WO2019040712A1 - Procédé et système pour une vente aux enchères en marché décentralisée - Google Patents

Procédé et système pour une vente aux enchères en marché décentralisée Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019040712A1
WO2019040712A1 PCT/US2018/047691 US2018047691W WO2019040712A1 WO 2019040712 A1 WO2019040712 A1 WO 2019040712A1 US 2018047691 W US2018047691 W US 2018047691W WO 2019040712 A1 WO2019040712 A1 WO 2019040712A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
auction
data
smart
smart contract
oracles
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PCT/US2018/047691
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English (en)
Inventor
Kurosh Santos KHAJVANDI
Monis Rahman
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Mochi, Inc.
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Publication of WO2019040712A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019040712A1/fr

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/06—Buying, selling or leasing transactions
    • G06Q30/08—Auctions
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
    • G06Q20/06—Private payment circuits, e.g. involving electronic currency used among participants of a common payment scheme
    • G06Q20/065—Private payment circuits, e.g. involving electronic currency used among participants of a common payment scheme using e-cash
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/22—Payment schemes or models
    • G06Q20/223—Payment schemes or models based on the use of peer-to-peer networks
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G06Q20/3829—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction involving key management
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/389—Keeping log of transactions for guaranteeing non-repudiation of a transaction
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
    • H04L9/3236—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions
    • H04L9/3239—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials using cryptographic hash functions involving non-keyed hash functions, e.g. modification detection codes [MDCs], MD5, SHA or RIPEMD
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/50—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols using hash chains, e.g. blockchains or hash trees
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q2220/00—Business processing using cryptography
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L2209/00—Additional information or applications relating to cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communication H04L9/00
    • H04L2209/56—Financial cryptography, e.g. electronic payment or e-cash

Definitions

  • Blockchain today is comparable to the internet in the early 1990s, where 9,600 bits per second modems were just entering the market.
  • Today Ethereum runs at a mere -13 transactions per second.
  • Blockchain developer tools and protocols today are similarly comparable to web developer tools in the early 1990s before Stripe created a standardized simple protocol to accept credit card payments and Amazon AWS introduced simple cloud computing that made it easy for anyone to deploy a web application.
  • FIG. 1 is a graphical illustration of expected market participants in a decentralized application store according to an embodiment
  • FIG. 2 is a functional schematic illustration of components employed in a decentralized auction according to an embodiment
  • FIG. 3 is a functional schematic illustration of components employed in a decentralized auction according to an embodiment
  • FIG. 4 is a tabular illustration of the results of a decentralized auction according to an embodiment
  • FIG. 5 is a tabular illustration of the results of a decentralized auction according to an embodiment
  • FIG. 6 is a tabular illustration of the results of a decentralized auction according to an embodiment
  • FIG. 7 is a tabular illustration of the results of a decentralized auction according to an embodiment
  • FIG. 8 is a functional schematic illustration of components employed in a decentralized auction according to an embodiment
  • FIG. 9 is a timeline illustration of the results of a decentralized cloud-file storage market auction according to an embodiment
  • FIG. 10 is a timeline illustration of the results of a decentralized cloud-file storage market auction according to an embodiment.
  • FIG. 11 is a supply-and-demand illustration of the results of a decentralized cloud-file storage market auction according to an embodiment.
  • Embodiments of the present invention may comprise or utilize a special- purpose or general-purpose computer including computer hardware, such as, for example, one or more processors and system memory, as discussed in greater detail below.
  • Embodiments within the scope of the present invention also include physical and other computer-readable media for carrying or storing computer-executable instructions or data structures.
  • one or more of the processes described herein may be implemented at least in part as instructions embodied in a non-transitory computer-readable medium and executable by one or more computing devices (e.g., any of the media content access devices described herein).
  • a processor receives instructions, from a non-transitory computer-readable medium, (e.g., a memory, etc.), and executes those instructions, thereby performing one or more processes, including one or more of the processes described herein.
  • a non-transitory computer-readable medium e.g., a memory, etc.
  • Computer-readable media can be any available media that can be accessed by a general purpose or special-purpose computer system.
  • Computer-readable media that store computer-executable instructions are non-transitory computer-readable storage media (devices).
  • Computer-readable media that carry computer-executable instructions are transmission media.
  • embodiments of the invention can comprise at least two distinctly different kinds of computer-readable media: non-transitory computer-readable storage media (devices) and transmission media.
  • Non-transitory computer-readable storage media includes RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM, solid state drives (“SSDs”) (e.g., based on RAM), Flash memory, phase-change memory (“PCM”), other types of memory, other optical disk storage, magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium which can be used to store desired program code means in the form of computer-executable instructions or data structures and which can be accessed by a general purpose or special-purpose computer.
  • SSDs solid state drives
  • PCM phase-change memory
  • a "network” is defined as one or more data links that enable the transport of electronic data between computer systems or modules or other electronic devices.
  • a network or another communications connection can include a network or data links which can be used to carry desired program code means in the form of computer-executable instructions or data structures and which can be accessed by a general purpose or special-purpose computer. Combinations of the above should also be included within the scope of computer-readable media.
  • program code means in the form of computer-executable instructions or data structures can be transferred automatically from transmission media to non-transitory computer-readable storage media (devices) (or vice versa).
  • computer-executable instructions or data structures received over a network or data link can be buffered in RAM within a network interface module (e.g., a "NIC"), and then eventually transferred to computer system RAM or to less volatile computer storage media (devices) at a computer system.
  • a network interface module e.g., a "NIC”
  • non-transitory computer-readable storage media (devices) can be included in computer system components that also (or even primarily) utilize transmission media.
  • Computer-executable instructions comprise, for example, instructions and data which, when executed at a processor, cause a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, or special-purpose processing device to perform a certain function or group of functions.
  • computer-executable instructions are executed on a general- purpose computer to turn the general-purpose computer into a special-purpose computer implementing elements of the invention.
  • the computer executable instructions may be, for example, binaries, intermediate format instructions such as assembly language, or even source code.
  • the combination of software or computer-executable instructions with a computer-readable medium results in the creation of a machine or apparatus.
  • the execution of software or computer-executable instructions by a processing device results in the creation of a machine or apparatus, which may be distinguishable from the processing device, itself, according to an embodiment.
  • a computer-readable medium is transformed by storing software or computer-executable instructions thereon.
  • a processing device is transformed in the course of executing software or computer-executable instructions.
  • a first set of data input to a processing device during, or otherwise in association with, the execution of software or computer- executable instructions by the processing device is transformed into a second set of data as a consequence of such execution.
  • This second data set may subsequently be stored, displayed, or otherwise communicated.
  • Such transformation alluded to in each of the above examples, may be a consequence of, or otherwise involve, the physical alteration of portions of a computer-readable medium.
  • Such transformation may also be a consequence of, or otherwise involve, the physical alteration of, for example, the states of registers and/or counters associated with a processing device during execution of software or computer-executable instructions by the processing device.
  • a process that is performed "automatically” may mean that the process is performed as a result of machine-executed instructions and does not, other than the establishment of user preferences, require manual effort.
  • the present protocol token blockchain runs protocols that provide standards for cross-blockchain login, payment, governance, and oracles such as the novel universal proof of stake oracle.
  • a strong developer community and open APIs have been key to the success of Facebook®, Salesforce, and eBay® and will similarly be key to the success of blockchain and expanding it to the masses.
  • every developer can be a blockchain developer through cross-blockchain and internet bridging protocols.
  • An embodiment similarly streamlines blockchain integration through a set of protocol APIs that bridge the gap between blockchains and internet-connected applications.
  • blockchain technology will experience exponential growth similar to the telephone system because of positive network effects and feedback loops, which will develop and become stronger with each blockchain integration.
  • blockchain will become the fastest growing technology of all time because it is a network system that rides on top of, and leverages, the most powerful network to date— the internet.
  • a company creates its own token, it creates a cryptographically secure decentralized organizing utility upon which it can self-govern and moderate its platform through an open community of members. For example, an organization with its own token can hold secure community votes in which each token represents one vote. If the organization relied on Bitcoin it would open its proposal voting to all Bitcoin holders, the vast majority of which would have no vested stake or interest in the organization and its platform.
  • the holders of the token have a specific vested interest in the organization and platform and therefore a token acts as a form of proof of membership to ensure that only people that are a part of the community can vote.
  • token-based voting can be broadened and used for additional vested proof of stake required micro-actions throughout a platform.
  • Wikipedia could require that editors have some tokens at stake before editing an article. Such a proof of stake requirement can help reduce spam and other unwanted behavior.
  • This could additionally be broadened to reward community members who contribute positively to the community and additionally penalize members that harm the community by taking away some of their at-stake tokens.
  • This type of decentralized self-governance and moderation will result in significant value creation and disintermediation.
  • Today's legacy global payment infrastructure is centralized, convoluted, and expensive.
  • Accepting credit and debit cards involves a three-step authorization, clearing, and settlement process that depends on payment gateways, terminals, merchant banks, credit card associations, cardholder banks, and other stakeholders resulting in high fees and slow payment finalization. Legacy payments are also expensive often costing approximately $0.30 + 2.9% per transaction.
  • Blockchain technology has the potential to simplify global payments by disintermediating large financial institutions and thus significantly reducing transaction costs.
  • current blockchain developer APIs and frameworks are in their infancy and are very hard to use.
  • Blockchain developer technology today is similar to payment developer frameworks before Stripe.
  • the present system's API provides a universal interface to accepting any blockchain token.
  • it is very complicated to accept, manage, and secure tokens. For example, if a video game developer creates an Ethereum ERC20 token that acts as their in-game credits, it is complicated to move tokens between the Ethereum network and their backend accounting system.
  • the present system's API simplifies all this by providing a REST API that returns (JavaScript Object Notation) JSON and uses secure webhooks to alert developers of incoming token transfers.
  • the present system's API according to an embodiment currently works with any ERC20 token such as: Golem, Augur, Iconomi, Bancor, Storj, Status, Credo, etc.
  • Tokens can be used to represent membership to a service and can be used as a login mechanism. Any service that uses tokens as a login mechanism has similar technical infrastructure needs analogous to token payment infrastructure.
  • An embodiment provides a simple REST API that abstracts low-level blockchain development required to verify token ownership at time of login and facilitate verified login.
  • Using a token to represent a subscription provides several benefits including increased anonymity, lower transaction fees, and the potential for an independent secondary market to develop providing greater value for subscribers and incentive to purchase a subscription or membership early. The secondary market will allow people to anonymously buy and sell their membership without ever transacting over centralized financial institutions such as credit cards, debit cards, or bank accounts allowing for completely anonymity assuming an anonymous protocol such as PIVX is used.
  • Multiple tiers of membership can also be represented through tokens by requiring a different number of tokens to access different levels. For example, a basic membership might only require one token to login while the plus membership might require five tokens, for example, to login.
  • Blockchain based governance will follow the same model and be offered to developers by the present system via standard protocols and APIs that they can use to facilitate token-based voting and vested at-stake micro-actions that result in token rewards or penalties based on community feedback.
  • DApps Decentralized Applications
  • Embodiments of the invention may include a universal DApp Store that will be similar to the Apple® App Store and Google® Play Store. Any app that accepts the present token will be listed in the DApp Store.
  • the DApp Store will also integrate the present token for a universal decentralized credit system.
  • DApps can be incentivized to accept the present token in the DApp Store because of the network effects of the DApp Store and present token.
  • the present token can experience similar network effects to the Internet in which the token becomes more valuable as more people use it. This is in parallel to a developer having its own token primarily for governance reasons.
  • a developer that has its own token will still want to accept the easiest to use and cheapest form of payment from transient users so they are not turned away. Simultaneously, a developer with its own token will want to limit governance and at-stake based micro-actions to users with a vested stake in their community and platform.
  • the DApp Store and present Network provide a platform to easily support both use cases.
  • Blockchain “content” in the form of apps will only come to fruition if the best developers are given an economic incentive in advance of mass market adoption by end users. Such an option is only accessible by major enterprises with significant funding.
  • ® x is the number of market participants in the DApp store, which represents the demand or consumer Side
  • ® y is the number of developers in the DApp store
  • ® dx/dt is the growth rate of market participants with respect to time
  • ® a, ⁇ , ⁇ , ⁇ are positive real parameters that describe the interactions of the developers and market participants.
  • Any individual pays a price, measured here in terms of the present system to become a market participant of the DApp store; in fact any potential individual will have a maximum limit on the price the individual would be willing to pay to participate.
  • This reserve price may be represented as follows:
  • the term g( x )f ⁇ ) represents the fact that market participants who derive a larger benefit, benefit more from an increase in the fraction of the population becoming market participants than those market participants that have smaller values.
  • ⁇ is the solution of the following equations Taking the inverse we can obtain ⁇ :
  • One or more embodiments give community members the power to vote on important proposals for the network's developmental roadmap.
  • Legacy commerce and social network ecosystems disenfranchise their existing user base, both developers and end users. Instead, these centralized networks of the old internet often leverage user generated data for profit using targeted-ads. As a result, virtually none of the value created by the user is shared with them. That said, blockchain governance can provide utilitarian outcomes if deployed cautiously and strategically.
  • An embodiment gives its community of developers and end users the right to actively participate, propose, and vote on the future development of the underlying software.
  • Any developer or end user in the present community can submit a proposal for other community members to vote on. In order to generate a proposal for community consideration a minimum is required.
  • the amount of token a community member holds is directly proportional to their voting power at any given time. It does not cost tokens to exercise a vote for proposals.
  • the community shall define the cadence for proposal calls and votes.
  • Blockchains exist in the digital world and only have access to data that is fed into them.
  • oracles are specialized applications that provide access to external data, essentially feeding the blockchain with information, which is consumed by well-defined smart contracts.
  • Smart contracts are built to consume information from oracles. Smart contracts are designed to be triggered depending on events, which are reported to them by oracles, performing pre-programmed tasks based on data inputs. Thus, one of the primary tasks of an oracle is to provide information to smart contracts.
  • a proof of stake protocol is used to incentivize oracles to provide correct data and penalize oracles that provide incorrect data.
  • the present system's Universal proof of stake oracle Protocol PSOP
  • PSOP Universal proof of stake oracle Protocol
  • Oracles that provide incorrect data will be penalized, losing their vested present tokens while oracles that provide correct data will be compensated with the present tokens by data consumers. Any oracles found to be providing incorrect data will lose some portion of their vested and staked tokens.
  • Market designs that incentivize authentication, validation and ultimately successful aggregation of information will be implemented as part of the Proof of Stake Protocol.
  • One way to overcome quality issues is to devise a rating mechanism like a quality score.
  • the smart contracts would be provided with a quality rating based on the oracles past performance and price. Quality scores are aggregated based on past performance, price, and proof of verification.
  • the present system allows audits of oracles. Prequalifying oracle's entry into the auction helps set up a segmented market for oracle data. High fidelity oracles would participate in a separate market from low fidelity and newly minted oracles. One format would run a high-fidelity auction where entry would require a minimum quality score.
  • Software oracles provide access to online data like an oracle to trending twitter handles while Hardware oracles provide access to real world data like IoT or RFID data.
  • a further classification is the direction of the data flow with Inbound oracles providing data to the block chain and Outbound oracles providing data to the real world from the block chain.
  • An important subclass are the Consensus oracles which as the name suggests work by consensus. With multiple oracles providing similar data which may have reliability issues, consensus-based rules are used to parse and aggregate the data provided. Example multiple weather IoT devices provide temperature readings and a consensus temperature reading is calculated.
  • Consider a game theoretic viewpoint Here we are interested in the private information that oracles hold and their actions as self-interested rational agents while participating in a market to sell their data.
  • N ⁇ 0,1, njdenote a list of oracles in an auction of data on the blockchain. In one embodiment this would be a reverse or procurement auction, where '0' denotes the auctioneer.
  • Type t l represents all the value, information, beliefs, utility and preferences of the oracle i.
  • Oracles with independent private values In game theory parlance oracles whose valuations of the data they supply only depends on their own typet and the types are statistically independent. Further the valuations are privately held by the oracles and not publicly known. They are not affected by other competing oracles during participation in the data smart market. This independence in valuation leads to a strong dependence between the bids placed in the reverse auction and the private valuations of the oracle.
  • Oracles with interdependent values do not know their own valuations themselves, they are prone to mimic valuations of competing oracles, more strongly the distribution of types tof the oracles are statistically dependent. This leads to a weaker relationship between the bids placed and the actual valuations.
  • Oracles who want to supply data may be required to sign a contract with an ancillary staker that verifies, validates and authenticates the oracle's data and then stakes the present system on behalf of the oracle, to participate in the auction. In case of issues in the data, the ancillary staker is held responsible.
  • Ancillary Stakers Ancillary stakers are essentially a kind of smart contract with a specialized role in the proof of stake oracle Protocol. Stakers are third parties: independent from the oracles, whose primary job is to validate oracle data and stake their present tokens reputation on the data, for which they can charge oracles a percentage cut of the proceeds from the sale of the data. Stakers are like reverse insurance agents. This is the scenario where the oracle may not be willing to stake on its own.
  • Premium auctions A bid specifies the premium rate that a smart contract can add in addition to the onward sale of data supplied by newly minted oracles. New oracles sell their data at such auctions which are bought by ancillary stakers and intermediary smart contracts for processing and onwards sale under a white-label equivalent arrangement. The white labeled data would have a higher quality rating.
  • Blockchain smart markets are auctions harnessing blockchain technology that clear periodically. Transactions take place between distinct pools of smart contracts acting as buyer and sellers rather than bilaterally. Pools of oracles may also participate but may be restricted to being sellers. Decentralized smart contracts submit bids to buy and offers to sell data or services in a commoditized manner. The whole process is managed by an 'auctioneer'. Clearing the market usually involves the auctioneer solving complex mathematical optimization problems with arbitrary constraints periodically to maximize the gains from trade. Smart markets are designed to reduce transaction costs significantly and eliminate externalities while allowing for competition not possible in more traditional settings.
  • the time period of smart markets is the time between successive instances of the market clearing. It may range from a few milliseconds to a few days. Markets include one sided forward auctions (demand only), one sided reverse auctions (supply only) and two- sided auctions with supply and demand components.
  • An embodiment implements blockchain smart markets protocol that allow auctioneers, market designers and game theorist to work in sync with developers to easily design and quickly deploy smart markets to enable the trade of commoditized data and services in a secure and transparent manner.
  • a smart market for the sale of oracle data may rely on both the Oracle Proof of Stake Protocol and the blockchain smart markets protocol.
  • a blockchain smart markets protocol implements and runs markets for decentralized cloud services including file storage and cloud computing.
  • Game theory is concerned with the mathematical modeling strategic behavior of market participants under specified rules. It is the part of economics concerned with the detailed rules and procedures of economic institutions (like markets and auctions). Contracts are games designed by the principal and played by the agents, which are the other oracles and smart contracts with the monetary transfer being in a crypto-token. Auctions are games designed by the auctioneer and played by the bidders.
  • An embodiment provides for the trade or exchange of information, using the blockchain infrastructure, between oracles and smart contracts.
  • This market uses the proof of stake oracle protocol and the blockchain smart markets protocol.
  • One or more embodiments provide the following features:
  • a two sided auction determines prices with some contractual language that guarantees data authenticity. Information supplied by oracles would be encrypted and fed to the blockchain. The encryption keys would then be sold to smart contracts which want to access the data, after which the oracles would be paid for their information. This is implemented using an auction as follows.
  • Information or IoT device data is 'produced' according to predefined terms in the auction contract. Data integrity, authenticity and validity requirements are part of the terms that govern the auction. This is made available by 'oracles', encrypted and added onto the blockchain. Encryption keys are sold at auction. RSA is used to encrypt the data.
  • An auction Private and Public key is created.
  • the Public key is declared and added to the blockchain.
  • Oracles desiring to take part in the auction add data to the blockchain and encrypt it using the auctioneer's public key (in an embodiment, the auctioneer is the oracle).
  • the winning smart contracts are then provided with private keys to decrypt the data after the auction ends.
  • Step 1 Forward Auction: Incentive Compatible Direct Mechanism for the sale of Information is required and the present system uses a modified Combinatorial VCG Auction is used.
  • the auction allows multiple keys for the same data set to be sold. Smart contracts may bid additional amounts to restrict sale of additional keys.
  • Step 2 Reverse Auction: To run a reverse (procurement auction) to buy data from oracles. Simultaneous Descending (Dutch) auction is used to select oracles which would be selling the data to smart contracts. Reserve price (opening price in case of the dutch auction) is set according to the closing price in the forward auction plus a markup. The initial price (or the effective reserve price) is the clearing price in the forward auction plus a markup.
  • Step 3 Clearing Price: The present system combines bids in the reverse and forward auction to determine how many and which combination of keys to sell.
  • Encryption keys would be sold at a forward auction using a modified combinatorial auction version of the weighted Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism.
  • a game set-up for VCG auction of oracle data to smart contracts is below.
  • Type t represents all the value, information, beliefs, utility and preferences of the smart contract i.
  • Every smart contract values the outcome of the auction and we denote smart contract z's value as V(x,t l ). The value is dependent on the outcome of the auction and the type t of the smart contract. Further the utility that the smart contract i derives from auction is:
  • the auctioneer denoted as smart contract 0 solves the following optimization problem to determine the outcome of the auction along with the constraints above: wgm x. ⁇ Y v ! (x, f)
  • the auction mechanism at equilibrium is incentive compatible. Weakly dominant strategy for each smart contract is to truthfully bid its true value. This is functionally equal to a second price auction.
  • An embodiment of the invention maximizes the revenue from the auction. Same data can be sold multiple times or equivalently multiple private encryption keys to the same data can be sold. The analog of this in the non-blockchain world is the sale of mp3 songs at a digital music store. This leads to some fundamental questions. How should bids be combined to determine the quantity transacted? Should the effect of bids on quantity transacted be recognized in the reverse auction incentive analysis?
  • Smart contracts will have the ability to be sole consumers of the data available at auction by outbidding the sum of all the competing bids.
  • the number of tokens required to buy oracle data at equilibrium, essentially the clearing price, is set by the oracles as a response to smart contract demand. This endogeneity of the quantity of data traded holds true even in a two-sided auction.
  • an embodiment conducts a second price auction where the winning smart contract pays the second highest bid. For example: consider 1 oracle selling a single instance of a data set with three smart contracts bidding. Only one copy of the data is to be sold at auction.
  • multiple keys to the same data can be sold.
  • the Oracle may sell the same data multiple times. This can be easily accomplished by selling multiple private encryption keys.
  • the winning smart contract pays its bid unless there is a lower winning bidder. If there is a lower winning bidder then the winning smart contract pays the lower bidders price. [0125] Referring to FIGS. 6 and 7, and in an embodiment, the smart contracts can have the option to block further sales by paying an increment called the blocking increment.
  • the blocking increment is the sum of all the blocked bids.
  • STEP 1 The auction is run as if no blocking takes place, and second price payments are calculated.
  • STEP 2 Blocking increment is calculated as the sum of all blocked winning bids.
  • STEP 3 All blocked winning bids are then added to the blocking winners payments calculated in STEP 1. The blocked winners bids are decremented appropriately from their payments.
  • Blocking Winner Payment Second price bid + Blocking increment
  • any smart contract buying oracle data will automatically be charged the blocking increment for the section of data that no other smart contract ends up buying.
  • Smart contracts place demand tuples of the keys that they want, where 1 indicates wanted, 0 indicates not wanted, X indicates blocking.
  • the first key may actually be very expensive to produce but oracles can produce additional keys at zero marginal cost hence there is effectively an unlimited supply of encryption keys.
  • the oracles do not have any supply restrictions other than those they voluntarily impose themselves or restrictions imposed by the auctioneer. The oracles and the auctioneer actually will have to artificially reduce supply in order to increase revenues.
  • the optimal singleton price is the k* + 1th highest bid which in the VCG mechanism is the value of the k* + 1th highest bidding smart contract.
  • the random sampling optimal price auction game may be played as follows:
  • Step 1 Randomly partition the smart contracts N into two sets Nl and N2.
  • Step 2 Using the above procedure find payments " the optimal singleton prices for each set.
  • Step 3 Clearing prices and allocations are calculated as follows:
  • Random sampling optimal price auctions are dominant-strategy truthful, weakly budget balanced and ex post individually rational.
  • Button auctions are those where the only options for a smart contract is to decide when to withdraw from the auction.
  • the block button auction is a demand side forward auction when static oracle data supply is available.
  • Smart contracts are the participants and are assisted by demand side distributed platforms. All transactions are settled and are settled in the next block created at the end of the auction.
  • any participating smart contract has one choice to make, whether to participate in the next block or drop out. Once a smart contract drops out there is no re-entry. The last smart contract remaining wins the auction. Each round the bids and demand tuples change.
  • the final block price is the second highest smart contract's valuation.
  • an embodiment includes a Real Time Intra-block Bidding arrangement.
  • This arrangement includes applications in an IoT Data Marketplace and Demand and supply side distributed platforms.
  • Real-time block bidding is the buying and selling of oracle data through real-time auctions that occur in the time it takes a new block to be added to the blockchain.
  • An embodiment may include a cloud-file storage market apart from long-term contracts.
  • a simple order matching market suffices for long-term contracts. These may be termed as Look Ahead markets for Cloud file storage.
  • a Day Ahead market Market to rent and host storage space for the next calendar day in 15 minute blocks. It is a closed double-sided anonymous auction for each 15 minute blocks for the following day.
  • a Term Ahead Market provides for trade in storage 15 min after settlement time. This is carried out for each 15 min block in the term ahead or the day ahead market.
  • Interested buyers specify requested durations, level of data redundancy and maximum buying price.
  • the bid and ask orders are accumulated to determine market clearing price and market clearing volume. Orders are matched after each call period. An equilibrium or clearing price is calculated and all orders are settled at this clearing price.
  • a supply and demand curve may be plotted: All the asks are ranked in order of increasing price and the supply curve is plotted and all the bids are ranked in decreasing order of price and plotted. This is the supply-demand curve.
  • Market clearing is the point of intersection of the demand and supply curves.
  • the price at that point represents the market clearing price or the equilibrium price and the quantity at that point is the market clearing volume. All the bids submitted at a price lower than or equal to the market clearing price are accepted. Similarly, all the offers submitted at a price greater than or equal to the market clearing price are accepted.
  • P* represents the market clearing price
  • Q* represents the market clearing volume.
  • a swaps agent is also run by the market manager to manage a long term market.
  • the swaps agent enters a contract with a supplier/buyer of storage space to provide a fixed rate while collecting the variable market rate.
  • Swaps may be bought on nominal amounts (actual market participation is not required). Settlement is done on a marginal basis. This allows participants to get fixed prices rather than pay floating daily spot prices.

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Abstract

La présente invention concerne un procédé de mise en œuvre d'une vente aux enchères décentralisée consistant à accéder à un ensemble de données doté d'au moins une référence. Au moins une clé privée de vente aux enchères et une clé publique de vente aux enchères sont créées. L'ensemble de données est chiffré avec ladite référence en utilisant la clé publique. L'ensemble de données chiffré est soumis sur une chaîne de blocs à au moins un commissaire-priseur. Des offres pour ladite clé privée sont reçues par le commissaire-priseur depuis une pluralité de contrats intelligents sur la chaîne de blocs. Ladite clé privée est configurée pour déchiffrer l'ensemble de données chiffré. Un contrat intelligent gagnant de la pluralité de contrats intelligents est déterminé par le commissaire-priseur à partir des offres. Un paiement associé au contrat intelligent gagnant est reçu. Ladite clé privée est fournie au contrat intelligent gagnant.
PCT/US2018/047691 2017-08-23 2018-08-23 Procédé et système pour une vente aux enchères en marché décentralisée WO2019040712A1 (fr)

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CN112508661A (zh) * 2020-12-17 2021-03-16 北京金山云网络技术有限公司 记账权的确定方法、装置和线上竞拍系统
CN112446771B (zh) * 2020-12-17 2024-04-05 北京金山云网络技术有限公司 在线拍卖系统、方法、装置和电子设备
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CN113011894A (zh) * 2021-03-29 2021-06-22 昆明理工大学 一种基于可信计算与智能合约的金融衍生品数字交易系统
CN113011894B (zh) * 2021-03-29 2023-04-07 昆明理工大学 一种基于可信计算与智能合约的金融衍生品数字交易系统
CN116862707A (zh) * 2023-09-04 2023-10-10 广东工业大学 一种基于区块链和多属性拍卖的3d打印社群制造管理系统
CN116862707B (zh) * 2023-09-04 2023-12-05 广东工业大学 一种基于区块链和多属性拍卖的3d打印社群制造管理系统

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