WO2018207653A1 - 鍵配送システム及び方法、鍵生成装置、代表ユーザ端末、サーバ装置、ユーザ端末並びにプログラム - Google Patents
鍵配送システム及び方法、鍵生成装置、代表ユーザ端末、サーバ装置、ユーザ端末並びにプログラム Download PDFInfo
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- WO2018207653A1 WO2018207653A1 PCT/JP2018/017124 JP2018017124W WO2018207653A1 WO 2018207653 A1 WO2018207653 A1 WO 2018207653A1 JP 2018017124 W JP2018017124 W JP 2018017124W WO 2018207653 A1 WO2018207653 A1 WO 2018207653A1
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- user terminal
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/065—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for group communications
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/083—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) involving central third party, e.g. key distribution center [KDC] or trusted third party [TTP]
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
- H04L63/06—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network
- H04L63/062—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for supporting key management in a packet data network for key distribution, e.g. centrally by trusted party
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0819—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s)
- H04L9/0825—Key transport or distribution, i.e. key establishment techniques where one party creates or otherwise obtains a secret value, and securely transfers it to the other(s) using asymmetric-key encryption or public key infrastructure [PKI], e.g. key signature or public key certificates
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0861—Generation of secret information including derivation or calculation of cryptographic keys or passwords
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/30—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy
- H04L9/3066—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves
- H04L9/3073—Public key, i.e. encryption algorithm being computationally infeasible to invert or user's encryption keys not requiring secrecy involving algebraic varieties, e.g. elliptic or hyper-elliptic curves involving pairings, e.g. identity based encryption [IBE], bilinear mappings or bilinear pairings, e.g. Weil or Tate pairing
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/32—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials
- H04L9/3263—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols including means for verifying the identity or authority of a user of the system or for message authentication, e.g. authorization, entity authentication, data integrity or data verification, non-repudiation, key authentication or verification of credentials involving certificates, e.g. public key certificate [PKC] or attribute certificate [AC]; Public key infrastructure [PKI] arrangements
Definitions
- This invention relates to information security technology.
- VoIP Voice over Internet Protocol
- WebRTC Web Real-Time Communication
- messaging etc. are provided over the Internet, and ensuring the confidentiality of communications and systems based on authentication is important.
- TLS Transport Layer Security
- Non-Patent Document 1 for the distribution of keys used in the above services (for example, see Non-Patent Document 1).
- Non-Patent Document 1 in the join phase in which a key is distributed to a newly added user terminal, not only a newly added user terminal but also a user terminal and a server already participating in the session Calculations were required with the device.
- An object of the present invention is to provide a key distribution system and method, a representative user terminal, a server device, a user terminal, and a program that do not require calculation between a user terminal and a server device that are already participating in a session during the join phase It is to be.
- a key distribution system encrypts key information using a predetermined encryption function of CertificateCless Encryption using a public key of the (n + 1) th user terminal and information for identifying the (n + 1) th user terminal in Certificate less Encryption.
- a representative user terminal that obtains a ciphertext by transmitting the ciphertext to the server device, a server device that transmits the ciphertext to the (n + 1) th user terminal when adding the (n + 1) th user terminal, and a Certificate
- the n + 1th user terminal that obtains key information by decrypting the ciphertext with a predetermined decryption function of Certificate ⁇ less Encryption using the overall secret key of the (n + 1) th user terminal and information for identifying the (n + 1) th user terminal in less Encryption And.
- the block diagram which shows the example of a key distribution system.
- the flowchart which shows the example of the key delivery method.
- the key distribution system includes, for example, a key generation device 1, a user terminal 2, and a server device 3.
- the user terminal 2 is made of, for example, the (n + 1) the user terminal 2 n + 1 from the first user terminal 2 1. Any one of the user terminals in the first n user terminal 2 n from the first user terminal 2 1, and has previously been selected as a representative user terminal 2 p.
- the n + 1 user terminal 2 n + 1 is that from the first user terminal 2 first terminal to be participating in the session that is already configured by the n user terminal 2 n.
- the key distribution method is realized, for example, by each part of the key distribution system performing each process of step S1 to step S4 shown in FIG.
- step 1 The processing in step 1 is realized by the following processing from step S11 to step S15, for example.
- the key generation device 1 performs a process of (Params, msk) ⁇ CLSetup (1 ⁇ ) (step S11). That is, the key generation device 1 generates the public parameter Params and the master secret key msk by a predetermined setup function CLSetup in Certificate less Encryption.
- ⁇ is a security parameter.
- the key generation device 1 performs the process of psk n + 1 ⁇ -CLDer (Params, msk, U n + 1 ) (step S12).
- the key generation device by using the information U n + 1 for identifying a master secret key msk and the n + 1 user terminal 2 n + 1, determined by the public parameter Params, Certificate less predetermined portion secret key generating function in the Encryption CLDer way, the n + 1 to generate the user terminal 2 n + 1 partial private key psk n + 1, is transmitted to the (n + 1) the user terminal 2 n + 1.
- the ( n + 1 ) th user terminal 2 n + 1 performs the process of sv n + 1 ⁇ SetSV (Params, U n + 1 ) (step S13). That is, the (n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1 uses the information U n + 1 for identifying the ( n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1 and uses the predetermined secret information generation function SetSV in Certificate less Encryption, which is determined by the public parameter Params. n + 1 to generate the secret information sv n + 1 of the user terminal 2 n + 1.
- the (n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1 performs the process of csk n + 1 ⁇ -SetSK (Params, psk n + 1 , sv n + 1 ) (step S14). That is, the n + 1 user terminal 2 n + 1 is the (n + 1) by using the secret information sv n + 1 of the user terminal 2 n + 1 of the psk n + 1 and the n + 1 user terminal 2 n + 1, determined by the public parameter Params, given the Certificate less Encryption entirety by the secret key generating function SetSK, generates the entire secret key csk n + 1 of the (n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1 of the.
- the ( n + 1 ) th user terminal 2 n + 1 performs the process of cpk n + 1 ⁇ SetPK (Params, sv n + 1 ) (step S15). That is, the n + 1 user terminal 2 n + 1 is the (n + 1) by using the secret information sv n + 1 of the user terminal 2 n + 1, determined by the public parameter Params, a predetermined public key generating function SetPK in Certificate less Encryption, the n + 1 user terminal 2 n + 1 public key cpk n + 1 is generated and transmitted to the representative user terminal 2 p .
- the representative user terminal 2 p performs the process of CT ⁇ CLEnc (Params, cpk n + 1 , U n + 1 , SK). That is, the key information SK is determined by the public parameter Params using the information U n + 1 for identifying the public key cpk n + 1 of the (n + 1) th user terminal and the (n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1 .
- the ciphertext CT is obtained by encrypting with the encryption function CLEnc, and the obtained ciphertext CT is transmitted to the server device 3 (step S2).
- the key information SK is key information such as a session key.
- the key information SK itself may be used as a key, or another key information may be generated based on the key information SK, and the other key information may be used as a key.
- step S1 and step S2 are performed for each user terminal that may participate in the session. That is, when N is an integer equal to or greater than 2, and there are N user terminals that may participate in the session, each of these N user terminals is defined as the (n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1 and the above steps S1 and The process of step S2 is performed.
- step S1 and step S2 are performed before the so-called join phase process including the following steps S3 and S4.
- step S3 and step S4 the first n + 1 user terminal 2 n + 1 is added to the session that is already configured by the n user terminal 2 n from the first user terminal 2 1.
- the server device 3 transmits the ciphertext CT to the ( n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1 when adding the ( n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1 to the session of the predetermined service (step S3).
- This ciphertext is a ciphertext CT corresponding to the ( n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1 generated in the process of step S2.
- the (n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1 performs the process of SK ⁇ CLDec (Params, csk n + 1 , CT) (step S4). That is, the (n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1 decrypts the ciphertext CT with the predetermined decryption function CLDec of Certificate less Encryption, which is determined by the public parameter Params, using the overall secret key csk n + 1 of the ( n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1. As a result, key information SK is obtained.
- the ciphertext relating to the key information is calculated in advance and stored in the server device 2 in advance, and the ciphertext is added to the (n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1 to be added in the join phase.
- the key information is passed, it is possible to pass the key information to the ( n + 1) th user terminal 2 n + 1 to be added without reducing the security.
- the above key distribution system for example, (1) Key distribution for VoIP calls used for two-point calls and conference calls, (2) Substitutes for DTLS in WebRTC, and Web conferences and web phones for browsers and smartphones It can be used for key distribution for encrypted communication and (3) key distribution for sharing a decryption key of a messaging application.
- the program describing the processing contents can be recorded on a computer-readable recording medium.
- a computer-readable recording medium for example, any recording medium such as a magnetic recording device, an optical disk, a magneto-optical recording medium, and a semiconductor memory may be used.
- each unit may be configured by executing a predetermined program on a computer, or at least a part of these processing may be realized by hardware.
- the key generation device 1 and the server device 3 are described as different devices, but the key generation device 1 and the server device 3 may be the same device.
- the key generation device 1 may be included in the server device 3.
- Certificate less Encryption is used to pass the key information SK to U n + 1 that is a join user via the server device 3.
- the server device 3 passes the entire secret key as KGC. If it is assumed that the server device 3 is semi-onest, Certificate less Encryption does not know the information related to any key information from the security of definition 2 to the server device. Also, from definition 1, an attacker who can replace the public key cannot obtain any information regarding the key information.
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Abstract
Description
例えば、鍵生成装置1、代表ユーザ端末2p、第n+1ユーザ端末2n+1及びサーバ装置3の各部における処理をコンピュータによって実現する場合、これらの端末及び装置の各部が有すべき機能の処理内容はプログラムによって記述される。そして、このプログラムをコンピュータで実行することにより、その各部の処理がコンピュータ上で実現される。
上記の実施形態では、鍵生成装置1及びサーバ装置3が互いに異なる装置として記述されているが、鍵生成装置1及びサーバ装置3は同じ装置であってもよい。例えば、サーバ装置3に鍵生成装置1が含まれていてもよい。
Certificate less Encryptionの安全性の定義は次の2つのケースに分離できる。定義1:攻撃者は、公開鍵を置き換え可能だが、全体秘密鍵を入手することができない。定義2:攻撃者、全体秘密鍵を入手することができるが、公開鍵を置き換えることができない。定義2は、KGC(Key Generation Center、上記実施形態では鍵生成装置1)が悪意のあるモデルになる。
Claims (6)
- Certificate less Encryptionにおける第n+1ユーザ端末の公開鍵及び第n+1ユーザ端末を識別するための情報を用いて鍵情報をCertificate less Encryptionの所定の暗号化関数により暗号化することにより暗号文を得て、得られた暗号文をサーバ装置に送信する上記代表ユーザ端末と、
上記第n+1ユーザ端末を追加するときに上記第n+1ユーザ端末に上記暗号文を送信するサーバ装置と、
Certificate less Encryptionにおける第n+1ユーザ端末の全体秘密鍵及び上記第n+1ユーザ端末を識別するための情報を用いて、上記暗号文をCertificate less Encryptionの所定の復号関数で復号することにより鍵情報を得る上記第n+1ユーザ端末と、
を含む鍵配送システム。 - 請求項1の鍵配送システムの代表ユーザ端末。
- 請求項1の鍵配送システムのサーバ装置。
- 請求項1の鍵配送システムの第n+1ユーザ端末であるユーザ端末。
- 上記代表ユーザ端末が、Certificate less Encryptionにおける第n+1ユーザ端末の公開鍵及び第n+1ユーザ端末を識別するための情報を用いて鍵情報をCertificate less Encryptionの所定の暗号化関数により暗号化することにより暗号文を得て、得られた暗号文をサーバ装置に送信するステップと、
サーバ装置が、上記第n+1ユーザ端末を追加するときに上記第n+1ユーザ端末に上記暗号文を送信するステップと、
第n+1ユーザ端末が、Certificate less Encryptionにおける第n+1ユーザ端末の全体秘密鍵及び上記第n+1ユーザ端末を識別するための情報を用いて、上記暗号文をCertificate less Encryptionの所定の復号関数で復号することにより鍵情報を得るステップと、
を含む鍵配送方法。 - 請求項2の代表ユーザ端末、請求項3のサーバ装置又は請求項4のユーザ端末の各部としてコンピュータを機能させるためのプログラム。
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KR1020197032818A KR102401460B1 (ko) | 2017-05-09 | 2018-04-27 | 키 배송 시스템 및 방법, 키 생성 장치, 대표 유저 단말, 서버 장치, 유저 단말 및 프로그램 |
US16/607,004 US11336436B2 (en) | 2017-05-09 | 2018-04-27 | Key distribution system and method, key generation apparatus, representative user terminal, server apparatus, user terminal, and program |
EP18798218.6A EP3624393B1 (en) | 2017-05-09 | 2018-04-27 | Key distribution system and method, key generation device, representative user terminal, server device, user terminal and program |
JP2019517565A JPWO2018207653A1 (ja) | 2017-05-09 | 2018-04-27 | 鍵配送システム及び方法、鍵生成装置、代表ユーザ端末、サーバ装置、ユーザ端末並びにプログラム |
CN201880028825.0A CN110574335B (zh) | 2017-05-09 | 2018-04-27 | 密钥分发系统以及方法、记录介质 |
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YOSHIDA, REO ET AL.: "ID-based Dynamic Multi-key : Distribution Protocol with Non-interactive Join and its Performance Evaluation", SCIS 2018 (2018 SYMPOSIUM ON CRYPTOGRAPHY AND INFORMATION SECURITY); 23-26/01/2018, 23 January 2018 (2018-01-23), pages 1 - 8, XP009517224 * |
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Publication number | Publication date |
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JPWO2018207653A1 (ja) | 2020-03-12 |
KR20190133249A (ko) | 2019-12-02 |
US11336436B2 (en) | 2022-05-17 |
CN110574335B (zh) | 2022-11-29 |
KR102401460B1 (ko) | 2022-05-24 |
EP3624393A1 (en) | 2020-03-18 |
EP3624393B1 (en) | 2022-06-01 |
CN110574335A (zh) | 2019-12-13 |
US20200136813A1 (en) | 2020-04-30 |
EP3624393A4 (en) | 2020-11-18 |
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