WO2019051839A1 - 一种数据处理的方法及装置 - Google Patents

一种数据处理的方法及装置 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019051839A1
WO2019051839A1 PCT/CN2017/102105 CN2017102105W WO2019051839A1 WO 2019051839 A1 WO2019051839 A1 WO 2019051839A1 CN 2017102105 W CN2017102105 W CN 2017102105W WO 2019051839 A1 WO2019051839 A1 WO 2019051839A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
entity
target
key
content management
card
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PCT/CN2017/102105
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
李国庆
常新苗
梅敬青
王思善
Original Assignee
华为技术有限公司
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Publication date
Application filed by 华为技术有限公司 filed Critical 华为技术有限公司
Priority to PCT/CN2017/102105 priority Critical patent/WO2019051839A1/zh
Priority to US16/648,126 priority patent/US11552807B2/en
Priority to CN201780087100.4A priority patent/CN110326266B/zh
Publication of WO2019051839A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019051839A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H04L9/3268—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements using certificate validation, registration, distribution or revocation, e.g. certificate revocation list [CRL]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3226—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using a predetermined code, e.g. password, passphrase or PIN
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3247—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving digital signatures
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/40—Network security protocols

Definitions

  • the embodiments of the present invention relate to the field of communications, and in particular, to a data processing method and apparatus.
  • the global platform (GP) International Standards Organization has developed specifications for the card application management process in the secure element (SE).
  • the card application management of the SE includes operations such as installing, deleting, updating, and configuring user data (also referred to as personalization) of the card application/applet in the SE.
  • the online management method is mainly adopted, that is, a secure channel between the server and the SE in the terminal is established, and the server manages the card application in the SE through the terminal.
  • Delegated management is a model for online management of SE.
  • the terminal collaboration server creates a security domain (SD) in the SE and configures the SD, and the configured content includes the SD key and the SD authority.
  • SD security domain
  • the SD will depend on the token verification function provided by the SE.
  • SD is a special card application management entity that provides services for the card applications it manages.
  • the server When the server manages the card application in the target SD, the server sends the card content management indication information to the target SD through a secure channel between the server and the SE.
  • the card content management indication information may include a card content management instruction and an authorization code corresponding to the card content management instruction.
  • the target SD After receiving the card content management indication information, the target SD invokes the authorization code verification function provided by the SE, and verifies the card content management instruction in the card content management indication information by using the key, and manages the verification result and the card content management.
  • the authorization code corresponding to the instruction is matched, and the target SD executes the card content management instruction after the matching is successful.
  • SE including SD
  • operations related to card application management are performed in SE (including SD), such as verification of card content management instructions.
  • SE is an operation environment in which the computing resources are limited, and the calculation process of the card content management instructions involved in the DM mode, which results in an inefficient execution of the SD content management instruction information.
  • some of the operations in SD are directly transferred to entities in other operating environments, it may result in a significant reduction in security.
  • the embodiment of the invention provides a data processing method and device for providing a trust basis for transferring part of the operation flow of the SD to other entities.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a data processing method, including:
  • the trusted application TA entity detects whether the target security domain SD corresponding to the target card application is bound. If bound, the TA entity sends the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature to the target SD, where the target SD is the security unit SE. In the SD. After receiving the certificate and the private key signature, the target SD forwards to the server, and the server authenticates the TA entity by signing the certificate and the private key signature. When the trust verification of the TA entity is successful, the target SD or the server sends the first key of the target SD to the TA entity.
  • the TA entity acquires the target SD.
  • the first key so that the TA entity establishes a trust relationship with the target SD. It realizes the trust foundation for transferring the SD part process to the TA entity.
  • the method further includes:
  • the TA entity obtains the card content management indication information that includes the first card content management instruction and the authorization code from the server, where the first card content management instruction and the authorization code have a corresponding relationship.
  • the TA entity decrypts the authorization code according to the first key, and the verification algorithm invoked by the TA entity performs calculation and verification on the first card content management instruction to obtain verification credentials.
  • the TA entity then matches the verification credential with the decrypted authorization code. When the matching is successful, the TA entity sends the first card content management instruction to the target SD.
  • the TA entity decrypts the authorization code according to the acquired first key, and the TA entity performs the first card content management instruction in the card content management indication information.
  • the verification is verified, and the verification credentials obtained by the verification are matched with the decrypted authorization code.
  • the TA entity only sends the first card content management instruction that verifies that the matching is successful to the target SD. Since the target SD and the TA entity have established a trust relationship, the target SD can directly execute the first card content management instruction after receiving the first card content management instruction sent by the TA entity. Thereby improving the execution efficiency of the target SD.
  • the TA entity sends the verification credential, the decrypted authorization code, and the first card content management instruction to the target SD, and the target SD is further The verification credential is matched with the decrypted authorization code. If the matching is successful, the target SD executes the first card content management instruction. In this way, the TA entity only performs the process of verifying the verification credential and decrypting the authorization code, and the process of matching the verification credential with the decrypted authorization code is still performed by the target SD, thus improving the security of the verification.
  • the TA entity may first detect whether the first key is valid. When the first key is invalid, the TA entity sends the target entity to the target SD. Requesting information, requesting to acquire a new key, after receiving the request information, the target SD requests a new key from the server, and the server sends a response message to the target SD, the response message includes a new key, and the target SD is to the TA entity.
  • the key update information including the new key is sent, and after receiving the key update information, the TA entity updates the first key stored locally to the new key.
  • the TA entity checks whether the first key stored locally is valid before verifying the card content management indication message sent by the server, and if it is invalid, acquires a new key to the target SD, thereby improving the school. The accuracy of the test.
  • the method further includes:
  • the TA entity obtains the local card application operation information for performing the management operation on the target card application from the terminal, and the TA entity generates the second card content management instruction and the authorization code according to the first key and the card application operation information, and the TA entity targets the target
  • the SD sends a second card content management command and an authorization code.
  • the TA entity has the function of generating the card content management instruction and the authorization code, so that the local operation of the terminal can be completed in cooperation with the target SD, and the card content management instruction and the authorization code are not required to be generated by the server, thereby improving the execution of the terminal. effectiveness.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a data processing method, including:
  • the target security domain SD receives the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature of the TA entity from the trusted application TA entity, the target SD is the SD in the security unit SE, the target SD corresponds to the target card application, and the target SD sends the certificate of the TA entity to the server.
  • the book and the private key signature of the TA entity, the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature of the TA entity are used by the server to perform trust verification on the TA entity.
  • the target SD receives the response message from the server and goes to the TA.
  • the entity sends the first key of the target SD.
  • the target SD may further determine, according to the response message, whether the trust verification of the TA entity is successful. When determining that the trust verification of the TA entity is successful, the target SD is to the TA. The entity sends the first key; when it is determined that the trust verification of the TA entity fails, the target SD does not send the first key to the TA entity.
  • the target SD can reconfirm the success or failure of the trust verification of the TA entity according to the response message, thereby improving the target SD and
  • the TA entity performs security for trust binding.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a data processing method, including:
  • the trusted application TA entity sends the integrity token of the TA entity to the target security domain SD.
  • the integrity credential is used for the target SD to perform trust verification on the TA entity.
  • the TA entity receives the response information from the target SD.
  • the response information is used to indicate that the target SD establishes a trust association with the TA entity, and the response information includes the first key of the target SD.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a data processing method, including:
  • the target security domain SD receives the integrity credentials of the TA entity from the trusted application TA entity, the target SD acquires a root certificate corresponding to the TA entity, and the target SD performs the integrity credential according to the root certificate. Checking, after the verification is passed, the target SD sends a response message to the TA entity, where the response information is used to indicate that the target SD establishes a trust association with the TA entity, and the response information includes the The first key of the target SD.
  • the target SD can perform trust verification on the TA entity according to the root certificate invoked from the SE, without relying on the server to perform trust verification on the TA entity, thereby improving the efficiency of the verification.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a device for data processing, where the device is a trusted application TA entity, and the device has the function of implementing the TA entity in the method of the first aspect or the third aspect.
  • This function can be implemented in hardware or in hardware by executing the corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the functions described above.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a device for data processing, where the device is a target security domain SD, and the device has the function of implementing the target SD in the method of the second aspect or the fourth aspect.
  • This function can be implemented in hardware or in hardware by executing the corresponding software.
  • the hardware or software includes one or more modules corresponding to the functions described above.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a device for data processing, where the device is a trusted application TA entity, including: a processor, a memory, a transceiver, a processor, a memory, and a transceiver connected by a bus, and the memory stores the computer.
  • the instructions are executed by the processor by executing computer instructions for implementing the method of the first aspect or the third aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a device for data processing, where the device is a target security domain SD, including: a processor, a memory, a transceiver, a processor, a memory, and a transceiver connected by a bus, where the memory stores computer instructions.
  • the processor is operative to implement the method of the second or fourth aspect by executing computer instructions.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a readable storage medium, where the storage medium is stored for implementation, such as the first Computer instructions of the method of the aspect or the second aspect or the third aspect or the fourth aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a computer program product, where the computer program product includes computer software instructions, which can be loaded by a processor to implement the first aspect or the second aspect or the third aspect or the The process in the method described in the four aspects.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a system for data processing, where the system may include the TA entity of the foregoing first aspect and the target SD of the second aspect; or The TA entity and the target SD of the fourth aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a chip device, where the chip system includes a processor and a memory, the processor is coupled to the memory, and the processor can execute a memory storage instruction to enable the chip device to perform the first aspect Or the method of the third aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a chip device including a processor and a memory, the processor being coupled to a memory, the processor being operable to execute a memory storage instruction to cause the chip device to perform the second aspect Or the method of the fourth aspect.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides a chip device including a processor and a memory, the processor being coupled to a memory, the processor being operable to execute a memory storage instruction to cause the chip device to perform the first aspect described above And the method of the second aspect; or the processor can execute the memory stored instructions to cause the chip device to perform the methods of the third and fourth aspects above.
  • the TA entity After the target SD collaboration server performs trust verification on the TA entity, the TA entity establishes a trust relationship with the target SD. It realizes the trust foundation for transferring the target SD part process to the TA entity.
  • the TA entity After receiving the card content management indication information sent by the server, the TA entity executes the process of verifying the card content management indication information, and the target SD only needs to execute the card content management instruction after the verification succeeds, thereby improving the execution efficiency of the target SD.
  • the TA entity may further generate a card content management instruction and an authorization code according to the obtained first key, so that the execution of the local operation instruction may be completed in cooperation with the target SD, without relying on the server to generate the card content management instruction and the authorization code, thereby improving the terminal. effectiveness.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a system applied to a method for data processing according to an embodiment of the present disclosure
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a method for data processing according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of another method for data processing according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of another method for data processing according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 5 is a schematic diagram of an apparatus for data processing according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 6 is a schematic diagram of another apparatus for data processing according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 7 is a schematic diagram of another apparatus for data processing according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 8 is a schematic diagram of another apparatus for data processing according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
  • FIG. 9 is a schematic diagram of another apparatus for data processing according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 10 is a schematic diagram of another apparatus for data processing according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the embodiments of the present invention provide a data processing method and related apparatus, which are used to provide a trust foundation for transferring part of the operation flow of the SD to other entities.
  • the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described in the following with reference to the accompanying drawings.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic structural diagram of a system applied to a method for data processing according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the system architecture of FIG. 1 includes a physical device on the server 101 side and a physical device on the terminal 102 side.
  • the physical device on the server 101 side includes a service provider-trusted service manager (SP-TSM) 103 and a secure element issuer-trusted service manager (English: secure element issuer-trusted) Service manager, SEI-TSM) 104.
  • SEI-TSM secure element issuer-trusted Service manager
  • the physical device on the side of the terminal 102 includes an SE 105 and an SD (including SD1 and SD2 in the figure) deployed in the SE 105.
  • the SEI-TSM 104 is used to generate an authorization code for the SD created by the server by using a key
  • the SP-TSM 103 is used to communicate with the SE 105 in the terminal 102 and manage the card application installed in the SD in the SE 105 (included in the figure) Card application 1, card application 2 card application 3 and card application 4).
  • the terminal 102 Before installing the target card application managed by the server 101, the terminal 102 first creates an SD corresponding to the SP-TSM 103 in the SE 105 (hereinafter referred to as a target SD 106, and SD1 is taken as an example SD106 in the figure).
  • the SP-TSM 103 transmits a request to install the target SD 106 to the SEI-TSM 104, and the SEI-TSM 104 responds to the request of the SP-TSM 103.
  • the SEI-TSM103 establishes a secure channel between SEI-TSM104 and SE105 (a channel for key encryption and signature to ensure confidentiality and integrity) through the key grasped by the SEI-TSM104, and sends the creation script of the target SD106. Go to SE105.
  • the SE 105 executes the creation script to create the target SD 106 in the SE 105 and configure the authority and key of the target SD 106.
  • the SE 105 can execute an attribute setting instruction in the creation script, and configure the target SD 106 to be the SD of the DM mode.
  • the SE105 can generate data by using the key provided in the creation script, and call the algorithm supported by SE105 to generate an RSA (rivest-shamir-adleman encryption) key.
  • the SE 105 can also configure the key for the target SD 106 in other ways, for example, directly obtaining the key generated by the SP-TSM 103 from the SEI-TSM through a secure channel. This key will be used by the subsequent SP-TSM 103 to establish a secure channel with the target SD 106 that is specific to the target SD 106.
  • the SP-TSM 103 can manage one or more card applications.
  • the SP-TSM 103 When the SP-TSM 103 installs the card application to the target SD 106, the SP-TSM 103 establishes a secure channel with the target SD 106, and transmits the card content management instruction information to the target SD 106 through the secure channel.
  • the target SD 106 calls the authorization code verification function provided by the SE 105, checks the card content management instruction in the card content management instruction information, and the authorization code corresponding to the card content management instruction. After the verification is passed, the target SD 106 executes the card content management instruction. , complete the management operation of the card application.
  • the SE105 is a key factor in implementing mobile payment services (such as mobile payment) in the terminal.
  • the SE105 is a tamper-proof platform, usually a chip with a secure microcontroller.
  • the SE 105 is able to securely provide an operating environment for applications and their confidential data or keys (eg, key management) in accordance with security requirements and rules proposed by authoritative trusted entities. Therefore, the SE105 provides an operational and storage environment with tamper resistant capabilities, as well as cryptographic operations.
  • the SE105 can be used to install, run payment applications and save confidential data such as keys and certificates.
  • the SD 106 is an entity that provides support for control, security, and communication requirements functions for entities other than SE 105, such as SE issuers, application developers, or authoritative certification authorities that provide SE.
  • the SD 106 is deployed in the SE 105 and corresponds to the operator's server or service provider server (SP-TSM in the server).
  • SP-TSM service provider server
  • SD106 Used to manage the target card application managed by the server.
  • the server issues the card content management indication information to the terminal
  • the SD 106 in the terminal executes the commands in the card content management indication information, such as performing operations such as installing, deleting, updating, and configuring user data.
  • the SE 105 and the SD 106 may be specific physical devices, or may be function modules in the terminal, such as an SE integrated in the SIM card, or an embedded SE soldered on the motherboard, or It is an SE integrated in a micro SD card, or an SE module integrated in a central processing unit (CPU) of the terminal, which is not limited in this embodiment of the present invention.
  • an SE integrated in the SIM card or an embedded SE soldered on the motherboard
  • It is an SE integrated in a micro SD card, or an SE module integrated in a central processing unit (CPU) of the terminal, which is not limited in this embodiment of the present invention.
  • CPU central processing unit
  • the terminal of the embodiment of the present invention further includes a trusted dxecution environment (TEE).
  • TEE may be a TEE based on the Trustzone technology of the ARM company, or may be a TEE based on the trusted computing technology of the Intel Corporation or other technologies, which is not limited by the embodiment of the present invention.
  • the trusted execution environment is an operating environment isolated from the CPU of the terminal by isolation technology, and the trusted execution environment may be composed of hardware and software for providing an isolated, trusted operating and storage environment for the application.
  • a trusted application (TA) entity 107 is deployed in the trusted execution environment, and the TA entity 107 is used by client applications in a rich execution environment (REE) to provide security-related functions.
  • REE rich execution environment
  • the TA entity 107 can be a specific physical device or a functional module in the terminal, and the TEE and the SE can be connected through a bus.
  • the TEE and SE can be connected to the bus through I2C or SPI or by using a universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter (UART).
  • UART universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter
  • the processing efficiency of the SD content management instruction information by the SD is low.
  • the calculation work of the partial SD is distributed to the TA entity in the trusted execution environment.
  • the TA entity performs the verification work of the card content management indication information (the CDR mode, the card content management indication message includes the card content management instruction and the corresponding authorization code) issued by the server, and the TA entity determines the content of the card.
  • the management instruction information verification is passed, the management instruction in the card content management instruction information is sent to the SD.
  • the SD only needs to perform related operations on the management instruction, and does not need to verify the card content management indication information before execution, thereby improving the execution efficiency of the SD.
  • the SD needs to establish a trust relationship with the TA entity, so that when the SD receives the card content management instruction sent by the TA entity, the SD can determine that the card content management instruction is legal and trusted.
  • a method for data processing provided by an embodiment of the present invention is exemplarily described below with reference to FIG. Figure 2 shows the interaction flow between the target SD and the TA entity to establish trust.
  • the target SD corresponding to the server SP-TSM in the server
  • the target SD is configured into the DM mode.
  • a dedicated authorization code verification key is configured for the target SD in the SE.
  • the SEI-TSM stores the authorization code corresponding to the SP-TSM. key.
  • the SEI-TSM can generate an authorization code for the card content management instruction generated by the SP-TSM in response to the SP-TSM request.
  • the server sends the card content management indication information to the TA entity.
  • the server pushes the card content management indication information to the terminal.
  • the SP-TSM in the server pushes the card content management indication information to the terminal.
  • the card content management instruction information includes a card content management instruction and an authorization code corresponding to the card content management instruction.
  • the TA entity in the terminal receives the card content management indication information.
  • the card content management indication information also carries an identification of the target SD corresponding to the target card application.
  • the acquiring of the card content management indication information may also be triggered by the user locally.
  • the user finds an application update prompt through the user interface of the terminal.
  • the terminal acquires the SP-TSM from the SP-TSM. Card content management instructions.
  • the server when the server does not obtain the identifier of the TA entity, the server cannot directly send the card content management indication information to the TA entity. Therefore, the server can send card content management indication information to other entities in the terminal, such as the SE of the terminal or an entity other than the TEE of the terminal. For example, the server sends the card content management indication information to the client application (CA) entity in the REE (as shown in FIG. 1, the CA entity includes the CA1 entity and the CA2 entity in FIG. 1), and then the card is used by the CA entity. The content management indication information is forwarded to the TA entity.
  • CA client application
  • the CA entity can invoke an application programming interface (API) provided by the REE, and receive the SP from the SP through the CA entity.
  • API application programming interface
  • the CA entity forwards the card content management indication information to the TA entity.
  • the terminal may preset or post-install an entity in the REE, such as the foregoing CA entity.
  • the CA entity is used to provide an API for entities other than the REE (such as TA entities in the TEE) to invoke. Therefore, the TA entity can also receive the card content management indication information sent by the server by calling the API of the CA entity.
  • the TA entity determines that the target SD is not bound.
  • the TA entity determines whether the TA entity is bound to the target SD according to the identifier of the target SD in the card content management indication information. For example, the TA entity stores a binding relationship list with multiple SDs, where the binding relationship list includes multiple identifiers of the SD that establish a binding relationship with the TA entity, and after the TA entity obtains the identifier of the target SD entity, Look for the identifier of the target SD in the binding relationship list. If it exists, it indicates that it has been bound. If it does not exist, it indicates that it is not bound.
  • the card content management indication information is verified (the process of the verification will be explained in the following embodiments); if the TA entity is not bound to the target SD, the subsequent step 103 is performed. -105.
  • the TA entity establishes a binding relationship with the target SD, the identifier ID of the target SD is saved, so that when the TA entity subsequently receives the card content management indication information, it can be confirmed whether the target SD included in the card content management indication information has been bound.
  • the TA entity sends the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature to the target SD.
  • the TA entity In order to be able to check the card content management indication information, the TA entity needs to acquire the first key corresponding to the target SD, that is, the verification key corresponding to the authorization code of the target SD.
  • the target SD needs to trust the TA entity to send the first key to the TA entity.
  • the TA entity To obtain the trust of the target SD, the TA entity needs to send the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature to the target SD, and the target SD performs the trust verification.
  • the TA entity may send the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature to the SE, and the SE forwards to the target SD.
  • the private key signature may be obtained by the TA entity using the private key to sign the challenge value contained in the card content management indication information, and the challenge value may be a string of random numbers.
  • the target SD sends the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature to the server for trust verification.
  • the target SD may send the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature to the server, and the server verifies the certificate and private key signature of the TA entity.
  • the server After receiving the certificate of the TA entity and the signature of the private key, the server first uses the root certificate preset in the server (for example, the operator of the server has a cooperative relationship with other terminal operators, therefore, the service
  • the root certificate for verifying the certificate of the TA entity of the other terminal operator is preset in the server, the certificate of the TA entity is verified, and then the public key is obtained from the TA entity certificate, and the private key is obtained according to the public key.
  • Signature for verification After receiving the certificate of the TA entity and the signature of the private key, the server first uses the root certificate preset in the server (for example, the operator of the server has a cooperative relationship with other terminal operators, therefore, the service
  • the root certificate for verifying the certificate of the TA entity of the other terminal operator is preset in the server, the certificate of the TA entity is verified, and then the
  • the method for verifying the certificate by the server is various, for example, it can be verified by determining whether the certificate is a certificate issued by a legal digital certificate authority, and the embodiment of the present invention does not limit this.
  • the server verifies the certificate and private key signature of the TA entity
  • the target SD is notified, indicating that the TA entity is a trusted TA entity.
  • the server After receiving the TA entity certificate and the private key signature, the server invokes the root certificate of the issuing authority corresponding to the certificate according to the attribute information included in the certificate of the TA entity. For example, if the certificate of the TA entity is issued by the authoritative certificate authority, the server needs to invoke the root certificate of the preset authority certificate authority; or, if the certificate of the TA entity is issued by a certain manufacturer, the server needs to invoke the preset of the vendor.
  • the root certificate (the vendor and the server form a partnership through an offline cooperation agreement and pre-populate the vendor's root certificate on the server). The server obtains the public key in the root certificate, and uses the root certificate public key to verify the certificate of the TA entity.
  • the server uses the public key to verify the encrypted ciphertext contained in the certificate of the TA entity, thereby obtaining the decrypted plaintext and the plaintext contained in the TA entity certificate (the certificate of the TA entity includes a public key x)
  • the plaintext and ciphertext, the ciphertext of the public key x is encrypted by using the private key corresponding to the public key of the root certificate. If it is consistent, it proves that the certificate has not been tampered with; if it is inconsistent, it means that the certificate may be tamper.
  • the server verifies the private key signature data by using the public key derived from the certificate of the TA entity.
  • the private key signature data includes a plaintext and a ciphertext encrypted by the private key of the TA entity
  • the server can use the TA entity certificate to derive the public key to decrypt the ciphertext, and decrypt the obtained plaintext and signature data. If there is a plain text comparison, if it is consistent, it proves that the private key signature data is correct and complete; if it is inconsistent, it means that the private key signature data is incomplete.
  • the server determines that the certificate of the TA entity is legal, and determines that the TA entity is a trusted entity.
  • the foregoing server trust verification of the TA entity may be: the SP-TSM receives and verifies the certificate and private key signature of the TA entity, and then sends a request to the SEI-TSM to obtain a credential, and the credential is used to request the SE. An authorization code verification key corresponding to the target SD.
  • the SP-TSM sends the certificate and the private key signature of the TA entity to the SEI-TSM, and the SEI-TSM performs verification. After the verification succeeds, a credential is sent to the SP-TSM. Finally, the SP-TSM sends a message to the target SD confirming that the TA entity is trusted, and the message contains the credential.
  • the server determines that the certificate of the TA entity is legal and determines that the private key signature data of the TA entity is complete, it indicates that the server successfully authenticates the trust of the TA entity.
  • the server sends a response message to the target SD, indicating that the TA entity trusts the verification success.
  • the target SD determines, according to the response message, that the TA entity trust verification succeeds.
  • the server may not send a response message to the target SD, and the target SD does not receive the response message after the preset time period, and then confirms that the trust verification of the TA entity fails.
  • the server sends a response message to the target SD, indicating that the TA entity fails to be verified in the response message, and after receiving the response message, the target SD according to the indication in the response message Determine that the TA entity trust verification failed.
  • the target SD sends the first key of the target SD to the TA entity.
  • the target SD After receiving the response message, the target SD confirms that the TA entity trust verification is successful, and the target SD sends the first key corresponding to the target SD for the check card content management instruction and the authorization code to the TA entity.
  • the TA entity root The verification credential is obtained according to the first card content management instruction.
  • the verification algorithm invoked by the TA entity described in the subsequent embodiment calculates the card content management instruction in the card content management indication information, and obtains the verification credential.
  • the TA entity decrypts the authorization code based on the first key.
  • the TA entity matches the verification credential with the decrypted authorization code. If the matching succeeds, the card content management instruction is a trusted instruction; if the matching fails, the card content management instruction is an untrusted instruction. .
  • the target SD before the target SD sends the first key to the TA entity, the target SD obtains the obtaining credential of the authorization code verification key from the server, and requests the SE for the first key by using the credential. After acquiring the first key, the target SD sends the first key to the TA entity.
  • the root certificate may also be preset in the SE.
  • the target SD After receiving the certificate sent by the TA entity and the signature of the private key, the target SD calls the preset root certificate to verify the certificate of the TA entity from the SE, and then uses the certificate of the TA entity to verify the private key signature of the TA entity, if the TA The entity's certificate and private key signature check are both passed, and the target SD sends the first key obtained from the SE to the TA entity.
  • the target SD may generate a symmetric key, and encrypt the first key by using a symmetric key, encrypt the symmetric key by using the public key derived by the certificate of the TA entity, and encrypt the symmetric key and the first key.
  • the key, and the corresponding encryption algorithm type are sent to the TA entity.
  • the TA entity decrypts the symmetric key with its private key, and then decrypts the first key with the symmetric key and stores it in the TEE.
  • the target SD sends the first key to the TA entity in an encrypted manner to prevent the first key from leaking to other entities, thereby improving the security of the key transmission.
  • the first key sent by the target SD to the TA entity may further include an expiration date.
  • the validity period can be an effective time, which can be a preset period.
  • the first key is valid until 00:00:00 on October 1, 2017.
  • the validity period may also be an expiration date of a usage period, and the effective number may be a preset number of times.
  • the first key can be used to verify the authorization code 10 times, and the first key fails after 10 verifications.
  • the preset period and the preset number of times may be determined according to a specific situation, which is not limited by the embodiment of the present invention.
  • the TA entity may not send the certificate and the private key signature to the target SD.
  • the TA entity can obtain the integrity credentials of the TA entity signed by the TEE certificate from the operating system (OS). Since the TEE can be based on read-only memory (ROM), when the TEE is started, the read-only code in the ROM (for example, a piece of code that checks the signature of each TA entity) can be used to verify the TA entity. Integrity, and use the signature function provided by the code in the ROM (for example, the TEE factory preset private key and a TEE certificate, use the private key corresponding to the TEE certificate to sign the integrity check result), thereby obtaining the TA entity Integrity credentials.
  • OS operating system
  • the TA entity sends the integrity credential to the target SD through the SE.
  • the SE is preset with a root certificate that can verify the TEE certificate, and the target SD calls the root certificate from the SE to verify the integrity credentials signed by the TEE certificate.
  • the target SD sends a response message to the TA entity, which indicates that the target SD establishes a trust association with the TA entity.
  • the response message contains the first key of the target SD.
  • the target SD performs trust verification by using the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature. After the verification is passed, it indicates that the target SD determines that the TA entity is trustworthy.
  • the target SD sends the first key to the TA entity, so that the TA entity can perform the operation process of the partial target SD according to the first key, and provides a security basis for the target SD transfer part operation flow.
  • the embodiment of Figure 2 describes the process of establishing trust between the TA entity and the target SD. The following establishes trust between the TA entity and the SD. After that, the flow of verifying the card content management instruction information is exemplarily described.
  • the embodiment of FIG. 3 is a process for verifying the card content management indication information sent by the server after the TA entity establishes a trust relationship with the target SD based on the embodiment of FIG. 2 .
  • another data processing method provided by an embodiment of the present invention includes:
  • the TA entity detects whether the first key of the target SD is valid.
  • the TA entity detects whether the first key is valid, for example, determining whether the usage period of the first key exceeds a preset period, or determining whether the number of times the first key is used exceeds a preset number of times.
  • the first key includes an expiration date, and if the expiration date is a preset period, the preset period is 00:00:00 on October 1, 2017. Then the TA entity detects whether the current time is before 00:00:00 on October 1, 2017, and if so, determines that the first key is valid, and if not, determines that the first key is invalid.
  • the validity period is a preset number of times, and the preset number of times is 10 times.
  • the TA entity detects the number of uses of the first key used for verification in the history record. If the number of times does not reach 10 times, it determines that the first key is valid; if the number of times reaches 10 times, it determines that the first key is invalid.
  • step 302 When the TA entity detects that the first key is invalid, step 302 is performed. When it is detected that the first key is valid, step 305 is performed.
  • the TA entity sends a key update request to the target SD.
  • the TA entity When the TA entity detects that the stored first key is invalid, it needs to acquire a new key from the target SD.
  • the key update request may include a certificate and a private key signature of the TA entity, and the target SD performs identity verification on the TA entity.
  • the target SD sends the key update information to the TA entity.
  • the target SD After receiving the key update request sent by the TA entity, the target SD determines whether the first key has been updated, and if updated, sends the updated first key to the TA entity, and if not updated, requests the server. The first key is updated and the updated first key is sent to the TA entity.
  • the target SD determines whether the first key is updated, and may determine the version number of the first key included in the key update request sent by the TA, and the version of the authorization code verification key corresponding to the target SD saved in the SE. The number is matched. If the versions are consistent, the first key is not updated. If the versions are inconsistent, the first key has been updated. If the first key in the SE is not updated, the target SD sends a key update request to the server, and the SEI-TSM configures a first key for the new version of the target SD to the SE. At the same time, the SEI-TSM will update the corresponding authorization code generation key.
  • the target SD after receiving the key update request, the target SD does not need to determine whether the first key is updated, but sends a key update request directly to the server, and the server then adds a new key (also referred to as a second key). ) sent to the SE, the SE forwards the new key to the target SD, and notifies the target SD key that it has been updated, and the target SD sends the new key to the TA entity.
  • a new key also referred to as a second key
  • the TA updates the first key according to the key update information.
  • the TA entity After receiving the key update information, the TA entity updates the stored first key of the target SD according to the key update information. For example, after receiving the key update information, the TA entity parses out the new key in the key update information and the version number of the new key, and the TA entity stores the version of the new key locally according to the version number of the new key. The version number of the first key is matched. If the matching result is inconsistent, the TA entity replaces the first key stored locally with the new key; if the matching result is always, the TA entity does not need to update the first key. .
  • the TA entity may not determine whether the new key matches the version number of the first key, but directly replaces the locally stored first key with the new key because the new key
  • the key sent for the current target SD, then the new key is the same as the key of the server, so the TA entity only needs to use the new key.
  • the TA entity may further implement a key security rule after updating the first key. For example, the number of times of use or the expiration date of the updated first key is recorded. After the preset number of times or the preset period is exceeded, the TA entity needs to update the first key again.
  • the first key saved by the TA entity includes a key version number.
  • the TA entity acquires card content management indication information.
  • the card content management indication information may be sent by the server to the TA entity, or may be triggered when the user operates the terminal.
  • the card content management indication information includes a card content management instruction (which may also be referred to as a first card content management instruction) and an authorization code corresponding to the card content management instruction, and the authorization code may be a token in the foregoing example.
  • step 305 may also be before step 301. That is, the TA entity first obtains the card content management indication information, and then determines whether the first key is valid. This embodiment of the present invention does not limit this.
  • the TA entity obtains the verification credential according to the card content management instruction, and decrypts the authorization code according to the first key.
  • the TA entity performs calculation and verification on the card content management instruction according to the verification algorithm supported by the TEE, obtains the verification credential, and decrypts the authorization code according to the first key.
  • the TA entity invokes a hash algorithm supported by the TEE, performs a hash operation on the card content management instruction (excluding the authorization code), and the result of the hash operation is used as a verification credential, and the verification credential can be represented by a group of bits. string.
  • the TA entity decrypts the authorization code by using the first key to obtain the plaintext of the authorization code, and the plaintext representation form of the authorization code after the decryption operation may be a set of bit strings.
  • the TA entity matches the verification credential with the decrypted authorization code.
  • the card content management instruction information is a message that the server is to send to the target SD
  • the card content management instruction for the target SD according to the card content management instruction information, the authorization code in the card content management instruction information and the first key of the target SD
  • the target SD can call the authorization code verification function provided by the SE to confirm whether the card content management indication information is a legitimate message. Therefore, after the TA entity obtains the corresponding verification credential according to the verification of the card content management instruction, the TA entity may perform matching according to the decrypted authorization code corresponding to the card content management instruction according to the verification credential, and if the matching is successful, the card indicates the card.
  • the content management instruction is legal. If the matching fails, it indicates that the card content management instruction is invalid.
  • the TA entity compares the verification credential with the decryption of the plaintext by the first key, and the TA entity determines whether the verification credential is consistent with the plaintext. If they are consistent, the matching is successful, and if they are inconsistent, the matching fails.
  • a set of card content management indication information may include a plurality of card content management instructions and a plurality of authorization codes corresponding to the plurality of card content management instructions.
  • the authorization code may be sent to the target SD together in the card content management instruction, or may be sent to the target SD separately from the card content instruction.
  • the TA entity checks the multiple card content management instructions, it needs to obtain the corresponding verification credentials according to each card content management instruction, and decrypts the authorization code corresponding to each card content management instruction by using the first key, and each verification is performed. The credential is matched with the decrypted authorization code corresponding to the card content management instruction.
  • the card content management indication information may be tampered with or there is a transmission error.
  • the terminal may prompt the user to generate an error through the user interface or prompt the user card application management to be abnormal.
  • the terminal should prompt the user to abandon or reset the card content management operation.
  • the TA entity sends a card content management instruction to the target SD.
  • the TA entity sends the card content management instruction in the card content management indication information to the target SD one by one, so that the target SD performs the relevant management operation according to the card content management instruction. Since the target SD has established a trust relationship with the TA entity, the target SD stores the identity of the TA. When receiving the card content management instruction, the target SD first confirms whether the card content management instruction is sent by the TA entity that established the trust relationship, and if so, executes the card content management instruction, and if not, does not execute.
  • step 307 is an optional step.
  • the TA entity may not match the decrypted authorization code according to the verification credential, but the calculated verification credential, the decrypted authorization code, and the card content management instruction instruction. Both are sent to the target SD.
  • the target SD matches the decrypted authorization code according to the verification credential (ie, whether the verification credential and the plaintext of the authorization code are consistent), and if the matching is successful, the card content management instruction is executed.
  • the TA entity acquires the card content management indication information sent by the server, and performs check matching on the card content management instruction and the authorization code in the card content management indication information according to the first key of the target SD.
  • the TA entity sends the successfully verified card content management instruction to the target SD. Since the target SD and the TA entity have established a trust relationship, the target SD determines that the card content management instruction sent by the TA entity is trusted, and the target SD executes the card. Content management instructions. In this way, the TA entity performs verification of the card content management indication information, and the target SD only needs to execute the received card content management instruction, thereby improving the execution efficiency of the target SD.
  • the verification process of the card content management indication information sent by the TA entity to the server is described in the embodiment of FIG.
  • the embodiment of the invention further provides an implementation manner in which the terminal side disconnects from the server to perform local card application management operations.
  • the related management operations of the card application in the SD in the terminal must be completed in cooperation with the server side. That is, the user cannot perform a local management operation on the card application in the SD in the terminal.
  • the embodiment of the present invention provides a corresponding solution.
  • FIG. 4 another method for data processing provided by the embodiment of the present invention is exemplarily introduced.
  • the TA entity first needs to establish a trust relationship with the target SD, and the manner in which the trust is established is similar to the embodiment of FIG. 2.
  • the first key is sent to the TA entity through the target SD
  • the server determines that the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature are legal, the server directly and the TA
  • the entity negotiation key establishes a secure channel, and the server sends the first key of the target SD to the TA entity.
  • the server notifies the target SD that the TA entity is trustworthy.
  • the first key is used by the TA entity to generate an authorization code for the target SD. After the TA entity establishes a trust with the target SD, the following steps are performed:
  • the TA entity acquires card application operation information from the terminal.
  • the terminal When the user performs a management operation on the target card application in the target SD in the terminal (such as deleting the target card application, or modifying whether the card application is selectable, or modifying other attributes of the card application, etc.), triggering the terminal
  • the card application operation information is generated, and the TA entity obtains the card application operation information. It should be noted that the card application operation information in this embodiment is different from the card content management indication information in the foregoing embodiment.
  • the card content management instruction information includes a card content management instruction generated by the server and an authorization code corresponding to the card content management instruction
  • the card application operation information is a corresponding operation instruction generated by the terminal when the user performs a behavior operation on the terminal (for example, In order to delete the indication, modify the status indication, or modify the attribute indication, etc., the card application operation information does not include the card content management instruction and the authorization code.
  • the card content management instruction and the authorization code are generated by the TA entity.
  • the TA entity generates a corresponding card content management instruction according to the obtained first key and the card application operation information. And authorization code.
  • a corresponding card content management instruction and an authorization code may be generated according to the first key and the card application operation information, so that the target SD can perform related operations.
  • the TA entity may generate a DELETE instruction including an authorization code according to the received card application operation information including the user's attempt to delete the card application, and the instruction may receive, verify, and execute the authorization code by the target SD.
  • the TA entity may generate an INSTALL FOR MAKE SELECTABLE command including an authorization code according to the received card application operation information including the user's attempt to modify the card application selectable state, and the instruction may receive, verify, and execute the authorization code by the target SD.
  • the TA entity may generate an INSTALL FOR REGISTRY UPDATE command including an authorization code according to the received card application operation information including the user's attempt to modify the card application attribute, and the instruction may receive, verify, and execute the authorization code by the target SD.
  • the first key acquired by the TA entity is different from the first key in the embodiment of FIG. 3.
  • the first key is used for the TA entity to the card content.
  • the management command and the authorization code are verified.
  • the first key in this embodiment is used by the TA entity to generate an authorization code of the card content management instruction.
  • the TA entity generates the card content management command and the authorization code according to the first key sent by the server to apply the operation information to the card.
  • the server pre-configures a plurality of card content management commands and an authorization code generation template in the TA entity, such as deleting a template or modifying a state template or modifying an attribute template.
  • the TA entity searches for the identifier of the target SD corresponding to the target card application according to the identifier of the target card application included in the card application operation information.
  • the TA entity determines the first key according to the identifier of the target SD (the TA entity may save multiple keys corresponding to the plurality of SDs), and then searches for a generation template corresponding to the card application operation information. For example, the TA entity parses out the card application operation information for the user to delete the information of the card application in the target SD, and the TA entity searches for the deletion template in the multiple generated templates. The TA entity then generates a corresponding card content management instruction (also referred to as a second card content management instruction) and an authorization code according to the first key and the generation template (which may also be referred to as a first generation template). The TA entity will instantiate the generated template according to the card application operation information and the authorization code data. For example, the TA entity fills the identifier of the target card application to be operated into the generated template, and generates a card application operation instruction by using the first key. The authorization code is populated into the generated template, making the generated template complete and an executable instance.
  • the TA entity sends a card content management instruction and an authorization code to the target SD.
  • the TA entity After generating the card content management instruction and the authorization code, the TA entity sends the card content management instruction and the authorization code to the target SD.
  • the target SD calls the authorization code verification function provided by the SE, performs the calculation of the verification credential of the card content management instruction, and matches the verification credential with the authorization code. If the matching is successful, the operation instruction is legal, and the target SD is Then execute the card content management instruction.
  • the manner in which the TA entity sends the card content management command and the authorization code to the target SD may be that the TA entity sends the multiple card content management commands and the corresponding authorization code in the complete first generated template to the target SD one by one. .
  • the TA entity establishes a trust relationship with the target SD, and the TA entity has the capability of generating a card content management instruction and an authorization code.
  • the process of generating the card content management instruction and the authorization code is transferred To the trusted TA entity in the terminal, so that for the local operation of the terminal, without relying on the server, the TA entity can cooperate with the target SD to complete related local operations.
  • the dependence of the terminal on the server is reduced, and the execution efficiency of the terminal is improved.
  • the apparatus is a TA entity 500, and includes:
  • a sending unit 501 configured to send, to the target security domain SD, a certificate of the TA entity and a private key signature of the TA entity;
  • the target SD is an SD in the security unit SE, and the target SD corresponds to the target card application;
  • the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature of the TA entity are used for the target SD to perform trust verification on the server;
  • the obtaining unit 502 is configured to acquire a first key of the target SD when the trust verification of the TA entity is successful.
  • the obtaining unit 502 is further configured to acquire card content management indication information sent by the server, where the card content management indication information includes a first card content management instruction and an authorization code;
  • the device 500 further includes:
  • the processing unit 503 is configured to obtain verification credentials according to the first card content management instruction, and decrypt the authorization code according to the first key;
  • the processing unit 503 is further configured to: match the verification credential with the decrypted authorization code;
  • the sending unit 501 is further configured to: when the verification credential matches the decrypted authorization code, send the first card content management instruction to the target SD.
  • the obtaining unit 502 is further configured to acquire card content management indication information sent by the server, where the card content management indication information includes a first card content management instruction and an authorization code;
  • the processing unit 503 is further configured to obtain the verification credential according to the first card content management instruction, and decrypt the authorization code according to the first key;
  • the sending unit 501 is further configured to send the verification credential, the decrypted authorization code, and the first card content management instruction to the target SD.
  • the processing unit 503 is further configured to: before the acquiring unit acquires the card content management indication information sent by the server, whether the first key is valid;
  • the obtaining unit 502 is further configured to: when the first key is invalid, obtain key update information from the target SD;
  • the processing unit 503 is further configured to update the first key according to the key update information.
  • the obtaining unit 502 is further configured to acquire card application operation information from the terminal, where the card application operation information is used to perform a management operation on the target card application;
  • the processing unit 503 is further configured to generate a second card content management instruction and an authorization code according to the first key and the card application operation information;
  • the sending unit 501 is further configured to send the second card content management instruction and an authorization code to the target SD.
  • processing unit 503 is specifically configured to:
  • the first generation template is a template configured by the server in the TA entity, and the first generation template corresponds to the card application operation information
  • the sending unit 501 is specifically configured to:
  • the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature of the TA entity are sent to the target SD by transmitting a certificate of the TA entity and a private key signature of the TA entity to the security unit SE.
  • the various units described in the embodiment of FIG. 5 can also perform the steps performed by the TA entity in any of the embodiments of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4, and the details can be referred to the embodiment of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4, and details are not described herein.
  • the device is the target SD600 and includes:
  • the receiving unit 601 is configured to receive, from the trusted application TA entity, the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature of the TA entity; the target SD is an SD in the security unit SE, and the target SD corresponds to the target card application. ;
  • a sending unit 602 configured to send, to the server, a certificate of the TA entity and a private key signature of the TA entity, where the certificate of the TA entity and a private key signature of the TA entity are used by the server to the TA entity Perform trust verification;
  • the receiving unit 601 is further configured to: when the trust verification of the TA entity is successful, receive a response message from the server;
  • the sending unit 602 is further configured to send the first key of the target SD to the TA entity.
  • the receiving unit 601 is further configured to receive a key update request from the TA entity, where the key update request is used to update the first key stored by the TA entity;
  • the device also includes:
  • the processing unit 603 is configured to acquire a second key from the server according to the key update request.
  • the sending unit 602 is further configured to send the second key to the TA entity.
  • the processing unit 603 is further configured to determine, according to the response message, whether the trust verification of the TA entity is successful.
  • the sending unit 602 is further configured to: when the trust verification of the TA entity is successful, send the first key of the target SD to the TA entity.
  • the components described in the embodiment of FIG. 6 can also perform the steps performed by the target SD in any of the embodiments of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4, and the details can be referred to the embodiment of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4, and details are not described herein.
  • the device is a TA entity 700 and includes:
  • the sending unit 701 is configured to send, to the target security domain SD, integrity credentials of the TA entity, where the integrity credentials are used by the target SD to perform trust verification on the TA entity;
  • the receiving unit 702 is configured to: when the trust verification of the TA entity is successful, receive response information from the target SD, where the response information is used to indicate that the target SD establishes a trust association with the TA entity, and the response information The first key of the target SD is included.
  • the device further includes:
  • the acquiring unit 703 is configured to acquire card content management indication information sent by the server, where the card content management indication information includes a first card content management instruction and an authorization code;
  • the processing unit 704 is further configured to obtain verification credentials according to the first card content management instruction, and according to the Decrypting the authorization code by the first key;
  • the processing unit 704 is further configured to: match the verification credential with the decrypted authorization code;
  • the sending unit 701 is further configured to: when the verification credential matches the decrypted authorization code, send the first card content management instruction to the target SD.
  • the obtaining unit 702 is further configured to acquire card content management indication information sent by the server, where the card content management indication information includes a first card content management instruction and an authorization code;
  • the processing unit 704 is further configured to obtain the verification credential according to the first card content management instruction, and decrypt the authorization code according to the first key;
  • the sending unit 701 is further configured to send the verification credential, the decrypted authorization code, and the first card content management instruction to the target SD.
  • processing unit 704 is further configured to: before the acquiring unit acquires the card content management indication information sent by the server, detecting whether the first key is valid;
  • the obtaining unit 703 is further configured to: when the first key is invalid, obtain key update information from the target SD;
  • the processing unit 704 is further configured to update the first key according to the key update information.
  • the obtaining unit 703 is further configured to acquire card application operation information from the terminal, where the card application operation information is used to perform a management operation on the target card application;
  • the processing unit 704 is further configured to generate a second card content management instruction and an authorization code according to the first key and the card application operation information;
  • the sending unit 701 is further configured to send the second card content management instruction and an authorization code to the target SD.
  • processing unit 704 is specifically configured to:
  • the first generation template is a template configured by the server in the TA entity, and the first generation template corresponds to the card application operation information
  • the sending unit 701 is specifically configured to:
  • the integrity credentials of the TA entity are sent to the target SD by sending the integrity credentials of the TA entity to the security unit SE.
  • the units described in the embodiment of FIG. 7 can also perform the steps performed by the TA entity in any of the embodiments of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4, and the details can be referred to the embodiment of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4, and details are not described herein.
  • the device is targeted SD 800 and includes:
  • the receiving unit 801 is configured to receive the integrity certificate of the TA entity from the trusted application TA entity.
  • the obtaining unit 802 is configured to acquire a root certificate corresponding to the TA entity.
  • the processing unit 803 is configured to check the integrity credential according to the root certificate.
  • the sending unit 804 is configured to send, after the verification is passed, the response information to the TA entity, where the response information is used to indicate that the target SD establishes a trust association with the TA entity, where the response information includes the target The first key of the SD.
  • the obtaining unit 802 is further configured to acquire a second key from the server according to the key update request.
  • the sending unit 804 is further configured to send the second key to the TA entity.
  • the components described in the embodiment of FIG. 8 can also perform the steps performed by the target SD in any of the embodiments of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4, and the details can be referred to the embodiment of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4, and details are not described herein.
  • the apparatus is a TA entity 900, and includes: a processor 901, a memory 902, a transceiver 903, and the processor 901.
  • the memory 902 and the transceiver 903 are connected by a bus 904, which may include a transmitter and a receiver, the memory 902 storing computer instructions, and the processor 901 is implemented by executing the computer instructions:
  • the transceiver 903 sends the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature of the TA entity to the target security domain SD;
  • the target SD is SD in the security unit SE, and the target SD corresponds to the target card application;
  • the certificate of the entity and the private key signature of the TA entity are used by the target SD to perform trust verification on the server;
  • the transceiver 903 acquires the first key of the target SD.
  • the transceiver 903 acquires card content management indication information sent by the server, where the card content management indication information includes a first card content management instruction and an authorization code;
  • the processor 901 obtains the verification credential according to the first card content management instruction, and decrypts the authorization code according to the first key;
  • the processor 901 matches the verification credential with the decrypted authorization code; when the verification credential matches the decrypted authorization code, the transceiver 903 sends the first card content management instruction to the target SD.
  • the transceiver 903 acquires card content management indication information sent by the server, where the card content management indication information includes a first card content management instruction and an authorization code;
  • the processor 901 obtains the verification credential according to the first card content management instruction, and decrypts the authorization code according to the first key;
  • the transceiver 903 transmits the verification credential, the decrypted authorization code, and the first card content management instruction to the target SD.
  • the processor 901 detects whether the first key is valid.
  • the transceiver 903 acquires key update information from the target SD;
  • the processor 901 updates the first key according to the key update information.
  • the processor 901 acquires card application operation information from the terminal, where the card application operation information is used to perform a management operation on the target card application;
  • the processor 901 generates a second card content management instruction and an authorization code according to the first key and the card application operation information;
  • the transceiver 903 transmits the second card content management instruction and the authorization code to the target SD.
  • the processor 901 determines, according to the card application operation information, the first generated template, where the first generated template is a template configured by the server in the TA entity, and the first generated template and the card are Application operation information pair should;
  • the processor 901 generates a second card content management instruction and an authorization code according to the first key and the first generation template, and writes the generated second card content management instruction and authorization code into the first generation template. .
  • the transceiver 903 sends the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature of the TA entity to the target by sending a certificate of the TA entity and a private key signature of the TA entity to the security unit SE. SD.
  • the components described in the embodiments of the present invention may also perform the steps performed by the TA entity in any of the embodiments of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4, and the details may be referred to the embodiment of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4, and details are not described herein.
  • the device is a target SD 1000, and includes: a processor 1001, a memory 1002, a transceiver 1003, and the processor 1001.
  • the memory 1002 and the transceiver 1003 are connected by a bus 1004.
  • the transceiver 1003 may include a transmitter and a receiver.
  • the memory 1002 stores computer instructions, and the processor 1001 is implemented by executing the computer instructions:
  • the transceiver 1003 receives the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature of the TA entity from the trusted application TA entity; the target SD is an SD in the security unit SE, and the target SD corresponds to the target card application.
  • the transceiver 1003 sends a certificate of the TA entity and a private key signature of the TA entity to a server, and the certificate of the TA entity and the private key signature of the TA entity are used by the server to perform trust verification on the TA entity. ;
  • the transceiver 1003 receives a response message from the server and transmits the first key of the target SD to the TA entity.
  • the transceiver 1003 receives a key update request from the TA entity, where the key update request is used to update the first key stored by the TA entity;
  • the transceiver 1003 acquires a second key from the server according to the key update request;
  • the transceiver 1003 transmits the second key to the TA entity.
  • the processor 1001 determines, according to the response message, whether the trust verification of the TA entity is successful.
  • the transceiver 1003 sends the first target SD to the TA entity. Key.
  • the various devices described in the embodiments of the present invention may also perform the steps performed by the target SD in any of the embodiments of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4 in the operation.
  • the steps performed by the target SD may also perform the steps performed by the target SD in any of the embodiments of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4 in the operation.
  • details refer to the embodiments in FIG. 2 to FIG. 4 , and details are not described herein.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides another apparatus for data processing, where the apparatus is a TA entity 900, including: a processor 901, a memory 902, a transceiver 903, the processor 901, the memory 902, and The transceiver 903 is connected by a bus 904, which may include a transmitter and a receiver, the memory 902 storing computer instructions, and the processor 901 is implemented by executing the computer instructions:
  • the transceiver 903 sends an integrity credential of the TA entity to the target security domain SD, where the integrity credential is used by the target SD to perform trust verification on the TA entity;
  • the transceiver 903 receives the response information from the target SD, where the response information is used to indicate that the target SD establishes a trust association with the TA entity, where the response information includes The first key of the target SD.
  • the transceiver 903 acquires card content management indication information sent by the server, where the card content management indication information includes a first card content management instruction and an authorization code;
  • the processor 901 obtains the verification credential according to the first card content management instruction, and decrypts the authorization code according to the first key;
  • the processor 901 matches the verification credential with the decrypted authorization code, and when the verification credential matches the decrypted authorization code, the transceiver 903 sends the first card content management instruction to the target SD.
  • the transceiver 903 acquires card content management indication information sent by the server, where the card content management indication information includes a first card content management instruction and an authorization code;
  • the processor 901 obtains the verification credential according to the first card content management instruction, and decrypts the authorization code according to the first key;
  • the transceiver 903 transmits the verification credential, the decrypted authorization code, and the first card content management instruction to the target SD.
  • the processor 901 detects whether the first key is valid.
  • the transceiver 903 acquires key update information from the target SD;
  • the processor 901 updates the first key according to the key update information.
  • the processor 901 acquires card application operation information from the terminal, where the card application operation information is used to perform a management operation on the target card application;
  • the processor 901 generates a second card content management instruction and an authorization code according to the first key and the card application operation information;
  • the transceiver 903 transmits the second card content management instruction and the authorization code to the target SD.
  • the processor 901 determines, according to the card application operation information, the first generated template, where the first generated template is a template configured by the server in the TA entity, and the first generated template and the card are Application operation information corresponding;
  • the processor 901 generates a second card content management instruction and an authorization code according to the first key and the first generation template, and writes the generated second card content management instruction and authorization code into the first generation template. .
  • the transceiver 903 sends the integrity credentials of the TA entity to the target SD by sending the integrity token of the TA entity to the security unit SE.
  • the components described in the embodiments of the present invention may also perform the steps performed by the TA entity in any of the embodiments of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4, and the details may be referred to the embodiment of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4, and details are not described herein.
  • an embodiment of the present invention provides another apparatus for data processing, which is a target SD 1000, including: a processor 1001, a memory 1002, a transceiver 1003, the processor 1001, the memory 1002, and The transceiver 1003 is coupled by a bus 1004, which may include a transmitter and a receiver, the memory 1002 storing computer instructions for implementing the computer instructions by:
  • the transceiver 1003 receives the integrity credentials of the TA entity from the trusted application TA entity;
  • the processor 1001 acquires a root certificate corresponding to the TA entity
  • the processor 1001 checks the integrity credentials according to the root certificate
  • the transceiver 1003 sends a response message to the TA entity, where the response information is used to indicate that the target SD establishes a trust association with the TA entity, where the response information includes the target SD A key.
  • the transceiver 1003 receives a key update request from the TA entity, where the key update request is used to update the first key stored by the TA entity;
  • the transceiver 1003 acquires a second key from the server according to the key update request;
  • the transceiver 1003 transmits the second key to the TA entity.
  • the various devices described in the embodiments of the present invention may also perform the steps performed by the target SD in any of the embodiments of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4 in the operation.
  • the steps performed by the target SD may also perform the steps performed by the target SD in any of the embodiments of FIG. 2 to FIG. 4 in the operation.
  • details refer to the embodiments in FIG. 2 to FIG. 4 , and details are not described herein.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a system for data processing, which may be a terminal.
  • the terminal may be a terminal 102 as shown in FIG. 1 , and the terminal may include various handheld devices with wireless communication functions, and an in-vehicle device. Wearable devices, computing devices, or other data processing capable devices connected to a wireless modem.
  • the terminal may also be referred to as a mobile station (MS), a user equipment, a terminal device, and may also include a subscriber unit and a cellular phone.
  • MS mobile station
  • user equipment user equipment
  • terminal device may also include a subscriber unit and a cellular phone.
  • the terminal includes the TA entity as shown in the embodiment of FIG. 5 and the target SD shown in the embodiment of FIG. 6; or the terminal may include the TA entity as shown in the embodiment of FIG. 7 and the target SD shown in the embodiment of FIG. In another form, the terminal may also include a TA entity as shown in the embodiment of Figure 9 and a target SD as shown in the embodiment of Figure 10.
  • the embodiment of the invention further provides a chip device, the chip device comprising a processing unit and a communication unit, the chip device comprising a processing unit and a communication unit.
  • the chip device further includes a storage unit, and the processing unit may execute an instruction stored by the storage unit, so that the chip device performs the execution of the TA entity and/or the target SD in any of the foregoing embodiments of FIG. 2 to FIG. A step of.
  • the embodiment of the invention further provides a chip device, which can be disposed inside the terminal.
  • the chip device includes a processor and a communication unit.
  • the processor can be various types of processors.
  • the communication unit may be, for example, an input/output interface, a pin or a circuit, etc., and the communication unit includes a system bus.
  • the chip further includes a memory, where the memory may be a memory inside the chip device, such as a register, a cache, a random access memory (RAM), an EEPROM or a FLASH, etc.; It may be a memory located outside the chip device, which may be various types of memory.
  • the processor is coupled to the memory, and the processor can execute the instructions stored in the memory to cause the chip device to perform the steps performed by the TA entity and/or the target SD in any of the embodiments of Figures 2 through 4 above.
  • the processor may be a central processing unit (CPU), a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), or an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC). Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, transistor logic device, hardware components Or any combination thereof.
  • the processor 780 can implement or perform various exemplary logical blocks, modules and circuits described in connection with the present disclosure.
  • the processor can also be a combination of computing functions, for example, including one or more microprocessor combinations, a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, and the like.
  • the processor may include one or more processing units.
  • the memory involved in various embodiments of the present application may include a volatile memory, such as a random access memory (RAM), a nonvolatile volatile random access memory (NVRAM), and a phase change random memory.
  • Memory change RAM (PRAM), magnetoresistive random access memory (MRAM), etc. may also include non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk storage device, read-only memory (read-only memory, ROM), Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory (EEPROM), flash memory device, such as NOR flash memory or NAND flash memory, semiconductor device, For example, Solid State Disk (SSD).
  • RAM random access memory
  • NVRAM nonvolatile volatile random access memory
  • EEPROM Magnetoresistive random access memory
  • flash memory device such as NOR flash memory or NAND flash memory
  • SSD Solid State Disk
  • the present invention may be implemented in whole or in part by software, hardware, firmware, or any combination thereof.
  • software it may be implemented in whole or in part in the form of a computer program product.
  • the computer program product includes one or more computer instructions.
  • the computer program instructions When the computer program instructions are loaded and executed on a computer, the processes or functions described in accordance with embodiments of the present invention are generated in whole or in part.
  • the computer can be a general purpose computer, a special purpose computer, a computer network, or other programmable device.
  • the computer instructions can be stored in a computer readable storage medium or transferred from one computer readable medium to another computer readable medium, for example, the computer instructions can be wired from a website site, computer, server or data center (for example, coaxial cable, optical fiber, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless (eg infrared, wireless, microwave, etc.) to another website site, computer, server or data center.
  • the computer readable storage medium can be any available media that can be accessed by a computer or a data storage device such as a server, data center, or the like that includes one or more available media.
  • the usable medium may be a magnetic medium (eg, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape), an optical medium (eg, a DVD), or a semiconductor medium (eg, a solid state hard disk) or the like.
  • a magnetic medium eg, a floppy disk, a hard disk, a magnetic tape
  • an optical medium eg, a DVD
  • a semiconductor medium eg, a solid state hard disk

Abstract

本发明实施例提供一种数据处理的方法，包括：可信应用TA实体向目标安全域SD发送所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名，所述目标SD为安全单元SE中的SD，所述目标SD与目标卡应用对应，所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名用于所述目标SD向服务器进行信任验证，当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，所述TA实体获取所述目标SD的第一密钥。这样，经过目标SD协同服务器对TA实体进行信任验证之后，TA实体获取到目标SD的第一密钥，从而TA实体与目标SD建立了信任关系，实现了为转移SD部分流程至TA实体提供了信任基础。

Description

一种数据处理的方法及装置 技术领域
本发明实施例涉及通信领域，尤其涉及一种数据处理的方法及装置。
背景技术
全球平台(global platform，GP)国际标准组织制定了安全单元(secure element，SE)中卡应用管理流程的相关规范。SE的卡应用管理包括对SE中卡应用(card application/applet)的安装、删除、更新和配置用户数据(也称为个人化，personalization)等操作。
针对SE的卡应用管理，目前主要采用在线(online)管理的方法，即建立服务器和终端中的SE之间的安全通道(secure channel)，由服务器通过终端管理SE中的卡应用。代理管理(delegated management，DM)是对SE进行在线管理的一种模式。在代理管理模式中，终端协同服务器在SE中创建安全域(security domain，SD)，并对SD进行配置，所配置的内容包括SD的密钥和SD的权限。例如，配置后的SD具有DM权限，则该SD将依赖于SE提供的授权码(token)校验功能。广义上，SD是一种特殊的卡应用管理实体，是为其所管理的卡应用提供服务的。服务器在对目标SD中的卡应用进行管理时，服务器通过服务器与SE之间的安全通道向该目标SD发送卡内容管理指示信息。其中，卡内容管理指示信息可以包括卡内容管理指令以及与该卡内容管理指令所对应的授权码。目标SD在接收到卡内容管理指示信息后，调用SE提供的授权码校验功能，通过密钥对该卡内容管理指示信息中的卡内容管理指令进行验证，并将验证结果与该卡内容管理指令对应的授权码进行匹配，匹配成功后目标SD才执行该卡内容管理指令。
现有技术中，与卡应用管理相关的操作都在SE(包括SD)中执行，如卡内容管理指令的验证等。但SE是一种计算资源受限的运行环境，DM模式所涉及的卡内容管理指令的验证等运算流程，导致了SD对卡内容管理指示信息的执行效率较低。但若将SD中的部分运算流程直接转移至其它运行环境中的实体中执行，则有可能导致安全性大幅度降低。
发明内容
本发明实施例提供了一种数据处理的方法及装置，用于为转移SD的部分运算流程至其它实体提供信任基础。
第一方面，本发明实施例提供一种数据处理的方法，包括：
可信应用TA实体检测是否绑定了与目标卡应用对应的目标安全域SD，若已绑定，TA实体将TA实体的证书以及私钥签名发送至目标SD，其中，目标SD为安全单元SE中的SD。目标SD接收到该证书以及私钥签名后，转发至服务器，服务器对该证书以及私钥签名对TA实体进行信任验证。当TA实体的信任验证成功时，目标SD或者服务器将目标SD的第一密钥发送给TA实体。
这样，经过目标SD协同服务器对TA实体进行信任验证之后，TA实体获取到目标SD 的第一密钥，从而TA实体与目标SD建立了信任关系。实现了为转移SD部分流程至TA实体提供了信任基础。
一种可能的实现方式中，该方法还包括：
TA实体从服务器中获取包含第一卡内容管理指令和授权码的卡内容管理指示信息，其中，第一卡内容管理指令与授权码存在对应关系。TA实体根据所述第一密钥解密该授权码，TA实体调用的验签算法对第一卡内容管理指令进行计算验证得到验证凭据。TA实体再将验证凭据与解密后的授权码进行匹配，匹配成功时，TA实体向目标SD发送该第一卡内容管理指令。
这样，对于服务器下发的卡内容管理指示信息，由TA实体根据所获取到的第一密钥解密该授权码，并且，由TA实体对卡内容管理指示信息中的第一卡内容管理指令进行计算验证，以及将验证所得到的验证凭据与解密后的授权码进行匹配。TA实体只将验证匹配成功的第一卡内容管理指令发送给目标SD。由于目标SD与TA实体已建立信任关系，从而目标SD在接收到TA实体发送的第一卡内容管理指令后，则可直接执行该第一卡内容管理指令。从而提高了目标SD的执行效率。
另一种可能的实现方式中，TA实体在验证计算得到验证凭据以及解密授权码后，将该验证凭据、解密后的授权码以及第一卡内容管理指令均发送给目标SD，目标SD再根据该验证凭据与解密后的授权码进行匹配，若匹配成功，目标SD则执行第一卡内容管理指令。这样，TA实体只执行验证计算得到验证凭据和解密授权码的流程，而将验证凭证与解密后的授权码匹配的流程仍然由目标SD执行，这样，提高了验证的安全性。
另一种可能的实现方式中，在TA实体获取服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息之前，TA实体还可以先检测第一密钥是否有效，当第一密钥无效时，TA实体向目标SD发送请求信息，请求获取新的密钥，目标SD接收到该请求信息后，向服务器申请新的密钥，服务器向目标SD发送响应消息，该响应消息中包含新的密钥，目标SD向TA实体发送包含新的密钥的密钥更新信息，TA实体接收到该密钥更新信息后，将本地所存储的第一密钥更新为新的密钥。
这样，TA实体在对服务器下发的卡内容管理指示信息进行校验之前，先检查本地所存储的第一密钥是否有效，若无效时，则向目标SD获取新的密钥，提高了校验的准确性。
另一种可能的实现方式中，该方法还包括：
TA实体从终端获取本地的用于对目标卡应用进行管理操作的卡应用操作信息，TA实体根据第一密钥和卡应用操作信息，生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码，TA实体向目标SD发送第二卡内容管理指令和授权码。
这样，TA实体具备了生成卡内容管理指令和授权码的功能，从而使得终端的本地操作，可以协同目标SD完成，无需依赖于服务器来生成卡内容管理指令和授权码，从而提高了终端的执行效率。
第二方面，本发明实施例提供一种数据处理的方法，包括：
目标安全域SD从可信应用TA实体接收TA实体的证书以及TA实体的私钥签名，目标SD为安全单元SE中的SD，目标SD与目标卡应用对应，目标SD向服务器发送TA实体的证 书以及TA实体的私钥签名，TA实体的证书以及TA实体的私钥签名用于服务器对TA实体进行信任验证，当TA实体的信任验证成功时，目标SD从服务器接收响应消息，并向TA实体发送目标SD的第一密钥。
一种可能的实现方式中，目标SD在接收到服务器发送的响应消息后，还可以根据该响应消息判断TA实体的信任验证是否成功，当确定TA实体的信任验证成功时，目标SD则向TA实体发送第一密钥；当确定TA实体的信任验证失败时，目标SD则不向TA实体发送第一密钥。
这样，对于即使服务器对TA实体的信任验证失败时，服务器也发送响应消息至目标SD的情况，目标SD则可以根据响应消息对TA实体的信任验证成功或失败进行再次确认，提高了目标SD与TA实体进行信任绑定的安全性。
第三方面，本发明实施例提供一种数据处理的方法，包括：
可信应用TA实体向目标安全域SD发送TA实体的完整性凭据，完整性凭据用于目标SD对TA实体进行信任验证，当TA实体的信任验证成功时，TA实体从目标SD接收应答信息，应答信息用于指示目标SD与TA实体建立信任关联，应答信息中包含目标SD的第一密钥。
第四方面，本发明实施例提供一种数据处理的方法，包括：
目标安全域SD从可信应用TA实体接收所述TA实体的完整性凭据，所述目标SD获取所述TA实体对应的根证书，所述目标SD根据所述根证书对所述完整性凭据进行校验，当校验通过后，所述目标SD向所述TA实体发送应答信息，所述应答信息用于指示所述目标SD与所述TA实体建立信任关联，所述应答信息中包含所述目标SD的第一密钥。
这样，目标SD可以根据从SE中调用的根证书对TA实体进行信任验证，无需依赖于服务器对TA实体进行信任验证，提高了验证的效率。
第五方面，本发明实施例提供一种数据处理的装置，该装置为可信应用TA实体，该装置具有实现上述第一方面或第三方面所述方法中TA实体的功能。该功能可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块。
第六方面，本发明实施例提供一种数据处理的装置，该装置为目标安全域SD，该装置具有实现上述第二方面或第四方面所述方法中目标SD的功能。该功能可以通过硬件实现，也可以通过硬件执行相应的软件实现。该硬件或软件包括一个或多个与上述功能相对应的模块。
第七方面，本发明实施例提供一种数据处理的装置，该装置为可信应用TA实体，包括：处理器、存储器、收发器，处理器、存储器以及收发器通过总线连接，存储器存储有计算机指令，处理器通过执行计算机指令用于实现如第一方面或第三方面所述的方法。
第八方面，本发明实施例提供一种数据处理的装置，该装置为目标安全域SD，包括：处理器、存储器、收发器，处理器、存储器以及收发器通过总线连接，存储器存储有计算机指令，处理器通过执行计算机指令用于实现如第二方面或第四方面所述的方法。
第九方面，本发明实施例提供一种可读存储介质，该存储介质存储有用于实现如第一 方面或第二方面或第三方面或第四方面所描述的方法的计算机指令。
第十方面，本发明实施例提供一种计算机程序产品，该计算机程序产品包括计算机软件指令，该计算机软件指令可通过处理器进行加载来实现如第一方面或第二方面或第三方面或第四方面所描述的方法中的流程。
第十一方面，本发明实施例提供一种数据处理的系统，该系统可以包括前述第一方面的所述TA实体和第二方面的所述目标SD；或者，包括前述第三方面的所述TA实体和第四方面的所述目标SD。
第十二方面，本发明实施例提供一种芯片装置，该芯片系统包括处理器和存储器，处理器连接到存储器，该处理器可以运行存储器存储的指令，以使该芯片装置执行上述第一方面或第三方面所述的方法。
第十三方面，本发明实施例提供一种芯片装置，该芯片系统包括处理器和存储器，处理器连接到存储器，该处理器可以运行存储器存储的指令，以使该芯片装置执行上述第二方面或第四方面所述的方法。
第十四方面，本发明实施例提供一种芯片装置，该芯片系统包括处理器和存储器，处理器连接到存储器，该处理器可以运行存储器存储的指令，以使该芯片装置执行上述第一方面和第二方面所述的方法；或者，该处理器可以运行存储器存储的指令，以使该芯片装置执行上述第三方面和第四方面所述的方法。
本发明实施例中，经过目标SD协同服务器对TA实体进行信任验证之后，从而TA实体与目标SD建立了信任关系。实现了为转移目标SD部分流程至TA实体提供了信任基础。TA实体在接收到服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息后，TA实体执行验证卡内容管理指示信息的流程，目标SD只需执行验证成功后的卡内容管理指令，提高了目标SD的执行效率。TA实体还可以根据获取到的第一密钥生成卡内容管理指令和授权码，从而可以协同目标SD完成本地的操作指令的执行，无需依赖服务器生成卡内容管理指令和授权码，提高了终端的执行效率。
附图说明
图1为本发明实施例提供的数据处理的方法所应用的系统架构示意图；
图2为本发明实施例提供的一种数据处理的方法的示意图；
图3为本发明实施例提供的另一种数据处理的方法的示意图；
图4为本发明实施例提供的另一种数据处理的方法的示意图；
图5为本发明实施例提供的一种数据处理的装置的示意图；
图6为本发明实施例提供的另一种数据处理的装置的示意图；
图7为本发明实施例提供的另一种数据处理的装置的示意图；
图8为本发明实施例提供的另一种数据处理的装置的示意图；
图9为本发明实施例提供的另一种数据处理的装置的示意图；
图10为本发明实施例提供的另一种数据处理的装置的示意图。
具体实施方式
本发明实施例提供了一种数据处理的方法及相关装置，用于为转移SD的部分运算流程至其它实体提供信任基础。下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图，对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述。
图1为本发明实施例所提供的数据处理的方法所应用的系统架构示意图。图1的系统架构中，包括服务器101侧的实体设备以及终端102侧的实体设备。其中，服务器101侧的实体设备包括业务提供商的可信服务管理器(service provider-trusted service manager，SP-TSM)103和安全单元发行商的可信服务管理器(英文：secure element issuer-trusted service manager，SEI-TSM)104。终端102侧的实体设备包括SE105以及部署在该SE105中的SD(图中包括SD1和SD2)。例如，SEI-TSM104用于通过密钥为该服务器所创建的SD生成授权码，SP-TSM103用于与终端102中的SE105通信，并管理安装在SE105中的SD中的卡应用(图中包括卡应用1、卡应用2卡应用3以及卡应用4)。终端102在安装该服务器101所管理的目标卡应用之前，首先应在SE105中创建与该SP-TSM103对应的SD(以下称为目标SD106，图中以SD1为目标SD106进行举例)。SP-TSM103向SEI-TSM104发送安装目标SD106的请求，SEI-TSM104响应SP-TSM103的请求。SEI-TSM103通过SEI-TSM104掌握的密钥，建立SEI-TSM104与SE105之间的安全通道(经密钥加密和签名，确保机密性和完整性的一个通道)，并将目标SD106的创建脚本发送到SE105中。SE105执行该创建脚本，从而在SE105中创建目标SD106，并配置目标SD106的权限和密钥。例如，SE105可执行创建脚本中的属性设置指令，配置目标SD106为DM模式的SD。SE105可利用创建脚本中提供的密钥生成数据，调用SE105支持的算法，生成RSA(rivest-shamir-adleman encryption)密钥。SE105还可用其它方式为目标SD106配置密钥，例如，通过安全通道从SEI-TSM直接获得SP-TSM103生成的密钥。此密钥将用于后续SP-TSM103与目标SD106建立专属于该目标SD106的安全通道。该SP-TSM103可以管理的一个或多个卡应用。SP-TSM103在向目标SD106中安装卡应用时，SP-TSM103与目标SD106建立安全通道，通过安全通道向目标SD106发送卡内容管理指示信息。目标SD106调用SE105提供的授权码校验功能，校验卡内容管理指示信息中的卡内容管理指令，以及该卡内容管理指令所对应的授权码，校验通过后，目标SD106执行卡内容管理指令，完成对卡应用的管理操作。
SE105是终端中实现移动支付业务(比如：手机移动支付)的关键因素，SE105是一种防篡改的平台，通常是一个具有安全微控制器的芯片。SE105能够依照权威的可信实体提出的安全要求和规则，安全地为应用及其机密的数据或密钥(例如，密钥管理)提供运行环境。因此，SE105提供了一个具有防篡改(tamper resistant)能力的运行和存储环境，以及密码学运算功能。SE105可用于安装、运行支付应用和保存机密数据，如密钥和证书等。
SD106是用于SE105之外的实体(如SE发行者，应用开发商或者权威证书颁发机构提供SE中)提供控制、安全和通信要求功能的支持的实体。SD106部署在SE105中并与运营商的服务器或业务提供商服务器(服务器中的SP-TSM)所对应。本发明实施例中，SD106 用于对服务器所管理的目标卡应用进行管理工作。当服务器下发卡内容管理指示信息至终端时，终端中的SD106执行该卡内容管理指示信息中的命令，比如执行安装、删除、更新和配置用户数据等操作。在本发明实施例中，SE105与SD106可以是具体的物理器件，也可以是终端中的功能模块，比如可以是集成在SIM卡中的SE，或者是焊接在主板上的嵌入式SE，又或者是集成于微SD卡中的SE，又或者是集成在终端的中央处理器(central processing unit，CPU)中的SE模块，本发明实施例对此不作限定。
本发明实施例的终端还包括可信执行环境(trusted dxecution environment，TEE)。所述TEE可以是基于ARM公司Trustzone技术实现的TEE，也可以是基于英特尔公司可信计算技术或其它技术实现的TEE，本发明实施例对此不作限定。该可信执行环境为通过隔离技术从终端的CPU上隔离出的运行环境，该可信执行环境可以由硬件和软件组成，用于为应用提供隔离的、可信的运行和存储环境。可信应用(trustde appcation，TA)实体107部署在该可信执行环境中，TA实体107用于富执行环境(rich execution environment，REE)中的客户端应用提供安全相关的功能。TA实体107可以是具体的物理器件，也可以是终端中的功能模块，TEE和SE之间可以通过总线连接。例如，TEE和SE之间可通过I2C或SPI或用异步收发传输器(universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter，UART)与总线连接。
由于SE的计算资源受限，从而导致SD对卡内容管理指示信息的处理效率较低。为了提高SD的执行效率，本发明实施例中，将部分SD的计算工作分给可信执行环境中的TA实体执行。比如，由TA实体执行对服务器所下发的卡内容管理指示信息(DM模式下，该卡内容管理指示信包含卡内容管理指令以及对应的授权码)的校验工作，TA实体确定该卡内容管理指示信息校验通过后，则将该卡内容管理指示信息中的管理指令发送至SD中。这样，SD则只需要对该管理指令执行相关操作，无需在执行之前对该卡内容管理指示信息进行校验，从而提高了SD的执行效率。在实现前述功能之前，SD需要与TA实体建立信任关系，从而使得SD在接收到TA实体发送的卡内容管理指令时，可以确定该卡内容管理指令是合法可信的。
下面结合图2，对本发明实施例提供的一种数据处理的方法进行示例性介绍。图2示出了目标SD与TA实体建立信任的交互流程。在执行该流程之前，SE中已经创建了对应于该服务器(服务器中的SP-TSM)所对应的目标SD，并将该目标SD配置为DM模式。在创建该目标SD时或创建该目标SD之后，在SE中为该目标SD配置了专属的授权码校验密钥，对应的，SEI-TSM中保存了对应于SP-TSM的授权码生成密钥。这样，SEI-TSM可响应SP-TSM请求，为该SP-TSM生成的卡内容管理指令生成授权码。
201、服务器向TA实体发送卡内容管理指示信息。
当服务器需要对终端的目标SD中的目标卡应用进行管理时，服务器向终端推送卡内容管理指示信息。例如，服务器中的SP-TSM向终端的推送卡内容管理指示信息。该卡内容管理指示信息包括卡内容管理指令以及与该卡内容管理指令对应的授权码。终端中的TA实体接收到该卡内容管理指示信息。该卡内容管理指示信息中还携带有与该目标卡应用对应的目标SD的标识(identification)。
可选的，该卡内容管理指示信息的获取也可以由用户在终端本地触发，比如，用户通过终端的用户界面发现应用更新提示，用户在终端上操作应用更新时，终端从SP-TSM获取该卡内容管理指示信息。
可选的，当服务器没有获得TA实体的标识时，服务器无法将卡内容管理指示信息直接发送给TA实体。因此，服务器可以向终端中其它实体，如终端的SE或终端的TEE之外的实体发送卡内容管理指示信息。例如，服务器向REE中的安装客户应用(client application，CA)实体发送卡内容管理指示信息(如图1所示，图1中CA实体包括CA1实体和CA2实体)，然后由CA实体将该卡内容管理指示信息转发至TA实体。由于服务器向终端TEE中配置为SE服务的TA实体时，同时向终端REE中安装CA实体，该CA实体可调用REE提供的应用程序接口(Application Programming Interface，API)，通过该CA实体接收来自SP-TSM的各种通知消息，包括卡内容管理指示信息。CA实体接收到卡内容管理指示信息后，则将卡内容管理指示信息转发给TA实体。可选的，终端为了建立SP-TSM与SE之间的安全通道，可以预置或后安装一个REE中的实体，例如前述的CA实体。该CA实体用于提供API供REE之外的实体(如TEE中的TA实体)调用。因此，TA实体还可以通过调用该CA实体的API，从而接收服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息。
202、TA实体确定未绑定目标SD。
TA实体根据卡内容管理指示信息中的目标SD的标识，判断TA实体是否绑定了该目标SD。例如，TA实体中存储有与多个SD的绑定关系列表，该绑定关系列表中包含多个与TA实体建立绑定关系的SD的标识，TA实体在获取到目标SD实体的标识后，在该绑定关系列表中查找是否存在目标SD的标识，若存在，则表示已经绑定，若不存在，则表示未绑定。若TA实体绑定了该目标SD，则对该卡内容管理指示信息进行校验(该校验的过程将在后续实施例中阐述)；若TA实体未绑定目标SD，则执行后续步骤103-105。TA实体建立与目标SD的绑定关系时，保存目标SD的标识ID，以便TA实体后续收到卡内容管理指示信息时，可确认卡内容管理指示信息中包含的目标SD是否已经绑定。
203、TA实体向目标SD发送TA实体的证书以及私钥签名。
TA实体为了能够校验卡内容管理指示信息，需要获取对应于目标SD的第一密钥，即，对应于目标SD的授权码的校验密钥。目标SD需要信任TA实体，才会将第一密钥发送给TA实体。TA实体要得到目标SD的信任，则需要将TA实体的证书以及私钥签名发送给目标SD，由目标SD进行信任验证。
可选的，当TA实体没有与目标SD建立直接的通信连接时，TA实体可以将TA实体的证书以及私钥签名发送至SE，由SE转发至目标SD中。
其中，私钥签名，可以是TA实体利用其私钥对卡内容管理指示信息中包含的挑战值(challenge)进行签名得到的，该挑战值可以为一串随机数。
204、目标SD将TA实体的证书以及私钥签名发送至服务器进行信任验证。
目标SD可以将TA实体的证书以及私钥签名发送至服务器，由服务器对该TA实体的证书和私钥签名进行验证。服务器接收到TA实体的证书以及私钥签名后，先利用在服务器中预置的根证书(比如，该服务器的运营商与其它终端运营商存在合作关系，因此，该服 务器中预置了用于验证其它终端运营商的TA实体的证书的根证书)，对TA实体的证书进行验证，然后从TA实体证书中获取到公钥，并根据该公钥对私钥签名进行验证。服务器验证证书的方式有多种，比如，可以通过判断该证书是否为合法的数字证书认证机构所颁布的证书等方式验证，本发明实施例对此不作限定。服务器对该TA实体的证书和私钥签名验证通过后，则通知目标SD，指示该TA实体为可信任的TA实体。下面对本发明实施例中服务器验证TA实体的证书以及私钥签名进行示例性介绍：
服务器在接收到TA实体证书以及私钥签名后，根据TA实体的证书中包含的属性信息，调用与该证书对应的签发机构的根证书。例如，若TA实体的证书为权威证书管理机构颁发，则服务器需要调用预置的权威证书管理机构的根证书；或者，若TA实体的证书为某厂商签发，则服务器需要调用该厂商的预置根证书(该厂商与服务器通过线下的合作协议结成合作关系，并将厂商的根证书预置到服务器上)。服务器获取根证书中的公钥，利用该根证书公钥，验证TA实体的证书。例如，服务器利用该公钥，校验TA实体的证书中包含的经过加密处理的密文，从而获得解密出来的明文并与TA实体证书中包含的明文(TA实体的证书中包含一个公钥x的明文和密文，这个公钥x的密文是利用根证书公钥对应的私钥加密的)进行比对，如果一致，则证明该证书没有被篡改；如果不一致，则表示该证书可能被篡改。服务器利用TA实体的证书导出的公钥，校验私钥签名数据。例如，私钥签名数据包含一段明文和这段明文经TA实体的私钥加密的密文，服务器可利用TA实体证书导出公钥对这段密文做解密，并将解密得到的明文与签名数据中带有的明文比对，如果一致，则证明该私钥签名数据正确完整；如果不一致，则表示该私钥签名数据不完整。服务器在确定TA实体的证书未被篡改且私钥签名数据完整后，则确定该TA实体的证书合法，并确定该TA实体为可信任的实体。
可选的，前述的服务器对TA实体的信任验证可以为：SP-TSM接收和验证TA实体的证书和私钥签名，然后向SEI-TSM发送请求，获得一个凭据，该凭据用于向SE请求对应于目标SD的授权码校验密钥。或者，SP-TSM将TA实体的证书和私钥签名发给SEI-TSM，由SEI-TSM进行验证，验证成功后发送一个凭据给SP-TSM。最终，SP-TSM向目标SD发送确认TA实体可信任的消息，消息中包含该凭据。
当服务器确定该TA实体的证书合法以及确定TA实体的私钥签名数据完整时，则表示服务器对TA实体的信任验证成功。服务器则向目标SD发送响应消息，该响应消息中指示TA实体信任验证成功。目标SD在接收到该响应消息后，根据该响应消息确定TA实体信任验证成功。可选的，若服务器对TA实体进行信任验证失败，服务器可以不向目标SD发送响应消息，目标SD在预设时间段后未接收到响应消息，则确认该TA实体的信任验证失败。可选的，即使服务器对TA实体的信任验证失败，服务器依然向目标SD发送响应消息，在该响应消息中指示该TA实体验证失败，目标SD接收到该响应消息后，根据响应消息中的指示确定该TA实体信任验证失败。
205、目标SD向TA实体发送目标SD的第一密钥。
目标SD接收到该响应消息后，确认TA实体信任验证成功，则目标SD将对应于目标SD的用于校验卡内容管理指令和授权码的第一密钥发送给TA实体。这样，所述TA实体根 据所述第一卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据。比如，后续实施例中所描述的TA实体调用的验签算法对卡内容管理指示信息中的卡内容管理指令进行计算，得到验证凭据。TA实体根据第一密钥解密授权码。TA实体再将该验证凭据与该解密后的授权码进行匹配，若匹配成功，则表示该卡内容管理指令为可信任的指令；若匹配失败，则表示该卡内容管理指令为不可信任的指令。
可选的，目标SD在向TA实体发送第一密钥之前，目标SD从服务器中获取授权码校验密钥的获取凭据，并通过该凭据向SE请求该第一密钥。目标SD在获取到第一密钥后，将该第一密钥发送给TA实体。
可选的，在一种可能的实现方式中，SE中也可以预置根证书。目标SD在接收到TA实体发送的证书以及私钥签名后，目标SD从SE中调用预置的根证书校验TA实体的证书，然后利用TA实体的证书验证TA实体的私钥签名，若TA实体的证书和私钥签名校验都通过，则目标SD则将从SE获得的第一密钥发送给TA实体。
可选的，目标SD可生成一个对称密钥，并利用对称密钥对第一密钥加密，利用TA实体的证书导出的公钥对对称密钥加密，将加密的对称密钥和第一密钥，以及相应的加密算法类型发送给TA实体，TA实体利用其私钥解密出对称密钥，然后利用对称密钥解密出第一密钥，并保存于TEE中。这样，目标SD通过加密的方式将第一密钥发送给TA实体，以防止该第一密钥泄露至其它实体，提高了密钥传输的安全性。
可选的，目标SD发送给TA实体的第一密钥，还可包括有效期。有效期可以是一个有效时间，该有效时间可以为预设期限。例如，第一密钥截止2017年10月1日00:00:00之前有效。可选的，有效期也可以是一个使用次数的有效期，该有效次数可以为预设次数。例如，第一密钥可用于10次校验授权码，校验10次之后第一密钥失效。所述预设期限和预设次数可以根据具体情况确定，本发明实施例对此不作限定。
可选的，在另一种可能的实现方式中，TA实体可以不向目标SD发送证书以及私钥签名。TA实体可以从TEE操作系统(operating system，OS)获得利用TEE证书签名的TA实体的完整性凭据。由于TEE可以是基于只读存储器(read-only memory，ROM)的，在TEE启动时，可利用ROM中的只读代码(例如，一段校验每个TA实体的签名的代码)校验TA实体的完整性，并利用ROM中的代码提供的签名功能(例如，TEE出厂时预置私钥和一个TEE证书，利用TEE证书对应的私钥对完整性校验结果进行签名)，从而获取TA实体的完整性凭据。TA实体通过SE向目标SD发送该完整性凭据，SE中预置有可验证TEE证书的根证书，目标SD从SE中调用该根证书，对该TEE证书签名的完整性凭据进行校验。校验通过后，目标SD则向TA实体发送应答信息，该应答信息指示目标SD与TA实体建立信任关联。该应答消息中包含目标SD的第一密钥。
本发明实施例中，目标SD通过对TA实体的证书以及私钥签名进行信任校验。校验通过后，表示目标SD确定该TA实体可信任。目标SD将第一密钥发送至TA实体，从而使得TA实体可以根据该第一密钥执行部分目标SD的运算流程，为目标SD转移部分运算流程提供了安全基础。
图2实施例描述了TA实体与目标SD建立信任的过程，下面对TA实体与SD建立信任 之后，对卡内容管理指示信息进行验证的流程进行示例性介绍。图3实施例为基于图2实施例，TA实体与目标SD建立信任关系之后，TA实体对服务器所发送的卡内容管理指示信息进行校验的流程。参照图3所示，本发明实施例提供的另一种数据处理的方法包括：
301、TA实体检测目标SD的第一密钥是否有效。
TA实体检测第一密钥是否有效的方式有多种，比如，判断该第一密钥的使用期限是否超过预设期限，或者判断该第一密钥的使用次数是否超过预设次数。例如，该第一密钥包含有效期，若有效期为预设期限，该预设期限为2017年10月1日00:00:00。那么TA实体则检测当前的时间是否在2017年10月1日00:00:00之前，若是，则确定第一密钥有效，若否，则确定第一密钥无效。或者，该有效期为预设次数，该预设次数为10次。那么TA实体则检测历史记录中使用该第一密钥进行校验的使用次数，若次数未达到10次，则确定第一密钥有效；若次数达到10次，则确定第一密钥无效。
当TA实体检测出该第一密钥无效时，执行步骤302，当检测出该第一密钥有效时，执行步骤305。
302、TA实体向目标SD发送密钥更新请求。
当TA实体检测出所存储的第一密钥无效时，则需要从目标SD中获取新的密钥。可选的，密钥更新请求可以包括TA实体的证书和私钥签名，用于目标SD对TA实体进行身份确认。
303、目标SD向TA实体发送密钥更新信息。
目标SD在接收到TA实体发送的密钥更新请求后，判断第一密钥是否已更新，若已更新，则将更新后的第一密钥发送给TA实体，若未更新，则向服务器请求更新第一密钥，并将更新的第一密钥发送给TA实体。
目标SD判断第一密钥是否更新，可以通过判断TA发送的密钥更新请求中包含的第一密钥的版本号，与SE中保存的对应于该目标SD的授权码校验密钥的版本号进行匹配，若版本一致，则表示第一密钥未更新；若版本不一致，则表示第一密钥已经更新。若SE中的第一密钥未更新，则目标SD向服务器发送密钥更新请求，由SEI-TSM向SE中配置一个针对目标SD的新版本的第一密钥。同时SEI-TSM会更新对应的授权码生成密钥。
可选的，目标SD在接收到密钥更新请求后，无需判断第一密钥是否更新，而是直接向服务器发送密钥更新请求，服务器再将新的密钥(也称为第二密钥)发送给SE，SE则将新的密钥转发给目标SD，并通知目标SD密钥已经更新，目标SD再将新的密钥发送至TA实体。
304、TA根据密钥更新信息更新第一密钥。
TA实体接收到密钥更新信息后，则根据密钥更新信息更新所存储的目标SD的第一密钥。例如，TA实体接收到该密钥更新信息后，解析出密钥更新信息中的新的密钥以及新的密钥的版本号，TA实体根据新的密钥的版本号与TA实体本地所存储的第一密钥的版本号进行匹配，若匹配结果不一致，TA实体则将本地所存储的第一密钥替换为该新的密钥；若匹配结果一直，TA实体则无需更新第一密钥。可选的，TA实体也可不判断新的密钥与第一密钥的版本号是否匹配，而是直接将本地存储的第一密钥替换为新的密钥，因为新的密钥 为当前目标SD所发送的密钥，那么该新的密钥与服务器的密钥一致，因此，TA实体只需使用新的密钥即可。
可选的，TA实体在更新第一密钥后，还可以实施密钥安全规则。比如记录更新后的第一密钥的使用次数或使用期限，在超过预设次数或者预设期限后，TA实体需要再次更新第一密钥。可选的，TA实体保存的第一密钥包括密钥版本号。
305、TA实体获取卡内容管理指示信息。
该卡内容管理指示信息可以由服务器发送给TA实体，也可以为用户操作终端时所触发的。卡内容管理指示信息包括卡内容管理指令(也可以称为第一卡内容管理指令)以及与该卡内容管理指令对应的授权码，该授权码可以为前述示例中的token。
需要说明的是，步骤305的执行顺序还可以在步骤301之前。即，TA实体先获取到卡内容管理指示信息，再判断第一密钥是否有效。本发明实施例对此不作限定。
306、TA实体根据卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据，并根据第一密钥解密授权码。
TA实体根据调用TEE支持的验签算法，对卡内容管理指令进行计算验证，得到验证凭据，并根据第一密钥解密授权码。例如，TA实体调用TEE支持的哈希算法，对该卡内容管理指令(不包括授权码)进行哈希运算，哈希运算后的结果作为验证凭据，该验证凭据的表现形式可以为一组比特串。TA实体再利用第一密钥对授权码进行解密运算，得到授权码的明文，解密运算后的授权码的明文的表现形式可以为一组比特串。
307、TA实体将验证凭据与解密后的授权码进行匹配。
由于卡内容管理指示信息为服务器要发送给目标SD，用于目标SD根据卡内容管理指示信息的卡内容管理指令执行的消息，卡内容管理指示信息中的授权码与目标SD的第一密钥存在关联关系。目标SD则能调用SE提供的授权码校验功能确认该卡内容管理指示信息是否为合法消息。因此，TA实体在根据对卡内容管理指令进行验证计算得到相应的验证凭据后，则可以根据验证凭据与卡内容管理指令对应的解密后的授权码进行匹配，若匹配成功，则表示该该卡内容管理指令合法，若匹配失败，则表示该卡内容管理指令不合法。例如，TA实体将验证凭据和通过第一密钥对授权码解密出明文进行比对，TA实体判断验证凭据是否与该明文一致，若一致，则表示匹配成功，若不一致，则表示匹配失败。
需要说明的是，一组卡内容管理指示信息中可能包含多条卡内容管理指令以及与多条卡内容管理指令对应的多条授权码。授权码可包含在卡内容管理指令中一起发送到目标SD，也可和卡内容指令分别发送到目标SD。TA实体在校验多条卡内容管理指令时，需要根据每条卡内容管理指令均获得相应的验证凭据，并利用第一密钥解密每条卡内容管理指令对应的授权码，将每一个验证凭据与该卡内容管理指令对应的解密后的授权码进行匹配。
在实际操作过程中，卡内容管理指示信息可能被篡改或存在传输错误。对于不合法的卡内容管理指令，终端可通过用户界面提示用户错误的发生或提示用户卡应用管理异常。当一组卡内容管理信息中存在一条卡内容管理指令的校验结果不合法时，终端应提示用户放弃或重置本次卡内容管理操作。
308、当验证凭据与解密后的授权码匹配时，TA实体向目标SD发送卡内容管理指令。
当每一条指令的验证凭据与其授权码的明文匹配时，则表示该卡内容管理指示信息中 包含的卡内容管理指令合法，TA实体则将卡内容管理指示信息中的卡内容管理指令逐一发送给目标SD，以使得目标SD根据该卡内容管理指令执行相关管理操作。由于目标SD已TA实体建立信任关系，因此，目标SD存储有TA的标识。目标SD在接收到卡内容管理指令时，先确认该卡内容管理指令是否为建立了信任关系的TA实体所发送的，若是，则执行该卡内容管理指令，若否，则不执行。
可选的，在一种可能的实现方式中，步骤307为可选步骤。TA实体在计算得到验证凭据以及解密授权码后，可以不根据该验证凭据与解密后的授权码进行匹配，而是将所计算得到的验证凭据、解密后的授权码以及该卡内容管理指示指令均发送给目标SD。目标SD则根据该验证凭据对解密后的授权码进行匹配(即，比对验证凭据和授权码的明文是否一致)，若匹配成功，则执行该卡内容管理指令。
本实施例中，TA实体获取服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息，并根据目标SD的第一密钥对该卡内容管理指示信息中的卡内容管理指令和授权码进行校验匹配。TA实体将校验成功的卡内容管理指令发送至目标SD中，由于目标SD与TA实体已建立信任关系，因此，目标SD确定TA实体发送的卡内容管理指令可信任，目标SD则执行该卡内容管理指令。这样，TA实体执行了对卡内容管理指示信息的校验工作，而目标SD则只需执行接收到的卡内容管理指令，从而提高了目标SD的执行效率。
图3实施例中描述了TA实体对服务器所下发的卡内容管理指示信息的校验过程。本发明实施例还提供了终端侧脱离服务器进行本地的卡应用管理操作的实现方式。在现有技术中，终端中的SD中的卡应用的相关管理操作，必须协同服务器侧共同完成。即，用户无法对终端中的SD中的卡应用进行本地管理操作。对此，本发明实施例提供了相应解决方案，参照图4所示，对本发明实施例提供的另一种数据处理的方法进行示例性介绍。
在图4实施例中，TA实体首先需要与目标SD建立信任关系，其建立信任的方式与图2实施例类似。其区别的地方在于，图2实施例中是通过目标SD将第一密钥发给TA实体，而图4实施例中，当服务器确定TA实体的证书和私钥签名合法时，服务器直接和TA实体协商密钥建立安全通道，并由服务器向TA实体发送目标SD的第一密钥。服务器通知目标SD：该TA实体可信任。在图4实施例中，第一密钥用于TA实体为目标SD生成授权码，在TA实体与目标SD建立信任后，执行如下步骤：
401、TA实体从终端获取卡应用操作信息。
当用户对终端中的目标SD中的目标卡应用进行管理操作时(比如删除该目标卡应用，或者修改该卡应用是否可选择的状态，或修改该卡应用的其他属性等)，则触发终端生成该卡应用操作信息，TA实体则获取到该卡应用操作信息。需要说明的是，本实施例中的卡应用操作信息与前述实施例中的卡内容管理指示信息有区别。卡内容管理指示信息中包含服务器所生成的卡内容管理指令以及与卡内容管理指令对应的授权码，而卡应用操作信息为用户对终端进行行为操作时，终端所生成的相应的操作指示(比如为删除指示、修改状态指示或者修改属性指示等)，卡应用操作信息不包括卡内容管理指令以及授权码。在本实施例中，卡内容管理指令以及授权码由TA实体生成。
402、TA实体根据获得的第一密钥和卡应用操作信息，生成对应的卡内容管理指令以 及授权码。
在本实施例中，由于TA实体获取到了服务器发送的目标SD的第一密钥，因此，TA实体在获取到卡应用操作信息(比如为删除、或修改状态、或修改属性信息)后，则可以根据该第一密钥和该卡应用操作信息，生成相应的卡内容管理指令和授权码，以使得目标SD能够进行相关操作。
例如，TA实体可根据收到的包含用户试图删除卡应用的卡应用操作信息，生成包含授权码的DELETE指令，该指令可以由目标SD接收、校验授权码并执行。
或者，TA实体可根据收到的包含用户试图修改卡应用可选择状态的卡应用操作信息，生成包含授权码的INSTALL FOR MAKE SELECTABLE指令，该指令可以由目标SD接收、校验授权码并执行。
或者，TA实体可根据收到的包含用户试图修改卡应用属性的卡应用操作信息，生成包含授权码的INSTALL FOR REGISTRY UPDATE指令，该指令可以由目标SD接收、校验授权码并执行。
需要说明的是，本实施例中TA实体所获取的第一密钥与图3实施例中的第一密钥的作用不同，图3实施例中，第一密钥用于TA实体对卡内容管理指令以及授权码进行校验，本实施例中的第一密钥用于TA实体生成卡内容管理指令的授权码。
可选的，TA实体根据服务器所发送的第一密钥对卡应用操作信息生成卡内容管理指令以及授权码的方式有多种。比如，服务器预先在该TA实体中配置多种卡内容管理指令和授权码的生成模板，比如删除模板或者修改状态模板或者修改属性模板等。TA实体在获取到卡应用操作信息后，根据卡应用操作信息中包含的目标卡应用的标识，查找该目标卡应用对应的目标SD的标识。进一步的，TA实体根据目标SD的标识确定第一密钥(TA实体可保存对应于多个SD对应的多个密钥)，然后查找该卡应用操作信息所对应的生成模板。例如，TA实体解析出该卡应用操作信息为用户删除目标SD中的卡应用的信息，TA实体则查找出多个生成模板中的删除模板。TA实体再根据该第一密钥和生成模板(也可称为第一生成模板)，生成相应的卡内容管理指令(也可称为第二卡内容管理指令)和授权码。TA实体将根据卡应用操作信息以及授权码数据对该生成模板进行实例化，例如，TA实体将要操作的目标卡应用的标识填充到该生成模板中，并利用第一密钥生成卡应用操作指令的授权码填充到该生成模板中，使得该生成模板完整并成为可执行的实例。
403、TA实体向目标SD发送卡内容管理指令和授权码。
TA实体在生成卡内容管理指令和授权码后，则将该卡内容管理指令和授权码发送给目标SD。目标SD则调用SE提供的授权码校验功能，对该卡内容管理指令进行验证凭据的计算，并将该验证凭据与该授权码进行匹配，若匹配成功，则表示该操作指令合法，目标SD则执行该卡内容管理指令。可选的，TA实体向目标SD发送卡内容管理指令和授权码的方式，可以是TA实体将填充完整的第一生成模板中的多条卡内容管理指令和对应的授权码逐条发给目标SD。
本实施例中，TA实体与目标SD建立了信任关系，且TA实体具备了生成卡内容管理指令和授权码的能力。通过本发明实施例方案，将生成卡内容管理指令和授权码的流程转移 至终端中可信任的TA实体中，从而使得对于终端的本地操作，无需依赖与服务器，TA实体可以协同目标SD完成相关的本地操作。减少了终端对服务器的依赖性，提高了终端的执行效率。
参照图5所示，对本发明实施例提供的一种数据处理的装置进行示例性介绍，该装置为TA实体500，包括：
发送单元501，用于向目标安全域SD发送TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名；所述目标SD为安全单元SE中的SD，所述目标SD与目标卡应用对应；所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名用于所述目标SD向服务器进行信任验证；
获取单元502，用于当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，获取所述目标SD的第一密钥。
可选的，所述获取单元502，还用于获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息，所述卡内容管理指示信息包括第一卡内容管理指令和授权码；
所述装置500还包括：
处理单元503，用于根据所述第一卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据，并根据所述第一密钥解密所述授权码；
所述处理单元503，还用于将所述验证凭据与解密后的授权码进行匹配；
所述发送单元501，还用于当所述验证凭据与解密后的授权码匹配时，向所述目标SD发送所述第一卡内容管理指令。
可选的，所述获取单元502，还用于获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息，所述卡内容管理指示信息包括第一卡内容管理指令和授权码；
所述处理单元503，还用于根据所述第一卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据，并根据所述第一密钥解密所述授权码；
所述发送单元501，还用于向所述目标SD发送所述验证凭据、解密后的授权码以及所述第一卡内容管理指令。
可选的，所述处理单元503，还用于在所述获取单元获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息之前，检测所述第一密钥是否有效；
所述获取单元502，还用于当所述第一密钥无效时，从所述目标SD获取密钥更新信息；
所述处理单元503，还用于根据所述密钥更新信息更新所述第一密钥。
可选的，所述获取单元502，还用于从终端获取卡应用操作信息，所述卡应用操作信息用于对所述目标卡应用进行管理操作；
所述处理单元503，还用于根据所述第一密钥和所述卡应用操作信息，生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码；
所述发送单元501，还用于向所述目标SD发送所述第二卡内容管理指令和授权码。
可选的，所述处理单元503具体用于：
根据卡应用操作信息确定第一生成模板；其中，所述第一生成模板为所述服务器配置在所述TA实体中的模板，所述第一生成模板与所述卡应用操作信息对应；
根据所述第一密钥和第一生成模板生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码，并将所述生成的第二卡内容管理指令和授权码写入所述第一生成模板中。
可选的，所述发送单元501具体用于：
通过向安全单元SE发送所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名，将所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名发送至所述目标SD。
图5实施例所描述的各个单元在运行时还可以执行图2至图4任意实施例中TA实体所执行的步骤，详细内容可参照图2至图4实施例，此处不做赘述。
参照图6所示，对本发明实施例提供的另一种数据处理的装置进行示例性介绍。该装置为目标SD600，包括：
接收单元601，用于从可信应用TA实体接收所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名；所述目标SD为安全单元SE中的SD，所述目标SD与目标卡应用对应；
发送单元602，用于向服务器发送所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名，所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名用于所述服务器对所述TA实体进行信任验证；
所述接收单元601，还用于当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，从所述服务器接收响应消息；
所述发送单元602，还用于向所述TA实体发送所述目标SD的第一密钥。
可选的，所述接收单元601，还用于从所述TA实体接收密钥更新请求，所密钥更新请求用于更新所述TA实体所存储的第一密钥；
所述装置还包括：
处理单元603，用于根据所述密钥更新请求从所述服务器获取第二密钥；
所述发送单元602，还用于向所述TA实体发送所述第二密钥。
可选的，所述处理单元603，还用于根据所述响应消息确定所述TA实体的信任验证是否成功；
所述发送单元602，还用于当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，向所述TA实体发送所述目标SD的第一密钥。
图6实施例所描述的各个单元在运行时还可以执行图2至图4任意实施例中目标SD所执行的步骤，详细内容可参照图2至图4实施例，此处不做赘述。
参照图7所示，对本发明实施例提供的另一种数据处理的装置进行示例性介绍。该装置为TA实体700，包括：
发送单元701，用于向目标安全域SD发送所述TA实体的完整性凭据，所述完整性凭据用于所述目标SD对所述TA实体进行信任验证；
接收单元702，用于当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，从所述目标SD接收应答信息，所述应答信息用于指示所述目标SD与所述TA实体建立信任关联，所述应答信息中包含所述目标SD的第一密钥。
可选的，所述装置还包括：
获取单元703，用于获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息，所述卡内容管理指示信息包括第一卡内容管理指令和授权码；
所述处理单元704，还用于根据所述第一卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据，并根据所述 第一密钥解密所述授权码；
所述处理单元704，还用于将所述验证凭据与解密后的授权码进行匹配；
所述发送单元701，还用于当所述验证凭据与所述解密后的授权码匹配时，向所述目标SD发送所述第一卡内容管理指令。
可选的，所述获取单元702，还用于获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息，所述卡内容管理指示信息包括第一卡内容管理指令和授权码；
所述处理单元704，还用于根据所述第一卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据，并根据所述第一密钥解密所述授权码；
所述发送单元701还用于，向所述目标SD发送所述验证凭据、解密后的授权码以及所述第一卡内容管理指令。
可选的，所述处理单元704，还用于在所述获取单元获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息之前，检测所述第一密钥是否有效；
所述获取单元703，还用于当所述第一密钥无效时，从所述目标SD获取密钥更新信息；
所述处理单元704，还用于根据所述密钥更新信息更新所述第一密钥。
可选的，所述获取单元703，还用于从终端获取卡应用操作信息，所述卡应用操作信息用于对所述目标卡应用进行管理操作；
所述处理单元704，还用于根据所述第一密钥和所述卡应用操作信息，生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码；
所述发送单元701，还用于向所述目标SD发送所述第二卡内容管理指令和授权码。
可选的，所述处理单元704具体用于：
根据卡应用操作信息确定第一生成模板；其中，所述第一生成模板为所述服务器配置在所述TA实体中的模板，所述第一生成模板与所述卡应用操作信息对应；
根据所述第一密钥和第一生成模板生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码，并将所述生成的第二卡内容管理指令和授权码写入所述第一生成模板中。
可选的，所述发送单元701具体用于：
通过向安全单元SE发送所述TA实体的完整性凭据，将所述TA实体的完整性凭据发送至所述目标SD。
图7实施例所描述的各个单元在运行时还可以执行图2至图4任意实施例中TA实体所执行的步骤，详细内容可参照图2至图4实施例，此处不做赘述。
参照图8所示，对本发明实施例提供的另一种数据处理的装置进行示例性介绍。该装置为目标SD 800，包括：
接收单元801，用于从可信应用TA实体接收所述TA实体的完整性凭据；
获取单元802，用于获取所述TA实体对应的根证书；
处理单元803，用于根据所述根证书对所述完整性凭据进行校验；
发送单元804，用于当校验通过后，向所述TA实体发送应答信息，所述应答信息用于指示所述目标SD与所述TA实体建立信任关联，所述应答信息中包含所述目标SD的第一密钥。
可选的，所述获取单元802，还用于根据所述密钥更新请求从所述服务器获取第二密钥；
所述发送单元804还用于，向所述TA实体发送所述第二密钥。
图8实施例所描述的各个单元在运行时还可以执行图2至图4任意实施例中目标SD所执行的步骤，详细内容可参照图2至图4实施例，此处不做赘述。
图5至8实施例所述的装置还有另一个形式的实施例。
参照图9所示，对本发明实施例提供的一种数据处理的装置进行示例性介绍，该装置为TA实体900，包括：处理器901、存储器902、收发器903，所述处理器901、所述存储器902以及所述收发器903通过总线904连接，收发器903可以包括发送器与接收器，所述存储器902存储有计算机指令，所述处理器901通过执行所述计算机指令用于实现：
收发器903向目标安全域SD发送所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名；所述目标SD为安全单元SE中的SD，所述目标SD与目标卡应用对应；所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名用于所述目标SD向服务器进行信任验证；
当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，收发器903获取所述目标SD的第一密钥。
可选的，收发器903获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息，所述卡内容管理指示信息包括第一卡内容管理指令和授权码；
处理器901根据所述第一卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据，并根据所述第一密钥解密所述授权码；
处理器901将所述验证凭据与解密后授权码进行匹配；当所述验证凭据与解密后的授权码匹配时，收发器903向所述目标SD发送所述第一卡内容管理指令。
可选的，收发器903获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息，所述卡内容管理指示信息包括第一卡内容管理指令和授权码；
处理器901根据所述第一卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据，并根据所述第一密钥解密所述授权码；
收发器903向所述目标SD发送所述验证凭据、解密后的授权码以及所述第一卡内容管理指令。
可选的，在收发器903获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息之前，处理器901检测所述第一密钥是否有效；
当所述第一密钥无效时，收发器903从所述目标SD获取密钥更新信息；
处理器901根据所述密钥更新信息更新所述第一密钥。
可选的，处理器901从终端获取卡应用操作信息，所述卡应用操作信息用于对所述目标卡应用进行管理操作；
处理器901根据所述第一密钥和所述卡应用操作信息，生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码；
收发器903向所述目标SD发送所述第二卡内容管理指令和授权码。
可选的，处理器901根据卡应用操作信息确定第一生成模板；其中，所述第一生成模板为所述服务器配置在所述TA实体中的模板，所述第一生成模板与所述卡应用操作信息对 应；
处理器901根据所述第一密钥和第一生成模板生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码，并将所述生成的第二卡内容管理指令和授权码写入所述第一生成模板中。
可选的，收发器903通过向安全单元SE发送所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名，将所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名发送至所述目标SD。
本发明实施例所描述的各个器件在运行时还可以执行图2至图4任意实施例中TA实体所执行的步骤，详细内容可参照图2至图4实施例，此处不做赘述。
参照图10所示，对本发明实施例提供的一种数据处理的装置进行示例性介绍，该装置为目标SD 1000，包括：处理器1001、存储器1002、收发器1003，所述处理器1001、所述存储器1002以及所述收发器1003通过总线1004连接，收发器1003可以包括发送器与接收器，所述存储器1002存储有计算机指令，所述处理器1001通过执行所述计算机指令用于实现：
收发器1003从可信应用TA实体接收所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名；所述目标SD为安全单元SE中的SD，所述目标SD与目标卡应用对应。
收发器1003向服务器发送所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名，所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名用于所述服务器对所述TA实体进行信任验证；
当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，收发器1003从所述服务器接收响应消息，并向所述TA实体发送所述目标SD的第一密钥。
可选的，收发器1003从所述TA实体接收密钥更新请求，所密钥更新请求用于更新所述TA实体所存储的第一密钥；
收发器1003根据所述密钥更新请求从所述服务器获取第二密钥；
收发器1003向所述TA实体发送所述第二密钥。
可选的，处理器1001根据所述响应消息确定所述TA实体的信任验证是否成功；当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，收发器1003向所述TA实体发送所述目标SD的第一密钥。
本发明实施例所描述的各个器件在运行时还可以执行图2至图4任意实施例中目标SD所执行的步骤，详细内容可参照图2至图4实施例，此处不做赘述。
仍然参照图9，本发明实施例提供了另一种数据处理的装置，该装置为TA实体900，包括：处理器901、存储器902、收发器903，所述处理器901、所述存储器902以及所述收发器903通过总线904连接，收发器903可以包括发送器与接收器，所述存储器902存储有计算机指令，所述处理器901通过执行所述计算机指令用于实现：
收发器903向目标安全域SD发送所述TA实体的完整性凭据，所述完整性凭据用于所述目标SD对所述TA实体进行信任验证；
当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，收发器903从所述目标SD接收应答信息，所述应答信息用于指示所述目标SD与所述TA实体建立信任关联，所述应答信息中包含所述目标SD的第一密钥。
可选的，收发器903获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息，所述卡内容管理指示信息包括第一卡内容管理指令和授权码；
处理器901根据所述第一卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据，并根据所述第一密钥解密所述授权码；
处理器901将所述验证凭据与解密后的授权码进行匹配，当所述验证凭据与解密后的授权码匹配时，收发器903向所述目标SD发送所述第一卡内容管理指令。
可选的，收发器903获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息，所述卡内容管理指示信息包括第一卡内容管理指令和授权码；
处理器901根据所述第一卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据，并根据所述第一密钥解密所述授权码；
收发器903向所述目标SD发送所述验证凭据、解密后的授权码以及所述第一卡内容管理指令。
可选的，收发器903获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息之前，处理器901检测所述第一密钥是否有效；
当所述第一密钥无效时，收发器903从所述目标SD获取密钥更新信息；
处理器901根据所述密钥更新信息更新所述第一密钥。
可选的，处理器901从终端获取卡应用操作信息，所述卡应用操作信息用于对所述目标卡应用进行管理操作；
处理器901根据所述第一密钥和所述卡应用操作信息，生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码；
收发器903向所述目标SD发送所述第二卡内容管理指令和授权码。
可选的，处理器901根据卡应用操作信息确定第一生成模板；其中，所述第一生成模板为所述服务器配置在所述TA实体中的模板，所述第一生成模板与所述卡应用操作信息对应；
处理器901根据所述第一密钥和第一生成模板生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码，并将所述生成的第二卡内容管理指令和授权码写入所述第一生成模板中。
可选的，收发器903通过向安全单元SE发送所述TA实体的完整性凭据，将所述TA实体的完整性凭据发送至所述目标SD。
本发明实施例所描述的各个器件在运行时还可以执行图2至图4任意实施例中TA实体所执行的步骤，详细内容可参照图2至图4实施例，此处不做赘述。
仍然参照图10，本发明实施例提供了另一种数据处理的装置，该装置为目标SD 1000，包括：处理器1001、存储器1002、收发器1003，所述处理器1001、所述存储器1002以及所述收发器1003通过总线1004连接，收发器1003可以包括发送器与接收器，所述存储器1002存储有计算机指令，所述处理器1001通过执行所述计算机指令用于实现：
收发器1003从可信应用TA实体接收所述TA实体的完整性凭据；
处理器1001获取所述TA实体对应的根证书；
处理器1001根据所述根证书对所述完整性凭据进行校验；
当校验通过后，收发器1003向所述TA实体发送应答信息，所述应答信息用于指示所述目标SD与所述TA实体建立信任关联，所述应答信息中包含所述目标SD的第一密钥。
可选的，收发器1003从所述TA实体接收密钥更新请求，所密钥更新请求用于更新所述TA实体所存储的第一密钥；
收发器1003根据所述密钥更新请求从所述服务器获取第二密钥；
收发器1003向所述TA实体发送所述第二密钥。
所属领域的技术人员可以清楚地了解到，为描述的方便和简洁，上述描述的系统，装置和单元的具体工作过程，可以参考前述方法实施例中的对应过程，在此不再赘述。
本发明实施例所描述的各个器件在运行时还可以执行图2至图4任意实施例中目标SD所执行的步骤，详细内容可参照图2至图4实施例，此处不做赘述。
本发明实施例还提供一种数据处理的系统，该系统可以为终端，该终端可以为如图1所示的终端102，该终端可以包括各种具有无线通信功能的手持设备、车载设备、可穿戴设备、计算设备或连接到无线调制解调器的其它具备数据处理能力的设备。所述终端(terminal)也可以称为移动台(mobile station,简称MS)，用户设备(user equipment)，终端设备(terminal device)，还可以包括用户单元(subscriber unit)、蜂窝电话(cellular phone)、智能电话(smart phone)、无线数据卡、个人数字助理(personal digital assistant，PDA)电脑、平板型电脑、无线调制解调器(modem)、手持设备(handheld)、膝上型电脑(laptop computer)、无绳电话(cordless phone)或者无线本地环路(wireless local loop，WLL)台、机器类型通信(machine type communication,MTC)终端，本发明实施例对此不做限定。该终端包括如图5实施例所示的TA实体和图6实施例所示的目标SD；或者该终端可以包括如图7实施例所示的TA实体和图8实施例所示的目标SD。在另一种形式中，该终端还可以包括如图9实施例所示的TA实体和如图10实施例所示的目标SD。
本发明实施例还提供了一种芯片装置，所述芯片装置包括处理单元和通信单元，所述芯片装置包括处理单元和通信单元。可选的，所述芯片装置还包括存储单元，所述处理单元可以运行存储单元存储的指令，以使该芯片装置执行上述图2至图4任意实施例中TA实体和/或目标SD所执行的步骤。
本发明实施例还提供了一种芯片装置，所述芯片装置可以设置在终端内部。所述芯片装置包括：处理器和通信单元。所述处理器可以是各种类型的处理器。所述通信单元例如可以是输入/输出接口、管脚或电路等，所述通信单元包括系统总线。可选地，所述芯片还包括存储器，所述存储器可以是所述芯片装置内部的存储器，例如寄存器、缓存、随机存取存储器(random access memory，RAM)、EEPROM或者FLASH等；所述存储器还可以是位于所述芯片装置外部的存储器，该存储器可以是各种类型的存储器。处理器连接到存储器，该处理器可以运行存储器存储的指令，以使该芯片装置执行上述图2至图4任意实施例中TA实体和/或目标SD所执行的步骤。
本申请各个实施例涉及的处理器，可以是中央处理器(Central Processing Unit，CPU)、通用处理器、数字信号处理器(Digital Signal Processor，DSP)、专用集成电路(Application Specific Integrated Circuit，ASIC)、现场可编程门阵列(Field Programmable Gate Array，FPGA)或者其他可编程逻辑器件、晶体管逻辑器件，硬件部件 或者其任意组合。处理器780可以实现或执行结合本申请公开内容所描述的各种示例性的逻辑方框，模块和电路。处理器也可以是实现计算功能的组合，例如包含一个或多个微处理器组合，DSP和微处理器的组合等等。可选地，处理器可包括一个或多个处理单元。
本申请各个实施例涉及的存储器，可以包括易失性存储器，例如随机存取存储器(random access memory，RAM)、非挥发性动态随机存取内存(Nonvolatile Random Access Memory，NVRAM)、相变化随机存取内存(Phase Change RAM，PRAM)、磁阻式随机存取内存(Magetoresistive RAM，MRAM)等，还可以包括非易失性存储器，例如至少一个磁盘存储器件、只读存储器(read-only memory，ROM)、电子可擦除可编程只读存储器(Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory，EEPROM)、闪存器件，例如反或闪存(NOR flash memory)或是反与闪存(NAND flash memory)、半导体器件，例如固态硬盘(Solid State Disk，SSD)等。
本发明实施例的说明书和权利要求书及上述附图中的术语“第一”、“第二”，是用于区别类似的对象，而不必用于描述特定的顺序或先后次序。应该理解这样使用的数据在适当情况下可以互换，以便这里描述的实施例能够以除了在这里图示或描述的内容以外的顺序实施。此外，术语“包括”和“具有”以及他们的任何变形，意图在于覆盖不排他的包含，例如，包含了一系列步骤或单元的过程、方法、系统、产品或设备不必限于清楚地列出的那些步骤或单元，而是可包括没有清楚地列出的或对于这些过程、方法、产品或设备固有的其它步骤或单元。
在上述各个本发明实施例中，可以全部或部分地通过软件、硬件、固件或者其任意组合来实现。当使用软件实现时，可以全部或部分地以计算机程序产品的形式实现。所述计算机程序产品包括一个或多个计算机指令。在计算机上加载和执行所述计算机程序指令时，全部或部分地产生按照本发明实施例所述的流程或功能。所述计算机可以是通用计算机、专用计算机、计算机网络、或者其他可编程装置。所述计算机指令可以存储在计算机可读存储介质中，或者从一个计算机可读介质向另一个计算机可读介质传输，例如，所述计算机指令可以从一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心通过有线(例如同轴电缆、光纤、数字用户线(digital subscriber line，DSL))或无线(例如红外、无线、微波等)方式向另一个网站站点、计算机、服务器或数据中心进行传输。所述计算机可读存储介质可以是计算机能够存取的任何可用介质或者是包含一个或多个可用介质集成的服务器、数据中心等数据存储设备。所述可用介质可以是磁性介质(例如，软盘、硬盘、磁带)、光介质(例如，DVD)、或者半导体介质(例如，固态硬盘)等。以上所述，仅为本发明较佳的具体实施方式，但本发明的保护范围并不局限于此，任何熟悉本技术领域的技术人员在本发明揭露的技术范围内，可轻易想到的变化或替换，都应涵盖在本发明的保护范围之内。因此，本发明的保护范围应该以权利要求的保护范围为准。

Claims (34)

  1. 一种数据处理的方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    可信应用TA实体向目标安全域SD发送所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名；所述目标SD为安全单元SE中的SD，所述目标SD与目标卡应用对应；所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名用于所述目标SD通过服务器对所述TA实体进行信任验证；
    当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，所述TA实体获取所述目标SD的第一密钥。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述TA实体获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息，所述卡内容管理指示信息包括第一卡内容管理指令和授权码；
    所述TA实体根据所述第一卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据，并根据所述第一密钥解密所述授权码；
    所述TA实体将所述验证凭据与解密后的授权码进行匹配，当所述验证凭据与所述解密后的授权码匹配时，所述TA实体向所述目标SD发送所述第一卡内容管理指令。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述TA实体获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息，所述卡内容管理指示信息包括第一卡内容管理指令和授权码；
    所述TA实体根据所述第一卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据，并根据所述第一密钥解密所述授权码；
    所述TA实体向所述目标SD发送所述验证凭据、解密后的授权码以及所述第一卡内容管理指令。
  4. 根据权利要求2或3所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述TA实体获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述TA实体检测所述第一密钥是否有效；
    当所述第一密钥无效时，所述TA实体从所述目标SD获取密钥更新信息；
    所述TA实体根据所述密钥更新信息更新所述第一密钥。
  5. 根据权利要求1至4任意一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述TA实体从终端获取卡应用操作信息，所述卡应用操作信息用于对所述目标卡应用进行管理操作；
    所述TA实体根据所述第一密钥和所述卡应用操作信息，生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码；
    所述TA实体向所述目标SD发送所述第二卡内容管理指令和授权码。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的方法，其特征在于，所述TA实体根据所述第一密钥和所述卡应用操作信息，生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码，包括：
    所述TA实体根据卡应用操作信息确定第一生成模板；其中，所述第一生成模板为所述服务器配置在所述TA实体中的模板，所述第一生成模板与所述卡应用操作信息对应；
    所述TA实体根据所述第一密钥和第一生成模板生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码，并 将所述生成的第二卡内容管理指令和授权码写入所述第一生成模板中。
  7. 根据权利要求1至6任意一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述TA实体向目标SD发送所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名，包括：
    所述TA通过向安全单元SE发送所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名，将所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名发送至所述目标SD。
  8. 一种数据处理的方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    目标安全域SD从可信应用TA实体接收所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名；所述目标SD为安全单元SE中的SD，所述目标SD与目标卡应用对应；
    所述目标SD向服务器发送所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名，所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名用于所述服务器对所述TA实体进行信任验证；
    当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，所述目标SD从所述服务器接收响应消息，并且，所述目标SD向所述TA实体发送所述目标SD的第一密钥。
  9. 根据权利要求8所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述目标SD从所述TA实体接收密钥更新请求，所密钥更新请求用于更新所述TA实体所存储的第一密钥；
    所述目标SD根据所述密钥更新请求从所述服务器获取第二密钥；
    所述目标SD向所述TA实体发送所述第二密钥。
  10. 根据权利要求8或9所述的方法，其特征在于，所述目标SD向所述TA实体发送所述目标SD的第一密钥，包括：
    所述目标SD根据所述响应消息确定所述TA实体的信任验证是否成功；
    当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，所述目标SD向所述TA实体发送所述目标SD的第一密钥。
  11. 一种数据处理的方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    可信应用TA实体向目标安全域SD发送所述TA实体的完整性凭据，所述完整性凭据用于所述目标SD对所述TA实体进行信任验证；
    当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，所述TA实体从所述目标SD接收应答信息，所述应答信息用于指示所述目标SD与所述TA实体建立信任关联，所述应答信息中包含所述目标SD的第一密钥。
  12. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述TA实体获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息，所述卡内容管理指示信息包括第一卡内容管理指令和授权码；
    所述TA实体根据所述第一卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据，并根据所述第一密钥解密所述授权码；
    所述TA实体将所述验证凭据与解密后的授权码进行匹配，当所述验证凭据与所述解密后的授权码匹配时，所述TA实体向所述目标SD发送所述第一卡内容管理指令。
  13. 根据权利要求11所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述TA实体获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息，所述卡内容管理指示信息包 括第一卡内容管理指令和授权码；
    所述TA实体根据所述第一卡内容管理指令获得验证凭据，并根据所述第一密钥解密所述授权码；
    所述TA实体向所述目标SD发送所述验证凭据、解密后的授权码以及所述第一卡内容管理指令。
  14. 根据权利要求12或13所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述TA实体获取所述服务器发送的卡内容管理指示信息之前，所述方法还包括：
    所述TA实体检测所述第一密钥是否有效；
    当所述第一密钥无效时，所述TA实体从所述目标SD获取密钥更新信息；
    所述TA实体根据所述密钥更新信息更新所述第一密钥。
  15. 根据权利要求11至14任意一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述TA实体从终端获取卡应用操作信息，所述卡应用操作信息用于对所述目标卡应用进行管理操作；
    所述TA实体根据所述第一密钥和所述卡应用操作信息，生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码；
    所述TA实体向所述目标SD发送所述第二卡内容管理指令和授权码。
  16. 根据权利要求15所述的方法，其特征在于，所述TA实体根据所述第一密钥和所述卡应用操作信息，生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码，包括：
    所述TA实体根据卡应用操作信息确定第一生成模板；其中，所述第一生成模板为所述服务器配置在所述TA实体中的模板，所述第一生成模板与所述卡应用操作信息对应；
    所述TA实体根据所述第一密钥和第一生成模板生成第二卡内容管理指令和授权码，并将所述生成的第二卡内容管理指令和授权码写入所述第一生成模板中。
  17. 根据权利要求11至16任意一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述TA向目标SD发送所述TA的完整性凭据，包括：
    所述TA通过向安全单元SE发送所述TA实体的完整性凭据，将所述TA实体的完整性凭据发送至所述目标SD。
  18. 一种数据处理的方法，其特征在于，所述方法包括：
    目标安全域SD从可信应用TA实体接收所述TA实体的完整性凭据；
    所述目标SD获取所述TA实体对应的根证书；
    所述目标SD根据所述根证书对所述完整性凭据进行校验；
    当校验通过后，所述目标SD向所述TA实体发送应答信息，所述应答信息用于指示所述目标SD与所述TA实体建立信任关联，所述应答信息中包含所述目标SD的第一密钥。
  19. 根据权利要求18所述的方法，其特征在于，所述方法还包括：
    所述目标SD从所述TA实体接收密钥更新请求，所密钥更新请求用于更新所述TA实体所存储的第一密钥；
    所述目标SD根据所述密钥更新请求从所述服务器获取第二密钥；
    所述目标SD向所述TA实体发送所述第二密钥。
  20. 一种数据处理的装置，所述装置为可信应用TA实体，其特征在于，包括：
    发送单元，用于向目标安全域SD发送TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名；所述目标SD为安全单元SE中的SD，所述目标SD与目标卡应用对应；所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名用于所述目标SD向服务器进行信任验证；
    获取单元，用于当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，获取所述目标SD的第一密钥。
  21. 一种数据处理的装置，所述装置为目标安全域SD，其特征在于，包括：
    接收单元，用于从可信应用TA实体接收所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名；所述目标SD为安全单元SE中的SD，所述目标SD与目标卡应用对应；
    发送单元，用于向服务器发送所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名，所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名用于所述服务器对所述TA实体进行信任验证；
    所述接收单元还用于，当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，从所述服务器接收响应消息；
    所述发送单元还用于，向所述TA实体发送所述目标SD的第一密钥。
  22. 一种数据处理的装置，所述装置为可信应用TA实体，其特征在于，所述装置包括：
    发送单元，用于向目标安全域SD发送所述TA实体的完整性凭据，所述完整性凭据用于所述目标SD对所述TA实体进行信任验证；
    接收单元，用于当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，从所述目标SD接收应答信息，所述应答信息用于指示所述目标SD与所述TA实体建立信任关联，所述应答信息中包含所述目标SD的第一密钥。
  23. 一种数据处理的装置，所述装置为目标安全域SD，其特征在于，所述装置包括：
    接收单元，用于从可信应用TA实体接收所述TA实体的完整性凭据；
    获取单元，用于获取所述TA实体对应的根证书；
    处理单元，用于根据所述根证书对所述完整性凭据进行校验；
    发送单元，用于当校验通过后，向所述TA实体发送应答信息，所述应答信息用于指示所述目标SD与所述TA实体建立信任关联，所述应答信息中包含所述目标SD的第一密钥。
  24. 一种数据处理的装置，所述装置为可信应用TA实体，包括：处理器、存储器和收发器，其中，所述处理器、存储器以及收发器通过总线连接，所述存储器存储有计算机指令，所述处理器通过执行计算机指令用于实现：
    所述收发器，用于向目标安全域SD发送TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名；所述目标SD为安全单元SE中的SD，所述目标SD与目标卡应用对应；所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名用于所述目标SD向服务器进行信任验证；
    所述收发器，还用于当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，获取所述目标SD的第一密钥。
  25. 一种数据处理的装置，所述装置为目标安全域SD，包括：处理器、存储器和收发器，其中，所述处理器、存储器以及收发器通过总线连接，所述存储器存储有计算机指令，所述处理器通过执行计算机指令用于实现：
    所述收发器，用于从可信应用TA实体接收所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名；所述目标SD为安全单元SE中的SD，所述目标SD与目标卡应用对应；
    所述收发器，还用于向服务器发送所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名， 所述TA实体的证书以及所述TA实体的私钥签名用于所述服务器对所述TA实体进行信任验证；
    所述收发器，还用于当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，从所述服务器接收响应消息，并向所述TA实体发送所述目标SD的第一密钥。
  26. 一种数据处理的装置，所述装置为可信应用TA实体，包括：处理器、存储器和收发器，其中，所述处理器、存储器以及收发器通过总线连接，所述存储器存储有计算机指令，所述处理器通过执行计算机指令用于实现：
    所述收发器，用于向目标安全域SD发送所述TA实体的完整性凭据，所述完整性凭据用于所述目标SD对所述TA实体进行信任验证；
    所述收发器，还用于当所述TA实体的信任验证成功时，从所述目标SD接收应答信息，所述应答信息用于指示所述目标SD与所述TA实体建立信任关联，所述应答信息中包含所述目标SD的第一密钥。
  27. 一种数据处理的装置，所述装置为目标安全域SD，包括：处理器、存储器和收发器，其中，所述处理器、存储器以及收发器通过总线连接，所述存储器存储有计算机指令，所述处理器通过执行计算机指令用于实现：
    所述收发器，用于从可信应用TA实体接收所述TA实体的完整性凭据；
    所述处理器，用于获取所述TA实体对应的根证书；
    所述处理器，还用于根据所述根证书对所述完整性凭据进行校验；
    所述收发器，还用于当校验通过后，向所述TA实体发送应答信息，所述应答信息用于指示所述目标SD与所述TA实体建立信任关联，所述应答信息中包含所述目标SD的第一密钥。
  28. 一种计算机可读存储介质，包括指令，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行如权利要求1至19任意一项所述的方法。
  29. 一种包含指令的计算机程序产品，当其在计算机上运行时，使得计算机执行如权利要求1至19任意一项所述的方法。
  30. 一种数据处理的系统，包括如权利要求20所述的可信应用TA实体和如权利要求21所述的目标安全域SD；或者，包括如权利要求22所述的TA实体和如权利要求23所述的目标SD。
  31. 一种数据处理的系统，包括如权利要求24所述的可信应用TA实体和如权利要求25所述的目标安全域SD；或者，包括如权利要求26所述的TA实体和如权利要求27所述的目标SD。
  32. 一种芯片装置，其特征在于，包括：
    处理器和存储器；
    所述存储器包括指令，所述处理器运行所述指令以使所述芯片装置实现如权利要求1至7任意一项或者权利要求11至17任意一项所述的方法。
  33. 一种芯片装置，其特征在于，包括：
    处理器和存储器；
    所述存储器包括指令，所述处理器运行所述指令以使所述芯片装置实现如权利要求8至10任意一项或者权利要求18或19所述的方法。
  34. 一种芯片装置，其特征在于，包括：
    处理器和存储器；
    所述存储器包括指令，所述处理器运行所述指令以使所述芯片装置实现如权利要求1至10任意一项或者权利要求11至19任意一项所述的方法。
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