WO2018086469A1

WO2018086469A1 - Data storage method utilized in non-volatile storage space in integrated circuit, and trusted integrated circuit

Info

Publication number: WO2018086469A1
Application number: PCT/CN2017/108254
Authority: WO
Inventors: 付颖芳
Original assignee: 阿里巴巴集团控股有限公司
Priority date: 2016-11-11
Filing date: 2017-10-30
Publication date: 2018-05-17
Also published as: CN108073351A; TW201818258A; CN108073351B

Abstract

A data storage method utilized in a non-volatile storage space in an integrated circuit (IC), and a trusted integrated circuit. The data storage method comprises: creating, in the integrated circuit, the non-volatile storage space (S302); wherein the non-volatile storage space has attributes including a parameter representing storage of owner data in the non-volatile storage space, and a storage address range of the owner data; and the storage address range of the owner data represents a maximum data length allowable for requesting data from the integrated circuit. The method resolves a technical issue in the prior art in which when reading, from a non-volatile space of a trusted IC, the raw data, the read raw data has low accuracy.

Description

Data storage method and trusted chip of non-volatile storage space in chip

The present application claims priority to Chinese Patent Application No. 201610998449.0 filed on Nov. 11, 2016, entitled "Data Storage Method and Trusted Chip in Non-Volatile Storage Space in Chip", the entire contents of which are incorporated by reference. Combined in this application.

Technical field

The present invention relates to the field of data storage, and in particular to a data storage method and a trusted chip for a non-volatile storage space in a chip.

Background technique

The user can create a non-volatile space in the trusted security chip, and can assign the attributes shown in Table 1 to the non-volatile space:

Table 1

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram of interaction of a user acquiring non-volatile spatial data according to the prior art. As shown in FIG. 1 , the method includes the following steps:

(1) The owner C initiates a request to access the non-volatile space to the trusted chip T;

(2) The trusted chip T responds to the owner C request and requests its feedback password password, non-volatile space number and data length;

(3) The owner C returns the password, the non-volatile space number to be accessed, and the non-volatile data length to the trusted chip T;

(4) The correctness of the trusted chip T verification password and the nonvolatile space index number, and whether the data length L of the nonvolatile space satisfies the following formula:

L≤|Last_adress-First_adress| (1)

In the above formula, First_adress represents the initial physical address of the nonvolatile space, and Last_adress represents the physical address of the last bit of the nonvolatile space.

If the password and the nonvolatile space number are correct, and the obtained data length L also satisfies the formula (1), the trusted chip returns the data to be accessed by the owner C, and the flow ends. Otherwise, the process is terminated directly.

The existing international TCG standard security chip specifies the fixed size and access grant of the non-volatile space of the trusted security chip. Right, the status identification data in the specification defaults to 0, which is easily confused with the owner data 0. When the user obtains the data, the obtained partial data may be the status identification data 0, instead of the data 0 actually stored by the user. For example, owner C applies for a 6-byte non-volatile space, which stores 4 bytes of data, as shown in Table 2: the owner space number is 1, the owner name is C, and the owner space number corresponds to The size of the nonvolatile space is 6 bytes, that is, the data length can be up to 6 bytes, and the corresponding physical address is FFFFF0 to FFFFF6, and 4 bytes are stored in the physical address, and the data written by the owner is "1101", the TCG standard does not write data by default, the two bytes are 00, that is, the main data is 110100 (the bold italic number indicates the status data, and the unbold number indicates the owner data, as shown in Table 1. Owner data).

Table 2

Nv_indexNv_index	User_nameUser_name	PasswordPassword	Nv_SizeNv_Size	Nv_F&L_adressNv_F&L_adress	DataData
11	CC	********	66	FFFFF0～FFFFF6FFFFF0~FFFFF6	110100110100

When the stored data is long and changes frequently, the owner C may not be able to remember how long it has been stored, and what data is stored, such as when the owner C and the owner obtains the data length 5 from the user, and responds The trusted chip requires feedback information: the user enters the correct password ****, Nv_index number 1, after the trusted chip receives the information, verifies the correctness of the password and the Nv index number, and also verifies that the length is 5<6, which is Within the allowable range, the data length returned to the owner C is 11010, so that the original data of the owner C is changed from 1101 to 11010, causing data errors.

In view of the above-mentioned prior art, when reading raw data from a non-volatile space of a trusted security chip, the technical problem of poor accuracy of the read original data has not yet proposed an effective solution.

Summary of the invention

Embodiments of the present invention provide a data storage method and a trusted chip for a non-volatile storage space in a chip, so as to at least solve the prior art when reading raw data from a non-volatile space of a trusted security chip. Technical problems with poor accuracy of raw data.

According to an aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, a data storage method for a non-volatile storage space in a chip is provided, including: creating a non-volatile storage space in a chip, wherein the non-volatile storage space has at least attributes The method includes: a parameter for characterizing the storage of the owner data in the non-volatile storage space, and a storage address range of the owner data; wherein the storage address range of the owner data is used to represent the maximum data length when the data is requested from the chip .

According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided a method for obtaining data stored in a chip, comprising: receiving an access request for accessing a non-volatile storage space of a chip; and obtaining verification information in response to the access request And the length of the data that needs to be requested; in the case where the verification verification information is passed, it is judged whether the length of the data to be requested is The storage address range of the owner data preset in the non-volatile storage space; if the requested data length is within the storage address range of the owner data, the content of the owner data is allowed to be returned; The storage address range of the primary data is used to characterize the maximum data length at which data is allowed to be requested from the chip.

According to another aspect of the present invention, a trusted chip is further provided, including: a memory, including a non-volatile storage space, wherein the attributes of the non-volatile storage space at least include: The parameter storing the master data in the loss storage space belongs to the storage address range of the master data; wherein the storage address range of the owner data is used to represent the maximum data length when the data is allowed to be requested from the chip.

According to another aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, a system for acquiring data stored in a chip, including: an access device end, is configured to issue an access request for accessing a non-volatile storage space of the chip; The communication chip communicates with the access device, and is configured to obtain the verification information returned by the access device and the data length required to be requested in response to the access request, and if the verification verification information passes, if the required data length is in the owner data Within the storage address range, the contents of the owner data are allowed to be returned; wherein the storage address range of the owner data is used to characterize the maximum data length at which data is allowed to be requested from the chip.

According to another aspect of an embodiment of the present invention, there is provided an apparatus for acquiring data stored in a chip, comprising: a receiving module, configured to receive an access request for accessing a non-volatile storage space of the chip; and a response module And responsive to the access request, obtaining the verification information and the length of the data that needs to be requested; and the determining module, configured to determine, in the case that the verification verification information passes, whether the data length that needs to be requested is in a preset genus in the non-volatile storage space a storage address range of the main data; the control module is configured to allow returning the content of the owner data if the length of the data to be requested is within the storage address range of the owner data; wherein the storage address range of the owner data is used The maximum data length at which the data is allowed to be requested from the chip.

In the embodiment of the present invention, after the non-volatile storage space is created in the chip, the owner data is written to the non-volatile storage space by using the storage address range that defines the owner data, and according to the owner data. The size determines the storage address range of the owner data, and returns the data that the owner needs to obtain according to the size of the owner data and the storage address range of the owner data, so as to achieve the purpose of accurately obtaining the owner data, thereby realizing the original acquisition of the owner. The technical effect of the correctness of the data further solves the technical problem that the accuracy of the original data read is poor when the prior art reads the original data from the non-volatile space of the trusted security chip.

DRAWINGS

The drawings described herein are intended to provide a further understanding of the invention, and are intended to be a part of the invention. In the drawing:

1 is a schematic diagram of interaction of a user acquiring non-volatile spatial data according to the prior art;

2 is a block diagram showing the hardware structure of an optional computer terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention;

3 is a flow chart of a data storage method for a non-volatile storage space in a chip according to an embodiment of the invention;

4 is a flow chart of a data storage method for a non-volatile memory space in an optional chip according to an embodiment of the invention;

5 is a flow chart of an alternative method of accessing owner data of a non-volatile storage space, in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention;

6 is a schematic structural diagram of an optional TCG trust chain according to an embodiment of the present invention;

7 is a flow chart of a method for acquiring data stored in a chip according to an embodiment of the present invention;

FIG. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of a trusted chip according to an embodiment of the present invention; FIG.

9 is a schematic structural diagram of a system for acquiring data stored in a chip according to an embodiment of the present invention;

10 is a schematic structural diagram of an apparatus for acquiring data stored in a chip according to an embodiment of the present invention;

11 is a block diagram showing the structure of an optional computer terminal in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.

detailed description

The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention are clearly and completely described in the following with reference to the accompanying drawings in the embodiments of the present invention. It is an embodiment of the invention, but not all of the embodiments. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention without creative efforts shall fall within the scope of the present invention.

It is to be understood that the terms "first", "second" and the like in the specification and claims of the present invention are used to distinguish similar objects, and are not necessarily used to describe a particular order or order. It is to be understood that the data so used may be interchanged where appropriate, so that the embodiments of the invention described herein can be implemented in a sequence other than those illustrated or described herein. In addition, the terms "comprises" and "comprises" and "the" and "the" are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion, for example, a process, method, system, product, or device that comprises a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to Those steps or units may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products or devices.

First, some of the nouns or terms that appear in the process of describing the embodiments of the present application are applicable to the following explanations:

Non-volatile memory (Nn-volatile memory, referred to as Nv), as a storage technology, can ensure that the data stored in the device will not be lost when the device is powered off, and is often used to protect user-sensitive data.

Owner data refers to the data stored by the user to the storage device, wherein the owner refers to the entity that operates on the data.

Trustworthy means that an entity has been running for a specific purpose in a predictable manner.

Trusted computing is a trusted computing platform supported by hardware security modules widely used in computing and communication systems. The trusted computing platform can improve the overall security of the system. The core mechanism is to build a trusted computing environment through the chain of trust mechanism.

The trusted security chip is a chip with the function of generating encryption and decryption keys. The trusted security chip can also perform high-speed data encryption and decryption, and acts as an auxiliary processor that protects the basic input/output system and the operating system from being modified.

Example 1

According to an embodiment of the invention, a method embodiment of a data storage method for a non-volatile storage space in a chip is also provided.

The method embodiment provided by Embodiment 1 of the present application can be executed in a mobile terminal, a computer terminal or the like. 2 is a block diagram showing the hardware structure of a computer terminal (or mobile device) for realizing a data storage method of a nonvolatile storage space in a chip. As shown in FIG. 2, computer terminal 10 (or mobile device 10) may include one or more (shown in the figures 102a, 102b, ..., 102n) processor 102 (processor 102 may include, but is not limited to, micro A processing device such as a processor MCU or a programmable logic device FPGA, a memory 104 for storing data, and a transmission module 4 for communication functions. In addition, it can also include: display, input/output interface (I/O interface), universal serial bus (USB) port (which can be included as one of the ports of the I/O interface), network interface, power supply And / or camera. It will be understood by those skilled in the art that the structure shown in FIG. 2 is merely illustrative and does not limit the structure of the above electronic device. For example, computer terminal 10 may also include more or fewer components than those shown in FIG. 2, or have a different configuration than that shown in FIG. 2.

It should be noted that one or more of the above-described processors 102 and/or other data processing circuits may be referred to herein generally as "data processing circuits." The data processing circuit may be embodied in whole or in part as software, hardware, firmware or any other combination. Moreover, the data processing circuitry can be a single, separate processing module, or incorporated in whole or in part into any of the other components in computer terminal 10 (or mobile device). As referred to in the embodiments of the present application, the data processing circuit is controlled as a processor (e.g., selection of a variable resistance terminal path connected to the interface).

The memory 104 can be used to store software programs and modules of the application software, such as the program instruction/data storage device corresponding to the data storage method of the non-volatile storage space in the chip in the embodiment of the present invention, and the processor 102 is stored in the memory 104 by running. Software programs and modules within, thus performing various functional applications and data processing, that is, The vulnerability detection method of the above application. Memory 104 may include high speed random access memory, and may also include non-volatile memory such as one or more magnetic storage devices, flash memory, or other non-volatile solid state memory. In some examples, memory 104 may further include memory remotely located relative to processor 102, which may be coupled to computer terminal 10 via a network. Examples of such networks include, but are not limited to, the Internet, intranets, local area networks, mobile communication networks, and combinations thereof.

It should be noted that, in some optional embodiments, the computer device (or mobile device) shown in FIG. 2 may include hardware components (including circuits), software components (including computers stored on a computer readable medium). Code), or a combination of both hardware and software components. It should be noted that FIG. 2 is only one example of a specific embodiment, and is intended to show the types of components that may be present in the above-described computer device (or mobile device).

In the above operating environment, the present application provides a data storage method for a non-volatile storage space in the chip as shown in FIG. 3. 3 is a flow chart of a data storage method for a non-volatile storage space in a chip according to Embodiment 1 of the present invention, comprising the following steps:

Step S302, creating a non-volatile storage space in the chip, wherein the attributes of the non-volatile storage space at least include: a parameter for characterizing the storage of the owner data in the non-volatile storage space, the storage of the owner data The address range; wherein the storage address range of the owner data is used to characterize the maximum data length when data is allowed to be requested from the chip.

In the technical solution defined in the foregoing step S302, the storage mode of the nonvolatile storage space may adopt a big end mode and a small end mode, and the big end mode means that a high byte of data is stored in a low address of the memory, and the data The low byte is stored in the high address of the memory; the little end mode means that the high byte of the data is stored in the high address of the memory, and the low byte of the data is stored in the inner low address, the storage mode can The address level is effectively combined with the bit weight of the data. The weight of the high address part data is high, and the weight of the low address part data is low.

It should be noted that one of the attributes of the non-volatile storage space belongs to the data that the user stores into the non-volatile storage space, for example, if the data stored by the user is “1101”, the data is stored to Owner data of a non-volatile storage space; another attribute of the non-volatile storage space is a storage address range of the main data, the length of which is a maximum data length that allows the user to read the non-volatile storage space, for example, the owner The data storage address range is: FFFFF0 to FFFFF6, which allows the user to request data from the chip with a maximum data length of 7. In addition, creating a non-volatile memory space in the chip ensures that the data stored in the chip is not lost when the device is powered down, so it can be used to store more important data.

Based on the solution disclosed in step S302 of the foregoing embodiment, it can be known that a non-volatile storage space is created in the chip, which can ensure that data stored in the chip by the user is not lost when the device is powered off, thereby improving data storage. safety.

Optionally, the attributes of the non-volatile storage space further include at least one of the following: a space number, a space owner name, a space authorization password, a space size, and a spatial physical address range.

In an alternative embodiment, Table 3 is a list of attributes for the non-volatile storage space that has been written to the owner data, as shown in Table 3.

table 3

In Table 3, the space number of the owner is 1, the space owner name is C, and the size of the owner space whose primary space number is 1 is 6 bytes, that is, the data length can be up to 6 bytes, and the corresponding space The physical address range is FFFFF0 to FFFFF6, and 4 bytes are stored in its physical address. The storage address range is FFFFF1 to FFFFF4, and the written owner data is "1101".

Optionally, FIG. 4 is a schematic flowchart of a data storage method of a non-volatile storage space in a chip after creating a non-volatile storage space in the chip. As shown in FIG. 4, the method further includes the following steps:

Step S304, writing the owner data to the non-volatile storage space, and determining the storage address range of the owner data according to the size of the owner data, wherein the initial storage address and the last storage address of the data block of the owner data are used. Determine the range of storage addresses.

In an optional embodiment, in the case that the storage mode of the owner data is the little end mode, it is assumed that the size of the owner data is L, and the initial storage address of the data block belonging to the main data, that is, the main data. The memory address of the low byte is Min_adress, which is the end storage address of the data block belonging to the main data. That is, the memory address of the high byte belonging to the main data is Max_adress, then L, Min_adress and Max_adress satisfy the following formula:

L≤|Max_adress-Min_adress| (2)

Therefore, based on the size L of the owner data and the initial storage address Min_adress of the owner data, the end address Max_adress of the owner data can be determined, and the storage address range of the owner data can be determined. For example, if the owner data written to the nonvolatile storage space is "1101" and the size of the owner data is 4 bytes, the length of the storage address range of the owner data is also 4 bytes. When the initial storage address of the main data is FFFFF1, the end address of the main data is FFFFF4, and the storage address range of the data block belonging to the main data is FFFFF1 to FFFFF4.

Optionally, FIG. 5 shows the owner accessing the non-volatile storage space after writing the owner data to the non-volatile storage space and determining the storage address range of the owner data according to the size of the owner data. Method flow chart of data, As shown in FIG. 5, the method includes the following steps:

Step S502, receiving an access request for accessing a non-volatile storage space;

Step S504, in response to the access request, obtaining the verification information and the length of the data that needs to be requested;

Step S506, in the case that the verification verification information passes, it is determined whether the data length that needs to be requested is within the storage address range of the owner data;

Step S508, if the data length required to be requested is within the storage address range of the owner data, the content of the owner data is allowed to be returned.

As an optional embodiment, the access device end initiates a non-volatile space request to the trusted chip, and after receiving the non-volatile space request sent by the device, the trusted chip responds to the request of the access device, and Requires access to the device side feedback verification information and the length information of the owner data; the access device end sends the verification information and the length information of the owner data to the trusted chip, for example, the length of the accessed owner data is 4 bytes; the trusted chip Verify that the verification information returned by the access device meets the requirements. If the verification information meets the requirements, determine whether the required data length is within the storage address range of the owner data. For example, the required data length is 4 bytes. The storage address range of the Owner data is FFFFF1~FFFFF4, the maximum storage length of the Owner data is 4 bytes, and the requested data length satisfies the formula (2). Therefore, the trusted chip allows access to the Owner data and returns the storage address. Owner data in the range of FFFFF1 to FFFFF4.

It should be noted that the foregoing verification information may be used to verify whether the access device has access rights and determine the location of accessing the device to access data, thereby further improving the accuracy of accessing data.

Optionally, if the requested data length is outside the storage address range of the owner data, the process of acquiring the owner data is aborted, and/or the prompt information for characterizing the request failure is output.

As an optional embodiment, if the verification information returned by the trusted chip verification access device meets the requirement, the trusted chip further determines whether the requested data length is within the storage address range of the owner data, if The length of the data to be requested is outside the range of the storage address of the owner data. For example, the length of the data to be requested is 4 bytes, and the range of the storage address of the owner data is FFFFF1 to FFFFF3, and the maximum storage length of the owner data is 3. Byte, the requested data length does not satisfy formula (2). Therefore, the trusted chip does not allow access to the owner data, directly terminates the process, and outputs the prompt message that the request failed.

Optionally, the verification information includes at least one of the following: a space number that needs to be accessed, and a password password.

As an optional embodiment, verifying the space number that needs to be accessed may confirm whether the space number exists in the trusted chip, and further verifying the password password may confirm whether the currently accessed user has access rights, thereby further improving access data. The accuracy.

Optionally, in the case that the verification verification information fails, the prompt information that cannot obtain the owner data is returned.

In an optional embodiment, the space number that the user needs to access is 2, but the owner data of the space number 2 does not exist in the trusted chip. In this case, the process of acquiring the owner data is suspended, and Send a prompt message to the access device to indicate that there is no owner data with space number 2. In another optional embodiment, the space number that the user needs to access is 2, and the owner data of the space number 2 exists in the trusted chip. When the password is detected to be incorrect, in this case, the same is also suspended. Obtain the process of the owner data, and send a prompt message to the access device, prompting the password password is incorrect, and asking it to operate again.

In a preferred embodiment, owner C applies for a 6-byte non-volatile space that stores 4 bytes of data, as shown in Table 4: the owner space number Nv_index is 1, the space belongs to The main name User_name is C, and the space size corresponding to the main space number 1 is Nv_Size is 6 bytes, that is, the data length can be up to 6 bytes; the corresponding physical address is FFFFF0 to FFFFF6, and 4 bytes are stored in the physical address. The data written by the owner is "1101". The data of the owner data that is not written by the TCG standard by default is 00, that is, the data of the data data item is 110100 (the bolded italic number indicates the state data, and the bold number indicates the genus. Master data, as the master data shown in Table 4).

Table 4

When the stored data is long and frequently changed, the owner may not remember how long the data length is stored in the storage space. For example, when the owner requests to obtain data from the trusted chip, the length is 5, and the response is ok. The information requested by the letter chip includes: the correct password password **** input by the owner, and the space number Nv_index 1, after the trusted chip receives the above verification information, the password password and the space number are correctly fed back and verified. The data length 5 required to be acquired is greater than the length 4 of the owner data. Since the requested data length is not within the range allowed by the access, the trusted chip prompts the request data to exceed the pre-stored range, and terminates the process of acquiring the owner data.

Trusted computing can perform security protection while calculating operations, so that the calculation results are always consistent with expectations, and the calculation can be controlled and controlled without interference.

The core elements of trusted computing are the trusted chain and the trusted root. Trusted computing can construct a trusted computing environment through the chain of trust mechanism. In the case where the trusted root is a trusted chip containing non-volatile storage space, there is another alternative embodiment, as follows:

At present, the trusted computing has two technical routes: the Trusted Platform Control Module (TPCM) and the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) of the international TCG standard organization.

The core elements of trusted computing are the trusted chain and the trusted root. The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in the TCG specification is the hardware trusted root of the trusted computing platform. The TPM provides protected secure storage. A security chip with cryptographic computing capabilities. The TPM is physically connected to the computing platform and connected to the CPU via an external bus, such as a PC platform that is directly solidified on the motherboard and connected via the LPC bus.

The definition of trusted is given in the TCG specification: an entity has always been running for a specific target in a predictable way. The core mechanism of trusted computing is to build a trusted computing environment through the trust chain mechanism. Whether the running entity is trusted or not is based on whether the previous running process of the system is credible. Based on this trust relationship, if the system starts from an initial trust root, in the case of every conversion of the platform computing environment, the trust can be maintained by means of delivery, thereby establishing a level 1 verification level on the computing platform. At the level 1 trust level, the computing environment is always trusted, and it can be trusted by local users or remote entities. Figure 6 shows the structure of the TCG trust chain, as shown in Figure 6, where the solid arrows indicate trusted metric connections, the dashed arrows indicate trusted report connections, and the bold solid arrows indicate trusted storage connections. The dotted arrows indicate trusted network connections.

Key technologies for trusted computing include trusted metrics, trusted reports, trusted storage, and trusted network connections.

The Trusted Platform Control Module TPCM implements the basic functions of the Trusted Platform Module. Its functional composition is basically the same as that of the TPM. However, since the core metric root CRTM of the TPM is in the BIOS of the basic input/output system, it is not protected by the TPM. Therefore, TPCM A new trusted metric root design is proposed, which solves the problem of the starting metric point of the trusted metric root, changes the startup and metric order. On this basis, the trust chain metric process with the chip as the root of trust is established. The chip controls the startup of the whole system, I/O interface control and system configuration, etc., which embodies the control effect of the chip on the credibility of the system.

During the operation control transfer process of the computing platform, the trusted root TPCM determines whether the authenticity and integrity of the next-level execution code have been tampered with. If not, the system passes the operational control right to the next-level trusted execution code. The credible scope is extended to the next level of function code; similarly, the control of this system is continuously transmitted, and the process of establishing and transmitting the chain of trust can be realized, and finally the system-wide trusted construction can be realized. A complete system trusted delivery process begins with a trusted root, which is passed from the trusted platform control module to the trusted BIOS and then passed to the trusted operating system loader, loaded from the trusted operating system. The device is passed to a trusted operating system and passed from a trusted operating system to a trusted application.

The trusted security chip has the function of generating an encryption and decryption key, high-speed data encryption and decryption, and an auxiliary processor that protects the BIOS and the operating system from being modified.

The TPM security chip is very versatile and can be used with the following special software:

(1) Store and manage the BIOS power-on password and hard disk password. In the past, these transactions were all done by the BIOS. Friends who have played may know that if you forget the password, just remove the CMOS battery and discharge the CMOS to clear the password. Nowadays, these keys are actually stored in the storage unit that is solidified in the chip, and the information will not be lost even if the power is turned off. Compared with the BIOS management password, the security of the TPM security chip is greatly improved.

(2) The TPM security chip can perform a wide range of encryption. In addition to traditional boot encryption and encryption of the hard disk, the TPM security chip can also encrypt the system login and application software login. For example, MSN, QQ, online games, and online banking login information and passwords can be encrypted by TPM and then transmitted, so that you don't have to worry about information and password being stolen.

(3) Encrypt any partition of the hard disk. You can encrypt any hard disk partition on your notebook, or you can put some sensitive files into the partition for security. For example, some of the one-click recovery features used by the vendor are one of the centralized manifestations of this use (which puts the system image in a TPM-encrypted partition). There are also some large commercial software companies (such as Microsoft) that also use it as a means of encrypting partitions (eg, the famous BitLocker).

It should be noted that, for the foregoing method embodiments, for the sake of simple description, they are all expressed as a series of action combinations, but those skilled in the art should understand that the present invention is not limited by the described action sequence. Because certain steps may be performed in other sequences or concurrently in accordance with the present invention. In addition, those skilled in the art should also understand that the embodiments described in the specification are all preferred embodiments, and the actions and modules involved are not necessarily required by the present invention.

Through the description of the above embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the method according to the above embodiment can be implemented by means of software plus a necessary general hardware platform, and of course, by hardware, but in many cases, the former is A better implementation. Based on such understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, which is essential or contributes to the prior art, may be embodied in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium (such as ROM/RAM, disk, The optical disc includes a number of instructions for causing a terminal device (which may be a cell phone, a computer, a server, or a network device, etc.) to perform the methods of various embodiments of the present invention.

Example 2

In accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, an embodiment of a method of acquiring data stored in a chip is also provided.

The present application provides a method of acquiring data stored in a chip as shown in FIG. 7 is a flow chart of a method of acquiring data stored in a chip according to Embodiment 2 of the present invention. Including the following steps:

Step S702, receiving an access request for accessing a non-volatile storage space of the chip;

Step S704, in response to the access request, obtaining the verification information and the data length required to be requested;

Step S706, if the verification verification information is passed, determining whether the requested data length is within the storage address range of the preset owner data in the non-volatile storage space;

Step S708, if the data length required to be requested is within the storage address range of the owner data, the content of the owner data is allowed to be returned; wherein the storage address range of the owner data is used to represent the maximum data when the data is requested from the chip. length.

In the solution defined in the foregoing steps S702 to S708, the access chip may be a trusted chip, and the trusted chip includes a non-volatile storage space. The storage mode of the nonvolatile storage space may adopt a big end mode and a little end mode. In the case where the storage mode of the main data is the little end mode, it is assumed that the size of the main data is L, and the data block of the main data is The initial storage address, that is, the memory address of the low byte belonging to the main data is Min_adress, which is the end storage address of the data block belonging to the main data, that is, the memory address of the high byte belonging to the main data is Max_adress, then L, Min_adress and Max_adress satisfies the following formula:

L≤|Max_adress-Min_adress|

After the access device sends a non-volatile space request to the trusted chip, the trusted chip receives the non-volatile space request sent by the device, responds to the request of the access device, and requests the device to feed back the verification information and The length information of the Owner data; the access device sends the verification information to the trusted chip and the length information of the Owner data. For example, the length of the accessed Owner data is 4 bytes; the trusted chip verifies the verification information returned by the access device. Whether it meets the requirements, if the verification information meets the requirements, it is determined whether the length of the data to be requested is within the storage address range of the owner data, for example, the length of the data to be requested is 4 bytes, and the storage address range of the primary data For FFFFF1~FFFFF4, the maximum storage length of the owner data is 4 bytes, and the requested data length satisfies the formula:

L≤|Max_adress-Min_adress|

Therefore, the trusted chip allows access to the owner data and returns the owner data whose storage address range is FFFFF1 to FFFFF4.

It should be noted that the foregoing verification information may be used to verify whether the access device has access rights and determine the location of accessing the device to access data, thereby further improving the accuracy of accessing data. The storage mode of the above nonvolatile storage space can adopt big end mode and little end mode, and the big end mode means that the high byte of data is stored in the low address of the memory, and the low byte of the data is stored in the high address of the memory. The little endian mode means that the high byte of the data is stored in the high address of the memory, and the low byte of the data is stored in the inner low address, which can effectively combine the address level and the bit weight of the data. The weight of the high address part data is high, and the weight of the low address part data is low.

Based on the solution disclosed in step S702 to step S708 of the above embodiment, it can be known that after the nonvolatile storage space is created in the chip, the owner data is written to the nonvolatile storage space, and is determined according to the size of the owner data. The storage address range of the Owner data returns the data that the Owner needs to obtain according to the size of the Owner data and the storage address range of the Owner data, and achieves the purpose of accurately acquiring the Owner data, thereby realizing the Owner to obtain the original data. The technical effect of the correctness further solves the technical problem that the accuracy of the original data read is poor when the prior art reads the original data from the non-volatile space of the trusted security chip.

In an alternative embodiment, Table 5 is a list of attributes for the non-volatile storage space that has been written to the owner data, as shown in Table 5.

table 5

In Table 5, the space number of the owner is 1, the space owner name is C, and the size of the owner space whose primary space number is 1 is 6 bytes, that is, the data length can be up to 6 bytes, and the corresponding space. The physical address range is FFFFF0 to FFFFF6, and 4 bytes are stored in its physical address. The storage address range is FFFFF1 to FFFFF4, and the written owner data is "1101".

Optionally, before receiving the access request for accessing the non-volatile storage space of the chip, the method further includes: writing the owner data to the non-volatile storage space, and determining the owner data according to the size of the owner data. The storage address range in which the storage address range is determined by the initial storage address and the last storage address of the data block of the owner data.

L≤|Max_adress-Min_adress|

As an optional embodiment, if the verification information returned by the trusted chip verification access device meets the requirement, the trusted chip further determines whether the requested data length is within the storage address range of the owner data, if The length of the data to be requested is outside the range of the storage address of the owner data. For example, the length of the data to be requested is 4 bytes, and the range of the storage address of the owner data is FFFFF1 to FFFFF3, and the maximum storage length of the owner data is 3. Byte, the requested data length does not satisfy the formula L ≤ | Max_adress-Min_adress|, therefore, the trusted chip does not allow access to the owner data, directly terminates the process, and outputs the prompt message that the request failed.

Example 3

An embodiment of a trusted chip is also provided in accordance with an embodiment of the present invention.

The application provides a schematic structural diagram of a trusted chip as shown in FIG. 8. FIG. 8 is a schematic structural diagram of a trusted chip according to Embodiment 3 of the present invention. The trusted chip includes: a memory 801. among them,

The memory 801 includes a non-volatile storage space, wherein the attributes of the non-volatile storage space at least include: a parameter for characterizing the storage of the owner data in the non-volatile storage space, and a storage address range of the owner data; The storage address range of the owner data is used to characterize the maximum data length when data is requested from the chip.

In the technical solution defined by the foregoing memory 801, the storage mode of the nonvolatile storage space may adopt a big end mode and a small end mode, and the big end mode means that a high byte of data is stored in a low address of the memory, and the data The low byte is stored in the high address of the memory; the little end mode means that the high byte of the data is stored in the high address of the memory, and the low byte of the data is stored in the inner low address, the storage mode can The address level is effectively combined with the bit weight of the data. The weight of the high address part data is high, and the weight of the low address part data is low.

It can be seen from the above that the non-volatile storage space is created in the chip, which can ensure that the data stored by the user in the chip is not lost when the device is powered off, thereby improving the security of the data storage.

Example 4

In accordance with an embodiment of the present invention, a system embodiment for acquiring data stored in a chip is also provided.

The present application provides a system for acquiring data stored in a chip as shown in FIG. Figure 9 is a representation of the present invention A schematic diagram of a system structure for acquiring data stored in a chip according to Embodiment 4, the system comprising: an access device end 901 and a trusted chip 903. among them,

Accessing the device end 901 for issuing an access request for accessing a non-volatile storage space of the chip;

The trusted chip 903 communicates with the access device, and is configured to obtain the verification information returned by the access device and the data length required to be requested in response to the access request. If the verification verification information passes, if the required data length is in the owner Within the storage address range of the data, the content of the owner data is allowed to be returned; wherein the range of storage addresses of the owner data is used to characterize the maximum data length allowed to request data from the trusted chip.

In an optional embodiment, the trusted chip includes a non-volatile storage space. The storage mode of the nonvolatile storage space may adopt a big end mode and a little end mode. In the case where the storage mode of the main data is the little end mode, it is assumed that the size of the main data is L, and the data block of the main data is The initial storage address, that is, the memory address of the low byte belonging to the main data is Min_adress, which is the end storage address of the data block belonging to the main data, that is, the memory address of the high byte belonging to the main data is Max_adress, then L, Min_adress and Max_adress satisfies the following formula:

L≤|Max_adress-Min_adress|

It can be seen from the above that by creating a non-volatile storage space in the chip, the owner is written to the non-volatile storage space. Data, and determining the storage address range of the owner data according to the size of the owner data, and returning the data that the owner needs to obtain according to the size of the owner data and the storage address range of the owner data, thereby achieving the purpose of accurately acquiring the owner data. Therefore, the technical effect of ensuring the correctness of the original data by the owner is realized, thereby solving the technical problem that the accuracy of the original data read by the prior art is poor when reading the original data from the non-volatile space of the trusted security chip. .

Optionally, the trusted chip 903 is further configured to write the owner data into the non-volatile storage space, and determine a storage address range of the owner data according to the size of the owner data, where the data block of the owner data is used. The initial storage address and the last storage address are used to determine the storage address range.

Example 5

According to the embodiment of the present invention, there is also provided a device for implementing the data stored in the chip in the foregoing Embodiment 2, as shown in FIG. 10, the device includes: a receiving module 1001, a response module 1003, and a determining module 1005. And control module 1007. among them,

The receiving module 1001 is configured to receive an access request for accessing a non-volatile storage space of the chip;

The response module 1003 is configured to obtain the verification information and the length of the data that needs to be requested in response to the access request.

The determining module 1005 is configured to determine, in the case that the verification verification information passes, whether the data length that needs to be requested is within a storage address range of the owner data set in advance in the non-volatile storage space;

The control module 1007 is configured to allow returning the content of the owner data if the data length required to be requested is within the storage address range of the owner data; wherein the storage address range of the owner data is used to characterize the time when the data is allowed to be requested from the chip The maximum data length.

The access chip may be a trusted chip, and the trusted chip includes a non-volatile storage space. The storage mode of the nonvolatile storage space may adopt a big end mode and a little end mode. In the case where the storage mode of the main data is the little end mode, it is assumed that the size of the main data is L, and the data block of the main data is The initial storage address, that is, the memory address of the low byte belonging to the main data is Min_adress, which is the end storage address of the data block belonging to the main data, that is, the memory address of the high byte belonging to the main data is Max_adress, then L, Min_adress and Max_adress satisfies the following formula:

L≤|Max_adress-Min_adress|

After the access device sends a non-volatile space request to the trusted chip, the trusted chip receives the non-volatile space request sent by the device, responds to the request of the access device, and requests the device to feed back the verification information and The length information of the Owner data; the access device sends the verification information to the trusted chip and the length information of the Owner data. For example, the length of the accessed Owner data is 4 bytes; the trusted chip verifies the verification information returned by the access device. Whether it meets the requirements, if the verification information meets the requirements, it is determined whether the length of the data to be requested is within the storage address range of the owner data, for example, the length of the data to be requested is 4 bytes, and the storage address of the primary data is The range is from FFFFF1 to FFFFF4, and the maximum storage length of the primary data is 4 bytes. The requested data length satisfies the formula:

L≤|Max_adress-Min_adress|

It can be seen from the above that after the nonvolatile storage space is created in the chip, the owner data is written into the nonvolatile storage space, and the storage address range of the owner data is determined according to the size of the owner data, according to the owner data. The storage address range of the size and the owner data returns the data that the owner needs to obtain, and achieves the purpose of accurately obtaining the owner data, thereby realizing the technical effect of ensuring the correctness of the owner to obtain the original data, thereby solving the prior art. A technical problem of poor accuracy of raw data read when reading raw data in a non-volatile space of a trusted security chip.

It should be noted that the foregoing receiving module 1001, the response module 1003, the determining module 1005, and the control module 1007 correspond to the steps S702 to S708 in Embodiment 2, and the examples and application scenarios implemented by the four modules and corresponding steps. The same, but not limited to, the content disclosed in the above embodiment 2. It should be noted that the above module can be operated as part of the device in the computer terminal 10 provided in the first embodiment.

In an alternative embodiment, Table 6 is a list of attributes for the non-volatile storage space that has been written to the owner data, as shown in Table 6.

Table 6

In Table 6, the space number of the owner is 1, the space owner name is C, and the size of the owner space whose main space number is 1 is 6 bytes, that is, the data length can be up to 6 bytes, and the corresponding space The physical address range is FFFFF0 to FFFFF6 store 4 bytes in their physical addresses. The memory address range is FFFFF1 to FFFFF4, and the written owner data is "1101".

Optionally, as shown in FIG. 10, the foregoing apparatus for acquiring data stored in a chip further includes: a writing module 1009, configured to write the owner data into the non-volatile storage space, and according to the size of the owner data. A storage address range of the owner data is determined, wherein the storage address range is determined by the initial storage address and the last storage address of the data block of the owner data.

L≤|Max_adress-Min_adress|

Example 6

Embodiments of the present invention may provide a computer terminal, which may be any one of computer terminal groups. Optionally, in this embodiment, the foregoing computer terminal may also be replaced with a terminal device such as a mobile terminal.

Optionally, in this embodiment, the computer terminal may be located in at least one network device of the plurality of network devices of the computer network.

Optionally, FIG. 11 is a structural block diagram of a computer terminal according to an embodiment of the present invention. As shown in FIG. 11, the computer terminal A may include one or more (only one shown in the figure) processor 1103 and memory 1101.

The memory can be used to store software programs and modules, such as the security vulnerability detection method and the program instruction/module corresponding to the device in the embodiment of the present invention. The processor executes various functions by running a software program and a module stored in the memory. Application and data processing, that is, the detection method for implementing the above system vulnerability attack. The memory may include a high speed random access memory, and may also include non-volatile memory such as one or more magnetic storage devices, flash memory, or other non-volatile solid state memory. In some examples, the memory can further include memory remotely located relative to the processor, which can be connected to terminal A via a network. Examples of such networks include, but are not limited to, the Internet, intranets, local area networks, mobile communication networks, and combinations thereof.

The processor may invoke the memory stored information and the application by the transmission device to perform the steps of: creating a non-volatile storage space in the chip, wherein the attributes of the non-volatile storage space include at least: The parameter storing the main data in the volatile storage space belongs to the storage address range of the main data; wherein the storage address range of the main data is used to represent the maximum data length when the data is allowed to be requested from the chip.

Optionally, the foregoing processor may further execute the following program code: write the owner data into the non-volatile storage space, and determine a storage address range of the owner data according to the size of the owner data, where the owner The initial storage address and the last storage address of the data block of the data determine the storage address range.

Optionally, the foregoing processor may further execute the following program code: receiving an access request for accessing the non-volatile storage space; responding to the access request, obtaining the verification information and the length of the data that needs to be requested; and verifying the verification information In the case, it is judged whether the length of the data to be requested is within the storage address range of the owner data; if the length of the data to be requested is within the storage address range of the owner data, the content of the owner data is allowed to be returned.

Optionally, the foregoing processor may further execute the following program code: if the required data length is outside the storage address range of the owner data, the process of acquiring the owner data is aborted, and/or the output is used to represent the request. Failed message.

With the embodiment of the present invention, a solution for acquiring data stored in a chip is provided. After creating a nonvolatile storage space in the chip, the owner data is written to the nonvolatile storage space, and according to the genus The size of the main data determines the storage address range of the main data, and returns the data that the owner needs to obtain according to the size of the owner data and the storage address range of the owner data, thereby achieving the purpose of accurately acquiring the owner data, thereby realizing the guarantee genus. The technical effect of the correctness of the original data is obtained, thereby solving the technical problem that the accuracy of the original data read by the prior art is poor when the original data is read from the non-volatile space of the trusted security chip.

A person skilled in the art can understand that the structure shown in FIG. 11 is only schematic, and the computer terminal can also be a smart person. Can be mobile phones (such as Android phones, iOS phones, etc.), tablets, applause computers and mobile Internet devices (Mobile Internet Devices, MID), PAD and other terminal devices. FIG. 11 does not limit the structure of the above electronic device. For example, computer terminal 11 may also include more or fewer components (such as a network interface, display device, etc.) than shown in FIG. 11, or have a different configuration than that shown in FIG.

A person of ordinary skill in the art may understand that all or part of the steps of the foregoing embodiments may be completed by a program to instruct terminal device related hardware, and the program may be stored in a computer readable storage medium, and the storage medium may be Including: flash disk, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), disk or optical disk.

Example 7

Embodiments of the present invention also provide a storage medium. Optionally, in this embodiment, the foregoing storage medium may be used to save the program code executed by the method for acquiring data stored in the chip provided by Embodiment 2 above.

Optionally, in this embodiment, the foregoing storage medium may be located in any one of the computer terminal groups in the computer network, or in any one of the mobile terminal groups.

Optionally, in the embodiment, the storage medium is configured to store program code for performing the following steps: receiving an access request for accessing a non-volatile storage space of the chip; obtaining the verification information and the request in response to the access request The length of the requested data; if the verification verification information is passed, it is determined whether the length of the data to be requested is within the storage address range of the preset owner data in the non-volatile storage space; if the required data length is in the genus Within the storage address range of the primary data, the contents of the owner data are allowed to be returned; wherein the storage address range of the owner data is used to characterize the maximum data length at which data is allowed to be requested from the chip.

Optionally, in the embodiment, the storage medium is configured to store program code for performing the following steps: writing the owner data to the non-volatile storage space, and determining the owner data according to the size of the owner data. The storage address range in which the storage address range is determined by the initial storage address and the last storage address of the data block of the owner data.

Optionally, in the embodiment, the storage medium is arranged to store program code for performing the following steps: if the requested data length is outside the storage address range of the owner data, the acquisition of the owner data is aborted The process, and/or the output is used to characterize the prompt information for the request failure.

The serial numbers of the embodiments of the present invention are merely for the description, and do not represent the advantages and disadvantages of the embodiments.

In the above-mentioned embodiments of the present invention, the descriptions of the various embodiments are different, and the parts that are not detailed in a certain embodiment can be referred to the related descriptions of other embodiments.

In the several embodiments provided by the present application, it should be understood that the disclosed technical contents may be implemented in other manners. Wherein, the device embodiments described above are merely illustrative, such as the division of units, only A logical function partitioning may be implemented in an actual manner. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. In addition, the mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be an indirect coupling or communication connection through some interface, unit or module, and may be electrical or otherwise.

The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components displayed as units may or may not be physical units, that is, may be located in one place, or may be distributed to multiple network units. Some or all of the units may be selected according to actual needs to achieve the purpose of the solution of the embodiment.

In addition, each functional unit in each embodiment of the present invention may be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit may exist physically separately, or two or more units may be integrated into one unit. The above integrated unit can be implemented in the form of hardware or in the form of a software functional unit.

An integrated unit, if implemented in the form of a software functional unit and sold or used as a standalone product, can be stored in a computer readable storage medium. Based on such understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, which is essential or contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, may be embodied in the form of a software product stored in a storage medium. A number of instructions are included to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server or network device, etc.) to perform all or part of the steps of the various embodiments of the present invention. The foregoing storage medium includes: a U disk, a Read-Only Memory (ROM), a Random Access Memory (RAM), a removable hard disk, a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, and the like. .

The above is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, and it should be noted that those skilled in the art can also make several improvements and retouchings without departing from the principles of the present invention. These improvements and retouchings should also be considered. It is the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

A trusted chip, comprising:

a memory, including a non-volatile storage space, wherein the attributes of the non-volatile storage space include at least: parameters for characterizing the owner data in the non-volatile storage space, and the owner The storage address range of the data;

The storage address range of the owner data is used to characterize the maximum data length when data is allowed to be requested from the chip.
A system for acquiring data stored in a chip, comprising:

Accessing the device side for issuing an access request for accessing a non-volatile storage space of the chip;

a trusted chip, configured to communicate with the access device, to obtain the verification information returned by the access device and the length of the data that needs to be requested in response to the access request, and if the verification information is verified, if The data length required to be requested is within the storage address range of the owner data, and the content of the owner data is allowed to be returned;

The storage address range of the owner data is used to represent a maximum data length when data is allowed to be requested from the trusted chip.
A data storage method for a non-volatile storage space in a chip, comprising:

Creating a non-volatile storage space in the chip, wherein the attributes of the non-volatile storage space at least include: parameters for characterizing the storage of the owner data in the non-volatile storage space, the owner The storage address range of the data;

The storage address range of the owner data is used to characterize the maximum data length when data is requested from the chip.
The method according to claim 3, wherein the attribute of the non-volatile storage space further comprises at least one of: a space number, a space owner name, a space authorization password, a space size, and a spatial physical address range. .
The method according to claim 3 or 4, wherein after the non-volatile storage space is created in the chip, the method further comprises: writing the owner data to the non-volatile storage space, And determining, according to the size of the owner data, a storage address range of the owner data, wherein the storage address range is determined by an initial storage address and a last storage address of the data block of the owner data.
The method according to claim 5, wherein said owner data is written to said nonvolatile storage space, and said storage address range of said owner data is determined according to a size of said owner data After that, the party The law also includes:

Receiving an access request for accessing the non-volatile storage space;

Responding to the access request, obtaining verification information and length of data required to be requested;

When it is verified that the verification information is passed, determining whether the data length required to be requested is within a storage address range of the owner data;

If the data length required to be requested is within the storage address range of the owner data, then the content of the owner data is allowed to be returned.
The method according to claim 6, wherein if the data length of the request request is outside the storage address range of the owner data, the process of acquiring the owner data is suspended, and/or output A message indicating the failure of the request.
The method according to claim 6, wherein the verification information comprises at least one of: a space number that requires access, and a password password.
The method according to claim 6, wherein in the case where the verification of the verification information fails, the prompt information that the owner data cannot be acquired is returned.
A method for obtaining data stored in a chip, comprising:

Receiving an access request for accessing a non-volatile storage space of the chip;

Responding to the access request, obtaining verification information and length of data required to be requested;

In the case of verifying that the verification information is passed, determining whether the data length required to be requested is within a storage address range of the owner data set in advance in the non-volatile storage space;

If the data length required to be requested is within the storage address range of the owner data, allowing the content of the owner data to be returned;

The storage address range of the owner data is used to characterize the maximum data length when data is requested from the chip.
The method according to claim 10, wherein the attribute of the non-volatile storage space further comprises at least one of: a space number, a space owner name, a space authorization password, a space size, and a spatial physical address range. .
The method according to claim 10 or 11, wherein before receiving the access request for accessing the non-volatile storage space of the chip, the method further comprises: writing to the non-volatile storage space Determining the storage address range of the owner data according to the size of the owner data, wherein the storage is determined by an initial storage address and a last storage address of the data block of the owner data Address range.
The method according to claim 10, wherein if the data length of the request request is outside the storage address range of the owner data, the process of acquiring the owner data is suspended, and/or output A message indicating the failure of the request.
An apparatus for acquiring data stored in a chip, comprising:

a receiving module, configured to receive an access request for accessing a non-volatile storage space of the chip;

a response module, configured to respond to the access request, obtain verification information, and a data length that requires the request;

a determining module, configured to determine, in a case where the verification information is verified, whether the data length required to be requested is within a storage address range of the owner data preset in the non-volatile storage space;

a control module, configured to allow returning content of the owner data if the data length required to be requested is within a storage address range of the owner data;

The storage address range of the owner data is used to characterize the maximum data length when data is requested from the chip.