WO2019052464A1 - 伪基站识别方法、设备及计算机可读存储介质 - Google Patents

伪基站识别方法、设备及计算机可读存储介质 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019052464A1
WO2019052464A1 PCT/CN2018/105210 CN2018105210W WO2019052464A1 WO 2019052464 A1 WO2019052464 A1 WO 2019052464A1 CN 2018105210 W CN2018105210 W CN 2018105210W WO 2019052464 A1 WO2019052464 A1 WO 2019052464A1
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Prior art keywords
base station
terminal
cell
information
prohibited
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PCT/CN2018/105210
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
寿永艳
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中兴通讯股份有限公司
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Publication of WO2019052464A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019052464A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/08—Access security
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/12—Detection or prevention of fraud
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W48/00—Access restriction; Network selection; Access point selection
    • H04W48/20—Selecting an access point

Definitions

  • the present disclosure relates to the field of communications technologies, and in particular, to a pseudo base station identification method, device, and computer readable storage medium.
  • the user terminal may preferentially connect to the pseudo base station, that is, the user terminal is forcibly connected to the pseudo base station, so as to affect the normal use of the terminal user, which is easy for the user to socialize, Work and property pose a great threat and reduce the user experience.
  • the present disclosure provides a pseudo base station identification method, where the pseudo base station identification method includes the following steps: when detecting an access instruction of a terminal accessing a cell base station, acquiring cell information delivered by a corresponding cell base station; determining the cell information Whether the public land mobile network information prohibited by the subscriber identity module SIM card of the terminal is included; and when the cell information includes the public land mobile network information prohibited by the subscriber identity module SIM card of the terminal, the terminal is prohibited from being connected Enter the cell base station.
  • the present disclosure further provides a pseudo base station identification device, where the pseudo base station identification device includes: an acquisition module, configured to acquire cell information delivered by a corresponding cell base station when detecting an access instruction of the terminal accessing the cell base station; a module, configured to determine whether the cell information includes public land mobile network information prohibited by a subscriber identity module SIM card of the terminal; and a first barring module configured to include the terminal in the cell information When the subscriber identifies the public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card, the terminal is prohibited from accessing the cell base station.
  • an acquisition module configured to acquire cell information delivered by a corresponding cell base station when detecting an access instruction of the terminal accessing the cell base station
  • a module configured to determine whether the cell information includes public land mobile network information prohibited by a subscriber identity module SIM card of the terminal
  • a first barring module configured to include the terminal in the cell information
  • the present disclosure also provides a pseudo base station identification device including: a memory, a processor, a communication bus, and a pseudo base station identification program stored on the memory, wherein the communication bus is configured to implement a processor a communication connection with the memory, and the processor is configured to perform the pseudo base station identification procedure, to implement the following steps: when detecting an access instruction of the terminal accessing the cell base station, acquiring cell information delivered by the corresponding cell base station; Determining whether the cell information includes public land mobile network information prohibited by the subscriber identity module SIM card of the terminal; and when the cell information includes public land mobile network information prohibited by the subscriber identity module SIM card of the terminal The terminal is prohibited from accessing the cell base station.
  • the present disclosure also provides a computer readable storage medium storing one or more programs, the one or more programs being executable by one or more processors to implement the steps of: When detecting the access instruction of the terminal accessing the cell base station, acquiring the cell information sent by the corresponding cell base station; determining whether the cell information includes the public land mobile network information prohibited by the user identity module SIM card of the terminal; When the cell information includes public land mobile network information prohibited by the subscriber identity module SIM card of the terminal, the terminal is prohibited from accessing the cell base station.
  • FIG. 1 is a flow diagram of one embodiment of a pseudo base station identification method in accordance with the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 2 is a flow chart showing still another embodiment of a pseudo base station identification method according to the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram showing the structure of a device for implementing the pseudo base station identification method of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a scenario in which the present disclosure is implemented.
  • the present disclosure provides a pseudo base station identification method.
  • the pseudo base station identification method includes: steps S10-S30.
  • step S10 when the access instruction of the terminal accessing the cell base station is detected, the cell information delivered by the corresponding cell base station is obtained.
  • the pseudo base station interferes with the signal of the operator within the preset range centered on the pseudo base station, forcing the mobile terminal in the preset range to be off the network, and the mobile terminal automatically reselects the cell after the network is disconnected, that is, reconnects the network.
  • the mobile terminal preferentially connects to the pseudo base station because the pseudo base station signal is strong, and then the pseudo base station pushes the illegal short message to the mobile terminal accessing the pseudo base station, after the short message is pushed,
  • the pseudo base station may be quickly shut down to stop the mobile terminal corresponding to the interference, that is, the mobile terminal accessing the pseudo base station is returned to the mobile communication network to reduce the suspicion of the mobile terminal user and reduce the risk of being traced by the relevant department.
  • the pseudo base station will forge the system information of its own base station to meet the requirements of multiple operators.
  • an existing pseudo base station can put public land mobile network information of a plurality of types of Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards into its system information.
  • SIM Subscriber Identity Module
  • the cell information sent by the pseudo base station to the terminal also has the Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) information of China Unicom, Telecom, and Mobile. All SIM cards in the cell are connected to this pseudo base station.
  • PLMN Public Land Mobile Network
  • the cell site of the normal operator provides only the unique carrier information in the system message, and puts the information of other operators into the disabled list.
  • the mobile terminal compares the home public mobile network information of the SIM card of the terminal with the system information sent by the cell base station, that is, the home public land mobile network information in the SIB message, and if yes, allows access to the The cell base station does not determine whether there is other public land mobile network information in the system information.
  • the corresponding number of the advertising promotion can be set as a suspicious number to be added to the blacklist for interception purposes, or intercepted according to the content of the short message.
  • the existing security software mainly implements the identification of the pseudo base station according to the sender number, the short message content keyword or the short message center number, and the interception efficiency is low, and the interception technology does not function for the fake number disguised by the pseudo base station. Big.
  • the present disclosure implements identification of a pseudo base station (such as a Long Term Evolution (LTE) pseudo base station), that is, the pseudo base station can be shielded before the short cell of the pseudo base station is received.
  • LTE Long Term Evolution
  • the cell base station when the terminal prepares to access the cell base station, the cell base station broadcasts cell parameters or cell information to the mobile terminal.
  • the access instruction of the terminal accessing the cell base station is detected, the cell information sent by the corresponding cell base station is obtained. It can be determined whether the base station accessed by the terminal is a pseudo base station by determining whether the cell information is abnormal.
  • step S20 it is determined whether the public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal is included in the cell information.
  • the step of determining whether the cell information includes the public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal includes: parsing the cell information to obtain a system information block (SIB) in the cell information; Whether the public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal is included in the system information block SIB.
  • SIB system information block
  • the cell information includes a system information block SIB and a master information block (MIB).
  • the system information block SIB includes information about the PLMN to be accessed, and further includes cell access information, radio channel configuration parameters, frequency bands, Tracking Area Code (TAC) information, serving cell reselection information, and the like.
  • the sub-information, and the main information block MIB includes sub-information such as downlink bandwidth, frequency point, and cell number.
  • the system information block SIB is stored in the information list separately from the various types of sub-information in the main information block MIB.
  • the system information block SIB and the main information block MIB in the cell information may be respectively obtained by parsing the cell information to determine whether the system information block SIB includes public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal. Specifically, it can be determined whether the Forbidden Public Land Mobile Network (FPLMN) of the current terminal's SIM card is also present in the system information block SIB. If yes, the base station currently sent to the terminal cell information is Pseudo base station.
  • FPLMN Forbidden Public Land Mobile Network
  • the FPLMN of the mobile SIM card may be acquired.
  • the FPLMN in the cell information obtained by the cell base station corresponding to the mobile SIM card may include a Unicom SIM card, and a telecommunications.
  • the public land mobile network information of the SIM card if the cell information includes the Unicom SIM card prohibited by the SIM card of the current terminal and the public land mobile network information of the Telecommunication SIM card, the base station corresponding to the cell information may be determined as a pseudo base station; If the current mobile terminal is a Unicom SIM card, the FPLMN of the Unicom SIM card may include a mobile SIM card, a public land mobile network information of the Telecommunication SIM card, etc., if the cell information includes a public land mobile network that is prohibited by the terminal Unicom SIM card. When the information is used, it can be determined that the base station corresponding to the cell is a pseudo base station.
  • step S30 when the cell information includes the public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal, the terminal is prohibited from accessing the cell base station.
  • the terminal when the cell information includes the public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal, the terminal is prohibited from accessing the cell base station. In an embodiment, when the cell information includes the public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal, the terminal may be permanently prohibited from accessing the cell base station.
  • the method may include the following steps: extracting information in the cell information of the abnormal cell base station a system information block SIB and a main information block MIB, wherein the cell identification base module of the terminal is prohibited from accessing the cell base station as an abnormal cell base station; and the system information block SIB is stored in the abnormal SIB information list of the terminal,
  • the master information block MIB is stored in the list of abnormal MIB information of the terminal.
  • the system information block SIB and the main information block MIB in the abnormal cell base station cell information may be extracted.
  • the terminal is provided with an abnormality information recording table in which the abnormal system information block SIB and the abnormal primary information block MIB are partitioned and stored.
  • the pseudo base station will forge the information of its own base station to meet the requirements of multiple operators, and the cell base station of the normal operator will only provide unique information in the system message. Carrier information and put other carriers' information into the disabled list.
  • the terminal When the terminal is ready to access the base station in the cell, it receives the cell information sent by the base station, and thus determines whether the cell information includes other public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal, and can determine that the terminal is about to access. Whether the cell information of the cell base station includes the prohibited other public land mobile network information, or whether the cell base station to which the terminal is to be accessed includes the mobile network of the plurality of operators.
  • the corresponding cell base station may be determined as a pseudo base station. Thereby, the terminal is prohibited from accessing the cell base station. Therefore, the technical solution of the present disclosure can quickly identify the pseudo base station, thereby solving the technical problem that the pseudo base station is difficult to recognize in some cases, thereby affecting the user's social, work, property use, and low user experience.
  • the cell information includes a tracking area identifier code
  • the step of acquiring the cell information delivered by the corresponding cell base station includes: steps S11-S13. The steps are shown in Figure 2.
  • step S11 the tracking area identification code is compared with the prohibited tracking area identification code list stored by the terminal.
  • step S12 when the tracking area identification code is one of the prohibited tracking area identification code lists, the corresponding terminal is prohibited from accessing the cell base station.
  • step S13 when the tracking area identification code is not any one of the forbidden tracking area identification code lists, performing determination of whether the cell information includes the public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal is performed. step.
  • the terminal storage After the step of acquiring the cell information delivered by the corresponding cell base station, and before determining whether the cell information includes the public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal, acquiring the terminal storage
  • the tracking area identification code TAC list is forbidden, and the tracking area identification code TAC in the cell information is obtained, and then the tracking area identification code TAC in the cell information is matched with the forbidden tracking area list stored by the terminal, and is currently received by the terminal.
  • the tracking area identifier code TAC in the cell information is any one of the forbidden tracking area lists, the current terminal is prohibited from accessing the cell base station, and the cell base station is used as a pseudo base station, and the subsequent steps are not performed, when the tracking area identifier is used.
  • the step of determining whether the cell information includes the public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal is performed, as shown in FIG. 4 .
  • the tracking area identification code may be compared with the prohibited tracking area identification code list stored by the terminal; when the tracking area identification code is one of the prohibited tracking area identification code list And the determining, by the cell information, whether the terminal is included in the cell information, and when the tracking area identification code is not one of the forbidden tracking area identification code lists, determining whether the terminal information is included in the cell information
  • the steps of the SIM card forbidding public land mobile network information By first determining whether the cell base station to which the terminal is currently connected is a stored cell base station that is prohibited from being connected, it is possible to more quickly identify whether the currently connected cell base station is a pseudo base station.
  • the method may include the following steps: detecting the location Whether the terminal accesses the normal cell base station; and when the terminal accesses the normal cell base station, sending alarm information about the pseudo base station, wherein the cell base station of the terminal's subscriber identity module SIM card is prohibited from being accessed as Pseudo base station.
  • the cell information sent by the pseudo base station acquired by the terminal in the threshold time before the access to the normal cell base station is acquired, and the alarm information about the pseudo base station is sent.
  • the cell information may be correspondingly reported to the public security system for the public security system to acquire the pseudo base station corresponding to the cell information.
  • the public security system includes each public security bureau, and the step of reporting the pseudo base station to the public security system includes the following steps: acquiring a current location of the terminal, to obtain an alarm query information of the public security bureau closest to the current location of the terminal; The alarm query information reports the cell information of the pseudo base station to the public security bureau that is closest to the current location of the terminal.
  • the current location of the terminal can be obtained, and the alarm query information of the public security bureau closest to the current location of the terminal is obtained based on the current location of the terminal.
  • the alarm query information may be an alarm short message number corresponding to the police station, an alarm website address, and the like.
  • the cell information of the pseudo base station can be reported to the public security bureau that is closest to the current location of the terminal.
  • the terminal may extract the cell information, and send the cell information to the short message receiving system of the public security bureau nearest to the current location of the terminal by using a short message form; or the terminal may extract the cell information, and use the micro information, the QQ, the browser, etc. to the cell information. Sended to the network receiving system of the Public Security Bureau closest to the current location of the terminal.
  • the cell base station for which the module SIM card is prohibited from accessing is used as a pseudo base station.
  • the method may further include the following steps: starting An evasive timer of the terminal; and a base station that blocks the subscriber identity module SIM card of the terminal from being blocked by the base station of the cell in the preset time period of the evasive timer.
  • the evasive timer of the terminal when the cell information received by the terminal includes the public land mobile network information that is prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal, the evasive timer of the terminal is started; and the preset time period of the evasion timer is blocked.
  • the cell base station of the terminal is prohibited from accessing the cell base station corresponding to other base stations of the cell. For example, it may be set to other base stations that cannot access the current cell within 10S or 5S, that is, the terminal may access other serving cells instead of the current cell, to avoid the cell of the cell base station for which the SIM card of the terminal is prohibited from accessing. information.
  • the spoofing timer of the terminal is started in the preset time period of the evasive timer
  • the base station that blocks the user identification module SIM card of the terminal is prohibited from accessing other base stations of the cell.
  • the evasive timer of the terminal may be started; and the base station of the terminal corresponding to the cell that is prohibited by the subscriber identity module SIM card of the terminal is blocked in the preset time period of the evasive timer. Therefore, in the present disclosure, the terminal extracts the system information block SIB and the main information block MIB in the abnormal cell base station cell information, and stores the system information block SIB and the main information block MIB respectively before the step of storing the abnormal information list of the terminal. The cell information of the cell base station that the SIM card of the terminal is prohibited from being accessed can be avoided, thereby improving the customer experience.
  • the present disclosure also provides a pseudo base station identification device, where the pseudo base station identification device includes: an acquisition module, a determination module, and a first inhibition module.
  • the acquiring module is configured to acquire the cell information delivered by the corresponding cell base station when detecting the access instruction of the terminal accessing the cell base station.
  • the determining module is configured to determine whether the cell information includes public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal.
  • the first prohibiting module is configured to prohibit the terminal from accessing the cell base station when the cell information includes public land mobile network information that is prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal.
  • the pseudo base station identification device further includes: a matching module, configured to compare the tracking area identification code with a prohibited tracking area identification code list stored by the terminal; and a second prohibition module When the tracking area identification code is one of the prohibited tracking area identification code lists, prohibiting the corresponding terminal from accessing the cell base station; and executing an module, where the tracking area identification code is set If it is not any one of the prohibited tracking area identification code lists, the step of determining whether the cell information includes the public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal is performed.
  • the pseudo base station identification device includes: an extraction module configured to extract a system information block SIB and a main information block MIB in the abnormal cell base station cell information, wherein the user identification module SIM card of the terminal prohibits access
  • the cell base station is an abnormal cell base station
  • a storage module is configured to store the system information block SIB into the abnormal SIB information list of the terminal, and store the main information block MIB into the abnormal MIB information list of the terminal.
  • the pseudo base station identification device further includes: a detecting module configured to detect whether the terminal accesses a normal cell base station; and a reporting module configured to when the terminal accesses a normal cell base station, And reporting the pseudo base station to the public security system, wherein the cell base station that is prohibited from accessing the SIM card of the user identification module of the terminal is used as a pseudo base station.
  • the reporting module includes an obtaining unit, configured to: acquire a current location of the terminal, to obtain alarm query information of the public security bureau closest to the current location of the terminal, and to use the pseudo-query information according to the alarm query information.
  • the cell information of the base station is reported to the public security bureau that is closest to the current location of the terminal.
  • the determining module includes: a parsing unit configured to parse the cell information to obtain a system information block SIB in the cell information; and a determining unit configured to determine whether the system information block SIB is included Public land mobile network information prohibited by the SIM card of the terminal.
  • the pseudo base station identification device includes: an activation module configured to start an evasive timer of the terminal; and a setting module configured to mask the terminal within a preset time period of the evasion timer
  • the subscriber identity module SIM card prohibits access to the base station corresponding to other base stations of the cell.
  • the operations performed by the pseudo base station identification device according to the present disclosure are substantially the same as the embodiments of the pseudo base station identification method described above, and are not described herein again.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a device for implementing a pseudo base station identification method of the present disclosure.
  • the pseudo base station identification device may be a PC, or may be a smart phone, a tablet computer, an e-book reader, a Motion Picture Experts Group Audio Layer III (MP3) player, and a motion picture. Experts compress standard audio level 4 (MP4) players, terminal devices such as portable computers.
  • MP3 Motion Picture Experts Group Audio Layer III
  • MP4 Motion Picture Experts Group Audio Layer III
  • the pseudo base station identification device may include a processor 1001 (for example, a CPU), a memory 1005, and a communication bus 1002.
  • Communication bus 1002 is arranged to effect connection communication between processor 1001 and memory 1005.
  • the memory 1005 may be a high speed RAM memory or a non-volatile memory such as a disk memory.
  • the memory 1005 may also be a storage device that is independent of the aforementioned processor 1001.
  • the pseudo base station identification device may further include a user interface, a network interface, a camera, a radio frequency (RF) circuit, a sensor, an audio circuit, a WiFi module, and the like.
  • the user interface may include a display, an input unit such as a keyboard, and the user interface may also include a standard wired interface and a wireless interface.
  • the network interface can include a standard wired interface, a wireless interface (such as a WI-FI interface).
  • pseudo base station identification device structure shown in FIG. 3 does not constitute a limitation on the pseudo base station identification device, and may include more or less components than those illustrated, or combine some components, or different. Parts layout.
  • an operating system may be included in the memory 1005 as a computer storage medium.
  • the operating system is a program that manages and controls the pseudo base station identification device hardware and software resources, which supports the operation of the pseudo base station identification program and other software and/or programs.
  • the network communication module is arranged to enable communication between components within the memory 1005 and to communicate with other hardware and software in the pseudo base station identification device.
  • the processor 1001 is arranged to execute a pseudo base station identification procedure stored in the memory 1005 to implement the steps in the pseudo base station identification method described above in connection with FIGS. 1-2.
  • the steps in the pseudo base station identification method have been described in detail above, and are not described herein again.
  • the present disclosure also provides a computer readable storage medium storing one or more programs, the one or more programs being further executable by one or more processors for implementation The steps of the pseudo base station identification method described above.

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  • Computer Networks & Wireless Communication (AREA)
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Abstract

本公开提供了一种伪基站识别方法、设备及计算机可读存储介质，所述伪基站识别方法包括以下步骤：当检测到终端接入小区基站的接入指令时，获取对应小区基站下发的小区信息；判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息；以及当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站。

Description

伪基站识别方法、设备及计算机可读存储介质 技术领域
本公开涉及通信技术领域，尤其涉及一种伪基站识别方法、设备及计算机可读存储介质。
背景技术
随着通讯技术的发展，移动终端基站的功能越来越丰富，同时针对移动终端的各种诈骗方法也在不断升级。例如，社会上存在诸多通过伪基站欺骗用户终端接入违法无线网络，然后通过伪造官方号码或任意冒用他人手机号码向用户终端发送消息或进行广告推销，以欺骗用户进行缴费、转账、付款等使用户蒙受经济损失的现象。由于伪基站信号较强，因而在伪基站运行时，用户终端可能优先连接到伪基站，即用户终端被强制连接到该伪基站上，以致影响终端用户的正常使用，这容易对用户的社交、工作、财产造成极大威胁，降低了用户体验。
发明内容
本公开提供一种伪基站识别方法，所述伪基站识别方法包括以下步骤：当检测到终端接入小区基站的接入指令时，获取对应小区基站下发的小区信息；判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息；以及当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站。
本公开还提供一种伪基站识别设备，所述伪基站识别设备包括：获取模块，其设置为当检测到终端接入小区基站的接入指令时，获取对应小区基站下发的小区信息；判断模块，其设置为判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息；以及第一禁止模块，其设置为当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所 述终端接入所述小区基站。
本公开还提供一种伪基站识别设备，所述伪基站识别设备包括：存储器、处理器、通信总线以及存储在所述存储器上的伪基站识别程序，其中，所述通信总线设置为实现处理器与存储器间的通信连接，并且所述处理器用于执行所述伪基站识别程序，以实现以下步骤：当检测到终端接入小区基站的接入指令时，获取对应小区基站下发的小区信息；判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息；以及当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站。
本公开还提供一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机可读存储介质存储有一个或者一个以上程序，所述一个或者一个以上程序可被一个或者一个以上的处理器执行以实现以下步骤：当检测到终端接入小区基站的接入指令时，获取对应小区基站下发的小区信息；判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息；以及当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站。
附图说明
图1为根据本公开的伪基站识别方法的一个实施例的流程示意图。
图2为根据本公开的伪基站识别方法的又一实施例的流程示意图。
图3是实现本公开的伪基站识别方法的设备结构示意图。
图4是在其中实现本公开的一个场景的示意图。
本公开目的的实现、功能特点及优点将结合实施例，参照附图做进一步说明。
具体实施方式
应当理解，此处所描述的具体实施例仅仅用以解释本公开，并不用于限定本公开。
本公开提供一种伪基站识别方法，参照图1，所述伪基站识别方法包括：步骤S10-S30。
在步骤S10，当检测到终端接入小区基站的接入指令时，获取对应小区基站下发的小区信息。
伪基站会干扰以伪基站为中心的预设范围内运营商的信号，迫使该预设范围内的移动终端脱网，移动终端在脱网后会自动重选小区即重新连接网络。在移动终端脱网后，由于伪基站信号较强，移动终端会优先连接到伪基站，之后所述伪基站会将非法短信推送到接入所述伪基站的移动终端，在短信推送完后，所述伪基站会迅速关闭以实现停止干扰对应的移动终端，即，让接入伪基站的移动终端重新回到移动通信网络，以减少移动终端用户的怀疑，并降低被有关部门追查的风险。
需要说明的是，伪基站为了获取尽可能多的用户的信息，会把自身基站的系统信息进行伪造以符合多个运营商的要求。例如，现有的伪基站可以把多类型的用户识别模块(Subscriber Identity Module，SIM)卡的公共陆地移动网络信息置入其系统信息中。举例而言，尽管当前移动终端可能只安装有联通SIM卡，伪基站发送给该终端的小区信息中也同时具有联通、电信、移动的公共陆地移动网络(Public Land Mobile Network，PLMN)信息，以使小区内所有的SIM卡都会接入这个伪基站。正常运营商的小区基站在系统消息中只提供唯一的运营商信息，并把其他运营商的信息放入禁用列表中。在一些情况下，移动终端会比较本终端的SIM卡的归属公共陆地移动网络信息与小区基站下发的系统信息即SIB消息中的归属公共陆地移动网络信息是否一致，如果一致则允许接入该小区基站，而不会判断系统信息中是否具有其它的公共陆地移动网络信息。
目前，可以通过将进行广告推销的对应号码设定为可疑号码加入黑名单中以实现拦截的目的，或者根据短信内容进行拦截。即，现有的安全软件主要根据发送方号码、短消息内容关键词或短信息中心 号码等来实现对伪基站的识别，拦截的效率低，且对于伪基站伪装的虚假号码，拦截技术作用不大。本公开实现了对伪基站(如长期演进(Long Term Evolution，LTE)伪基站)的识别，即，在没有接收到伪基站的短信之前就可以屏蔽该伪基站。
在本公开中，在终端准备接入小区基站时，小区基站会向该移动终端广播小区参数或者小区信息。当检测到终端接入小区基站的接入指令时，获取对应小区基站下发的小区信息。可以通过判断所述小区信息是否异常来判断终端接入的基站是否为伪基站。
在步骤S20，判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息。
所述判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息步骤包括：解析小区信息，以获取小区信息中的系统信息块(System Information Block，SIB)；以及判断所述系统信息块SIB中是否包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息。
需要说明的是，小区信息包括系统信息块SIB与主信息块(Master Information Block，MIB)。具体地，系统信息块SIB包括关于要接入的PLMN的信息，还包括小区接入信息、无线信道配置参数、频段、跟踪区域标示码(Tracking Area Code，TAC)信息、服务小区重选信息等子信息，而主信息块MIB包括下行链路带宽、频点、小区号等子信息。在小区信息中，系统信息块SIB与主信息块MIB中的各类子信息分开存储在信息列表中。
解析所述小区信息可以分别获取所述小区信息中的系统信息块SIB与主信息块MIB，以判断所述系统信息块SIB中是否包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息。具体地，可以确定当前终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络(Forbidden Public Land Mobile Network，FPLMN)是否也存在于该系统信息块SIB中，若存在，则表示当前发送给终端小区信息的基站是伪基站。
在一个实施例中，在当前终端为移动SIM卡时，可以获取所述移动SIM卡的FPLMN，例如，由移动SIM卡对应的小区基站而得到的 小区信息中的FPLMN可以包括联通SIM卡、电信SIM卡的公共陆地移动网络信息，若当小区信息中包含当前终端的SIM卡禁止的联通SIM卡、电信SIM卡的公共陆地移动网络信息时，可以判断该小区信息对应的基站为伪基站；而若当前移动终端为联通SIM卡时，所述联通SIM卡的FPLMN可以包括移动SIM卡、电信SIM卡的公共陆地移动网络信息等，若当小区信息中包含终端联通SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，可以判断该小区对应的基站为伪基站。
在步骤S30，当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站。
在本公开中，当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入该小区基站。在一个实施例中，当小区信息中包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，可以永久禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站。
所述当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站步骤之后，可以包括以下步骤：提取异常小区基站小区信息中的系统信息块SIB与主信息块MIB，其中，终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止接入的小区基站为异常小区基站；以及将所述系统信息块SIB存储至终端的异常SIB信息列表中，将所述主信息块MIB存储至终端的异常MIB信息列表中。
可以提取异常小区基站小区信息中的系统信息块SIB与主信息块MIB。在一个实施例中，终端设有异常信息记录表，在该异常信息记录表中，对异常系统信息块SIB与异常主信息块MIB进行分区存储。
在一些情况下，伪基站为了获取尽可能多的用户的信息，会把自身基站的信息进行伪造以符合多个运营商的要求，而正常运营商的小区基站会在系统消息中只提供唯一的运营商信息，并把其他运营商的信息放入禁用列表中。由于终端在准备接入小区中基站时，会接收基站下发的小区信息，因而判断小区信息中是否包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的其它公共陆地移动网络信息，即可判断终端即将接入的小区基站的小区信息中是否包含禁止的其它公共陆地移动网络信息，或者可判断终端即将接入的小区基站中是否包含多个运营商的移动网络。 当小区信息中包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息、或者可判断终端即将接入的小区基站中包含多个运营商的移动网络时，可以判断对应的小区基站为伪基站，从而禁止终端接入该小区基站。因此，本公开技术方案可快速识别伪基站，因而解决了在一些情况下伪基站难以识别，从而影响用户的社交、工作、财产使用、用户体验低的技术问题。
在一个实施例中，所述小区信息中包括跟踪区域标识码，所述获取对应小区基站下发的小区信息步骤之后包括：步骤S11-S13。所述步骤如图2所示。
在步骤S11，将所述跟踪区域标识码与所述终端存储的禁止的跟踪区域标识码列表比对。
在步骤S12，当所述跟踪区域标识码为所述禁止的跟踪区域标识码列表中一项时，禁止所述对应终端接入所述小区基站。
在步骤S13，当所述跟踪区域标识码不是所述禁止的跟踪区域标识码列表中任意一项时，执行判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息的步骤。
根据本公开实施例，在获取对应小区基站下发的小区信息步骤之后，并且在判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息步骤之前，先获取终端存储的禁止跟踪区域标识码TAC列表，并获取小区信息中的跟踪区域标识码TAC，然后将该小区信息中的跟踪区域标识码TAC与所述终端存储的禁止跟踪区域列表对应匹配，当终端当前接收的小区信息中的跟踪区域标识码TAC为禁止跟踪区域列表中任意一项时，禁止当前终端接入所述小区基站，将该小区基站作为伪基站，并不再执行后续的步骤，当跟踪区域标识码对应的跟踪区域不是所述禁止跟踪区域列表中任一项时，执行判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息的步骤，如图4所示。
根据本公开实施例，可以将所述跟踪区域标识码与所述终端存储的禁止的跟踪区域标识码列表比对；当所述跟踪区域标识码为所述禁止的跟踪区域标识码列表中一项时，禁止所述对应终端接入所述小 区基站；以及当所述跟踪区域标识码不是所述禁止的跟踪区域标识码列表中任意一项时，执行判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息的步骤。通过先判断终端当前连接的小区基站是否为存储的禁止连接的小区基站，可以更快速地识别当前连接的小区基站是否为伪基站。
在一个实施例中，所述当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站步骤之后，可以包括以下步骤：检测所述终端是否接入正常小区基站；以及当所述终端接入正常小区基站时，发送关于所述伪基站的警报信息，其中，将所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止接入的小区基站作为伪基站。
在本公开实施例中，若终端接入正常小区基站时，获取终端在接入正常小区基站之前的阀值时间内获取的伪基站下发的小区信息，并发送关于该伪基站的警报信息。例如，可以将该小区信息对应上报至公安系统，以供公安系统获取该小区信息对应的伪基站。具体地，所述公安系统包括各个公安局，所述将所述伪基站上报至公安系统步骤包括以下步骤：获取终端当前的位置，以获取距离终端当前位置最近公安局的告警查询信息；以及基于所述告警查询信息，将所述伪基站的小区信息上报至所述距离终端当前位置最近的公安局。
自终端联网(例如，接入正常小区基站)后，可以获取终端当前的位置，并基于终端当前位置来获取距离终端当前位置最近公安局的告警查询信息。该告警查询信息可以是对应警局的报警短信号码、报警网址等。基于该告警查询信息，可以将所述伪基站的小区信息上报至所述距离终端当前位置最近的公安局。具体地，终端可以提取小区信息，并通过短信形式将小区信息发送给距离终端当前位置最近的公安局的短信接收系统；或者，终端可以提取小区信息，通过微信、QQ、浏览器等将小区信息发送给距离终端当前位置最近的公安局的网络接收系统。
根据本公开实施例，可以检测所述终端是否接入正常小区基站；以及当所述终端接入正常小区基站时，并将所述伪基站上报至公安系 统，其中，将所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止接入的小区基站作为伪基站。通过将伪基站的小区信息上报给公安系统，以供公安系统进行伪基站的处理，能够有效防止他人的移动终端再次接入伪基站。
在一个实施例中，所述当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站步骤之后，还可以包括以下步骤：启动终端的规避定时器；以及在所述规避定时器的预设时间段内屏蔽所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止接入的基站对应小区的其它基站。
在本公开实施例中，可以在终端接收的小区信息中包含终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，启动终端的规避定时器；并在所述规避定时器的预设时间段内屏蔽所述终端的SIM卡禁止接入的小区基站对应小区的其它基站。例如，可以设置为在10S或5S内无法接入当前小区的其它基站，即终端可接入其它服务小区，而不是当前小区，以暂避所述终端的SIM卡禁止接入的小区基站的小区信息。由于伪基站可能在某一段时间内连续发送诈骗短信等，而终端屏蔽该伪基站需要时间，因而在本公开中，启动终端的规避定时器，以在所述规避定时器的预设时间段内屏蔽所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止接入的基站对应小区的其它基站。
在本公开实施例中，可以启动终端的规避定时器；以及在所述规避定时器的预设时间段内屏蔽所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止接入的基站对应小区的其它基站。因而在本公开中，在终端提取异常小区基站小区信息中的系统信息块SIB与主信息块MIB，将该系统信息块SIB与主信息块MIB分别对应存储至终端的异常信息列表中的步骤之前，能够暂避所述终端的SIM卡禁止接入的小区基站的小区信息，提升了客户体验。
本公开还提供了一种伪基站识别设备，所述伪基站识别设备包括：获取模块、判断模块和第一禁止模块。
所述获取模块设置为当检测到终端接入小区基站的接入指令时，获取对应小区基站下发的小区信息。
所述判断模块设置为判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的 SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息。
所述第一禁止模块设置为当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站。
在一个实施例中，所述伪基站识别设备还包括：匹配模块，其设置为将所述跟踪区域标识码与所述终端存储的禁止的跟踪区域标识码列表比对；第二禁止模块，其设置为当所述跟踪区域标识码为所述禁止的跟踪区域标识码列表中一项时，禁止所述对应终端接入所述小区基站；以及执行模块，其设置为当所述跟踪区域标识码不是所述禁止的跟踪区域标识码列表中任意一项时，执行判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息的步骤。
在一个实施例中，所述伪基站识别设备包括：提取模块，其设置为提取异常小区基站小区信息中的系统信息块SIB与主信息块MIB，其中，终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止接入的小区基站为异常小区基站；以及存储模块，其设置为将所述系统信息块SIB存储至终端的异常SIB信息列表中，将所述主信息块MIB存储至终端的异常MIB信息列表中。
在一个实施例中，所述伪基站识别设备还包括：检测模块，其设置为检测所述终端是否接入正常小区基站；以及上报模块，其设置为当所述终端接入正常小区基站时，并将所述伪基站上报至公安系统，其中，将所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止接入的小区基站作为伪基站。
在一个实施例中，所述上报模块包括获取单元，其设置为：获取终端当前的位置，以获取距离终端当前位置最近公安局的告警查询信息；以及基于所述告警查询信息，将所述伪基站的小区信息上报至所述距离终端当前位置最近的公安局。
在一个实施例中，所述判断模块包括：解析单元，其设置为解析小区信息，以获取小区信息中的系统信息块SIB；以及判断单元，其设置为判断所述系统信息块SIB中是否包含所述终端的SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息。
在一个实施例中，所述伪基站识别设备包括：启动模块，其设置为启动终端的规避定时器；以及设置模块，其设置为在所述规避定时器的预设时间段内屏蔽所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止接入的基站对应小区的其它基站。
根据本公开的伪基站识别设备所执行的操作与上述伪基站识别方法的各实施例基本相同，在此不再赘述。
参照图3，图3是实现本公开的伪基站识别方法的设备结构示意图。
本公开实施例伪基站识别设备可以是PC，也可以是智能手机、平板电脑、电子书阅读器、动态影像专家压缩标准音频层面3(Moving Picture Experts Group Audio Layer III，MP3)播放器、动态影像专家压缩标准音频层面4(Moving Picture Experts Group Audio Layer IV，MP4)播放器、便携计算机等终端设备等。
如图3所示，该伪基站识别设备可以包括：处理器1001(例如CPU)、存储器1005、通信总线1002。通信总线1002设置为实现处理器1001和存储器1005之间的连接通信。存储器1005可以是高速RAM存储器，也可以是稳定的存储器(non-volatile memory)，例如磁盘存储器。存储器1005还可以是独立于前述处理器1001的存储设备。
在一个实施例中，该伪基站识别设备还可以包括用户接口、网络接口、摄像头、射频(Radio Frequency，RF)电路、传感器、音频电路、WiFi模块等等。用户接口可以包括显示屏(Display)、输入单元比如键盘(Keyboard)，用户接口还可以包括标准的有线接口、无线接口。网络接口可以包括标准的有线接口、无线接口(如WI-FI接口)。
本领域技术人员可以理解，图3中示出的伪基站识别设备结构并不构成对伪基站识别设备的限定，可以包括比图示更多或更少的部件，或者组合某些部件，或者不同的部件布置。
如图3所示，作为一种计算机存储介质的存储器1005中可以包括操作系统、网络通信模块以及伪基站识别程序。操作系统是管理和 控制伪基站识别设备硬件和软件资源的程序，其支持伪基站识别程序以及其它软件和/或程序的运行。网络通信模块设置为实现存储器1005内部各组件之间的通信，以及与伪基站识别设备中其它硬件和软件之间通信。
在图3所示的伪基站识别设备中，处理器1001设置为执行存储器1005中存储的伪基站识别程序，以实现以上结合图1-2所描述的伪基站识别方法中的各步骤。所述伪基站识别方法中的各步骤在上文中已经详细描述，此处不再赘述。
本公开还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机可读存储介质存储有一个或者一个以上程序，所述一个或者一个以上程序还可被一个或者一个以上的处理器执行以用于实现上述所述的伪基站识别方法的步骤。
以上仅为本公开的示例性实施例，并非因此限制本公开的保护范围。凡是利用本公开说明书及附图内容所作的等效结构或等效流程变换，或将本公开的技术内容在其他相关的技术领域的直接或间接运用，均包括在本公开的保护范围内。

Claims (9)

  1. 一种伪基站识别方法，包括以下步骤：
    当检测到终端接入小区基站的接入指令时，获取对应小区基站下发的小区信息；
    判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息；以及
    当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站。
  2. 如权利要求1所述的伪基站识别方法，其中，所述小区信息中包括跟踪区域标识码，所述获取对应小区基站下发的小区信息步骤之后包括以下步骤：
    将所述跟踪区域标识码与所述终端存储的禁止的跟踪区域标识码列表比对；
    当所述跟踪区域标识码为所述禁止的跟踪区域标识码列表中一项时，禁止所述对应终端接入所述小区基站；以及
    当所述跟踪区域标识码不是所述禁止的跟踪区域标识码列表中任意一项时，执行判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息的步骤。
  3. 如权利要求1所述的伪基站识别方法，其中，所述当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站步骤之后包括以下步骤：
    提取异常小区基站小区信息中的系统信息块SIB与主信息块MIB，其中，终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止接入的小区基站为异常小区基站；以及
    将所述系统信息块SIB存储至终端的异常SIB信息列表中，将所述主信息块MIB存储至终端的异常MIB信息列表中。
  4. 如权利要求1所述的伪基站识别方法，其中，所述当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站步骤之后包括以下步骤：
    检测所述终端是否接入正常小区基站；以及
    当所述终端接入正常小区基站时，发送关于所述伪基站的警报信息，其中，将所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止接入的小区基站作为伪基站。
  5. 如权利要求1所述的伪基站识别方法，其中，所述判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息步骤包括以下步骤：
    解析小区信息，以获取小区信息中的系统信息块SIB；以及
    判断所述系统信息块SIB中是否包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息。
  6. 如权利要求1-5任一项所述的伪基站识别方法，其中，所述当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接入所述小区基站步骤之后还包括以下步骤：
    启动终端的规避定时器；以及
    在所述规避定时器的预设时间段内屏蔽所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止接入的小区基站对应小区的其它基站。
  7. 一种伪基站识别设备，包括：
    获取模块，其设置为当检测到终端接入小区基站的接入指令时，获取对应小区基站下发的小区信息；
    判断模块，其设置未判断所述小区信息中是否包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息；以及
    第一禁止模块，其设置为当所述小区信息中包含所述终端的用户识别模块SIM卡禁止的公共陆地移动网络信息时，禁止所述终端接 入所述小区基站。
  8. 一种伪基站识别设备，包括：存储器、处理器、通信总线以及存储在所述存储器上的伪基站识别程序，其中，
    所述通信总线设置为实现处理器与存储器间的通信和连接，并且
    所述处理器设置为执行所述伪基站识别程序，以实现如权利要求1至6中任一项所述的伪基站识别方法的步骤。
  9. 一种计算机可读存储介质，所述计算机课读存储介质上存储有伪基站识别程序，所述伪基站识别程序被处理器执行时实现如权利要求1-6中任一项所述的伪基站识别方法的步骤。
PCT/CN2018/105210 2017-09-13 2018-09-12 伪基站识别方法、设备及计算机可读存储介质 WO2019052464A1 (zh)

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