WO2018231765A1 - Clés de chiffrement codées exécutables - Google Patents

Clés de chiffrement codées exécutables Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018231765A1
WO2018231765A1 PCT/US2018/037011 US2018037011W WO2018231765A1 WO 2018231765 A1 WO2018231765 A1 WO 2018231765A1 US 2018037011 W US2018037011 W US 2018037011W WO 2018231765 A1 WO2018231765 A1 WO 2018231765A1
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WO
WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
encryption
decryption
devices
executable coded
transmission
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/US2018/037011
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English (en)
Inventor
Daniel Maurice Lerner
Original Assignee
Daniel Maurice Lerner
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Daniel Maurice Lerner filed Critical Daniel Maurice Lerner
Publication of WO2018231765A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018231765A1/fr

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Classifications

    • G—PHYSICS
    • G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
    • G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
    • G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
    • G06F21/60—Protecting data
    • G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
    • H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
    • H04L9/0822—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using key encryption key
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0894—Escrow, recovery or storing of secret information, e.g. secret key escrow or cryptographic key storage

Definitions

  • the technical field comprises cyber security. More specifically, the present disclosure relates to securitization of communications, and more particularly to devices and an associated system that conceals and reveals signals between devices to ensure that the communications are discoverable by only designated third parties. Methods and devices for securitization of these (primarily digital and normally two-way) communications using applications that may be combined with authorization and validation for receiving, storing, and retrieval of electronic, optical, and/or electro-optical communications in the form of voice, data, or optical transmissions, are also included.
  • the present disclosure includes devices and a key management system that is specifically suited for data transmission applications that require a need for discrete communications, preserving privacy of information, electronic commerce transactions, electronic mail communications and the like.
  • the devices may be virtual or real devices as they may exist only in a CPU/computer or in computer memory.
  • Encryption experts also assert that, despite the name, "plaintext", the word is also synonymous with textual data and binary data, both in data file and computer file form.
  • the term "plaintext” also refers to serial data transferred, for example, from a communication system such as a satellite, telephone or electronic mail system.
  • Terms such as 'encryption' and 'enciphering', 'encrypted' and 'ciphered', 'encrypting device' and 'ciphering device', 'decrypting device' and 'decipher device' have an equivalent meaning within cryptology and are herein used to describe devices and methods that include encryption and decryption techniques.
  • Network security is a burgeoning field.
  • encryption algorithms for example, public key encryption techniques using RSA and Diffie-Hellman are widely used.
  • Well known public key encryption techniques generally described in the following U. S. Pat. Nos: 4,200,770 entitled, Cryptographic Apparatus and Method, invented by Hellman, Diffie and Merkle; 4,218,582 entitled, Public Key Cryptographic Apparatus and Method, invented by Hellman and Merkle; 4,405,829 entitled Cryptographic Communications System and Method, invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman; and 4,424,414 entitled, Exponentiation Cryptographic Apparatus and Method, invented by Hellman and Pohlig.
  • network security refer to Network and Internetwork Security, by William Stallings, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1995.
  • Another trend in data mobility is to upload and download data on demand over a network, so that the most recent version of the data is always accessible and can be shared only with authorized users.
  • This facilitates the use of "thin client" software and minimizes the cost of storing replicated versions of the data, facilitates the implementation of a common backup and long-term storage retention and/or purging plan, and may provide enhanced visibility and auditing as to who accessed the data and the time of access, as may be required for regulatory compliance.
  • thin client software greatly increases the vulnerability of such data to hackers who are able to penetrate the firewalls and other mechanisms, unless the data is encrypted on the storage medium in such a way that only authorized users could make sense of it, even if an unauthorized user were able to access the encrypted files.
  • DES Data Encryption Standard
  • NSS National Institute of Standards and Technology
  • FEAL Fast data encipherment algorithm
  • Asymmetric file encryption systems use a different key to encrypt a file from the key used to decrypt the encrypted file.
  • Many current file encryption systems rely on asymmetric encryption, such as those that rely on public key/private key pairs.
  • An example of an encryption algorithm that utilizes public key/private key pairs is the RSA (Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman) algorithm.
  • Symmetric file systems use an identical key to encrypt a file as the key used to decrypt the encrypted file.
  • Certain file encryption systems utilize a cryptographic process or random number generator to derive a random symmetric key known as the file encryption key (FEK). The FEK is used to encrypt the file.
  • Symmetric cryptography functions up to five orders of magnitude faster than asymmetric cryptography on files.
  • any such file encryption system still has to overcome the fact that asymmetric keys generally operate at orders of magnitude slower than symmetric keys.
  • the file encryption key each time a file is being authenticated, the file encryption key has to be decrypted by the asymmetric key which is time consuming, but becoming less so as computer speeds and operations are constantly improving.
  • the present disclosure relates generally to a cryptographic management scheme that provides for network security, mobile security and specifically and more particularly relates to devices and a system for creating and manipulating encryption keys without risking the security of the key.
  • the present disclosure addresses all of the needs described directly herein, as well as described earlier above. Executable Coded Keys
  • the executable coded keys themselves contain code which can perform a portion or all of the encryption. These executable coded keys can be equivalent to binary bits. They can be inserted into execution memory and provide instructions to the computer to execute the code.
  • the CPU In order for the system to operate property with the encrypter and decrypter devices, the CPU must be designed specifically to ensure it can accommodate binary codes to carry out encryption/decryption duties. These include performing both reversible and non-reversible mathematic operations such as inverts, shifts with rotations, call functions, etc.
  • the implications are important in that here we are removing encryption code from the execution memory (library) and placing the execution code in the encryption key - thus the term executable coded cipher keys applies.
  • the keys can be indirectly accessed as an I/O device as well, which establishes the fact that the key is part of the encrypting key program. As with any public/private key arrangement, the keys remain secret or hidden from any third party, and the keys in this instant are dynamic. Therefore, if a third party has access to the source code, they cannot decrypt the data because at least a portion of the source code that was used to decrypt the data is unavailable. In other words, part of the source code is binary code that resides in the key.
  • analogue computational mechanism utilizing, for example, optical, thermal, radiative and/or electromagnetic circuitry.
  • analogue computational mechanism utilizing, for example, optical, thermal, radiative and/or electromagnetic circuitry.
  • digital bits would most likely be replaced and provided, for instance, by some sequence of analogue modulators.
  • the present disclosure describes two or more devices that encrypt transmission(s) transmitted to and/or decrypt transmission(s) received from the devices comprising; at least one executable coded cipher key(s), and at least one executable coded encryption key (ECEK) device that encrypts transmission(s) that uses executable cipher coded key(s), and at least one executable coded decryption key (ECDK) device that decrypts transmission(s) that also uses the at least one executable coded cipher key(s), at least one computer processing unit (CPU) with computational capabilities that is connected to and controls a computer memory via an address bus and a data bus such that the address bus accesses a designated range of computer memories and range of memory bits and the data bus provides for a flow of transmission(s) into and out of the CPU and computer memory, and wherein the computer memory contains encrypter/decrypter memory that possesses at least one encryption space location and at least one decryption space location for the executable coded cipher key(
  • ECEK and ECDK devices operate as a single device that when in operation as a single device provides the same functionality as if they operated as individual devices.
  • ECEK and the ECDK devices each provide functions that allow for encryption and/or decryption.
  • the ECEK and ECDK devices individually or in combination can create said executable coded cipher keys. These devices can be real and/or virtual devices. Gate arrays can provide the necessary functionality in lieu of or together with the CPU. Here, the gate arrays can be programmable gate arrays. In a further embodiment, the executable coded cipher key(s) are removed from memory after one or more encryption/decryption functions are performed with the key(s). The executable coded cipher key(s) can be automatically removed from a location where said key(s) reside.
  • executable coded cipher key(s) provide executable code that controls encryption/decryption processes within the key(s) in lieu of within a CPU and/or the CPU memory.
  • the transmission(s) and transmission(s) devices can be data and data devices as well as transmission(s) and transmission(s) devices that can be signals and signal devices and/or a combination of signals and transmissions.
  • the transmission(s) can also be provided with and contain noise and/or a form of illogical randomness.
  • data at rest is implemented by utilizing a memory storage device in lieu of an unsecured network, where the data at rest can reside.
  • the executable coded cipher keys exist within virtual or real input/output (I/O) devices.
  • the executable coded cipher keys are capable of containing binary randomized bits that are interpreted by one or more encrypt/decrypt binary primitive interpreters.
  • the interpreters dispatch control to a remaining balance of binary primitive subroutine libraries, wherein the primitive subroutine libraries are chosen functions that provide instructions to encrypt and/or decrypt data in encrypt/decrypt memory.
  • the encryption includes an encryption set of primitives utilized by bits in executable coded cipher keys that produce encryption functions and wherein decryption includes a decryption set of primitives that utilizes the bits found in the executable coded cipher keys.
  • These executable coded cipher keys provide matching but inverse functions that are required to decrypt the data, such that the decryption bits obtained from the executable coded cipher keys are utilized in a reverse order when compared with those utilized for encryption.
  • computer memory contains the encrypter/decrypter memory with one encryption space location and one decryption space location so that the computer memory also may contain space location for the executable coded cipher keys and subroutine primitives.
  • the executable coded cipher keys can be divided into memory space locations and subroutine primitives can also be divided into memory space locations represented by and including encrypt/decrypt binary primitive interpreter(s) as well as an encryption set of primitives and a decryption set of primitives.
  • the data to be encrypted has been stored in an encryption space location and the encrypt/decrypt binary primitives interpreter(s) accesses a first portion of an executable coded cipher key and interprets bits to select an encryption set of a primitives library that reads, modifies, and writes the encryption space location.
  • the encrypt/decrypt binary primitive interpreter then accesses a second portion of an executable coded cipher key and interprets bits to again select an encryption set of primitives library which will further read, modify, and write the encryption space location such that a stepwise process continues and utilizes some or all portions of the executable coded cipher key, that results in completing the encryption.
  • the data can be stored in a decryption space location and the encrypt/decrypt binary primitives interpreter(s) accesses a last portion of an executable coded cipher key and interprets bits to select a decryption primitives library which will read, modify, and write the decryption space location.
  • the binary primitive interpreter(s) then accesses a next to last portion of an executable coded cipher key and interprets bits to further select from the decryption primitives library to further read, modify, and write the decryption space location such that a stepwise process continues and utilizes some or all portions of an executable coded cipher key(s) in reverse order of the encryption that results in completing the decryption.
  • the executable coded cipher keys are place into divided memory space locations and the encrypt/decrypt binary primitive interpreter is found within the executable coded cipher key(s). It is also true that in some instances, the encryption and decryption primitives can be found within the executable coded cipher key(s).
  • the executable coded cipher key(s) can be stored in computer memory. It is also possible that the executable coded cipher key(s) be stored in a form of crypto memory. In addition, the executable coded cipher key(s) can themselves operate as a virtual CPU. Further, the executable coded cipher key(s) may operate as virtual hardware that includes one or more virtual CPUs.
  • a system with two or more devices that encrypt transmission(s) transmitted to and/or decrypt transmission(s) received from the system comprising at least one executable coded encryption key(s), and at least one executable coded encryption key (ECEK) device that encrypts transmission(s) that uses executable coded cipher key(s), and at least one executable coded decryption key (ECDK) device that decrypts transmission(s) that also uses at least one executable coded encryption key(s), at least one computer processing unit (CPU) with computational capabilities that is connected to and controls a computer memory via an address bus and a data bus such that the address bus accesses a designated range of computer memories and range of memory bits and allows for the data bus to provide for a flow of transmission(s) into and out of the CPU and computer memory.
  • CPU computer processing unit
  • the computer memory in this instance contains encrypter/decrypter memory that possesses at least one encryption space location and at least one decryption space location for executable coded cipher key(s), such that transmission(s) is sent to the encrypter/decrypter memory that stores the transmission(s) while said transmission(s) is encrypted and/or decrypted.
  • the transmission(s) is sent to at least one transmitter such that encryption/decryption of the transmission(s) is controlled and manipulated by executable coded cipher key(s), wherein the executable coded cipher key(s) remain in the computer memory long enough to achieve encryption/decryption completion.
  • Figure 1 is a flowchart describing the structure and functionality of a device that uses an executable coded encryption key, an ECEK device that encrypts and/or decrypts data using executable coded cipher keys.
  • Figure 2 is a flowchart describing the structure and functionality of a device that uses an executable coded decryption key (ECDK) device that encrypts and/or decrypts data using executable coded cipher keys.
  • Figure 3 is a schematic (300) depicting the combination of two transceiver devices utilizing both encrypters and decrypters which operate according to the randomized encryption and decryption of the present disclosure.
  • ECDK executable coded decryption key
  • Figure 4 is a schematic diagram that illustrates devices utilized initially represented in simple block form for Figures 1, 2, and 3. Detailed Description
  • Figure 1 is a flowchart (100) describing a device that uses an executable coded encryption key, an ECEK device, (100 A) that encrypts and/or decrypts data using executable coded cipher keys (140).
  • a data source (1 10) which could be plaintext
  • the data is sent to an encrypter/decrypter memory (120) which stores the data while it is being encrypted and/or decrypted.
  • the encryption/decryption is completed the data is sent to a data transmitter (130).
  • the process of encryption/decryption is controlled by the executable coded cipher keys (140).
  • the executable coded cipher keys (140) need only remain in computer memory for at least the duration of the encryption/decryption process.
  • Executable coded cipher keys (140) control the execution of encryption/decryption subroutine primitives (150).
  • the subroutine primitives (150) read, modify, and write the encrypter/decrypter memory (120). This allows for the executable coded cipher keys (140) to control the
  • it is impossible to reverse compile the code because the code no longer resides in computer memory.
  • it is impossible to steal or copy the coded keys (140) because they also no longer reside in computer memory.
  • the encryption/ decryption instructions reside in the key itself, for which no source code exists, i.e., there is no source code for the key.
  • the executable coded cipher keys (140) simply contain the typical binary randomized bits that are the same or similar to those contained in today's symmetric encryption keys. These bits may be interpreted by the encrypt/decrypt binary primitive interpreter (152) which then dispatches control to the balance of the binary primitive subroutine libraries (154, 156).
  • the binary primitive subroutine libraries (154, 156) are chosen functions which provide instructions to encrypt or decrypt the data in encrypt/decrypt memory (120). While encrypting, the encryption set of primitives (154) are utilized by bits in executable coded cipher keys (140) to produce encryption functions.
  • FIG. 2 is a flowchart (200) describing the structure and functionality of a device that uses an executable coded decryption key (ECDK) device, (200A) that encrypts and/or decrypts data using executable coded cipher keys (140).
  • Computer processing unit (210) is connected to computer memory (220) through an address bus (230) and a data bus (240).
  • the address bus (230) accesses a range of computer memory (235).
  • the data bus (240) accesses a range of memory bits (245).
  • the computer memory (220) contains the encrypter/decrypter memory (120) with one encryption location (222) and one decryption location (224).
  • the computer memory (220) also contains location for the executable coded cipher keys (140) and the subroutine primitives (150).
  • the executable coded cipher keys are divided into memory locations (141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146... .nnn) as required.
  • the subroutine primitives (150) are divided into memory locations represented by and including the encrypt/decrypt binary primitive interpreter (152) as well as the encryption set of primitives (154), and decryption set of primitives (156).
  • the encrypt/decrypt binary primitive interpreter (152) accesses the first portion of an executable coded cipher key (141) and interprets the bits to select the encryption set of primitives library (154) which will read, modify, and write the encryption location (222).
  • the encrypt/decrypt binary primitive interpreter (152) accesses the second portion of an executable coded cipher key (142) and interprets the bits to select the encryption set of primitives library (154) which will read, modify, and write the encryption location (222).
  • This stepwise process continues by utilizing all of the portions of the executable coded cipher key (140) which results in completing the encryption process.
  • decryption location 224
  • the encrypt/decrypt binary primitives interpreter (152) accesses the last portion of an executable coded cipher key (146) and interprets the bits to select the decryption primitives library (156) which will read, modify, and write the decryption location (224).
  • the encrypt/decrypt binary primitives interpreter (152) accesses the next to last portion of an executable coded cipher key (145) and interprets the bits to select the decryption primitives library (156) which will read, modify, and write the decryption location (224).
  • This stepwise process continues by utilizing all of the portions of the executable coded cipher keys (140) in the reverse order of the encryption process, which results in completing the decryption process.
  • Figure 3 is a schematic (300) depicting the combination of two transceiver devices utilizing both encrypters and decrypters.
  • Communication signals from a first source (310) are sent through connection (320) to the first transceiver (330).
  • the first transceiver (330) securely connects encrypted data through connection (340) through an unsecured network (350).
  • the second transceiver (370) securely connects encrypted data through another connection (360) through the unsecured network (350).
  • Communication signals from a second source (390) are sent through connection (380) to the second transceiver (370).
  • the (ECEK) Encrypter (332) is controlled by the computer (331) to optionally encrypt and transmit the communication signals to the ECDK Decrypter (373) via an unsecured network (350).
  • Encrypted signals arrive at the second transceiver (370) to the ECDK Decrypter (373) controlled by computer (371).
  • ECDK Decrypter (373) decrypts the signals and sends them to the second source (390) thorough connection (380). This accomplishes sending secured signals from a first source (310) to a second source (390) by utilizing the optional encryption system which may be randomized, of the present disclosure.
  • the communication signals can be conversely secured by sending them from the second source (390) to the first source (310) utilizing the ECEK (372) in the second transceiver (370) as well as the ECDK Decrypter (333) in the first transceiver (330). This completes the process for securing data in transit.
  • Figure 4 is a schematic diagram that illustrates devices utilized initially represented in simple block form for Figures 1, 2, and 3. More specifically, Figure 4 further illustrates and demonstrates actual and various devices using exploded view callouts from that depicted in the schematic diagram shown as shown and described in Figures 1-3.
  • item 350 primarily represents DASA databases.
  • the list of devices associated with callouts 100A, 200A, as well as 310, 330,370, and 390 found in Figures 1 -3) can also represent DASA database(s) as well as user devices and/or access devices including desktop or stand- alone computer terminals replete with hard drives, laptop computers, cellular or smart telephones, computer tablets such as the iPad®, computer mainframes, and even printed circuit boards or integrated circuits (ICs).
  • DASA database(s) can also represent DASA database(s) as well as user devices and/or access devices including desktop or stand- alone computer terminals replete with hard drives, laptop computers, cellular or smart telephones, computer tablets such as the iPad®, computer mainframes,
  • communication data connections from 350 to the list of 100A, 200A, as well as 310, 330, 370, and 390 devices.
  • Data communication amplifiers, repeaters, and/or range extenders which optionally assist in ensuring signal integrity and strength, over various communication distances can be located in the data communication flow paths connecting the DASA databases, user devices, and/or access devices.
  • the computer readable media described within this application is non-transitory. In most if not all cases, the transmission of data is transmitted via signals that are non- transitory signals. In addition, each and every aspect of all references mentioned herein are hereby fully incorporated by reference.

Abstract

L'invention concerne au moins deux dispositifs qui sécurisent au moins une transmission transmise depuis ces dispositifs et reçue par ces derniers, comprenant au moins une clé chiffrée codée exécutable, au moins un dispositif de clé de chiffrement codée exécutable (ECEK) qui chiffre ladite transmission au moyen de ladite clé chiffrée codée, et au moins un dispositif de clé de déchiffrement codée exécutable (ECDK) qui déchiffre ladite transmission et qui utilise également au moins une clé chiffrée codée, de telle sorte que la transmission est envoyée à une mémoire de chiffrement/déchiffrement qui stocke la transmission lorsque la transmission est chiffrée et/ou déchiffrée. Lorsque le chiffrement/déchiffrement est achevé, la transmission est envoyée à au moins un émetteur de telle sorte que le chiffrement/déchiffrement de la transmission est commandé et manipulé par ladite clé chiffrée codée exécutable, cette dernière restant dans la mémoire de l'ordinateur suffisamment longtemps pour réaliser l'achèvement du chiffrement/déchiffrement.
PCT/US2018/037011 2017-06-12 2018-06-12 Clés de chiffrement codées exécutables WO2018231765A1 (fr)

Applications Claiming Priority (12)

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US201762518337P 2017-06-12 2017-06-12
US201762518281P 2017-06-12 2017-06-12
US201762518371P 2017-06-12 2017-06-12
US62/518,281 2017-06-12
US62/518,337 2017-06-12
US62/518,371 2017-06-12
US201762540266P 2017-08-02 2017-08-02
US201762540326P 2017-08-02 2017-08-02
US201762540307P 2017-08-02 2017-08-02
US62/540,266 2017-08-02
US62/540,307 2017-08-02
US62/540,326 2017-08-02

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Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5363447A (en) * 1993-03-26 1994-11-08 Motorola, Inc. Method for loading encryption keys into secure transmission devices
US20070199071A1 (en) * 2004-09-20 2007-08-23 Callas Jonathan D Apparatus and method for identity-based encryption within a conventional public-key infrastructure
WO2016173724A1 (fr) * 2015-04-27 2016-11-03 Gurulogic Microsystems Oy Système de cryptage, portefeuille de clés de cryptage et procédé
EP3161718A1 (fr) * 2014-06-30 2017-05-03 Nicira Inc. Architecture de cryptage

Patent Citations (4)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
US5363447A (en) * 1993-03-26 1994-11-08 Motorola, Inc. Method for loading encryption keys into secure transmission devices
US20070199071A1 (en) * 2004-09-20 2007-08-23 Callas Jonathan D Apparatus and method for identity-based encryption within a conventional public-key infrastructure
EP3161718A1 (fr) * 2014-06-30 2017-05-03 Nicira Inc. Architecture de cryptage
WO2016173724A1 (fr) * 2015-04-27 2016-11-03 Gurulogic Microsystems Oy Système de cryptage, portefeuille de clés de cryptage et procédé

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