WO2018076175A1 - 一种信息处理方法及装置 - Google Patents
一种信息处理方法及装置 Download PDFInfo
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- WO2018076175A1 WO2018076175A1 PCT/CN2016/103229 CN2016103229W WO2018076175A1 WO 2018076175 A1 WO2018076175 A1 WO 2018076175A1 CN 2016103229 W CN2016103229 W CN 2016103229W WO 2018076175 A1 WO2018076175 A1 WO 2018076175A1
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
- H04L9/0816—Key establishment, i.e. cryptographic processes or cryptographic protocols whereby a shared secret becomes available to two or more parties, for subsequent use
- H04L9/0852—Quantum cryptography
- H04L9/0858—Details about key distillation or coding, e.g. reconciliation, error correction, privacy amplification, polarisation coding or phase coding
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04B—TRANSMISSION
- H04B10/00—Transmission systems employing electromagnetic waves other than radio-waves, e.g. infrared, visible or ultraviolet light, or employing corpuscular radiation, e.g. quantum communication
- H04B10/70—Photonic quantum communication
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- H—ELECTRICITY
- H04—ELECTRIC COMMUNICATION TECHNIQUE
- H04L—TRANSMISSION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION, e.g. TELEGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION
- H04L9/00—Cryptographic mechanisms or cryptographic arrangements for secret or secure communications; Network security protocols
- H04L9/08—Key distribution or management, e.g. generation, sharing or updating, of cryptographic keys or passwords
Definitions
- the present invention relates to the field of quantum communication technologies, and in particular, to an information processing method and apparatus.
- QKD quantum key distribution
- the shorter communication distance has been limited to the promotion of the practical application of QKD.
- the photon source at the midpoint of the communication transmits one photon to each of the communicating parties, so theoretically the communication distance can be extended to twice that of the conventional BB84 protocol.
- a nonlinear process such as parametric down conversion (PDC) or four wave mixing (FWM) is usually used to generate a pulse in a pulse.
- a pair of entangled photon pairs, or such photon sources generate a plurality of pairs of photons that are entangled in one pulse with a certain probability, and two entangled photons in the photon pair are transmitted to both sides of the communication with the pulse.
- the communication parties announce the base used for the measurement through the common channel, and at this time, the part of the photons that Eve retains is measured using the same base as both sides of the communication, thereby obtaining a part of the key;
- the security of the long-distance entangled quantum key distribution communication method is extremely low, and the key is easily stolen by the eavesdropper.
- the embodiment of the invention provides an information processing method and device, which can estimate the degree of photon attack by the PNS in the entangled state quantum key distribution, thereby correcting the key information and improving the security of the key distribution.
- a first aspect of the present invention provides an information processing method, which is applied to an entangled state quantum key distribution communication between a first station and a second station, where the first station receives a plurality of pulses transmitted by the photon source,
- the pulses include a signal state pulse and a decoy state pulse, the number of photons in the signal state pulse being different from the probability distribution of photons in the decoy pulse, the photons in the plurality of pulses carrying key information; Calculating, by a station, a ratio estimate of the number of multiphoton-containing pulses of the plurality of pulses that are attacked by the photon number PNS, and a ratio estimate of the total number of the plurality of pulses; if the ratio estimate is less than a predetermined threshold, The first station performs error correction processing on the key information according to the ratio estimation value, and obtains a shared key of the first station and the second station.
- the first station discards the key information carried by photons in the plurality of pulses.
- the first station calculates a ratio estimation of the number of multi-photon-containing pulses that are attacked by the photon number PNS in the plurality of pulses, and the ratio of the total number of the plurality of pulses, specifically including
- the first station calculates a first detection gain of the signal state pulse of the plurality of pulses; the first detection gain is that the first station and the second station both detect photons in the same signal state pulse a ratio between the number of pulses and the total number of signal state pulses transmitted by the photon source;
- the first station calculates a second detection gain of the decoy pulse in the plurality of pulses; the second detection gain is The first station and the second station both detect a ratio between the number of pulses of photons and the total number of decoy pulses sent by the photon source in the same decoy pulse; Computing a gain, a second detection gain, a probability of generating a plurality of photon pairs in the signal state pulse, and a probability of generating a plurality of photon pairs in
- the method before the first station calculates the first detection gain of the plurality of pulses, the method further includes: the first station performing the plurality of pulses received by using an orthogonal basis vector Measure to determine a first pulse identification of the photon measured by the first station in the plurality of pulses received; The first station acquires a second pulse identifier of the photon measured in the plurality of pulses received by the second station; the first station determines an identifier of the plurality of pulses belonging to a signal state pulse and belongs to a decoy pulse Identification
- the first station calculates a first detection gain of the signal state pulse in the plurality of pulses, specifically: the first station according to the first pulse identifier, the second pulse identifier, and the An identifier of the plurality of pulses belonging to the signal state pulse, determining a number of pulses of the photon detected by the first station and the second station in the same signal state pulse; the first station according to the first station and the The second station detects the number of pulses of the photon in the same signal state pulse and the number of pulses of the signal state pulse in the plurality of pulses, and calculates a first detection gain of the signal state pulse in the plurality of pulses;
- the first station calculates a second detection gain of the signal state pulse in the plurality of pulses, specifically: the first station according to the first pulse identifier, the second pulse identifier, and the An identifier of the plurality of pulses belonging to the decoy pulse, determining a number of pulses of the photon detected by the first station and the second station in the same decoy pulse; the first station according to the first station and the The second station detects the number of pulses of the photon in the same decoy pulse and the number of pulses of the decoy pulse in the plurality of pulses, and calculates a second detection gain of the decoy pulse in the plurality of pulses.
- the acquiring, by the first station, the second pulse identifier of the photon measured in the plurality of pulses received by the second station comprises: the first station listening to the second station a second pulse identification of the photon measured in the plurality of pulses received by the second station notified by the classical channel;
- the method further includes:
- the first station notifies the second station of the first pulse identifier through the classic channel.
- the signal state pulse is pulse pumped for the photon source using a first pump intensity for a nonlinear material
- the decoy pulse is a second pump for the photon source Intensity produces pulsed pumping of nonlinear materials.
- a second aspect of the present invention provides an information processing apparatus, which is applied to a first station, where the first station and the second station perform entangled state quantum key distribution communication, and the information processing apparatus includes a receiving unit, a calculating unit, and a processing unit, and receives a unit, configured to receive a plurality of pulses sent by the photon source, the plurality of pulses comprising a signal state pulse and a decoy state pulse, wherein the number of photons in the signal state pulse is different from the probability distribution of the photon number in the decoy state pulse, The photons in the plurality of pulses carry key information; a computing unit, a ratio estimation value for calculating a number of pulses including multiphotons affected by the photon number PNS in the plurality of pulses, and a processing unit, configured to: if the ratio estimation value is smaller than a preset And the threshold value is used to perform error correction processing on the key information according to the ratio estimation value to obtain a shared key of the first station and the second station.
- a third aspect of the present invention provides an information processing apparatus, which is applied to a first station, where the first station and the second station perform entangled state quantum key distribution communication, and the information processing apparatus includes: a transceiver, a processor, and a memory; a memory for storing computer program instructions; the processor coupled to the memory for reading computer program instructions stored by the memory and performing the method as provided in the first aspect above.
- a fourth aspect of the present invention provides a program storage medium, which can implement the method provided by the above first aspect when the program stored in the program storage medium is executed.
- the first station receives a plurality of pulses sent by the photon source, where the plurality of pulses include a signal state pulse and a decoy state pulse, and the number of photons in the signal state pulse is different from the probability distribution of the photon number in the decoy pulse.
- the photons in the plurality of pulses carry key information
- the first station estimates an estimated value of the number of pulses including multiphotons that are attacked by the photon number PNS in the plurality of pulses, and the ratio of the total number of the plurality of pulses, if If the ratio estimation value is less than the preset threshold, the first station performs error correction processing on the key information according to the ratio estimation value, and obtains a shared key of the first station and the second station. This manner can estimate that the photon is attacked by the PNS. The degree, thus correcting the key information, and improving the security of key distribution.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of an information processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart diagram of another information processing method according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of an information processing apparatus according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of another information processing apparatus according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- FIG. 5 is a schematic structural diagram of still another information processing apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- the "calculation” mentioned in the embodiment of the present invention may be an approximate estimation method.
- FIG. 1 is a schematic flowchart of an information processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- the information processing method in the embodiment of the present invention may be applied to an entangled state quantum key distribution communication between a first station and a second station, such as The figure shows that the information processing method of this embodiment includes steps S100-S102;
- the first station receives a plurality of pulses sent by the photon source, where the plurality of pulses include a signal state pulse and a decoy state pulse, and the number of photons in the signal state pulse is different from the probability distribution of the photon number in the decoy pulse.
- the photons in the plurality of pulses carry key information;
- the photon source used in the embodiment of the present invention includes, but is not limited to, a non-ideal entangled photon source using a principle of parametric down conversion, four-wave mixing, etc., for example, the photon source may also be double-excited by using quantum dots.
- Embodiments of the present invention are applicable to a QKD system in which an entangled photon source is in the middle of a communication or a photon source is at one of the communication sites.
- the photon source is described as an example between the two communicating parties. Of course, this does not constitute a limitation of the present invention.
- the plurality of pulses include a signal state pulse and a decoy state pulse
- the number of the decoy state pulses may be one or more, and the power of pumping each decoy state pulse may be arbitrarily selected.
- the probability distribution of the photon number of the signal state pulse and the decoy state pulse is different. Generally, the probability of occurrence of a single photon of a signal state pulse is greater than the probability of occurrence of a multiphoton. The probability of occurrence of a single photon of a decoy pulse is less than the probability of occurrence of a multiphoton.
- the attacker Eve For a pulse containing a plurality of photons, the attacker Eve retains part of the photons, and then transmits the remaining photons to the communication parties by using the channel with extremely low loss.
- the communication parties in the embodiment of the present invention are the first station and the second station.
- the photons of the signal state pulses and/or the decoy state pulses of the plurality of pulses carry key information.
- the number of spoofing pulses is taken as an example.
- the first station and the second station have a quantum channel and a classic channel; there is a reliable site (Charlie) at the midpoint of the channel, the Charlie is a photon source; Charlie can select two
- the pumping intensity (P ⁇ , P ⁇ ′ ) is used to pulse pump the nonlinear material, wherein the pulse generated by pumping intensity P ⁇ is a signal state pulse, and the pump intensity of P ⁇ ′ is a decoy pulse.
- Charlie chooses which intensity to use for pumping is completely random.
- Charlie sends the entangled photons in the generated pulses through the quantum channel to the first station and the second station.
- the first station calculates a ratio estimation value of a number of multi-photon-containing pulses that are attacked by a photon number PNS among the plurality of pulses, and a total number of the plurality of pulses;
- the first station and the second station randomly measure the received pulse by using two mutually orthogonal base vectors to determine whether a photon is detected in the pulse; after the communication ends, Charlie announces that Among the transmitted pulses, which are signal state pulses and which are decoyed pulses, that is, the pump intensity of each pulse is declared; the first station and the second station calculate the detection gain and deception state of the signal state pulse according to the announced result.
- the detection gain of the pulse Q ⁇ , Q ⁇ ′ using the above parameters, the first station and the second station can estimate the proportion of the pulse of the unobscured PNS attack, and remove the information that Eve may obtain in the information processing such as secret amplification, and finally Get the shared key of the first site and the second site secure.
- the decoy state pulse is introduced through different pumping intensities; since the probability distribution of the decoy state pulse and the signal state pulse photon number is different, other properties ( The polarization, frequency, pulse width, etc. are exactly the same, so the eavesdropper can't distinguish between the two. All that can be done is to perform the same PNS attack on the decoy pulse and the signal state pulse.
- the first station performs error correction processing on the key information according to the estimated value, and obtains sharing between the first site and the second site. Key.
- the PNS attack degree is acceptable, and the connection is received.
- the received key information is subjected to error correction processing, and a shared key of the first station and the second station can be obtained.
- the first station receives a plurality of pulses sent by the photon source, where the plurality of pulses include a signal state pulse and a decoy state pulse, and the number of photons in the signal state pulse is different from the probability distribution of the photon number in the decoy pulse.
- the photons in the plurality of pulses carry key information
- the first station calculates a ratio estimation of the number of pulses including multiphotons attacked by the photon number PNS in the plurality of pulses, and the ratio of the total number of the plurality of pulses, if If the ratio estimation value is less than the preset threshold, the first station performs error correction processing on the key information according to the ratio estimation value, and obtains a shared key of the first station and the second station, so that the entangled state quantum key can be estimated.
- the photon is attacked by the PNS, so that the key information is corrected and the security of the key distribution is improved.
- FIG. 2 is a schematic flowchart of another information processing method according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- the information processing method according to the embodiment of the present invention is optimized based on the information processing method of FIG. 1, and the present invention is as shown in the figure.
- the information processing method of the embodiment includes steps S200-S205;
- the first station receives a plurality of pulses sent by the photon source, where the plurality of pulses include a signal state pulse and a decoy state pulse, and the number of photons in the signal state pulse is different from the probability distribution of photons in the decoy pulse.
- the photons in the plurality of pulses carry key information;
- step S200 of the embodiment of the present invention refer to the step S100 of the embodiment of FIG. 1 , and details are not described herein again.
- the first station calculates a first detection gain of the signal state pulse in the plurality of pulses; the first detection gain is detected by the first station and the second station in the same signal state pulse a ratio between the number of pulses of photons and the total number of signal state pulses transmitted by the photon source;
- the first station calculates a second detection gain of the decoy pulse in the plurality of pulses; the second detection gain is detected by the first station and the second station in the same decoy pulse The ratio between the number of pulses of photons and the total number of decoys pulses sent by the photon source;
- the first station according to the first detection gain, the second detection gain, a probability of generating a plurality of photon pairs in the signal state pulse, and a probability of generating a plurality of photon pairs in the decoy pulse.
- a ratio estimate of the number of pulses comprising multiphotons attacked by the number of photons PNS in the plurality of pulses is calculated as a percentage of the total number of the plurality of pulses.
- the processing process of the first station and the second station is the same, and the first detection gain of the signal state pulse in the plurality of pulses and the second detection increase of the decoy pulse in the plurality of pulses are calculated.
- the number of spoofing pulses may include one or more.
- the embodiment of the present invention exemplifies a decoy pulse.
- Pulse pumping wherein the pulse generated by the pump intensity P ⁇ is a signal state pulse, and the pump intensity of P ⁇ ′ is a decoy pulse. At any given moment, Charlie chooses which intensity to use for pumping is completely random. Later, Charlie sends the two entangled photons through the quantum channel and sends them to the communicating parties.
- the first station and the second station randomly select one of the two orthogonal basis vectors, respectively, to measure the received pulse to determine whether the photon is included in the pulse, if the first station measures a pulse included
- the photon records the first pulse identifier of the pulse. If the second station detects that a pulse contains a photon, the second pulse identifier of the pulse is recorded.
- the first station and the second station announce through the classical channel which pulses each detected photons (ie, the pulse identification of each detected photon through the classical channel).
- the first station and the second station can determine which of the multiple pulses belong to the signal state pulse according to the pump intensity used by each pulse, which are deceptive states. pulse. Therefore, the first station and the second station may determine that the first station and the second station detect in the same signal state pulse according to the first pulse identifier, the second pulse identifier, and the identifier of the plurality of pulses belonging to the signal state pulse.
- the number of pulses to the photon further, the number of pulses of the photon detected in the same signal state pulse of the first station and the second station and the number of pulses belonging to the signal state pulse among the plurality of pulses may be calculated The first detection gain of the signal state pulse.
- the first station and the second station may determine that the first station and the second station are in the same decoy state pulse according to the first pulse identifier, the second pulse identifier, and the identifier of the plurality of pulses belonging to the decoy pulse.
- the number of pulses of photons detected, and further, the number of pulses of the photons detected in the same decoy pulse in the first station and the second station and the number of pulses belonging to the decoy pulse in the plurality of pulses may be calculated The second detection gain of the decoy pulse in the pulse.
- the formula for calculating the estimated value ⁇ provided by the embodiment of the present invention is merely an optional embodiment and does not constitute a limitation of the present invention.
- the first station and the second station correct the obtained key information, and use ⁇ to remove the information that Eve may obtain in the secret amplification, and finally obtain a reliable shared key.
- the first station performs error correction processing on the key information according to the ratio estimation value, to obtain sharing between the first station and the second station. Key.
- step S204 of the embodiment of the present invention refer to step S102 of the embodiment of FIG. 1 , and details are not described herein again.
- the first station discards the key information carried by the photons in the multiple pulses.
- the PNS attack degree is relatively large, and the first station and the second station may abandon the The secondary communication, that is, the first station and the second station both discard the key information carried by the photons in the plurality of pulses.
- the first station receives a plurality of pulses sent by the photon source, where the plurality of pulses include a signal state pulse and a decoy state pulse, and the number of photons in the signal state pulse is different from the probability distribution of the photon number in the decoy pulse.
- the photons in the plurality of pulses carry key information
- the first station calculates a ratio estimation of the number of pulses including multiphotons attacked by the photon number PNS in the plurality of pulses, and the ratio of the total number of the plurality of pulses, if If the ratio estimation value is less than the preset threshold, the first station performs error correction processing on the key information according to the ratio estimation value, and obtains a shared key of the first station and the second station, so that the entangled state quantum key can be estimated.
- the photon is attacked by the PNS, so that the key information is corrected and the security of the key distribution is improved.
- FIG. 3 is a schematic structural diagram of an information processing apparatus according to an embodiment of the present disclosure.
- the information processing apparatus is applied to a first station, where the first station and the second station perform entangled state quantum key distribution communication, such as As shown in the figure, the information processing apparatus of this embodiment includes:
- the receiving unit 100 is configured to receive a plurality of pulses sent by the photon source, where the plurality of pulses include a signal state pulse and a decoy state pulse, and the number of photons in the signal state pulse and the probability distribution of photons in the decoy pulse Differentiating, photons in the plurality of pulses carry key information;
- the calculating unit 101 is configured to calculate a ratio estimation value of the number of the multi-photon-containing pulses that are attacked by the photon number PNS in the plurality of pulses, and the total number of the plurality of pulses;
- the calculating unit 101 calculates, by the calculating unit 101, the estimated number of the multi-photon-containing pulses that are attacked by the photon number PNS in the plurality of pulses, and the estimated value of the total number of the plurality of pulses, specifically:
- the first detection gain is a number of pulses in which the first station and the second station both detect photons in the same signal state pulse The ratio between the total number of signal state pulses transmitted by the photon source;
- the second detection gain is a number of pulses in which the first station and the second station both detect photons in the same decoy pulse The ratio between the total number of decoy pulses sent by the photon source;
- the number of pulses containing multiphotons attacked by the photon number PNS accounts for a proportional estimate of the total number of pulses.
- the processing unit 102 is configured to: perform error correction processing on the key information according to the ratio estimation value, to obtain a shared secret of the first station and the second station, if the estimated value of the ratio is less than a preset threshold. key.
- processing unit 102 is further configured to discard the key information carried by photons in the plurality of pulses if the estimated value is greater than the preset threshold.
- FIG. 4 is a schematic structural diagram of another information processing apparatus according to an embodiment of the present invention.
- the information processing apparatus of the embodiment of the present invention includes a measurement unit 103, in addition to the structure of FIG.
- the measuring unit 103 is configured to measure the received plurality of pulses by using an orthogonal basis vector to determine a first pulse identifier of the photon measured by the first station in the received plurality of pulses;
- the acquiring unit 104 is configured to acquire a second pulse identifier of the photon measured in the plurality of pulses received by the second station;
- a determining unit 105 configured to determine an identifier of the plurality of pulses belonging to a signal state pulse and an identifier belonging to a decoy pulse;
- the calculation unit 101 calculates the first detection gain of the signal state pulse in the plurality of pulses, and specifically includes:
- the calculation unit 101 calculates a second detection gain of the signal state pulse in the plurality of pulses, and specifically includes:
- the obtaining, by the acquiring unit 104, the second pulse identifier of the photon measured in the plurality of pulses received by the second station specifically includes:
- the device also includes:
- the notifying unit 106 is configured to notify the second station of the first pulse identifier by using the classic channel.
- the signal state pulse is generated by pulse pumping the nonlinear material by using the first pump intensity of the photon source, and the decoy pulse is for the photon source to pulse the nonlinear material by using the second pump intensity. Pump generated.
- the first station receives a plurality of pulses sent by the photon source, where the plurality of pulses include a signal state pulse and a decoy state pulse, and the number of photons in the signal state pulse is different from the probability distribution of the photon number in the decoy pulse.
- the photons in the plurality of pulses carry key information
- the first station calculates a ratio estimation of the number of pulses including multiphotons attacked by the photon number PNS in the plurality of pulses, and the ratio of the total number of the plurality of pulses, if If the estimated ratio is less than a preset threshold, the first station is based on the estimated value pair
- the key information is subjected to error correction processing to obtain a shared key of the first station and the second station. In this way, the degree of photon suppression by the PNS in the entangled state quantum key distribution can be estimated, thereby correcting the key information. Improve the security of key distribution.
- the information processing apparatus of this embodiment may be applied to a first station, where the first station and the second station perform entangled state quantum key distribution communication.
- the information processing apparatus may include a transceiver 301 and a processor 302.
- the processor 302 is for controlling the operation of the apparatus, including transmitting (including receiving and/or transmitting) data through the transceiver 301.
- a memory 303 may be included.
- the memory 303 may include a read only memory and a random access memory for providing instructions and data to the processor 302.
- the memory 303 can be integrated into the processor 302 or can be independent of the processor 302.
- a portion of the memory 303 may also include non-volatile line random access memory (NVRAM).
- NVRAM non-volatile line random access memory
- bus system 304 includes a power bus, a control bus, and a status signal bus in addition to the data bus.
- bus system 304 includes a power bus, a control bus, and a status signal bus in addition to the data bus.
- bus system 304 includes a power bus, a control bus, and a status signal bus in addition to the data bus.
- bus system 304 includes a power bus, a control bus, and a status signal bus in addition to the data bus.
- various buses are labeled as bus system 304 in the figure.
- the flow disclosed in the embodiment of the present application may be applied to the processor 302 or implemented by the processor 302.
- the steps of the process implemented by the device may be completed by an integrated logic circuit of hardware in the processor 302 or an instruction in the form of software.
- the processor 302 can be a general-purpose processor, a digital signal processor, an application specific integrated circuit, a field programmable gate array or other programmable logic device, a discrete gate or a transistor logic device, and a discrete hardware component, which can be implemented or executed in the embodiment of the present application.
- a general purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor or the like.
- the steps of the method disclosed in the embodiments of the present application may be directly implemented as a hardware processor, or may be performed by a combination of hardware and software modules in the processor.
- the software module can be located in a conventional storage medium such as random access memory, flash memory, read only memory, programmable read only memory or electrically erasable programmable memory, registers, and the like.
- the storage medium is located in the memory 303, and the processor 302 reads the information in the memory 303, and completes the steps of the instruction flow of the embodiment of the present invention in combination with the hardware thereof.
- the transceiver 301 is configured to receive a plurality of pulses sent by the photon source, where the plurality of pulses include a signal state pulse and a decoy state pulse, and the number of photons in the signal state pulse and the probability distribution of photons in the decoy pulse Differentiating, photons in the plurality of pulses carry key information;
- the processor 302 is configured to calculate a ratio estimation value of the number of the multi-photon-containing pulses that are attacked by the photon number PNS in the plurality of pulses, and the total number of the plurality of pulses;
- the processor 302 is further configured to perform error correction processing on the key information according to the ratio estimation value, if the ratio estimation value is less than a preset threshold, to obtain a shared secret between the first station and the second station. key.
- the processor 302 is further configured to discard the key information carried by the photons in the multiple pulses if the estimated value of the ratio is greater than the preset threshold.
- the processor 302 calculates, by the processor 302, the estimated number of the multi-photon-containing pulses that are attacked by the photon number PNS in the plurality of pulses, and the estimated value of the total number of the plurality of pulses, specifically:
- the first detection gain is a number of pulses in which the first station and the second station both detect photons in the same signal state pulse The ratio between the total number of signal state pulses transmitted by the photon source;
- the second detection gain is a number of pulses in which the first station and the second station both detect photons in the same decoy pulse The ratio between the total number of decoy pulses sent by the photon source;
- the number of pulses containing multiphotons attacked by the photon number PNS accounts for a proportional estimate of the total number of pulses.
- the processor 302 is further configured to measure the received plurality of pulses by using an orthogonal basis vector to determine a first pulse identifier of the photon measured by the first station in the received plurality of pulses;
- the processor 302 is further configured to acquire a second pulse identifier of the photon measured in the plurality of pulses received by the second station;
- the processor 302 is further configured to determine an identifier of the plurality of pulses belonging to a signal state pulse and an identifier belonging to a decoy pulse;
- the processor 302 calculates a first detection gain specific packet of the signal state pulse in the plurality of pulses include:
- the calculating, by the processor 302, the second detection gain of the signal state pulse in the plurality of pulses includes:
- the acquiring, by the processor 302, the second pulse identifier of the photon measured by the second station is:
- the transceiver 301 is further configured to notify the second station of the first pulse identifier by using the classic channel.
- the signal state pulse is generated by pulse pumping the nonlinear material by using the first pump intensity of the photon source, and the decoy state pulse is used for pulse pumping of the nonlinear material by using the second pump intensity.
- the first station receives a plurality of pulses sent by the photon source, where the plurality of pulses include a signal state pulse and a decoy state pulse, and the number of photons in the signal state pulse is different from the probability distribution of the photon number in the decoy pulse.
- the photons in the plurality of pulses carry key information
- the first station calculates a ratio estimation of the number of pulses including multiphotons attacked by the photon number PNS in the plurality of pulses, and the ratio of the total number of the plurality of pulses, if If the estimated ratio is less than a preset threshold, the first station is based on the estimated value pair
- the key information is subjected to error correction processing to obtain a shared key of the first station and the second station. In this way, the degree of photon suppression by the PNS in the entangled state quantum key distribution can be estimated, thereby correcting the key information. Improve the security of key distribution.
- the storage medium may be a magnetic disk, an optical disk, a read-only memory (ROM), or a random access memory (RAM).
- the units in the information processing apparatus of the embodiment of the present invention may be combined, divided, and deleted according to actual needs.
- the components of the microcontroller and the like may be implemented by a general-purpose integrated circuit, such as a central processing unit (CPU), or an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC).
- a general-purpose integrated circuit such as a central processing unit (CPU), or an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC).
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- Optical Modulation, Optical Deflection, Nonlinear Optics, Optical Demodulation, Optical Logic Elements (AREA)
Abstract
一种信息处理方法及装置,该信息处理方法包括:第一站点接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,所述多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,所述信号态脉冲中的光子数与所述诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,所述多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息;所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值;若所述比例估计值小于预设阈值,则所述第一站点根据所述比例估计值对所述密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得所述第一站点和所述第二站点的共享密钥。通过本发明可以估算出光子受到PNS攻击的程度,从而对密钥信息进行纠错,提高密钥分发的安全性。
Description
本发明涉及量子通信技术领域,尤其涉及一种信息处理方法及装置。
根据量子比特不可克隆原理,量子密钥分发(quantum key distribution,QKD)具有无条件的安全性。然而较短的通信距离一直局限着QKD实际应用的推广。在基于纠缠态的QKD协议(BBM92协议)中,在通信中点的光子源向通信双方各发送一个光子,因此理论上其通信距离可扩展至传统BB84协议的两倍。然而实际中,由于完美的纠缠光子源很难实现,通常使用参量下转换(parametric down conversion,PDC)或四波混频(four wave mixing,FWM)等非线性过程以一定几率在一个脉冲中产生一对纠缠的光子对,或者这种光子源以一定几率在一个脉冲中产生相互纠缠的多对光子对,光子对中两个纠缠的光子分别随脉冲向通信双方发送。
然而,这一现象会导致窃听者(Eve)可利用光子数攻击(photon-number splitting attack,PNS attack)窃取这些相互纠缠的多对光子中的一个或多个且保证不被发现,从而获得通信双方的密钥信息、导致QKD系统的安全传输距离和安全密钥的生成率大大下降。Eve具体窃取过程如下:
a)Eve对Charlie(光子源)发向通信双方的脉冲进行光子数测量,对于含多个光子的脉冲,Eve保留部分光子,之后利用损耗极低的信道,将剩下的光子发送给通信双方;
b)在通信结束后,通信双方通过公共信道宣布其测量使用的基底,此时Eve对其保留的那部分光子使用与通信双方相同的基底进行测量,从而获得一部分密钥;
c)在极限条件下(一个脉冲里多个光子对产生的概率大于信道损耗),Eve可阻挡所有单光子脉冲,PNS攻击所有多光子脉冲。这样通信双方的密钥全部由多光子脉冲产生,而两人并不能发现通信异常。此时Eve可拥有全部密钥。
从上述可以看出,对于远距离的纠缠态量子密钥分发通信方式安全性极低,密钥很容易被窃听者窃取。
发明内容
本发明实施例提供了一种信息处理方法及装置,可以估算出纠缠态量子密钥分发中光子受到PNS攻击的程度,从而对密钥信息进行纠错,提高密钥分发的安全性。
本发明第一方面提供一种信息处理方法,该信息处理方法应用于第一站点与第二站点的纠缠态量子密钥分发通信中,第一站点接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,所述多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,所述信号态脉冲中的光子数与所述诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,所述多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息;所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值;若所述比例估计值小于预设阈值,则所述第一站点根据所述比例估计值对所述密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得所述第一站点和所述第二站点的共享密钥。
在一种可能的设计中,若所述比例估计值大于所述预设阈值,则所述第一站点丢弃所述多个脉冲中的光子携带的所述密钥信息。
在另一种可能的设计中,所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值,具体包括:所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益;所述第一探测增益为所述第一站点和所述第二站点均在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量与所述光子源发送的信号态脉冲的总数量之间的比值;所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的第二探测增益;所述第二探测增益为所述第一站点和所述第二站点均在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量与所述光子源发送的诱骗态脉冲的总数量之间的比值;所述第一站点根据所述第一探测增益、所述第二探测增益、所述信号态脉冲中产生多个光子对的概率以及所述诱骗态脉冲中产生多个光子对的概率,计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值。
在又一种可能的设计中,所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中的第一探测增益之前,还包括:所述第一站点采用正交基矢对接收的所述多个脉冲进行测量,以确定所述第一站点在接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第一脉冲标识;所述
第一站点获取所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识;所述第一站点确定所述多个脉冲中属于信号态脉冲的标识和属于诱骗态脉冲的标识;
可选的,所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益,具体包括:所述第一站点根据所述第一脉冲标识、所述第二脉冲标识以及所述多个脉冲中属于信号态脉冲的标识,确定所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量;所述第一站点根据所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量和所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的脉冲数量,计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益;
可选的,所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第二探测增益,具体包括:所述第一站点根据所述第一脉冲标识、所述第二脉冲标识以及所述多个脉冲中属于诱骗态脉冲的标识,确定所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量;所述第一站点根据所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量和所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的脉冲数量,计算所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的第二探测增益。
在又一种可能的设计中,所述第一站点获取所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识具体包括:所述第一站点监听所述第二站点通过经典信道通知的所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识;
进一步可选的,所述方法还包括:
所述第一站点通过所述经典信道向所述第二站点通知所述第一脉冲标识。
在又一种可能的设计中,所述信号态脉冲为所述光子源采用第一泵浦强度对非线性材料进行脉冲泵浦产生,所述诱骗态脉冲为所述光子源采用第二泵浦强度对非线性材料进行脉冲泵浦产生。
本发明第二方面提供一种信息处理装置,应用于第一站点,该第一站点与第二站点进行纠缠态量子密钥分发通信,该信息处理装置包括接收单元、计算单元和处理单元,接收单元,用于接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,所述多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,所述信号态脉冲中的光子数与所述诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,所述多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息;计算单元,
用于计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值;处理单元,用于若所述比例估计值小于预设阈值,则根据所述比例估计值对所述密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得所述第一站点和所述第二站点的共享密钥。
本发明第三方面提供一种信息处理装置,应用于第一站点,该第一站点与第二站点进行纠缠态量子密钥分发通信,该信息处理装置包括:收发器、处理器和存储器;所述存储器,用于存储计算机程序指令;所述处理器,耦合到所述存储器,用于读取所述存储器存储的计算机程序指令,并执行如上第一方面所提供的方法。
本发明第四方面还提供一种程序存储介质,该程序存储介质所存储的程序被执行时,可以实现上述第一方面所提供的方法。
本发明实施例中,第一站点接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,该多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,信号态脉冲中的光子数与诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,该多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息,该第一站点估算多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值,若该比例估计值小于预设阈值,则该第一站点根据比例估计值对密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得第一站点和第二站点的共享密钥,这种方式可以估算出光子受到PNS攻击的程度,从而对密钥信息进行纠错,提高密钥分发的安全性。
为了更清楚地说明本发明实施例或现有技术中的技术方案,下面将对实施例中所需要使用的附图作简单地介绍,显而易见地,下面描述中的附图仅仅是本发明的一些实施例,对于本领域普通技术人员来讲,在不付出创造性劳动的前提下,还可以根据这些附图获得其他的附图。
图1为本发明实施例提供的一种信息处理方法的流程示意图;
图2为本发明实施例提供的另一种信息处理方法的流程示意图;
图3为本发明实施例提供的一种信息处理装置的结构示意图;
图4为本发明实施例提供的另一种信息处理装置的结构示意图;
图5为本发明实施例提供的又一种信息处理装置的结构示意图。
下面将结合本发明实施例中的附图,对本发明实施例中的技术方案进行清楚、完整地描述,显然,所描述的实施例仅仅是本发明一部分实施例,而不是全部的实施例。基于本发明中的实施例,本领域普通技术人员在没有作出创造性劳动前提下所获得的所有其他实施例,都属于本发明保护的范围。
本发明实施例中所提及的“计算”可以是一种大概的估算方法。
请参照图1,为本发明实施例提供的一种信息处理方法的流程示意图,本发明实施例的信息处理方法可以应用于第一站点与第二站点的纠缠态量子密钥分发通信中,如图所示,本实施例的信息处理方法包括步骤S100-S102;
S100,第一站点接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,所述多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,所述信号态脉冲中的光子数与所述诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,所述多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息;
本发明实施例中,本发明实施例所使用的光子源包含但不局限于使用参量下转换、四波混频等原理的非理想纠缠光子源,比如,光子源也可以是利用量子点双激子等原理产生的其他种类的纠缠光子源。本发明实施例适用于纠缠光子源在通信双方中间,或者光子源在其中一个通信站点的QKD系统。在本发明实施例中,以光子源在通信双方中间为例进行说明,当然这并不构成对本发明的限定。
本发明实施例中,多个脉冲中包括信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,该诱骗态脉冲的数量可以为一个或者多个,并且泵浦各个诱骗态脉冲的功率可任意选择。信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲的光子数概率分布不同,通常信号态脉冲单光子出现的概率大于多光子出现的概率,诱骗态脉冲单光子出现的概率小于多光子出现的概率。对于含多个光子的脉冲,攻击者Eve保留部分光子,之后利用损耗极低的信道,将剩下的光子发送给通信双方,本发明实施例的通信双方为第一站点和第二站点。该多个脉冲中信号态脉冲和/或诱骗态脉冲的光子携带密钥信息。
这里以诱骗态脉冲的个数为一个进行举例,第一站点和第二站点拥有量
子信道和经典信道;在信道的中点有一可靠站点(Charlie),该Charlie为光子源;Charlie可选择两个泵浦强度(Pμ,Pμ′)对非线性材料进行脉冲泵浦,其中泵浦强度为Pμ产生的脉冲为信号态脉冲,泵浦强度为Pμ′产生的为诱骗态脉冲。在任意时刻,Charlie选择使用哪种强度进行泵浦是完全随机的。之后,Charlie将产生的脉冲中的纠缠光子通过量子信道,分别发送给第一站点和第二站点。
S101,所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值;
本发明实施例中,第一站点和第二站点分别随机使用两种相互正交的基矢对接收到的脉冲进行测量,从而确定在该脉冲中是否检测到光子;通信结束后,Charlie宣布所发送的脉冲中,哪些为信号态脉冲,哪些为诱骗态脉冲,即是宣布各个脉冲所采用泵浦强度;第一站点和第二站点根据宣布结果,计算出信号态脉冲的探测增益和诱骗态脉冲的探测增益Qμ,Qμ′;利用上述参数,第一站点和第二站点可以估算出未受窃听者PNS攻击的脉冲比例,在保密放大等信息处理中除去Eve可能获得的信息,最终得到第一站点和第二站点安全的共享密钥。
根据本发明实施例提出的基于诱骗态与纠缠态的量子密钥分发方法,通过不同的泵浦强度引入诱骗态脉冲;由于诱骗态脉冲和信号态脉冲除光子数概率分布不同外,其他性质(偏振,频率,脉冲宽度等)完全相同,因此窃听者无法分辨两者,其所能做的就是对诱骗态脉冲与信号态脉冲进行同样的PNS攻击。我们能够利用诱骗态脉冲的增益,估算出整个PNS攻击的程度,即为“未受PNS攻击的脉冲数所占比例”设定一个合理的下限,而不是简单的将全部多光子脉冲视作被PNS攻击。我们能在后续信息处理,特别是保密放大中,避免丢掉不必要的信息,因此提高了安全密钥的最大生成率和最远通信距离,具有较强的应用价值。
S102,若所述比例估计值小于预设阈值,则所述第一站点根据所述比例估计值对所述密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得所述第一站点和所述第二站点的共享密钥。
本发明实施例中,若受到PNS攻击的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值小于预设阈值,则说明PNS攻击程度可以接受,通过对所接
收的密钥信息进行纠错处理,可以获得第一站点和第二站点的共享密钥。
本发明实施例中,第一站点接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,该多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,信号态脉冲中的光子数与诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,该多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息,该第一站点计算多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值,若该比例估计值小于预设阈值,则该第一站点根据比例估计值对密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得第一站点和第二站点的共享密钥,这种方式可以估算出纠缠态量子密钥分发中光子受到PNS攻击的程度,从而对密钥信息进行纠错,提高密钥分发的安全性。
请参照图2,为本发明实施例提供的另一种信息处理方法的流程示意图,本发明实施例的信息处理方法是在图1的信息处理方法基础上优化得到,如图所示,本发明实施例的信息处理方法包括步骤S200-S205;
S200,第一站点接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,所述多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,所述信号态脉冲中的光子数与所述诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,所述多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息;
本发明实施例步骤S200请参照图1的实施例步骤S100,在此不再赘述。
S201,所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益;所述第一探测增益为所述第一站点和所述第二站点均在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量与所述光子源发送的信号态脉冲的总数量之间的比值;
S202,所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的第二探测增益;所述第二探测增益为所述第一站点和所述第二站点均在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量与所述光子源发送的诱骗态脉冲的总数量之间的比值;
S203,所述第一站点根据所述第一探测增益、所述第二探测增益、所述信号态脉冲中产生多个光子对的概率以及所述诱骗态脉冲中产生多个光子对的概率,计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值。
本发明实施例中,第一站点与第二站点的处理过程相同,均计算该多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益以及该多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的第二探测增
益,诱骗态脉冲的个数可以包括一个或者多个,本发明实施例以诱骗态脉冲为一个进行举例说明。
第一站点和第二站点之间拥有量子信道和经典信道,在信道中的中点有一可靠站点(Charlie);Charlie可选择两个泵浦强度(Pμ,Pμ′)对非线性材料进行脉冲泵浦,其中泵浦强度为Pμ产生的脉冲为信号态脉冲,泵浦强度为Pμ′产生的为诱骗态脉冲。在任意时刻,Charlie选择使用哪种强度进行泵浦是完全随机的。之后,Charlie将产生的两个纠缠光子通过量子信道,分别发送给通信双方。
第一站点和第二站点分别随机地从两个正交的基矢中选择一个,对接收到的脉冲进行测量,以确定该脉冲中是否包含光子,若第一站点测得某一个脉冲中包含光子,则记录该脉冲的第一脉冲标识,若第二站点测得某一个脉冲中包含光子,则记录该脉冲的第二脉冲标识。通信结束后,第一站点和第二站点通过经典信道宣布各自在哪些脉冲探测到了光子(即是通过经典信道宣布各自探测到光子的脉冲标识)。
同时Charlie通过经典信道宣布其每个脉冲使用的泵浦强度,第一站点和第二站点可以根据每个脉冲使用的泵浦强度确定该多个脉冲中哪些属于信号态脉冲,哪些是属于诱骗态脉冲。由此第一站点和第二站点可以根据上述第一脉冲标识、第二脉冲标识以及该多个脉冲中属于信号态脉冲的标识,确定该第一站点和第二站点在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量,进一步,可以根据第一站点和第二站点在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量和该多个脉冲中属于信号态脉冲的脉冲数量,计算出该多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益。同理,该第一站点和第二站点可以根据上述第一脉冲标识、第二脉冲标识以及该多个脉冲中属于诱骗态脉冲的标识,确定该第一站点和第二站点在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量,进一步,可以根据第一站点和第二站点在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量和该多个脉冲中属于诱骗态脉冲的脉冲数量,计算出该多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的第二探测增益。
由公式Ω≥1-P2(μ)Qμ′/P2(μ′)Qμ,可以估算出对未受PNS攻击的脉冲数量占该多个脉冲总数量的比例估计值Ω,需要说明的是,本发明实施例提供的计算比例估计值Ω的公式仅仅为一种可选的实施方式,并不构成本发明的限定。该
第一站点和第二站点对得到的密钥信息进行纠错,并利用Ω,在保密放大中除去Eve可能获得的信息,最终获得可靠的共享密钥。
S204,若所述比例估计值小于预设阈值,则所述第一站点根据所述比例估计值对所述密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得所述第一站点和所述第二站点的共享密钥。
本发明实施例步骤S204请参照图1的实施例步骤S102,在此不再赘述。
S205,若所述比例估计值大于所述预设阈值,则所述第一站点丢弃所述多个脉冲中的光子携带的所述密钥信息。
本发明实施例中,若受到PNS攻击的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值大于预设阈值,则说明PNS攻击程度比较大,第一站点和第二站点可以放弃此次通信,即是第一站点和第二站点均丢弃该多个脉冲中的光子携带的密钥信息。
本发明实施例中,第一站点接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,该多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,信号态脉冲中的光子数与诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,该多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息,该第一站点计算多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值,若该比例估计值小于预设阈值,则该第一站点根据比例估计值对密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得第一站点和第二站点的共享密钥,这种方式可以估算出纠缠态量子密钥分发中光子受到PNS攻击的程度,从而对密钥信息进行纠错,提高密钥分发的安全性。
请参照图3,为本发明实施例提供的一种信息处理装置的结构示意图,该信息处理装置应用于第一站点,所述第一站点与第二站点进行纠缠态量子密钥分发通信,如图所示,该实施例的信息处理装置包括:
接收单元100,用于接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,所述多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,所述信号态脉冲中的光子数与所述诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,所述多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息;
计算单元101,用于计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值;
具体可选的,所述计算单元101计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值具体包括:
计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益;所述第一探测增益为所述第一站点和所述第二站点均在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量与所述光子源发送的信号态脉冲的总数量之间的比值;
计算所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的第二探测增益;所述第二探测增益为所述第一站点和所述第二站点均在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量与所述光子源发送的诱骗态脉冲的总数量之间的比值;
根据所述第一探测增益、所述第二探测增益、所述信号态脉冲中产生多个光子对的概率以及所述诱骗态脉冲中产生多个光子对的概率,计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值。
处理单元102,用于若所述比例估计值小于预设阈值,则根据所述比例估计值对所述密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得所述第一站点和所述第二站点的共享密钥。
进一步可选的,所述处理单元102还用于若所述比例估计值大于所述预设阈值,则丢弃所述多个脉冲中的光子携带的所述密钥信息。
请一并参照图4,为本发明实施例提供的另一种信息处理装置的结构示意图,如图所示,本发明实施例的信息处理装置除了包括图3的结构,还包括测量单元103、获取单元104、确定单元105以及通知单元106:
测量单元103,用于采用正交基矢对接收的所述多个脉冲进行测量,以确定所述第一站点在接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第一脉冲标识;
获取单元104,用于获取所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识;
确定单元105,用于确定所述多个脉冲中属于信号态脉冲的标识和属于诱骗态脉冲的标识;
所述计算单元101计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益具体包括:
根据所述第一脉冲标识、所述第二脉冲标识以及所述多个脉冲中属于信号态脉冲的标识,确定所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量;
根据所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量和所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的脉冲数量,计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益;
所述计算单元101计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第二探测增益具体包括:
根据所述第一脉冲标识、所述第二脉冲标识以及所述多个脉冲中属于诱骗态脉冲的标识,确定所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量;
根据所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量和所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的脉冲数量,计算所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的第二探测增益。
所述获取单元104获取所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识具体包括:
监听所述第二站点通过经典信道通知的所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识;
所述装置还包括:
通知单元106,用于通过所述经典信道向所述第二站点通知所述第一脉冲标识。
可选的,上述信号态脉冲为所述光子源采用第一泵浦强度对非线性材料进行脉冲泵浦产生,上述诱骗态脉冲为所述光子源采用第二泵浦强度对非线性材料进行脉冲泵浦产生。
本发明实施例中,第一站点接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,该多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,信号态脉冲中的光子数与诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,该多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息,该第一站点计算多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值,若该比例估计值小于预设阈值,则该第一站点根据比例估计值对
密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得第一站点和第二站点的共享密钥,这种方式可以估算出纠缠态量子密钥分发中光子受到PNS攻击的程度,从而对密钥信息进行纠错,提高密钥分发的安全性。
可以理解的是,上述信息处理装置中各个单元的具体实现方式可以进一步参考方法实施例中的相关描述。
请参照图5,为本发明实施例提供的又一种信息处理装置,本实施例的信息处理装置可以应用于第一站点,所述第一站点与第二站点进行纠缠态量子密钥分发通信,该信息处理装置可包括:收发器301和处理器302。处理器302用于控制该装置的操作,包括通过收发器301进行数据的传输(包括接收和/或发送)。进一步的,还可以包括存储器303,存储器303可以包括只读存储器和随机存取存储器,用于向处理器302提供指令和数据。存储器303可以集成于处理器302中,也可以独立于处理器302。存储器303的一部分还可以包括非易失行随机存取存储器(NVRAM)。该装置的各个组件通过总线系统耦合在一起,其中总线系统304除包括数据总线之外,还包括电源总线、控制总线和状态信号总线。但是为了清楚说明起见,在图中将各种总线都标为总线系统304。
本申请实施例揭示的流程可以应用于处理器302中,或者由处理器302实现。在实现过程中,该装置实现的流程的各步骤可以通过处理器302中的硬件的集成逻辑电路或者软件形式的指令完成。处理器302可以是通用处理器、数字信号处理器、专用集成电路、现场可编程门阵列或者其他可编程逻辑器件、分立门或者晶体管逻辑器件、分立硬件组件,可以实现或者执行本申请实施例中的公开的各方法、步骤及逻辑框图。通用处理器可以是微处理器或者任何常规的处理器等。结合本申请实施例所公开的方法的步骤可以直接体现为硬件处理器执行完成,或者用处理器中的硬件及软件模块组合执行完成。软件模块可以位于随机存储器,闪存、只读存储器,可编程只读存储器或者电可擦写可编程存储器、寄存器等本领域成熟的存储介质中。该存储介质位于存储器303,处理器302读取存储器303中的信息,结合其硬件完成本发明实施例指示流程的步骤。
收发器301,用于接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,所述多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,所述信号态脉冲中的光子数与所述诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,所述多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息;
处理器302,用于计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值;
处理器302还用于若所述比例估计值小于预设阈值,则根据所述比例估计值对所述密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得所述第一站点和所述第二站点的共享密钥。
可选的,所述处理器302还用于若所述比例估计值大于所述预设阈值,则丢弃所述多个脉冲中的光子携带的所述密钥信息。
具体可选的,处理器302计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值具体包括:
计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益;所述第一探测增益为所述第一站点和所述第二站点均在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量与所述光子源发送的信号态脉冲的总数量之间的比值;
计算所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的第二探测增益;所述第二探测增益为所述第一站点和所述第二站点均在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量与所述光子源发送的诱骗态脉冲的总数量之间的比值;
根据所述第一探测增益、所述第二探测增益、所述信号态脉冲中产生多个光子对的概率以及所述诱骗态脉冲中产生多个光子对的概率,计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值。
所述处理器302还用于采用正交基矢对接收的所述多个脉冲进行测量,以确定所述第一站点在接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第一脉冲标识;
所述处理器302还用于获取所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识;
所述处理器302还用于确定所述多个脉冲中属于信号态脉冲的标识和属于诱骗态脉冲的标识;
所述处理器302计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益具体包
括:
根据所述第一脉冲标识、所述第二脉冲标识以及所述多个脉冲中属于信号态脉冲的标识,确定所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量;
根据所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量和所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的脉冲数量,计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益;
所述处理器302计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第二探测增益具体包括:
根据所述第一脉冲标识、所述第二脉冲标识以及所述多个脉冲中属于诱骗态脉冲的标识,确定所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量;
根据所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量和所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的脉冲数量,计算所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的第二探测增益。
可选的,所述处理器302获取所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识具体包括:
监听所述第二站点通过经典信道通知的所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识;
收发器301还用于通过所述经典信道向所述第二站点通知所述第一脉冲标识。
上述信号态脉冲为所述光子源采用第一泵浦强度对非线性材料进行脉冲泵浦产生,上述诱骗态脉冲为所述光子源采用第二泵浦强度对非线性材料进行脉冲泵浦产生。
本发明实施例中,第一站点接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,该多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,信号态脉冲中的光子数与诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,该多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息,该第一站点计算多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值,若该比例估计值小于预设阈值,则该第一站点根据比例估计值对
密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得第一站点和第二站点的共享密钥,这种方式可以估算出纠缠态量子密钥分发中光子受到PNS攻击的程度,从而对密钥信息进行纠错,提高密钥分发的安全性。
可以理解的是,上述信息处理装置中各个组件的具体实现方式可以进一步参考方法实施例中的相关描述。
本领域普通技术人员可以理解实现上述实施例方法中的全部或部分流程,是可以通过计算机程序来指令相关的硬件来完成,所述的程序可存储于一计算机可读取存储介质中,该程序在执行时,可包括如上述各方法的实施例的流程。其中,所述的存储介质可为磁碟、光盘、只读存储记忆体(Read-Only Memory,ROM)或随机存储记忆体(Random Access Memory,RAM)等。
本发明实施例方法中的步骤可以根据实际需要进行顺序调整、合并和删减。
本发明实施例信息处理装置中的单元可以根据实际需要进行合并、划分和删减。
本发明实施例的微控制器等部件,可以以通用集成电路,如中央处理器(Central Processing Unit,CPU),或以专用集成电路(Application Specific Integrated Circuit,ASIC)来实现。
以上所揭露的仅为本发明具体实施例而已,当然不能以此来限定本发明之权利范围,因此依本发明权利要求所作的等同变化,仍属本发明所涵盖的范围。
Claims (12)
- 一种信息处理方法,应用于第一站点与第二站点的纠缠态量子密钥分发通信中,其特征在于,包括:第一站点接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,所述多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,所述信号态脉冲中的光子数与所述诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,所述多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息;所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值;若所述比例估计值小于预设阈值,则所述第一站点根据所述比例估计值对所述密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得所述第一站点和所述第二站点的共享密钥。
- 如权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述方法还包括:若所述比例估计值大于所述预设阈值,则所述第一站点丢弃所述多个脉冲中的光子携带的所述密钥信息。
- 如权利要求1所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值,包括:所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益;所述第一探测增益为所述第一站点和所述第二站点均在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量与所述光子源发送的信号态脉冲的总数量之间的比值;所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的第二探测增益;所述第二探测增益为所述第一站点和所述第二站点均在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量与所述光子源发送的诱骗态脉冲的总数量之间的比值;所述第一站点根据所述第一探测增益、所述第二探测增益、所述信号态脉冲中产生多个光子对的概率以及所述诱骗态脉冲中产生多个光子对的概率,计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值。
- 如权利要求3所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中的第一探测增益之前,还包括:所述第一站点采用正交基矢对接收的所述多个脉冲进行测量,以确定所述第一站点在接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第一脉冲标识;所述第一站点获取所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识;所述第一站点确定所述多个脉冲中属于信号态脉冲的标识和属于诱骗态脉冲的标识;所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益,包括:所述第一站点根据所述第一脉冲标识、所述第二脉冲标识以及所述多个脉冲中属于信号态脉冲的标识,确定所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量;所述第一站点根据所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量和所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的脉冲数量,计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益;所述第一站点计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第二探测增益,包括:所述第一站点根据所述第一脉冲标识、所述第二脉冲标识以及所述多个脉冲中属于诱骗态脉冲的标识,确定所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量;所述第一站点根据所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量和所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的脉冲数量,计算所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的第二探测增益。
- 如权利要求4所述的方法,其特征在于,所述第一站点获取所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识,包括:所述第一站点监听所述第二站点通过经典信道通知的所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识;所述方法还包括:所述第一站点通过所述经典信道向所述第二站点通知所述第一脉冲标识。
- 如权利要求1-5任意一项所述的方法,其特征在于,所述信号态脉冲为所述光子源采用第一泵浦强度对非线性材料进行脉冲泵浦产生,所述诱骗态脉冲为所述光子源采用第二泵浦强度对非线性材料进行脉冲泵浦产生。
- 一种信息处理装置,应用于第一站点,所述第一站点与第二站点进行纠缠态量子密钥分发通信,其特征在于,包括:接收单元,用于接收光子源发送的多个脉冲,所述多个脉冲包含信号态脉冲和诱骗态脉冲,所述信号态脉冲中的光子数与所述诱骗态脉冲中的光子数概率分布不同,所述多个脉冲中的光子携带密钥信息;计算单元,用于计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值;处理单元,用于若所述比例估计值小于预设阈值,则根据所述比例估计值对所述密钥信息进行纠错处理,获得所述第一站点和所述第二站点的共享密钥。
- 如权利要求7所述的装置,其特征在于,所述处理单元还用于若所述比例估计值大于所述预设阈值,则丢弃所述多个脉冲中的光子携带的所述密钥信息。
- 如权利要求7所述的装置,其特征在于,所述计算单元计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值具体包括:计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益;所述第一探测增益为所述第一站点和所述第二站点均在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量与所述光子源发送的信号态脉冲的总数量之间的比值;计算所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的第二探测增益;所述第二探测增益为所述第一站点和所述第二站点均在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量与 所述光子源发送的诱骗态脉冲的总数量之间的比值;根据所述第一探测增益、所述第二探测增益、所述信号态脉冲中产生多个光子对的概率以及所述诱骗态脉冲中产生多个光子对的概率,计算所述多个脉冲中受到光子数PNS攻击的包含多光子的脉冲的数量占所述多个脉冲的总数量的比例估计值。
- 如权利要求9所述的装置,其特征在于,所述装置还包括:测量单元,用于采用正交基矢对接收的所述多个脉冲进行测量,以确定所述第一站点在接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第一脉冲标识;获取单元,用于获取所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识;确定单元,用于确定所述多个脉冲中属于信号态脉冲的标识和属于诱骗态脉冲的标识;所述计算单元计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益具体包括:根据所述第一脉冲标识、所述第二脉冲标识以及所述多个脉冲中属于信号态脉冲的标识,确定所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量;根据所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同信号态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量和所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的脉冲数量,计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第一探测增益;所述计算单元计算所述多个脉冲中信号态脉冲的第二探测增益具体包括:根据所述第一脉冲标识、所述第二脉冲标识以及所述多个脉冲中属于诱骗态脉冲的标识,确定所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量;根据所述第一站点和所述第二站点在相同诱骗态脉冲中探测到光子的脉冲数量和所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的脉冲数量,计算所述多个脉冲中诱骗态脉冲的第二探测增益。
- 如权利要求10所述的装置,其特征在于,所述获取单元获取所述第 二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识具体包括:监听所述第二站点通过经典信道通知的所述第二站点接收的所述多个脉冲中测得光子的第二脉冲标识;所述装置还包括:通知单元,用于通过所述经典信道向所述第二站点通知所述第一脉冲标识。
- 如权利要求7-11任意一项所述的装置,其特征在于,所述信号态脉冲为所述光子源采用第一泵浦强度对非线性材料进行脉冲泵浦产生,所述诱骗态脉冲为所述光子源采用第二泵浦强度对非线性材料进行脉冲泵浦产生。
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