WO2019011273A1 - 基于奖惩的数据区块链授权参与共识的拜占庭容错方法及其奖惩方法 - Google Patents

基于奖惩的数据区块链授权参与共识的拜占庭容错方法及其奖惩方法 Download PDF

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WO2019011273A1
WO2019011273A1 PCT/CN2018/095271 CN2018095271W WO2019011273A1 WO 2019011273 A1 WO2019011273 A1 WO 2019011273A1 CN 2018095271 W CN2018095271 W CN 2018095271W WO 2019011273 A1 WO2019011273 A1 WO 2019011273A1
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consensus
node
command
result
reward
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French (fr)
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赫尔穆特 李莱德 拉伊莫马尔科姆
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成都励睿德企业管理有限公司
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    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/04—Payment circuits
    • G06Q20/06—Private payment circuits, e.g. involving electronic currency used among participants of a common payment scheme
    • G06Q20/065—Private payment circuits, e.g. involving electronic currency used among participants of a common payment scheme using e-cash
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
    • G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
    • G06F11/0703—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation
    • G06F11/0706—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation the processing taking place on a specific hardware platform or in a specific software environment
    • G06F11/0709—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation the processing taking place on a specific hardware platform or in a specific software environment in a distributed system consisting of a plurality of standalone computer nodes, e.g. clusters, client-server systems
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F11/00—Error detection; Error correction; Monitoring
    • G06F11/07—Responding to the occurrence of a fault, e.g. fault tolerance
    • G06F11/0703—Error or fault processing not based on redundancy, i.e. by taking additional measures to deal with the error or fault not making use of redundancy in operation, in hardware, or in data representation
    • G06F11/0793—Remedial or corrective actions
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/382—Payment protocols; Details thereof insuring higher security of transaction
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
    • G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
    • G06Q20/40—Authorisation, e.g. identification of payer or payee, verification of customer or shop credentials; Review and approval of payers, e.g. check credit lines or negative lists
    • G06Q20/401—Transaction verification
    • G06Q20/4016—Transaction verification involving fraud or risk level assessment in transaction processing
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q30/00—Commerce
    • G06Q30/02—Marketing; Price estimation or determination; Fundraising
    • G06Q30/0207—Discounts or incentives, e.g. coupons or rebates
    • G06Q30/0215—Including financial accounts
    • G06Q30/0216—Investment accounts
    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
    • G06Q40/00—Finance; Insurance; Tax strategies; Processing of corporate or income taxes
    • G06Q40/04—Trading; Exchange, e.g. stocks, commodities, derivatives or currency exchange

Definitions

  • the invention relates to a fault-tolerant technology of a data blockchain, in particular to a Byzantine fault-tolerant method based on reward and punishment data blockchain authorization to participate in consensus and a reward and punishment method thereof.
  • the data blockchain uses algorithms to ensure fault tolerance.
  • Traditional methods use Proof of Work for fault tolerance. As long as more than 50% of the network's computing power is honest, it can guarantee fault tolerance. However, the workload proves to be a lot of energy.
  • Newer technologies use Proof of Stakes for fault tolerance, where nodes need to put proofs or "bets" for their blockchain versions. With proof of equity, nodes can remain honest under the threat of economic loss. As long as more than 50% of the "bets" in the network are honest, fault tolerance is guaranteed.
  • the data blockchain can use a Byzantine fault-tolerant algorithm that is responsible for participating in the consensus.
  • Data blockchains can be called “consensus nodes” by different means, such as voting by ordinary nodes, and nodes that appoint special consensus decisions. These "consensus nodes” replace the entire network for consensus games, improving efficiency while still ensuring fault tolerance close to the complete network.
  • the "consensus node” can increase the speed at which the network finds consensus, and is close to the fault tolerance of the complete network, honest behavior is not encouraged, and dishonest behavior is not hindered. Ordinary nodes and “consensus nodes” can freely implement dishonest behavior without any penalty. Because the "consensus node” does not threaten its own interests by economic loss, it only sends commands on behalf of ordinary nodes, so a malicious node becomes a "consensus node” and poses a great threat to the entire network. A malicious "consensus node” can reject all honest commands, causing more consensus game iterations to reach consensus and affect network speed.
  • a “consensus node” that rejects all honest commands can cause an infinite deadlock, allowing the data block to re-select the “consensus node”, giving more malicious nodes the opportunity to become “consensus nodes” and finally taking over the network.
  • a malicious ordinary node can make a dishonest command casually, because it does not personally participate in the consensus game, it just sends commands, so its own interests will not be threatened by any economic loss.
  • the "consensus node” is a command sent by a normal node, it is also not responsible for sending dishonest commands.
  • the present invention uses a node reward and punishment algorithm to ensure that the commands sent by the nodes in the Byzantine fault-tolerant data blockchain that are authorized to participate in the consensus are honest.
  • the Byzantine fault tolerance method based on the reward and punishment data blockchain authorization to participate in the consensus provided by the present invention includes:
  • Step 1 Elect the consensus node in the data blockchain, the number of consensus nodes is smaller than the total number of nodes in the data blockchain;
  • Step 2 The consensus node performs a consensus game to reach a consensus on the authenticity judgment of the command sent by the node in the data blockchain;
  • Step 3 Reward and punish the nodes in the blockchain based on the consensus of the consensus nodes.
  • step 3 further includes: penalizing the node that sends or forwards the pseudo-command based on the result of the consensus reached by the consensus node, penalizing the consensus node whose judgment result is opposite to the consensus result; rewarding the node that sends or forwards the true command, The consensus node with the judgment result and the consensus result is rewarded.
  • step 2 further includes: when the consensus node cannot reach a consensus, the consensus node repeats the consensus game until a consensus result is obtained.
  • step 3 further includes: penalizing the node that sends or forwards the pseudo-command based on the result of the consensus reached by the consensus node, and penalizing the consensus node whose judgment result is opposite to the consensus result in each consensus game, and the degree of punishment is The judgment result of each consensus game of the consensus node is proportional to the number of times the consensus result is opposite;
  • the node that sends or forwards the true command is rewarded, and the consensus node of each consensus game is rewarded with the consensus node whose consensus result is consistent, and the degree of reward is proportional to the number of consensus games.
  • step 3 the nodes in the blockchain are rewarded and punished according to at least one of the following:
  • the consensus node is rewarded or punished multiple times according to P5 ⁇ P8.
  • the present invention also provides a reward and punishment method for a node in a Byzantine fault-tolerant data blockchain that is authorized to participate in consensus, including: a node that sends or forwards a pseudo-command in a data blockchain based on a consensus result reached by a consensus node in a data blockchain Punishment is performed, and the consensus node whose judgment result is opposite to the consensus result is punished; the node that sends or forwards the true command in the data blockchain is rewarded, and the consensus node whose judgment result is consistent with the consensus result is rewarded.
  • the consensus result is that the consensus node obtains the consensus game multiple times
  • the node that sends or forwards the pseudo-command is punished, and at least one judgment result in each consensus game is opposite to the consensus result.
  • the consensus node performs the penalty, and the degree of punishment is proportional to the number of times the judgment result of the consensus game of the consensus node is opposite to the consensus result;
  • the node that sends or forwards the true command is rewarded, and the consensus node of each consensus game is rewarded with the consensus node whose consensus result is consistent, and the degree of reward is proportional to the number of consensus games.
  • reward and punish the nodes in the blockchain according to at least one of the following:
  • the consensus node is rewarded or punished multiple times according to P5 ⁇ P8.
  • the present invention also provides a storage device readable by a computer and storing a set of instructions executed by the computer to perform rewards and penalties in accordance with at least one of the aforementioned reward and punishment methods.
  • the invention also provides a set of soft systems corresponding to the aforementioned reward and punishment methods.
  • the "consensus node” In order to avoid malicious "consensus nodes” passing the inaction until they get the majority, the "consensus node” must choose to verify or not verify the command. If the consensus game rules of the Consensus Node allow voting to be abandoned, the ticket must be treated as a non-verification command. If only the possibility of being punished would make the honest “consensus node” less profitable, it would also be necessary to reward the honest “consensus node”. The “consensus node” only needs to remain honest and will always be rewarded.
  • the "consensus node” can also represent a normal node relay command.
  • the algorithm In order to prevent ordinary nodes from using a dishonest command to attack the network, the algorithm also uses a trusted penalty to identify and punish ordinary nodes that send dishonest commands. However, this may prevent honest users from using the data blockchain to trade, so the algorithm also uses a trusted reward method to identify and reward ordinary nodes that send honest commands. Since ordinary nodes do not participate in the consensus game, they are allowed to become passive players.
  • Figure 1 is a first embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 2 is a second embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 3 is a third embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 4 is a fourth embodiment of the present invention.
  • Figure 5 is a fifth embodiment of the present invention.
  • Normal node A node in a data blockchain. Ordinary nodes do not participate in consensus games.
  • Consensus node A special consensus decision node in the data blockchain. The Consensus Node will participate in the consensus game.
  • Node Consensus node or normal node.
  • Consensus game Any algorithm used to reach consensus.
  • Reward Any algorithm that provides benefits to the recipient.
  • Penalty Any algorithm that provides a fine to the recipient.
  • the Byzantine fault tolerance method based on the reward and punishment data blockchain authorization to participate in the consensus provided by the present invention includes:
  • Step 1 Elect the consensus node in the data blockchain, the number of consensus nodes is smaller than the total number of nodes in the data blockchain;
  • Step 2 The consensus node performs a consensus game to reach a consensus on the authenticity judgment of the command sent by the node in the data blockchain;
  • Step 3 Reward and punish the nodes in the blockchain based on the consensus of the consensus nodes.
  • the consensus decision node is referred to as a “consensus node” and may be appointed in any manner.
  • the consensus node is selected by voting of a common node, but the node reward and punishment algorithm of the present invention does not How is the reliance on the "consensus node” appointed?
  • the total number of "consensus nodes" must be less than the total number of ordinary nodes, since the purpose of the present invention is to obtain a more valid proof of equity.
  • the present invention also does not rely on "consensus nodes” to achieve consensus results by any means.
  • the "consensus node” that receives the command may not be allowed to participate in the consensus game, only let it relay the command.
  • Other consensus games may receive the "consensus node” of the command to participate in the consensus game.
  • Some consensus games have the potential to use different "consensus nodes” in different aspects of the data blockchain.
  • the node reward and punishment algorithm of the present invention can be applied to all consensus games.
  • the present invention also covers rewards and penalties for "consensus nodes" where previous iterations are judged to be dishonest.
  • the reward and punishment algorithm punishes the node that sends or forwards the pseudo-command based on the consensus of the consensus node, and punishes the consensus node whose judgment result is opposite to the consensus result; rewards the node that sends or forwards the true command Reward the consensus node whose judgment result is consistent with the consensus result.
  • the consensus node when the consensus node fails to reach a consensus after a consensus game, the consensus node is required to repeat the consensus game again or again until a consensus result is obtained. In order to effectively prevent the dishonest behavior of malicious consensus nodes, it leads to more consensus game iterations to reach a consensus and affect the network speed.
  • the reward and punishment algorithm in still another embodiment of the present invention includes: penalizing a node that sends or forwards a pseudo-command based on a consensus result of the consensus node, and performing a consensus node with at least one judgment result opposite to the consensus result in each consensus game. Punishment, and the degree of punishment is proportional to the number of times the judgment result of the consensus game of the consensus node is opposite to the consensus result;
  • the node that sends or forwards the true command is rewarded, and the consensus node of each consensus game is rewarded with the consensus node whose consensus result is consistent, and the degree of reward is proportional to the number of consensus games.
  • the nodes in the blockchain are rewarded and punished according to at least one of the following, and the reward and punishment algorithm covered by the present invention includes each of the following separate applications, and in any combination and in any order. Multiple combined applications:
  • the consensus node that judges the result of the command is rewarded.
  • This article includes two aspects. The first part or the latter part of the operation of this article is related to the rules of the game of consensus. If the consensus game forces the "consensus node" to give honest or dishonest judgment results, the algorithm runs the first part. If the honest judgment result is not equal to the dishonest result in the consensus game rules, the algorithm runs the second half of this article.
  • the consensus node is rewarded or punished multiple times according to P5 ⁇ P8.
  • the reward and punishment algorithm performs the following operations: the ordinary node is rewarded (P1), the "consensus node” 1 is rewarded (P2), the “consensus node” 2 is punished (P6), and the “consensus node” 3 is rewarded (P2), "Consensus Node” 4 was awarded (P2).
  • the normal node sends a command to the "consensus node.”
  • the "consensus node” 1, the “consensus node” 2, and the “consensus node” 3 all conclude that the command is a dishonest judgment result.
  • the “consensus node” 4 concludes that the command is an honest judgment.
  • the “consensus node” reached a consensus result that the order was dishonest.
  • the reward and punishment algorithm performs the following operations: the normal node is punished (P4), the "consensus node” 1 is rewarded (P3), the “consensus node” 2 is awarded (P3), and the “consensus node” 3 is rewarded (P3) The "consensus node” 4 is punished (P5).
  • the reward and punishment algorithm performs the following operations: the ordinary node is rewarded (P1), the "consensus node” 1 is rewarded (P3), the “consensus node” 2 is punished (the first half of P8), and the “consensus node” 3 is rewarded ( P3), "Consensus Node” 4 is awarded (P3).
  • the normal node sends a command to the "consensus node.”
  • the "consensus node” 1, “consensus node” 3, and “consensus node” 4 do not conclude that the command is an honest judgment.
  • the “consensus node” 2 concludes that the command is an honest judgment.
  • the “consensus node” reached a consensus that the order was dishonest.
  • the reward and punishment algorithm performs the following operations: the normal node is punished (P4), the "consensus node” 1 is rewarded (the second half of P8), the "consensus node” 2 is punished (P5), and the "consensus node” 3 is rewarded. (Post part of P8), "Consensus Node” 4 is awarded (the second half of P8).
  • the ordinary node sends a command to the "consensus node"
  • the consensus node forms a deadlock after the first consensus game
  • the "consensus node” 2, 3 determines that the command is dishonest
  • the "consensus node” 1, 4 judgment commands It is honest.
  • the consensus game performs the second iteration.
  • the "consensus nodes” 1, 3, and 4 determine that the command is honest.
  • the "consensus node” 2 judges that the command is dishonest.
  • the consensus result is reached and the order is considered to be honest.
  • the reward and punishment algorithm performs the following operations: the ordinary node is rewarded (P1), the "consensus node” 1 is rewarded (P2) the same number of times as the number of iterations, twice; the "consensus node” 2 is punished (P5) twice, Because the judgment result is opposite to the consensus result twice; the "consensus node” 3 is punished (P5) once, because its judgment result is opposite to the consensus result once; the "consensus node” 4 is also rewarded (P2) twice.
  • the invention is not limited to the specific embodiments described above.
  • the invention extends to any new feature or any new combination disclosed in this specification, as well as any novel method or process steps or any new combination disclosed.

Abstract

基于奖惩的数据区块链授权参与共识的拜占庭容错方法及其奖惩方法，涉及数据区块链的容错技术。使用一个节点奖惩算法确保授权参与共识的拜占庭容错数据区块链中的节点发送的命令都是诚实的。所述拜占庭容错方法包括：步骤1：选举出数据区块链中的共识节点，共识节点数量小于数据区块链中的节点总数；步骤2：共识节点进行共识游戏对数据区块链中的节点发送的命令的真伪判断达成共识；步骤3：基于共识节点达成共识的结果对区块链中的节点进行奖惩。

Description

基于奖惩的数据区块链授权参与共识的拜占庭容错方法及其奖惩方法 技术领域
本发明涉及数据区块链的容错技术，尤其是一种基于奖惩的数据区块链授权参与共识的拜占庭容错方法及其奖惩方法。
背景技术
数据区块链使用算法来保证容错。传统方法使用工作量证明(Proof of Work)进行容错。只要多于50％的网络的全部计算能力是诚实的，就可以保证容错的能力。然而工作量证明是需要花费大量的能源。较新的技术使用权益证明(Proof of stake)进行容错，其中节点需要为它们的区块链版本押上证明或“赌注”。有了权益证明，节点就可以在经济损失的威胁下保持诚实，只要网络中50％以上的“赌注”是诚实的，那么就保证了容错能力。
为了得到一个更有效的权益证明，数据区块链可以使用一个委托负责参与共识的拜占庭容错算法。数据区块链可以通过不同的方式，比如普通节点的投票，任命特别共识决策的节点称为“共识节点”。这些“共识节点”代替整个网络进行共识游戏，提高效率，而仍然确保和完整的网络接近的容错。
虽然“共识节点”可以增加网络找到共识的速度，而和完整的网络有接近的容错，但是诚实的行为没有被鼓励，不诚实的行为也没有被阻碍。普通的节点和“共识节点”都可以随意实施不诚实的行为，而不会有没有任何的处罚。因为“共识节点”不是把自己的利益受到经济损失的威胁，它只是代表普通节点发送命令，所以一个恶意的节点成为“共识节点”会对整个网络造成非常大的威胁。一个恶意的“共识节点”可以拒绝所有诚实的命令，造成更多的共识游戏迭代才达成共识，影响网络速度。在最坏的情况下，一个拒绝所有诚实的命令的“共识节点”可以造成无限僵局，让数据区块重新选“共识节点”，给更多恶意的节点机会成为“共识节点”，最后接管网络。此外，一个恶意的普通节点可以随便发不诚实的命令，因为它不亲自参与共识游戏，它只是发送命令，所以它自己的利益不会受到任何经济损失的威胁。另外，因为“共识节点”是代表普通节点发送命令，所以它也不能为发送不诚实的命令负责。
鉴于有必要提供一种能有效防止上述情形发生的方法。
发明内容
本发明使用一个节点奖惩算法确保授权参与共识的拜占庭容错数据区块链中的节点 发送的命令都是诚实的。
本发明提供的基于奖惩的数据区块链授权参与共识的拜占庭容错方法，包括：
步骤1：选举出数据区块链中的共识节点，共识节点数量小于数据区块链中的节点总数；
步骤2：共识节点进行共识游戏对数据区块链中的节点发送的命令的真伪判断达成共识；
步骤3：基于共识节点达成共识的结果对区块链中的节点进行奖惩。
进一步，步骤3还包括：基于共识节点达成共识的结果，对发送或转发伪命令的节点进行惩罚，对判断结果与共识结果相反的共识节点进行惩罚；对发送或转发真命令的节点进行奖励，对判断结果与共识结果一致的共识节点进行奖励。
进一步，步骤2还包括：当共识节点无法达成共识时，共识节点重复共识游戏直到得出共识结果。
进一步，步骤3还包括：基于共识节点达成共识的结果，对发送或转发伪命令的节点进行惩罚，对各次共识游戏中至少一次判断结果与共识结果相反的共识节点进行惩罚，且惩罚程度与该共识节点各次共识游戏的判断结果与共识结果相反的次数成正比；
对发送或转发真命令的节点进行奖励，对各次共识游戏的判断结果均与共识结果一致的共识节点进行奖励，且奖励程度与共识游戏的次数成正比。
进一步，步骤3中，依据以下至少一条对区块链中的节点进行奖惩：
P1：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则最近一次发送该命令的节点被奖励；
P2:如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被奖励；
P3：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被奖励；
P4：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则最近一次发送该命令的节点被惩罚；
P5：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
P6：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
P7：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则没有得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
P8：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则没有得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；或者，如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则没有得出该命令为真的判断结果的共 识节点被奖励。
进一步，如果共识结果是通过多次共识游戏才得到，则按照P5～P8条对共识节点进行多次奖励或惩罚。
本发明还提供了授权参与共识的拜占庭容错数据区块链中节点的奖惩方法，包括：基于数据区块链中的共识节点达成的共识结果，对数据区块链中发送或转发伪命令的节点进行惩罚，对判断结果与共识结果相反的共识节点进行惩罚；对数据区块链中发送或转发真命令的节点进行奖励，对判断结果与共识结果一致的共识节点进行奖励。
进一步，当共识结果是共识节点多次进行共识游戏得到时，基于共识节点达成的共识结果，对发送或转发伪命令的节点进行惩罚，对各次共识游戏中至少一次判断结果与共识结果相反的共识节点进行惩罚，且惩罚程度与该共识节点各次共识游戏的判断结果与共识结果相反的次数成正比；
对发送或转发真命令的节点进行奖励，对各次共识游戏的判断结果均与共识结果一致的共识节点进行奖励，且奖励程度与共识游戏的次数成正比。
进一步，依据以下至少一条对区块链中的节点进行奖惩：
P1：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则最近一次发送该命令的节点被奖励；
P2:如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被奖励；
P3：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被奖励；
P4：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则最近一次发送该命令的节点被惩罚；
P5：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
P6：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
P7：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则没有得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
P8：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则没有得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；或者，如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则没有得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被奖励。
进一步，如果共识结果是通过多次共识游戏才得到，则按照P5～P8条对共识节点进 行多次奖励或惩罚。
本发明还提供了一种存储器件，其可以由计算机读取，并可以存储由所述计算机执行的一套指令，以便根据前述奖惩方法中的至少一项执行奖惩。
本发明还提供了一套与前述奖惩方法一一对应的软系统。
在没有奖惩机制的授权参与共识的拜占庭容错数据区块链中，普通的节点和“共识节点”发送不诚实的命令或不诚实的验证结论没有对它们自己任何的风险。为了避免不诚实的命令与恶意的“共识节点”接管网络，本发明使博弈论保证诚实地行为。具有优点如下：首先，该算法会惩罚不诚实的行为。节点必须决定以诚实或不诚实的方式行为，而不知道其他的节点是否诚实。如果“共识节点”同意它们具有相同的信息，就会把行为判为诚实的。如果不诚实的行为受到惩罚，那么在这种环境下的理性决定就是要么诚实地行为，要么不行为。为了避免恶意的“共识节点”通过不作为直到它们获得多数，“共识节点”必须选择验证或不验证命令。如果“共识节点”的共识游戏规则允许放弃投票，那么该票必须被视为不验证命令。如果只有被惩罚的可能性就会让诚实的“共识节点”得到更少的收益，因此也需要给诚实的“共识节点”奖励。“共识节点”只需要保持诚实的状态，就会一直有奖励。
既然诚实的行为是被强制的，这不仅可以确保更安全的数据区块链，而且可以减少“共识节点”达成共识所需的共识游戏的迭代次数，整个网络更有效率。
“共识节点”也可以代表普通节点转播命令。为了避免普通节点使用不诚实的命令攻击网络，该算法也使用一个委托的惩罚方式认定并且惩罚发送不诚实的命令的普通节点。然而，这可能会阻止诚实的用户使用数据区块链进行交易，所以该算法也使用一个委托的奖励方式认定并且奖励发送诚实的命令的普通节点。由于普通节点不参与共识游戏，所以被允许成为被动玩家。
附图说明
本发明将通过例子并参照附图的方式说明，其中：
图1是本发明第一实施例。
图2是本发明第二实施例。
图3是本发明第三实施例。
图4是本发明第四实施例。
图5是本发明第五实施例。
具体实施方式
本说明书中公开的所有特征，或公开的所有方法或过程中的步骤，除了互相排斥的 特征和/或步骤以外，均可以以任何方式组合。
本说明书中公开的任一特征，除非特别叙述，均可被其他等效或具有类似目的的替代特征加以替换。即，除非特别叙述，每个特征只是一系列等效或类似特征中的一个例子而已。
技术术语解释：
真：诚实的，为共识节点对其他节点发送的命令做出的一种判断结果。
伪：不诚实的，为共识节点对其他节点发送的命令做出的另一种判断结果，与真相对。
普通节点：数据区块链中的节点。普通节点不参与共识游戏。
共识节点：数据区块链中的特别共识决策节点。“共识节点”会参与共识游戏。
节点：共识节点或普通节点。
共识游戏：任何用于达成共识的算法。
命令：数据区块链中的任何对象改变状态的建议，或任何通过数据区块链的对象改变状态的建议。
转播：转发数据。
奖励：任何为接收者提供好处的算法。
惩罚：任何为接收者提供罚款的算法。
本发明提供的基于奖惩的数据区块链授权参与共识的拜占庭容错方法，包括：
步骤1：选举出数据区块链中的共识节点，共识节点数量小于数据区块链中的节点总数；
步骤2：共识节点进行共识游戏对数据区块链中的节点发送的命令的真伪判断达成共识；
步骤3：基于共识节点达成共识的结果对区块链中的节点进行奖惩。
需要说明的是，共识决策节点称为“共识节点”，可以用过任何方式被任命，在一个具体实施例中，采用普通节点的投票的方式选出共识节点，但是本发明的节点奖惩算法不依赖“共识节点”是通过什么方式被任命的。
“共识节点”的总数必须比普通节点的总数少，因为本发明的目的是得到一个更有效的权益证明。
本发明也不依赖“共识节点”是通过任何方式达成共识结果的。在一种共识游戏中，可能不让收到命令的“共识节点”参与共识游戏，只让它转播命令。其他的共识游戏可能收到命令的“共识节点”参与共识游戏。有的共识游戏有可能使用不同的“共识节点”在 数据区块链中不同的方面。本发明的节点奖惩算法可以适用于所有共识游戏。
该专利不依赖普通节点给“共识节点”发送命令的方式。可以通过一个或多个“共识节点”转播，可以通过一个或多个专用转播机构，或任何其他转播方式。
如果共识游戏通过多个迭代才得到共识结果，本发明也涵盖奖励和惩罚以前的迭代被判断不诚实的“共识节点”。
下面进一步说明本发明的奖惩算法。
在一个实施例中，奖惩算法基于共识节点达成共识的结果，对发送或转发伪命令的节点进行惩罚，对判断结果与共识结果相反的共识节点进行惩罚；对发送或转发真命令的节点进行奖励，对判断结果与共识结果一致的共识节点进行奖励。
在一些实施例中，共识节点经过一次共识游戏无法达成共识时，需要共识节点再次或多次重复共识游戏直到得出共识结果。为了有效防止恶意的共识节点不诚实的行为，造成更多的共识游戏迭代才达成共识，影响网络速度。
本发明的又一个实施例中的奖惩算法包括：基于共识节点达成共识的结果，对发送或转发伪命令的节点进行惩罚，对各次共识游戏中至少一次判断结果与共识结果相反的共识节点进行惩罚，且惩罚程度与该共识节点各次共识游戏的判断结果与共识结果相反的次数成正比；
对发送或转发真命令的节点进行奖励，对各次共识游戏的判断结果均与共识结果一致的共识节点进行奖励，且奖励程度与共识游戏的次数成正比。
为了实现上述奖惩，在一个更具体的实施例中，依据以下至少一条对区块链中的节点进行奖惩，本发明涵盖的奖惩算法包含以下每一条单独应用，以及以任何组合方式和任何顺序的多条组合应用：
P1：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则最近一次发送该命令的节点被奖励；
P2:如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被奖励；
P3：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被奖励；
P4：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则最近一次发送该命令的节点被惩罚；
P5：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
P6：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被惩 罚；
P7：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则没有得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
P8：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则没有得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；或者，如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则没有得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被奖励。本条包括两个方面，运行本条的前一部分或后一部分是和共识游戏规则有关系的。如果共识游戏强制“共识节点”必须给出诚实或不诚实的判断结果，算法就运行前一部分。如果在共识游戏规则中不给出诚实的判断结果等于判为不诚实的结果，算法就运行本条的后半部分。
如果共识结果是通过多次共识游戏才得到，则按照P5～P8条对共识节点进行多次奖励或惩罚。
下面再通过几种可能的情形进一步对本发明的奖惩算法进行解释：
在图1中，普通节点给“共识节点”发送命令。“共识节点”1、“共识节点”3、“共识节点”4，都得出该命令为诚实的判断结果。“共识节点”2得出命令为不诚实的结果。因此，“共识节点”达成的共识结果是该是诚实的。奖惩算法执行以下操作：该普通节点被奖励了(P1条)，“共识节点”1被奖励了(P2条)，“共识节点”2被惩罚了(P6条)，“共识节点”3被奖励了(P2条)，“共识节点”4被奖励了(P2条)。
在图2中,普通节点给“共识节点”发送命令。“共识节点”1、“共识节点”2、“共识节点”3，都得出该命令为不诚实的判断结果。“共识节点”4得出该命令为诚实的判断结果。“共识节点”达成共识结果，即该命令不诚实。奖惩算法执行以下操作：普通节点被惩罚了(P4)，“共识节点”1被奖励了(P3)，“共识节点”2被奖励了(P3)，“共识节点”3被奖励了(P3)，“共识节点”4被惩罚了(P5)。
在图3中,普通节点给“共识节点”发送命令。“共识节点”1、“共识节点”3、“共识节点”4，都得出该命令为不诚实的判断结果。“共识节点”2没有得出该命令为不诚实的判断结果。“共识节点”达成共识认为该命令是诚实的。奖惩算法执行以下操作：普通节点被奖励了(P1)，“共识节点”1被奖励了(P3)，“共识节点”2被惩罚了(P8前半部分)，“共识节点”3被奖励了(P3)，“共识节点”4被奖励了(P3)。
在图4中,普通节点给“共识节点”发送命令。“共识节点”1、“共识节点”3、“共识节点”4，都不得出该命令为诚实的判断结果。“共识节点”2得出该命令是诚实的判断结果。“共识节点”达成共识，认为该命令不诚实。奖惩算法执行以下操作：普通节点被惩罚 了(P4)，“共识节点”1被奖励了(P8后半部分)，“共识节点”2被惩罚了(P5)，“共识节点”3被奖励了(P8后半部分)，“共识节点”4被奖励了(P8后半部分)。
在图5中,普通节点给“共识节点”发送命令，共识节点在第一次共识游戏后形成僵局，“共识节点”2、3判断命令是不诚实的，“共识节点”1、4判断命令是诚实的。共识游戏进行第二次迭代，“共识节点”1、3、4判断命令是诚实的，“共识节点”2判断命令是不诚实的，达成共识结果，认为该命令为诚实的。奖惩算法执行以下操作：普通节点被奖励了(P1)，“共识节点”1被奖励(P2)了与迭代次数相同的次数，两次；“共识节点”2被惩罚(P5)两次了，因为其判断结果两次与共识结果相反；“共识节点”3被惩罚(P5)一次了，因为其判断结果一次与共识结果相反；“共识节点”4也被奖励(P2)了两次。
本发明并不局限于前述的具体实施方式。本发明扩展到任何在本说明书中披露的新特征或任何新的组合，以及披露的任一新的方法或过程的步骤或任何新的组合。

Claims (15)

  1. 基于奖惩的数据区块链授权参与共识的拜占庭容错方法，其特征在于，包括：
    步骤1：选举出数据区块链中的共识节点，共识节点数量小于数据区块链中的节点总数；
    步骤2：共识节点进行共识游戏对数据区块链中的节点发送的命令的真伪判断达成共识；
    步骤3：基于共识节点达成共识的结果对区块链中的节点进行奖惩。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的基于奖惩的数据区块链授权参与共识的拜占庭容错方法，其特征在于，步骤3还包括：基于共识节点达成共识的结果，对发送或转发伪命令的节点进行惩罚，对判断结果与共识结果相反的共识节点进行惩罚；对发送或转发真命令的节点进行奖励，对判断结果与共识结果一致的共识节点进行奖励。
  3. 根据权利要求1所述的基于奖惩的数据区块链授权参与共识的拜占庭容错方法，其特征在于，步骤2还包括：当共识节点无法达成共识时，共识节点重复共识游戏直到得出共识结果。
  4. 根据权利要求2所述的基于奖惩的数据区块链授权参与共识的拜占庭容错方法，其特征在于，步骤3还包括：基于共识节点达成共识的结果，对发送或转发伪命令的节点进行惩罚，对各次共识游戏中至少一次判断结果与共识结果相反的共识节点进行惩罚，且惩罚程度正比于该共识节点各次共识游戏的判断结果与共识结果相反的次数；
    对发送或转发真命令的节点进行奖励，对各次共识游戏的判断结果均与共识结果一致的共识节点进行奖励，且奖励程度与共识游戏的次数成正比。
  5. 根据权利要求1所述的基于奖惩的数据区块链授权参与共识的拜占庭容错方法，其特征在于，步骤3中，依据以下至少一条对区块链中的节点进行奖惩：
    P1：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则最近一次发送该命令的节点被奖励；
    P2:如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被奖励；
    P3：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被奖励；
    P4：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则最近一次发送该命令的节点被惩罚；
    P5：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
    P6：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
    P7：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则没有得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被 惩罚；
    P8：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则没有得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；或者，如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则没有得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被奖励。
  6. 根据权利要求5所述的基于奖惩的数据区块链授权参与共识的拜占庭容错方法，其特征在于，如果共识结果是通过多次共识游戏才得到，则按照P5～P8条对共识节点进行多次奖励或惩罚。
  7. 授权参与共识的拜占庭容错数据区块链中节点的奖惩方法，其特征在于，包括：基于数据区块链中的共识节点达成的共识结果，对数据区块链中发送或转发伪命令的节点进行惩罚，对判断结果与共识结果相反的共识节点进行惩罚；对数据区块链中发送或转发真命令的节点进行奖励，对判断结果与共识结果一致的共识节点进行奖励。
  8. 根据权利要求7所述的授权参与共识的拜占庭容错数据区块链中节点的奖惩方法，其特征在于，当共识结果是共识节点多次进行共识游戏得到时，基于共识节点达成的共识结果，对发送或转发伪命令的节点进行惩罚，对各次共识游戏中至少一次判断结果与共识结果相反的共识节点进行惩罚，且惩罚程度正比于该共识节点各次共识游戏的判断结果与共识结果相反的次数；
    对发送或转发真命令的节点进行奖励，对各次共识游戏的判断结果均与共识结果一致的共识节点进行奖励，且奖励程度与共识游戏的次数成正比。
  9. 根据权利要求7所述的授权参与共识的拜占庭容错数据区块链中节点的奖惩方法，其特征在于，依据以下至少一条对区块链中的节点进行奖惩：
    P1：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则最近一次发送该命令的节点被奖励；
    P2:如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被奖励；
    P3：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被奖励；
    P4：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则最近一次发送该命令的节点被惩罚；
    P5：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
    P6：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
    P7：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则没有得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
    P8：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则没有得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；或者，如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则没有得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被奖励。
  10. 根据权利要求9所述的授权参与共识的拜占庭容错数据区块链中节点的奖惩方法，其特征在于，如果共识结果是通过多次共识游戏才得到，则按照P5～P8条对共识节点进行多次奖励或惩罚。
  11. 一种存储器件，其可以由计算机读取，并可以存储由所述计算机执行的一套指令，以便根据权利要求7到10中的至少一项执行奖惩方法。
  12. 授权参与共识的拜占庭容错数据区块链中节点的奖惩装置，其特征在于，包括奖惩模块，用于：基于数据区块链中的共识节点达成的共识结果，对数据区块链中发送或转发伪命令的节点进行惩罚，对判断结果与共识结果相反的共识节点进行惩罚；对数据区块链中发送或转发真命令的节点进行奖励，对判断结果与共识结果一致的共识节点进行奖励。
  13. 根据权利要求12所述的授权参与共识的拜占庭容错数据区块链中节点的奖惩装置，其特征在于，奖惩模块还用于：当共识结果是共识节点多次进行共识游戏得到时，基于共识节点达成的共识结果，对发送或转发伪命令的节点进行惩罚，对各次共识游戏中至少一次判断结果与共识结果相反的共识节点进行惩罚，且惩罚程度正比于该共识节点各次共识游戏的判断结果与共识结果相反的次数；
    对发送或转发真命令的节点进行奖励，对各次共识游戏的判断结果均与共识结果一致的共识节点进行奖励，且奖励程度与共识游戏的次数成正比。
  14. 根据权利要求12所述的授权参与共识的拜占庭容错数据区块链中节点的奖惩装置，其特征在于，所述奖惩模块用于依据以下至少一条对区块链中的节点进行奖惩：
    P1：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则最近一次发送该命令的节点被奖励；
    P2:如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被奖励；
    P3：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被奖励；
    P4：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则最近一次发送该命令的节点被惩罚；
    P5：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被惩 罚；
    P6：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
    P7：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为真，则没有得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；
    P8：如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则没有得出该命令为伪的判断结果的共识节点被惩罚；或者，如果共识结果为所述命令应被判为伪，则没有得出该命令为真的判断结果的共识节点被奖励。
  15. 根据权利要求14所述的授权参与共识的拜占庭容错数据区块链中节点的奖惩方法，其特征在于，所述奖惩模块还用于：当共识结果是通过多次共识游戏才得到时，则按照P5～P8条对共识节点进行多次奖励或惩罚。
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