WO2018196813A1 - 一种共识验证的方法及装置 - Google Patents
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- WO2018196813A1 WO2018196813A1 PCT/CN2018/084624 CN2018084624W WO2018196813A1 WO 2018196813 A1 WO2018196813 A1 WO 2018196813A1 CN 2018084624 W CN2018084624 W CN 2018084624W WO 2018196813 A1 WO2018196813 A1 WO 2018196813A1
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Definitions
- the present application relates to the field of blockchain technology, and in particular, to a method and device for consensus verification.
- the blockchain network also known as the distributed ledger network, is characterized by decentralization, openness and transparency, and blockchain nodes in each block synchronize the blockchain.
- the blockchain network consists of blockchain nodes, each of which can initiate a transaction request or participate in a consensus verification of the transaction request.
- the existing consensus verification method is that, for a transaction, a blockchain node participating in the transaction broadcasts a transaction request for the transaction to each consensus node in the blockchain network.
- the consensus node is a blockchain node responsible for consensus verification, and the transaction request contains transaction data of the transaction. After the consensus nodes have passed the consensus verification of the transaction request, the consensus nodes will store the transaction data in the blockchain.
- each block chain node can synchronize the blockchain and obtain the transaction data of each transaction stored in the blockchain, it is easy to cause the privacy of the blockchain node participating in the transaction included in the transaction data to be leaked.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a method and device for consensus verification, so as to solve the problem that the existing consensus verification method easily leads to the leakage of the privacy of the blockchain node participating in the transaction.
- the supervisory node acquires a transaction request; the transaction request includes transaction data and a signature of at least one transaction node;
- a first obtaining module acquiring a transaction request;
- the transaction request includes transaction data and a signature of at least one transaction node;
- the judgment processing module determines whether the transaction request is legal according to the transaction data and the signature of each transaction node; if the transaction request is legal, generates a digest according to the specified data included in the transaction data, and generates the digest And the non-designated data included in the transaction data is sent to each consensus node, so that each consensus node performs consensus verification.
- the supervisory node is responsible for verifying whether the transaction request is legal, and if the transaction request is legal, generating a digest according to the specified data in the transaction data, and The summary and the non-designated data included in the transaction data are sent to the consensus nodes for consensus verification, and after the consensus verification of each consensus node is passed, the summary and non-designated data are stored in the blockchain.
- the consensus node will not receive the specified data, so the specified data will not be stored in the blockchain, and the specified data will not be leaked.
- the digest can be used to verify that the specified data not stored in the blockchain has been tampered with.
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a blockchain network provided by an embodiment of the present application.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a blockchain network provided by an embodiment of the present application.
- FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram of a device for consensus verification provided by an embodiment of the present application.
- the embodiment of the present application provides a method and device for consensus verification.
- FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for consensus verification provided by an embodiment of the present application, including the following steps:
- S101 The supervisory node acquires a transaction request.
- the supervisory node is a blockchain node that is specifically responsible for supervising transactions.
- the supervisory node has credibility, and the items verified by the supervising node will be recognized by the blockchain nodes in the whole network.
- the blockchain nodes participating in the transaction are transaction nodes
- the blockchain nodes participating in the consensus are consensus nodes. It is worth emphasizing that a blockchain node can be both a trading node and a consensus node, which can participate in transactions as well as participate in consensus verification of the transaction.
- FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a blockchain network provided by an embodiment of the present application.
- the black blockchain node is the supervisory node.
- the white blockchain node is the consensus node.
- a shadow node is a trading node, which can also participate in consensus verification.
- the transaction request includes transaction data and a signature of at least one transaction node.
- the transaction node may be a blockchain node that pays assets in the transaction.
- the blockchain node that accepts assets in the transaction may also be the trading node described herein.
- the following is an example of a blockchain node in which a transaction node is an asset paid in a transaction.
- the present application does not limit whether the transaction node is a consensus node at the same time.
- the transaction data is the detailed data of the transaction, such as the identity information of the transaction node, the specific content of the asset involved in the transaction, the asset number of the asset involved in the transaction, and the account address of the transaction node.
- the signature of the transaction node is generated by the transaction node for the transaction data, and is used as a transaction node to approve the transaction data. Specifically, if a trading node approves the transaction data of a transaction in which it participates, in order to retain the certificate for the subsequent transaction, the transaction node may first construct a summary of the transaction data according to the digest algorithm, and adopt a signature algorithm and a private key pair. The summary of the transaction data is further processed to generate its own signature.
- the digest algorithm can be various, but the common feature of the various digest algorithms is that the plaintext calculated digest can not be inverted before the plaintext is introduced, and if there is any modification in the plaintext, the modified plaintext is calculated.
- the abstract will also be different. It can be seen that the summary of the transaction data can be used as a unique identifier for the transaction data to identify each transaction. Therefore, when the transaction node signs the transaction data, it can be surely indicated that the transaction node is recognized for the transaction data, and the transaction node can be prevented from evading afterwards.
- the signature of the transaction node corresponds to the asset number of the asset used by the transaction node in the transaction data, and the transaction node declares the asset number of the asset used by the transaction node.
- the transaction node can make its signature and the asset number it uses to form a specific data structure, such as "asset number 001 (signature A)", or use other methods to establish the correspondence between the signature and the asset number used.
- the asset number corresponding to the signature of the transaction node is not necessarily the asset number actually owned by the transaction node, that is, the transaction node may maliciously use the asset number owned by other nodes. How to avoid this risk is part of the legality verification of the transaction request described later.
- the signature of the plurality of transaction nodes may be included by one transaction request, that is, the signature of each transaction node may be collected by any one of the transaction nodes, and a transaction request is generated and sent to the supervision node.
- the method for collecting the signature may be that the transaction data is transmitted in sequence at each transaction node, and each transaction node attaches its signature, and finally the transaction request is generated by the delivery to the last transaction node; or may be received by a transaction node.
- the signatures sent by each of the other trading nodes are then generated.
- the following is an explanation of a transaction request containing signatures of a plurality of transaction nodes.
- step S102 Determine whether the transaction request is legal according to the transaction data and the signature of each transaction node. If yes, execute step S103; otherwise, execute step S104.
- the supervisory node may score the credit ability of each signed transaction node according to the credit records of each transaction node stored therein, and if the score of the credit capability of each transaction node is lower than a specific score, It is determined that the transaction request is illegal. If the credit capability score of each transaction node is not lower than a specific score, it is determined that the transaction request is legal.
- the supervisory node may also use the transaction data, the signature of each transaction node, and the public key of each transaction node to verify whether there is a transaction node tampering with the transaction data or fraudulent use of other people's assets.
- the legality of the transaction request is verified, and will not be described again.
- the supervising node may hold the public key of each transaction node in advance, or the transaction request may also include the public key of each transaction node.
- the public key of each transaction node can decrypt the signature of the transaction node to obtain a summary of the transaction data, thereby verifying whether the signer has falsified the transaction data. If the decryption result obtained by the supervisory node using the public key provided by the transaction node to decrypt the transaction node's signature is inconsistent with the summary of the transaction data, the transaction node generates a signature by using the private key of the other blockchain node or the transaction node falsifies the transaction. Data, then the transaction request is illegal. If each transaction node has not falsified the transaction data, it can further perform subsequent legality verification work on the transaction request.
- the subsequent legality verification work may include verifying whether there is a situation in which the transaction node fraudulently uses another person's assets.
- the asset number of an asset owned by each blockchain node is associated with the public key of the blockchain node, and the public key is uniquely identified as an identity feature of the blockchain node.
- the role of the identity of the blockchain node, that is, the asset number associated with the public key of a blockchain node is the asset number actually owned by the blockchain node.
- the supervisory node determines the asset number of the asset actually owned by each transaction node according to the public key of each transaction node, and then compares the asset number corresponding to the signature of the transaction node in the transaction data (used by the transaction node) The asset number) and the asset number actually owned by the trading node to determine whether the trading node maliciously uses the asset number owned by other blockchain nodes. If at least one trading node maliciously uses the asset number owned by other blockchain nodes, the transaction request is illegal. If the asset number used by each trading node is its own asset number, the transaction request is legal. .
- the verification work is carried out progressively, and the following two aspects need to be confirmed in order to determine that the transaction request is legal: 1.
- the transaction data is not Tampering; 2.
- the trading node does not use the asset number owned by other blockchain nodes.
- S103 Generate a privacy summary according to the privacy data in the transaction data, and send the privacy summary and the non-private data in the transaction data to each consensus node, so that each consensus node performs consensus verification.
- the specified data may be private data
- the non-designated data may be non-private data.
- the privacy data includes the privacy of the transaction node, which may be specified by the transaction node and notified to the supervising node, or may be specified by the supervising node.
- the identity information of the transaction node in the transaction data, the specific content of the asset, the account address, and the like are the privacy of the transaction node, and all belong to the privacy data.
- the plaintext cannot be reversed. Therefore, after the private data is digested, the digest can be stored in a trusted blockchain, and the private data is hidden at the same time. Retain the credible deposit of private data and protect the privacy data.
- each consensus node can perform consensus verification based on the non-private data. For example, it can be verified based on the asset number in the non-private data whether there is a duplicate cost. If the consensus verification is passed, the privacy summary and non-private data will be stored in the blockchain. The legality of the transaction request is verified and provided by the supervisory node in advance.
- the summary of the stored blockchain can verify whether the privacy data claimed by a transaction node is true to resolve the disputes of each transaction node.
- the supervising node may further send the signatures of the transaction nodes to the consensus nodes, so that after the consensus nodes verify the transaction consensus, the signatures of the transaction nodes are also stored in the blockchain to prevent Each trading node replies afterwards.
- the supervisory node may notify the at least one transaction node to store the transaction data or the specified data included in the transaction data.
- the supervisory node can also wait for the consensus nodes to verify the consensus of the transaction, and save the digest into the blockchain, and then notify at least one transaction node to store the transaction data or the specified data in the private corresponding to the transaction node. database.
- each transaction node stores the specified data or transaction data by itself, and this application does not limit this.
- the transaction node can tamper with the specified data stored by itself, the summary stored on the blockchain can be used to verify the authenticity of the specified data at any time, thereby eliminating the risk of the transaction node privately tampering with the specified data.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic diagram of a blockchain network according to an embodiment of the present application.
- each blockchain node maintains a blockchain, and each blockchain node has its own private database for storing the blockchain node participation. Privacy data for transactions.
- the private database of the blockchain node (transaction node) participating in transaction A stores the private data corresponding to transaction A, and does not participate in the private operation of the blockchain node (non-transaction node) of transaction A.
- the private data corresponding to transaction A is not stored in the database.
- the supervisory node is responsible for verifying whether the transaction request is legal. If the transaction request is legal, generating a digest according to the specified data in the transaction data, and the summary and the transaction data are The included non-designated data is sent to the consensus nodes for consensus verification, and after the consensus verification of each consensus node is passed, the summary and non-designated data are stored in the blockchain. In this way, the consensus node will not receive the specified data, so the specified data will not be stored in the blockchain, and the specified data will not be leaked.
- the digest can be used to verify that the specified data not stored in the blockchain has been tampered with.
- each blockchain node in the federated chain network has a digital certificate issued by a certificate authority for endorsing the true identity of the blockchain node.
- the digital certificate contains the identity (ID) and public key of the blockchain node.
- ID the identity
- public key of the blockchain node the public key of the blockchain node.
- the asset number owned by the blockchain node is associated with its ID.
- the supervisory node can obtain the digital certificate of the transaction node, and judge whether the transaction request is legal according to the digital certificate of the transaction node, the signature of each transaction node, and the transaction data.
- the supervisory node may decrypt the signature of the transaction node according to the public key included in the digital certificate of the transaction node for each transaction node; and determine that the decryption result corresponding to each transaction node is related to the transaction data.
- the asset number corresponding to the identity identifier is determined as the asset number owned by the transaction node; according to the asset number owned by each transaction node,
- the signature of each transaction node and the transaction data determine whether the transaction request is legal; when it is determined that the decryption result corresponding to the at least one transaction node is different from the summary of the transaction data, it is determined that the transaction request is illegal.
- the supervisory node may determine, for each transaction node, the asset number corresponding to the signature in the transaction data according to the signature of the transaction node, as the asset number used by the transaction node; if the transaction node owns the asset If the number does not include at least one asset number used by the transaction node, it is determined that the transaction node is illegal; if the transaction node has an asset number containing all the asset numbers used by the transaction node, it is determined that the transaction node is legal; When at least one transaction node is illegal, it is determined that the transaction request is illegal; when all transaction nodes are legal, it is determined that the transaction request is legal.
- the transaction node legal means that the transaction node does not do malicious illegal acts (such as fraudulent use of others' signatures, fraudulent use of other people's assets).
- malicious illegal acts such as fraudulent use of others' signatures, fraudulent use of other people's assets.
- the transaction node provides its own digital certificate to the supervising node instead of its own public key, and the asset number actually owned by the transaction node needs to be confirmed according to the ID of the transaction node. .
- the above-mentioned two aspects of the verification of the legality of the transaction request by the supervisory node need to be confirmed (1, the transaction data has not been tampered with; 2, the transaction node does not use the asset number owned by other blockchain nodes) The way it will be slightly different.
- the supervisory node first attempts to decrypt the signature of the transaction node according to the public key included in the digital certificate of each transaction node. If the decryption result is consistent with the summary of the transaction data, the transaction node does not tamper with the transaction data; After the transaction node identity is true, the supervisory node can continue to determine the signature of the transaction node in the transaction data according to the asset number corresponding to the ID contained in each transaction node digital certificate (ie, the asset number actually owned by the transaction node). The asset number (that is, the asset number used by the trading node in the transaction) is the asset number of the trading node. If all trading nodes do not use the asset number of others, the transaction request is legal.
- the ID of the transaction node contained in the digital certificate of the transaction node is actually the privacy of the transaction node.
- the supervising node does not send the digital certificate of the transaction node to the consensus node, thereby ensuring that the ID of the transaction node is not leaked.
- the embodiment of the present application further provides a device for consensus verification, as shown in FIG. 4 , including:
- a first obtaining module 401 acquiring a transaction request; the transaction request includes transaction data and a signature of at least one transaction node;
- the determining processing module 402 determines whether the transaction request is legal according to the transaction data and the signature of each transaction node; if the transaction request is legal, generating a digest according to the specified data included in the transaction data, and The summary and the non-designated data included in the transaction data are sent to the consensus nodes, so that the consensus nodes perform consensus verification.
- the apparatus further includes a rejection module 403 that rejects the transaction request if the transaction request is not legitimate.
- the device further includes: a second obtaining module 404, acquiring a digital certificate of each transaction node before determining whether the transaction request is legal according to the transaction data and the signature of each transaction node;
- the determining processing module 402 determines whether the transaction request is legal according to the transaction data, the signature of each transaction node, and the digital certificate of each transaction node.
- the determining processing module 402 decrypts the signature of the transaction node according to the public key included in the digital certificate of the transaction node for each transaction node; and determines that the decryption result corresponding to each transaction node is related to the transaction data.
- the asset number corresponding to the identity identifier is determined as the asset number owned by the transaction node; according to the asset number owned by each transaction node,
- the signature of each transaction node and the transaction data determine whether the transaction request is legal; when it is determined that the decryption result corresponding to the at least one transaction node is different from the summary of the transaction data, it is determined that the transaction request is illegal.
- the determining processing module 402 determines, for each transaction node, an asset number corresponding to the signature in the transaction data according to the signature of the transaction node, as an asset number used by the transaction node; if the transaction node owns If the asset number does not include at least one asset number used by the transaction node, it is determined that the transaction node is illegal; if the transaction node has an asset number containing all the asset numbers used by the transaction node, it is determined that the transaction node is legal. When the at least one transaction node is not legal, it is determined that the transaction request is illegal; when all the transaction nodes are legal, it is determined that the transaction request is legal.
- the apparatus further includes a notification module 405 notifying the at least one transaction node to store the transaction data or the specified data included in the transaction data if the transaction request is legal.
- PLD Programmable Logic Device
- FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array
- HDL Hardware Description Language
- the controller can be implemented in any suitable manner, for example, the controller can take the form of, for example, a microprocessor or processor and a computer readable medium storing computer readable program code (eg, software or firmware) executable by the (micro)processor.
- computer readable program code eg, software or firmware
- examples of controllers include, but are not limited to, the following microcontrollers: ARC 625D, Atmel AT91SAM, The Microchip PIC18F26K20 and the Silicone Labs C8051F320, the memory controller can also be implemented as part of the memory's control logic.
- the controller can be logically programmed by means of logic gates, switches, ASICs, programmable logic controllers, and embedding.
- Such a controller can therefore be considered a hardware component, and the means for implementing various functions included therein can also be considered as a structure within the hardware component.
- a device for implementing various functions can be considered as a software module that can be both a method of implementation and a structure within a hardware component.
- the system, device, module or unit illustrated in the above embodiments may be implemented by a computer chip or an entity, or by a product having a certain function.
- a typical implementation device is a computer.
- the computer can be, for example, a personal computer, a laptop computer, a cellular phone, a camera phone, a smart phone, a personal digital assistant, a media player, a navigation device, an email device, a game console, a tablet computer, a wearable device, or A combination of any of these devices.
- embodiments of the present invention can be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Accordingly, the present invention may take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment, or a combination of software and hardware. Moreover, the invention can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) including computer usable program code.
- computer-usable storage media including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.
- the computer program instructions can also be stored in a computer readable memory that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to operate in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer readable memory produce an article of manufacture comprising the instruction device.
- the apparatus implements the functions specified in one or more blocks of a flow or a flow and/or block diagram of the flowchart.
- These computer program instructions can also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing device such that a series of operational steps are performed on a computer or other programmable device to produce computer-implemented processing for execution on a computer or other programmable device.
- the instructions provide steps for implementing the functions specified in one or more of the flow or in a block or blocks of a flow diagram.
- a computing device includes one or more processors (CPUs), input/output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.
- processors CPUs
- input/output interfaces network interfaces
- memory volatile and non-volatile memory
- the memory may include non-persistent memory, random access memory (RAM), and/or non-volatile memory in a computer readable medium, such as read only memory (ROM) or flash memory.
- RAM random access memory
- ROM read only memory
- Memory is an example of a computer readable medium.
- Computer readable media includes both permanent and non-persistent, removable and non-removable media.
- Information storage can be implemented by any method or technology.
- the information can be computer readable instructions, data structures, modules of programs, or other data.
- Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read only memory. (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technology, compact disk read only memory (CD-ROM), digital versatile disk (DVD) or other optical storage, Magnetic tape cartridges, magnetic tape storage or other magnetic storage devices or any other non-transportable media can be used to store information that can be accessed by a computing device.
- computer readable media does not include temporary storage of computer readable media, such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.
- embodiments of the present application can be provided as a method, system, or computer program product.
- the present application can take the form of an entirely hardware embodiment, an entirely software embodiment or an embodiment in combination of software and hardware.
- the application can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including but not limited to disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) including computer usable program code.
- the application can be described in the general context of computer-executable instructions executed by a computer, such as a program module.
- program modules include routines, programs, objects, components, data structures, and the like that perform particular tasks or implement particular abstract data types.
- the present application can also be practiced in distributed computing environments where tasks are performed by remote processing devices that are connected through a communication network.
- program modules can be located in both local and remote computer storage media including storage devices.
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Abstract
Description
Claims (12)
- 一种共识验证的方法,包括:监管节点获取交易请求;所述交易请求包含交易数据和至少一个交易节点的签名;根据所述交易数据和各交易节点的签名,判断所述交易请求是否合法;若所述交易请求合法,则根据所述交易数据中包含的指定数据生成摘要,并将所述摘要和所述交易数据中包含的非指定数据发送给各共识节点,以使各共识节点进行共识验证。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,所述方法还包括:若所述交易请求不合法,则拒绝所述交易请求。
- 根据权利要求1所述的方法,在根据所述交易数据和各交易节点的签名,判断所述交易请求是否合法之前,所述方法还包括:获取各交易节点的数字证书;根据所述交易数据和各交易节点的签名,判断所述交易请求是否合法,具体包括:根据所述交易数据、各交易节点的签名和各交易节点的数字证书,判断所述交易请求是否合法。
- 根据权利要求3所述的方法,根据所述交易数据、各交易节点的签名和各交易节点的数字证书,判断所述交易请求是否合法,具体包括:针对每个交易节点,根据该交易节点的数字证书中包含的公钥,解密该交易节点的签名;当确定每个交易节点对应的解密结果都与所述交易数据的摘要相同时,针对每个交易节点,根据该交易节点的数字证书中包含的身份标识,确定该身份标识对应的资产号,作为该交易节点拥有的资产号;根据各交易节点拥有的资产号、各交易节点的签名和所述交易数据,判断所述交易请求是否合法;当确定至少一个交易节点对应的解密结果与所述交易数据的摘要不同时, 确定所述交易请求不合法。
- 根据权利要求4所述的方法,根据各交易节点拥有的资产号、各交易节点的签名和所述交易数据,判断所述交易请求是否合法,具体包括:针对每个交易节点,根据该交易节点的签名,在所述交易数据中,确定该签名对应的资产号,作为该交易节点使用的资产号;若该交易节点拥有的资产号中不包含该交易节点使用的至少一个资产号时,则确定该交易节点不合法;若该交易节点拥有的资产号中包含该交易节点使用的全部资产号时,则确定该交易节点合法;当至少一个交易节点不合法时,确定所述交易请求不合法;当全部交易节点都合法时,确定所述交易请求合法。
- 根据权利要求1~5任一项所述的方法,所述方法还包括:若所述交易请求合法,则通知至少一个交易节点存储所述交易数据或所述交易数据中包含的指定数据。
- 一种共识验证的装置,包括:第一获取模块,获取交易请求;所述交易请求包含交易数据和至少一个交易节点的签名;判断处理模块,根据所述交易数据和各交易节点的签名,判断所述交易请求是否合法;若所述交易请求合法,则根据所述交易数据中包含的指定数据生成摘要,并将所述摘要和所述交易数据中包含的非指定数据发送给各共识节点,以使各共识节点进行共识验证。
- 根据权利要求7所述的装置,所述装置还包括:拒绝模块,若所述交易请求不合法,则拒绝所述交易请求。
- 根据权利要求7所述的装置,所述装置还包括:第二获取模块,在根据所述交易数据和各交易节点的签名,判断所述交易请求是否合法之前,获取各交易节点的数字证书;所述判断处理模块,根据所述交易数据、各交易节点的签名和各交易节点的数字证书,判断所述交易请求是否合法。
- 根据权利要求9所述的装置,所述判断处理模块,针对每个交易节点,根据该交易节点的数字证书中包含的公钥,解密该交易节点的签名;当确定每个交易节点对应的解密结果都与所述交易数据的摘要相同时,针对每个交易节点,根据该交易节点的数字证书中包含的身份标识,确定该身份标识对应的资产号,作为该交易节点拥有的资产号;根据各交易节点拥有的资产号、各交易节点的签名和所述交易数据,判断所述交易请求是否合法;当确定至少一个交易节点对应的解密结果与所述交易数据的摘要不同时,确定所述交易请求不合法。
- 根据权利要求10所述的装置,所述判断处理模块,针对每个交易节点,根据该交易节点的签名,在所述交易数据中,确定该签名对应的资产号,作为该交易节点使用的资产号;若该交易节点拥有的资产号中不包含该交易节点使用的至少一个资产号时,则确定该交易节点不合法;若该交易节点拥有的资产号中包含该交易节点使用的全部资产号时,则确定该交易节点合法;当至少一个交易节点不合法时,确定所述交易请求不合法;当全部交易节点都合法时,确定所述交易请求合法。
- 根据权利要求7~11任一项所述的装置,所述装置还包括:通知模块,若所述交易请求合法,则通知至少一个交易节点存储所述交易数据或所述交易数据中包含的指定数据。
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EP3547199B1 (en) | 2021-09-22 |
KR102281558B1 (ko) | 2021-07-27 |
TWI698820B (zh) | 2020-07-11 |
BR112019013367A2 (pt) | 2019-12-31 |
KR20210081444A (ko) | 2021-07-01 |
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JP2020508593A (ja) | 2020-03-19 |
CN107392040A (zh) | 2017-11-24 |
TW201839682A (zh) | 2018-11-01 |
KR20190090832A (ko) | 2019-08-02 |
AU2018257226A1 (en) | 2019-07-11 |
BR112019013367B1 (pt) | 2022-03-03 |
RU2728524C1 (ru) | 2020-07-30 |
CA3048743A1 (en) | 2018-11-01 |
US20190354977A1 (en) | 2019-11-21 |
MX2019007807A (es) | 2019-09-06 |
AU2018257226B2 (en) | 2021-06-24 |
EP3547199A1 (en) | 2019-10-02 |
EP3547199A4 (en) | 2020-01-01 |
ZA201904221B (en) | 2022-06-29 |
CN107392040B (zh) | 2019-08-09 |
JP6789397B2 (ja) | 2020-11-25 |
PH12019501503A1 (en) | 2020-06-08 |
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