed.
  • the chain of trust is to evaluate the security of the next link under the premise of trusting the current link, and to determine the next link is credible, then transfer the control to the next link, thus extending to the entire embedded platform.
  • the metric summary values of each executor in the sequence before execution will be stored in the PCR.
  • the platform status information is placed in the metric log file outside the TPM in the form of a log.
  • the platform status register is capable of storing 160 bits of information, storing the hash value obtained using the SHA-1 algorithm.
  • SHA-1 generates a fixed length (160 bits) of output (hash value) for any length of input message.
  • the present invention includes:
  • CRTM writes the configuration information of the bootloader bootloader into the metric log, then measures the BootLoader, and then extends the metric to the PCR corresponding to the TPM.
  • the TPM can be viewed as a complete computer including a processor, coprocessor, storage unit, operating system, and the like.
  • the TPM has four main functions: symmetric/asymmetric encryption, secure storage, integrity metrics, and signature authentication.
  • the asymmetric encryption and signature authentication of the data is implemented by the RSA algorithm; the integrity metric is done by the efficient SHA-1 hash algorithm.
  • the basic components include a processor, a coprocessor, a storage unit, an I/O, and the like.
  • the PCR value, the hash value of the configuration information in the boot sequence is stored in the platform configuration register PCR in the chip. Once the platform is started, the data is sealed at the time of the PCR value and can only be unsealed when the PCR value is the same as the sealed value of the data. If an abnormal system is started, the data cannot be decapsulated because the PCR values cannot be matched, thus protecting the data.
  • the chain of trust is to evaluate the security of the next link under the premise of trusting the current link, and to determine the next link is credible, then transfer the control to the next link, thus extending to the entire embedded platform.
  • the present invention provides a TPM-based industrial control.
  • the design method of the letter embedded platform Referring to FIG. 1, a main board structure of a TPM-based trusted embedded platform of the present invention is shown. Referring to FIG. 2, a basic model flow chart and structure of the method are shown. When the method of the present invention is implemented, the main processes are as follows:
  • Step 1 The BIOS as a Core Root of Trust Measurement (CRTM), Trusted Metric Root (CRTM) and Trusted Platform Module (TPM) together form a trusted building block, which not only protects CRTM, but also Solved the problem caused by the difference of the CPU system.
  • CRTM Core Root of Trust Measurement
  • CRTM Trusted Metric Root
  • TPM Trusted Platform Module
  • Step 2 Package the functions of all TPM modules in the form of a soft IP core. See Figure 2. Simultaneously transfer the logical IP and ZYNQ processors through the AXI4 bus and the LMB bus to form a complete trusted embedded SOC system.
  • the basic components include a processor, a coprocessor, a storage unit, an I/O, and the like.
  • Step 3 The TPM measures the integrity of the BIOS, bootloader, operating system kernel, application, etc. in turn, and establishes a chain of trust. Referring to Figure 3, the integrity of the next link is measured before loading it. When the integrity of a link is compromised, the system will return to the previous level for re-measurement.
  • the Bootloader can detect that the Os kernel has been tampered with before the control is handed over to the Os kernel.
  • the Os kernel's metric is different from the standard PCR value, thus judging its integrity is destroyed. Automatically terminate the startup of the system.

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Abstract

一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法，该方法包括：嵌入式平台加电后，可信根CRTM作为信任链的源头并执行；进行BIOS的可信度量，度量通过后启动BIOS；BIOS度量Bootloader，并将度量值扩展到TPM对应的PCR中，度量通过后，将控制执行权移交给Bootloader；Bootloader度量Os kernel启动过程，将其度量值记录在TPM的PCR中，度量通过后执行Os的启动流程。该方法在启动过程的每一部分启动之前都得到了度量，度量值也保存在了TPM对应的PCR中，当启动过程被攻击者篡改，完整性度量机制将终止程序的执行，从而保证了嵌入式平台的安全。

Description

一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法 技术领域
本发明涉及一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法，其能确保工业嵌入式平台的安全可信，属于工业系统的信息安全技术领域。
背景技术
由于信息化技术的快速发展，信息化推动工业化进程的加快，越来越多的网络通信技术、计算机技术以及嵌入式技术应用于工业控制系统中。这些高新技术应用的同时，也随之带来了工业控制系统的安全问题，比如信息泄露和篡改、病毒等等。2010年9月14日，伊朗核设施突然受到“超级病毒”震网病毒攻击，导致其核设施不能正常运转。至此，工业控制系统信息安全引起工业界的高度关注。
工业控制系统信息的安全威胁主要来自内部的终端安全威胁和外部的网络安全威胁。内部的终端安全威胁主要表现在平台的脆弱性：工业控制系统的脆弱性通常由系统缺陷、错误配置或对设备平台(包括硬件、操作系统和工业控制系统应用程序)的错误操作使用引起，缺乏恰当的密码管理机制，使用不合理的访问控制机制等等；外部的网络安全威胁表现为工业控制系统网络脆弱性：工业控制系统网络和与之相连的其他的网络缺陷、错误配置或不完善的网络管理过程可能导致工业控制系统的脆弱性。BIOS启动计算机的过程分为硬件启动和操作系统启动两个阶段。BIOS启动和初始化硬件的过程是相对封闭和安全的，而启动操作系统的阶段则相对复杂和多样，使用者可选择从硬盘、软盘或从其他介质启动操作系统等。操作系统启动的多样性，给计算机的数据安全和访问控制带来很多风险，系统容易受到非授权的篡改或破坏。
可信计算有着广泛的发展前景，国内外学者在可信计算应用于工业领域开展了大量的研究工作，但对于工业测控系统的特殊应用需求，需要提高更加满足工业信息领域复杂特征的可信计算方法。因此要保证可编程嵌入式电子设备的安全，就要保证嵌入式平台的完整性，即确保信息不能在外部通过软件被截获以及恶意代码不能在启动序列的某一个环节上截获控制权。可信启动的目的是保证操作系统启动过程的完整性。在系统启动过程中，可信平台模块(TPM)依次度量引导加载程序、操作系统内核、系统配置文件等的完整性，并建立信任链。在加载下一环节之前先度量其完整性。当某一环节的完整性遭到破坏时，系统将无法启动。
发明内容
针对上述技术不足，本发明的目的是一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法和系统，本发明以集成XC7Z015芯片的开发板作为嵌入式平台，重点研究了如何将可信计 算技术应用于工业嵌入式系统，以构建安全可信的嵌入式开发环境。
本发明解决其技术问题所采用的技术方案是：一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法，包括以下步骤：
第一步：嵌入式平台加电后，可信根CRTM作为信任链的源头并执行；
第二步：进行BIOS的可信度量，度量通过后启动BIOS；
第三步：BIOS度量Bootloader，并将度量值扩展到TPM对应的PCR中，度量通过后，将控制执行权移交给Bootloader；
第四步：Bootloader度量Os kernel启动过程，将其度量值记录在TPM的PCR中，度量通过后执行Os的启动流程。
将BIOS作为可信根CRTM。
CRTM把引导加载程序Bootloader的配置信息写入度量日志中。
所述度量通过SHA-1算法实现。
所述度量值为采用SHA-1算法得到的哈希值，存储于TPM内的平台状态寄存器中。
所述度量值为一个固定长度的散列值。
所述度量值为一个160比特的散列值。
所述度量通过具体为度量值与PCR中反映的度量值一致。
一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动系统，包括：
可信度量根模块，用于嵌入式平台加电后，可信根CRTM作为信任链的源头并执行；
可信平台模块(TPM)，用于进行BIOS的可信度量，度量通过后启动BIOS；BIOS度量Bootloader，并将度量值扩展到TPM对应的PCR中，度量通过后，将控制执行权移交给Bootloader；Bootloader度量Os kernel启动过程，将其度量值记录在TPM的PCR中，度量通过后执行Os的启动流程。
本发明具有以下有益效果及优点：
1.本发明在启动过程的每一部分在启动之前都得到了度量，度量值也保存在了TPM对应的PCR中。当启动过程被攻击者篡改，完整性度量机制将终止程序的执行，从而保证了嵌入式平台的安全。
2.本发明在不改变现有硬件设备架构的前提下，结合嵌入式设备自身特点，利用可信计算技术，实现了一套嵌入式平台的安全启动机制。
附图说明
图1为本发明的基于TPM的嵌入式平台主板结构示意图。
图2为本发明的基于TPM的可信嵌入式平台功能框图。
图3为本发明的基于TPM的嵌入式可信平台信任链传递过程示意图。
图4为本发明的基于TPM的可信嵌入式平台的启动过程完整性验证流程图。
具体实施方式
下面结合实施例对本发明做进一步的详细说明。
本发明提供了一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的设计方法,该方法在可信计算技术基础上，设计了基于可信平台模块TPM的嵌入式可信计算平台，并从软件结构和硬件结构，分析了可信平台模块和信任链的传递机制。该方法主要通过三个可信根实现可信机制：可信度量根RTM(Root of Trust for Measurement)、可信存储根RTS(Root of Trust for Storage)、可信报告根RTR(Root of Trust for Reporting)。最后本方法在ZYNQ硬件平台上进行可信验证，通过内核伪造攻击测试，验证了该设计方法的正确性，从而确保工业嵌入式平台的安全可信。
该方法通过三个可信根实现，RTM是可信度量的起点，在度量过程中建立信任链。RTS是一个准确的记录完整度量的摘要值和顺序计算引擎，是一个能进行可靠加密的存储单元。RTR是一个可靠报告RTS的计算引擎，能可靠报告信息并标识平台身份的可信性。TPM对启动序列进行评估的核心是信任链机制。具体实现过程如下：
第一步：嵌入式平台加电后，可信根CTRM作为信任链的源头，系统会最先执行可信根CTRM的代码。
第二步：系统从可信根开始，首先进行BIOS的可信度量，度量通过后启动BIOS。
第三步：BIOS度量Bootloader，并将度量值扩展到TPM对应的PCR中，BIOS完成对Boot loader的度量且度量通过后，将控制执行权移交给Bootloader。
第四步：Bootloader度量Os kernel启动过程，将其度量值记录在TPM的PCR中，度量通过后执行Os(操作系统)的启动流程。
信任链，就是在信任当前某一环节的前提下，由该环节去评估下一环节的安全性，确定下一个环节可信之后，再将控制权移交给下一个环节，从而扩展至整个嵌入式平台。
在系统启动过程中，序列中的每一个执行程序在执行之前的度量摘要值都将存储于PCR中
平台状态信息是以日志的形式放置在TPM外部的度量日志文件中。
平台状态寄存器能够存储160比特的信息，存放的是使用SHA-1算法得到的哈希值。SHA-1对于任何长度的输入消息都生成一个固定长度(160比特)的输出结果(散列值)。
如图4所示，本发明包括：
1)初始化阶段：系统启动过程中，CRTM初始化系统启动后的执行程序并引导TPM。
2)度量阶段：CRTM把引导加载程序Bootloader的配置信息写入度量日志中，然后对BootLoader进行度量，之后将度量值扩展到TPM对应的PCR中。
3)若度量日志与PCR中反映的度量值相印证，证明Bootloader可信，控制权将被移交给Booloader，并进行下一阶段的度量；若度量失败，返回2)进行重新度量。
所述TPM可看作是一个完整的计算机，包括处理器、协处理器、存储单元和操作系统等等。TPM具备四个主要功能：对称/非对称加密、安全存储、完整性度量、和签名认证。数 据的非对称加密和签名认证是通过RSA算法来实现的；完整性度量则是通过高效的SHA-1散列算法来完成。
结合ZYNQ XC7Z015可动态重配置的特点以及TCG组织提出的TPM架构，以软IP核的形式封装所有模块的功能，同时通过AXI4总线以及LMB总线实现逻辑IP与ZYNQ无缝迁移，最终构成一个完整的可信嵌入式SOC系统。其基本组成单元包括处理器、协处理器、存储单元、I/O等。
PCR值，引导序列中的配置信息的散列值被存储到芯片中的平台配置寄存器PCR中。一旦平台启动，数据就在当时PCR值的情况下被密封，仅当PCR值与数据被密封的值相同时才能被解封。如果启动一个非正常系统，由于PCR值的无法匹配，则不能解封，从而保护数据的安全。
信任链，就是在信任当前某一环节的前提下，由该环节去评估下一环节的安全性，确定下一个环节可信之后，再将控制权移交给下一个环节，从而扩展至整个嵌入式平台。
针对工业测控系统的信息安全防护需求，突破可编程嵌入式电子设备开发与运行阶段的安全防护关键技术，提升可编程嵌入式电子设备的安全性，本发明提供了一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的设计方法。参见图1，示出了本发明基于TPM的可信嵌入式平台的主板结构。参见图2，示出了本方法的基本模型流程图及结构，本发明的方法在具体实施时，工作主要流程如下：
步骤一：将BIOS作为信任度量核心根(Core Root of Trust Measurement，CRTM)，可信度量根(CRTM)和可信平台模块(TPM)共同构成了可信构件块，这样不仅保护了CRTM，也解决了CPU体系的差异性导致的问题。
步骤二：以软IP核的形式封装TPM所有模块的功能，参见图2，同时通过AXI4总线以及LMB总线实现逻辑IP与ZYNQ处理器无缝迁移，最终构成一个完整的可信嵌入式SOC系统。其基本组成单元包括处理器、协处理器、存储单元、I/O等。
步骤三：TPM依次度量BIOS、引导程序、操作系统内核、应用程序等的完整性，并建立信任链。参见图3，在加载下一个环节之前，先度量其完整性。当某一个环节的完整性遭到破坏时，系统将返回上一级重新度量。
若伪造了一个与安全合法内核相似的非可信内核。该内核非法篡改合法启动内核的强制访问控制功能，来达到任意破坏操作系统内核代码和数据的完整性。XC7Z015嵌入式平台启动过程中，在Bootloader将控制权移交给Os kernel之前能够及时发现Os kernel遭到了篡改，即Os kernel的度量值与标准的PCR值不同，从而判断其完整性遭到破坏，并自动终止系统的启动。

Claims (9)

  1. 一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法，其特征在于，包括以下步骤：
    第一步：嵌入式平台加电后，可信根CRTM作为信任链的源头并执行；
    第二步：进行BIOS的可信度量，度量通过后启动BIOS；
    第三步：BIOS度量Bootloader，并将度量值扩展到TPM对应的PCR中，度量通过后，将控制执行权移交给Bootloader；
    第四步：Bootloader度量Os kernel启动过程，将其度量值记录在TPM的PCR中，度量通过后执行Os的启动流程。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法，其特征在于：将BIOS作为可信根CRTM。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法，其特征在于：CRTM把引导加载程序Bootloader的配置信息写入度量日志中。
  4. 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法，其特征在于所述度量通过SHA-1算法实现。
  5. 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法，其特征在于所述度量值为采用SHA-1算法得到的哈希值，存储于TPM内的平台状态寄存器中。
  6. 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法，其特征在于所述度量值为一个固定长度的散列值。
  7. 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法，其特征在于所述度量值为一个160比特的散列值。
  8. 根据权利要求1所述的一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动方法，其特征在于所述度量通过具体为度量值与PCR中反映的度量值一致。
  9. 一种基于TPM的工业控制可信嵌入式平台的启动系统，其特征在于包括：
    可信度量根模块，用于嵌入式平台加电后，可信根CRTM作为信任链的源头并执行；
    可信平台模块，用于进行BIOS的可信度量，度量通过后启动BIOS；BIOS度量Bootloader，并将度量值扩展到TPM对应的PCR中，度量通过后，将控制执行权移交给Bootloader；Bootloader度量Os kernel启动过程，将其度量值记录在TPM的PCR中，度量通过后执行Os的启动流程。
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