WO2019024708A1 - 一种基于可信内核的防攻击数据处理器 - Google Patents

一种基于可信内核的防攻击数据处理器 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2019024708A1
WO2019024708A1 PCT/CN2018/096759 CN2018096759W WO2019024708A1 WO 2019024708 A1 WO2019024708 A1 WO 2019024708A1 CN 2018096759 W CN2018096759 W CN 2018096759W WO 2019024708 A1 WO2019024708 A1 WO 2019024708A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
kernel
trusted
data processor
switch
switching
Prior art date
Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
Ceased
Application number
PCT/CN2018/096759
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English (en)
French (fr)
Chinese (zh)
Inventor
崔晓夏
李春强
侯光恩
陈理
Current Assignee (The listed assignees may be inaccurate. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy of the list.)
Hangzhou C Sky Microsystems Co Ltd
Original Assignee
Hangzhou C Sky Microsystems Co Ltd
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Hangzhou C Sky Microsystems Co Ltd filed Critical Hangzhou C Sky Microsystems Co Ltd
Priority to EP18841743.0A priority Critical patent/EP3663958B1/en
Priority to JP2020502210A priority patent/JP7113887B2/ja
Priority to US16/175,710 priority patent/US10909246B2/en
Publication of WO2019024708A1 publication Critical patent/WO2019024708A1/zh
Anticipated expiration legal-status Critical
Ceased legal-status Critical Current

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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/52—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems during program execution, e.g. stack integrity ; Preventing unwanted data erasure; Buffer overflow
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/55—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures
    • G06F21/556—Detecting local intrusion or implementing counter-measures involving covert channels, i.e. data leakage between processes
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/50—Monitoring users, programs or devices to maintain the integrity of platforms, e.g. of processors, firmware or operating systems
    • G06F21/57—Certifying or maintaining trusted computer platforms, e.g. secure boots or power-downs, version controls, system software checks, secure updates or assessing vulnerabilities
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/70—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer
    • G06F21/71—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information
    • G06F21/74—Protecting specific internal or peripheral components, in which the protection of a component leads to protection of the entire computer to assure secure computing or processing of information operating in dual or compartmented mode, i.e. at least one secure mode
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING OR CALCULATING; COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F9/00—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units
    • G06F9/06—Arrangements for program control, e.g. control units using stored programs, i.e. using an internal store of processing equipment to receive or retain programs
    • G06F9/46—Multiprogramming arrangements
    • G06F9/54—Interprogram communication
    • G06F9/545—Interprogram communication where tasks reside in different layers, e.g. user- and kernel-space

Definitions

  • the present invention relates to the field of information security technologies, and in particular, to an attack defense data processor based on a trusted kernel.
  • the security of system information has been guaranteed to a certain extent.
  • safe mode the system truly implements hardware isolation.
  • the system kernel runs at the highest privilege level of the entire system, manages and controls the underlying hardware resources, provides a secure isolation of resource abstraction and access interfaces for upper-layer applications, and is the basis of the entire system.
  • the operating system running the trusted kernel is independent of the operating system running in non-secure mode.
  • the trusted kernel provides services such as secure authentication, encryption and decryption, and sensitive data storage. Physical isolation by hardware security components ensures that operating systems in non-secure mode cannot directly access resources in secure mode, thereby reducing the attack surface.
  • the anti-attack data processor based on the trusted kernel provided by the invention can provide the underlying software protection mechanism and enhance the security of the trusted kernel in the trusted kernel according to the deficiencies of the prior art.
  • the invention provides an attack-proof data processor based on a trusted kernel, which comprises:
  • a trusted kernel exception vector table for providing a processing entry for kernel switching
  • a trusted kernel stack pointer register for storing a trusted kernel stack pointer to a trusted kernel stack space
  • the trusted site including a program status register, a program pointer, and a general purpose register for storing a start kernel flag bit of the kernel switch;
  • the data processor addresses the processing entry of the kernel switch and performs the handoff when the non-trusted kernel performs a kernel switch to the trusted kernel.
  • the processing entry for providing kernel switching includes a kernel switching instruction exception entry and a trusted interrupt processing entry.
  • the trusted kernel is addressed to the processing entry of the kernel switch by a kernel switching instruction, a kernel switching return instruction, or an interrupt response manner, and performs switching.
  • the trusted core when the trusted core performs the handover by using the kernel switch return instruction, it is determined to return the starting kernel or stay in the current kernel according to the flag of the starting kernel of the program status register.
  • the trusted kernel is addressed to the kernel switch instruction exception entry by an entry vector table that is invoked across kernel tasks.
  • the trusted kernel is addressed to the trusted interrupt processing entry by the trusted kernel exception vector table.
  • the trusted kernel when the trusted kernel switches to the non-trusted kernel in response to a non-trusted interrupt, the trusted kernel saves the trusted scene in the trusted kernel stack space;
  • the trusted kernel restores the trusted scene from the trusted kernel stack space.
  • the trusted site is a site before the trusted kernel switches to the non-trusted kernel in response to a non-trusted interrupt.
  • the trusted kernel may be from the trusted kernel The stack space is restored to a trusted site.
  • the trusted site is a site before the trusted kernel actively switches to the non-trusted kernel for the first time.
  • the trusted kernel-based anti-attack data processor provided by the embodiment of the present invention provides an underlying software protection mechanism for all trusted kernel switching entries, which can make the trusted kernel and the non-trusted kernel more secure when switching.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of a basic architecture of an attack-based data processor based on a trusted kernel provided by the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of operations when a data processor normally executes a kernel switching instruction according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of the operation of the trusted kernel executing the kernel switch return instruction and returning to the trusted kernel after the trusted kernel responds to the non-trusted kernel interrupt according to an embodiment of the present invention
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of an operation of an illegal kernel switching abnormality according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing the basic structure of a data processor provided by the present invention. As shown in Figure 1, the data processor includes a trusted kernel exception vector table, a trusted kernel stack pointer register, and a trusted site within the trusted kernel stack space.
  • the trusted kernel exception vector table includes processing entries of two kernel switching, that is, a kernel switching instruction exception entry and a trusted interrupt processing entry, and the data processor can perform a kernel switch of the non-trusted kernel to the trusted kernel.
  • the letter kernel will address the processing entry of the kernel switch and perform the switch according to different methods.
  • the trusted kernel stack pointer register refers to a separate stack pointer owned by the trusted core that points to the trusted kernel stack space; the trusted kernel stack space holds the trusted site, and the trusted scene contains the current trusted kernel context, typically including Program status register, program pointer, general purpose register before the last trusted core switch.
  • the program status register contains the flag bits of the starting core of the kernel switch.
  • the kernel switching mode of the data processor includes a kernel switching instruction, a kernel switching return instruction, and an interrupt response.
  • a kernel switching instruction when performing a kernel switch using the kernel switch return instruction, it is possible to determine whether to return to the start kernel or to stay in the current core according to the start kernel flag position of the program status register.
  • the trusted core is addressed to the kernel switch instruction exception entry according to the entry vector table of the trusted kernel cross-core task call.
  • the trusted core is addressed to the trusted interrupt processing entry based on the trusted kernel exception vector table.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram showing the operation of a data processor in a normal execution of a kernel switching instruction according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the current data processor normally executes kernel switch commands in a non-trusted kernel.
  • the data processor saves the untrusted site located in the untrusted kernel and switches to the trusted kernel through the switching process.
  • the data processor is addressed to the kernel switch instruction exception entry in the exception vector table of the trusted kernel, and the core switch exception processing code of the trusted kernel executes the kernel switch instruction, and returns to the non-trusted kernel through the switching process.
  • the data processor resumes execution after restoring the untrusted site.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram showing the operation of the trusted kernel executing the kernel switch return instruction and returning to the trusted kernel after the trusted kernel responds to the non-trusted kernel interrupt according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • the current data processor executes in a trusted kernel.
  • the data processor saves the trusted site to the trusted kernel stack space and switches to the non-trusted kernel to respond to the interrupt through the switching process.
  • the trusted stack pointer register points to the trusted core. Stack space.
  • the interrupt handling function of the non-trusted kernel executes the kernel switching instruction to return the trusted kernel.
  • the data processor resumes execution after restoring the trusted site based on the trusted kernel stack space pointed to by the trusted kernel stack pointer register.
  • FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram showing the operation of an illegal kernel switching abnormality according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in the figure, set the trusted kernel in the trusted kernel to switch to the site before the untrusted kernel for the first time, and save the live to the trusted kernel stack space pointed to by the trusted kernel stack pointer register, and then execute the kernel switch instruction. Switch to a non-trusted kernel.
  • the non-trusted kernel modifies the start kernel flag of the program status register and performs a kernel switch return instruction to switch to the trusted kernel execution. After the data processor saves the non-trusted kernel site, it switches to the trusted kernel for execution.
  • the data processor restores the trusted scene based on the trusted kernel stack space pointed to by the trusted kernel stack pointer register. After the data processor executes the illegal kernel switch exception handling code, it can restart or throw an exception, thereby preventing illegal kernel intrusion.
  • the trusted kernel-based anti-attack data processor provided by the embodiment of the present invention provides an underlying software protection mechanism for all trusted kernel switching entries, which can make the trusted kernel and the non-trusted kernel more secure when switching.

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  • Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
  • Software Systems (AREA)
  • Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
  • Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
  • General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
  • General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
  • Mathematical Physics (AREA)
  • Storage Device Security (AREA)
PCT/CN2018/096759 2017-08-01 2018-07-24 一种基于可信内核的防攻击数据处理器 Ceased WO2019024708A1 (zh)

Priority Applications (3)

Application Number Priority Date Filing Date Title
EP18841743.0A EP3663958B1 (en) 2017-08-01 2018-07-24 Trusted kernel-based attack-prevention data processor
JP2020502210A JP7113887B2 (ja) 2017-08-01 2018-07-24 トラステッドカーネルベースの耐攻撃データプロセッサ
US16/175,710 US10909246B2 (en) 2017-08-01 2018-10-30 Trusted kernel-based anti-attack data processor

Applications Claiming Priority (2)

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CN201710648239.3 2017-08-01
CN201710648239.3A CN107463856B (zh) 2017-08-01 2017-08-01 一种基于可信内核的防攻击数据处理器

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US16/175,710 Continuation US10909246B2 (en) 2017-08-01 2018-10-30 Trusted kernel-based anti-attack data processor

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US (1) US10909246B2 (enExample)
EP (1) EP3663958B1 (enExample)
JP (1) JP7113887B2 (enExample)
CN (1) CN107463856B (enExample)
WO (1) WO2019024708A1 (enExample)

Cited By (1)

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US10909246B2 (en) 2017-08-01 2021-02-02 C-Sky Microsystems Co., Ltd. Trusted kernel-based anti-attack data processor

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CN109033842B (zh) * 2018-07-27 2020-10-16 杭州中天微系统有限公司 数据处理器
CN108985098B (zh) * 2018-07-27 2020-10-13 杭州中天微系统有限公司 数据处理器
CN109063516B (zh) * 2018-07-27 2020-12-04 杭州中天微系统有限公司 数据处理器
CN111552514B (zh) * 2019-02-12 2024-12-06 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司 一种处理器以及指令执行方法
CN115718444A (zh) * 2022-11-04 2023-02-28 航天科工空间工程发展有限公司 一种基于异构计算机的星务工作模式的切换方法和系统

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Also Published As

Publication number Publication date
EP3663958A4 (en) 2020-07-22
EP3663958B1 (en) 2023-06-21
JP2020529063A (ja) 2020-10-01
US10909246B2 (en) 2021-02-02
CN107463856A (zh) 2017-12-12
EP3663958A1 (en) 2020-06-10
US20190073477A1 (en) 2019-03-07
CN107463856B (zh) 2020-06-16
JP7113887B2 (ja) 2022-08-05

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