WO2018114010A1 - Prevention of vibration-based re-identification - Google Patents

Prevention of vibration-based re-identification Download PDF

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Publication number
WO2018114010A1
WO2018114010A1 PCT/EP2016/082625 EP2016082625W WO2018114010A1 WO 2018114010 A1 WO2018114010 A1 WO 2018114010A1 EP 2016082625 W EP2016082625 W EP 2016082625W WO 2018114010 A1 WO2018114010 A1 WO 2018114010A1
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WIPO (PCT)
Prior art keywords
wireless communication
vibration
communication device
numbers
vibration alarm
Prior art date
Application number
PCT/EP2016/082625
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French (fr)
Inventor
Peter Schoo
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Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Priority date (The priority date is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the date listed.)
Filing date
Publication date
Application filed by Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. filed Critical Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.
Priority to PCT/EP2016/082625 priority Critical patent/WO2018114010A1/en
Publication of WO2018114010A1 publication Critical patent/WO2018114010A1/en

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Classifications

    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/02—Protecting privacy or anonymity, e.g. protecting personally identifiable information [PII]
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K1/00—Secret communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/80—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function
    • H04K3/82—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection
    • H04K3/827—Jamming or countermeasure characterized by its function related to preventing surveillance, interception or detection using characteristics of target signal or of transmission, e.g. using direct sequence spread spectrum or fast frequency hopping
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K1/00—Secret communication
    • H04K1/02—Secret communication by adding a second signal to make the desired signal unintelligible
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K1/00—Secret communication
    • H04K1/04—Secret communication by frequency scrambling, i.e. by transposing or inverting parts of the frequency band or by inverting the whole band
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K1/00—Secret communication
    • H04K1/06—Secret communication by transmitting the information or elements thereof at unnatural speeds or in jumbled order or backwards
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
    • H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
    • H04K2203/12—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for acoustic communication
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
    • H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
    • H04K2203/16—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for telephony
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K2203/00—Jamming of communication; Countermeasures
    • H04K2203/10—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application
    • H04K2203/18—Jamming or countermeasure used for a particular application for wireless local area networks or WLAN
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
    • H04K3/41—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming activation or deactivation time
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
    • H04K3/42—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming frequency or wavelength
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04K—SECRET COMMUNICATION; JAMMING OF COMMUNICATION
    • H04K3/00—Jamming of communication; Counter-measures
    • H04K3/40—Jamming having variable characteristics
    • H04K3/43—Jamming having variable characteristics characterized by the control of the jamming power, signal-to-noise ratio or geographic coverage area
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1466—Active attacks involving interception, injection, modification, spoofing of data unit addresses, e.g. hijacking, packet injection or TCP sequence number attacks
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
    • H04L63/00—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security
    • H04L63/14—Network architectures or network communication protocols for network security for detecting or protecting against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1441—Countermeasures against malicious traffic
    • H04L63/1483—Countermeasures against malicious traffic service impersonation, e.g. phishing, pharming or web spoofing
    • H—ELECTRICITY
    • H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
    • H04W—WIRELESS COMMUNICATION NETWORKS
    • H04W12/00—Security arrangements; Authentication; Protecting privacy or anonymity
    • H04W12/60—Context-dependent security
    • H04W12/69—Identity-dependent
    • H04W12/79—Radio fingerprint

Abstract

The present invention relates to a method and apparatus to prevent vibration-based re- identification of a wireless communication device. Existing wireless communication devices are extremely susceptible to eavesdropping and device tracking by reading out the device- specific frequency responses of devices when they are exposed to vibrations caused by their internal vibration motor. Consequently, the present invention aims at improving this situation by "fuzzying" of this vibration signal and it adopts following technical solution: the characteristics of a vibration signal like magnitude, frequency and phase with which a wireless communication device is vibrated are randomly varied to become unpredictably different. Attackers will have to put much more effort into the repetitive reading of sensor data of a device to produce characteristic data allowing for robust identification and tracking of devices.

Description

Prevention of vibration-based Re-identification
Field of the Invention
The present invention relates to a method, apparatus and computer program to prevent vibration-based re-identification of a wireless communication device.
Background of the Invention
At present, the privacy of owners of mobile phones, tablets or generally wireless communication devices can be attacked to identify the device owner in a non legitimate manner. The attack can be mounted by crafting an HTML page enticing a dedicated user to open the page upon receipt. Once the page is opened by the recipient with a browser of a wireless communication device the vibration alarm of the wireless communication device is activated and subsequent readings of potentially a variety of sensors (e.g. accelerometer) are used to identify the wireless device due to device-specific sensor calibration errors. The measurements can detect vibration variations that are due to production specific variations in the vibration hardware (e.g. MEMS resonator elements) within milliseconds. Such a unique hardware "fingerprint" can then be used to de-anonymize mobile devices as they connect to web sites. Provided that said device is used by the same person in the course of the re-identification procedure users can be identified as they connect to a remote server without their consent, control or knowledge.
Hristo Bojinov et al: "Mobile Device Identification via Sensor Fingerprinting" is demonstrating how the multitude of sensors on a smartphone can be used to construct a reliable hardware fingerprint of the phone. Two implementations are presented: one is based on analyzing the frequency response of the speakerphone-microphone and another one is based on analyzing device-specific accelerometer calibration errors once the vibration alarm of the device to be identified has been activated. Particularly the accelerometer-based fingerprint is interesting from a security standpoint, because the accelerometer is easily accessible via JavaScript running in a mobile web browser without requesting any permissions or notifying the user. Once the vibration alarm is activated the accelerometer of the device measures the forces exerted on the device in each of the three dimensions. Imprecisions in accelerometer calibration then result in a device specific scaling and translation or offset of the measured values. The presented results show that a robust device ID, or fingerprint can be extracted from this data, while the attained fingerprint is independent of the software state and survives a hard reset. There is no need in accessing traditional hardware identifiers such as the IMEI or UDID. Hence, simply disallowing app access to the device UDID is an ineffective privacy policy.
With respect to mitigating this threat to mobile users the document suggests that the feasibility of fingerprinting can be eliminated by calibrating the sensor at the time of manufacturing or by adding a random value to the sensor output at the OS level to avoid electronic eavesdropping.
Summary of the Invention
The present invention is based on the observation that wireless communication devices are extremely susceptible to eavesdropping by reading out the device-specific frequency responses of devices when they are exposed to vibrations. These measurements can detect vibration variations within milliseconds, which allows to distinguish production-specific variations of vibrations due to hardware imperfections and subsequently to track users and their communication devices.
The present invention solves this problem by means of randomization, no matter what sensor-channel to read the vibration response is used (e.g. microphone, accelerometer, gyroscope etc.). To this end, the invention provides a "fuzzying" of the vibration signal by directly manipulating the characteristics of the vibration with which the device is vibrated by a vibration control unit in the communication device. Once the characteristics like magnitude, frequency and phase of vibration signals employed on wireless communication devices are randomly varied to become unpredictably different, attackers will have to put much more effort into the repetitive reading of sensor data of a device to produce characteristic data allowing for robust identification and tracking of devices.
Resulting threats that are mitigated with the solution encompass (cf. RFC 6973) surveillance, intrusion, correlation of information related to an individual, identification, secondary use or disclosure of individual's location information, and exclusion from knowing that others have individual's location information.
A first aspect of the present invention provides a method for preventing identification of a wireless communication device, the method comprising the steps of:
executing a function call prepared by an application programming interface (API) that is provided by a platform of a wireless communication device to start a vibration alarm on the wireless communication device; whereby the function call has a plurality of parameters; randomizing the function call by modifying at least one of the plurality of parameters to change a characteristic of the vibration alarm;
generating the vibration alarm according to the changed characteristic on the wireless communication device.
In a first possible implementation manner of the first aspect, the plurality of parameters includes a first parameter ¾■ determining a frequency, a second parameter fm determining a magnitude and a third parameter s determining a start of the vibration alarm.
With reference to the first possible implementation manner of the first aspect, in a second possible implementation manner, the first parameter ¾■ is changed according to the equation f& = ffr - (ci * ri), whereby a first number n and a second number ci is generated, such that 0 <= n <= 1 and 0 <= ci <= 1.
With reference to the first or second possible implementation manner of the first aspect, in a third possible implementation manner of the first aspect the second parameter fm is changed according to the equation fm = fm - (c2 * r2), whereby a first number r2 and a second number c2 is generated, such that 0 <= r2 <= 1 and 0 <= c2 <= 1.
With reference to the first, second or third possible implementation manner of the first aspect, in a forth possible implementation manner of the first aspect the third parameter s is changed according to the equation s = s - (c3 * r3), whereby a first number r3 and a second number c3 is generated, such that 0 <= r3 <= 1 and 0 <= c3 <= 1.
With reference to the second, third or forth possible implementation manner of the first aspect, in a fifth possible implementation manner of the first aspect the second numbers ci, c2 or c3 are generated, such that 0 < ci,2,3 <= 0,15.
With reference to any one of the second to the fifth possible implementation manners of the first aspect, in a sixth possible implementation manner of the first aspect the first numbers ri, r2 or r3 are random numbers.
With reference to any one of the second to the sixth possible implementation manners of the first aspect, in a seventh possible implementation manner of the first aspect the first numbers ri, r2 or r3 are the same.
With reference to any one of the second to the sixth possible implementation manners of the first aspect, in an eighth possible implementation manner of the first aspect the first numbers ri, r2 or r3 are different.
With reference to any one of the second to the eighth possible implementation manners of the first aspect, in an ninth possible implementation manner of the first aspect the second numbers ci, c2 or c3 are the same. With reference to any one of the second to the eighth possible implementation manners of the first aspect, in an tenth possible implementation manner of the first aspect the second numbers ci, c2 or c3 are different.
A second aspect of the present invention further provides a wireless communication device for identification prevention, comprising:
a platform unit adapted to host a web application;
an application programming interface unit adapted to execute a function call initiated by the web application, whereby said function call starts a vibration alarm on the mobile wireless communication device and has a plurality of parameters;
a randomizing unit adapted to randomize the function call by modifying at least one of the plurality of parameters to change a characteristic of the vibration alarm; and
a vibration control unit adapted to generate the vibration alarm according to the changed characteristic of the vibration alarm.
In a first possible implementation manner of the second aspect, the plurality of parameters for a function call to be executed by the application programming interface unit includes a first parameter f& determining a frequency, a second parameter fm determining a magnitude and a third parameter s determining a start of the vibration alarm.
With reference to the first possible implementation manner of the second aspect, in a second possible implementation manner of the second aspect the randomizing unit sets the first parameter f& according to the equation f& = f& - (ci * ri), whereby a first number n and a second number ci is generated, such that 0 <= ri <= 1 and 0 <= ci <= 1.
With reference to the first or second possible implementation manner of the second aspect, in a third possible implementation manner of the second aspect the randomizing unit sets the second parameter fm according to the equation fm = fm - (c2 * r2), whereby a first number r2 and a second number c2 is generated, such that 0 <= r2 <= 1 and 0 <= c2 <= 1.
With reference to the first, second or third possible implementation manner of the second aspect, in a forth possible implementation manner of the second aspect the randomizing unit sets the third parameter s according to the equation s = s - (c3 * r3), whereby a first number r3 and a second number c3 is generated, such that 0 <= r3 <= 1 and 0 <= c3 <= 1.
With reference to the second, third or forth possible implementation manner of the first aspect, in a fifth possible implementation manner of the second aspect the randomizing unit generates the second numbers ci, c2 or c3 such that 0 < ci,2,3 <= 0,15. With reference to any one of the second to the fifth possible implementation manners of the second aspect, in a sixth possible implementation manner of the second aspect the randomizing unit generates the first numbers ri, r2 or r3 such that they are random numbers.
With reference to any one of the second to the sixth possible implementation manners of the second aspect, in a seventh possible implementation manner of the second aspect the randomizing unit sets the first numbers ri, r2 or r3 such that they are the same.
With reference to any one of the second to the sixth possible implementation manners of the second aspect, in an eighth possible implementation manner of the second aspect the randomizing unit sets the first numbers ri, r2 or r3 such that they are different.
With reference to any one of the second to the eighth possible implementation manners of the second aspect, in an ninth possible implementation manner of the second aspect the randomizing unit sets the second numbers ci, c2 or c3 such that they are the same.
With reference to any one of the second to the eighth possible implementation manners of the second aspect, in an tenth possible implementation manner of the second aspect the randomizing unit sets the second numbers ci, c2 or c3 such that they are different.
A third aspect of the present invention further provides a computer program stored in the internal memory of a wireless communication device comprising software code portions for performing the steps of the first aspect of the present invention, when said computer program is run on the wireless communication device.
Brief Description of the Drawings
The appended drawings are intended to clarify and explain different embodiments of the present invention in which:
Fig. l is a schematic diagram of the characteristics of a vibration signal according to the embodiments of this invention.
Fig.2 is a flowchart of a method of prevention of vibration-based re-identification according to the first aspect of the present invention.
Fig. 3 is a schematic diagram of the system architecture and API according to the second aspect of the present invention.
Fig. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of a wireless communication device according to the second aspect of the present invention. Detailed Description of the Invention
A detailed description of embodiments in accordance with the present invention is provided hereinafter with reference to accompanying drawings.
As shown in Fig. l any vibration alarm signal (105) on a wireless communication device is characterized by its frequency (104), magnitude (103), vibration start delay (102) and end of vibration period (106), the latter is not subjected to any modifications in this present invention since its timing is determined by other signals arriving at the vibration controller of a wireless communication signal. Modifications of this parameter could result in activation errors in the vibration controller.
Fig. 2 shows a flowchart showing the consecutive steps of a method for preventing identification of a wireless communication device according to one embodiment. A platform of wireless communication device (e.g. Android or iOS) provides an application programming interface (API), which allows a web site, another program or makro language to execute function calls on the wireless communication device. The claimed vibration call randomization is achieved by manipulating the parameters of a vibration function call executed on the wireless communication device. Once this function call is executed (201) the characteristics of the initiated vibration alarm are changed by modifying at least one of a variety of parameters, which are given as arguments to the function call (202). As shown in Fig. 1 the parameters defining the characteristics of a vibration alarm are frequency (104), magnitude (103), vibration start delay (102) and end of vibration period (106). Hence, an API function call to initiate a vibration alarm on a wireless communication device is executed not only by the calling of the function, but also by transferring parameters to control the execution of the function as far as the API allows. In a last step, the vibration alarm is generated according to the changed characteristic on the wireless communication device.
Fig. 3 shows the according system architecture and API of a wireless communication device, which is employed to activate a vibration alarm and to manipulate the characteristics of the vibration. According to this invention, upon reception of a function call, which is provided by the API (301) of the wireless communication, to start a vibration alarm the characteristics of the vibration are randomized (302), such that the vibration alarm signals differ from each other. The specific API call is randomized by manipulating any of the three parameters regarding frequency (303), magnitude (304) or vibration start (305), which are handed over as arguments for the API function call to vibrate the device once this function call is received. As has been discussed before in Fig. 1 the parameter controlling the end of vibration period (306) is not subjected to any modifications in this present invention since its timing is determined by other signals arriving at the vibration controller of a wireless communication signal. Modifications of this parameter could result in activation conflicts in the vibration controller.
In order to randomize this call and subsequently the resulting vibration characteristics of the vibration alarm, a number r is generated such that 0 <= r <= 1, preferably by using a pseudorandom number generator for drawing said number, e.g. by means of using the function "SecureRandom" on the Android platform.
Secondly, a number c is generated such that 0 <= c <= 1, whereby this fraction c determines the extent to which any of the characteristics of the vibration is varied. If this fraction c is set to 0, the vibration characteristics like frequency, magnitude or phase are not changed versus a standard setting, while a value c=l indicates that the vibration characteristic to which this value is applied will be changed to the maximum extent possible, given the manufacture-specific range for allowable tuning of the vibration characteristics or mere practical limitations for setting said characteristics. For practical reasons the entire allowable range of the vibration characteristics will not be manipulated, but only a fraction e.g. 10/100. The value c represent this fraction and is preferably set to lie within an interval from 0 to 0,15.
In a next step any or any combination of the parameters fc, fm and s that are used to control the vibration motor with regards to frequency, magnitude and phase are set according to the following formulas for the according parameters:
(a) ffr = ffr - (c * r)
(b) fm = fm - (c * r)
(c) s = s - (c * r)
It is to be noted that the values c and r in formulas (a), (b) and (c) are to be set independently from each other in order to randomize the vibration characteristics frequency (303), magnitude (304) and phase (305) independently. Any combination of manipulated parameters is now given to a vibration controller, which stimulates a vibration motor or any other means to vibrate a wireless communication device according to the selected, randomized values of frequency, magnitude and vibration start. The end of the vibration period is not manipulated in this invention, because it is determined by other signals arriving at the vibration controller. Fig.4 outlines the schematic structural diagram of a wireless communication device (401) according to the second aspect of the present invention. Herewith, the necessary functional units are presented that enable a wireless communication device to execute the claimed invention.
Firstly, a platform or operating system (402) needs to be provided by the wireless device to enable it to run applications like a web application. Further, an API unit (403) is disposed in the wireless communication device providing the interface for function calls initiated by a web application or any other program running on the platform of the wireless communication device. Once the API unit receives a function call to start a vibration alarm the characteristics of the vibration alarm are randomized by a randomizing unit (404). The randomizing unit is adapted to randomize the function call by modifying the characteristics of the vibration alarm. To this end, one or a combination of the parameters fc, fm and s that are transferred to the API function call as arguments and are used to control a vibration motor or any other means to generate device vibrations with regards to frequency, magnitude and phase are modified within their valid interval determined by the parameter constraints depending on the API. At last, a vibration control unit (405) is disposed in the wireless communication device to generate the vibration alarm according to the changed characteristic of the vibration alarm.
As a result of these steps the vibrational characteristics, namely frequency, magnitude and phase of a vibration signal of a wireless communication device can be independently manipulated to mitigate threats of device tracking.
Finally, it should be understood that the present invention is not limited to the embodiments described above, but also relates to and incorporates all embodiments within the scope of the appended independent claims.

Claims

1. A method for preventing identification of a wireless communication device, the method comprising the steps of:
executing a function call (201) prepared by an application programming interface (301) that is provided by a platform of a wireless communication device (401) to start a vibration alarm on the wireless communication device; whereby the function call has a plurality of parameters (303, 304, 305, 306);
randomizing the function call (202) by modifying at least one of the plurality of parameters to change a characteristic of the vibration alarm;
generating the vibration alarm (203) according to the changed characteristic on the wireless communication device.
2. The method according to claim 1, wherein said plurality of parameters includes a first parameter ffr (303) determining a frequency (104), a second parameter fm (304) determining a magnitude (103) and a third parameter s (305) determining a start (101) of the vibration alarm.
3. The method according to claim 2, wherein the first parameter f& (303) is changed according to the equation
ffr = ft - (ci * ri),
whereby a first number ri and a second number ci is generated, such that 0 <= ri <= 1 and 0 <= ci <= 1.
4. The method according to claim 2 or 3, wherein the second parameter fm (304) is changed according to the equation
Figure imgf000011_0001
whereby a first number r2 and a second number c2 is generated, such that 0 <= r2 <= 1 and 0 <= C2 <= 1.
5. The method according to claim 2, 3 or 4, wherein the third parameter s (305) is changed according to the equation
s = s - (C3 * r3),
whereby a first number r3 and a second number c3 is generated, such that 0 <= r3 <= 1 and 0
<= C3 <= 1.
6. The method according to anyone of claims 3, 4 or 5, wherein the second numbers ci, c2 or C3 are generated, such that 0 < ci,2,3 <= 0,15.
7. The method according to anyone of claims 3 to 6, wherein the first numbers ri, r2 or r3 are random numbers.
8. The method according to anyone of claims 3 to 7, wherein the first numbers ri, r2 or r3 are the same.
9. The method according to anyone of claims 3 to 7, wherein the first numbers ri, r2 or r3 are different.
10. The method according to anyone of claims 3 to 9, wherein the second numbers ci, c2 or c3 are the same.
11. The method according to anyone of claims 3 to 9, wherein the second numbers ci, c2 or c3 are different.
12. A wireless communication device (401) for identification prevention, comprising: a platform unit adapted (402) to host a web application;
an application programming interface unit (403) residing in the platform unit (402) adapted to execute a function call initiated by the web application, whereby said function call starts a vibration alarm on the mobile wireless communication device and has a plurality of parameters (303, 304, 305, 306);
a randomizing unit (404) adapted to randomize the function call by modifying at least one of the plurality of parameters to change a characteristic of the vibration alarm; and
a vibration control unit (405) adapted to generate the vibration alarm according to the changed characteristic of the vibration alarm.
13. A computer program stored in the internal memory of a wireless communication device comprising software code portions for performing the steps of claim 1 when said computer program is run on the wireless communication device.
PCT/EP2016/082625 2016-12-23 2016-12-23 Prevention of vibration-based re-identification WO2018114010A1 (en)

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Citations (2)

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Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2013063268A1 (en) * 2011-10-26 2013-05-02 Google Inc. Obscuring an accelerometer signal
US20150150116A1 (en) * 2013-11-26 2015-05-28 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Preventing Spoofing Attacks for Bone Conduction Applications

Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Publication number Priority date Publication date Assignee Title
WO2013063268A1 (en) * 2011-10-26 2013-05-02 Google Inc. Obscuring an accelerometer signal
US20150150116A1 (en) * 2013-11-26 2015-05-28 At&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. Preventing Spoofing Attacks for Bone Conduction Applications

Non-Patent Citations (2)

* Cited by examiner, † Cited by third party
Title
HRISTO BOJINOV ET AL: "Mobile Device Identification via Sensor Fingerprinting", 6 August 2014 (2014-08-06), XP055235060, Retrieved from the Internet <URL:http://arxiv.org/pdf/1408.1416v1.pdf> [retrieved on 20151209], DOI: arXiv:1408.1416 *
SANORITA DEY ET AL: "AccelPrint: Imperfections of Accelerometers Make Smartphones Trackable", PROCEEDINGS 2014 NETWORK AND DISTRIBUTED SYSTEM SECURITY SYMPOSIUM, 2014, Reston, VA, XP055405160, ISBN: 978-1-891562-35-8, DOI: 10.14722/ndss.2014.23059 *

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