WO2018079690A1 - Communication system, network device, authentication method, communication terminal and security device - Google Patents

Abstract

The purpose of the present invention is to provide a communication system that executes security procedures necessary for applying an Attach Procedure to a NextGen System. This communication system comprises: a communication terminal (10) which transmits an Attach Request message that includes Network Slice Selection Assistance Information (NSSAI) and User Equipment (UE) Security Capabilities; and a network device (20) which is located within a mobile network (30) and which receives the Attach Request message. The network device (20) uses the NSSAI and UE Security Capabilities to determine whether to allow the communication terminal (10) to connect to a core network indicated by NSSAI, from among a plurality of core networks divided up by network slicing.

Description

Communication system, network device, authentication method, communication terminal, and security device

The present disclosure relates to a communication system, a network device, an authentication method, a communication terminal, and a security device.

Currently, LTE (Long Term Evolution), which is a standard defined in 3GPP (3rd Generation Partnership Project), is widely used as a wireless communication method used between a communication terminal and a base station. LTE is a wireless communication method used to realize high-speed and large-capacity wireless communication. Further, as a core network that accommodates a wireless network using LTE, 3GPP defines a packet network called SAE (System Architecture Evolution) or EPC (Evolved Packet 等 Core).

The communication terminal is required to register with the core network in order to use the communication service using LTE. Attach す る Procedure is defined in 3GPP as a procedure for registering a communication terminal in the core network. An MME (Mobility Management Entity) arranged in the core network performs communication terminal authentication processing and the like using the identification information of the communication terminal in the Attach Procedure. The MME performs authentication processing of a communication terminal in cooperation with an HSS (Home Subscriber Server) that manages subscriber information. For example, IMEISV (International Mobile Equipment Identity) or IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) is used as the identification information of the communication terminal.

In recent years, studies on IoT (Internet of Things) services are being promoted in 3GPP. Many terminals (hereinafter referred to as IoT terminals) that perform communication autonomously without requiring user operation are used for the IoT service. Therefore, in order for a service provider to provide an IoT service using many IoT terminals, it is desired to efficiently accommodate many IoT terminals in a mobile network managed by a communication provider or the like. A mobile network is a network including a wireless network and a core network.

Non-Patent Document 1 Annex IV B describes the configuration of a core network to which network slicing is applied. Network slicing is a technique for dividing a core network for each service to be provided in order to efficiently accommodate many IoT terminals. Section 5.1 describes that each divided network (network slice system) needs to be customized and optimized.

A system to which network slicing is applied is also called, for example, NextGen (Next Generation) System. A wireless network used in NextGen System may be referred to as NG (Next Generation) RAN (Radio Access Network).

In the NextGen System, it is necessary to register communication terminals including the IoT terminal and the like in the NextGen System using the same procedure as the Attach Procedure that registers the communication terminal in the core network defined as SAE. However, in NextGen System, various functions related to security processing are introduced, and there is a problem that the Attach procedure currently specified in 3GPP cannot be applied to NextGen System as it is. Specifically, in Non-Patent Document 2, ARPF (Authentication Credential Repository and Processing Processing Function), AUSF (Authentication Server Function), SEAF (Security Anchor Function), SCMF (Security Context Management Function), etc. are introduced to NextGen System. Is being considered.

An object of the present disclosure is to provide a communication system, a network device, an authentication method, a communication terminal, and a security device that execute a security procedure necessary for applying an Attach Procedure to the NextGen System.

A communication system according to a first aspect of the present disclosure includes a communication terminal that transmits an Attach Request message including NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) and UE (User Equipment) Security Capabilities, and is arranged in a mobile network. A network device that receives a Request message, wherein the network device uses the NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities, and among the plurality of core networks divided by network slicing, the network device indicated by the NSSAI It is determined whether or not the connection of the communication terminal is permitted.

The network device according to the second aspect of the present disclosure is configured to receive the Attach Request message from a communication terminal that transmits an Attach Request message including NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) and UE (User Equipment) Security Capabilities. And determining whether to permit connection of the communication terminal to the core network indicated by the NSSAI among a plurality of core networks divided by network slicing using the NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities. Composed.

The authentication method according to the third aspect of the present disclosure includes receiving the Attach Request message from a communication terminal that transmits an Attach Request message including NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) and UE (User Equipment) Security Capabilities. And determining whether to permit connection of the communication terminal to the core network indicated by the NSSAI among the plurality of core networks divided by network slicing, using the UE Security Capabilities.

According to the present disclosure, it is possible to provide a communication system, a network device, an authentication method, a communication terminal, and a security device that execute a security procedure necessary for applying an Attach Procedure to the NextGen System.

1 is a configuration diagram of a communication system according to a first exemplary embodiment; FIG. 3 is a configuration diagram of a communication system according to a second exemplary embodiment. It is a figure which shows Attach | Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 2. FIG. It is a figure which shows Attach | Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 3. FIG. It is a figure which shows Attach | Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 4. FIG. It is a figure which shows Attach | Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 5. FIG. It is a figure which shows Attach | Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 5. FIG. It is a figure which shows Attach | Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 5. FIG. FIG. 10 is a configuration diagram of a communication system according to a sixth embodiment. FIG. 10 is a configuration diagram of a communication system according to a seventh exemplary embodiment. It is a figure which shows the hierarchical structure of the security key concerning Embodiment 7. FIG. It is a figure which shows NAS security | security Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 7. FIG. It is a figure which shows NAS security | security Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 7. FIG. It is a figure which shows NAS security | security Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 7. FIG. It is a figure which shows UP security | security Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 8. FIG. It is a figure which shows UP security | security Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 8. FIG. It is a figure which shows UP security | security Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 8. FIG. It is a figure which shows UP security | security Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 8. FIG. It is a figure which shows UP security | security Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 8. FIG. It is a figure which shows UP security | security Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 8. FIG. It is a figure which shows AS security | security Procedure in NextGen | System concerning Embodiment 9. FIG. FIG. 11 is a configuration diagram of a communication system according to a tenth embodiment. It is a figure explaining the AKA algorithm concerning Embodiment 10. FIG. It is a figure explaining the AKA algorithm concerning Embodiment 10. FIG. FIG. 20 is a diagram showing a modified example of the hierarchical structure of security keys according to the tenth embodiment. It is a figure which shows the flow of derivation | leading-out of the security key concerning Embodiment 10. FIG. FIG. 20 is a diagram showing a modified example of the hierarchical structure of security keys according to the tenth embodiment. It is a figure which shows the flow of derivation | leading-out of the security key concerning Embodiment 10. FIG. FIG. 20 is a diagram showing a modified example of the hierarchical structure of security keys according to the tenth embodiment. It is a figure which shows the flow of derivation | leading-out of the security key concerning Embodiment 10. FIG. FIG. 20 is a diagram showing a modified example of the hierarchical structure of security keys according to the tenth embodiment. It is a figure which shows the flow of derivation | leading-out of the security key concerning Embodiment 10. FIG. FIG. 20 is a diagram showing a modified example of the hierarchical structure of security keys according to the tenth embodiment. It is a figure which shows the flow of derivation | leading-out of the security key concerning Embodiment 10. FIG. FIG. 20 is a diagram showing a modified example of the hierarchical structure of security keys according to the tenth embodiment. It is a figure which shows the flow of derivation | leading-out of the security key concerning Embodiment 10. FIG. FIG. 20 is a diagram showing a modified example of the hierarchical structure of security keys according to the tenth embodiment. It is a figure which shows the flow of derivation | leading-out of the security key concerning Embodiment 10. FIG. FIG. 20 is a diagram showing a modified example of the hierarchical structure of security keys according to the tenth embodiment. It is a figure which shows the flow of derivation | leading-out of the security key concerning Embodiment 10. FIG.

(Embodiment 1)
Hereinafter, embodiments of the present disclosure will be described with reference to the drawings. A configuration example of the communication system according to the first exemplary embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. The communication system in FIG. 1 includes a communication terminal 10 and a network device 20. The network device 20 is arranged in the mobile network 30. The communication terminal 10 and the network device 20 may be computer devices that operate when a processor executes a program stored in a memory. The processor may be, for example, a microprocessor, an MPU (Micro Processing Unit), or a CPU (Central Processing Unit). The memory may be a volatile memory or a nonvolatile memory, and may be configured by a combination of a volatile memory and a nonvolatile memory. The processor executes one or more programs including a group of instructions for causing a computer to execute an algorithm described with reference to the following drawings.

The communication terminal 10 may be a mobile phone terminal, a smartphone terminal, an IoT terminal, or the like.

The mobile network 30 includes a radio access network and a core network that perform radio communication with the communication terminal 10. For example, the network device 20 may be a node device or an entity whose operation is defined in 3GPP.

The communication terminal 10 transmits an Attach Request message including NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) and UE (User Equipment) Security Security Capabilities (or UE Security Capability) to the network device 20. NSSAI is information for identifying a core network that provides a service used by the communication terminal 10, for example. Here, the core network included in the mobile network 30 is divided into each service to which network slicing is applied. The divided network may be referred to as a network slice.

UE Security Capabilities may be a set of identification information corresponding to algorithm information used for encryption and integrity assurance processing executed in the UE that is the communication terminal. (The set of identifiers corresponding to the ciphering and integrity algorithms implemented in the UE).

The communication terminal 10 transmits an Attach Request message to the network device 20 when, for example, the power source transitions from the OFF state to the ON state.

The network device 20 receives the Attach Request message transmitted from the communication terminal 10. Furthermore, the network device 20 permits the connection of the communication terminal 10 to the core network indicated by NSSAI among the plurality of core networks divided by network slicing, using the NSSAI and UE Security Capabilities included in the Attach Request message. It is determined whether or not.

As described above, even if the core network is divided by network slicing, the communication system in FIG. 1 determines whether or not the communication terminal 10 is connected to the core network to which the communication terminal 10 requests connection. can do. As a result, the communication system of FIG. 1 can execute the security procedure necessary for applying the Attach Procedure in the NextGen System to which network slicing is applied.

(Embodiment 2)
Next, a configuration example of the communication system according to the second embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. The communication system of FIG. 2 shows NextGen System. 2 includes an ARPF entity 41 (hereinafter referred to as ARPF 41), an AUSF entity 42 (hereinafter referred to as AUSF 42), a SEAF entity 43 (hereinafter referred to as SEAF 43), and an SCMF entity 44 (hereinafter referred to as SCMF 44). SCMF45, CP-CN (C-Plane Core Network) entity 46 (hereinafter referred to as CP-CN46), CP-CN47, NG-RAN entity 48 (hereinafter referred to as NG-RAN48), and NG-RAN49 is doing. The CP-CN 46 includes an MM entity that executes Mobility Management and an SM entity that executes Session Management.

Specifically, MM registers UE or user who manages UE to mobile network, supports reachability that enables mobile terminated communication, detects unreachable UE , C (Control) -Plane and U (User) -Plane network functions may be allocated, mobility may be limited, and the like.

Also, SM is to set IP connectivity or non-IP connectivity for UE. In other words, the SM may be managing or controlling the connectivity of the U-Plane.

ARPF 41, AUSF 42, SEAF 43, SCMF 44, SCMF 45, CP-CN 46, and CP-CN 47 constitute a core network. Each entity arranged in the core network may be referred to as a core network device or a security device. The NG-RAN 48 and the NG-RAN 49 constitute a radio access network. The NG-RAN 48 may be, for example, a base station used in NextGen System.

Each entity shown in FIG. 2 may include a plurality of functions. For example, in FIG. 2, ARPF 41 is an entity different from AUSF 42, but one entity that executes ARPF and AUSF may be used.

ARPF entity is a node device that executes ARPF. The AUSF entity is a node device that executes AUSF. ARPF and AUSF are functions for executing an authentication process regarding whether or not a UE (User （Equipment) corresponding to the communication terminal 10 can connect to NextGenNextSystem, for example. The ARPF 41 and the AUSF 42 generate a security key used for authentication processing and hold the generated security key.

SEAF and SCMF are functions for executing an authentication process regarding whether or not the UE can connect to a core network to which network slicing is applied. SCMF 44 and SEAF 43 may be referred to as security devices. The SEAF 43 derives a security key K _SCMF from the security key K _SEAF received from the AUSF 42. The SEAF 43 transmits the security key K _SCMF to the SCMF 44 and the SCMF 45. The SCMF 44 derives a security key K _CP-CN from the security key K _SCMF received from the SEAF 43. The SCMF 44 transmits the security key K _CP-CN to the CP- _CN 46 and the CP- _CN 47.

The NG-RAN 48 and the NG-RAN 49 receive the security key K _AN derived in the SCMF 44 or the SEAF 43.

Each entity constituting the NextGen System executes security processing such as UE authentication processing and message integrity guarantee processing using the received security key K. Also, the security key K may be referred to as security context.

Next, the Attach Procedure in the NextGen System will be described with reference to FIG. First, the UE transmits an RRC Connection Request message to the NG-RAN 48 (S11). The Attach Request message is multiplexed with the RRC Connection Request message (The Attach Request is piggy-backed within the RRC Connection Request). The Attach Request message includes GUTI (GloballyGlobalUnique Temporary UE Identity), Network Capabilities, KSI (Key Set Identifier), NSSAI, and UE Security Capabilities as parameters. GUTI is an identifier temporarily assigned to the UE. Network Capabilities is a NAS and AS security algorithm supported in the UE, for example. KSI is key identification information held by the UE.

Next, the NG-RAN 48 confirms UE Security Capabilities and subscriber information (Subscription) regarding the UE (S12) (The NG-RAN 48 Checks UE Security, Capabilities and Subscription UE for UE). Confirmation of UE Security Capabilities includes algorithm information used for encryption and integrity guarantee processing executed in the UE, and encryption and integrity guarantee processing executed in the core network or NG-RAN 48 where the UE requests connection. It may be determined whether or not the algorithm information used in the process matches. The confirmation of the subscriber information may be confirmation of whether or not the UE is permitted to connect to the NextGen System, or whether or not the UE is permitted to connect to the core network. The core network is a core network from which the UE requests connection, and may be configured by one or a plurality of network slices. The core network to which the UE requests connection may be determined based on NSSAI.

Here, NG-RAN48 is assumed to hold the security key _{K AN (retain) (It is} assumed that the NG-RAN48 retains the security key K AN). Also in UE, and the NG-RAN48 holds the same key as the security key _{K AN} holding. In this case, NG-RAN48 is able to use the security key K _AN, performing integrity (integrity) assurance processing of Attach Request message in the RRC Connection Request message. The NG-RAN 48 can guarantee that the Attach Request message has not been tampered with by executing the integrity guarantee process.

Next, the NG-RAN 48 transmits an RRC Connection Setup message to the UE as a response to the RRC Connection Request message (S13). Next, the UE transmits an RRC Connection Complete message to the NG-RAN48 in order to notify the NG-RAN48 that the RRC Connection Setup message has been received (S14).

Next, the NG-RAN 48 transmits an Attach Request message to the SEAF 43 (S15). The Attach Request message includes GUTI, Network Capabilities, KSI, NSSAI, and UE Security Capabilities. The SEAF 43 transmits an Initial Context Setup Request / Attach Accept message to the NG-RAN 48.

Next, the NG-RAN 48 transmits an RRC Connection Reconfig (RRC Connection Reconfiguration) message to the UE (S17). The Attach Accept message is multiplexed with the RRC Connection Reconfig message.

Next, in response to the RRC Connection Refoncig message, the UE transmits an RRC Connection Reconfig Complete message to the NG-RAN 48 (S18). Next, the NG-RAN 48 transmits an Initial Context Setup Response message to the SEAF 43 in response to the Initial Context Setup Request message (S19). Next, the UE transmits an Attach Complete message to the SEAF 43 via the NG-RAN 48 (S20).

In step S12, the NG-RAN 48 does not match the algorithm information used for the encryption and integrity guarantee processing executed in the UE and the NG-RAN 48, and the UE is not permitted to connect to the NextGen System or the core network. If it is determined that it corresponds to at least one of the above, a Reject message may be transmitted to the UE without executing the processing after step S13.

Alternatively, in step S12, the NG-RAN 48 does not match the algorithm information used for the encryption and integrity guarantee processing executed in the UE and the NG-RAN 48, and the UE is permitted to connect to the NextGen System or core network. Even if it is determined that it falls under at least one of the above, the processing after step S13 may be continued. In this case, for example, the SEAF 43 may continue the Attach Procedure so that the UE is connected to a predetermined core network (default core network) instead of the core network to which the UE requests connection.

In step S12, the NG-RAN 48 matches the algorithm information used for the encryption and integrity guarantee processing executed in the UE and the NG-RAN 48, and the UE is permitted to connect to the NextGen System or core network. When it is determined that both of the above and the above are applicable, the Attach Procedure is continued so that the UE is connected to the core network to which the UE requests connection.

As described above, the NG-RAN 48 checks the UE Security Capabilities and the subscriber information (Subscription) about the UE, thereby checking the Attach Procedure considering the NextGen System in which the core network is divided by network slicing. Can be introduced.

Also, the NG-RAN 48 may transmit an Attach request message to the SEAF 43 via the MM entity, or may transmit an Attach request message to the SEAF 43 via the SCMF 44.

(Embodiment 3)
Next, an Attach Procedure in the NextGen System according to the third embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. In FIG. 4, NG-RAN48 is, and does not hold a security key _{K AN (retain) (It is} assumed that the NG-RAN48 does not retain the security key K AN).

Since step S31 is the same as step S11 of FIG. 3, detailed description thereof is omitted. Next, the NG-RAN 48 checks (checks) UE Security Capabilities and subscriber information (Subscription) regarding the UE (S32). Here, NG-RAN48 does not retain the security key _{K AN.} Therefore, the NG-RAN 48 transfers the message to the SEAF 43 without executing the integrity guarantee process of the Attach Request message included in the RRC Connection Request message.

Since steps S33 to S35 are the same as steps S13 to S15 in FIG. 3, detailed description thereof will be omitted.

Next, the SEAF 43 verifies or checks the integrity of the Attach Request message. It is assumed that the SEAF 43 holds a security key K related to the UE. The security key K held by the SEAF 43 may be a security key K _AN or a security key K _SEAF . It is assumed that the UE also holds the same key as the security key K _AN or the security key K _SEAF held by the _{SEAF 43} . The SEAF 43 performs the integrity guarantee process for the Attach Request message using the security key K that is held.

Next, when the SEAF 43 is able to confirm the integrity of the Attach Request message, it transmits an Attach Request Integrity Verified message to the NG-RAN 48 (S37). After step S37, the same processing as steps S16 to S20 in FIG. 3 is executed.

In step S35, the NG-RAN 48 may transmit an Attach Request message to the SEAF 43 via the MM entity, or may transmit an Attach Request message to the SEAF 43 via the SCMF 44. Further, the integrity verification in step S36 may be executed in the SCMF 44 or may be executed in the ARPF 41 (The verification of the integrity of the Attach Request message can be done at the SCMF44 or ARPF41).

As described above, even if the NG-RAN 48 does not hold the security key K, it is possible to confirm the integrity of the Attach Request message at the entity arranged on the core network side.

(Embodiment 4)
Next, an Attach Procedure in the NextGen System according to the fourth embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. In FIG. 5, it is assumed that the UE, NG-RAN 48, and SEAF 43 do not hold the security key K.

First, the UE transmits an RRC connection request message to the NG-RAN 48 (S41). The Attach Request message is multiplexed with the RRC Connection Request message. The Attach Request message includes Network capability, NSSAI, and UE Security Capabilities as parameters. However, it is assumed that the Attach Request message does not include GUTI (Globally Unique Temporary UEIdentity) and KSI temporarily allocated to the UE.

Next, the NG-RAN 48 transmits an RRC Connection Setup message to the UE as a response to the RRC Connection Request message (S42). Next, the UE transmits an RRC Connection Complete message to the NG-RAN48 in order to notify the NG-RAN48 that the RRC Connection Setup message has been received (S43).

Next, the NG-RAN 48 transmits an Attach Request message to the SEAF 43 (S44). The Attach request message includes Network capability, NSSAI, and UE security Capabilities. However, it is assumed that the Attach Request message does not include GUTI and KSI that are temporarily allocated to the UE.

Next, the SEAF 43 transmits an Identity request message to the UE in order to acquire the identification information of the UE (S45). Next, the UE transmits an Identity Response message including the IMSI that is the identification information of the own device to the SEAF 43 (S46).

Next, the SEAF 43 checks (checks) UE Security Capabilities and subscriber information (Subscription) regarding the UE (S47). Next, in order to establish security context between the UE and the SEAF 43, AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) and （NAS (Non-Access Stratum) SMC (Security Mode Command) is executed (S48). By executing AKAＡＦand に お い て NASＵＥSMC in the UE and the SEAF 43, the security key K is derived in the UE and the SEAF 43.

With AKA and NAS SMC, for example, KDF (Key Derivation Function) may be executed in UE and SEAF 43. In KDF, for example, NSSAI is used as an input parameter. As a result of the KDF being executed in the UE, the security key K and RES (Response) are derived, and as a result of the KDF being executed in the SEAF 43, the security key K and XRES (Expected Response) are derived. Here, if RES and XRES match, the UE has derived the same security key K as the security key K derived in SEAF 43.

After step S48, the same processing as steps S16 to S20 in FIG. 3 is executed.

In step S44, the NG-RAN 48 may transmit an Attach Request message to the SEAF 43 via the MM entity, or may transmit an Attach Request message to the SEAF 43 via the SCMF 44. In addition, the confirmation of UE Security Capabilities and subscriber information (Subscription) regarding the UE in step S47 may be executed in the SCMF 44 or in the ARPF 41.

As described above, even if each entity arranged in the UE, NG-RAN 48 and the core network does not hold the security key K, by deriving the security key K in the UE and the SEAF 43, The integrity of the Attach Request message can be confirmed.

(Embodiment 5)
Next, the flow of processing for confirming UE Security Capabilities and Subscription in an entity on the core network side will be described with reference to FIGS.

In FIG. 6, the Attach Request message that the UE transmits to the SEAF 43 includes IMSI in addition to NSSAI and UE Security Capabilities (S51). When the SEAF 43 receives an Attach Request message including IMSI, Network Capabilities, KSI, NSSAI, and UE Security Capabilities, it checks (checks) UE Security Capabilities and subscriber information (Subscription) for the UE (S52). After step S52, the same processing as steps S16 to S20 in FIG. 3 is executed. In FIG. 5, after receiving the Attach request message, the SEAF 43 transmits an Identity request message to the UE and receives an Identity response message in which the IMSI of the UE is set. On the other hand, FIG. 6 differs from the process of FIG. 5 in that SEAF 43 does not transmit the Identity request message to the UE because IMSI is included in the Attach request message transmitted by the UE.

Subsequently, FIG. 7 shows that the confirmation of UE Security Capabilities and the confirmation of subscriber information (Subscription) are executed in different entities. Specifically, when the SEAF 43 receives the same message as the Attach Request message transmitted in step S51 of FIG. 6, the SEAF 43 confirms UE Security Capabilities (S62). Next, the SEAF 43 transmits a UE Subscription Check Request message to the ARPF 41 via the AUSF 42 in order to request the ARPF 41 to confirm the subscription. The UE Subscription Check Request message includes the same information as the Attach Request message transmitted in step S61.

ARPF 41 confirms the subscriber information when receiving the UE Subscription Check Request message (S64). Next, when the confirmation of the subscriber information is completed, the ARPF 41 transmits a UE Subscription Check Response message to the SEAF 43 via the AUSF 42 (S65). After receiving the UE Subscription Check Response message, the SEAF 43 performs the same processing as steps S16 to S20 in FIG.

Subsequently, FIG. 8 shows that the confirmation of UE Security Capabilities and subscriber information is executed in the ARPF 41. Specifically, first, the SEAF 43 receives the same message as the Attach Request message transmitted in step S51 of FIG. Upon receiving the Attach Request message, the SEAF 43 transmits a UE４３Security Capabilities and Subscription Check Response message to the ARPF 41 via the AUSF 42 in order to request confirmation of UE Security Capabilities and subscriber information (S74).

Next, the ARPF 41 checks (checks) UE Security Capabilities and subscriber information (Subscription) regarding the UE (S73). Next, when the ARPF 41 completes the confirmation of the UE Security Capabilities and the subscriber information, it sends a UE 送信 Security Capabilities and Subscription Check Response message to the SEAF 43 via the AUSF 42 (S74). After receiving the UE Subscription Check Response message, the SEAF 43 performs the same processing as steps S16 to S20 in FIG.

As described above, the confirmation of UE Security Capabilities and subscriber information may be executed in one entity arranged in the core network, or may be executed in a distributed manner in a plurality of entities.

(Embodiment 6)
Next, a configuration example of a communication system according to the sixth embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. The communication system in FIG. 9 includes a communication terminal 10_1 and a core network system 20_1.

The node device (may be referred to as a core network device or a security device) constituting the communication terminal 10_1 and the core network system 20_1 may be a computer device that operates by executing a program stored in a memory by a processor. Good. The processor may be, for example, a microprocessor, an MPU (Micro Processing Unit), or a CPU (Central Processing Unit). The memory may be a volatile memory or a nonvolatile memory, and may be configured by a combination of a volatile memory and a nonvolatile memory. The processor executes one or more programs including a group of instructions for causing a computer to execute an algorithm described with reference to the following drawings.

The communication terminal 10_1 may be a mobile phone terminal, a smartphone terminal, an IoT terminal, or the like.

The core network system 20_1 is a communication system included in the mobile network. The core network system 20_1 performs, for example, session management and mobility management of the communication terminal 10_1. Further, the core network system 20_1 executes NAS (Non Access Access Stratum) Security Step and UP (U-Plane) Security Procedure for the communication terminal 10_1.

The core network system 20_1 uses a security key (Key) using NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) and UE (User Equipment Equipment) Security Security Capabilities in a NAS Security Procedure (which may be referred to as a NAS SMC (Security Mode Command) procedure). ) Is generated.

NSSAI is information for identifying a core network system that provides a service used by the communication terminal 10_1, for example. Here, it is assumed that the core network system included in the mobile network 30 is divided for each service to which network slicing is applied. The divided core network system may be referred to as a network slice.

UE Security Capabilities may be a set of identification information corresponding to algorithm information used for encryption and integrity assurance processing executed in the UE that is the communication terminal. (The set of identifiers corresponding to the ciphering and integrity algorithms implemented in the UE).

Furthermore, the core network system 20_1 transmits information related to the NSSAI and UE Security Capabilities used for generating the security key to the communication terminal 10_1.

The communication terminal 10_1 generates a security key related to NAS Security using information related to NSSAI and UE Security Capabilities transmitted from the core network system 20_1. The security key generated by the communication terminal 10_1 is the same as the security key generated in the core network system 20_1.

As described above, by using the communication system of FIG. 9, the communication terminal 10_1 can generate a security key using NSSAI. Thereby, the network terminal is applied to the communication terminal 10_1, and the security key used when connecting to the core network system that provides a desired service among the divided core network systems can be generated.

(Embodiment 7)
Next, a configuration example of a communication system according to the seventh embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. The communication system of FIG. 10 shows NextGen System. 10 includes an ARPF entity 41 (hereinafter referred to as ARPF 41), an AUSF entity 42 (hereinafter referred to as AUSF 42), a SEAF entity 43 (hereinafter referred to as SEAF 43), and an SCMF entity 44 (hereinafter referred to as SCMF 44). SCMF45, CP-CN (C-Plane Core Network) entity 46 (hereinafter referred to as CP-CN46), CP-CN47, NG-RAN entity 48 (hereinafter referred to as NG-RAN48), NG-RAN49, UP ( U-Plane) -GW (Gateway) 50 and UP-GW 51. CP-CN 46 and CP-CN 47 include an MM entity that executes Mobility Management and an SM entity that executes Session Management.

Specifically, MM registers UE or user who manages UE to mobile network, supports reachability that enables mobile terminated communication, detects unreachable UE , C (Control) -Plane and U (User) -Plane network functions may be allocated, or mobility may be limited.

Also, SM is to set IP connectivity or non-IP connectivity for UE. In other words, the SM may be managing or controlling the connectivity of the U-Plane.

ARPF 41, AUSF 42, SEAF 43, SCMF 44, SCMF 45, CP-CN 46, CP-CN 47, UP-GW 50, and UP-GW 51 constitute a core network. Each entity arranged in the core network may be referred to as a core network device or a security device. The NG-RAN 48 and the NG-RAN 49 constitute a radio access network. The NG-RAN 48 may be, for example, a base station used in NextGen System.

Each entity shown in FIG. 10 may include a plurality of functions. For example, in FIG. 10, the ARPF 41 is an entity different from the AUSF 42, but one entity that executes the ARPF and the AUSF may be used.

ARPF entity is a node device that executes ARPF. The AUSF entity is a node device that executes AUSF. ARPF and AUSF are functions for executing an authentication process regarding whether or not a UE (User （Equipment) corresponding to the communication terminal 10 can connect to NextGenNextSystem, for example. The ARPF 41 and the AUSF 42 generate a security key used for authentication processing and hold the generated security key.

SEAF and SCMF are functions for executing an authentication process related to whether or not the UE can connect to the network-sliced core network. The SEAF entity and the SCMF entity may be referred to as a security device.

Next, a hierarchical structure of security keys will be described with reference to FIG. The SEAF 43 derives a security key K _SCMF from the security key K _SEAF received from the ARPF 41 via the AUSF 42. Deriving may be paraphrased as, for example, acquiring or generating. The SEAF 43 transmits the security key K _SCMF to the SCMF 44. The SCMF 44 _{derives the} security key K _CP-CN and the security key K _UP from the security key K _SCMF received from the SEAF 43. The SCMF 44 transmits the security key K _UP to the UP-GW 50.

Further, the SCMF ₄₄ generates a key K _NASinc used for encrypting the NAS message and a key K _NASint used for the NAS message integrity guarantee processing from the security key K _CP-CN .

UP-GW 50 generates the key _{K Sess1int} used from the security key _{K UP} integrity assurance processing of the key _{K Sess1enc} and NAS messages used for encrypting the U-Plane data. Sess1enc indicates encryption of U-Plane data transmitted in a session identified as session 1. Sess1int indicates the integrity guarantee processing of U-Plane data transmitted in the session identified as session1. Security key K _UP security keys used in the security key and a plurality of integrity assurance process used multiple encryption may be generated from. In FIG. 3, a security key K _SessNenc and a security key K _SessNint are shown as security keys used for U-Plane data transmitted in an arbitrary session N.

The NG-RAN 48 receives the security key K _AN derived in the SCMF 44 or the SEAF 43. The NG-RAN ₄₈ generates a security key K _RRCenc and a security key K _RRCint to be used for RRC message encryption and integrity assurance processing from the security key K _AN . Further, the NG-RAN ₄₈ generates a security key K _UPenc and a security key K _UPint used for encryption and integrity assurance processing of U-Plane data from the security key K _AN .

Each entity constituting the NextGen System executes security processing such as UE authentication processing and message integrity guarantee processing using the received security key K. Also, the security key K may be referred to as security context.

Next, NAS Security Procedure in NextGen System will be described with reference to FIG. First, the SEAF ₄₃ derives a security key K _SCMF from the held security key K _SEAF (S111). The security key K _SCMF may be referred to as a slice anchor key (The SEAF derives the K _SCMF , the slice anchor key.). Next, when the SEAF ₄₃ derives the security key K _SCMF (S112), the SEAF 43 transmits a NAS SMC (Security Mode Command) message to the SCMF 44 (S113). The NAS SMC message includes a security key K _SCMF , NSSAI, UE Security Capabilities, and Network Capabilities.

Next, the SCMF 44 derives a security key K _CP-CN from the received security key K _SCMF (S114, S115). Next, the SCMF 44 selects an algorithm related to integrity assurance and encryption, and derives a NAS key from the security key K _CP-CN (S116) (The SCMF selects the algorithm for integrity protection and encryption and derives the NAS keys). . NAS key, specifically, may be a security key _{K NASenc} used in security key _{K NASint} and encryption used in integrity protection process (S117).

Next, the SCMF 44 forwards the NAS-SMC message received in step S13 to the UE (S118). The NAS SMC message includes, as parameters, KSI (Key Set Identifier), NSSAI, UE Security Capabilities, Network Capabilities, NAS enc Algo, NAS int Algo, and NAS-MAC (Message Authentication Code). The NAS SMC message is information related to NSSAI and UE Security Capabilities in the sixth embodiment. NAS enc Algo is an algorithm related to encryption, and NAS int Algo is an algorithm related to integrity assurance.

Next, the UE _derives a security key K _SCMF and a security key K _CP-CN (S119, S120). Next, the UE derives a NAS key from the security key K _{CP-CN in} order to use the algorithm related to integrity assurance and encryption received in step S118 (S121). NAS key, specifically, may be a security key _{K NASenc} used in security key _{K NASint} and encryption used in integrity protection process (S122).

Next, the UE transmits a NAS SM (Security Mode) Complete message including NAS-MAC to the SCMF 44 (S123). The SCMF 44 transfers the received NAS SM Complete message to the SEAF 43 (S124).

Subsequently, NAS Security Procedure different from FIG. 12 will be described with reference to FIG. Steps S131 to S135 are the same as steps S111 to S115 in FIG.

The SCMF 44 derives the security key K _CP-CN in step S135, and then transmits a NAS SMC message to the MM entity (hereinafter referred to as MM) (S136). MM corresponds to CP-CN46. The NAS SMC message includes a security key K _CP-CN , NSSAI, UE Security Capabilities, and Network Capabilities. Steps S137 and S138 are the same as steps S116 and S117 of FIG. However, steps S137 and S138 are executed by the MM, and steps S116 and S117 of FIG. 12 are executed by the SCMF 44.

Further, steps S139 to S143 are the same as steps S118 to S122 of FIG. When the UE derives the security key K _NASint and the security key K _NASenc in step S143, the UE transmits a NAS SM Complete message including the NAS-MAC to the MM (S144). Further, the MM transfers the NAS SM Complete message to the SCMF 44, and the SCMF 44 transfers the NAS SM Complete message to the SEAF 43 (S145).

Next, NAS Security Procedure different from FIGS. 12 and 13 will be described with reference to FIG. Steps S151 to S157 are the same as steps S111 to S117 in FIG.

Next, in step S157, the _{SCMF 44} derives the security key K _NASint and the security key K _NASenc, and then transmits a NAS SMC message to the MM (S158). NAS SMC message includes KSI, security key _{K NASint,} security key _{K NASenc, NSSAI, UE Security Capabilities} , Network Capabilities, NAS enc Algo, NAS int Algo, and NAS-MAC.

Steps S159 to S165 are the same as steps S139 to S145 in FIG.

As described above, by performing the NAS Security Procedure shown in FIGS. 12 to 14, the security key K _NASint used for the encryption and integrity guarantee processing of the NAS message and the security key K _NASinc used for the encryption are _obtained . , And can be shared between the UE and devices located in the core network.

(Embodiment 8)
Next, the UP Security Procedure according to the eighth embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. The UP Security Procedure relates to a security process when transmitting U-Plane data.

First, the SCMF 44 performs a subscriber information check (Subscription check) and allocation of network slices (NS (Network Slice) allocation) regarding the UE (S171). The subscriber information check may be, for example, determining whether the connection to the network slice desired by the UE can be permitted. The assignment of the network slice may be assignment of a network slice that permits connection to the UE.

Next, the SCMF 44 transmits a Slice Initiation Request message to the UP-GW 50 (S172). Slice Initiation Request message includes a security key _{K SCMF} and NSSAI. The UP-GW 50 may be an UP-GW arranged in a network slice assigned by the SCMF 44, for example.

Next, the UP-GW 50 derives the security key K _UP from the received security key K _SCMF (S173, S174). Next, the UP-GW 50 transmits a Slice Session Request message to the SM entity (hereinafter referred to as SM) (S175). SM corresponds to, for example, CP-CN46. Slice Session Request message includes a security key _{K UP.}

Then, SM, select the algorithm for integrity assurance and encryption, to derive the session key from the security key _{K UP} (S176). Sessyon key may be, for example, a security key _{K SessNenc} used in security key _{K SessNint} and encryption used in integrity protection.

Next, the SM transmits a Slice Session Response message to the UP-GW 50 (S177). The Slice Session Response message includes the security key K _SessNint and the security key K _SessNenc .

Next, the UP-GW 50 transmits an UP SMC message to the UE (S178). The UP SMC message includes KSI, SV (), Algorithms, and NS-MAC. SV is an abbreviation for Security Vector. Algorithms are algorithms related to integrity assurance and encryption.

Next, the UE derives the security key K _UP from the held security key K _SCMF . Further, the UE derives the security key K _SessNint and the security key K _SessNen from the security key K _{UP in} order to use the Algorithms received in step S78 (S179).

Next, the UE transmits an UP SM (Security Mode) Complete message including NS-MAC to the UP-GW 50 (S180). The UP-GW 50 confirms the NS-MAC value and authenticates the UP SM Complete message. Next, the UP-GW 50 transmits a Slice Initiation Response message to the SCMF 44 (S181).

Subsequently, UP Security１６Procedure different from Fig. 15 will be described with reference to Fig. 16. Steps S191 to S196 are the same as steps S171 to S176 in FIG.

SM from the security key _{K UP} after deriving a session key in step S196, transmits an UP SMC message to UE (S197). The UP SMC message includes KSI, SV (), Algorithms, and NS-MAC.

Step S198 is the same as step S179 in FIG. The UE, in step S198, after deriving the security key _{K SessNint} and security key _{K SessNenc,} transmits the UP SM Complete message containing NS-MAC (S199).

Next, the SM confirms the NS-MAC value and authenticates the UP SM Complete message. Next, the SM transmits a Slice Session Response message to the UP-GW 50 (S200). Next, the UP-GW 50 transmits a Slice Initiation Response message to the SCMF 44 (S201).

Subsequently, UP Security Procedure different from those in Figs. 15 and 16 will be described with reference to Fig. 17. Steps S211 to S215 are the same as steps S171 to S175 in FIG.

SM receives the security key _{K UP} in step S215, the selecting algorithm for integrity protection and encryption. Further, the SM transmits a Slice Session Response message including information regarding the selected algorithm as a parameter to the UP-GW 50 (S216).

Next, the UP-GW 50 derives a session key based on the algorithm selected in the SM. Sessyon key may be, for example, a security key _{K SessNenc} used in security key _{K SessNint} and encryption used in integrity protection.

Since steps S218 to S221 are the same as steps S178 to S181 in FIG. 15, detailed description thereof is omitted.

Next, UP Security Procedure different from FIGS. 15 to 17 will be described with reference to FIG. Step S231 is the same as step S171 in FIG. Next, the SCMF 44 derives the security key K _UP from the held security key K _SCMF (S232, S233).

Next, the SCMF 44 transmits a Slice Initiation Request message to the UP-GW 50 (S234). Slice Initiation Request message includes a security key _{K UP} and NSSAI. Steps S235 to S241 are the same as steps S175 to S181 in FIG.

Subsequently, UP Security Procedure different from that shown in Figs. 15 to 18 will be described with reference to Fig. 19. Steps S251 to S256 are the same as steps S231 to S236 in FIG. Further, steps S257 to S261 are the same as steps S197 to S201 in FIG.

Subsequently, UP Security２０Procedure different from that shown in Figs. 15 to 19 will be described with reference to Fig. 20. Steps S271 to 275 are the same as steps S231 to S235 in FIG. Further, steps S276 to S281 are the same as steps S216 to S221 in FIG.

As described above, by performing the UP Security Procedure shown in FIGS. 15 to 20, the security key K _Session used for the encryption and integrity guarantee processing of the U-Plane data and the security key K used for the encryption are used. _Sessenc can be shared between the UE and devices located in the core network.

(Embodiment 9)
Next, AS Security Procedure according to the ninth embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. The AS Security Procedure relates to a security process between the UE and the NG-RAN 48. The AS Security Procedure in FIG. 21 is executed in an Attach process for the UE.

First, the SCMF 44 derives a security key K _AN from the held security key K _SCMF (S291, S292). Next, the SCMF 44 transmits an Attach Accept message to the SM (S293). Attach Accept message includes a security key _{K AN.} Next, NG-RAN48 derives the security keys related RRC messages and U-Plane data from the security key _{K AN} (S294). The security key related to the RRC message and the U-Plane data may be, for example, the security key K _RRCint , the security key K _RRCenc , the security key K _UPint , and the security key K _UPenc ( _S295 ).

Next, the NG-RAN 48 transmits an AS SMC message including an algorithm (Int Algo) for guaranteeing the integrity of the RRC message and U-Plane data and an algorithm for encryption (Enc Algo) to the UE (S296).

Next, the UE derives a security key K _AN from the held security key K _SCMF (S297). Further, the UE _derives a security key K _RRCint , a security key K _RRCenc , a security key K _UPint , and a security key K _UPenc from the security key K _AN (S298).

Next, the UE transmits an UP SM Complete message to the NG-RAN 48 (S299).

As described above, by executing the AS Security Procedure shown in FIG. 21, the security key _KAN used for the encryption and integrity guarantee processing of data transmitted between the UE and the NG-RAN is used. K _RRCint , security key K _RRCenc , security key K _UPint , and security key K _UPenc can be shared between the UE and devices located in the core network.

(Embodiment 10)
Subsequently, a configuration example of the communication system according to the tenth embodiment will be described with reference to FIG. 22 includes a UE (User Equipment) 101, an (R) AN ((Radio) Access Network) 102, a UPF (User Plane Function) entity 103 (hereinafter referred to as UPF 103), an AMF (Access and Mobility Management Function). ) Entity 104 (hereinafter referred to as AMF 104), SMF (Session Management Function) entity 105 (hereinafter referred to as SMF 105), PCF (Policy Control Function) entity 106 (hereinafter referred to as PFC 106), and AUSF (Authentication Server Function) entity 107 (hereinafter referred to as AUSF 107), UDM (Unified Data Management) 108, DN (Data Network) 109, and AF (Application Function) entity 110 (hereinafter referred to as AF 110).

(R) AN102 corresponds to NG-RAN48 and NG-RAN49 in FIG. The UPF 103 corresponds to the UP-GW 50 and the UP-GW 51 in FIG. The AMF 104 and the SMF 105 correspond to the CP-CN 46 and the CP-CN 47 in FIG. The AUSF 107 corresponds to the AUSF 42 in FIG. Further, as shown in FIG. 22, in the communication system of FIG. 22, NG1 to NG15 interfaces are set between devices or between functions.

The UDM 108 manages subscriber data (UE Subscription or Subscription information). For example, the UDM 108 may be a node device that executes ARPF.

Next, the AKA algorithm executed in the node device that executes ARPF will be described with reference to FIG. The node device that executes ARPF may be the UDM 108, for example. As parameters input to the AKA algorithm, K, RAND, SQN (Sequence Number), SNID, and NSAI are used. Further, when K, RAND, SQN (Sequence Number), SNID, and NSAI are input to the AKA algorithm, AUTN_ARPF, XRES, and _KSEAF are generated. FIG. 24 illustrates an AKA algorithm executed in the UE 101. Also in the UE 101, as in the ARPF, K, RAND, SQN (Sequence Number), SNID, and NSAI are used as parameters. In addition, when the AKA algorithm is executed in the UE 101, AUTN_UE, RES, and K _SEAF are generated. 23 and 24, network slice ID, tenant ID, SST (Slice / Service Type), and SD (Slice Differentiator) may be used.

Next, a modified example of the security key hierarchical structure shown in FIG. 11 will be described with reference to FIG. In the hierarchical structure of Figure 25, NG-RAN48 is in that to derive the _{K AN} using the security key _{K SEAF,} differs from the hierarchical structure of FIG. 11. The other points in the hierarchical structure of FIG. 25 are the same as those of FIG.

Next, a flow of security key derivation in the security key hierarchical structure of FIG. 25 will be described with reference to FIG. A KDF (Key Deriviation Function) is used to derive the security key. The security key K _SCMF is derived by inputting a security key K _SEAF , SST (Slice / Service Type), and SD (Slice Differentiator) into the KDF. Security key K _CP-CN is derived by inputting security keys K _SCMF and COUNT into KDF. Also, for all KDFs shown in FIG. 26, SST, SD, NSSAI, network slice ID, tenant ID values, or values derived using these values may be used as input values.

The security key K _{NAS_MMint} is derived by inputting the NAS-int-algo and the security key K _CP-CN into the KDF. The security key K _NASenc is derived by inputting the NAS-enc-algo and the security key K _CP-CN into the KDF.

The security key K _UP is derived by inputting the security keys K _SCMF , Counter, Time limit, and Data volume to the KDF. The security key _{K_Sessint} is derived by inputting the security keys K _UP , UP-int-algo, and Counter into KDF. The security key K _Sensec is derived by inputting the security keys K _UP , UP-enc-algo, and Counter to the KDF.

The security key K _AN is derived by inputting the security key K _SEAF , NAS Uplink Count, and RAN slice parameters into the KDF. The security key K _RRCint is derived by inputting the security key K _AN and RRC-int-algo. The security key K _RRCenc is derived by inputting the security key K _AN and RRC-enc-algo. The security key K _UPint is derived by inputting the security keys K _AN and AN-UP-int-algo. Security key _{K UPenc} are derived by the security key _{K AN} and AN-UPenc-algo is input.

Next, a modification of the security key hierarchical structure shown in FIG. 11 will be described with reference to FIG. In the hierarchical structure of FIG. 27, the AMF 104 _{generates a} security key K _{CP-CN_MM} , a security key K _{AN_other} , a security key K _{3GPP_AN} , and a security key K _{non-3GPP_AN} from the security key K _SEAF received from the UDM 108. Further, the AMF ₁₀₄ generates a security key K _{NAS-MM_enc} and a security key K _{NAS-MM_int} from the security key K _{CP-CN_MM} . The security key K _{NAS-MM_enc} and the security key K _{NAS-MM_int} are used for integrity assurance and encryption of NAS messages related to Mobility Management.

The AMF 104 transmits the security key K _SEAF to the SMF 105, the UPF 103, and the (R) AN 102.

SMF105 derives the security key _{K CP-CN_SM} from the security key _{K SEAF.} Further, the SMF ₁₀₅ generates a security key K _{NAS-SM_enc} and a security key K _{NAS-SM_int} from the security key K _{CP-CN_SM} . The security key K _{NAS-SM_enc} and the security key K _{NAS-SM_int} are used to guarantee and encrypt the NAS message related to Session Management.

The UPF 103 derives a security key K _UP from the security key K _SEAF . Furthermore, SMF105 from the security key _{K UP,} to generate a security key _{K Sess1int} used for integrity protection processing security key _{K Sess1enc} and NAS messages. Further, the UPF ₁₀₃ generates a security key K _SessNenc and a security key K _SessNint as security keys used in an arbitrary session N.

(R) The _{AN 102} derives a security key K _{AN / NH} from the security key K _SEAF . Further, the (R) _{AN 102} generates a security key K _RRCenc , a security key K _RRCint , a security key K _UPenc, and a security key K _UPint from the security key K _{AN / NH} .

Next, the flow of security key derivation in the security key hierarchical structure of FIG. 27 will be described with reference to FIG. Security key K _{CP-CN_MM} is derived by inputting security keys K _SEAF and COUNT to KDF in _{AMF 104} . The security key K _{NAS_MMint} is derived by inputting the NAS_MM-int-algo and the security key K _{CP-CN_MM} into the KDF. The security key K _{NAS_MMenc} is derived by inputting the NAS_MM-enc-algo and the security key K _{CP-CN_MM} into the KDF.

Security key K _{CP-CN_SM} is derived by inputting security keys K _SEAF , SST, and SD to KDF in _{SMF 105} . The security key K _{NAS_SMint} is derived by inputting the NAS_SM-int-algo and the security key K _{CP-CN_SM} into the KDF. The security key K _{NAS_SMenc} is derived by inputting the NAS_SM-enc-algo and the security key K _{CP-CN_SM} into the KDF.

The security key K _UP is derived in the SMF 105 by inputting the security keys K _SEAF , Counter, Time limit, and Data volume to the KDF. Security key _{K Sessint} and security key _{K Sessenc} is a detailed description thereof is omitted because it is derived in the same manner as FIG. 26.

Security key _{K AN,} security key _{K RRCint,} security key _{K RRCenc,} security key _{K UPint,} and security key _{K UPenc} is a detailed description thereof is omitted because it is derived in the same manner as FIG. 26. Also, the security key K _AN , the security key K _RRCint , the security key K _RRCenc , the security key K _UPint , and the security key K _UPenc are derived in the NG-RAN 48 corresponding to (R) AN102.

Next, a modified example of the security key hierarchical structure shown in FIG. 11 will be described with reference to FIG. In the hierarchical structure of FIG. 29, the AMF 104 receives a security key K _NAS-MMenc , a security key K _NAS-MMint , a security key K _{AN_other} , a security key K _{3GPP_AN} , and a security key K _non- from the security key K _SEAF received from the _{UDM 108} . _{3GPP_AN} is generated.

The AMF 104 transmits the security key K _SEAF to the SMF 105 and the (R) AN 102.

The SMF ₁₀₅ generates a security key K _{NAS_SM} from the security key K _SEAF . Further, the SMF 105 _generates a security key K _{UP, a} security key K _{NAS-SM_enc,} and a security key K _{NAS-SM_int} from the security key K _{NAS_SM} . In addition, SMF105 is, from the security key _{K UP,} to generate the security key _{K Sess1enc} and security key _{K Sess1int.} Further, the SMF ₁₀₅ generates a security key K _SessNenc and a security key K _SessNint as security keys used in an arbitrary session N.

(R) AN 102 generates a security key _{K AN / NH} from the security key _{K SEAF.} Furthermore, the (R) _{AN 102} generates a security key K _RRCenc , a security key K _RRCint , a security key K _UPenc, and a security key K _UPint from the security key K _{AN / NH} .

Next, the flow of security key derivation in the security key hierarchical structure of FIG. 29 will be described with reference to FIG. The security key K _{NAS_MMint} is derived in the _{AMF 104} by inputting the NAS_MM-int-algo and the security key K _SEAF into the KDF. The security key K _{NAS_MMenc} is derived by inputting the NAS_MM-enc-algo and the security key K _SEAF into the KDF.

The security key K _{NAS_SM} is derived by inputting the security keys K _SEAF , SST and SD into the KDF in the _{SMF 105} . The security key K _{NAS_SMint} is derived by inputting the NAS_SM-int-algo and the security key K _{NAS_SM} into the KDF. The security key K _{NAS_SMnc} is derived by inputting the NAS_SM-enc-algo and the security key K _{NAS_SM} into the KDF.

The security key K _UP is derived in the SMF 105 by inputting the security keys K _{NAS_SM} , Counter, Time limit, and Data volume to the KDF. Security key _{K Sessint} and security key _{K Sessenc} is a detailed description thereof is omitted because it is derived in the same manner as FIG. 26.

Security key _{K AN,} security key _{K RRCint,} security key _{K RRCenc,} security key _{K UPint,} and security key _{K UPenc} is a detailed description thereof is omitted because it is derived in the same manner as FIG. 26. Also, the security key K _AN , the security key K _RRCint , the security key K _RRCenc , the security key K _UPint , and the security key K _UPenc are derived in the NG-RAN 48 corresponding to (R) AN102.

Next, a modified example of the security key hierarchical structure shown in FIG. 11 will be described with reference to FIG. In the hierarchical structure of FIG. 31, the UDM 108 derives CK (Cipher Key) and IK (Integrity Key) from the security key K. Further, the UDM ₁₀₈ derives a security key K _SEAF from CK and IE. Further, in the hierarchical structure of FIG. 31, the AMF 104 _{derives the} security key K _NAS-MM from the security key K _SEAF received from the UDM 108, and further, the security key K _NAS-MMint and the security key from the security key K _{NAS- MM.} It differs from the hierarchical structure of FIG. 29 in that K _NAS-MMenc is generated. The other hierarchical structure of FIG. 31 is the same as that of FIG.

Next, a flow of derivation of the security key in the security key hierarchical structure of FIG. 31 will be described with reference to FIG. The security key K _{NAS_MM} is derived by inputting the COUNT and the security key K _SEAF to the KDF in the _{AMF 104} . The security key K _{NAS_MMint} is derived in the _{AMF 104} by inputting the NAS_MM-int-algo and the security key K _{NAS_MM} into the KDF. The security key K _{NAS_MMenc} is derived by inputting the NAS_MM-enc-algo and the security key K _{NAS_MM} into the KDF.

The derivation of the security key executed in the SMF 105 and the NG-RAN 48 is the same as that shown in FIG.

Next, a modification of the security key hierarchical structure shown in FIG. 11 will be described with reference to FIG. In the hierarchical structure of FIG. 33, the SMF 105 generates a security key K _UP from the security key K _SEAF received from the AMF 104. The other hierarchical structure of the security key is the same as that shown in FIG.

Next, the flow of security key derivation in the security key hierarchical structure of FIG. 33 will be described with reference to FIG. The security key K _UP is derived in the _{SMF 105} by inputting Counter, Time limit, Data volume, and security key K _SEAF to KDF.

Since the derivation of other security keys executed in the SMF 105 and the derivation of security keys executed in the AMF 104 and the NG-RAN 48 are the same as those in FIG. 30, detailed description thereof will be omitted.

Next, a modified example of the security key hierarchical structure shown in FIG. 11 will be described with reference to FIG. In the hierarchical structure of FIG. 35, the SMF 105 generates a security key K _UP from the security key K _SEAF received from the AMF 104. Further, the SMF 105 does not derive the security key K _NAS-SM . The other security key hierarchical structure is the same as that shown in FIG.

Subsequently, a flow of derivation of the security key in the security key hierarchical structure of FIG. 35 will be described with reference to FIG. The security key K _UP is derived in the _{SMF 105} by inputting Counter, Time limit, Data volume, and security key K _SEAF to KDF. Also, the security key K _NAS-SM is not derived in the SMF 105.

Since the derivation of the security key executed in the AMF 104 and the NG-RAN 48 is the same as that in FIG. 32, detailed description thereof is omitted.

Next, a modification of the security key hierarchical structure shown in FIG. 11 will be described with reference to FIG. In the hierarchical structure of FIG. 37, the AMF 104 transmits the derived security key K _NAS-MM to the (R) AN 102. Further, (R) AN 102 generates a security key K _{AN / NH} from the security key K _NAS-MM received from AMF 104. The other hierarchical structure of the security key is the same as that shown in FIG.

Next, the flow of security key derivation in the security key hierarchical structure of FIG. 37 will be described with reference to FIG. The security key K _{AN / NH} is derived by inputting the security key K _NAS-MM , NAS Uplink Count, and RAN slice parameters to the KDF in the NG-RAN 48 corresponding to the (R) _AN 102.

The derivation of other security keys executed in the NG-RAN 48 and the derivation of security keys executed in the AMF 104 and the SMF 105 are the same as those in FIG.

Subsequently, a modified example of the security key hierarchical structure shown in FIG. 11 will be described with reference to FIG. The hierarchical structure of FIG. 39 is different from the hierarchical structure of FIG. 33 in that the SMF 105 does not derive the security key K _NAS-SM . The other hierarchical structure of FIG. 39 is the same as that of FIG.

Next, the flow of security key derivation in the security key hierarchical structure of FIG. 39 will be described with reference to FIG. 40 is different from the flow of deriving the security key in FIG. 34 in that the security key K _NAS-SM is not derived in the SMF 105. Since the flow of derivation of the other security keys in FIG. 40 is the same as that in FIG. 34, detailed description thereof is omitted.

In the above description, it has been explained that the AMF 104, SMF 105, UPF 103, NG-RAN 48, etc. derive the security key, but the same security key as the security key derived in each entity (node device) is also derived in the UE 101. Is done.

For example, in order to derive the security key K _NAS-SM and the security key K _NAS-MM by using the security key hierarchical structure and the security key derivation flow described in FIGS. And a unique parameter (Count) related to mobility can be used.

The above-described embodiment has been described as an example configured with hardware, but is not limited thereto. The present disclosure can also realize processing in the UE and each device by causing a CPU (Central Processing Unit) to execute a computer program.

In the above example, the program can be stored using various types of non-transitory computer-readable media and supplied to a computer. Non-transitory computer readable media include various types of tangible storage media (tangible storage medium). Examples of non-transitory computer-readable media include magnetic recording media (eg flexible disks, magnetic tapes, hard disk drives), magneto-optical recording media (eg magneto-optical discs), CD-ROMs (Read Only Memory), CD-Rs, CD-R / W, semiconductor memory (for example, mask ROM, PROM (Programmable ROM), EPROM (Erasable ROM), flash ROM, RAM (Random Access Memory)) are included. The program may also be supplied to the computer by various types of temporary computer-readable media. Examples of transitory computer readable media include electrical signals, optical signals, and electromagnetic waves. The temporary computer-readable medium can supply the program to the computer via a wired communication path such as an electric wire and an optical fiber, or a wireless communication path.

In addition, this indication is not restricted to the said embodiment, It can change suitably in the range which does not deviate from the meaning. In addition, the present disclosure may be implemented by appropriately combining the respective embodiments.

The present invention has been described above with reference to the embodiment, but the present invention is not limited to the above. Various changes that can be understood by those skilled in the art can be made to the configuration and details of the present invention within the scope of the invention.

This application claims priority based on Indian applications 201611036774 and 201611036775 filed on October 26, 2016, and Indian application 201711003071 filed on January 27, 2017, the entire disclosure of which is hereby incorporated by reference herein. Into.

DESCRIPTION OF SYMBOLS 10 Communication terminal 10_1 Communication terminal 20 Network apparatus 20_1 Core network system 30 Mobile network 41 ARPF
42 AUSF
43 SEAF
44 SCMF
45 SCMF
46 CP-CN
47 CP-CN
48 NG-RAN
49 NG-RAN
50 UP-GW
51 UP-GW
101 UE
102 (R) AN
103 UPF
104 AMF
105 SMF
106 PCF
107 AUSF
108 UDM
109 DN
110 AF

Claims (23)

1. A communication terminal that transmits an Attach Request message including NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) and UE (User Equipment) Security Capabilities;
   A network device arranged in a mobile network and receiving the Attach Request message,
   The network device is:
   A communication system that uses the NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities to determine whether to permit connection of the communication terminal to a core network indicated by the NSSAI among a plurality of core networks divided by network slicing.
2. The network device is:
   A wireless device for performing wireless communication with the communication terminal;
   An authentication process for the communication terminal is performed, and a security device arranged in the mobile network is further provided,
   The wireless device includes:
   Sending the Attach Request message to the security device;
   The security device comprises:
   The communication system according to claim 1, wherein the integrity of the Attach Request message is confirmed, and a confirmation result is transmitted to the wireless device.
3. The network device is:
   A core network device arranged in a core network included in the mobile network, and by performing an AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) process with the communication terminal, a security key is derived, and the security key is The communication system according to claim 1, wherein the communication is used to confirm the integrity of the Attach Request message.
4. The network device is:
   A core network device disposed in a core network included in the mobile network;
   Whether or not to permit connection of the communication terminal to the core network indicated by the NSSAI among the plurality of core networks divided by network slicing using the NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities in the plurality of network devices The communication system according to claim 1, wherein the process of determining the number is distributed.
5. NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) and UE (User Equipment) are configured to receive the Attach Request message from a communication terminal that transmits an Attach Request message including Security Capabilities,
   The NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities are used to determine whether to permit connection of the communication terminal to the core network indicated in the NSSAI among a plurality of core networks divided by network slicing. Network device.
6. NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) and UE (User Equipment) Receive the Attach Request message from a communication terminal that transmits an Attach Request message including Security Capabilities,
   An authentication method for determining whether to permit connection of the communication terminal to a core network indicated by the NSSAI among a plurality of core networks divided by network slicing, using the NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities.
7. A communication terminal that sends an Attach Request message including NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information),
   A network device arranged in a mobile network and receiving the Attach Request message,
   The communication terminal and the network device use at least the NSSAI as an input, and execute AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) processing, whereby the communication terminal and the network device derive the same security key. system.
8. It is configured to receive the Attach Request message from a communication terminal that transmits an Attach Request message including NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information),
   By using at least the NSSAI as an input and executing an AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) process with the communication terminal, the same security key as the security key derived by the communication terminal is derived. Network equipment.
9. It is configured to send an Attach Request message containing NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) to a network device located in the mobile network,
   By using at least the NSSAI as an input and executing an AKA (Authentication and Key Agreement) process with the network device, the same security key as the security key derived by the network device is derived. , Communication terminal.
10. A communication terminal;
    A core network system that executes NAS Security Procedure for the communication terminal, and a communication system comprising:
    The core network system is
    In the NAS Security Procedure, NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) and UE (User Equipment) to obtain a security key using Security Capabilities, transmit information related to the NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities to the communication terminal,
    The communication terminal is
    A communication system that acquires the security key using information related to the NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities.
11. The core network system is
    An encryption key and an integrity guarantee key are obtained from the security key, and an encryption algorithm and an integrity guarantee algorithm executed using the encryption key and the integrity guarantee key are transmitted to the communication terminal,
    The communication terminal is
    The communication system according to claim 10, wherein an encryption key and an integrity guarantee key used in a NAS protocol are obtained in order to use the encryption algorithm and the integrity guarantee algorithm.
12. A communication terminal;
    A core network system that executes UP Security Procedure for the communication terminal, and a communication system comprising:
    The core network system is
    In the UP Security Procedure, a security key is acquired using NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information), and a user plane encryption key and user plane integrity used in a session for transferring user data using the security key. Obtaining a guarantee key, and transmitting an algorithm executed using the user plane encryption key and the user plane integrity guarantee key to the communication terminal;
    The communication terminal is
    A communication system for acquiring the security key related to the UP Security Procedure acquired in the core network system in order to use the algorithm.
13. In NAS Security Procedure, NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) and UE (User Equipment) A key generation unit that acquires security keys using Security Capabilities,
    A communication device comprising: a communication unit that transmits information related to the NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities to a communication terminal.
14. In UP Security Procedure, a security key is acquired using NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information), and the user plane encryption key and user plane integrity assurance used in a session for transferring user data using the security key. A key generation unit for obtaining a key;
    And a communication unit that transmits an algorithm executed using the user plane encryption key and the user plane integrity guarantee key to the communication terminal.
15. A communication unit that receives information related to NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) and UE (User Equipment) Security Capabilities from the core network system;
    In NAS Security Procedure, a communication terminal provided with the key generation part which acquires a security key using the information relevant to said NSSAI and said UE Security Capabilities.
16. A communication unit that receives an algorithm executed using the user plane encryption key and the user plane integrity guarantee key in the UP Security Procedure from the core network system;
    A communication terminal comprising: a key generation unit that acquires the user plane encryption key and the user plane integrity assurance key acquired in the core network system in order to use the algorithm.
17. In NAS Security Procedure, NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) and UE (User Equipment) Security Capabilities are acquired using Security Capabilities,
    A communication method in a core network system, which transmits information related to the NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities to a communication terminal.
18. Receives information related to NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) and UE (User Equipment) Security Capabilities from the security device,
    In the NAS Security Procedure, a communication method in a communication terminal that acquires a security key using information related to the NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities.
19. In UP Security Procedure, use NSSAI (Network Slice Selection Assistance Information) to obtain the security key,
    Using the security key, obtain a user plane encryption key and a user plane integrity guarantee key used in a session for transferring user data,
    A communication method in a core network system, wherein an algorithm executed using the user plane encryption key and the user plane integrity guarantee key is transmitted to a communication terminal.
20. From the core network system, in UP Security Procedure, receive the algorithm executed using the user plane encryption key and the user plane integrity guarantee key,
    A communication method in a communication terminal that acquires the user plane encryption key and the user plane integrity guarantee key acquired in the core network system in order to use the algorithm.
21. The communication system according to claim 10, wherein the information related to the NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities is a NAS Security Mode Command message.
22. 14. The security device according to claim 13, wherein the information related to the NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities is a NAS Security Mode Command message.
23. The communication terminal according to claim 15, wherein the information related to the NSSAI and the UE Security Capabilities is a NAS Security Mode Command message.

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