WO2018133675A1 - 一种密钥更新方法、装置及系统 - Google Patents

一种密钥更新方法、装置及系统 Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018133675A1
WO2018133675A1 PCT/CN2018/071395 CN2018071395W WO2018133675A1 WO 2018133675 A1 WO2018133675 A1 WO 2018133675A1 CN 2018071395 W CN2018071395 W CN 2018071395W WO 2018133675 A1 WO2018133675 A1 WO 2018133675A1
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Prior art keywords
key
chip card
authentication
update
background
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PCT/CN2018/071395
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English (en)
French (fr)
Inventor
李东声
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天地融科技股份有限公司
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Publication of WO2018133675A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018133675A1/zh

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    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
    • H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
    • H04L9/0891—Revocation or update of secret information, e.g. encryption key update or rekeying

Definitions

  • the application is based on the application number of 201710053735.4, the application date is January 24, 2017, and the invention name is a Chinese patent application for a key update method, device and system, and requires the priority of the Chinese patent application, the Chinese patent The entire contents of the application are incorporated herein by reference.
  • the present invention relates to the field of electronic technologies, and in particular, to a key update method, apparatus, and system.
  • the user's authentication key is stored in the chip card, and when the identity authentication is performed, the chip card uses the authentication key to treat The authentication information is encrypted, and the authentication information is obtained.
  • the authentication information is sent to the authentication device for authentication.
  • the authentication device uses the locally stored authentication key of the user to authenticate the authentication information sent by the chip card. After the authentication is passed, the user identity is confirmed.
  • the authentication key stored in the chip card is static. If the chip card of the legitimate user is lost or illegally stolen, the illegal user may break the authentication key stored in the chip card, and then use the authentication key. Forging new chip cards, posing as legitimate users, and the back-end system can not be discovered in time, thus bringing security risks to users.
  • the invention aims to solve the problem that the authentication key in the above chip card is broken and brings security risks to the user.
  • the main object of the present invention is to provide a key update method.
  • Another object of the present invention is to provide a key update apparatus.
  • An aspect of the present invention provides a method for updating a key, including: determining, by a background, an authentication key that needs to update a chip card according to a preset policy; and generating, by the background, a new key for the chip card; Sending, by the background, an update indication to the chip card, instructing the chip card to update a local authentication key, where the update indication carries a ciphertext of key synchronization information or the key synchronization information; The key synchronization success indication of the chip card replaces the authentication key of the chip card with the new key.
  • the background determines, according to a preset policy, that an authentication key of the chip card needs to be updated, where the background receives an authentication request of the chip card sent by the card reader, where the authentication request is The identifier information of the chip card and the information to be authenticated are carried in the background; the background acquires an authentication key of the chip card according to the identification information of the chip card; and the background uses the authentication key to authenticate the chip The information is authenticated, and in the case where the authentication is passed, it is determined that the authentication key of the chip card needs to be updated.
  • the method further includes: determining, by the background, that the chip card that uses the identifier information is attacked, and prohibiting the use of the chip card that uses the identifier information to pass Certification.
  • the method further includes: returning, by the background, the device to the card reader to authenticate the to-be-authenticated information. Certification results.
  • the key synchronization information includes: a new key update factor, indicating that the chip card updates the local authentication key to the new key according to the new key update factor.
  • the key synchronization information includes: the new key, indicating that the chip card updates a local authentication key to the new key.
  • the ciphertext of the key synchronization information includes: ciphertext information obtained by encrypting the key synchronization information by using a current authentication key of the chip card.
  • a key updating apparatus including: a determining module, configured to determine, according to a preset policy, an authentication key that needs to update a chip card; and a generating module, configured to use the chip The card generates a new key, and the sending module is configured to send an update indication to the chip card, to instruct the chip card to update a local authentication key, where the update indication carries key synchronization information or the key a ciphertext of the synchronization information; a receiving module, configured to receive a key synchronization success indication of the chip card; and an update module, configured to: after the receiving module receives the synchronization success indication, encrypt the chip card The key is replaced with the new key.
  • the system includes: a background, a card reader, and a chip card, wherein the background is configured to determine, according to a preset policy, an authentication key that needs to update the chip card, for the chip
  • the card generates a new key, and sends an update indication to the chip card by the card reader, instructing the chip card to update a local authentication key, where the update indication carries key synchronization information or the secret a ciphertext of the key synchronization information
  • the card reader is configured to receive and send the update indication to the chip card
  • the chip card is configured to receive the update indication, and according to the update indication, the local Updating the authentication key to the new key, and after the update is successful, sending a key synchronization success indication to the card reader
  • the card reader is further configured to receive and send the key synchronization success indication to the
  • the background is configured to receive the key synchronization success indication, and replace the authentication key of the chip card with the new key.
  • the background is specifically used to determine, by using the following manner, an authentication key that needs to update the chip card: receiving an authentication request of the chip card sent by the card reader, where the authentication request carries The identification information of the chip card and the information to be authenticated; the authentication key of the chip card is obtained according to the identification information of the chip card; the background uses the authentication key to authenticate the information to be authenticated, and the authentication is passed In case, it is determined that the authentication key of the chip card needs to be updated.
  • the background is further configured to: when the authentication of the to-be-authenticated information is not passed, determine that the chip card that uses the identifier information is attacked, and the chip card that uses the identifier information is prohibited from passing the authentication.
  • the background is further configured to: after authenticating the to-be-authenticated information by using the authentication key in the background, returning, to the card reader, an authentication result obtained by performing authentication on the to-be-authenticated information .
  • a computer readable storage medium having instructions stored therein, the background performing the above-described key update method when a processor in the background executes the instructions.
  • the present invention provides a key update scheme, in which the background determines whether the authentication key of the chip card needs to be updated according to a preset policy, if necessary, Then, a new key is generated for the chip card, and the chip card is instructed to update the local authentication key, and after receiving the key synchronization success indication of the chip card, the local chip card authentication key is replaced with the new key.
  • the background can update the authentication key of the chip card at an appropriate timing, so that only one chip card can be authenticated by the same user in the same time period, if the user is in the time period. If the authentication key of the used chip card is inconsistent with the background, it cannot pass the authentication in the background.
  • the third party attacks the authentication key stored in the chip card.
  • the authentication key of the chip card may have been updated in the background, and the original authentication key has expired, so that the old authentication key cannot be used for authentication, so that the background can detect whether the chip card is forged or stolen in time, thereby avoiding the user's Personal or property damage.
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for updating a key according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic structural diagram of a key update system according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a key update apparatus according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention.
  • This embodiment provides a key update method.
  • FIG. 1 is a flowchart of a method for updating a key according to the embodiment. As shown in FIG. 1 , the method mainly includes the following steps S102 to S108.
  • Step S102 The background determines, according to a preset policy, an authentication key that needs to update the chip card.
  • the chip card may be a contact card or a non-contact card, which is not limited in this embodiment.
  • the corresponding authentication key update policy may be set according to a specific application scenario of the chip card, for example, may be updated according to usage time, for example, updated once a day. Alternatively, it may be updated according to the number of uses. For example, the chip card updates the authentication key once it is authenticated once using the authentication key. Alternatively, it is also possible to determine whether the key needs to be updated according to the frequency of use. For example, if the authentication key is used for n times, the authentication key of the chip card is updated, which is not limited in this embodiment.
  • step S102 may include the following steps:
  • Step 1 The background receives the authentication request of the chip card sent by the card reader, where the authentication request carries the identification information of the chip card and the information to be authenticated;
  • the information to be authenticated may be a value obtained by the chip card using a certain operation key of the chip card by using the authentication key, for example, a signature value obtained by signing the identification information of the chip card, or
  • the identification information of the chip card may be encrypted by using the authentication key to obtain the encrypted information, etc., which is not limited in this embodiment.
  • Step 2 The background acquires an authentication key of the chip card according to the identifier information of the chip card.
  • Step 3 The background uses the authentication key to authenticate the to-be-authenticated information, and if the authentication passes, it is determined that the authentication key of the chip card needs to be updated.
  • the authentication key of the chip card needs to be updated, which improves the update speed of the authentication key and reduces the usage period of the same key.
  • the effective time for the attacker to crack the key is compressed. If the old authentication key is cracked beyond the usage period, since the old authentication key has been abolished, even if it is cracked, it will not bring harm to the user. Security.
  • the chip card that uses the identifier information is determined to be attacked in the background. It is forbidden to use the chip card of the identification information to pass the authentication.
  • the background card is considered to be a fake card, so that the identification information of the current chip card is added to the blacklist, and the identification information is prohibited.
  • the chip card is certified.
  • the method may further include: returning, to the card reader, the authentication result obtained by performing authentication on the information to be authenticated.
  • the card reader can perform further operations according to the authentication result. For example, in the access control system, the card reader can determine whether to control the access control electric lock to be turned on according to the authentication result.
  • Step S104 the background generates a new key for the chip card.
  • the background may generate a new key update factor for the chip card, and generate a new key for the chip card by using a preset algorithm according to the new key update factor and the current authentication key of the chip card.
  • the key update factor may be an event factor, or may be a time factor, or may be a combination of an event factor and a time factor, which is not limited in this embodiment.
  • the background may also set an authentication key list for each chip card, and the authentication key list includes a plurality of authentication keys.
  • the background selects one and the chip from the list.
  • the authentication key of the current authentication key of the card is different.
  • the background may select the next authentication key in the authentication key list after the current authentication key, or may randomly select.
  • the authentication key may be separated from the current authentication key by one or more of the current authentication keys in the authentication key list.
  • the background sends an update indication to the chip card, instructing the chip card to update the local authentication key, where the update indication carries the key synchronization information or the ciphertext of the key synchronization information.
  • the background after determining that the authentication key of the chip card needs to be updated, after the background generates a new key for the chip card, the background sends an update indication to the chip card, instructing the chip card to update its authentication key to the New key.
  • the background may send the update indication to the chip card through the card reader.
  • the background may carry the update indication. It is sent to the card reader in the authentication result to save the interaction process between the background and the card reader.
  • the key synchronization information may be directly carried in the update indication, or in order to ensure the security of the transmission of the key synchronization information, the ciphertext carried in the update indication may also be the key synchronization information, where the ciphertext
  • the key synchronization information may be obtained by encrypting the key synchronization information by using the current authentication key of the chip card. After receiving the ciphertext of the key synchronization information, the chip card decrypts the ciphertext using the local authentication key to obtain a key. Synchronize the information and update the local authentication key based on the key synchronization information.
  • the key synchronization information may be a new key update factor, and after receiving the new key update factor, the chip card adopts the same algorithm as the background, and the local authentication key is used. Update to the new key.
  • the chip card may obtain the new key according to a new key update factor and a current authentication key by using a preset algorithm, and then use the new key to update the local authentication key.
  • the key synchronization information may also be a new key generated in the background, that is, a new key generated by the chip card for the chip card is sent to the chip card as key synchronization information. After the chip card receives the new key, the local authentication key is updated with the new key.
  • the key synchronization information may also adopt other implementation manners, as long as the chip card can obtain the same new key as the background according to the key synchronization information.
  • Step S108 The background receives a key synchronization success indication of the chip card, and replaces the authentication key of the chip card with the new key.
  • the chip card after updating the authentication key according to the update indication, the chip card returns a key synchronization success indication to the background, and the background can learn that the chip card has successfully updated the authentication key to the new secret according to the key synchronization success indication.
  • the background also replaces the authentication key of the chip card with the new key, so that the authentication key of the chip card stored in the background is consistent with the local authentication key of the chip card, thereby enabling Ensure that the subsequent authentication request of the chip card can be verified by the background to ensure the normal use of the chip card.
  • the background determines whether the authentication key of the chip card needs to be updated according to a preset policy, and if necessary, generates a new key for the chip card, and instructs the chip card to update the local authentication.
  • the key and after receiving the key synchronization success indication of the chip card, replace the local chip card authentication key with the new key.
  • the background can update the authentication key of the chip card at an appropriate timing, so that only one chip card can be authenticated by the same user in the same time period, if the user is in the time period. If the authentication key of the used chip card is inconsistent with the background, it will not pass the authentication in the background.
  • the authentication key of the chip card may have been updated in the background during the process of the third party breaking the authentication key stored in the chip card.
  • the key has expired, so that the old authentication key cannot be used for authentication, so that the background can detect whether the chip card is forged or stolen in time, thereby avoiding personal injury or damage to the user.
  • This embodiment provides a key update system, which can be used to implement the key update method described in Embodiment 1.
  • FIG. 2 is a schematic diagram of a system architecture of a key update system according to the embodiment.
  • the system mainly includes: a background 10, a card reader 20, and a chip card 30.
  • a background 10 can communicate with a plurality of card readers 20, and a card reader 20 can communicate with a chip card 30 at the same time.
  • the background 10 can also be used. Only one card reader 20 is in communication.
  • the background 10 is configured to determine, according to a preset policy, an authentication key that needs to update the chip card 30, generate a new key for the chip card 30, and send an update instruction to the chip card 30 through the card reader 20 to instruct the chip card 30 to update.
  • a local authentication key wherein the update indication carries the ciphertext of the key synchronization information or the key synchronization information
  • the card reader 20 is configured to receive and send the update indication to the chip card 30
  • the chip card 30 is configured to Receiving the update indication, and updating the local authentication key to the new key according to the update indication.
  • the card reader 20 After the update is successful, sending a key synchronization success indication to the card reader 20; the card reader 20 is further configured to receive and encrypt the key
  • the synchronization success indication is sent to the background 10; the background 10 is configured to receive the key synchronization success indication, and replace the authentication key of the chip card 30 with the new key.
  • a corresponding authentication key update policy may be set according to a specific application scenario of the chip card 30. For example, it can be updated by usage time, such as once a day. Alternatively, it may be updated in accordance with the number of uses. For example, the chip card 30 updates the authentication key once it is authenticated once using the authentication key. Alternatively, it is also possible to determine whether the key needs to be updated according to the frequency of use. For example, if the authentication key is used for n times, the authentication key of the chip card 30 is updated, which is not limited in this embodiment.
  • the background 10 determines that the authentication key of the chip card 30 needs to be updated. Therefore, in an optional implementation of the embodiment of the present invention, the background 10 is specifically configured to determine, by using the following manner, an authentication key that needs to update the chip card 30: receiving the chip card 30 sent by the card reader 20 An authentication request, wherein the authentication request carries the identification information of the chip card 30 and the information to be authenticated; the authentication key of the chip card 30 is obtained according to the identification information of the chip card 30; and the authentication key is used. The key authenticates the information to be authenticated, and if the authentication passes, it is determined that the authentication key of the chip card 30 needs to be updated.
  • the to-be-authenticated information may be a value obtained by the chip card 30 using a certain operation of the authentication information of the chip card 30 by using the authentication key.
  • the signature value obtained by signing the identification information of the chip card 30, or the like, or the identification information of the chip card 30 may be encrypted by using the authentication key to obtain the encrypted information, etc., which is not limited in this embodiment.
  • the authentication background 10 needs to update the authentication key of the chip card 30, thereby improving the update speed of the authentication key and reducing the use of the same key.
  • the period compresses the effective time of the attacker to crack the key. If the old authentication key is cracked beyond the usage period, since the old authentication key has been abolished, even if it is cracked, it will not bring harm to the user. , improved security.
  • the background 10 is further configured to: use the information to be authenticated In the case where the authentication is not passed, it is determined that the chip card 30 using the identification information is attacked, and the chip card 30 using the identification information is prohibited from passing the authentication. In the optional implementation, the background 10 does not pass the authentication information sent by the chip card 30, and the current chip card 30 is considered to have a fake card, thereby adding the identification information of the current chip card 30 to the blacklist. The chip card 30 using the identification information is authenticated.
  • the background 10 authenticates the authentication information by using the authentication key
  • the background 10 is further configured to return, to the card reader 20, the authentication result obtained by authenticating the information to be authenticated.
  • the card reader 20 can perform further operations according to the authentication result. For example, in the access control system, the card reader 20 can determine whether to control the access control lock to be turned on based on the authentication result.
  • the background 10 generates a new key for the chip card 30, including but not limited to the following two implementation manners:
  • a new key update factor is generated for the chip card 30, and a new key is generated for the chip card 30 by using a preset algorithm according to the new key update factor and the current authentication key of the chip card 30.
  • the key update factor may be an event factor, or may be a time factor, or may be a combination of an event factor and a time factor, which is not limited in this embodiment.
  • the background 10 may also set an authentication key list for each chip card 30.
  • the authentication key list includes a plurality of authentication keys.
  • the background 10 When generating a new key for the chip card 30, the background 10 is from the list. An authentication key different from the current authentication key of the chip card 30 is selected.
  • the background 10 When selected, the background 10 may sequentially select the next authentication key after the current authentication key in the authentication key list.
  • selecting one or more authentication keys that are separated from the current authentication key after the current authentication key in the authentication key list in this embodiment. Not limited.
  • the key synchronization information carried in the update indication returned by the background 10 to the card reader 20 may be: (1) a new key update factor, and the chip card 30 adopts the background 10 after receiving the new key update factor.
  • the same algorithm updates the local authentication key to the new key.
  • the chip card 30 can obtain the new key according to the new key update factor and the current authentication key by using a preset algorithm.
  • the local authentication key is then updated with the new key.
  • the new key generated by the background 10, that is, the new key generated by the background 10 for the chip card 30 is sent to the chip card 30 as the key synchronization information. After receiving the new key, the chip card 30 uses the new key.
  • the key updates the local authentication key.
  • the key synchronization information may be directly carried in the update indication sent by the background 10, or the ciphertext carried in the update indication may be the ciphertext of the key synchronization information, in order to ensure the security of the key synchronization information.
  • the ciphertext may be obtained by encrypting the key synchronization information by using the current authentication key of the chip card 30. After receiving the ciphertext of the key synchronization information, the chip card 30 uses the local authentication key to the ciphertext. Decryption is performed to obtain key synchronization information, and then the local authentication key is updated according to the key synchronization information.
  • the background 10 may The update indication is carried in the authentication result and sent to the card reader 20, and the update instruction is sent by the card reader 20 to the chip card 30 to save the interaction process between the background 10 and the card reader 20.
  • the background 10 determines whether it is necessary to update the authentication key of the chip card 30 according to a preset policy, and if necessary, generates a new key for the chip card 30, and passes the card reader. 20 instructs the chip card 30 to update the local authentication key, and after receiving the key synchronization success indication of the chip card 30, replaces the local chip card 30 authentication key with the new key.
  • the background 10 can update the authentication key of the chip card 30 at an appropriate timing, so that only one chip card 30 can be authenticated by the same user in the same time period, if at this time period. If the authentication key of the chip card 30 used by the user does not match the background 10, the authentication of the background 10 cannot be performed.
  • the background 10 may have updated the authentication key of the chip card 30 in the process of the third party breaking the authentication key stored in the chip card 30.
  • the original authentication key has expired, so that the old authentication key cannot be used for authentication, so that the background 10 can timely discover whether the chip card 30 is forged or stolen, thereby avoiding personal injury or damage to the user.
  • the present embodiment provides a key update apparatus, which may be disposed in the background described in Embodiment 1 and Embodiment 2, for implementing the key update method described in Embodiment 1.
  • FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of a key updating apparatus according to the embodiment. As shown in FIG. 3, the apparatus mainly includes: a determining module 300, a generating module 302, a sending module 304, a receiving module 306, and an updating module 308.
  • a determining module 300 configured to determine, according to a preset policy, an authentication key that needs to update a chip card; a generating module 302, configured to generate a new key for the chip card; and a sending module 304, configured to send the chip card Sending an update indication, instructing the chip card to update a local authentication key, wherein the update indication carries a ciphertext of key synchronization information or the key synchronization information; and a receiving module 306, configured to receive the chip The key synchronization success indication of the card is used by the update module 308, after the receiving module receives the synchronization success indication, replacing the authentication key of the chip card with the new key.
  • the corresponding authentication key update policy may be set according to a specific application scenario of the chip card, for example, may be updated according to usage time, for example, updated once a day. Alternatively, it may be updated according to the number of uses. For example, the chip card updates the authentication key once it is authenticated once using the authentication key. Alternatively, it is also possible to determine whether the key needs to be updated according to the frequency of use. For example, if the authentication key is used for n times, the authentication key of the chip card is updated, which is not limited in this embodiment.
  • the determining module 300 determines that the authentication key of the chip card needs to be updated. Therefore, in an optional implementation of the embodiment of the present invention, the determining module 300 is specifically configured to determine, by using the following manner, an authentication key that needs to update the chip card: receiving an authentication request of the chip card sent by the card reader, The authentication request carries the identification information of the chip card and the information to be authenticated; the authentication key of the chip card is obtained according to the identification information of the chip card; and the authentication key is used to authenticate the chip The information is authenticated, and in the case where the authentication is passed, it is determined that the authentication key of the chip card needs to be updated.
  • the authentication determination module 300 considers that the authentication key of the chip card needs to be updated, thereby improving the update speed of the authentication key and reducing the use of the same key.
  • the period compresses the effective time of the attacker to crack the key. If the old authentication key is cracked beyond the usage period, since the old authentication key has been abolished, even if it is cracked, it will not bring harm to the user. , improved security.
  • the determining module 300 may be further configured to: If the information is authenticated but the authentication is not passed, it is determined that the chip card using the identification information is attacked, and the chip card using the identification information is prohibited from passing the authentication. In the optional implementation, if the authentication information sent by the chip card fails to pass the authentication, the determining module 300 considers that the current chip card has a fake card, thereby adding the identification information of the current chip card to the blacklist, and prohibiting the use of the The chip card that identifies the information is authenticated.
  • the generating module 302 when generating a new key for the chip card, includes but is not limited to the following two modes:
  • a new key update factor is generated for the chip card, and a new key is generated for the chip card by using a preset algorithm according to the new key update factor and the current authentication key of the chip card.
  • the key update factor may be an event factor, or may be a time factor, or may be a combination of an event factor and a time factor, which is not limited in this embodiment.
  • an authentication key list is set, and the authentication key list includes a plurality of authentication keys.
  • the generating module 302 selects one chip from the list. If the current authentication key of the card is not the same, the generating module 302 may sequentially select the next authentication key after the current authentication key in the authentication key list, or may randomly select, or For example, the authentication key is separated from the current authentication key by one or more of the current authentication keys in the authentication key list.
  • the specific manner is not limited in this embodiment.
  • the key synchronization information carried in the update indication returned by the sending module 304 may be: (1) a new key update factor, and after receiving the new key update factor, the chip card adopts the same algorithm as the generating module 302. Updating the local authentication key to the new key. For example, the chip card may obtain the new key according to the new key update factor and the current authentication key, and then use the new key. The key updates the local authentication key. (2) The new key generated by the generating module 302, that is, the sending module 304 sends the new key generated by the generating module 302 for the chip card as the key synchronization information to the chip card, and after receiving the new key, the chip card uses the The new key updates the local authentication key.
  • the update indication sent by the sending module 304 may directly carry the key synchronization information, or may be the ciphertext of the key synchronization information carried in the update indication, in order to ensure the security of the transmission of the key synchronization information.
  • the ciphertext may be obtained by encrypting the key synchronization information by using the current authentication key of the chip card. After receiving the ciphertext of the key synchronization information, the chip card uses the local authentication key to perform the ciphertext. Decrypt, obtain key synchronization information, and then update the local authentication key according to the key synchronization information.
  • the determining module 300 determines whether it is necessary to update the authentication key of the chip card according to a preset policy. If necessary, the generating module 302 generates a new key for the chip card, and the sending module 304 After the card reader instructs the chip card to update the local authentication key, the update module 308 replaces the local chip card authentication key with the new key after the receiving module 306 receives the key synchronization success indication of the chip card.
  • the key update device can update the authentication key of the chip card at an appropriate timing, so that only one chip card can be authenticated by the same user in the same time period, if at this time period If the authentication key of the chip card used by the user does not match the key update device, the authentication by the key update device cannot be performed. Therefore, even if the third party breaks the authentication key stored in the chip card, it is broken by the third party.
  • the key update device may have updated the authentication key of the chip card, and the original authentication key has expired, so that the old authentication key cannot be used for authentication, thereby making the key update.
  • the device can detect whether the chip card is forged or stolen in time, thereby avoiding personal injury or damage to the user.
  • the embodiment of the present invention further provides a computer readable storage medium having instructions stored therein, and when the background processor executes the instructions, the background performs a key update method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
  • a "computer-readable medium” can be any apparatus that can contain, store, communicate, propagate, or transport a program for use in an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device, or in conjunction with the instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.
  • portions of the invention may be implemented in hardware, software, firmware or a combination thereof.
  • multiple steps or methods may be implemented in software or firmware stored in a memory and executed by a suitable instruction execution system.
  • a suitable instruction execution system For example, if implemented in hardware, as in another embodiment, it can be implemented by any one or combination of the following techniques well known in the art: having logic gates for implementing logic functions on data signals. Discrete logic circuits, application specific integrated circuits with suitable combinational logic gates, programmable gate arrays (PGAs), field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), etc.

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Abstract

本发明公开了一种密钥更新方法、装置及系统。该方法包括：后台根据预先设定的策略，确定需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥；后台为芯片卡生成新密钥；后台向芯片卡发送更新指示，指示芯片卡更新本地的认证密钥，其中，更新指示中携带有密钥同步信息或密钥同步信息的密文；后台接收芯片卡的密钥同步成功指示，将芯片卡的认证密钥替换为新密钥。通过本发明提供的方案，可以避免芯片卡中的认证密钥被攻破而给用户带来安全隐患。

Description

一种密钥更新方法、装置及系统
相关申请的交叉引用
本申请基于申请号为201710053735.4，申请日为2017年01月24日，发明名称为一种密钥更新方法、装置及系统的中国专利申请提出，并要求该中国专利申请的优先权，该中国专利申请的全部内容在此引入本申请作为参考。
技术领域
本发明涉及一种电子技术领域，尤其涉及一种密钥更新方法、装置及系统。
背景技术
在现有使用芯片卡(可以是接触卡也可以是非接触卡)作为用户的身份识别的系统中，在芯片卡中存储用户的认证密钥，在进行身份认证时，芯片卡使用认证密钥对待认证信息进行加密，得到认证信息，将认证信息发送给认证设备进行认证，认证设备使用本地存储的该用户的认证密钥，对芯片卡发送的认证信息进行认证，认证通过之后，确认用户身份。
但是，在现有技术中，芯片卡中存储的认证密钥是静态地，在合法用户的芯片卡丢失或者被非法盗用，非法用户可能攻破芯片卡中存储的认证密钥，进而使用认证密钥伪造新的芯片卡，冒充合法用户，而后台系统也无法及时发现，从而给用户带来安全隐患。
发明内容
本发明旨在解决上述芯片卡中的认证密钥被攻破而给用户带来安全隐患的问题。
本发明的主要目的在于提供一种密钥更新方法。
本发明的另一目的在于提供一种密钥更新装置。
本发明的又一目的在于提供一种密钥更新系统。
为达到上述目的，本发明的技术方案具体是这样实现的：
本发明一方面提供了一种密钥更新方法，该方法包括：后台根据预先设定的策略，确定需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥；所述后台为所述芯片卡生成新密钥；所述后台向所述芯片卡发送更新指示，指示所述芯片卡更新本地的认证密钥，其中，所述更新指示中携带有密钥同步信息或所述密钥同步信息的密文；所述后台接收所述芯片卡的密钥同步成功指示，将所述芯片卡的认证密钥替换为所述新密钥。
可选地，所述后台根据预先设定的策略，确定需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥，包括：所述 后台接收到读卡器发送的所述芯片卡的认证请求，其中，所述认证请求中携带有所述芯片卡的标识信息和待认证信息；所述后台根据所述芯片卡的标识信息获取所述芯片卡的认证密钥；所述后台使用所述认证密钥对所述待认证信息进行认证，在认证通过的情况下，确定需要更新所述芯片卡的认证密钥。
可选地，在对所述待认证信息进行认证没有通过的情况下，所述方法还包括：所述后台确定使用所述标识信息的芯片卡受到攻击，禁止使用所述标识信息的芯片卡通过认证。
可选地，在所述后台使用所述认证密钥对所述待认证信息进行认证之后，所述方法还包括：所述后台向所述读卡器返回对所述待认证信息进行认证得到的认证结果。
可选地，所述密钥同步信息包括：新密钥更新因子，指示所述芯片卡根据所述新密钥更新因子将本地的认证密钥更新为所述新密钥。
可选地，所述密钥同步信息包括：所述新密钥，指示所述芯片卡将本地的认证密钥更新为所述新密钥。
可选地，所述密钥同步信息的密文包括：使用所述芯片卡当前的认证密钥对所述密钥同步信息进行加密得到的密文信息。
根据本发明的另一个方面，提供了一种密钥更新装置，包括：确定模块，用于根据预先设定的策略，确定需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥；生成模块，用于为所述芯片卡生成新密钥；发送模块，用于向所述芯片卡发送更新指示，指示所述芯片卡更新本地的认证密钥，其中，所述更新指示中携带有密钥同步信息或所述密钥同步信息的密文；接收模块，用于接收所述芯片卡的密钥同步成功指示；更新模块，用于在所述接收模块接收到所述同步成功指示之后，将所述芯片卡的认证密钥替换为所述新密钥。
根据本发明的又一个方面，包括：后台、读卡器和芯片卡，其中，所述后台，用于根据预先设定的策略，确定需要更新所述芯片卡的认证密钥，为所述芯片卡生成新密钥，通过所述读卡器向所述芯片卡发送更新指示，指示所述芯片卡更新本地的认证密钥，其中，所述更新指示中携带有密钥同步信息或所述密钥同步信息的密文；所述读卡器，用于接收并将所述更新指示发送给芯片卡；所述芯片卡，用于接收所述更新指示，并按照所述更新指示，将本地的认证密钥更新为所述新密钥，更新成功后，向所述读卡器发送密钥同步成功指示；所述读卡器，还用于接收并将所述密钥同步成功指示发送给所述后台；所述后台，用于接收所述密钥同步成功指示，将所述芯片卡的认证密钥替换为所述新密钥。
可选地，所述后台具体用于通过以下方式确定需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥：接收到所述读卡器发送的所述芯片卡的认证请求，其中，所述认证请求中携带有所述芯片卡的标识信息和待认证信息；根据所述芯片卡的标识信息获取所述芯片卡的认证密钥；所述后台使用所述 认证密钥对所述待认证信息进行认证，在认证通过的情况下，确定需要更新所述芯片卡的认证密钥。
可选地，所述后台还用于：在对所述待认证信息进行认证没有通过的情况下，确定使用所述标识信息的芯片卡受到攻击，禁止使用所述标识信息的芯片卡通过认证。
可选地，所述后台还用于：在所述后台使用所述认证密钥对所述待认证信息进行认证之后，向所述读卡器返回对所述待认证信息进行认证得到的认证结果。
根据本发明的又一个方面，提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，具有存储于其中的指令，当后台的处理器执行所述指令时，所述后台执行上述的密钥更新方法。
由上述本发明提供的技术方案可以看出，本发明提供了一种密钥更新方案，在该方案中，后台根据预先设定的策略，判断是否需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥，如果需要，则为芯片卡生成新密钥，并指示芯片卡更新本地的认证密钥，并在接收到芯片卡的密钥同步成功指示之后，将本地的芯片卡认证密钥替换为所述新密钥。通过本发明提供的技术方案，后台可以在合适的时机更新芯片卡的认证密钥，从而使得同一个用户在同一时间段内，只能有一个芯片卡通过认证，如果在该时间段内该用户使用的芯片卡的认证密钥与后台不一致，则无法通过后台的认证，因此，即使第三方攻破了芯片卡内存储的认证密钥，但由于在第三方攻破芯片卡内存储的认证密钥的过程中，后台可能已经更新了该芯片卡的认证密钥，原认证密钥已经失效，从而无法使用旧认证密钥通过认证，从而使得后台可以及时发现芯片卡是否被伪造盗用，避免了用户的人身或财产的伤害。
附图说明
为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例的技术方案，下面将对实施例描述中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍，显而易见地，下面描述中的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例，对于本领域的普通技术人员来讲，在不付出创造性劳动的前提下，还可以根据这些附图获得其他附图。
图1为本发明实施例1提供的一种密钥更新方法的流程图；
图2为本发明实施例2提供的一种密钥更新系统的架构示意图；以及
图3为本发明实施例3提供的一种密钥更新装置的结构示意图。
具体实施方式
下面结合本发明实施例中的附图，对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述，显然，所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分实施例，而不是全部的实施例。基于本发明的实施例，本领域普通技术人员在没有做出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例，都属于 本发明的保护范围。
下面将结合附图和实施例对本发明进行详细描述。
实施例1
本实施例提供了一种密钥更新方法。
图1为本实施例提供的一种密钥更新方法的流程图，如图1所示，该方法主包括以下步骤S102-步骤S108。
步骤S102，后台根据预先设定的策略，确定需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥。
在本实施例中，芯片卡可以是接触式卡片，也可以是非接触式卡片，具体本实施例不作限定。
在具体实施过程中，可以根据芯片卡的具体应用场景，设置相应的认证密钥更新的策略，例如，可以按使用时间更新，例如，每天更新一次。或者，也可以按照使用次数进行更新，例如，芯片卡每使用认证密钥进行一次认证之后，就更新一次认证密钥。或者，也可以按使用频率确定是否需要更新密钥，例如，一天之内使用了n次，则更新芯片卡的认证密钥等，具体本实施例不作限定。
在本发明实施例的一个可选实施方案中，可以是芯片卡每使用一次认证密钥进行认证之后，后台即确定需要更新该芯片卡的认证密钥。因此，在本发明实施例的一个可选实施方案中，步骤S102可以包括以下步骤：
步骤1，后台接收到读卡器发送的所述芯片卡的认证请求，其中，所述认证请求中携带有所述芯片卡的标识信息和待认证信息；
在具体应用过程中，待认证信息可以是芯片卡使用其认证密钥对芯片卡的标识信息进行一定运算得到的值，例如，对芯片卡的标识信息进行签名得到的签名值等，或者，也可以是使用认证密钥对芯片卡的标识信息进行加密得到加密信息等，具体本实施例不作限定。
步骤2，后台根据所述芯片卡的标识信息获取所述芯片卡的认证密钥；
步骤3，后台使用所述认证密钥对所述待认证信息进行认证，在认证通过的情况下，确定需要更新所述芯片卡的认证密钥。
通过上述可选实施方式，每次刷卡认证或在指定的设备上刷卡通过认证后台均认为需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥，提升了认证密钥的更新速度，缩减同一个密钥的使用周期，压缩了攻击者对该密钥破解的有效时间，如果旧的认证密钥超过使用周期被破解，由于旧的认证密钥已被废止，因此，即使被破解也不会给用户带到危害，提升了安全性。
在上述可选实施方式中，进一步地，后台对所述待认证信息进行认证但认证没有通过的 情况下，在作为一种可选实施方式，后台确定使用所述标识信息的芯片卡受到攻击，禁止使用所述标识信息的芯片卡通过认证。在该可选实施方式中，后台在对芯片卡发送的认证信息进行认证没有通过的情况下，认为当前芯片卡存在伪卡，从而将当前芯片卡的标识信息加入黑名单，禁止使用该标识信息的芯片卡通过认证。通过该可选实施方式，即使非法用户在芯片卡两次的使用间隔期间破解了芯片卡的认证密钥，并使用伪卡从后台获得了新的认证密钥，但由于真卡没有获取到新的认证密钥，因此，当真卡刷卡进行认证时，认证不能通过，从而使得后台可以及时获知当前芯片卡存在伪卡，禁用当前芯片卡，避免用户的损失持续。
在上述可选实施方式中，后台使用认证密钥对待认证信息进行认证之后，可选地，该方法还可以包括：后台向读卡器返回对所述待认证信息进行认证得到的认证结果。读卡器在收到该认证结果之后，根据该认证结果可以执行进一步的操作。例如，在门禁系统中，读卡器根据认证结果可以判断是否控制门禁电锁开启。
步骤S104，后台为所述芯片卡生成新密钥。
在具体实施过程中，后台可以针对芯片卡生成新密钥更新因子，根据新密钥更新因子及芯片卡的当前认证密钥，采用预设算法为所述芯片卡生成新密钥。其中，密钥更新因子可以是事件因子，也可以是时间因子，还可以是事件因子和时间因子的组合，具体本实施例不作限定。
或者，后台也可以针对每张芯片卡，设置一个认证密钥列表，该认证密钥列表中包括若干个认证密钥，在为芯片卡生成新密钥时，后台从该列表中选取一个与芯片卡当前的认证密钥不相同的认证密钥，在选取时，后台可以按序选择认证密钥列表中排在当前的认证密钥之后的下一个认证密钥，也可以随机选择。或者，也可以按其它规则，例如，选择认证密钥列表中排在当前的认证密钥之后的与当前的认证密钥间隔一个或多个的认证密钥，具体方式本实施例不作限定。
步骤S106，后台向所述芯片卡发送更新指示，指示所述芯片卡更新本地的认证密钥，其中，所述更新指示中携带有密钥同步信息或所述密钥同步信息的密文。
在本实施例中，后台在确定需要对芯片卡的认证密钥进行更新之后，在为该芯片卡生成新密钥之后，向芯片卡发送更新指示，指示芯片卡将其认证密钥更新为该新密钥。在具体实施过程中，后台可以通过读卡器向芯片卡发送该更新指示。
在本发明实施例的一个可选实施方案中，如果后台在对芯片卡发送的待认证信息进行认证且认证通过之后，确定需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥的情况下，后台可以将更新指示携带在认证结果中发送给读卡器，以节约后台与读卡器之间的交互流程。
在本发明实施例，更新指示中可以直接携带密钥同步信息，或者，为了保证密钥同步信 息的传输安全，更新指示中携带的还可以是密钥同步信息的密文，其中，该密文可以是使用芯片卡当前的认证密钥对密钥同步信息进行加密得到的，芯片卡在接收到密钥同步信息的密文之后，使用本地的认证密钥对该密文进行解密，得到密钥同步信息，再根据密钥同步信息更新本地的认证密钥。
在本发明实施例的一个可选实施方案中，密钥同步信息可以是新密钥更新因子，芯片卡在接收到新密钥更新因子之后，采用与后台相同的算法，将本地的认证密钥更新为所述新密钥。例如，芯片卡可以根据新密钥更新因子与当前的认证密钥，采用预设的算法，得到所述新密钥，再使用该新密钥更新本地的认证密钥。
或者，在本实施例的另一个可选实施方式中，密钥同步信息也可以是后台生成的新密钥，即后台将为芯片卡生成的新密钥作为密钥同步信息发送给芯片卡，芯片卡接收到该新密钥之后，使用该新密钥更新本地的认证密钥。
当然，并不限于上述两种方式，在具体实施过程中，密钥同步信息也可以采用其它的实现方式，只要芯片卡根据该密钥同步信息可以得到与后台相同的新密钥即可。
步骤S108，后台接收所述芯片卡的密钥同步成功指示，将所述芯片卡的认证密钥替换为所述新密钥。
在本实施例中，芯片卡根据更新指示更新认证密钥之后，向后台返回密钥同步成功指示，后台根据该密钥同步成功指示可以获知芯片卡已成功将认证密钥更新为所述新密钥，因此，后台也将所述芯片卡的认证密钥替换为所述新密钥，从而使得后台存储的所述芯片卡的认证密钥与所述芯片卡本地的认证密钥一致，进而能够保证芯片卡后续的认证请求能够被后台认证通过，确保芯片卡的正常使用。
通过本实施例提供的密钥更新方法，后台根据预先设定的策略，判断是否需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥，如果需要，则为芯片卡生成新密钥，并指示芯片卡更新本地的认证密钥，并在接收到芯片卡的密钥同步成功指示之后，将本地的芯片卡认证密钥替换为所述新密钥。通过本发明提供的技术方案，后台可以在合适的时机更新芯片卡的认证密钥，从而使得同一个用户在同一时间段内，只能有一个芯片卡通过认证，如果在该时间段内该用户使用的芯片卡的认证密钥与后台不一致，则无法通过后台的认证。因此，即使第三方攻破了芯片卡内存储的认证密钥，但由于在第三方攻破芯片卡内存储的认证密钥的过程中，后台可能已经更新了该芯片卡的认证密钥，原认证密钥已经失效，从而无法使用旧认证密钥通过认证，从而使得后台可以及时发现芯片卡是否被伪造盗用，避免了用户的人身或财产的伤害。
实施例2
本实施例提供了一种密钥更新系统，该系统可以用于实现实施例1所述的密钥更新方法。
图2为本实施例提供的密钥更新系统的系统架构示意图，如图2所示，该系统主要包括：后台10、读卡器20和芯片卡30。如图2所示，一个后台10可以与多个读卡器20通信，一个读卡器20同一时间可以与一个芯片卡30通信，当然，并不限于此，在具体应用中，后台10也可以只与一个读卡器20通信。
下面对本实施例提供的密钥更新系统中的各个组成部件的功能及信号流向进行描述。
后台10，用于根据预先设定的策略，确定需要更新芯片卡30的认证密钥，为芯片卡30生成新密钥，通过读卡器20向芯片卡30发送更新指示，指示芯片卡30更新本地的认证密钥，其中，更新指示中携带有密钥同步信息或密钥同步信息的密文；读卡器20，用于接收并将更新指示发送给芯片卡30；芯片卡30，用于接收更新指示，并按照更新指示，将本地的认证密钥更新为新密钥，更新成功后，向读卡器20发送密钥同步成功指示；读卡器20，还用于接收并将密钥同步成功指示发送给后台10；后台10，用于接收密钥同步成功指示，将芯片卡30的认证密钥替换为新密钥。
在具体实施过程中，可以根据芯片卡30的具体应用场景，设置相应的认证密钥更新的策略。例如，可以按使用时间更新，如，每天更新一次。或者，也可以按照使用次数进行更新，例如，芯片卡30每使用认证密钥进行一次认证之后，就更新一次认证密钥。或者，也可以按使用频率确定是否需要更新密钥，例如，一天之内使用了n次，则更新芯片卡30的认证密钥等，具体本实施例不作限定。
在本发明实施例的一个可选实施方案中，可以是芯片卡30每使用一次认证密钥进行认证之后，后台10即确定需要更新该芯片卡30的认证密钥。因此，在本发明实施例的一个可选实施方案中，后台10具体用于通过以下方式确定需要更新芯片卡30的认证密钥：接收到所述读卡器20发送的所述芯片卡30的认证请求，其中，所述认证请求中携带有所述芯片卡30的标识信息和待认证信息；根据所述芯片卡30的标识信息获取所述芯片卡30的认证密钥；使用所述认证密钥对所述待认证信息进行认证，在认证通过的情况下，确定需要更新所述芯片卡30的认证密钥。
在具体应用过程中，待认证信息可以是芯片卡30使用其认证密钥对芯片卡30的标识信息进行一定运算得到的值。例如，对芯片卡30的标识信息进行签名得到的签名值等，或者，也可以是使用认证密钥对芯片卡30的标识信息进行加密得到加密信息等，具体本实施例不作限定。
通过上述可选实施方式，每次刷卡认证或在指定的设备上刷卡通过认证后台10均认为需要更新芯片卡30的认证密钥，提升了认证密钥的更新速度，缩减同一个密钥的使用周期，压缩了攻击者对该密钥破解的有效时间，如果旧的认证密钥超过使用周期被破解，由于旧的认证密钥已被废止，因此，即使被破解也不会给用户带到危害，提升了安全性。
在上述可选实施方式中，进一步地，后台对所述待认证信息进行认证但认证没有通过的情况下，在作为一种可选实施方式，后台10还用于：在对所述待认证信息进行认证没有通过的情况下，确定使用所述标识信息的芯片卡30受到攻击，禁止使用所述标识信息的芯片卡30通过认证。在该可选实施方式中，后台10在对芯片卡30发送的认证信息进行认证没有通过的情况下，认为当前芯片卡30存在伪卡，从而将当前芯片卡30的标识信息加入黑名单，禁止使用该标识信息的芯片卡30通过认证。通过该可选实施方式，即使非法用户在芯片卡30两次的使用间隔期间内破解了芯片卡30的认证密钥，并使用伪卡从后台10获得了新的认证密钥，但由于真卡没有获取到新的认证密钥，因此，当真卡刷卡进行认证时，认证不能通过，从而使得后台10可以及时获知当前芯片卡30存在伪卡，禁用当前芯片卡30，避免用户的损失持续。
在上述可选实施方式中，后台10使用认证密钥对待认证信息进行认证之后，可选地，后台10还用于向所述读卡器20返回对所述待认证信息进行认证得到的认证结果。读卡器20在收到该认证结果之后，根据该认证结果可以执行进一步的操作。例如，在门禁系统中，读卡器20根据认证结果可以判断是否控制门禁电锁开启。
在具体实施过程中，后台10在为芯片卡30生成新密钥时，包括但不限于以下两种实现方式：
(1)针对芯片卡30生成新密钥更新因子，根据新密钥更新因子及芯片卡30的当前认证密钥，采用预设算法为所述芯片卡30生成新密钥。其中，密钥更新因子可以是事件因子，也可以是时间因子，还可以是事件因子和时间因子的组合，具体本实施例不作限定。
(2)后台10也可以针对每张芯片卡30，设置一个认证密钥列表，该认证密钥列表中包括若干个认证密钥，在为芯片卡30生成新密钥时，后台10从该列表中选取一个与芯片卡30当前的认证密钥不相同的认证密钥，在选取时，后台10可以按序选择认证密钥列表中排在当前的认证密钥之后的下一个认证密钥，也可以随机选择，或者，也可以按其它规则，例如，选择认证密钥列表中排在当前的认证密钥之后的与当前的认证密钥间隔一个或多个的认证密钥，具体方式本实施例不作限定。
对应的，后台10返回给读卡器20的更新指示中携带的密钥同步信息可以是：(1)新密钥更新因子，芯片卡30在接收到新密钥更新因子之后，采用与后台10相同的算法，将本地 的认证密钥更新为所述新密钥，例如，芯片卡30可以根据新密钥更新因子与当前的认证密钥，采用预设的算法，得到所述新密钥，再使用该新密钥更新本地的认证密钥。(2)后台10生成的新密钥，即后台10将为芯片卡30生成的新密钥作为密钥同步信息发送给芯片卡30，芯片卡30接收到该新密钥之后，使用该新密钥更新本地的认证密钥。
在本发明实施例，后台10发送的更新指示中可以直接携带密钥同步信息，或者，为了保证密钥同步信息的传输安全，更新指示中携带的还可以是密钥同步信息的密文，其中，该密文可以是使用芯片卡30当前的认证密钥对密钥同步信息进行加密得到的，芯片卡30在接收到密钥同步信息的密文之后，使用本地的认证密钥对该密文进行解密，得到密钥同步信息，再根据密钥同步信息更新本地的认证密钥。
在本发明实施例的一个可选实施方案中，如果后台10在对芯片卡30发送的待认证信息进行认证且认证通过之后，确定需要更新芯片卡30的认证密钥的情况下，后台10可以将更新指示携带在认证结果中发送给读卡器20，由读卡器20将更新指示发送给芯片卡30，以节约后台10与读卡器20之间的交互流程。
通过本实施例提供的密钥更新系统，后台10根据预先设定的策略，判断是否需要更新芯片卡30的认证密钥，如果需要，则为芯片卡30生成新密钥，并通过读卡器20指示芯片卡30更新本地的认证密钥，并在接收到芯片卡30的密钥同步成功指示之后，将本地的芯片卡30认证密钥替换为所述新密钥。通过本发明提供的技术方案，后台10可以在合适的时机更新芯片卡30的认证密钥，从而使得同一个用户在同一时间段内，只能有一个芯片卡30通过认证，如果在该时间段内该用户使用的芯片卡30的认证密钥与后台10不一致，则无法通过后台10的认证。因此，即使第三方攻破了芯片卡30内存储的认证密钥，但由于在第三方攻破芯片卡30内存储的认证密钥的过程中，后台10可能已经更新了该芯片卡30的认证密钥，原认证密钥已经失效，从而无法使用旧认证密钥通过认证，从而使得后台10可以及时发现芯片卡30是否被伪造盗用，避免了用户的人身或财产的伤害。
实施例3
本实施例提供了一种密钥更新装置，该装置可以设置在实施例1以及实施例2所述的后台中，用于实现实施例1所描述的密钥更新方法。
图3为本实施例提供的密钥更新装置的结构示意图，如图3所示，该装置主要包括：确定模块300、生成模块302、发送模块304、接收模块306以及更新模块308。
下面主要对本实施例提供的密钥更新装置的各个模块的功能进行描述，其它未尽事宜可以参考实施例1及2的描述，在此不再赘述。
确定模块300，用于根据预先设定的策略，确定需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥；生成模块302，用于为所述芯片卡生成新密钥；发送模块304，用于向所述芯片卡发送更新指示，指示所述芯片卡更新本地的认证密钥，其中，所述更新指示中携带有密钥同步信息或所述密钥同步信息的密文；接收模块306，用于接收所述芯片卡的密钥同步成功指示；更新模块308，用于在所述接收模块接收到所述同步成功指示之后，将所述芯片卡的认证密钥替换为所述新密钥。
在具体实施过程中，可以根据芯片卡的具体应用场景，设置相应的认证密钥更新的策略，例如，可以按使用时间更新，例如，每天更新一次。或者，也可以按照使用次数进行更新，例如，芯片卡每使用认证密钥进行一次认证之后，就更新一次认证密钥。或者，也可以按使用频率确定是否需要更新密钥，例如，一天之内使用了n次，则更新芯片卡的认证密钥等，具体本实施例不作限定。
在本发明实施例的一个可选实施方案中，可以是芯片卡每使用一次认证密钥进行认证之后，确定模块300即确定需要更新该芯片卡的认证密钥。因此，在本发明实施例的一个可选实施方案中，确定模块300具体用于通过以下方式确定需要更新该芯片卡的认证密钥：接收到读卡器发送的所述芯片卡的认证请求，其中，所述认证请求中携带有所述芯片卡的标识信息和待认证信息；根据所述芯片卡的标识信息获取所述芯片卡的认证密钥；使用所述认证密钥对所述待认证信息进行认证，在认证通过的情况下，确定需要更新所述芯片卡的认证密钥。
通过上述可选实施方式，每次刷卡认证或在指定的设备上刷卡通过认证确定模块300均认为需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥，提升了认证密钥的更新速度，缩减同一个密钥的使用周期，压缩了攻击者对该密钥破解的有效时间，如果旧的认证密钥超过使用周期被破解，由于旧的认证密钥已被废止，因此，即使被破解也不会给用户带到危害，提升了安全性。
在上述可选实施方式中，进一步地，在对所述待认证信息进行认证但认证没有通过的情况下，在作为一种可选实施方式，确定模块300还可以用于：对所述待认证信息进行认证但认证没有通过的情况下，确定使用所述标识信息的芯片卡受到攻击，禁止使用所述标识信息的芯片卡通过认证。在该可选实施方式中，在对芯片卡发送的认证信息进行认证没有通过的情况下，确定模块300认为当前芯片卡存在伪卡，从而将当前芯片卡的标识信息加入黑名单，禁止使用该标识信息的芯片卡通过认证。通过该可选实施方式，即使非法用户在芯片卡两次的使用间隔期间破解了芯片卡的认证密钥，并使用伪卡获得了新的认证密钥，但由于真卡没有获取到新的认证密钥，因此，当真卡刷卡进行认证时，认证不能通过，从而使得密钥更新装置可以及时获知当前芯片卡存在伪卡，禁用当前芯片卡，避免用户的损失持续。
在具体实施过程中，生成模块302在为所述芯片卡生成新密钥时，包括但不限于以下两 种方式：
(1)针对芯片卡生成新密钥更新因子，根据新密钥更新因子及芯片卡的当前认证密钥，采用预设算法为所述芯片卡生成新密钥。其中，密钥更新因子可以是事件因子，也可以是时间因子，还可以是事件因子和时间因子的组合，具体本实施例不作限定。
(2)针对每张芯片卡，设置一个认证密钥列表，该认证密钥列表中包括若干个认证密钥，在为芯片卡生成新密钥时，生成模块302从该列表中选取一个与芯片卡当前的认证密钥不相同的认证密钥，在选取时，生成模块302可以按序选择认证密钥列表中排在当前的认证密钥之后的下一个认证密钥，也可以随机选择，或者，也可以按其它规则，例如，选择认证密钥列表中排在当前的认证密钥之后的与当前的认证密钥间隔一个或多个的认证密钥，具体方式本实施例不作限定。
对应的，发送模块304返回的更新指示中携带的密钥同步信息可以是：(1)新密钥更新因子，芯片卡在接收到新密钥更新因子之后，采用与生成模块302相同的算法，将本地的认证密钥更新为所述新密钥，例如，芯片卡可以根据新密钥更新因子与当前的认证密钥，采用预设的算法，得到所述新密钥，再使用该新密钥更新本地的认证密钥。(2)生成模块302生成的新密钥，即发送模块304将生成模块302为芯片卡生成的新密钥作为密钥同步信息发送给芯片卡，芯片卡接收到该新密钥之后，使用该新密钥更新本地的认证密钥。
在本发明实施例，发送模块304发送的更新指示中可以直接携带密钥同步信息，或者，为了保证密钥同步信息的传输安全，更新指示中携带的还可以是密钥同步信息的密文，其中，该密文可以是使用芯片卡当前的认证密钥对密钥同步信息进行加密得到的，芯片卡在接收到密钥同步信息的密文之后，使用本地的认证密钥对该密文进行解密，得到密钥同步信息，再根据密钥同步信息更新本地的认证密钥。
通过本实施例提供的密钥更新装置，确定模块300根据预先设定的策略，判断是否需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥，如果需要，则生成模块302为芯片卡生成新密钥，发送模块304通过读卡器指示芯片卡更新本地的认证密钥，更新模块308在接收模块306接收到芯片卡的密钥同步成功指示之后，将本地的芯片卡认证密钥替换为所述新密钥。通过本发明提供的技术方案，密钥更新装置可以在合适的时机更新芯片卡的认证密钥，从而使得同一个用户在同一时间段内，只能有一个芯片卡通过认证，如果在该时间段内该用户使用的芯片卡的认证密钥与密钥更新装置不一致，则无法通过密钥更新装置的认证，因此，即使第三方攻破了芯片卡内存储的认证密钥，但由于在第三方攻破芯片卡内存储的认证密钥的过程中，密钥更新装置可能已经更新了该芯片卡的认证密钥，原认证密钥已经失效，从而无法使用旧认证密钥通过认证，从而使得密钥更新装置可以及时发现芯片卡是否被伪造盗用，避免了用户的人身或财 产的伤害。
本发明实施例还提供了一种计算机可读存储介质，具有存储于其中的指令，当后台的处理器执行所述指令时，所述后台执行根据本发明一个实施例的密钥更新方法。
在流程图中表示或在此以其他方式描述的逻辑和/或步骤，例如，可以被认为是用于实现逻辑功能的可执行指令的定序列表，可以具体实现在任何计算机可读介质中，以供指令执行系统、装置或设备(如基于计算机的系统、包括处理器的系统或其他可以从指令执行系统、装置或设备取指令并执行指令的系统)使用，或结合这些指令执行系统、装置或设备而使用。就本说明书而言，"计算机可读介质"可以是任何可以包含、存储、通信、传播或传输程序以供指令执行系统、装置或设备或结合这些指令执行系统、装置或设备而使用的装置。
应当理解，本发明的各部分可以用硬件、软件、固件或它们的组合来实现。在上述实施方式中，多个步骤或方法可以用存储在存储器中且由合适的指令执行系统执行的软件或固件来实现。例如，如果用硬件来实现，和在另一实施方式中一样，可用本领域公知的下列技术中的任一项或他们的组合来实现：具有用于对数据信号实现逻辑功能的逻辑门电路的离散逻辑电路，具有合适的组合逻辑门电路的专用集成电路，可编程门阵列(PGA)，现场可编程门阵列(FPGA)等。

Claims (13)

  1. 一种密钥更新方法，其特征在于，包括：
    后台根据预先设定的策略，确定需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥；
    所述后台为所述芯片卡生成新密钥；
    所述后台向所述芯片卡发送更新指示，指示所述芯片卡更新本地的认证密钥，其中，所述更新指示中携带有密钥同步信息或所述密钥同步信息的密文；
    所述后台接收所述芯片卡的密钥同步成功指示，将所述芯片卡的认证密钥替换为所述新密钥。
  2. 根据权利要求1所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述后台根据预先设定的策略，确定需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥，包括：
    所述后台接收到读卡器发送的所述芯片卡的认证请求，其中，所述认证请求中携带有所述芯片卡的标识信息和待认证信息；
    所述后台根据所述芯片卡的标识信息获取所述芯片卡的认证密钥；
    所述后台使用所述认证密钥对所述待认证信息进行认证，在认证通过的情况下，确定需要更新所述芯片卡的认证密钥。
  3. 根据权利要求2所述的方法，其特征在于，在对所述待认证信息进行认证没有通过的情况下，所述方法还包括：
    所述后台确定使用所述标识信息的芯片卡受到攻击，禁止使用所述标识信息的芯片卡通过认证。
  4. 根据权利要求2或3所述的方法，其特征在于，在所述后台使用所述认证密钥对所述待认证信息进行认证之后，所述方法还包括：所述后台向所述读卡器返回对所述待认证信息进行认证得到的认证结果。
  5. 根据权利要求1至4任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述密钥同步信息包括：新密钥更新因子，指示所述芯片卡根据所述新密钥更新因子将本地的认证密钥更新为所述新密钥。
  6. 根据权利要求1至4任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述密钥同步信息包括：所述新密钥，指示所述芯片卡将本地的认证密钥更新为所述新密钥。
  7. 根据权利要求1至6任一项所述的方法，其特征在于，所述密钥同步信息的密文包括：使用所述芯片卡当前的认证密钥对所述密钥同步信息进行加密得到的密文信息。
  8. 一种密钥更新装置，其特征在于，包括：
    确定模块，用于根据预先设定的策略，确定需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥；
    生成模块，用于为所述芯片卡生成新密钥；
    发送模块，用于向所述芯片卡发送更新指示，指示所述芯片卡更新本地的认证密钥，其中，所述更新指示中携带有密钥同步信息或所述密钥同步信息的密文；
    接收模块，用于接收所述芯片卡的密钥同步成功指示；
    更新模块，用于在所述接收模块接收到所述同步成功指示之后，将所述芯片卡的认证密钥替换为所述新密钥。
  9. 一种密钥更新系统，其特征在于，包括：后台、读卡器和芯片卡，其中，
    所述后台，用于根据预先设定的策略，确定需要更新所述芯片卡的认证密钥，为所述芯片卡生成新密钥，通过所述读卡器向所述芯片卡发送更新指示，指示所述芯片卡更新本地的认证密钥，其中，所述更新指示中携带有密钥同步信息或所述密钥同步信息的密文；
    所述读卡器，用于接收并将所述更新指示发送给芯片卡；
    所述芯片卡，用于接收所述更新指示，并按照所述更新指示，将本地的认证密钥更新为所述新密钥，更新成功后，向所述读卡器发送密钥同步成功指示；
    所述读卡器，还用于接收并将所述密钥同步成功指示发送给所述后台；
    所述后台，用于接收所述密钥同步成功指示，将所述芯片卡的认证密钥替换为所述新密钥。
  10. 根据权利要求9所述的系统，其特征在于，所述后台具体用于通过以下方式确定需要更新芯片卡的认证密钥：接收到所述读卡器发送的所述芯片卡的认证请求，其中，所述认证请求中携带有所述芯片卡的标识信息和待认证信息；根据所述芯片卡的标识信息获取所述芯片卡的认证密钥；使用所述认证密钥对所述待认证信息进行认证，在认证通过的情况下，确定需要更新所述芯片卡的认证密钥。
  11. 根据权利要求10所述的系统，其特征在于，所述后台还用于：在对所述待认证信息进行认证没有通过的情况下，确定使用所述标识信息的芯片卡受到攻击，禁止使用所述标识信息的芯片卡通过认证。
  12. 根据权利要求10或11所述的系统，其特征在于，所述后台还用于：在所述后台使用所述认证密钥对所述待认证信息进行认证之后，向所述读卡器返回对所述待认证信息进行认证得到的认证结果。
  13. 一种计算机可读存储介质，具有存储于其中的指令，当后台的处理器执行所述指令时，所述后台执行如权利要求1至7任一项所述的密钥更新方法。
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